


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CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,

C. F. CLAY, MANAGER.

London: FETTER LANE, E.C.

Glasgow: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.



Leipzig: F. A. BROCKHAUS.

Bombay and Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD

THE
CAMBRIDGE
MODERN HISTORY

PLANNED BY
THE LATE LORD ACTON LL.D.
REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY

34682 .

EDITED BY

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VOLUME III
THE WARS OF RELIGION

~~71~~
~~24-3-43~~
~~940.2-940.21.02~~
CAMBRIDGE ~~WKP~~

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1907

First Edition, 1905
Reprinted 1907

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
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PREFACE.

THE present volume, as its title imports, relates a complicated series of conflicts of which the origin or the pretext has for the most part to be sought in the great religious schism with which the preceding volume was concerned. But the cause of the restoration of Catholic unity in the West was, in the minds of both the supporters and the opponents of that cause, inextricably interwoven with the purposes of dynastic ambition, and powerfully affected by influences traceable to the rapid advance of the monarchical principle and to the gradual growth of the conception of the modern national State. Although in graver peril than ever before from the persistent advance of the Ottoman Power, Europe no longer finds a real unifying force in either Papacy or Empire. The spiritual ardour of the Catholic Reaction, which might have served to strengthen the resistance to the general enemy of Christendom, is expended largely on internecine conflicts. It allies itself with the settled resolution of Philip of Spain to control the destinies of Western Europe; and thus there is not a phase of the religious and political struggle here described which remains unconnected with the rest. The Religious Wars of France, with an account of which this volume opens, furnish the most complete instance of the constant intersection of native and foreign influences; but it is illustrated by almost every portion of the narrative. Since, therefore, the story of no European country or group of countries in this troubled period admits of being told as detached from the contemporary history of its neighbours, allies, or adversaries, the same series of events must necessarily appear more than once in these pages as forming an organic part of the history of several countries, but treated in each case from a distinct point of view.

Within the division of Modern History treated in this volume falls the adoption by the majority of European governments of the New

Style introduced into the Calendar by Pope Gregory XIII. Events which happened in the history of any country after the adoption by it of the New Style are dated in that Style accordingly. For the convenience of readers a table showing the several dates of the adoption of the New Style by the chief European governments is printed at the close of this volume.

Among the chapters included in it we are fortunately able to print two, contributed by two eminent historians, whose loss we, in common with all British historical students, deeply deplore. The chapter by the late Mr T. G. Law had the benefit of his own revision; such was not the case with the contribution of the late Professor S. R. Gardiner, one of the earliest received in the course of our undertaking.

It is the intention of the Syndics of the University Press, after the issue of Vol. XII of this *History*, to supplement its narrative by the publication of a volume of Maps, and by that of another volume containing Genealogies and other auxiliary information, with a General Index to the entire work.

A. W. W.

G. W. P.

S. L.

CAMBRIDGE,

November, 1904.

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CHAPTER I.

THE WARS OF RELIGION IN FRANCE.

SMALL as was the measure of toleration accorded to the Protestants by the Edict of January, it was too large for the zealots of the opposite party. Throughout the winter attacks upon Huguenot congregations had been taking place all over the country; but the chief impression was made by an incident which occurred on Sunday, March 1, 1562. The Duke of Guise, who was staying at his house of Joinville (in the modern Department of the Haute-Marne), went that day to dine at the little town of Vassy, attended after the fashion of the times by a large band of armed retainers. At Vassy they found a Huguenot service going on, and some of the Duke's followers attempting to push their way into the barn where it was being held were met with shouts of "Papists! idolaters!" Stones began to fly; and the Duke was himself struck. His enraged attendants fired upon the crowd, with the result that out of six or seven hundred worshippers sixty were killed and many wounded.

The exasperation of the Protestants throughout France was great, nor was it abated by the line of apology which the opposite party adopted. Comparisons of the Duke to Moses and Jehu were not soothing to people who had been attacked when only exercising their legal right. Another slaughter of Huguenots at Sens, where the Cardinal of Guise was Archbishop, added fuel to the fire, and by April war was seen to be inevitable.

The first object of either party was to secure the presence of the King in its midst. Catharine, who wished to maintain her neutral position as long as possible, had withdrawn with him to Fontainebleau, after sending orders, which were not obeyed, to the Duke of Guise not to bring an armed force to Paris. He had entered the capital on March 20, and Condé, at the Queen-Mother's desire, had immediately left it; retiring first to Meaux, then to La Ferté-sous-Jouarre. Then the King of Navarre, at the bidding of the Triumvirate, by whom he was now entirely ruled, had induced Catharine, partly by persuasion, partly by menaces, to consent to her own and the King's return to Paris; a decision which, it is said, cost tears both to the child and to his mother.

Condé and Admiral de Coligny, on learning by a message from the Queen-Mother herself that they had been forestalled, made the best of their way to Orleans, which city d'Andelot, the second of the Châtillon brothers, was already trying to enter. The reinforcement which they brought at once terminated the half-hearted resistance of the town; and Orleans passed into the hands of the Huguenots without the usual preliminary sack. The first overt act of war had thus been committed by the weaker side; and the last voice of wisdom was silenced. The Chancellor L'Hôpital, who till now had with the assent of the Queen-Mother been making a final effort for conciliation, was met with insult and excluded from the Council, which was packed with creatures of the House of Guise. Orders were sent to the regular troops to be in readiness by May 15; the Huguenots replied by seizing the larger towns on the Rhone, the Saone, the Loire, and the lower Seine, with others in the south and centre. Negotiations did not on that account altogether cease; Condé offering more than once to withdraw to his own house, if the chiefs of the opposite party would do the like. To this, however, they would only consent on condition that the Edict of January was revoked—in other words, if the Protestants would surrender at discretion.

Early in June an interview took place between Condé and the Queen-Mother at Talsy, near Orleans. The Prince held to his conditions, which Catharine made another effort to induce the Guises to accept, but in vain; though the King of Navarre, if he had had any real power, would have been ready enough to close with them. The month was spent in parleying, while "two armies were helping the inhabitants of the district to get in their crops." Finally, the King of Navarre met Condé at Beaugency, where the Prince offered to place himself in the King's hands if his terms were accepted, as a hostage for their loyal observance by his party. The Queen-Mother at once declared it impossible for two religions to exist side by side in France. The Catholics were clearly the stronger party: the Edict of January must go. Condé then made a last offer. If the Edict were allowed to stand, he and the other leaders, as soon as the Guises had left the Court, would quit France altogether and remain abroad until they should be recalled. Somewhat to their surprise, Catharine closed with this proposal. The Catholic chiefs, with the exception of the King of Navarre, were ordered to leave the camp, handing over their forces to him; while Condé was called upon to fulfil his part of the contract. He went so far as to meet Catharine again at Talsy: but some intercepted letters, whether genuine or forged, fell into Huguenot hands, in which the King of Navarre was directed by the Lorraine party to seize his brother's person. Hereupon the Admiral and the other Huguenot chiefs intervened, and practically bore their leader back to their camp (June 27).

The war now began in earnest. The *Parlement* of Paris declared the Huguenots rebels, and a few executions followed. The Huguenots,

finding themselves outmatched, resolved on seeking foreign aid. Like their rivals, they had already applied for help from the German Princes, who, whatever their creed, were usually ready to furnish *reiters* and *landsknechts* if they got their price; in the present instance the Rhinegrave John Philip, who commanded the Germans on the Catholic side, was a Protestant, as were most of his men. The levy of *reiters* was almost a matter of course wherever warlike operations were on foot; but the Huguenots took a step which even in those days was felt by many to be hazardous. They invited the Queen of England to land a force on French soil. The matter was negotiated in London by the Vidame de Chartres, a political adventurer who played a considerable part in the intrigues of the next twenty years; the Queen was to give a large subsidy in money on condition that in the event of the Huguenots proving victorious, Calais should be restored. Meanwhile the town and port of Havre-de-Grâce (which the English called Newhaven) were to be occupied by an English garrison. Accordingly Sir Adrian Poynings landed on October 4 with some 3000 men, 2000 of whom were immediately thrown into Rouen to reinforce the weak garrison; Ormesby with 600 occupied Dieppe a few days later; and on the 29th the Earl of Warwick, in whose hands was placed the chief command of the expedition, brought over the remainder of the force, which now amounted to about 6000.

The English intervention had little result. The Royalist commanders strained every nerve to get possession of Rouen before d'Andelot, who with a strong force of hired troops was on his way from Germany, could arrive. Montgomery, who was in command, refused all terms; and on October 26, three days before the landing of the Earl of Warwick, Guise delivered his final assault, and after a short resistance the garrison were overpowered. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Royalist commanders the usual sack followed, Catholics and Protestants being impartially pillaged and slaughtered. Montgomery escaped by boat, but three or four of the leaders were hanged. On November 17 the King of Navarre succumbed to a wound, received in the trenches, leaving, as head of the House of Bourbon and not very remote in the succession to the throne, his son, a boy of nine, brought up in the Protestant religion by a severely Protestant mother.

A desultory warfare was meanwhile going on in the south-east. At Orange the Catholics massacred the Huguenots; and the reprisals exacted by the Baron des Adrets fixed an indelible stain on his name. Chalon and Mâcon were retaken, but Lyons remained in the Huguenots' hands. Joyeuse, the King's lieutenant-general in Languedoc, laid siege to Montpellier, but a reverse sustained by the Catholics near Nîmes compelled him to withdraw. In spite of their enormous inferiority in numbers the Protestants were enabled by the ability of their leaders and

the greater efficiency of what may be called their secret service almost to hold their own.

Early in November, d'Anselot, having managed to elude the vigilance of the Duke of Nevers and Marshal Saint-André, who were looking out for him in Champagne, brought his Germans, 9000 in number, safely to Montargis, where he was joined by his brother the Admiral and Condé. Leaving d'Anselot in command at Orleans, the others made a bold dash for Paris, hoping to seize the capital by a *coup-de-main* before the bulk of the Royalist army could get back from Normandy. They reached Arcueil without opposition on November 23; but found Guise and Saint-André already there, and the city prepared for defence. An assault was repulsed; but when Condé challenged the King's forces to a pitched battle, the Queen-Mother, partly no doubt in order to give time for the arrival of reinforcements from the South, made overtures for peace. The Constable, the Duke of Montmorency, actually went into the Huguenot camp as a hostage while the Admiral was in Paris, and the negotiations continued for some days. No result was reached; and on December 10 Condé withdrew his forces in the direction of Chartres. The royal army followed, marching on a nearly parallel line to Étampes, thus threatening Orleans. The Huguenot chiefs were a little perplexed, and various moves were suggested. Condé, with whom valour was apt to be the better part of discretion, was for doubling back with all speed to Paris and seizing it before the other side could come up. The more wary Admiral pointed out that, even if they got into Paris, with the King's army between them and Orleans, not only would that city be easily retaken, but they would be cut off from their main source of provisions. The *reiters*, too, as usual wanted their pay; and the money was in English hands at Havre. A march into Normandy would enable them to join hands with the English; and, since the enemy would be compelled to follow, Orleans would no longer be in danger. This counsel prevailed, and the Huguenots, who for three days had been making futile attempts to take the little town of Saint-Arnoul, proceeded in the direction of Dreux, a fortified town close to the frontier of Normandy, of which a detachment from their army had been sent to make sure. This operation, however, did not succeed, and only dislocated the formation of their forces.

The Huguenots reached the river Eure first and crossed it (as it would seem) on the morning of December 19, the Admiral's division leading. The Catholics arrived later in the day, and, remaining unobserved in consequence of the bad scouting of Condé's division, succeeded during the night in crossing about two miles higher up and placing themselves by a flank march between their opponents and the town of Dreux. This movement brought Saint-André, who commanded the advance-guard (the Duke of Guise choosing to serve that day as a simple captain) on the left wing of the royal army, opposite to Condé and somewhat outflanking him;

while the Constable was opposed to his nephew the Admiral. Finding their road blocked, the Huguenots, though in considerably inferior force, were compelled to accept battle. "We must now look to our hands to save us, not to our feet," observed the Admiral. The battle was hard fought, the lowest estimate of the slain being about 6000. On each side the left wing broke and routed the enemy's right, but on the whole the victory was with the Royalists, who remained in possession of the ground. Their losses, however, were severe. The aged Constable, fighting after his wont like a private soldier, was wounded and taken prisoner, and carried straight to Orleans. Marshal Saint-André and the Duke of Nevers were killed; also the Constable's youngest son, Gabriel de Montberon. The Huguenots also lost their chief, Condé having been compelled to surrender to the Duke of Aumale, who commanded the brigade of lancers jointly with the Constable's second son, Henry de Damville. The command of the two forces thus devolved on Guise and on the Admiral, who brought off his men in good order to Beaugency.

Throughout January, 1563, Guise was engaged with preparations for the siege of Orleans. On February 5 he encamped before the town on its northern side. The Admiral who had thrown himself into the town, saw the imprudence of locking up his whole army in one place, and soon left the defence of it to d'Andelot, making his way into Normandy. He did not succeed in getting into touch with the English, already closely invested by the Rhinegrave, though Throgmorton contrived to reach him with a supply of English money. Indeed, his operations were confined to the left side of the Seine; but he took Caen and some smaller towns.

On February 18 an event happened which changed the whole position of affairs. The Duke of Guise, after effecting a lodgment in one of the suburbs of Orleans and planting guns on some islands, had made his arrangements for a night-attack, and was riding to his quarters, when he was shot in the back by Jean Poltrot de Méré, a kinsman of La Renaudie the conspirator of Amboise, and a fanatical Huguenot, who had attached himself to the royal army for the easier execution of his purpose. Both the Admiral and the theologian Beza were accused of having prompted the crime; but beyond Poltrot's own statement under torture no evidence of their complicity was ever produced. Of the Triumvirate two were now dead, the third was a prisoner; while the Huguenots also had temporarily lost one of their chiefs. The Cardinal of Lorraine was at Trent; the Admiral, who might perhaps have been glad to push the advantage his party seemed for the moment to hold, was ten days' march away. The opportunity was excellent for conciliation. The Queen-Mother, the Constable, Condé and d'Andelot met in Orleans, and by March 7 had agreed on terms, which were published in the form of an Edict on the 18th, at Amboise, where the Court then was. They were somewhat less favourable to the Huguenots than those of January, 1562,

but their recognition of the "Reformed Religion" met with a good deal of opposition from some of the provincial *Parlements*; those of Paris, Toulouse, and Aix requiring some modification. The Admiral, too, who did not reach Orleans till the 23rd, was not entirely pleased to find that peace had been made in his absence.

The Queen-Mother's next move was to consolidate the peace between the two parties by uniting them in a common task. English troops were still established on French soil, and all Frenchmen must combine to dislodge them. Marshal de Brissac was sent into Normandy at once; the Court following shortly after, with the Constable, his sons Marshal Montmorency and Damville, Condé, and other captains. The Admiral was thought better away. Warwick had taken steps to strengthen his position; but his army was being rapidly thinned by disease. Nor was it possible any longer to maintain the pretext that it had been sent solely to aid in delivering the King from coercion by a faction. The French nobles, most of whom had friends among Warwick's officers, had no desire to exact hard terms of capitulation. On July 28 Warwick, who was that day wounded, agreed to surrender; and on the 31st the French were put into possession of the town. The capitulation had hardly been signed when an English fleet with reinforcements came in sight; but the only work it found was to carry home the remains of the garrison. The relations between France and England remained for some time rather strained; but a settlement was reached in a peace made at Troyes on the 13th of the following April. It was contended on the French side that Elizabeth's action in occupying Havre had cancelled the clause in the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis which entitled her to claim 500,000 crowns if Calais were not restored within eight years. She finally agreed to abandon the claim and release the four gentlemen detained as sureties for the sum. As a token of amity Lord Hunsdon was sent to invest the French King with the Garter.

By the death of the King of Navarre, the Prince of Condé had become the senior "Prince of the Blood." As such he had claimed to succeed his brother as lieutenant-general of the realm—an inconvenient claim, which Catharine and L'Hôpital evaded by having the King, though he had not completed his fourteenth year, declared of age and competent to rule. This was done by an Assembly held at Rouen on September 15, 1563. Peace was outwardly established, but the roots of strife were not cut off. Early in 1564 the Cardinal of Lorraine returned from Trent, where the Council had closed in December, 1563. On the 13th of the previous October Paul IV had, at the instigation of the King of Spain, cited the widowed Queen of Navarre to appear and answer to a charge of heresy; and in default had declared her excommunicated, her fiefs forfeited, and her children illegitimate. The Cardinal came back with feelings of bitter resentment against the Châtillons, whom he persisted in regarding as accessories to his brother's murder.

Moreover, the general effect of the Council was to strengthen the hands of those who were determined to root out Protestantism, and who looked upon the King of Spain as in some sense their temporal head.

It was thought desirable that Charles should make personal acquaintance with his subjects throughout the realm; and in the early spring of 1564 the Court set out on a prolonged tour of France. The route was laid out so that, without rousing suspicion, conferences might be held with representatives of the Pope, the Duke of Savoy, and the King of Spain, the chief movers in the design of a Catholic League. Troyes was reached by the second week in April, and there the peace with England was concluded. At Nancy it is said that the scheme of the Catholic League was first laid before the young King. At present, however, he and his advisers were not prepared to listen to proposals emanating from Rome; for the Trent decrees had given great offence in France, and had been censured by the *Paris Parlement*. The King therefore drily replied that the Edict of Orleans was recent, and that he was not yet prepared to quash it. On May 26 he was at Dijon with his mother on their way to Lyons. As the entrance to that part of France where Protestantism was most vigorous, Lyons needed careful treatment. A new governor was appointed, and a large fort was founded in the angle between the Saône and the Rhone. At Roussillon on the Rhone an Edict of partial toleration was issued, calling upon each side to respect the religion of the other; and an interview took place with the Duke of Savoy, at which the subject may have been differently dealt with. At any rate—whether an actual inspection of the relative strength of the two parties had shown the Queen-Mother that “the repose of the realm” could be as easily attained by extirpating the Protestants, whether the Nancy reply was intended from the first as a blind, or whether it was felt that conformity with the Pope’s wishes in one point might diminish his insistence as to the Trent decrees—it seems that in conference with the papal officials at Avignon the suppression of Calvinism was spoken of as a practical question.

The Court passed the winter in the south. In the spring progress was resumed through Languedoc, and Bayonne was reached in the beginning of June. The Queen of Spain, with the Duke of Alva in her suite, came to meet her mother and brother. Several weeks were spent in gaieties, with intervals of more serious business. No authentic record has been preserved of what took place, but Protestants both in France and elsewhere believed that the policy was then concerted which bore fruit in the “Blood Council” of the Netherlands and the St Bartholomew massacres.

It is about this time that a third party begins to emerge; that of the so-called “*Politiques*.” The term, originally, as it would seem, implying that those denoted by it acted from motives of policy rather than of principle, came to define the group which, while remaining

within the Catholic religion and, when called upon, bearing arms on the side of the King, were opposed to all coercion in matters of religion. The greatest and most enlightened exponent of this view was, no doubt, the Chancellor L'Hôpital. "Let us get rid," he had said to the Estates assembled at Orleans in December, 1560, "of these devilish words, these names of party, of faction, of sedition—Lutheran, Huguenot, Papist—let us keep unadulterated the name of Christian." And again: "A man does not cease to be a citizen for being excommunicated." Various motives doubtless actuated the various members of the group. Some felt keenly the state of impotence to which France had been reduced by these internal dissensions. "With the men whom we have lost in these wars," said one a few years later, "we could have driven the Spaniards out of the Low Countries." Another important section, of whom the great House of Montmorency may be taken as the type, were strongly moved by jealousy of the half-foreign Guises, and of the wholly foreign gang of Italians, from the Queen-Mother downwards, who held positions of power and influence at the Court. In the case of the Constable, strict orthodoxy and dread of innovation outweighed all other considerations, and, though not on good terms with the Guises, he never broke with them; but his eldest son, Marshal Montmorency, whom in 1563 Sir Thomas Smith, the English Envoy, described as "a Huguenot, or little it lacks," though he never, like his cousins the Châtillons, actually joined the Reformed religion, was as tolerant as the Chancellor himself. In the period subsequent to the Massacre, when the Queen-Mother for a time threw in her lot with the Guises, he was imprisoned and his life was more than once in danger.

The King and his mother returned to the capital towards the end of 1565. Early in the following year a great Assembly was held at Moulins-sur-Allier, which was attended by most of the chief nobles, and by representatives of the provincial *Parlements*. Ordinances of lasting importance for the legal administration of France were drawn up by the Chancellor and passed by the Assembly. Reconciliations also took place between the widowed Duchess of Guise and Coligny, and between the Cardinal of Lorraine and Montmorency, who had forcibly opposed his entry into Paris; but they were felt to be merely formal, nor did the young Duke of Guise or his uncle, the Duke of Aumale, take part in them. Catharine was probably sincere in wishing to avoid war at this time by any means; but events were too strong for her.

The Huguenots had been uneasy since the Bayonne Conference, believing that it indicated a desire on the part of the King of Spain to associate the French Court with his crusade against Protestantism. His own affairs in the Netherlands were rapidly coming to a crisis. In October, 1565, he had definitely refused any religious toleration. Throughout 1566 the Low Countries were seething; and early in 1567 Alva was commissioned to raise an army in Lombardy and Piedmont for the

restoration of order. The Admiral and Condé worked on the young King's suspicions so far as to persuade him to levy a force of Swiss under Colonel Pfyffer in order to watch Alva's march through Franche-Comté and Lorraine. Alva, however, turned neither to the right nor to the left, "having his work cut out for him in the Netherlands"; and the Huguenot leaders began to see that the King's Swiss might have other employment found for them in quarters where the voice of discontented Protestants was no less audible than in Flanders. As at the beginning of the last war, their first idea was to get possession of the King's person. The Court, which had been for a few days at Monceaux, near Paris, moved on September 26 to Meaux, where it was thought the King might be seized unawares during the festivities of the Order of St Michael. On the 28th the Huguenot army under Condé, the Admiral, and d'Anselot, reached Lagny on the Marne, but some gentlemen of the Court succeeded in destroying the only bridge. Before they could cross the river the Swiss had been summoned, and the Huguenots could only watch the phalanx march past them, with the Constable at its head, escorting the King safely into Paris. They then took up a position in and about Saint-Denis, ravaging the country. As before, they secured Orleans, which was seized by La Noue with fifteen horsemen, and several towns in the South fell into their hands. The "Enterprise of Meaux," as it was called, left a deep impression of resentment in the young King's mind.

Partly, however, in order to gain time for reinforcements to arrive, the King and his mother were willing to hear such representations as the Huguenots had to make, and several interviews took place between their leaders and those of the other party; but with little result. The force in Paris was considerably straitened by the enemy's command of the approaches, especially of the river, the Admiral having, by a bold stroke, seized Charenton. A messenger had been dispatched at the outset to Flanders for succour; but Alva, who probably had no wish to see France quieted too soon, declined to send Spanish troops, offering only *landsknechts* and local cavalry. Finally, some 1700 horse of good quality under Count Arenberg, reached Poissy on the 9th. Their approach was, however, known, and d'Anselot was detached, with Montgomery, to hold them. The Constable, judging the moment suitable for an attack on the main body, offered battle next day, the 10th. Condé met him in the plain between Aubervilliers and Saint-Ouin. The action was mainly one of cavalry, hard fought but indecisive. The Huguenots were driven back into Saint-Denis, but were able to come out next day and defy the royal forces, who had no inclination to renew the fight. The chief result was the loss of the Constable; who, fighting in spite of his seventy-five years like an ordinary trooper, was mortally wounded. His office was not filled up; but the King's brother, Henry Duke of Anjou, a lad of sixteen, was presently appointed lieutenant-general of the kingdom.

The Huguenot army now abandoned its hold on the rivers and moved eastward to meet a force of German mercenaries under the Count Palatine John Casimir. An attempt to bring them to battle near Châlons failed, owing, as some thought, to the reluctance of the *politique* Marshal Cossé to push them too hard. The junction with John Casimir was effected on January 11 near Pont-à-Mousson. Encouraged by this reinforcement, the Huguenot leaders rejected a proposal for peace on the lines of the Orleans pacification, influenced mainly by their followers' distrust of the Guises. Their forces entered Burgundy, and the royal army marched to Troyes; both making for Paris, but the Huguenots keeping in view the necessity of relieving Orleans. Meanwhile, Rochelle had opened its gates to the Huguenots, giving them a port, the possibility of a fleet, and a door of communication with their friends in England. The possession of this town, which became the citadel of the Religion, was most important.

In the course of February Condé succeeded in raising the siege of Orleans, and the Huguenot army, resolved to force the fighting which the other side seemed inclined to protract, proceeded to invest Chartres. The King had already sent to the Ernestine Duke John William of Saxony for *reiters*; and the Duke, who, as a rigid Lutheran, was quite ready to fight his Calvinistic brother-in-law, John Casimir, himself led 5000 horse as far as Rethel in Champagne. Before he arrived there, however, negotiations had begun; and, much to his annoyance, he was told that his services were not required. In fact, the presence of so many foreigners on French soil had alarmed both sides; the war was assuming a savage character, particularly in the south; the Huguenots were willing to accept the very favourable terms offered them, containing nearly all they asked; and peace was concluded at Longjumeau on March 23. The Duke of Saxony agreed to withdraw; but John Casimir at first declined; nor was it till the King undertook to guarantee the pay due to him and his men, that he consented to go.

The Peace of Longjumeau was in the main a confirmation of the edict of March, 1562. No one was really satisfied with it; Alva was both surprised and displeased; and it was generally felt to be no more than a truce. Fresh causes of quarrel arose at once. The King tried to extract from the Huguenot leaders the repayment of the money advanced by him to Casimir, forbidding them at the same time to levy it from their party; no one but himself, he said, should tax his people. Rochelle refused to admit a royal garrison, but fortified itself, and began to raise a fleet. The summer was passed in mutual recriminations; and finally, towards the end of August, a plan was formed of seizing Condé, and if possible, the Admiral also, at Noyers in Burgundy. They got wind of the scheme, it was said, through a hint dropped by Marshal Tavannes, and fled, with only a small escort, through the hill and forest country between the Loire and the Saône. Crossing the former at Roanne, they

struck westward through the mountains of Auvergne, and safely reached Rochelle. There they were shortly joined by the Queen of Navarre with her son, a lad of fifteen, and by d'Andelot, La Noue, and the other Protestant chiefs, except the Cardinal de Châtillon, who escaped to England, there to spend the short remainder of his life as an honoured guest.

The Third War had now begun. This time the Catholics were the attacking party, and hostilities were clearly to be carried on with far more determination than hitherto. An inner council or Cabinet—the term seems to have been then used for the first time—had been formed. The Chancellor L'Hôpital had been included in this; but on the outbreak of war he was dismissed from all his offices and banished from the Court; so the most powerful voice on the side of toleration was silenced. His place as Chancellor was taken by Morvilliers, Bishop of Orleans, a creature of the Guises and a bitter enemy of the Protestants; and the edicts of toleration were revoked.

Anjou, who was in supreme command of the royal army, did not leave Paris until the beginning of November. About the same time the Duke of Montpensier, at Messignac in Périgord, met a Huguenot contingent coming from Languedoc, and defeated them with heavy loss, including that of their commander Mouvans; but he was unable to prevent the junction of the greater part with the Admiral and Condé, or to hold the ground himself. On the arrival of Anjou the two armies manœuvred for some time in close vicinity to one another, but neither side would risk a pitched battle. Finally the weather became very severe, with much sickness in both armies, and both sides went into winter-quarters; the Catholics at Chinon, the Huguenots at Niort, where they received munitions (for which they had to pay) from the Queen of England. During the winter they raided Périgord and Saintonge. At the beginning of March the Catholic army moved south. After securing their right flank by the capture of Ruffec and Molle, and crossing the Charente at some point between the former place and Angoulême, they followed its left bank as far as Châteauneuf, which surrendered at once. The bridge, however, was broken, and the time occupied in its repair was devoted to a reconnaissance, extending as far as Cognac, where the enemy was reported to be in strength. The Huguenot army was presently seen marching in the direction of Jarnac, separated by the river from the Catholics. Their van, under the Admiral, was already at Bassac, higher up the stream. Anjou returned to Châteauneuf, and remained there the next day. By midnight of March 12 the restoration of the bridge was completed and a bridge of boats also thrown across; and before sunrise on Sunday, the 13th, Tavannes and Biron, who were the real commanders, had brought their army to the other side. They found the enemy in position, and having driven in the outposts came in sight of the left wing in the direction of Jarnac. The Admiral, who was in command, was not anxious to fight until Condé could arrive from

Jarnac; but the impetuous charge of the Duke of Montpensier left him no time to retire, and in spite of desperate efforts on his own part and that of d'Anelot, La Noue and others in command under him, he was forced back. Condé presently came up, with the bulk of the Huguenot cavalry, and by a furious charge checked the Royalists for a moment; but was himself charged in flank by the *reiters* under Tavannes and Anjou. The Huguenots were routed; Condé continuing to fight till he was surrounded and borne down. He had hardly given his sword to his captor, d'Argens, when Montesquiou, captain of Anjou's guard, shot him dead. Among the prisoners were La Noue and Rosny, father of the future Duke of Sully. But, though defeated, the Huguenots were not discouraged. Their leaders soon reassembled at Cognac, where the Queen of Navarre joined them. Her son, the Duke of Vendôme, then about fifteen years old, was proclaimed head of the party, and the young Prince of Condé associated with him. The command-in-chief of the army was entrusted to the Admiral.

The King and his mother were at this time at Metz, whither they had gone partly for security and partly for greater facility of communication with Alva in the Netherlands and with Margrave Philibert of Baden, from both of whom reinforcements were expected. On the other side it was known that Duke Wolfgang of Zweibrücken (Deux-Ponts) was about to bring a powerful force of German troops to the aid of the Protestants; and it was all-important to prevent these, if possible, from crossing the Loire. The Dukes of Aumale and Nemours, who commanded in the east, though strengthened by the accession of nearly 5000 men duly sent by Alva, did nothing beyond feebly opposing the passage of the Armançon at Nuits by the German invaders. About May 10 the Germans reached La Charité, which was taken by assault after a short bombardment, thus securing their passage of the Loire. Thence after crossing the Vienne a little above Limoges, they effected a junction with the Admiral's forces at Saint-Yrieix on June 23. The Duke of Zweibrücken had, however, died a few days before; some thought from over-indulgence in the wines of southern France. He was succeeded in the command by Count Wolrad of Mansfeld. William of Orange, with his brothers Lewis and Henry of Nassau, was in the army. Anjou, who had been engaged in reducing some small places in Saintonge and Perigord, now brought his army to Limoges, where his mother joined him. He soon moved to La Rochelabeille, nearer to the Huguenot position, and a few indecisive skirmishes took place, chiefly notable as having afforded to the young Prince of Navarre his first experience of actual fighting. Before long, however, the wiser heads among the Catholics decided to leave the opposing forces to the disintegrating effects of a summer spent in a half-ravaged country, and withdrew their army to Touraine. The Protestant army, from which Montgomery had been detached for operations in Guienne and Gascony, followed into

Poitou, where they recovered most of the smaller places that had surrendered after Jarnac, raised the siege of Niort, and on July 24 appeared before Poitiers, into which Anjou had but just time to throw a reinforcement under the young Duke of Guise, who now also began his military career. From July 24 till September 8 the siege and the defence were conducted with an equal display of spirit on both sides. Finally, Anjou effected a diversion by threatening Châtellerault, and the siege of Poitiers was raised, after costing the Huguenots a loss of some 3000 men. On the whole, however, they had rather the best of the campaign of sieges which occupied the summer. Sansac failed to reduce La Charité, while on the other side Montgomery captured Orthez and gained some advantages in Guienne and Gascony. A decree of attainder published at this time against the Admiral and other Protestant chiefs only served to exasperate their followers.

The royal army in its retreat from Châtellerault was closely followed by the Admiral, who in vain sought to bring it to battle. After a day or two the respective forces drew off, Anjou going to Chinon, while the Admiral led his troops first to Faie-la-Vineuse, and then further to Moncontour. The Catholic army, numbering about 22,000, of whom just one-third were French, now thoroughly rested and reorganised, followed in about a week's time; and by October 1 the two forces were in position on either side of the little river Dive. Anjou's main object was to prevent the Huguenots from again moving south into Poitou, and effecting their junction with Montgomery. Moving to the left, he crossed the Dive near its source, and in the afternoon of October 3 found the opposing force drawn up in the level ground between it and the Thouet. Neither side had any advantage of position, and the battle resolved itself into a series of furious charges on the part of the royal troops, and of hand-to-hand encounters. The Admiral exchanged pistol-shots with the Rhinegrave, receiving a wound in the jaw, but mortally wounding his adversary. The Margrave of Baden also fell. Finally a charge of the Swiss upon the Huguenots' *landsknechts*, who were butchered almost to a man, decided the day. The *reiters* under Count Lewis of Nassau and Count Wolrad of Mansfeld drew off in good order, but 3000 French surrendered, and the artillery and baggage fell into the victors' hands. La Noue, with his usual ill-luck, was again taken prisoner, but was soon exchanged, and took the command at Rochelle.

Though Moncontour was the most crushing defeat the Huguenots had yet sustained, they were not prepared to surrender. In the course of November de Losses was sent to Rochelle to treat with the Queen of Navarre on the terms that full liberty of worship should be allowed to the Protestants, provided it were not exercised publicly. "If a peace be made on those terms," she replied, "the names of Jeanne and Henry will not be found attached to it." Nor, indeed, were their losses so heavy as might be inferred from the number of the slain. The French

and German cavalry had not suffered very severely; the south was still unshaken, perhaps indeed confirmed, in its loyalty to the cause by Montgomery's successful campaign. Moreover Marshal Damville, the second of the Montmorency brothers, who governed in Languedoc, had quarrelled with Monluc, and was not more friendly than the rest of his House to the Guises.

Thus, when the Admiral, a few days after the battle, rallied his party at Niort, he had little difficulty in persuading them, after leaving garrisons in Rochelle, Saint-Jean-d'Angely, and Angoulême, to abandon Poitou and the adjacent districts to the King's forces, and to march eastwards. Mouy was left with a small garrison in Niort, which held out for a short time against the Duke of Anjou; but on the treacherous murder of its commander by Maurevel, it opened its gates, and its example was followed by the other towns of Poitou and Saintonge, with the exception of those named above. Their loss was balanced by the capture of Nîmes, which took place about this time. Anjou next proceeded to besiege Saint-Jean-d'Angely, which after a gallant defence of forty-six days capitulated towards the end of the year. After this the Court retired to Angers, and the army was disbanded.

The desultory fighting which went on during the early part of 1570 was, on the whole, favourable to the Huguenots. La Noue, sallying out of Rochelle, recaptured several towns, including Niort and Saintes. Meanwhile the Admiral and the young Princes had, after a raid into Dauphiné, recrossed the Rhone, and were by the end of May at Saint-Étienne. Thither Marshal Biron and the Sieur de Malassise were sent to negotiate; but as the condition which prohibited public worship was still insisted on, no agreement was reached, and the Huguenot army, on June 25, reached Arnay-le-Duc in Burgundy, where they found Marshal Cossé (Anjou being absent through illness) waiting to offer battle. A smart though indecisive skirmish ensued; but after this both armies drew off, the Admiral to Autun, Cossé—alarmed for the safety of Paris, and, as a *politique*, unwilling to push matters to extremity—towards Sens. Negotiations were then resumed, and on August 8 peace was signed at Saint-Germain-en-Laye, on terms if anything more favourable than the Protestants had hitherto obtained.

It is possible that at the moment neither Charles IX nor his mother had any purpose in view beyond the restoration of peace to the country. There is no reason to suppose that either of them had any special antipathy to Protestantism. Religion was not a dominating influence with Catharine; while the two persons whom Charles probably loved best in the world, his foster-mother and his mistress, Marie Touchet, were Huguenots. Piety was not a marked characteristic of the French upper classes; nor, except possibly among a section of the clergy, was there any enthusiasm in the country at large for the See of Rome. On the other hand, in view of the growing danger of foreign intervention, it

was felt by the rulers of France that internal unity was the most urgent necessity of the State; and the King and the Queen-Mother seem at first to have had some hopes of securing this unity by negotiation. Accordingly an old scheme originally proposed by Henry II, and more recently revived by Catharine, was again brought to the front, of a marriage between Henry of Bourbon, son of the Queen of Navarre, and, after the House of Valois, the next in succession to the throne of France, and Margaret, the King's youngest sister. At the same time, Charles himself was betrothed to Elizabeth, daughter of the Emperor Maximilian II, who had hitherto been in no great favour at either Rome or Madrid, although in this same year another daughter of his was married to Philip II of Spain. The alliance between Bourbon and Valois, promoted mainly by the *Politiques*, was not at first welcomed by the Huguenot leaders, some of whom had a scheme of their own for marrying Henry to the Queen of England. This, again, crossed a plan which had been in Catharine's mind for the past two years, of securing the hand of Elizabeth for her second son Henry of Anjou; and, after some talk between the Huguenot agents and Francis Walsingham, the new English ambassador to the French Court, the matter was dropped. The negotiations for the Duke of Anjou's marriage, on the other hand, were vigorously pushed forward during the first half of 1571. They were opened by a despatch, dated January 2, from Sir Henry Norris, then ambassador in France, to the Queen, in which he mentioned that he had been sounded by Montmorency and others as to her matrimonial intentions. This revival of the scheme seems to have been due to the Vidame de Chartres as much as to anyone; for in the previous October he was urging Montmorency to forward the match, as offering an opportunity for the Gallican Church to throw off the yoke of Rome—a phrase of no small significance as a key to the action of the *Politiques*. The Pope on his side did what he could to hinder the match. Norris added that, being “resolved thereof,” Monsieur intended to be a suitor to the Queen. The proposal was favourably received, the chief difficulty being the question of religion, or rather the “exercise” of it when Monsieur should be established as King Consort. About Easter Walsingham hopefully quoted a conversation between the King and Teligny, “who with the rest of his profession wished the match to proceed.” The King thought that if he could only get the Duke away from “certain superstitious friars that seek to nourish this new holiness in him,” he could soon put that right. Two days later, after another conversation with the Duke, Teligny was able to assure the King that he found him “so far in” that he hoped he would make no difficulty at religion. “No,” said the King; “observe my brother well, and you shall see him every day less superstitious.” By the beginning of June things were so far advanced that de Foix was sent over to negotiate in conjunction with the resident ambassador, La Mothe-Fénelon. Articles

were drawn up; but in the end the religious difficulty proved insurmountable. Even the perusal of the Book of Common Prayer, duly translated into French, did not overcome the Duke's scruples; and, though towards the end of July he expressed his regrets to Walsingham, he did not give way.

Foix remained in England till September, when, failing the marriage, he suggested a treaty of defensive alliance between France and England. This was favourably received; and in December the accomplished Secretary, Sir Thomas Smith, went over to negotiate it. But he found the Guises making every effort to prevent an English alliance, and Scottish agents earnestly soliciting aid in the interest of their Queen. On the other hand Smith had a valuable ally in Coligny, who had been at length induced to come to Blois, and whose presence at Court was connected with another intrigue, destined to have serious consequences. Count Lewis of Nassau, who had served in the Huguenot ranks during the last war, had at the conclusion of peace remained at Rochelle, occupied in organising the privateers sent from the Low Countries to prey upon Spanish commerce in the Bay of Biscay, and to hinder communication by sea between Spain and their own ports. In the spring of 1571 there arrived at Rochelle a Genoese adventurer named Fregoso, in the service of the Grand Duke of Tuscany; by whom he alleged that he had been sent to the Elector Palatine, and then into France in order to secure eventual support against Spain. He came apparently as an avowed messenger from the Huguenot agents in Paris to the Admiral, and at the same time with some kind of business on the Queen-Mother's account—or so it was believed by suspicious Huguenots.

Fregoso had speech of Count Lewis, and returned to lay before the King and his mother certain proposals which rendered a personal interview with the Count desirable. The idea of an invasion of the Low Countries had for some time been growing in certain quarters. Even before the conclusion of peace, Alava, the Spanish ambassador, had warned Alva as to these rumours. On April 5 Walsingham wrote to Burghley referring in guarded terms, and unofficially, to the same subject, urging English cooperation, and pointing out its importance in connection with the scheme of marriage. The upshot was that on July 14 Count Lewis met the King at Lumigny in a house belonging to Madame de Mouy, widow of the Huguenot leader, and shortly to be married to La Noue, who was present himself, with Montmorency, his brother-in-law Teligny, and others of the anti-Spanish party. The Count's plan was to rid the Netherlands of Spanish rule in the following manner. Flanders and Artois, ancient fiefs of the French Crown, were to revert to it; Brabant, Guelders, and Luxemburg in like manner to be restored to the Empire; while England was to have Zealand. Other arrangements would presumably be made as to Holland and the smaller States. Strozzi was to occupy the King of Spain by a raid on his coasts.

Early in August Lewis saw Walsingham in Paris, reported the conference, and advocated the plan. The ambassador answered diplomatically, but wrote to Leicester in terms that showed his strong approval of both the scheme and its propounder.

On September 12 the last step, as it appeared, was taken towards the complete reconciliation between the King and his late rebels. The Admiral was at last persuaded by Marshal Cossé to come from Rochelle to the Court at Blois. Charles addressed him as "*Mon père*," and deferred to his judgment in everything, including the Netherlands enterprise. For the time the Guise influence seemed to be utterly annihilated; and the "amity" with England and the preparations for open hostility to Spain progressed steadily through the winter. In the course of the autumn Alava shook the dust of France off his feet and retired to Brussels; and the Spanish ambassador in England was desired to withdraw. At an interview in January, 1572, Smith and Walsingham spoke with much freedom to the King, pointing out that there was a Spanish party in England as well as in France. If they should take advantage of the delay to cause the treaty to be broken off, it might be hard to set it on foot again. "Break off," said he; "I had rather die. I will satisfy the Queen my good sister, though you be never so stiff."

Meanwhile the marriage negotiations were not forgotten. It was clear by the end of 1571 that Anjou must be given up; but Catharine was ready with a substitute in the person of his younger brother Alençon. In March we find her pressing for an answer as to whether the Queen could "fancy" him. The ambassadors also had an interview with the Queen of Navarre, who had followed Coligny to the Court, touching her son's marriage, and gave her as a kind of precedent a copy of the marriage-contract between Edward VI and the French princess who ultimately married Philip II. But again the difference of religion stood in the way.

Finally, in April a defensive alliance, which was as far as Elizabeth would go, was concluded between the two Crowns. Although it only pledged each party to come to the other's aid in the event of invasion, Charles felt sufficiently secure to allow the expedition to the Netherlands to go forward. About May 17, accordingly, Count Lewis left Paris, and on the 23rd was in possession of Mons. La Noue, following close in his wake, seized Valenciennes with a small force on the 29th. He was well received, but while he was engaged in reducing the citadel a message from the Count summoned him to Mons, and the Spaniards recaptured Valenciennes at once. Alva marched on Mons, and laid siege to it. Sieges in those days proceeded slowly, and Lewis had time to send for reinforcements. Unfortunately he selected for the purpose an incompetent officer, Jean de Hangest, Sieur de Genlis, whom Coligny had once had occasion to reprimand in the field.

On June 9 the Queen of Navarre, who had come to Paris in order

to make the final arrangements for her son's marriage, died of pleurisy after a short illness. A legend that she had been poisoned long formed one of the stock charges against the Queen-Mother. There is as little evidence for it as for most of the similar accusations brought in those days. Pius V had died about a month before. His successor Gregory XIII, though less rigidly severe, was not more favourable to the match.

During this same month Montmorency went to England to carry out the final formalities in regard to the treaty, the former envoy, Foix, accompanying him. He was received with extreme friendliness, and took the opportunity of urging Alençon's suit with the Queen. The Earl of Lincoln went from England on a similar errand; and with him Philip Sidney. Coligny succeeded in raising a force for the relief of Mons. Alva was however kept duly informed of his movements, whether by the members of the King's Council who disapproved of the enterprise, or, according to one report, by Anthony Standen, an English refugee, said to be the paramour of Barbara Blomberg, mother of Don John of Austria. In any case, Genlis was on July 17 surprised at Quiévrain, two leagues from Mons, by Alva's son, Don Frederick of Toledo, his force was cut to pieces, and himself wounded and captured. A hundred of his men succeeded in reaching Mons, which was closely invested. The reverse was a serious blow to Catharine's plan of operations, for she was not herself prepared for open war with Spain. It was said that compromising documents had been found on Genlis, proving the King's complicity in the raid. Catharine was however a woman of resource. The enterprise had been undertaken largely with a view, if one may so say, to keeping the Admiral quiet. This method had failed; it was time to try another. She was certain of an ally; for in spite of a formal reconciliation which had recently at the King's instance taken place between Coligny and the young Duke of Guise, the Duke and his mother at any rate had no idea of forgoing the vengeance to which they conceived themselves entitled. There is little reason to suppose that Catharine bore the Admiral any special resentment, or was jealous of his influence over her son; nor would she have let her personal likes and dislikes, if she had such, interfere with the aim of her policy, directed wholly, so far as one can perceive, to keeping France tranquil, and the House of Valois secure on its throne. At this moment there was every prospect that the dynasty would be continued to another generation.

The marriage of Henry, now by his mother's death, King of Navarre, to Margaret took place on August 18. The next few days were devoted to festivities. On Friday the 22nd, in the forenoon, the Admiral was, with a few friends, leaving the Louvre after an audience. As he walked along he read a letter. Before he reached his lodging, a shot was fired from a window of a house recognised as that of a retainer of the Guises. The ball carried away a finger of one hand

and broke the other arm. Before the house could be searched, the assassin was beyond the reach of pursuit. He was generally believed to be a bravo named Maurevel, the murderer of Mouy; an Italian named Tosingni was perhaps with him. The news reached the King as he was playing tennis. He swore roundly after his manner and started at once to visit the injured man, to whom he sent his own surgeon, the famous Ambrose Paré, himself a Huguenot. At the same time he promised a strict enquiry, and condign punishment of the culprit when caught.

Paris was full of Huguenot gentlemen who had come to celebrate the wedding. All that day and the next, consternation prevailed among them. Many meetings were held, but no definite plan of action was decided on. The Court was hardly less frightened. The deed had exasperated the Huguenots without depriving them of their head; all the fair words of the last two years had been thrown away, and the hostility of Spain and the Pope incurred for nothing. On the 23rd Catharine held a council, at which were present, so far as can be ascertained, her son Anjou, Marshal Tavannes, Nemours (Guise's stepfather), Nevers, Birago (now Chancellor), and Gondi, Count (afterwards Duke and Marshal) de Retz. It was afterwards noticed that out of the seven, four were Italians and one a Savoyard. Even Tavannes' family probably belonged to the Jura, which then was far from France.

The result of their deliberations was soon seen. In the early morning of the next day, August 24, the feast of St Bartholomew, the church bells rang. At the signal, armed bands, directed by the Guises, the Duke of Angoulême, bastard brother to the King, and other Catholic lords, left the Louvre and went into the streets of Paris. The municipal authorities had received warning of what was on foot; and the Paris mob, which needed as little encouragement to massacre Huguenots then as in later times it needed to murder priests, was ready to take its part. A party, led by the Duke of Guise in person, proceeded to the Admiral's house. A few armed men, headed by one Janovitch, a Bohemian (hence generally known as Besme), entered the room where the wounded man was lying, and after running him through with a pike, threw him out of the window into the courtyard where Guise was waiting. His body was brutally mutilated and treated with every indignity, being finally hung by the heels to the public gibbet at Montfaucon. During the remainder of that day and into the next the slaughter went on. The Huguenot nobles who were in the Louvre were brought into the court and killed. The King of Navarre and the Prince of Condé were spared, but presently compelled to profess themselves Catholics. Montgomery, the Vidame of Chartres, and other Huguenots, who were lodged on the south side of the river, got the alarm in time to fly. They were pursued by the Dukes of Guise and Aumale for nearly twenty miles, but effected their escape. It was doubtless owing to their being thus occupied that the Guises, as several historians of the Massacre

have noted, took little part in it after gratifying their vengeance against the Admiral. The total number of victims has been variously estimated. In any case it amounted to several thousands in Paris alone. Three Englishmen only are reported to have perished.

How far the Massacre was premeditated has been a subject of discussion ever since. The Spanish ambassador Cúñiga wrote that, except as concerned the Admiral, it was done on a sudden impulse. La Mothe-Fénelon was instructed to tell a similar story in England; and to Walsingham, Catharine insisted on the alleged Huguenot plots; to which the Privy Council reasonably replied that it would have been easy for the King to seize the persons suspected and have them regularly tried. Walsingham on his own account mentioned the fact that Montgomery, whom Catharine indicated as a chief object of suspicion, had been with him on the night following the attack on the Admiral, and had spoken gratefully of the King's expressed intention to enquire into and punish the crime. Protestants, not in France only, believed that the scheme had been forming in Catharine's mind since the conference at Bayonne in 1565. Cardinal Michael Bonetti, Pius V's nephew and confidant, had in the early part of the year been sent on a mission first into Spain and thence into France. He was at the Court for some weeks in February; and, though little is known of what then passed, it seems at least possible that some plan of the kind was discussed. The promptitude, again, with which many of the great towns followed the example of Paris points, in those days of slow communication, to a scheme of at any rate more than a few hours' conception.

The news was variously received throughout Europe. Gregory XIII is said to have expressed dismay, but a *Te Deum* was sung in Rome. Philip II laughed, for almost the only time on record. Alva observed that in Coligny "France had lost a great captain, and Spain a great foe." The Emperor disapproved without reserve, as did most of the Princes of the Empire; and the Duke of Anjou on his way to take the Crown of Poland in the following year, had to listen to some home-truths. In spite of the indignation that was felt by several of her ministers, and in England at large, Elizabeth was quite ready, after some decorous expressions of surprise and regret, to accept explanations, and allow the alliance to stand, and the marriage negotiations to go on.

Left without leaders—for besides those that had been slain, La Noue was shut up in Mons, and Montgomery had escaped to Jersey—the Huguenots throughout the country had to take what steps they could for local defence. Rochelle closed its gates first against Strozzi, then against Biron, sent as governor; Nîmes and Montauban resisted the entry of Joyeuse, left in charge during the absence in Paris of the governor, Marshal Damville; while Sancerre on the Loire served as a refuge to the Protestants of the centre; their usual stronghold, La Charité, having been promptly seized by order of the Duke of Nevers.

The operations for the reduction of these and the other towns held by the Protestants form the Fourth War. Of these Rochelle was by far the most important; and to its recovery the most energetic measures were addressed. At first Charles decided to try the effect of negotiation. He sent for La Noue, who since the capture of Mons in September had remained in Alva's camp, and induced him, somewhat against his will, to act as his envoy to the citizens. Biron, who had as yet done little beyond observing the town, in the hope that terms might be arrived at without the use of force, gave facilities for communication; and on November 19 some deputies from within met La Noue at a place outside the walls. The Rochellois were however in no mood for listening to any terms, and returned, remarking that they had supposed they were going to meet La Noue. The envoy, they admitted, was very like him, but they could not believe it was he. He then persuaded Biron to allow him to enter the town, in order to attempt a direct appeal. There, however, he had no more success, and finally was induced to take the command while continuing to negotiate with Biron, and to do all in his power to bring the citizens to a peaceful mind. In February the Duke of Anjou took command of the royal army, and the siege was more vigorously pressed. The Rochellois held out, vainly expecting succours from England, though Montgomery, with a fleet mainly equipped there, succeeded in landing stores. Unfortunately some jealousy (not unusual between Normans and Bretons) estranged him from La Noue, and the two chiefs did not cooperate. On the contrary, almost immediately after Montgomery's appearance, La Noue, finding that his mission as peace-maker only exposed him to insults, and on one occasion to blows, from some of the more hot-headed ministers, left the town and went into the camp of the besiegers, where he remained, taking no part in the operations. In June the election of Anjou to the vacant throne of Poland put an end to the siege and the war; and the Edict of Rochelle, issued in July, granted fair terms, though less generous than those of some past edicts, to the Huguenots.

Peace was not however to last long. One result of the Massacre had been to bring the *Politiques* more openly into line with the Huguenots. Different motives doubtless actuated the leaders; and it is difficult to suppose that the adhesion of the Duke of Alençon, who saw in his brother's absence his own opportunity, can have been due to any but the most purely selfish. But the main influence which consolidated the party and led them to seek common action with the Huguenots was unquestionably dislike of the methods adopted by the Queen-Mother and the "Italians," and a keen perception of the helpless state to which France was being reduced by the depopulation and impoverishment inseparable from protracted civil war. It is worth noting that not only the Chancellor L'Hôpital, "who had the *fleur de lys* in his heart," but (after the death of Tavannes on his way to Rochelle) all

the Marshals of France, Montmorency, Damville, and Cossé, were of this way of thinking. The alliance was looked on with suspicion by some of the stricter Huguenots, like Duplessis-Mornay, who "did not see what religion had to do with the Duke of Alençon's discontent"; but La Noue approved, and joined in inviting the Duke to put himself at the head of the combination. The two younger of the Montmorency brothers, Méru and Thoré, are said to have about this time become Protestants; and Thoré, who with Navarre, Condé, and the Vicomte de Turenne, a young Gascon noble, was in the camp before Rochelle, added his persuasions to those of La Noue.

At the conclusion of peace the Princes returned to Paris, where the preparations for Anjou's departure to his new kingdom were being made. In October the Court started. Charles, whose health was beginning to fail, did not go beyond Vitry, where a long stay was made—Henry, who was not ignorant of his younger brother's ambitions and had no desire to be out of the way when the French Crown should become vacant, delaying his journey until the King grew angry, and threatened to deport him forcibly. Hereupon Catharine and Henry started, taking with them Alençon, and leaving Navarre with the King. On the frontier of the Palatinate they were met by the Elector's youngest son, Christopher, and Count Lewis of Nassau. Catharine's mind was again turning in the direction of intervention, this time less ostentatious, in the Netherlands. She also wished to guard against the danger of another invasion of France by *reiters*, such as John Casimir would be only too ready to conduct. Carefully as Alençon was watched by his mother, he managed at parting to exchange a word or two with Lewis, when promises of mutual assistance passed. The Queen-Mother rejoined the King at Rheims, and on the road thence to Paris, Navarre and Alençon received a secret message from Lewis, urging them to escape and join him. The Queen of Navarre, getting wind of the plan, informed her mother; and the two Princes were more closely watched than ever. Charles, who had intended to summon a meeting of the Estates to Compiègne, abandoned his intention, and went to Saint-Germain.

Intrigues of every kind went on during the first weeks of 1574. Guise and Montmorency had met as friends; but Catharine contrived to set them at odds again by devising, perhaps in concert with the Cardinal of Lorraine, a story that Montmorency, one of the least rancorous of men, had directed a member of his household to assassinate Guise; upon which Montmorency retired to Chantilly. Alençon wanted the office of lieutenant-general, vacated by Anjou; which the King refused to give him. Meanwhile Thoré and Turenne, with the assent of La Noue, had been arranging for a general rising, to take place on Shrove-Tuesday, February 23. As part of the scheme, Alençon and Navarre were to be got away from the Court. Thus began the Fifth War.

The first part of the plan was punctually executed. Throwing out

his forces fanwise from Rochelle, La Noue seized Fontenay, Lusignan, Melle, Saint-Jean-d'Angely, and Rochefort. The south rose at the same time. If the Princes could be got away all would go well. The Count Palatine Christopher, with a strong force of Germans, was waiting near Sédan, while Guitry with several companies of Huguenots lay near Mantes, which was garrisoned by Montmorency's own company under de Buy, brother to Duplessis-Mornay. Guitry's over-haste spoilt the scheme. Instead of waiting till March 10, the day fixed by La Noue for the attempt, he showed himself in the neighbourhood of Saint-Germain as early as February 20, and persuaded Alençon to escape on the 28th. Mantes was to be secured as a place of temporary refuge for the fugitives. On the appointed day, Guitry appeared before Mantes with so small a force that Buy did not deem it prudent to admit him. Alençon did not start; Navarre, Condé, Thoré, and Turenne, who were waiting outside the castle, had nothing to do but to return. Meanwhile the Queen-Mother was in possession of the whole scheme, which had been revealed to Margaret by Alençon's favourite, La Molle, a worthless profligate, who was more than suspected of being her lover, and at her instance reported by him to her mother. Being questioned, Alençon admitted the whole and was pardoned. Henry himself did not deny the plot, but justified his own action. Thoré made his escape, and joined Condé in Germany. About March 8 Charles went to Vincennes. He still seems to have relied on conciliation.

The Queen-Mother lost no time in meeting this new storm. Within a few days three armies were in readiness. One, under the Duke of Montpensier, was to check La Noue in the West; another, under his eldest son, to pacify Dauphiné, always a dangerous quarter from its proximity to Savoy; while the third, under Matignon, was destined for Normandy, where Montgomery, who had landed on March 11, was overrunning the Côtentin. Languedoc was more perplexing. Damville, who governed there with almost viceregal authority, was inclined, like the rest of his House, to the *Politique* side; it was almost as dangerous to let him alone as to interfere with him. Meanwhile he was left to pacify his province as he best could. The war was most vigorously conducted in Normandy. On May 25, Montgomery, after a heroic defence against vastly superior numbers, was captured in Domfront. He surrendered under a promise of personal safety, but Catharine, vindictive for once in her life, insisted on his execution.

At Vincennes a fresh plot for the escape of the Princes was brewing. Many persons were involved in it, and all kinds of wild designs were imputed to them, though, as a matter of fact, its objects seem to have been much the same as those of the former one. This time the chief organiser was La Molle, in company with a Count Annibale Coconato, a Piedmontese adventurer of the worst type, who had for some time, it would seem, been acting as a Spanish spy about the French Court. The

execution of the plan was fixed for April 8, the Thursday before Easter. This time Catharine was kept well informed of the conspirators' proceedings throughout; and on the Thursday morning the gates of Vincennes were shut, and the guards doubled. By Friday evening those of the conspirators who were quick enough, among them Turenne, were in flight; the rest hid themselves in Paris, where they were before long unearthed. La Molle and Coconato were brought to trial, tortured, and on April 30 beheaded, in spite of the interest made on behalf of the former by persons of consequence in France and elsewhere, including the Queen of England, on whom he had made a favourable impression when in England on his master's affairs. Alençon and Navarre were also judicially examined. The whining deposition of the former endeavoured to throw the blame as much as possible on others. Henry replied to the questions in a vigorous memorandum, reciting the circumstances of his life, and justifying his action by the treatment that he had undergone. On May 4 Marshals Montmorency and Cossé were sent to the Bastille. Damville remained at large so long as it was not prudent to go to any greater length with his colleague and brother. Attempts had already been made to supersede him by his lieutenant Joyeuse; now, on the day of the Marshals' arrest, Sciarra Martinengo, an Italian soldier of fortune, was sent with all secrecy and dispatch to bring him alive or dead. Martinengo found him at Pécnas, a town devoted to him, and on being admitted to his presence was too much alarmed to do more than present a letter from the King, demanding an explanation of the omission to hand over certain troops to Joyeuse. This Damville was quite ready to give, and the messenger returned, to be followed in a day or two by an envoy from the Marshal, whom the news of his brother's arrest had now reached, demanding fair treatment for him and asserting the loyalty of himself and his family. His letter was received on May 29; on the following day, Whitsunday, Charles died.

The Queen-Mother, left in sole charge of the kingdom until Anjou, now become Henry III, could make his way back to France, wisely resolved not to force the pace. The capture of Montgomery, and the consequent cessation of active hostilities in Normandy, had eased the pressure considerably; and, though she would not forgo her vengeance against the slayer of her husband, she had as a rule no wish for severity. When Carentan, the last stronghold in the province, surrendered on June 26, and Guitry, who had been in command there, was brought to Paris, she dismissed him to his own house unpunished. An armistice was ordered for the months of July and August or as much longer as the King should decide. Strozzi and the Abbé Guadagni were sent to treat with La Noue, bearing the announcement of the truce, and an offer of 12,000 crowns a month, while it should last, for the payment of the garrison of Rochelle. At the same time she sent by another hand letters calculated to provoke distrust between the citizens and the nobles who

had cast in their lot with them. The Rochelois were also allowed to send deputies to the meeting which the Protestants of Languedoc and Dauphiné were holding at Millau.

To Damville Catharine was less conciliatory. Immediately after Charles' death she had sent again to him confirming the order for his arrest, of which he appears now to have heard for the first time, and ordering him to give up his government to the Admiral de Villars, and the command of his troops to the Prince Dauphin. For himself, he was advised to go to Savoy, and await the arrival of the King. His answer was to summon the Estates of Languedoc to Montpellier (Toulouse, the capital, being bitterly hostile to him), to extend the truce for his own government to the end of the year, and to receive a deputation from the assembly at Millau, where Condé had just been declared the head of the party. For the next three years or so Damville worked entirely with the Huguenots, though never like his two younger brothers quitting the Roman Church.

On receiving the news of his brother's death, Henry made all haste to leave Poland. Evading the Polish nobles by a nocturnal flight he rode hard with a few followers to the Silesian frontier. The route by which he had left France was now barred to him, with Condé and Méru active in western Germany and the Duke of Bouillon at Sedan in full sympathy with the Huguenots. Accordingly he passed through Vienna, Venice, and Ferrara to Turin, whither he summoned Damville to confer with him. Though their meeting was friendly, and the cause of the Protestants was pleaded by the King's aunt, the Duchess of Savoy, no important concessions could be obtained from him. On September 5 he entered his own kingdom at Pont-Beauvoisin, where he was met by Navarre and Alençon. The Queen-Mother had remained at Bourgoin, on the road from Lyons, and on the next day they all entered that city together. The Duke of Savoy had escorted Henry thus far, and before he returned had obtained the retrocession of Pignerol and other fortresses now in French keeping. On September 18 the Duchess died. On All Saints' Day the King, his brother, and Navarre received the Communion together at Lyons, proceeding afterwards to Avignon, where they took part in a procession of Flagellants. The Duchess of Savoy's death was soon followed by those of the Cardinal of Lorraine, and, on the opposite side, of the Duke of Bouillon.

In the west, after the cessation of the armistice, Montpensier captured Fontenay and Lusignan, and pressed Rochelle hard during the winter. But the chief centre of activity was in the south. On November 3 Damville issued a manifesto calling not only for religious toleration, but for a general administrative reform, coupled with the usual demand for the expulsion of foreigners (among whom the Guises were indicated) from office. For the settlement of religion a Council was to be called, while the States-General should be convened to deal with the political

issues. Shortly afterwards a man was arrested at Montpellier, who confessed under torture that he had been sent by Villequier, one of the King's Council, to poison Damville. About the same time he received from Henry through de Belloy a friendly letter, followed by the invitation to an interview, which he declined on the ground that Condé might think it suspicious. Henry then talked of putting himself at the head of an army, and joining hands with Joyeuse and Uzès to crush Damville; but nothing came of it, and on January 20, 1575, the King left Avignon and proceeded northwards. He was crowned at Rheims on February 13, and the next day married to Louise de Vaudémont, of the House of Lorraine, thus allying himself with the Guises. The marriage was not popular. As a matter of fact, however, the young Queen interfered very little in politics. In spite of Henry's gross profligacy, she was always faithful to him, and led a blameless and obscure existence throughout his reign.

That reign opened unpropitiously. Damville, left with none to oppose him save the Duke of Uzès, himself a Protestant, though a personal enemy of the Marshal, took towns almost as he pleased. The King's disposition seemed to be entirely changed. Instead of the reputed victor of Jarnac and Moncontour, the hardy campaigner, the ruthless accomplice in massacre, men saw an effeminate youth, devoted at best to religious exercises, leaving business mostly to his mother, and languidly submitting to the influence of a gang of worthless young courtiers. Yet, though enervated in mind and body by self-indulgence, he was not devoid of shrewdness. Throughout his reign, though perfectly aware of the aid which, at all events during the first years of it, Elizabeth was giving to his rebels, he maintained the alliance with England. One of his first acts was to take steps for the continuance of the "league" of 1572 with that country; and, in spite of some opposition on the English side due to the offence caused by the Massacre, it was duly ratified on April 30, 1575. At this very time Wilkes was on a mission to the Elector Palatine, with the view of suggesting to him the importance of assisting the Huguenots. If he would find the men, Elizabeth would guarantee 50,000 crowns towards the expenses. From certain expressions in Wilkes' instructions she seems to have hoped that such a show of force would bring the King to terms; in which case there need be no actual breach of her treaty. The Palatine replied that 50,000 crowns would not go far. He asked for 150,000; and undertook not to conclude peace till Calais should be restored to the Queen. She did not provide the whole sum asked for, but in the course of the summer a considerable force of *reiters* was levied, and entered France later in the year under Thoré and John Casimir.

In March arrived deputies from the various Huguenot centres with proposals for peace. The principal points required were, as usual, the observance of the Edict of January, with the addition—which henceforth

was to figure in all similar proposals—of the condemnation of the Massacre and the reversal of all sentences pronounced on the victims and their families. The King was inclined to reject the terms at once; but it was thought more expedient to try what could be done to destroy the cohesion of the insurgent provinces. Fair promises were separately made to Rochelle and La Noue, to Condé, and to those of the south, on the condition that they should abandon Damville, now the prime object of dislike to the Catholic party, and stronger than ever, owing to the assistance given him by Turenne, who was busy in Auvergne. The only result seemed to be to stiffen the deputies' demands. The King was to pay 200,000 crowns towards their expenses; the Marshals Montmorency and Cossé were to be released; the Queen of England, the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Savoy, and the Swiss were to be parties to the peace; the Italians, Retz and Birago, were to have no hand in the negotiations. This last clause was doubtless aimed specially at the Queen-Mother, who, as Dale reported, worked entirely with the Chancellor Birago. In the end the deputies departed unsatisfied, though the King was ready to yield on such points as the assembling of the States General. Warlike preparations were resumed; and meantime efforts were made, Dale thought by the Duke of Guise, to breed jealousy between Navarre and Alençon, now Duke of Anjou and "*Monsieur*," by means of the notorious Madame de Sauve, wife of one of the Secretaries of State, an early instance of that employment of affairs of gallantry as a political instrument which the Queen-Mother was presently to develop into a fine art. At the same time Guise, possibly foreseeing the result of a conflict between himself and the King, endeavoured to win over Navarre.

The English ambassador's reports during the summer describe a state of complete disorganisation throughout the country. Paris was full of brawls and murders; no money could be got for State purposes; desultory fighting went on in the provinces. The capture and execution of Montbrun in July did nothing to loosen the grip of the Huguenots on Dauphiné; La Noue failed in an attempt on Niort, but captured Benon, a stronghold commanding the route by which supplies reached Rochelle from Poitou, and extended a hand to Turenne; the whole of Périgord was reported to be in arms. The King began to suspect a fresh attempt of his brother to escape, this time with the connivance of their mother, who seems to have been pleading the cause of her youngest son. If the brothers were to become hopelessly estranged, the game would be wholly in the hands of the Guises; and this she was determined to prevent. Nor did she wish to see the dormant negotiations for his marriage with the Queen of England and with them the English alliance altogether fall through.

Matters were brought to a head by the escape of Monsieur on the night of September 15. Guitry and other gentlemen joined him; and by the time he reached Dreux he had a following of three- or four-hundred.

Consternation reigned in the Court; the Queen-Mother started to try persuasion; but before she reached Dreux the fugitive had issued a proclamation announcing the loyalty of his intentions and his desire for nothing but the reform of abuses, and was on his way to join La Noue and Turenne in the West. Immediately on the arrival of the news at Strassburg, Condé, though mistrustful of Anjou as an ally, ordered Thoré and Clervant to start at once with such force as he had. Guise, who was watching the passes of the Vosges, but owing to the disaffection of Champagne, with an inadequate force, fell back before him, keeping on the right flank of the invaders. On October 9 both armies were about sixty miles from Paris, Guise at Fismes, Thoré at la Fère-en-Tardenois. Thence Thoré turned south to cross the Seine, but by this time the King had succeeded in sending considerable reinforcements under Biron and Retz; and Guise with a force double that of the invaders drove them back to the Marne at Dormans. After a sharp fight, in which Guise himself received a severe wound in the face, of which he bore the scar to his dying day, the *reiters* were routed. Clervant was taken prisoner, but Thoré with some 1200 horsemen made his way to the Seine, which he crossed at Nogent, and after cutting up a force under Martinengo at Montargis joined Monsieur at Vatan, having effected his main object in drawing the royal force eastward.

Meanwhile the Queen-Mother, more vexed, as reported, than she had ever been in her life, continued her pursuit of her son; and on September 30, being at Chambord, he came to meet her in the neighbourhood of Blois. His conduct during this period was regarded as discreet, and Catharine was willing to agree to his terms. The first of these was the release of Montmorency; and on October 3 he and Cossé were allowed to go to their own houses on parole, which was presently exchanged for complete freedom. Their services were at once required to conduct the negotiations with Monsieur. Dale considered that the situation was not unlike that of the Wars of the *Bien public*, but with the difference that there was now no Louis XI alive. Monsieur continued his retreat to Châtillon-sur-Indre, whence he returned as far as Loches for another meeting with his mother. No conclusion was arrived at, and he went further into Poitou, while she repaired to a house of the Duke of Montpensier's at Champigny. On November 8 a truce, to last till about Christmas, was agreed to at Marigny. Certain towns were to be granted to Monsieur, and a large contribution was to be made towards the pay of Condé's *reiters*. Montpensier, Montmorency, and Cossé were appointed to execute the terms, which were ratified at Champigny on the 21st. Anjou at once notified the Queen of England, somewhat apologetically. At the same time he expressed to Walsingham a hope, which the King in a subsequent dispatch endorsed, for a successful issue to the marriage negotiation.

From truce to peace was however yet a long way. The Queen-

Mother might "labour for it tooth and nail," but Condé was no party to the arrangement, and had no confidence in the King's good faith. Nor was it easy to persuade the *reiters* to forgo the facilities for a profitable campaign offered by the defenceless state of France. The Huguenots thought that the presence of their chief with a powerful army would be a better guarantee than any number of towns in the hands of Monsieur. On the other hand, the Pope was not expected to approve; while the Guises and the Italians were against any sort of peace. Then the people of Paris, though desirous of peace, objected to being taxed for the benefit of the *reiters*; and some of the towns assigned to Monsieur demurred strongly to being thus disposed of. When the year ended no one had much hope.

About the beginning of January, 1576, Condé, Méru, and John Casimir entered France near Sédan. They marched rapidly through Champagne, Burgundy, and the Bourbonnais, Mayenne helplessly watching them; they reached Vichy about the beginning of February. The King and his mother, who returned to Paris on January 25, fortified the capital as best they could and sent to Germany for troops. Anjou, who was lying in the Limousin, began to move eastward on learning that Condé had reached the centre of France. On March 11 the two forces joined at Villefranche (Allier).

The beginning of February was marked by another incident, which, though it created some perturbation, did not at once affect the course of events. On February 3 the King of Navarre, under pretext of a sporting expedition, escaped from the Court with a few friends, and riding hard reached Alençon in time to attend the Protestant service on Sunday the 5th. A few days later, at Tours, he publicly abjured Catholicism. No attempt was made to bring him back; on the contrary, his sister was allowed to join him, with anyone else who cared to do so; and his personal property was sent after him. Contrary to the general expectation, and indeed to an intention expressed by himself, he did not join Condé and Anjou, but remained in Poitou. He sent, however, his own demands, to be forwarded with those of the confederates, including a request to the King to aid him in recovering from Spain the part of his kingdom annexed by Ferdinand the Catholic.

The armies, numbering some 30,000 men, lay at Moulins till the end of March. John Casimir, who never in his life trusted Frenchmen, least of all French Catholics, took up his quarters in a house at La Guerche, belonging to the Duke of Nevers, with his army between the Allier and the Loire, and set to work to throw a bridge over the river below that point. From Moulins a memorial in ninety-three articles was sent in which the demands of the Huguenots and their *Politique* allies were embodied. They comprised the usual requests for freedom of religion, subject however to the prohibition of any but the two at present professed: for indemnity on account of acts committed in the war; for

the addition to the *Parlements* of "*chambres mi-parties*," composed of Catholics and Protestants in equal numbers; and for the restoration of civil status and privileges. One clause is remarkable, and was probably due to Damville, who in a former memorial had complained of the lack of education in France. The King is requested "to appoint in every cathedral church the revenue of one prebend to provide a college for the teaching of children." This is marked "Cannot be granted."

The Queen of England was in communication with both John Casimir and Anjou, and in April sent over Randolph to watch the course of events, especially to find out whether the King had any designs on Holland and Zealand. Montmorency, much broken in health from his imprisonment, went to Moulins; and the Queen-Mother hovered between that place and Paris, finally establishing herself near Sens. The Huguenots continued to levy contributions on Berry and the Nivernais, and some of Condé's horsemen pushed nearly to Montereau. The King was ready enough to grant peace, which was delayed mainly by Casimir's suspicions. Finally, terms were agreed to on Easter Eve, April 21, and ratified by the Edict of Beaulieu on May 6. They were the best on the whole that the Protestants had hitherto obtained. The exercise of their religion was allowed everywhere, save within two leagues of Paris; in no case were private houses to be searched; *chambres mi-parties* were to be set up; amnesty was carried back as far as the negotiations for the surrender of Havre in 1562; eight towns of refuge were granted. Certain other concessions, sworn to by the King, were not included in the Edict; of these the most important were the grant of La Charité to Monsieur and that of Péronne to Condé. The peace was known as "the Peace of Monsieur." Casimir obtained promises of lands and a pension from the King, the town of Château-Thierry from Monsieur, various honours and dignities, and pay for his men. The summer was, however, far advanced before they were got out of France; and a longer time elapsed before they saw their pay.

It became at once apparent that the peace was not destined to last. The Guises refused from the first to be parties to it. The Edict was not published in any *Parlement* save that of Paris; and at Paris and elsewhere the clergy preached a "boycott" against the Huguenots. Persuasion and intimidation were alike resorted to. At Rouen the archbishop, Cardinal de Bourbon, with the most benevolent intentions, entered a Protestant place of worship, and mounting the pulpit began to address an exhortation to those present, only to see the congregation disperse in some panic. Guise hanged two Protestant captains serving under him. Near Bordeaux Protestants were massacred. Picardy entirely refused to receive Condé; and Humières, the Governor of Péronne, who had a private quarrel with the Montmorencys, founded a league of the province for his exclusion, which being adopted as a precedent by other provinces, rapidly developed into the formidable organisation

which kept civil war alive in France for twenty years. It was believed that the original outline of this league was due to the Cardinal of Lorraine, and dated from the termination of the Council of Trent; and that its full development was only delayed till the young Duke of Guise should be of age to take the control of it. Beginning with a statement that it was formed for the protection of Henry III and his successors, its articles established an *imperium in imperio*, claiming an allegiance more peremptory than that due to the King, and even threatening the lives and goods of recalcitrant members. These articles were secretly circulated and received many signatures, including in December that of the King himself. He was practically forced to adopt this course as the only means of taking the wind out of the sails of the Guises, in whose interest the League had almost avowedly been formed. Its formation was duly reported to and approved by the King of Spain and the Pope.

The States General had been convoked to Blois, and held their first meeting on December 6. The elections had been looked after by the Guises; and the deputies for the nobility and the third Estate were almost exclusively such as were opposed to the Edict. The *cahiers* or memorials sent up by the provincial Estates were without exception adverse to toleration. The fears of Du Plessis seemed likely to be better justified than the more sanguine anticipations of La Noue, who had spent the autumn in efforts to maintain the good understanding between the King, Monsieur, and the Huguenot chiefs. His head was still full of a scheme of intervention in the Netherlands; to which Monsieur, it was thought with the King's assent, was again turning his thoughts.

On Sunday, October 7, Dale had presented his successor, Sir Amyas Poulet, to the King and Queen-Mother. Both ambassadors received assurances that the ill-treatment of Protestants in Paris should be checked, accompanied by friendly phrases as to the "amity" between the countries. Yet the pendulum was undoubtedly beginning to swing towards Spain. In the latter part of October Don John of Austria, passing incognito through France to take up the government of the Netherlands, had seen the Queen-Mother at Chenonceau and Guise at Joinville. About the same time La Noue had found it expedient to quit the Court, his views in regard to the Low Countries having brought him into disfavour. Approach to Spain necessarily involved coolness towards England; and while in May, 1576, immediately after the peace, Dale had reported that "her Majesty's friends are much increased in countenance and force," just a year later Poulet writes, "England never had fewer friends at the French Court than at this present."

The Estates declared almost unanimously in favour of one religion only; and on January 1, 1577, the King announced in their assembly that the edict had been extorted from him by force, and that he did not intend to keep it. The Huguenots at once prepared for war, which indeed had been already begun with the capture by de Luynes of

Pont-Saint-Esprit on the Rhone, whence Thoré had to fly precipitately. Their position was far less favourable than it had been nine months before. Monsieur, whose fidelity to his late allies had long been suspected, had on January 30, in the assembly of nobles at Blois, in company with the Guises and Nevers (who had lately spoken of him as "hated by one side and not trusted by the other"), signed a formal promise to aid the King. He carried it out by laying siege to La Charité, which had refused to admit him. It capitulated in May; but a general slaughter followed. Thence Monsieur proceeded to Issoire, the capture of which was attended with even greater cruelty.

The chief operations of the Sixth War, however, took place in the west. The Duke of Mayenne was in command of the King's forces here, Guise being as usual sent to Champagne. Mayenne took Tonnay-Charente and Marans in May, and proceeded to lay siege to Brouage, a town commanding the entrance to the harbour of Rochelle, which La Noue had fortified and Condé garrisoned. The siege was not conducted with much energy, and it was not till August that the place surrendered on terms which in this instance were duly kept. Rochelle was at the same time rather loosely invested by a fleet under the younger Lansac, whose main exploit, performed after peace was concluded, was to capture some English merchantmen, no doubt bringing supplies to the town—an act construed in England as the sign of a hostile combination between France and Spain. In the south the Huguenots had lost their ally, Damville, who after at first proposing a scheme for calling in the Turk to make a diversion on the coast, subsequently quarrelled with the Protestants, and in May declared for the King. His brothers, Méru and Thoré, however, were staunch to the cause. Elizabeth, who all the summer was in constant communication with Casimir, was at last persuaded to send a sum of £20,000 to enable him to levy a fresh force for the aid of the Huguenots. In spite of Poulet's diplomatic evasions and denials, the Queen-Mother was aware of what was going on, and knew that Navarre had no funds to levy mercenaries for his own defence. To this more than to anything was due the prompt opening of negotiations after the capture of Brouage.

Navarre, whose heart was never in the war, had begun to treat in June, almost before Condé's envoys to the Queen of England and Casimir had even left Rochelle. The Treaty was concluded on September 17, 1577, at Bergerac, and soon afterwards made public by the Edict of Poitiers. The terms were slightly less favourable to the Huguenots than those of the previous year, but on the whole formed a satisfactory *modus vivendi*, which sufficed to preserve at least official peace, with one trifling interval, for the next eight years. The relations with England also improved. The Queen had indeed to arrest some French ships in English ports in order to secure the release of those taken by Lansac; but neither side had any desire, in spite of Poulet's inveterate suspicion

of French duplicity, for a serious rupture, which would only have played into the hands of Spain. Elizabeth and Catharine understood each other thoroughly, and the policy of both was directed to the same end—the securing of internal tranquillity, in order to allow their respective countries to recuperate and consolidate their forces. Neither was desirous of being too far outstripped by the other in the attainment of this result, and therefore each was not unwilling, when occasion served, to keep sedition alive among the subjects of the other. Each, too, had her moments of inclining to the advances of Spain; and each had her domestic zealots to hold in check—zealots equally capable, as the event showed, of carrying zeal to the point of rebellion and regicide. The shiftiness perceptible at times in their respective methods was no doubt largely due, in Elizabeth's case to dislike of abetting rebels, in that of Catharine, apart from her Italian blood and training, to her consciousness of the ease and secrecy with which, as a Continental Power, France could be attacked, and the consequent necessity for rapid decision in moments of sudden danger.

As usual, the Peace of Bergerac was followed by complaints that its terms were not being properly carried out, and by sporadic outbreaks of actual hostilities. To put a stop to these, in August, 1578, Catharine, accompanied by several of the principal Councillors, and by the Queen of Navarre, who had not seen her husband since his departure from the Court, started on a prolonged tour through the south. During the winter conferences were held at Nérac, at which the two parties met for the first time as almost equal Powers; and in February articles explaining and confirming the provisions of the last Edict were drawn up and agreed to by both sides. The Catholics were however far from being content. At a Council in January, 1580, we find the Catholic clergy, Cardinal Birago and the Bishops of Lyons and Valence, strongly in favour of renewing the war. The laymen were opposed; and when Malassise suggested that it might be necessary to provide funds from vacant benefices and tithes, the Bishop of Lyons indignantly denounced the proposal as "an heretical opinion." In spite of the lack of funds war broke out in the spring. It began with the seizure by Navarre of Cahors, a town which formed part of his wife's dowry, but which he had never been allowed to occupy. Its capture was a remarkable feat of arms, involving several days' street-fighting. Biron was sent into Guienne, but the King had no wish to crush Navarre and leave the Guises predominant. The remainder of the war in the south is a record of desultory skirmishing and attempts on insignificant fortresses. In the north the only operation of any importance was the siege of La Fère in Picardy. Condé, chafing at his continued exclusion from the government of his province, had taken possession of the town. He afterwards went to seek help in England; but Elizabeth had other plans in hand. The town stood a short and not very vigorous siege, finally capitulating

on easy terms ; and this series of conflicts, dignified by the name of the Seventh War, was terminated in November by the Peace of Fleix. Its terms differed in no material respect from those agreed to at Nérac.

So early as 1577 overtures from the Netherlands had been made to Anjou ; and in the summer of that year his sister the Queen of Navarre, under the pretext of a visit to Spa, had passed through Artois and Hainault, and had exercised her fascinations on some of the nobles of those provinces, with a view to securing their interest in his behalf. By the middle of 1578 his plans were generally known, and generally disapproved ; sincerely by the King of Spain and the Pope, ostensibly by the French King and his mother. In England a notion prevailed that the League had a hand in it ; and Edward Stafford was sent to France to dissuade the government from furthering the scheme ; shortly afterwards Cobham and Walsingham, who were about to go on an errand of mediation to the Low Countries, were instructed to do what they could to hinder the reception of Anjou. Before they started, however, this part of their instructions was cancelled. The Queen had another scheme in her head, which without directly thwarting Monsieur's plans would enable her in a great measure to regulate his movements. Stafford brought back a letter from the Queen-Mother, accepting in very cordial terms a suggestion that the suspended marriage negotiations should be renewed. Envoys from the suitor himself quickly followed ; he paid more than one visit in person to England, and in 1581 a commission composed of many of the most notable persons in France went over to arrange the terms. It is difficult to suppose that Elizabeth ever seriously intended to marry a dissolute and ill-conditioned youth who might, so far as age went, have been her son ; but she kept him dangling for many years, until his plans for sovereignty in the Low Countries were obviously doomed to failure, and all danger of the alternative marriage with an Infanta of Spain was at an end. His doings in the Low Countries hardly concern the progress of the religious conflict in France, except in so far as they served to draw off a large part of the fighting power of the Huguenots, and kept ill-feeling alive between France and Spain.

The political history of the years following the Peace of Fleix is of extreme complexity, but shows the growth of a pronounced hostility between France and Spain. Anjou's enterprise, and, in a less degree, the coquetting of the Queen-Mother with Don Antonio, the claimant for the throne of Portugal against Philip, had led to considerable animosity on the part of the latter towards the French Court. In February, 1582, we even find Cardinal Granvelle, who three months before had seemed in favour of the marriage of Anjou with the Infanta, hinting at the possibility of an alliance with England to chastise France. Overtures were more than once made to the King of Navarre ; and on one occasion at least reported by him to Catharine. He was himself by no means in entire harmony with the extreme section of his own party,

whose leader Condé was not satisfied with the terms agreed upon at Fleix, and refused to promulgate them in the Protestant towns of Languedoc. Turenne, however, succeeded in inducing Condé to meet Navarre, and made the proclamation in his absence. Condé appears at this time to have cherished some fancy of carving out a separate State for himself in the south-east of France—a scheme with which Navarre, who throughout never forgot that the Crown would in all human probability one day be his, was not likely to sympathise. Condé and his section, again, were inclined to turn for aid and alliance to John Casimir, between whom and Navarre no love was lost. On the other hand, Casimir had designs upon the bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, and was in frequent communication with the Duke of Lorraine and Guise. He was jealous, too, of Anjou's intervention in the Netherlands, where he himself had failed, and was on bad terms with the Prince of Orange. Navarre, in short, acted throughout, in spite of his apparent levity, as a statesman, Condé as a somewhat narrow partisan, John Casimir as an adventurer, though with a dash of principle, Guise as an unscrupulous player for his own hand.

Among the negotiations and combinations, actual or attempted, of these years of intrigue, there was one antagonism which nothing could reconcile. However the sides might at any moment be made up, Henry of Navarre and Henry of Guise were always opposed to one another. There was no personal antipathy between the two, such as seems to have existed between Guise and the King—indeed they had been friends in their younger days—nor was the antagonism based, it may safely be said, on any fervour of religious conviction on either side. Yet these two were instinctively felt to be the natural leaders of the contending causes; and neither, it was thought, deemed himself secure so long as the other lived. As soon as Anjou's death had simplified the issues, and the head of the Huguenot party had become the next in succession to the throne, the first object of the Leaguers was, as will be seen, to legalise their position by securing, not, indeed, after the fashion of the earlier Huguenots, the person, but at least the adhesion of the King; and to Guise was entrusted the management of the operation.

In November, 1582, we find Navarre reminding the King of his former offers to assist in annoying the King of Spain; curiously enough, at the very same moment Henry was being urged by the papal Nuncio not to forget his amity with that Power. Anjou's treacherous attempt, two months later, to seize and sack Antwerp, though baffled by the promptitude of the citizens, while it terminated his chances of success in those parts, still further embittered the relations between France and Spain; for, in spite of protestations, Philip was well enough aware of Henry's complicity in his brother's adventure. It was doubtless as a result of this fresh aggravation that the overtures already mentioned

were made to Navarre. Negotiations of a kind were, however, also going on with Anjou himself, who, soon after his repulse at Antwerp, had approached Parma with what is best described as an offer to be bought off; and communications passed between Anjou and the agents of Parma. In November a report was current in Paris that the Duke intended to sell Cambray, which he had occupied at the outset of his expedition, to Spain, which he himself denied. He had left the Low Countries for the last time in the previous month. In February he visited Paris, and was well received by his brother. Some envoys from the Low Countries accompanied him, and it was decided to renew the enterprise, this time with the King's definite adhesion; the reversion of the sovereignty over the provinces being secured to him, in the event of Anjou's dying without heirs. Anjou himself presently fell ill at Château-Thierry, whither he had retired, and died on June 10, 1584.

During this time the Guises and Navarre had been watching the course of affairs and endeavouring to adapt their policy to its various turns. When it became clear that Anjou would neither succeed in the Low Countries, nor marry the Queen of England, little time was lost in reviving the relations with natural allies which his enterprises had somewhat interrupted. In June, 1583, Ségur-Pardailhan was sent by Navarre on a mission, first to England, then to the Prince of Orange, and later to the German Princes. The Guises on their side, while actively intriguing with Spain, and forming plans for an invasion of England, were careful to keep in touch with the French Court. In the summer of 1583 we hear of an ingenious suggestion on the part of Guise and Mayenne that the former should take charge of an army, to be levied by the Queen-Mother, on the frontier of Flanders, while the latter should find the money for a fleet and effect a diversion by sea in favour of Don Antonio.

Catharine was, however, too doubtful as to the ultimate destination of these forces to accede to the proposal at that time. Guise remained about the Court, scheming in silence. "The Duke of Guise," wrote the English ambassador, "saith little, and then he commonly thinketh the most." He had secured the friendship of Joyeuse, the rival in the King's favour of Épernon. These two young noblemen, both of whom had recently received dukedoms, may be called the last, as they were the most able of the long succession of *mignons* who exercised so disastrous an influence over Henry III. Joyeuse was of the two most in favour with the Queen-Mother. It was thought (to quote the English ambassador again) that she and the Duke of Guise "would be glad to hoist the other out."

The condition of the country during these years offers a picture of demoralisation hardly to be matched in the records of any period. Peace nominally existed between the two factions, but acts of private war were continually taking place. Indeed for some time after the

Treaty of Fleix Mayenne was carrying on avowed hostilities in Dauphiné. The Catholics seized Périgueux in the summer of 1581; in 1583 there were risings in Languedoc. Duels and assassinations were matters of daily occurrence. The profligacy of the upper classes, as attested by unprejudiced witnesses, was appalling; nor was there much to choose in this respect between Catholics and Huguenots, though of the few serious-minded men who have left any record the majority are perhaps to be found among either the Protestants or the *Politiques*. Offices of every sort were freely bought and sold; indeed they were hardly to be obtained without payment, and justice suffered accordingly. The King, who, though himself one of the worst offenders, was in his better moments neither stupid nor callous, saw and deplored the disorder into which his realm had fallen, and made spasmodic efforts for reform. But the life he led was not of a kind to brace his will, while his own whims and the luxury of his favourites demanded never-ending supplies of money. The sale of offices went on, necessities of life were subject to heavy and arbitrary taxation, public debts were unpaid. Swiss envoys, sent to demand the pay long overdue to their countrymen who had served in the royal armies, were told that the King had no money, though a million had just been spent on the celebration of Joyeuse's marriage with a sister of the Queen.

Anjou's death, followed a few weeks later by the assassination of the Prince of Orange, cleared the situation materially. No life, except that of the childless Henry III, now stood between Navarre and the Crown of France. The death of William left him without question the most prominent champion of Protestantism on the Continent, while it removed the leading advocate of French intervention in the Netherlands. At the same time the conjunction of events forced Elizabeth's hand. The fiction of amity with her "good brother" the King of Spain was worn very thin; while with the life of her suitor her great asset in negotiating a French alliance had disappeared. She made one more effort, sending an embassy in February, 1585, to invest Henry III with the Garter, at the time when a deputation from the Netherlands was in Paris with a last appeal to him to assume the sovereignty. For a moment the King seemed inclined to respond favourably, and returned a spirited answer to Spanish threats. But the activity of the League left him no choice, and the offer was declined. Before the end of the year Leicester, with an English force, had landed in the Low Countries.

Before these events, however, a definite alliance had been formed between the chiefs of the League and the King of Spain. On January 2, 1585, a treaty had been signed at Joinville, by which the succession to the Crown was vested in the Cardinal of Bourbon, to the exclusion of Navarre and Condé, his elder brothers' sons; Philip promised a monthly subsidy of 50,000 crowns to the funds of the party; and neither ally was to treat independently with the King of France.

Thus the League assumed the position of a sovereign Power, while the opposing forces were once more clearly divided, and in alliance with Spain confronted the Huguenots, supported by such aid as England could overtly or covertly afford them. The struggle, though localised for the moment, really embraced a good deal more than French interests. As the King of Navarre's secretary wrote to Walsingham, "France is the stage on which is being played a strange tragedy in which all Christendom has a share. Many persons will come on, if not in the earlier acts, at any rate in the later."

One important question still remained unsolved: which side would the King of France himself take? Henry's personal and political preferences drew him, and in a less degree his mother (who seems to have had some scheme for the devolution of the Crown to the children of one of her daughters, either of Spain or of Lorraine), towards Navarre and the English alliance. Yet he was, after all, "the eldest son of the Church," and as such could hardly join openly with those whom the Church regarded as her deadly foes.

At this juncture an event took place which at first seemed likely to prove of considerable advantage to the League. In April, 1585, Gregory XIII died, and was succeeded by Cardinal di Montalto, who owed his promotion to Pius V. He took the name of Sixtus V. Gregory had resisted the pressure of the Leaguers to give a formal sanction to their proceedings, and would go no further than a vaguely expressed verbal approval. "Neither bull nor brief will the League get from me," he is reported to have said not long before his death, "until I can see further into its game." Sixtus was at first in doubt. Much as he disapproved of heresy, he was little better disposed towards rebellion; and, though he had no great esteem for Henry III, he, like most Italians, had no desire to see the power of Spain increased. Finally, however, he yielded so far to the persuasions of the Duke of Nevers, as to send a brief to the Cardinal of Bourbon. As yet he would not issue the desired bull, nor proceed to the excommunication and deposition of Navarre.

Henry III himself, throughout the latter part of 1584 and the beginning of the following year, was struggling as best he could against the toils that were closing round him. As soon as it became clear that his brother's life was drawing to a close, he had sent Épernon to Gascony to try if Navarre might by any means be induced to cut the ground from under the feet of the League by returning to the Church. There were divided counsels at the Béarnese Court; but in the end Mornay and the stricter party prevailed. Navarre offered the King all the aid in his power against the disturbers of the realm, but declined either to change his creed or to come to Court. He was under no illusion as to his own position, and was taking his own precautions.

Towards the end of March, 1585, the King published an edict forbidding all armed assemblies; which was in a few days followed by a

declaration dated from Péronne, in the name of the Cardinal of Bourbon. Beginning with complaints of the favour shown to the Huguenots, this document went on to recite the various grievances under which the country was suffering—sale of offices, excessive taxation, undue preference of favourites, and so forth—and to demand reforms. It concluded with an appeal to all persons for aid, calling on the towns to refuse to admit garrisons, and ending with a promise to abstain from hostilities save against “such as shall oppose us by force of arms.” Active measures followed immediately. Guise had already secured Châlons-sur-Marne, whither he presently brought the Cardinal; this place, commanding the routes by which German levies would naturally enter France, became practically the headquarters of the League till Paris fell into its hands. Attempts on Bordeaux and Marseilles failed; but Verdun, Dijon, Lyons, Bourges, Orleans, Angers formed a line of strongholds behind which the Huguenots were helpless; while even in the west and south, where their strength lay, they were of course in a minority. No time was lost by the League in getting to work. So early as April an English messenger reported that in the neighbourhood of Boulogne the Duke of Guise’s horsemen had laid wait for and slain a minister and others on their way to the *prêche*. In Paris emissaries of the League were busy among the lawyers and the municipal officials; the University of the Sorbonne was on their side, as well as most of the clergy of the city. The King found it necessary to give orders for the closer guarding of the gates, and to forbid the promiscuous sale of arms; about this time, too, he engaged his famous bodyguard of forty-five gentlemen, mostly from Gascony.

Henry’s courage was, however, nearly exhausted, nor could Elizabeth’s exhortations and warnings delay much longer his surrender. At the end of March the Queen-Mother undertook a journey into Champagne to see what terms could be arranged with the Guises; and from then till late in June Miron, the King’s physician, went to and fro between Épernay and Paris. So completely did the Leaguers feel themselves masters of the situation, that, even while negotiations were proceeding, Mayenne was sent to meet and stop, if necessary by force of arms, the Swiss levies expected by the King. An attempt to detach the Cardinal of Bourbon from the Guises precipitated matters; Catharine after many grumbles at the inconstancy and irresolution of “*ces messieurs*,” was finally intimidated by the manifest strength of the party; and on July 7 a treaty was concluded at Nemours, and signed a few days later at Saint-Maur by the King and the heads of the League. It embodied a complete capitulation on Henry’s part to all their demands, and bound him to abandon entirely the principle of toleration. The entire north-eastern half of France was placed in the power of the House of Guise, and large subsidies were promised to meet their expenses. It was currently said that, when the news of the treaty reached the King of Navarre, one-half of his moustache turned white.

On July 19 effect was given to the Treaty of Nemours by an edict, revoking all that had preceded, and reducing the Protestants to the position of a proscribed and outlawed sect. The King did not disguise the fact that he had yielded only to superior force. His hatred of the Guises was only stimulated by his enforced surrender. To the Cardinal of Bourbon he said, "I signed the former edicts against my conscience, but with a good will; this one is in conformity with my conscience, but against my will." He left the palace of the *Parlement* with a gloomy countenance, returning no man's salutation.

Even the most experienced of the King's councillors now inclined to war; but first one more appeal was made to Navarre. Three days after the publication of the edict, Bishop Lenoncourt and Secretary Brulart went on this rather hopeless errand. The King's idea, however, was to gain time by any means, in the hope that either the resources of the League might be exhausted, or that their high-handed proceedings might show the real value of their affectation of concern for the people's welfare. Navarre himself had recently issued a skilfully worded remonstrance, contrasting the conduct of the House of Bourbon with that of the half-foreign Lorrainers, reasserting his loyalty and his willingness to be instructed in religion, and ending characteristically enough with a personal challenge to Guise. On receiving news of the edict he issued a further protest, putting his case with irresistible force.

But the time for paper warfare or peaceful negotiation had gone by. An army under Mayenne, with Matignon as second in command, speedily set forth for Guyenne; Biron was to command in Saintonge, Joyeuse in Gascony, while Épernon received the government of Provence. In this way the King could to some extent control the operations of the League in the south. Languedoc was left in the hands of Montmorency, who was too strong to be meddled with; though some friendly letters addressed to him about this time by Sixtus seem to show that efforts were being made to win him over. Guise took charge of the east, Mercœur of Brittany and Poitou, Elbeuf of Normandy, Aumale of Picardy. The "War of the Three Henrys" had begun.

The news of the Treaty of Nemours decided the Pope to take a step to which in spite of Spanish urgency he had hitherto hesitated to commit himself. On September 9 a Bull was launched declaring Navarre and Condé incapable of succeeding to the Crown of France, depriving them of their estates, and absolving their vassals from allegiance. The effect of this manifesto was not wholly that intended. It was generally regarded as an unprecedented interference with French rights and customs; the *Parlement* refused to publish it, and addressed a protest on the subject to the King. Navarre himself appealed from it to the Peers of France, giving the lie direct to "Monsieur Sixtus, self-styled Pope, saving his Holiness," and hoping to visit on him and his successors the insult done to the King of France and all the *Parlements*

of the realm. It is said that he contrived to get this document posted up in Rome, and that Sixtus was more delighted than offended by its audacity. He was himself by no means convinced of the policy of the step taken by him under a miscalculation of the sincerity of the King's adhesion to the League. In the earlier half of August, Navarre, Condé and Montmorency had met at Saint-Paul, on the confines of Gascony and Languedoc, and concerted a plan of action. Condé went into Saintonge, and after a slight success over Mercœur at Fontenay, sat down to besiege Brouage, which was held by Saint-Luc. Unfortunately he allowed himself with a large part of his force to be drawn off to Angers, where the castle had been seized by a handful of Huguenots. Two days before he arrived, the place had been recaptured by part of Joyeuse's force; and Condé's army in presence of superior numbers had to disperse. He himself made his way to Avranches, and so to England; while Saint-Luc had little difficulty in beating off the reduced force before Brouage. Thus unfavourably did the war open for the Huguenots. In Dauphiné however Lesdiguières continued to hold his own; and Condé presently returned to Rochelle.

The winter of 1585-6 was occupied by Mayenne and Matignon with small captures. Navarre wisely confined himself to guerilla warfare, relieving places that were hard pressed, cutting off the enemy's stragglers, intercepting his supplies, and generally baffling the slow Mayenne by the rapidity of his movements. In the spring Biron arrived in Poitou with the intention of undertaking the siege of Marans, a place commanding the approaches to Rochelle on the north much as Brouage did on the south. Navarre at once hastened to Marans, and fortified it so effectually that when Biron appeared before it in June a short skirmish (in which he himself was wounded) showed him that the place could only be taken by regular siege. Meanwhile the negotiations of Ségur, who was now aided by Clervant, and backed by a promise of money from the Queen of England, had been so far successful that a powerful German force was set on foot.

At this juncture the Queen-Mother undertook the last, and not the least courageous, of her many journeys in the interests of peace. The King, still fretting under the yoke of the League, had invited Navarre to send some confidential person to the Court with whom he might discuss possible means of reconciliation. Rosny, afterwards known as the Duke of Sully, was chosen for this purpose. He had several interviews with the King and his mother, and found that the main obstacle was still religion. The envoy argued that by changing his creed Navarre would bring only himself to the King's side, whereas, if this point could be waived, the whole forces of the Huguenots would be at the King's disposal, and with such levies as he could make in the Catholic States of Germany and Switzerland, would be amply sufficient to suppress the League. An influential deputation of German Princes and nobles,

who arrived at Paris in the course of the summer, were prepared to add their persuasions. In October, 1586, Mayenne returned to Paris, "having done more for the King of Navarre's reputation than for his own," and in no friendly frame of mind towards the King. Finally an armistice was arranged in Saintonge; and in December Catharine and Navarre met at Saint-Bris near Cognac. She consented to a divorce between him and her daughter, who had now entirely deserted her husband, and was carrying on some kind of hostilities on her own account; and she suggested a marriage with her grand-daughter Christine of Lorraine. Navarre was to be officially recognised as successor to the Crown, and other friendly offers were made. Nevers and Turenne also took an active part in the debate. But, as before, Henry would not agree to the one indispensable condition. A suggested compromise, of a truce for one year, during which the exercise of the Reformed religion was to cease, was not more acceptable. Disquieting reports of the state of affairs at Paris began to arrive, and Catharine set her face homewards, holding however further conferences with Turenne at Fontenay and Niort, whence the news of the Scottish Queen's execution recalled her to Paris.

Rumour had not exaggerated the threatening position of affairs in the capital. A revolutionary government had been secretly formed, called "the Sixteen," as representing the sixteen Sections of Paris. The leaders at first were mostly lawyers; Étienne de Neuilly, President of the *Cour des Aides*, who had attained that office by arranging for the murder of his predecessor on St Bartholomew's Day; his son-in-law, Michel Marteau de la Chapelle, a Master in the *Chambre des Comptes*; Jean (known as Bussi) le Clerc, a proctor in the *Parlement*; and Charles Hotman, collector to the Archbishop of Paris, brother to a more famous man, the eminent Protestant publicist. This body was in constant communication with the Spanish ambassador Mendoza, and took its orders from the Duke of Guise. One of their schemes was the seizure of Boulogne, with a view to facilitating the operations of the fleet which the King of Spain was fitting out for the invasion of England. This would have the further advantage of affording an easier entrance for a Spanish army into France than was offered by the route through Guyenne. Plans were also formed for the seizure of the King's person. Fortunately there was a traitor in their camp, in the person of one Nicholas Poulain, a superior police official, whom they proposed to use as an instrument of their schemes. This man, while ostensibly acceding to their requirements, contrived to keep the Chancellor Chiverny and the King regularly informed of all that went on; and the plots were for the present frustrated. The advance of the German army held Guise occupied in Champagne; and the King himself presently marched with a force under his own command to take part in repelling them.

Marans fell in February, 1587; but Navarre lost no time in providing for the safety of the Huguenots' vital point in the west. Pushing boldly

out into Poitou, in May he captured Talmont, Fontenay, Saint-Maixent, and Chizé. The news of the Germans' advance summoned him eastward, but before he had had time to do more than collect his army, Joyeuse, who had so far only retaken some small places in Poitou, and had retired to Saumur, advanced again with more determination. Navarre attempted to put himself behind the fortified line of the Dordogne, but was overtaken and forced to fight on October 20 at Coutras in the south of Saintonge, where his superior generalship in the face of an army twice as large as his own secured for the Huguenots their first victory in a pitched battle. The action lasted little more than an hour, but it resulted in the complete defeat of the royal army, Joyeuse himself being among the slain.

One week later the Germans under the command of Fabian von Dohna, who, having been headed off from the Loire by the King's army, had made their way as far as Vimory near Montargis, were badly shaken by a spirited night attack delivered by the Duke of Guise. They pushed on, however, as far as Auneau near Chartres, where Guise again fell upon them and routed them utterly; though the French contingent, under Châtillon, Coligny's eldest son, fought its way back to Languedoc.

The King returned to Paris for Christmas, 1587; while Guise, having pursued the remains of the German army as far as Montbéliard, retired to Nancy. Here future plans were discussed; the immediate upshot being that in February, 1588, the heads of the League, emboldened by Guise's recent exploits, presented a memorial to the King, insolently demanding that he should purge his Court and Council of all persons obnoxious to themselves, publish the decrees of Trent, and confiscate the estates of all Huguenots. Henry, as usual, temporised; but events were moving rapidly in Paris. The Sixteen were entirely under Guise's orders, given through his agent Mayneville. Nothing except Poulain's timely informations frustrated the continual plots against the King's life or liberty. Épernon, who had succeeded Joyeuse in the government of Normandy, secured most of that province, with the goodwill of the Huguenots. Less success attended Secretary Villeroy's half-hearted attempts to detach Orleans and its governor Entragues from the League. The King summoned 4000 Swiss first to Lagny, then into the suburbs of the capital; and the Parisians in alarm sent to the Duke of Guise, imploring his presence. At Soissons he was met by Bellièvre, bearing the King's command not to enter the city—a command which Guise, it was believed with the connivance of the Queen-Mother, chose to disregard. On May 9 he entered Paris amid the applause of the citizens, and proceeded to her house. She at once sent word to the King, who was much agitated, but rejected the proposal of some of those present that the Duke should be put to death on his entry into the Louvre. Presently, Guise himself arrived, accompanying the Queen-Mother. Henry received him with words of reprimand, but allowed him

to depart unhurt. The next day he came again to the Louvre, after taking counsel with his chief supporters, and in the afternoon conferred with the King at the Queen-Mother's house. On the 11th, an attempt to turn all suspicious persons out of the city having failed, the Swiss under Biron were ordered in. They entered early on the 12th, and were posted in various parts of the town. The citizens flew to arms and raised barricades in all directions, cutting off communication between the different detachments of the royal forces. The Swiss were attacked, and finding themselves incapable of resistance, surrendered. Marshals Biron and d'Aumont were received with musket-shots and retired into the Louvre, where the King was practically besieged. Guise rode through the streets unarmed, and showed his complete command of the situation by quieting the people. A long interview then took place at his house between him and the Queen-Mother, at which he repeated his former demands, with the further requirement that the conduct of the war against the Huguenots should be placed entirely in his hands. On the 13th they met again. During their discussion the King with a few followers walked quietly from the Louvre to the royal stables, took horse, rode out of Paris, swearing that he would enter it again only through the breach, and made his way to Chartres. The government of Paris remained wholly in the hands of the adherents of the League, appointed to the chief municipal offices under Guise's influence; La Chapelle-Marteau becoming Provost of the Merchants, or virtually Mayor of Paris. The two Queens remained, the Queen-Mother continuing to act as an intermediary between her son and the League. On July 11 a fresh treaty was concluded, by which the King practically granted all Guise's demands; undertaking once more to uproot heresy throughout the kingdom, and further to publish the decrees of Trent, to appoint the Duke lieutenant-general of the realm, and to convoke the States General at Blois in October. Épernon had already been removed from the Court and from his government of Normandy, and the King presently dismissed his chancellor Chiverny and his four principal secretaries; but refused entirely to go to Paris.

Immediately on receiving news of the doings at Paris, Elizabeth had sent Thomas Bodley on a confidential errand with condolences and offers of assistance. Henry III replied gratefully, but said that many of his own subjects had offered their services, and that he had no doubt of being able with his own forces to chastise his enemies. The world should see that he would not, as Stafford reported, "put up unavenged with so manifest indignities." As a matter of fact, the value of English aid was just then uncertain. The Armada was ready to sail; and for the moment Henry was once more inclined to seek an escape from his difficulties in an understanding with Spain. The Legate Morosini, with the full approval of the Pope and the cooperation of Mendoza, suggested an alliance between the two great Catholic Powers. Philip was

sounded, but deferred any decision until he should be clear as to the motives of all parties to the proposal. Long before he could be satisfied the Armada had met its fate, and a Spanish alliance had less to recommend it.

On October 16 the King opened the session of the Estates with a speech betraying clearly enough his animosity towards the faction which for the moment was his master, and which held a vast preponderance in the assembly he was addressing. The speakers for the Three Estates, the Archbishop of Bourges, the Baron de Senece, and La Chapelle-Marteau were all ardent Leaguers. The sessions of the Estates continued for the next two months, Guise taking steps for the confirmation of his appointment as lieutenant-general, which would give him supreme command of the forces, and the King revolving in his mind the scheme on which he had been bent since his humiliation in Paris. The Duke of Nevers, who was in command against the Huguenots in the west, was not a keen partisan of the League, and made no effort to press Navarre hard, or to weaken forces of which the King might yet have need. Soon after the destruction of the Spanish Armada informal communications seem to have passed between the Kings of France and Navarre through Épernon, who had retired to Angoulême. Finally Henry III deemed himself strong enough to act. Early in the morning of December 23 he sent for Guise and his brother the Cardinal. The Duke went alone into the King's antechamber, where his body-guard were posted. He had hardly entered the room when he was stabbed and, unable to draw his sword, fell pierced with many wounds almost on the threshold of the royal closet. He wanted a few days of completing his thirty-eighth year. The Cardinal was arrested at the same time, and put to death the next day. The bodies of the two brothers were burnt, and their ashes thrown into the Loire, lest any relics of them should be preserved. The Cardinal of Bourbon, and the young Prince of Joinville (now become Duke of Guise), were arrested; together with the Archbishop of Lyons, La Chapelle-Marteau, and other prominent Leaguers.

Another, if less direct, victim of these fatal days was the Queen-Mother. She had been ailing for some time, and had already taken to her bed when her son in person brought her the news. According to one version he said, "Now I am King of France; I have killed the King of Paris." "God grant it may be so, my son," was the answer; "but have you made sure of the other towns?" On January 5, 1589, she passed away. She had been an indefatigable worker in the cause of peace in her adopted country. She had, however, had to contend with causes of strife that reached deeper than she could fathom. The result was that, though virtuous herself, she assented to and utilised the profligacy of perhaps the most profligate Court in history, and, with no natural tendency to cruelty, has come down to posterity as the main author of a most justly execrated massacre.

The news of Guise's death was brought to Paris by a special messenger from Mendoza, and reached the city on Christmas Eve. The fury of the Parisians was unbounded. The Duke of Aumale was appointed governor, and proceeded to plunder the houses of any citizens who were suspected of favouring the King. The royal arms were torn down, and the insulting anagram of "*Vilain Hérodes*" (*Henri de Valois*) was freely bandied about. Preachers fulminated from all the pulpits, finally working up feeling to such a pitch that the Sorbonne pronounced that the King had forfeited all claim to the Crown, and that it was the duty of subjects to cast off their allegiance. The warning of the dying Queen-Mother was quickly justified; for, with the exception of Bordeaux, which Matignon saved, Caen, Blois, Tours, Saumur, and one or two more along the Loire, every town of importance in the country gave its adhesion to the League. An attempt to seize Mayenne at Lyons had failed, and the Duke presently came to Paris, entering the city with a powerful force on February 15. He was declared lieutenant-general of the kingdom, and took the chief command of the League.

The King had lost no time in communicating his action, through Saint-Goard, Marquis Pisani, his ambassador, to the Pope. Sixtus took the death of Guise easily enough; but the execution and arrest of Cardinals was a more serious matter. Henry sent Claude d'Angennes, Bishop of Le Mans, to ask for absolution; the heads of the League sent an envoy urging its refusal. Olivarez, the Spanish ambassador, added his persuasions; and Sixtus withheld absolution till the Archbishop of Lyons and the Cardinal of Bourbon should be released. About the same time Mendoza left the Court, and at Paris acted henceforth in full accord with, and indeed as an intimate adviser of, the League.

Henry was now forced to adopt the only course that promised him even personal safety. Negotiations were opened with Navarre, and on April 3 a truce was concluded, on the terms that Catholics should not be molested by the Huguenots, and that Navarre should bring his forces to the King's aid, receiving Saumur as a cautionary town, and to secure him a passage across the Loire. The matter was not arranged without some difficulty. Henry stood in fear of the papal censure that hung over his head; while many of Navarre's advisers dreaded some treachery. At length the advice of the King's half-sister, Diana of Angoulême, the widow of the late Marshal Francis de Montmorency, overcame his fears; while on the other side Duplessis-Mornay was actively encouraging Navarre to accept the King's overtures. Events, too, were pressing. Navarre was advancing by the usual road through Poitou; he had taken Niort and Châtellerauld, and made a dash to clear the League out of Argenton. On the other side Mayenne was marching from Paris and had reached and occupied Vendôme. The Legate Morosini was made the bearer of some despairing proposals to Mayenne, which were rejected; and he also left the Court. On April 28 the treaty with Navarre was

published; and on the 30th the two Kings met just outside of Tours, where the King of France had fixed his headquarters and summoned the few members of the *Parlement* of Paris who retained their allegiance. Mayenne arrived in the suburbs during the following week, but after some fighting withdrew. A few days later the Duke of Longueville and La Noue defeated at Senlis a force under the Duke of Aumale, Balagny (who since Anjou's death had exercised a quasi-independent sovereignty at Cambray in the name of the Queen-Mother), and Mayneville, the factotum of the Guises in Paris; the last-named losing his life in a gallant attempt to save his guns. The two Kings recaptured most of the towns in the Isle of France; though, as it was said, "there was not a hovel which did not treat resistance to its King as a feather in its cap."

Sixtus now launched his thunderbolt. On May 24 a "monitory" was posted up at Rome directing the King under pain of excommunication to release the prelates within ten days, and himself to appear personally or by proxy within sixty days before the tribunal of Peter. The effect was twofold. The Duke of Nevers and some of the more moderate Leaguers, resenting the interference in the domestic affairs of France, came over to the Royalist side; but the bulk of the party was stimulated and the exasperation reached a greater height than ever.

On July 29 the royal army, reinforced by some 14,000 Swiss and Germans, forced the bridge of Saint-Cloud, and proceeded to invest Paris on the south and west. An assault was planned for August 2. On the previous day, however, a Jacobin friar named Jacques Clément having obtained admission to the house in which the King of France was lodging at Saint-Cloud, sought an interview with him under pretext of presenting a letter, and while the King was reading it stabbed him in the lower part of the body. The wound was not at first considered dangerous, but unfavourable symptoms set in, and Henry expired in the early hours of August 2, 1589, after recognising Navarre as his heir, and calling upon all present to acknowledge him. According to one version he also counselled Navarre himself to become a Catholic, as the only means of securing the throne; but it seems doubtful whether Navarre was present at the final scene.

The new King was accepted at once by many of the nobles who were on the spot, including the Marshals Biron and d'Aumont, Bellegarde, d'O, and others, though even of these several urged his instant reconciliation with the Church of Rome. The risk, however, of alienating the Huguenots by a step which would certainly not conciliate the League, now wholly under Spanish influence, was too great; and Henry found it better to temporise, promising in due course to submit to "instruction" and meanwhile to do nothing to disturb the existing privileges enjoyed by Catholics. In spite of this, Épernon and others retired, leaving the army so much depleted that Henry, seeing it useless to make any attempt on Paris after a brief essay at negotiations with Mayenne, withdrew

to Normandy. Mayenne, suspected of having designs on the Crown for himself, proclaimed the imprisoned Cardinal of Bourbon as Charles X.

After breaking up his camp at Saint-Cloud Henry marched with a force of little over 7000 men into Normandy. Tours was chosen as the temporary capital of the Royalist party. Henry's chances seemed for the moment almost hopeless; and it was important at first to keep within easy reach of succour from England. Also Paris was largely dependent for its food on the district between the rivers Eure and Oise. Thus the scene of war was again that in which the earliest operations had been conducted nearly a generation before; and the siege of Rouen by a royal army was to be one of the last, as it had been one of the first events in the long series of campaigns. At present, however, Henry passed on to Dieppe, whither Mayenne, at the head of an army of 30,000 men, followed him. The King prepared to meet him at Arques, where a stubbornly contested battle, in which the royal troops had not the worst, was fought on September 21. An attack three days later by Mayenne on Dieppe itself was foiled; and on the 26th La Noue and Longueville joined the King, and Mayenne drew his forces off. Henry marched to Amiens; and at the same time came a welcome reinforcement of 4000 English under Lord Willoughby. After returning to Dieppe to meet them, Henry marched on Paris with a force now increased to 23,000, and on November 1 captured the *faubourgs* of Saint-Jacques and Saint-Germain, while La Noue nearly penetrated into the city itself. On the next day, however, Mayenne, who had been on the eastern frontier, came back to Paris; and Henry, after vainly challenging him to fight in the open, withdrew to Tours. In December Le Mans, Bayeux, Lisieux, and other towns surrendered to Henry. About the same time the Seignior of Venice decided to recognise him as King of France, and accredited their ambassador to him. By the end of 1589 the King's prospects were far more promising than they had been at his accession. With the exception of the House of Lorraine and their immediate connexions, the higher nobility and the best fighting men had rallied to Henry; and his superiority in the field was speedily shown. Soon after the beginning of 1590 Mayenne, having arranged for reinforcements from Flanders, took Pontoise, and laid siege to Meulan, a small town on the Seine. Henry had set out with the view of taking Honfleur, the last stronghold of the League in Lower Normandy, but hastened to the relief of Meulan. On February 25, 1590, Mayenne, disquieted by news from Rouen, left Meulan; and Henry at once laid siege to Dreux, thus placing himself between his enemy and Paris. Mayenne, with a force raised to nearly 25,000 by the addition of Flemings under Count Egmont, and of Germans, turned back to meet him or draw him away from Dreux. Henry, though with a far inferior force, was ready to accept battle, and on March 14 the armies met near Ivry on the Eure. The result was the complete rout of the Leaguers. By the King's order

Frenchmen were spared as much as possible, but there was a terrible slaughter of the foreign auxiliaries, Count Egmont and a "Duke of Brunswick" being among the slain. Mayenne and his cousin Aumale escaped by hard riding. The Royalist loss was not above 500.

The road to Paris was now open; and, had the King chosen, there can be little doubt that the city might have been taken by assault. Henry appears however to have shrunk from exposing his capital to the horrors which this would have entailed. At the same time he rejected very decidedly proposals for an armistice brought by Villeroy and others, and prepared for a siege in due form. On May 7 he proceeded to invest the city on the northern side. Saint-Denis and Vincennes remained in the hands of the League, but all the other neighbouring towns of any consequence on that side of the Seine were reduced. On May 10 the old Cardinal of Bourbon died. He had been brought into the League against his will. Nevertheless his death was a cause of some perplexity to the Leaguers, as depriving them of even the semblance of a legitimate head. An attempt which was presently made by the Cardinal de Vendôme (known henceforth as the young Cardinal of Bourbon), brother to the late Prince of Condé, to form a third party, for the maintenance of the Catholic monarchy without Spanish interference—though countenanced to some extent by Mayenne himself—came to very little.

Paris was in no condition to stand a long blockade. It was estimated that the available provisions would last the population, reckoned at 200,000, for a month. By the end of May famine was imminent. Wheat was selling at 120 crowns the bushel; and before long horses, dogs, and cats had become recognised articles of diet. Even the grass that grew in the streets was eagerly sought after. Mendoza was openly playing the King of Spain's game, even causing coins with his arms to be struck and distributed among the people. Mayenne, after some difficulty, and at last only by the aid of peremptory orders from Spain, succeeded in persuading Parma to come in person to the relief of the hard-pressed city. On August 30 the Duke reached Meaux. Henry marched to meet him, and vainly tried to draw him to action near Chelles. On September 5, however, Parma issued from his trenches in full order of battle, with his cavalry spread out in front. Behind their screen he with his main body made a clever move to the left, seized the suburb of the town of Lagny lying on the right bank of the Marne, and entrenched himself there. The bridge, which had been broken by the garrison as they withdrew to the town itself, was replaced by a bridge of boats; and on the following day Parma stormed Lagny under Henry's eyes. Thus astride of the river, he could revictual Paris at his pleasure; and the King, making a futile attempt at escalade as he passed the city, withdrew to Saint-Denis. Presently he broke up his army, retaining only a flying force, and retired along the valley of the Oise. Parma took Corbeil (which was retaken a few weeks later); but jealousies soon

arose between him and the heads of the League; and in November he went back to Flanders, harassed by Henry so long as he remained on French soil. He had however rendered an immense service to the League in saving Paris from imminent surrender.

In the winter of 1590–1 Henry sent Turenne to England and Germany in quest of further aid, returning himself to the neighbourhood of Paris. An attempt by the League to recover Saint-Denis had been repulsed; there were reports of dissensions within the city, where the relations between Mayenne and the Spanish faction, which controlled the Sixteen, were becoming strained; the *Politiques* were gaining courage; and there seemed a chance of effecting a surprise. But the citizens were on the alert, and the scheme failed. More confidence had, however, been given to the whole party by the death, in August, 1590, of Sixtus V, who had grown more and more estranged from the League, and who (after the brief papacy of Urban VII) was followed by Gregory XIV (Nicolas Sfondrato). This Pope showed himself disposed to carry into effect the promise of material aid which Sixtus, if he ever made it, had successfully evaded. Henry saw that his tactics of isolating the capital promised best. About the middle of February, 1591, he laid siege to Chartres, which surrendered on April 19. At the end of July the Earl of Essex landed at Dieppe, with 4000 men from England. The States of Holland sent a contingent, and about the same time 16,000 troops arrived from Germany. Henry was besieging Noyon in Picardy, which fell on August 19; and, being now at the head of an army of 40,000 men, he decided to besiege Rouen, the last important town still held by the League in the North. On November 11 Biron and Essex opened the siege.

In the course of August occurred the death of the veteran La Noue from a wound received in an attack on the petty fortress of Lamballe; and the escape of the young Duke of Guise from his captivity at Tours. The King found some consolation in the latter event for the loss of his old comrade in arms; it will, he said, “be the ruin of the League,” foreseeing that the jealousies certain to spring up between nephew and uncle would open a fresh rift in that faction.

In Paris during this autumn, Mayenne being absent in Champagne, the Sixteen took the law into their own hands. In September a letter to the King of Spain was drawn up, begging him to appoint a sovereign for France, and suggesting for the throne his daughter, whom it was proposed to marry to the young Duke of Guise. They next formed a “secret council” of Ten, to deal with persons suspected of being out of sympathy with the dominant faction; and on November 16 Barnabé Brisson, the aged President of the *Parlement*, a man of much account in the late reign, was with two other eminent lawyers arrested and hanged with barely the form of a trial. Mayenne instantly returned, and by administering similar treatment to four of the Sixteen, and issuing a stringent edict, for the time stopped further outrage.

The siege of Rouen went on throughout the winter of 1591-2, the brilliant defence of the governor, Villars, frustrating the no less brilliant gallantry of the King and his officers. Early in January, 1592, Parma again set out to the aid of the League. Henry dashed off with 7000 horse, and came in touch with the invaders on the confines of Picardy. Thence he fell back before them, keeping on their flank, and skirmishing whenever an opportunity offered. At Aumale he narrowly escaped capture, and was wounded for the first and only time. After a brief delay caused by the resistance of Neuchâtel, and the difficulty of advancing through a country denuded of supplies, Parma arrived on February 26 at Bellencombre, where he was met by a messenger from Villars, announcing a successful sortie, and expressing confidence in his own power to raise the siege. Parma therefore contented himself with throwing a few hundred men into the place, retired with Mayenne to Picardy, and besieged Rue near the mouth of the Somme. The King, who had been at Dieppe, returned to Rouen, and prosecuted the siege with such vigour that Villars sent to Mayenne fixing April 20 as the day on which he must capitulate if not relieved. This brought Parma promptly back; and Henry, whose army had been of late much weakened by illness and secession, had to raise the siege. On the day which Villars had specified as the limit of his resistance, he withdrew to Pont-de-l'Arche, thus placing himself between the enemy and Paris. Parma, desiring to open the river, took Caudebec, receiving a severe wound during the operations. A day or two later, Henry, reinforced by the Duke of Montpensier, who had secured western Normandy by the capture of Avranches, was ready to take the field again. He had quickly detected the blunder made by Parma in allowing himself to be drawn into a narrow triangle, between sea and river, all the naval power being in the hands of his opponents. All that seemed necessary to compel his surrender was to close the landward side; and this the King proceeded to do. He drove Mayenne and Guise before him to Yvetôt and Fécamp, and after three weeks of hard fighting was preparing to assault Parma's camp between Caudebec and Rouen. The attack was fixed for May 21; but when day broke not an enemy was to be seen on the right bank of the river. Parma, who, though the illness caused by his wound had prevented him from directing his army in the field, had lost none of the resource which had made him the first general in Europe, had secretly collected boats and timber at Rouen. Bringing these down on the ebb, he was able during the night to bridge the river; and his entire force was in safety before the Royalists suspected what was going on. He marched rapidly up the Seine to Saint-Cloud, and passed on to Flanders without entering Paris, but leaving 1500 Walloons to reinforce the garrison. Apart from his wound Parma's health was now breaking down; and he died before the year was out.

The King's arms continued to prosper, though he had to lament the

loss of several of his best supporters; Francis, Duke of Montpensier, the most trustworthy and capable man among the Princes of the Blood, Guitry, a faithful servant for twenty years, and the veteran Biron, whose head was taken off by a cannon-ball before Épernay. Biron and Montpensier being Catholics, the balance within the Royalist party was in a sense shifted in favour of those who unlike them were Catholics first and Royalists afterwards. Most of these, however, were “too good Frenchmen to endure the domination of Spain”; and thus grew up that Third Party whose object was, while keeping the Crown in the actual royal House, to ensure its being worn by a Catholic. A marriage between the Cardinal of Bourbon and the Infanta formed part of the plan. The scheme was revealed to Henry in the course of the summer by the interception of some correspondence, and decided him to take a course which some of his staunchest Huguenot advisers now began to regard as unavoidable.

Meantime some of the saner and more patriotic men on the side of the League, notably Villeroy, the ex-Secretary of State, and the President Jeannin, who for some time past had been working in the cause of peace, had, soon after the siege of Rouen, renewed communications with Du Plessis-Mornay and others on the King's side; and terms were actually drawn up and proposed on Mayenne's behalf. Hostilities, however, went on throughout the autumn of 1592, fortune generally favouring the royal cause. So long as Parma lived the League was not without hope of aid; but the news of his death, which reached Paris on December 4, while not wholly displeasing to Mayenne, rendered a change of policy necessary. He called a meeting of the States General, who assembled at Paris in January, 1593. The Spanish party, aided by the Cardinal-Legate, Sega, Bishop of Plasencia, strove hard for the election of the Infanta as Queen. Philip sent the Duke of Feria as his special envoy, and wrote more than once recalling his own services to the Catholic cause in France. Even Mendoza, though blind and ailing, made “a long discourse, crammed with laws, canons, glosses of theologians and casuists.” The Estates could not be brought to see the blessings of Spanish rule; and in April a conference began at Suresnes between their deputies and those of the royal party, the Archbishops of Lyons and Bourges taking the leading parts respectively. An armistice was declared at the same time; and a guarantee was given by the Catholics on the King's side to their Protestant allies that nothing should be done to prejudice their interests. On May 18 the King himself wrote to the Archbishops expressing his desire to be “instructed.” On July 25 he received absolution from the Archbishop of Bourges (Renaud de Beaune, sometime Chancellor to the late Duke of Anjou) and heard mass at Saint-Denis. Henceforward, though hostilities were for some time maintained by the remnant of the League, acting avowedly in the interest of Spain, there was no longer any “War of Religion.” Within eighteen months after Henry's “conversion” France and Spain were in open conflict.

CHAPTER II.

FRENCH HUMANISM AND MONTAIGNE.

THE fall of Florence in 1530, together with the building of the new royal *château* at Fontainebleau and the marriage of the second son of Francis I with Catharine de' Medici, had led to a large influx of Italians, mostly Florentines, into France. On the accession of Catharine's husband, Henry II, to the throne, they began to make their influence felt alike in politics, society, literature, and art. The result was that the Renaissance in France entered upon a distinctly Italian phase of development, which lasted for forty years, though after the first five-and-twenty of these a species of reaction ensued.

At the same time a change took place in the character of French humanism. Instead of being more or less encyclopaedic, it began to specialise in particular branches of knowledge, and in two of them, philology and jurisprudence, speedily took the lead. The quarter of a century from 1547 to 1572 was the golden age alike of French philology and French jurisprudence. Moreover French literature, both poetry and prose, now received a strong and lasting impulse from humanism, which had hitherto neglected the vernacular language.

A few days after the death of Francis I, Adrien Tournibus (1512-65), known to scholars as Turnebus, was appointed to succeed Jacques Toussain (Tusanus) as regius professor of Greek at Paris. The difference between the two men marks the change in the character of French humanism. Toussain was nicknamed "the living library"; Turnèbe, to call him by the French form of his Latinised name, though a man of wide interests, devoted himself to the task of reconstructing, translating, and commenting on classical texts. His name stood so high in his own day that German professors raised their caps when they mentioned it in their lectures, while to Montaigne's partial eyes he seemed the greatest man of letters the world had seen for a thousand years. His most notable contributions to scholarship were editions of Philo, Æschylus, and Sophocles, all of which he printed himself in his capacity of King's printer for Greek. His edition of Philo was the first complete one; the merits of that of Sophocles have been pointed out in

an earlier volume; that of Æschylus was of no less value. His other works include Latin translations of Philo and various treatises of Plutarch and Theophrastus, and commentaries on Cicero, Varro, Horace, and the elder Pliny. In 1564, the year before his death, he published the first volume of his *Adversaria*, a collection of critical, explanatory, and illustrative notes on passages of classical authors. A second volume was added in 1565, and a third in 1573. The historian de Thou prophesied for it immortality, and scholars may still consult it with profit.

His friend and colleague Denys Lambin (1516–72), though a professor of Greek, made his mark chiefly as a Latin scholar. According to H. A. J. Munro, “his knowledge of Cicero and the older Latin writers, as well as the Augustan poets, has never been surpassed and rarely equalled.” He edited brilliantly Plautus, Lucretius, Cicero, and Horace. In his Lucretius he acknowledges his obligations to Turnèbe and Jean Dorat (Auratus) who also held a chair of Greek in the Royal College. Gottfried Hermann is said to have regarded Dorat as the most illustrious of Æschylean critics, and his emendations, though less numerous than those of Turnèbe, go somewhat deeper. But he is chiefly known as a teacher of genius. For a time he was tutor to some of the royal princes and princesses and in various noble families, one of his pupils being Jean Antoine de Baïf, the future poet. Being appointed about the year 1544 to the headship of the College of Coqueret at Paris he began to lecture on Greek poetry to an enthusiastic class, which included Baïf and his friend, Pierre de Ronsard, and, somewhat later, Joachim du Bellay. Thus the group of French poets known under the name of the *Pléiade* had its origin in Dorat’s lecture-room. Hitherto Frenchmen had read the great classical authors for their subject-matter. Dorat taught them to appreciate the perfection of classical form.

The leader of this youthful band of humanists who now set themselves to revolutionise French poetry was Ronsard, but it was du Bellay who wrote their manifesto. This work, which appeared in 1549 under the title of *Deffence et Illustration de la Langue Française*, is less remarkable for sustained argument than for its confident and vigorous eloquence, and for its grasp of the vital principle, that without style there can be no great poetry. If Frenchmen, Du Bellay says in effect, would make their language “illustrious,” they must abandon the inferior forms of poetry hitherto in fashion, and take for their models the Greek and Latin poets, or the modern Italians. They must write odes like Horace, eclogues like Theocritus and Virgil, elegies like Ovid, sonnets like Petrarch. Poetry is an art, and therefore natural capacity is not sufficient in itself; it must be trained and cultivated by study and labour.

Another important principle, namely, that poetic style is distinct from prose style, requiring an embellished and heightened diction, though fully recognised by du Bellay, is more clearly enunciated by Ronsard in his preface to the *Franciade* and in his *Abrégé de l’art*

poétique. It is this part of the poetical theory and practice of the *Pléiade* which, from Boileau downwards, has been most misunderstood. The borrowing of Greek and Latin words and forms of syntax was only one of the many devices recommended by Ronsard for the purposes of poetic diction; it was the one which met with the strongest opposition, and which with his usual prudence he soon greatly modified in his own poetry. In fact so far from "his Muse speaking Greek and Latin in French," as Boileau has it, his best poems contain no word or expression which is not of the purest French.

On the other hand, a feature of the *Pléiade* poetry which recent research has brought to light is that its direct debt to Italian models is far larger than to classical ones. Petrarch, Ariosto, Bembo, Sannazaro, and many less known poets of the Italian Renaissance, are freely laid under contribution. Another Italian who had great influence on the whole movement was the Florentine exile, Luigi Alamanni, who, since 1530, had resided at the French Court, and had received many substantial marks of favour from Francis I. He was a poet of no great originality, but he had a strong feeling for style, and was an ardent classicist. Ronsard's Pindaric odes resemble his hymns in structure, while du Bellay, when recommending in his *Deffence* certain kinds of poetry, is possibly influenced by the practice of the *seigneur Loys Aleman*.

The new school of poetry naturally did not supplant its predecessor without a struggle; but by the year 1554 the victory was assured, and Ronsard was hailed as the "prince of French poets." His followers were originally known as the *Brigade*: but now he and six others assumed, in imitation of a group of Alexandrian poets of the third century B.C., the name of the *Pléiade*. His colleagues were Dorat, Du Bellay, Baif, Estienne Jodelle, Remy Belleau, and Pontus de Tyard. In 1560 the crown was put on Ronsard's reputation by the publication of his collected poems in four volumes. It is significant partly of the pedantry of the age, and partly of the close connexion of the new poetry with humanism, that the first book of the *Amours* was provided with a commentary from the pen of Marc-Antoine Muret (Muretus), who, having abandoned French poetry for classical scholarship, was on his way to become the foremost Latin stylist in Europe.

There is no great depth or originality of thought in Ronsard's poetry, no intense passion; but his best pieces are signal examples of the power of style when it has imagination or emotion to support it. The famous ode, *À Cassandre*, the equally fine one beginning *Pourquoi chétif laboureur*, several of the sonnets to Marie and to Hélène, including the perfect *Quand vous serez bien vieille*, with many passages in the elegies, hymns, and other longer poems, bear witness that Ronsard was not only a great artist in verse, but a true poet.

Du Bellay's genius was somewhat longer in finding its true bent. It was not till 1558, less than two years before his early death, that he

produced a really original work in *Les Regrets*, mostly written at Rome, whither he had gone as secretary to his cousin the Cardinal. In form a sonnet-sequence, it departs widely from the favourite Petrarchian pattern. Instead of being addressed to some more or less imaginary mistress, it is a *journal intime* of the poet's thoughts and impressions, in which he records the *ennui* of his life, the corruptions of the Roman Curia, and his longing for his native land. Though du Bellay had a slighter poetic endowment than Ronsard, possessing less imagination and less mastery of his art, he represents almost better the delicacy of perception and the refined grace which are proper to the French genius. It is the latter quality which is preeminent in the well-known *D'un vanneur de blé*.

The close relations of the *Pléiade* with the Court made its members ardent Royalists. This was especially the case with Ronsard, who had been page in succession to two of the sons of Francis I. Moreover, like du Bellay, he was dependent on the royal favour for the Church preferment which was in those days the recognised method of rewarding men of letters. It was this attachment to the throne which led him, who had all a humanist's aversion from political or religious strife, to take up a militant attitude in the great struggle, and in the two *Discours des misères de se temps*, written towards the close of the year 1562, to throw all the blame of the war on the Protestants. This led to reprisals from the Huguenot camp, and Ronsard was attacked in several venomous poems, which along with much that was false contained a certain amount of truth, especially as regards the irregularities of his life and the licentiousness of some of his verses. Stung to fury, he replied in another *Discours*, which was too violent to be effective. Moreover, he could not do away with the fact that in his own person he was a conspicuous example of the corruption from which the Church was suffering.

If Dorat's lectures gave a stimulus to French poetry, the work of another scholar largely contributed to the successful development of French prose. In 1559, the year between the publication of du Bellay's *Regrets* and that of Ronsard's collected poems, Jacques Amyot (1513-93), formerly a poor scholar of the college of Navarre, and now abbot of Bellozane, published a complete translation of the *Lives* of Plutarch. The translation of the *Moralia* or moral treatises of the same author followed in 1572, when Amyot was Grand Almoner of France and Bishop of Auxerre, to both of which posts he had been appointed by his former pupil, Charles IX. His Plutarch is one of the rare instances of a translation which has taken its place as an original work in the literature of its adopted country; and the secret of its success lies in the double fidelity with which the translator has preserved at once the meaning of the original author and the spirit of his own language. Though Amyot's scholarship is very seldom at fault, he never allows either the Greek idiom or Plutarch's idiosyncrasies to colour his own style. And that style, from its high artistic qualities, its feeling for order and

proportion and harmony, was of the greatest service to a language which, in spite of Rabelais and Calvin, still stood in need of considerable moulding before it could become a perfect instrument for the expression of thought. Hardly less important was the influence of Amyot's work on the moral and intellectual development of the nation. In the evil days upon which France had fallen, Plutarch's examples of lofty patriotism were an encouragement and an invitation to her worthier sons. They helped to strengthen the mental and moral fibre of the nation and to prepare the way for her regeneration. Moreover, the moral treatises stimulated that interest in the causes and phenomena of human conduct, which, beginning with the *Essays* of Montaigne, has given rise to so many masterpieces of French literature.

Another French scholar of this period who did not disdain to cultivate his own language was Henri Estienne (1528-98). Trained in Latin and Greek from his childhood, and endowed with a rare natural instinct for language, he knew Greek as if it were his native tongue. His home was at Geneva, where he had inherited the printing-press of his father, Robert Estienne; but, with a full share of the restlessness which is so characteristic of the Renaissance, he was a constant traveller, especially during the last eighteen years of his life. The best part of his work was done between 1554 and 1579, and it was enormous. About one hundred and thirty editions of Greek and Latin authors issued from his press, comprising eighteen first editions of Greek authors, and such important undertakings as Plato, Plutarch, and an edition of *Æschylus* in which for the first time the *Agamemnon* was printed in its entirety and as a separate play. They were all, or nearly all, of his own editing; and in spite of the rapidity with which he worked, he was at once a scrupulous and a careful editor. Moreover, owing to his instinctive knowledge of the Greek language, he was the first to show what conjecture could do towards restoring really corrupt passages. But his greatest legacy to scholarship is the *Thesaurus Graecæ Linguae* (1572). After making due allowance for the materials collected by his father and for the assistance given him by the German scholar Sylburg, it stands forth as a monument of industry and sound learning, and remains to this day the most complete Greek dictionary. He also wrote several French works which, though they bear evident marks of haste, are remarkable not only for their racy and picturesque language, but for the logical construction of the sentences, a rare quality at that time. Three of these writings (1575-9) are devoted to establishing the merits of the French language and its superiority over Italian, one of them being especially directed against the prevailing fashion of interlarding French with Italian words and forms. They were signs of the growing reaction against Italian influences in France.

The services of Pierre de la Ramée, better known as Ramus (1515-72), to the French language were of a different character. His only

French writings were a French grammar, a few speeches and prefaces, and a translation of his famous treatise on logic (1555); but this last is important as almost the first scientific work written in the vernacular, and as a practical expression of Ramus' view that learned as well as popular works should be written in French. It was one of the many reforms advocated by this many-sided and original thinker, whose reforming spirit, rather than his actual achievements, makes him of such importance in the history of thought. The fame of the Ramist logic was due far less to its intrinsic merits than to its patronage by Protestant universities (excepting Oxford); but it still has an historical interest as a revolt against the Aristotelian tyranny. The man himself was greater than his work. As president of the College of Presles and regius professor of eloquence and philosophy he was for more than a quarter of a century a power in the university life of Paris. This was due partly to his brilliance as a lecturer, but chiefly to the breadth of his views and the dignity of his character.

From humanist logic we turn to humanist jurisprudence. Its pioneer in France was Pierre de l'Estoile (Stella), the grandfather of the well-known diarist, who began to lecture at Orleans in 1512; but its real founder was the Italian, Andrea Alciati, who, coming to Bourges in 1528, definitely restored the *Corpus Juris* to the place which had been usurped by the Gloss. Under the wise patronage of Margaret, Duchess of Berry, daughter of Francis I, and afterwards wife of Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, Bourges became the first school of jurisprudence in Europe, and was illustrated by such names as Baron, Baudouin, Duaren, Doneau, Hotman, and, greatest of all, Cujas. The services of Jacques Cujas (1522–90), "the pearl of jurists," to jurisprudence were similar to those of Turnèbe in the field of classical scholarship. He resolved the *Corpus Juris* into its component parts, purified the text, and enriched it with a commentary. His labours included Papinian, Ulpian, Paul, Justinian's *Institutes*, the last three books of the *Codex Justinianus*, three books of the *Codex Theodosianus*, and the *Lex Romana Burgundiorum*.

On the other hand, Hugues Doneau or Donellus (1527–91) aimed at a philosophical conception of the Roman law as a whole, a task which was rendered easier by the publication in 1583 of an edition of the whole *Corpus iuris civilis* by Denys Godefroi, father of a greater son, Jacques Godefroi. The text was a mere reproduction of earlier editions, but it remained the standard one till the close of the eighteenth century. The commentary has still some value. Mention also may be made of Barnabé Brisson, a man of great erudition, who wrote a dictionary of Roman law and who paid the penalty of political ambition. Having been appointed by the League First President of the Paris Parliament in the room of the royalist de Harlay, he was three years later put to death by the stalwarts of the party (November, 1591). With the almost solitary exception of Brisson, the great French jurists did not

practise; but their influence on the whole bar and bench was immense. The French lawyers of this time, to use the words of Sir Henry Maine, "in all the qualities of the advocate, the judge, and the legislator, far excelled their compeers throughout Europe." Estienne Pasquier, Antoine Loisel, the brothers Pithou, Guy du Faur de Pibrac, Pierre Seguier and his son Antoine, Jacques-Auguste de Thou, and his brother-in-law, Achille de Harlay—all these great advocates and magistrates, most of whom also achieved high distinction in literature, had sat at the feet of "*le grand Cujas*." Moreover, they were all ardent humanists, and their speeches bristled with references to classical authors.

A sound training in Roman law was absolutely necessary in those provinces of France which acknowledged that law as the basis of their jurisprudence; but part of France was subject, not to the *Droit Écrit*, but to the *Droit Coutumier*, or law based on local usage. Of this vast and varied domain Charles Dumoulin (1500–66) was the master whose European reputation vied with that of Cujas. But, unlike Cujas, he took an active part in the political and religious disputes of his day, and especially opposed the publication of the decrees of the Council of Trent in France. Even Dumoulin did not escape the influence of Roman law, for it was from the jurists of the Antonine era that he derived those ideas of the law of Nature which were destined to play at a later date so important a part in the history of French thought.

The Massacre of St Bartholomew, with its sequels on a smaller scale in large towns like Orleans, Bourges, Bordeaux, and Toulouse, dealt a blow to French humanism from which it never recovered. The Religious Wars in themselves had been a serious hindrance to the pursuit of learning, but down to the Massacre they had been relieved by considerable intervals of peace. Even Protestant professors, especially if they made no parade of their religious opinions, had been able to continue their teaching in comparative security. Now, all was changed. Ramus, hunted down by a rival professor, perished in the Massacre; Lambinus died of the shock a month later; Doneau and Hotman fled from Bourges to Geneva; and the same city provided a refuge for the younger Scaliger, the rising hope of French scholarship. When Scaliger returned to France in 1574, Cujas and Dorat were almost the only scholars left in the land; and a year later even Cujas was driven by religious disturbances from Bourges, as he had already been driven from Valence eight years earlier.

Joseph Scaliger (1540–1609) is the greatest name in the history of French classical scholarship. To a mastery over Greek and Latin and a critical sense equal, if not superior, to that of any of his predecessors, he added a range of learning, a sureness of method, and a constructive power that have never been surpassed. The firstfruits of his labours after his return to France were editions of Festus, and of the Latin elegiac poets Catullus, Tibullus, and Propertius. But, having shown his capacity for the restoration of texts, he turned to a new field of labour,

and in his edition of Manilius (1577) produced what was practically a treatise on ancient astronomy. This was the prelude to the great work of his life, the creation of a scientific system of ancient chronology, which he accomplished by his *De emendatione temporum* (1583) and *Thesaurus temporum* (1606). The latter included a marvellous reconstruction of the lost first book of Eusebius' Chronicle, the very existence of which he had divined. If the discovery of an Armenian translation in the last century has somewhat modified his results, it has detracted nothing from the brilliance of his conjectures. But when his master-work was published he was no longer living in France. In 1593 he had accepted an invitation to become a professor at the new University of Leyden.

Three years later a French scholar was restored to France in the person of Isaac Casaubon (1559–1614), who had been living for nearly twenty years at Geneva, where he had married the daughter of Henri Estienne. He had neither Scaliger's constructive genius nor his instinctive feeling for language, but, thanks to his patient industry and lively memory, he acquired, as Scaliger himself admitted, an even greater knowledge of Greek. His special aim was, in Mark Pattison's words, "to revive the picture of the ancient world,"—a work which his special gifts enabled him to carry out with great success. His editions of Athenaeus, Theophrastus, and Strabo, have never been superseded; while those of Polybius, Persius, Suetonius, and the *Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, are indispensable to students of those particular authors. He was professor at Montpellier till 1600, when Henry IV summoned him to Paris and made him one of the regius professors of Greek. But the assassination of the King deprived him of his only protector; and he gladly accepted an invitation, with the offer of a prebendal stall, from Richard Bancroft, Archbishop of Canterbury. It was no longer possible for a scholar who was a Protestant to make a livelihood in France.

The decline of scholarship in France was partly due to the fact that the study of Greek, though it had flourished greatly for a time, had never taken deep root. At the first touch of adversity it began to wither; and henceforth French culture and civilisation became almost exclusively Latin. After the departure of Scaliger the most learned man in France was Pierre Pithou (1539–96), and Scaliger could say of him that he was nothing of a Greek scholar. But he was an excellent Latin scholar, and we owe to him *editiones principes* of Phaedrus (1596), the *Pervigilium Veneris* (1577), Salvianus (1580), and the Edict of Theodoric (1579). He also edited Petronius, and the *Lex Visigothorum*. The text of most of these editions was based on manuscripts in his own library. His many-sided activity also displayed itself in the publication of medieval historical texts, and in various short treatises, of which the best known is *Les libertés de l'Église gallicane*. We shall meet him again as one of the authors of the *Satire Ménippée*.

One effect of the Counter-Reformation in France was to divert the energies of French scholars from pagan to Christian studies. This was in a large measure due to the Jesuits. They saw that, if they wished to dominate thought, they must train men to vie with Scaliger and Casaubon in learning. Partly as a result of this policy, a succession of excellent editions of Christian writers began to issue from the Paris presses early in the seventeenth century. Thus Fronton du Duc (1558–1624) edited St John Chrysostom (1621–4) and a collection of minor writers under the title of *Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum* (1624); Jacques Sirmond (1559–1652) edited Sidonius Apollinaris (1614) and a large number of writers on ecclesiastical history and doctrine. Denys Petau (1583–1652) edited Synesius (1612) and Epiphanius (1622). All these were Jesuits, and the two latter had been educated in Jesuit colleges. Another illustrious pupil of the Jesuits, though he never became a Jesuit, was Nicolas Rigault (1577–1654), who, after editing a few classical authors, turned his attention to the Latin Apologists and Fathers and produced important editions of Tertullian (1634) and Cyprian (1648). All this hardly accords with the theory that Jesuit education owing to its excessive devotion to style and language did not produce men of learning. Even more eminent instances to the contrary are Ducange and Adrien de Valois.

French poetry cannot be said to have suffered from the Massacre of St Bartholomew to the same extent as French scholarship; but nevertheless a certain deviation in its development may be traced to this period. Within a month of the massacre Ronsard published the first books of his epic, *La Franciade*, but he never completed it, and eighteen months later retired from the Court. Though he lived till 1585, his work was practically done. After his retirement the poetical stream divided into two channels—the one represented by the Catholic courtier and ecclesiastic Philippe Desportes, and the other by the Huguenot country gentleman and soldier Salluste du Bartas. Both were disciples and admirers of Ronsard, but they deviated from his methods in exactly opposite directions. Desportes (1546–1606) has more *esprit* and less imagination than Ronsard; his language is less poetical but more lucid and correct; and he is an excellent writer of courtly songs. If in his choice of frivolous subjects and in his devotion to Italian models he went even beyond his predecessor, his style marks a return to the more genuinely French tradition of Marot. On the other hand, Du Bartas (1544–90) deliberately chose sacred subjects as a protest against the frivolous and pagan character of the contemporary muse. He wrote the epics, *Judith* and *La Semaine*—the latter a long poem on the Creation, which was received with acclamation not only in France but in all Protestant countries. But his work has not stood the test of time, and nowhere has it been rejected more decisively than in France. For, though he has imagination of the highest order, his execution is seldom equal to his

conception. *La Semaine* is a poem of splendid single lines and a few fine passages; but even these are marred by blemishes of bad taste or provincialism; the rest is a dreary waste. "*Notre Milton manqué*," is the French verdict, and the verdict is just.

It was the perusal of part of *La Semaine* which moved another Huguenot, Agrippa d'Aubigné (1550–1630), to write a rival epic on the same subject. It was a complete failure. In 1577 he began a new one, taking for his subject the great religious struggle, and entitling it *Les Tragiques*. Constant fighting left him little leisure for poetry, but he wrote as furiously as he fought; and the poem, though not printed till 1616, seems to have been practically completed before the death of Henry III. An epic in intention, or rather, as the author describes it, a poem in seven *tableaux*, it is chiefly the satirical parts which have any merit. The description of the *mignons*, the portrait of Henry III, the account of the young man's arrival at Court, evidently a personal reminiscence, show a concentrated energy and a fire of declamation equal to anything in Juvenal. But on the whole *Les Tragiques* is, like *La Semaine*, a poem of fine passages and still finer single lines.

To one department of study, that of historical research, the Massacre of St Bartholomew gave a certain indirect impetus. The treatment which the Protestants had received from their rulers led them to investigate the origin and limits of the royal authority. Among numerous treatises on the subject, two stand forth conspicuous, the *Vindiciae contra tyrannos*, written almost certainly by Duplessis-Mornay, and not, as was long supposed, by Hubert Languet, and the *Franco-Gallia* (1573) of François Hotman. While the former is mainly philosophical in character, the latter, though a *pièce de circonstance* written with a definite political object, pursues a strictly historical method. In masterly fashion Hotman establishes the German origin of the Franks and gives the true explanation of the Salic law; his whole work is based on the best original authorities, and it is a sign of his historic insight that he was the first to recognise the importance of Gregory of Tours. Six years later Claude Fauchet (1530–1601) published the first part of his *Recueil des antiquités Gauloises et Françaises*, in which, independently of Hotman, he pointed out that the Franks were a German tribe. His work was eventually carried down to the close of the Carolingian dynasty.

Another writer who, like Hotman, had a wider knowledge and a rounder conception of history than any of the professed historians was Jean Bodin (1530–96). In his *Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionem* (1566) he had declared that political history is the only true history; ten years later appeared his great work, the *Six livres de la République*, which laid the foundations of modern political science. It had a great success; and, when Bodin went to England in 1579, he found a Cambridge professor lecturing on it in a Latin translation. This was so bad that he made a new one himself which, owing to the

improvements he introduced, is superior to the original version. Though neither an Aristotle nor a Montesquieu, he is an enlightened and independent thinker, of great learning and sound judgment. His chief contribution to political science is his theory of sovereignty, which Hobbes borrowed from him; and he was the first to work out in detail the effect of climate and situation on national character and government. His defence of lawful monarchy, which he distinguishes from despotism as that in which the monarch obeys the laws of Nature, is what one might expect from a distinguished and active member of the *politique* party. It was no doubt provoked by the republican theories of the Protestants, and especially by those of the *Franco-Gallia*. Equally characteristic of his party are his views on the religious question. A prince, he says, should not allow the religion established in his State to be made the subject of controversy; but if religious factions spring up he must not put them down by force. This was also the view of Montaigne.

Fauchet's work on the origin and early history of the nation was preceded by the *Recherches de la France* of Estienne Pasquier (1529–1615), who had won great distinction as advocate for the University of Paris in her first dispute with the Jesuits. The first book appeared in 1566, but the whole work was not published in a complete form till after the author's death. It contains much valuable information on various subjects, especially on the history of French institutions and French poetry, and is written in a style which, though not quite of the first rank, gives it considerable literary importance. Pasquier's antiquarian researches were largely inspired by his patriotism. The same patriotism and the same interest in the early history of his country led Pierre Pithou to edit from his own manuscripts two collections of French medieval chroniclers (1588 and 1596). Similar work was done by the diplomatist, Jacques Bongars (1554–1612), a man of many-sided learning, who at the close of his active life published, under the title of *Dei gesta per Francos*, a collection of contemporary writers on the French crusades. These were the forerunners of André Duchesne (1584–1640) and Adrien de Valois (1607–92), the former of whom, at the date of Bongars' death, had already been giving to the world for some years the fruits of his marvellous erudition.

In spite of all this historical research no great result was achieved in the actual writing of history. It is true that in 1576 Bernard du Haillan (*circa* 1536–1610) produced the first modern history of France written in French. His work, as he claims in his preface, is far superior in treatment to that of a mere chronicler like his contemporary Belleforest; but his standard of research is anything but a high one, and his history is after all little more than a reproduction in elevated language of the *Grandes Chroniques* with rhetorical additions translated from the Latin History of Paolo Emilio of Verona. The only writer who dealt with the later history in a really critical spirit was Nicolas Vignier (1530–96),

whose critical sense had been stimulated by the study and practice of medicine. His principal works are a *Sommaire de l'histoire des Français* (1579) and a *Bibliothèque historique* (1588),—the latter a universal history on the pattern of that of Diodorus, in the preface to which he speaks with equal contempt of the *Miroirs historiques* and *Mers des histoires* of the chroniclers, and the *inventions de rhétorique* and *harangues forgées à crédit* of the school of Paolo Emilio.

Contemporary history was treated with greater success. Jacques-Auguste de Thou (1553–1627) produced in his Latin *History of his Times* (from 1543 to 1607) a work which not only achieved an immediate continental reputation, but retained it till the close of the eighteenth century. The first part appeared in 1604, the complete work in 1620–1. It is a testimony to the Catholic historian's honesty and impartiality that his work was formally condemned by the Congregation of the Index; but his very endeavours to avoid giving offence to either Catholics or Protestants have caused modern critics to accuse him, not unjustly, of timidity. Moreover, the difficulties which beset a writer of contemporary history were increased in his case by the use of the Latin language and subservience to Latin models. That his work should fail to satisfy the modern scientific standard is only to be expected, but we also miss in it that atmosphere of contemporary thought which makes contemporary narratives valuable as historical documents.

It is this atmosphere which, accompanied by a large measure of fair-mindedness, gives value to the Huguenot history, *Histoire Universelle* (1616–20), of Agrippa d'Aubigné. Save however for a few chapters in which he gives some excellent summaries of the political and religious situation, it partakes more of the nature of personal memoirs than of a regular history. It was supplemented by the charming autobiography (*Vie à ses enfants*) which he wrote towards the end of his long life (circ. 1625), and which closes the long series of memoirs in which so many of the leading actors in the stirring drama of the Religious Wars recorded their manifold experiences.

The earlier memoirs of the sixteenth century were rather contemporary narratives than personal reminiscences. Such are the political and military memoirs of Guillaume and Martin du Bellay for the reign of Francis I, and the account of the campaigns in the Low Countries from 1551 to 1559 by François de Rabutin. The first man who set the example of employing the evening of an active life in writing down his own experiences for the benefit of posterity seems to have been the celebrated Gascon commander, Blaise de Monluc (1502–77), the hero of the siege of Siena, who began to write his *Commentaires* in 1574. In the opinion of French judges he is the first in merit as well as in time. His style at the outset is somewhat stiff and awkward, but, once at his ease, he writes with all the racy and picturesque charm which makes Frenchmen the best *raconteurs* in the world. His book was written chiefly for the instruction

of soldiers—Henry IV called it “the soldiers’ Bible”—but it is at the same time an admirable reflexion of that intensity of life which is so marked a feature of the Renaissance.

It is likewise characteristic of the Renaissance that a rough soldier like Monluc should have borrowed not only the idea but the title of his work from Caesar’s *Commentaries*. In the memoirs of Michel de Castelnau, which he began to write in 1575 when he was ambassador to the English Court, we find numerous references to ancient history with other touches of pedantry common to the books of the day. Though his book is unimportant from a literary point of view, it is among our surest sources of information for events between 1559 and 1569.

The *Discours politiques et militaires* of the Protestant leader, François de La Noue (1531–91), which he wrote while a prisoner in the fortress of Limburg (1580–5), are, as the title indicates, a series of reflexions suggested by the author’s political, military, and moral experiences, rather than personal memoirs. They are a noble contribution to that work of moral reconstruction of which France was so urgently in need, and they breathe a spirit of lofty and hopeful patriotism, akin to that of Plutarch, the careful reading of whose works was one of the consolations of La Noue’s imprisonment.

With Pierre de Bourdeilles, Abbé de Brantôme (1534–c. 1614), as with Montluc, the predisposing cause of his memoirs was the love of posthumous fame, but the immediate cause was a bodily accident. In Brantôme’s case it was a fall from his horse, which, like Monluc’s gunshot wound, put an end to his active career in 1584. His *Vies des grands capitaines, dames illustres, and dames galantes*, which make up the greater part of his work, though biographical in form, are so full of personal reminiscences that they fairly come under the category of personal memoirs. But they are at the same time a valuable historical document, not because Brantôme has been at any pains to control the copious and varied information which his insatiable and aimless curiosity led him to collect, but because the whole courtly society of the later French Renaissance is here mirrored before our eyes in all its manifold aspects. Vice and virtue have no meaning for Brantôme; he cares only for intensity of life. When he is not an actor in the drama he is content to sit among the spectators, to applaud but not to criticise.

It was far otherwise with Michel de Montaigne (1533–92). He, too, was an interested spectator in the stirring drama of his day, but he was a deeply reflecting one, a critic of singular sincerity, shrewdness, and penetration. “There are some men, and these not the worst, who look for no other profit but to watch how and why everything is done, and to be spectators of the lives of others, in order to judge of them, and by them to regulate their own.” It was in the year 1571, on his thirty-eighth birthday, that Montaigne, having resigned his post of councillor in the *Parlement* of Bordeaux, retired to the *château* which three years

earlier he had inherited from his father. Here his *Essays* grew as he grew, and became part and parcel of his existence. Originally undertaken as an occupation to vary the monotony of country life, and as an outlet for his vagabond fancies, the earliest essays consist of little more than anecdotes culled from his favourite books and pointed with some moral reflexion of his own. But before long he found wings; and the nineteenth essay, written in March, 1572, already shows that realistic grasp of the facts of life, combined with an imaginative portrayal of them, which is the goal of all artistic achievement. The subject, *That philosophy is to learn how to die*, was peculiarly suited to the times; for to the men of the Renaissance death, like the sword of Damocles, seemed to be for ever suspended over the banquet of life, and struck them with a chill all the colder from the passionate intensity of their enjoyment.

It was soon after writing this essay that, gradually and with some hesitation, a plan began to shape itself in Montaigne's mind, which, carried into execution in his own desultory fashion, gave unity and cohesion to his book. His *Essays* from the first revealed his interest in human nature, in the study and analysis of human motives. But, living as he did somewhat out of the world, he had little opportunity for observation at first hand. It was chiefly from books that he got his material, from Plutarch and Seneca, and his favourite historians, where he found "man drawn more to the life and more completely than elsewhere." There was one man, however, with whom he was in daily intercourse, and whom he had unrivalled opportunity of observing—and that was himself. On this subject he believed that he was the "most learned man alive." So he would make his book a portrait of himself—not a grand imaginative portrait to be hung up in some public place, but a likeness "simple, natural and ordinary, without study and without artifice." Such was the portrait he offered to the world in 1580 in the form of two books of *Essays*.

Immediately after their publication he set out for an extended tour through Germany to Italy, from which, at the end of eighteen months, he was recalled by the news that he had been elected Mayor of Bordeaux. He accepted the post unwillingly, and only after being practically compelled by the King; but he served two terms of office, four years in all, acting throughout with judgment and moderation. When, during his second term the death of Anjou (which left Henry of Navarre next in succession to the throne) rendered the state of affairs more critical, and there was a danger of Bordeaux being seized by the League, he showed vigilance, promptitude and coolness. Then, released from office, he returned to his beloved *Essays*, and, encouraged by the success of his design, continued it with increasing freedom and boldness. The old *Essays* were expanded and new ones written; and thus enlarged a new edition of his work in three books was published in 1588. It is in the third book that Montaigne reaches the full maturity of his genius. The *Essay on*

Repentance shows a profound knowledge of human nature; that on the *Art of Conversation* roused Pascal's admiration for its "incomparable author"; finest perhaps of all is the *Essay on Vanity*, containing the splendid burst of eloquence on the grandeur of Rome, and rich in details of Montaigne's life and character. After this he wrote no fresh *Essays*, but went on correcting and adding to the old ones down to his death on September 13, 1592.

The term of Montaigne's literary labours was almost coincident with what may be called the acute stage of the Wars of Religion, that which followed the Massacre of St Bartholomew. His attitude towards the great struggle was peculiarly his own. He was on friendly terms with the leaders of both parties, and was even entrusted by them with delicate negotiations. His was the only country-house in France, he believed, "which, with no guard or sentinel but the stars," was left "to the protection of heaven." Yet it was never pillaged. It was not, however, to any hesitation between the rival forms of religion that his neutrality was due. Distrust of change and respect for duly constituted authority combined to make him, outwardly at least, a loyal adherent of the Catholic Church. He had no doubt that "the best and the soundest cause was that which maintained the ancient religion and government of the country." Nor had he any sort of sympathy with Protestantism. That enquiring habit of mind which seemed to him so desirable in all other matters was, he held, wholly out of place in the sphere of religion. He objected to the promiscuous singing of Psalms, and he regarded the translation of the Holy Scriptures into the vernacular as more dangerous than useful. But he was deterred from taking a side, partly by his love of ease and tranquillity and independence, but still more by his love of toleration. It is worthy of note that he dedicated his edition of La Boétie's writings in terms of warm admiration to the fallen statesman, Michel de l'Hôpital, the one man who had tried to carry out a tolerant policy. In Montaigne's case toleration sprang not so much from any philosophical principle as from a hatred of civil war. It was "a monstrous war." Nor did he believe religion to be the real cause of it. "Pick out from the Catholic army all the men who are actuated either by a pure zeal for religion or by loyalty to their country or their Prince, and you will not find enough to form one complete company." He was especially shocked by what he calls the "horrible impudence" with which the rival parties interchanged their principles, as for instance that of the right of rebellion in defence of religion, which, originally set up by the Protestants after the Massacre of St Bartholomew, was adopted by the League as soon as the death of Anjou had made Henry of Navarre heir to the throne. But, however parties might shift and multiply, he never budged. He was always a royalist and a patriot. Thus, on the death of Henry III, he found himself in agreement with the now united *Politique* party, ready to recognise the legitimate successor, the strongest and the

ablest man in France. Twice Henry IV, when he was only King of Navarre, had visited him at his *château*, and now in July, 1590, during the siege of Paris, he summoned him to his presence with the offer of some post or pension. Montaigne declined the offer in a noble and dignified letter, and, while he expressed himself willing to obey the summons, pleaded his age and infirmities. Though he did not live to welcome the final close of the struggle and Henry's triumphal entry into his capital, he saw at any rate the League scotched by Mayenne's summary execution of some of its leaders, and witnessed the formation of a strong *Politique* party in Paris.

Thus it was in no indifferent spirit that Montaigne from his quiet corner looked on the troubles of his country. Rather they colour his whole book, or what is almost the same, his whole estimate of man. It was the self-seeking, the dissimulation, the want of principle of most of the party leaders which made this partisan of truth doubt at times of its very existence. It was the singular corruption of the age which, added to his inborn dislike of taking a side, and his love of balancing contrary arguments without coming to a final decision, gave to his mind its sceptical quality, and made it a congenial soil for the doctrines of the Greek sceptics. But Montaigne's scepticism was never crystallised into a definite system either for his own use or for that of others. His sceptical habit did not prevent him from holding very definite opinions on many subjects, on politics, morals, education, literature. The sum of his moral philosophy was rather the old precept, "to live according to Nature"; though, like Rabelais and like the Renaissance generally, he interpreted it in a very different fashion from either the Academy or the Porch. For him as for them it meant that every man should follow his own nature; and towards the close of his life, in his last Essay, he could say "that he was grateful for what Nature had done for him," "that he loved life and cultivated it as it had pleased God to grant it to him." His imagination might sometimes soar to lofty heights (as it sometimes descended to unsavoury depths), but at heart he was no transcendentalist. "The fairest lives are, in my opinion, those which conform to the common human pattern, well-ordered, but without miracle or extravagance." This was his conclusion of the whole matter.

This sober and tempered estimate of human nature marks the close of the Renaissance. We are far from Pico della Mirandola's treatise *On the Dignity of Man*, far even from Rabelais' Abbey of Thelema and Oracle of the Bottle. Man is no longer the centre of the universe: he is rather in Pascal's phrase "the epitome of an atom, or at best a thinking reed." So too Montaigne's attitude towards that literature which had impressed the earlier humanists with so strong a sense of human dignity differs considerably from theirs. Yet he had been educated on thoroughly humanistic lines. So anxious was his father to carry out the humanistic theory that boys should learn to speak as well as write pure

Latin that from his infancy no other language was spoken in his presence. At the age of six he was sent to the College of Guienne at Bordeaux, a revival on humanistic lines of the old College of Arts, and already under its principal, André de Govea, the most flourishing place of education in the kingdom. Here he studied under distinguished scholars, among whom were George Buchanan and Marc-Antoine Muret, and acted in Latin plays which those scholars wrote for their pupils. His studies were mainly in Latin; and, though he probably exaggerates when he says that he knew little or no Greek, he was never anything of a Greek scholar. But he studied with none of the enthusiasm and ardour which we find in the early humanists, or even in some of his own contemporaries. "Greek and Latin," he wrote afterwards, "are no doubt fine accomplishments, but we pay too dear for them." And though in his retirement he learnt to love the classical writers, and pillaged them in his Essays, taking, as he quaintly says, "a wing here and a leg there," his love stopped short of superstition. They were to him great writers dealing with a world which he thought in many respects better than his own; but they were not the only great writers, and their opinions, like those of everyone else, had to be brought to the bar of common sense. This attitude of Montaigne's to the classics was a wholesome correction to the pedantry which in his day had largely taken the place of the simple enthusiasm of the early Renaissance. Though he has not escaped the charge of pedantry himself, he at any rate recognised that mere erudition was neither learning nor wisdom. He valued the classical writers mainly as interpreters of life, and he approached them in that spirit of free enquiry which was after all the chief characteristic of the Renaissance. If his cultivation of that spirit produced on the one hand a tendency to scepticism and inaction, on the other it fostered common sense and independence of thought. For his professed disciples, the *libertins* of the seventeenth century, half free-thinkers, half sensualists, he may have been a dangerous teacher; but France and the world at large owe a great debt to the sincerity and practical good sense which, underlying his scepticism and love of paradox, form the real basis of his character.

Some six months after Montaigne's death a member of the *Politique* party in Paris, Pierre Le Roy, a canon of the Sainte-Chapelle, turned the weapon of ridicule against the League by writing a short burlesqued account of the meeting of the Estates, held in the spring of 1593. It is not clear that in this form it was ever published, but it circulated freely in manuscript. A year later, having been to some extent recast, and with very considerable additions, it was printed under the title of *La Satyre Ménippée*. In this enlarged form it was the joint production of several writers, including Pierre Pithou and two other scholars of repute, Florent Chrestien and Jean Passerat. The whole period of the

French Religious Wars is remarkable for the quantity and quality of its pamphlet literature. Ever since the *Tigre* of Hotman, published in the year of the conspiracy of Amboise (1560), there had been a long succession of pamphlets, many of considerable literary merit. But it is only the *Satyre Ménippée*, the last missile of the war, which has attained to the position of a French classic. The merit of its conception and initial design, to which sufficient justice has perhaps hardly been done, is due, as we have seen, to Le Roy; but the comparatively easier task of filling in the details has been carried out with equal success. Designed to be at once a comedy and a party manifesto, the speakers of the League party in the Estates are by a happy stroke, while preserving their own idiosyncrasies, compelled, as in a Palace of Truth, to reveal their real aims and ambitions. Mayenne, the papal Legate, the French pensioners of Spain, each in turn disclose their selfish and anti-national policy. Finally, the Sieur d'Aubray, the leader of the Paris *Politiques*, in a long speech, in which burlesque and irony are allowed no place, and which good authority ascribes to Pierre Pithou, declares the sentiments of his party. It is an excellent piece of reasoned logic, and in its finest passages reaches a high standard of patriotic eloquence, not unworthy of a Demosthenes, a Cicero, or a Burke.

Quiescendum—this was the motto on the bookplate of Jacques Gillot, one of the authors of the *Satyre Ménippée*, at whose house the other contributors used to meet, and it expressed the longing for peace and repose felt by the whole of France. The first task which awaited Henry IV, after he had cleared the kingdom of its enemies without and within, was reconstruction. The *Théâtre d'Agriculture* of Olivier de Serres (1539–1619), which had only been waiting for a favourable moment for publication, and which was now published with the King's warm approval (1600), dealt in adequate fashion with the true basis of the material prosperity of the nation. But before this an attempt had been made to reconstruct the moral basis. In a series of lectures of which the most important is the *De la constance et consolation es calamitez publiques*, written apparently in September or October, 1590, though not published till 1594, Guillaume du Vair (1556–1621), a councillor of the Paris *Parlement* and the most eloquent speaker of his day, urged his countrymen not to despair of their country; and in one of these treatises, *La philosophie morale des Stoïques*, offered them a moral code based not on a revealed religion, but on that Stoic law of Nature with which the study of the Roman law had familiarised French writers.

The same lines were followed in his *De la Sagesse* (1601) by the popular preacher, Pierre Charron (1541–1603), who borrowed literally and liberally from his predecessor, adding little of his own but a more systematic arrangement. Unfortunately he combined with this system of positive morality an equally systematic *réchauffé* of Montaigne's sceptical tirades, thus elaborately wrecking the foundation of human

reason upon which his superstructure was built. Yet all this was done in perfect good faith, and there can be little doubt that Charron, however much it may have tickled his vanity to pose as an *esprit fort*, was a sincere Christian.

The love of order which manifests itself in the divisions and subdivisions of Charron's book appears also in the poems of Jean Bertaut, Bishop of Séz (1552-1611), published in the same year. In his preference for serious subjects, whether religious or official, and in his habitual use of the Alexandrine line, he is the forerunner of the man in whom the new order of literature was embodied. It was in the year 1605 that François Malherbe (1555-1628), the future dictator and legislator of the French Parnassus, came to reside in Paris, and before long directed his critical batteries against the poetry of the *Pléiade* in general and that of Desportes, the reigning chief of the school, in particular. As he left no treatise on the art of poetry we have to gather his views from the uncivil comments which he inserted on the margins of a copy of Desportes' works. They are based on the heresy, that versification apart, there is practically no difference between poetry and prose. This was a direct denial of the cardinal doctrine of the *Pléiade*. "*C'est proser de la rime et rimer de la prose*," said Mathurin Regnier (1573-1613), the nephew of Desportes, in a satire which he wrote in defence of the old school, and in which he attacked in nervous and pregnant lines the theory and practice of the new. The last poet of the *Pléiade*, the first great French satirist, Regnier stands between two ages. Like Ronsard, Du Bellay, and Desportes, he "takes his property wherever he finds it," from Horace and Juvenal, from Ariosto and Berni, from Ronsard and Desportes themselves; and even more than his predecessors he is indifferent to order and composition and grammatical correctness. But in his close and sincere observation of life, especially in its social aspects, and in his firm and manly versification he announces the great writers of the reign of Louis XIV.

At the time of Regnier's early death in 1613 the cause for which he pleaded was already a losing one. By 1624, the year in which Richelieu became first minister, the success of the new school was assured. At his death in 1628 Malherbe was the recognised dictator of French literature. None but a prosaic age could have hailed him as a great poet, and French lyric poetry would never have withered as it did under his cold touch, had it not been for the barrenness of the soil. The only merits of Malherbe's own poetry are an occasional felicity of expression, and a versification which, though it lacks the charm of mystery and variety, compels admiration by its sustained dignity of movement and its virile harmony. But without such an instrument the classical drama of France would never have attained its perfection. Further, Malherbe's critical theories were of the greatest service to French prose. The qualities of purity, clearness, and precision upon which he insisted, and which he

illustrated in his own prose style, were just those which we miss in Montaigne's otherwise incomparable art; but they were needed in order to make French the language of educated Europe. Even before Malherbe's death there appeared a new writer who, by adding to these qualities those of balance and harmony in the architecture of the sentence and period, completed the lesson which his master had begun. "This young man will go further in prose than anyone has yet done in France," prophesied Malherbe. But the work of Jean Guez de Balzac, and the verification of this prophecy, lie beyond the limits of this chapter.

CHAPTER III.

THE CATHOLIC REACTION, AND THE VALOIS AND BÁTHORY ELECTIONS, IN POLAND.

TOWARDS the end of the sixteenth century the vast Polish Republic was one of the most interesting actual and potential factors in European politics. Originally a small and struggling military monarchy, wedged in the midst of hostile and oppressive neighbours, who excluded her altogether from the sea, Poland's dynastic union with the still vaster Grand-Duchy of Lithuania (1386) was the beginning of a fresh period of expansion; and during the following two centuries, under the ambitious impetus of the great Jagiello Princes, she gradually grew to be the mightiest State in Eastern Europe. In 1387 Red Russia, and, in 1431, Podolia, were definitively incorporated with her other territories. By the end of the fifteenth century the almost perpetual warfare between the Republic and its most dangerous and persistent enemy, the Teutonic Order, had terminated in the collapse of the Knights and the restitution to Poland of all the territory of which they had deprived her. A subsequent attempt of the Grand Master, Albert of Brandenburg, to reconquer West Prussia was defeated; and, by the Compact of Cracow (1525) Albert was recognised as Duke of Prussia under the suzerainty of Poland. Six-and-twenty years later the Order of the Sword also fell completely to pieces after a long decay, and the last Grand Master, Gotthard Kettler, ceded Livonia to Poland and did homage for Semigallia and Courland, which latter was erected into a semi-independent duchy under Polish protection. Poland had now reached the height of her power and territorial extension, her domains embracing the whole of the vast plain which lies between the Baltic, the Oder, the Carpathians, the Dniester, and the Dnieper. She had thus recovered her northern seaboard, and even touched the Black Sea towards the south. She was therefore indisputably the foremost of the Slavonic States, and, after the Spanish monarchy, the most considerable Catholic Power in Europe. Her political significance, however, was mainly due to the fact, that, since the battle of Mohács (1526) and the fall of the Hungarian kingdom, she had become the one permanent barrier against the rising tide of Ottoman aggression.

From the churchman's point of view, the Polish Republic in the sixteenth century was equally interesting and important. It marked the extreme limit of Catholicism towards the east, and, situated as it was midway between Greek schismatics and German heretics, might well be regarded and utilised as a battle-ground against both. Hitherto Poland had given the Holy See but little anxiety. Hussite influences, in the beginning of the fifteenth century, had been superficial and transitory. The love of orthodoxy proved stronger, in the long run, than fellow-feeling for a kindred race. The Edict of Wielun (1424), remarkable as the first anti-heretical decree issued in Poland, crushed the new sect in its infancy; and it was with the general approval of the nation that the five Hussite preachers, who had found a temporary refuge at the castle of Abraham Zbaski, were publicly burnt to death in the market-place of Posen. Lutheranism, moreover, was at first regarded with grave suspicion by the intensely patriotic Polish gentry, because of its German origin. Nevertheless, the frequent and extremely severe penal edicts issued against it during the reign of Sigismund I (1506-48), who in this respect, be it remarked, anticipated the action of the clergy, seem to point to the fact that the heresy was spreading widely throughout the country.

Sigismund's motives in opposing the Reformation were mainly political; and certainly the violent outbreaks of the sectaries at Cracow, 1518 and 1520, to say nothing of the civil war resulting from the revolt of Danzig in 1526, seemed to justify his suspicions that the new doctrines were not merely anti-Christian but anti-social. For a time, therefore, the Protestants had to be cautious in Poland proper, but they found a sure refuge in Prussia, where Lutheranism was already the established religion. Duke Albert gladly welcomed the Polish Reformers at his Court, and the newly erected University of Königsberg, where Polish printing-presses were speedily set up, became a seminary for Polish ministers and preachers, one of the ablest of whom, Jan Seklucyan, was actually the Duke's chaplain.

While Lutheranism was thus threatening the Polish Church from the north, Calvinism had already invaded her from the west. Calvinism, indeed, rather recommended itself to the Poles as being of non-German origin; and it is a curious coincidence that, in 1539, the same year in which Catharine Zalasowska, the wife of a town-councillor of Cracow, was burnt for propagating Lutheranism, Calvin should have dedicated his *Commentary on the Mass* to the young Crown-Prince Sigismund Augustus, from whom Protestantism expected much in the future. Meanwhile conversions to Calvinism, among the higher classes in Poland, became more and more frequent. In 1544 Stanislas Lutomirski, Canon of Konin, openly embraced the Helvetian Confession. A still more notable defection was that of Jan Laski, nephew of the Primate, who, after studying abroad and cultivating the acquaintance

of Erasmus and other humanists, returned home, took Orders, and, favoured by his uncle, was already on the road to high preferment, when, immediately after another European tour, he suddenly and publicly professed the tenets of the Reformers, married, and ultimately, though himself holding advanced views, sought to establish a union of the Reformed Churches. It is characteristic of the confusion of the times that, although no longer a celibate, he still retained the rich canonry of Gnesen, nobody daring to deprive him of it till he voluntarily relinquished it in 1542. We hear of crowded Calvinist conventicles in Little Poland, from 1545 onwards, which were regularly attended by several of the Canons of Cracow and other eminent Church dignitaries, among them being the Franciscan Lismanini, Queen Bona's confessor, who propagated heresy under the very eyes of his Bishop. Calvinism continued to spread throughout the country during the latter years of Sigismund I, and was publicly professed by many Catholic priests, some of whom carried their congregations along with them. One of the most notable of these renegades was Andrew Prazmowski, Prebend of the church of St John at Posen, who, banished by Bishop Izdbiński, found an asylum with the powerful magnate Raphael Leszczynski at Radziejowice in Cujavia, where he organised a Calvinistic community. Young Nicholas Olesnicki, too, who had been expelled from the Paulinist Order, and many other Protestant ministers, preached and taught beneath the protection of the Karwonskis, the Filipowskis, and other powerful families; but above them all towered Stanislaus Orzechowski, one of the most accomplished young humanists of the day. The son of a country notary and a Ruthenian priest's daughter, he was sent abroad for the education denied to him at home, and studied with distinction at Vienna, Wittenberg, Venice, Padua, and Bologna. At Wittenberg he readily adopted the doctrines of Luther and Melancthon; but, during his subsequent residence at Rome, Cardinal Contarini succeeded in re-converting the impressionable youth to Catholicism. On his return to Poland he was persuaded by his father to adopt a clerical career as being the most profitable, but his views grew more and more heterodox, and he presently came forward as the ardent advocate of a married clergy, and many of his fellow-priests followed his example by taking unto themselves wives. Another sect which ultimately found even more favour in Poland than the Calvinists, was that of the Bohemian Brethren. We first hear of them in Great Poland in 1548, and here they found a temporary protector in the magnate Andrew Gorka. A royal decree promptly banished them to Prussia, where, beneath the ægis of Duke Albert, they soon increased so rapidly as to be able to hold their own against the Lutherans. Thus, by the middle of the sixteenth century, the Reformers had gained a firm footing in Poland, though, during the life of the old King, they had to exercise caution. To the last Sigismund continued to

pursue them with severe penal statutes, and we even hear of isolated cases of the burning of heretics not members of the nobility. Nay, the very importation of heretical books was made a capital offence. On the other hand, it is extremely doubtful whether any regular attempt was ever made to execute these persecuting decrees.

On April 1, 1548, Sigismund I died after a troubled but not inglorious reign of forty-two years, leaving the sceptre to his only son, Sigismund Augustus, now in his twenty-eighth year. The Protestants generally entertained great hopes of the new monarch. Brought up by and among women, under the eye of his refined Italian mother, Queen Bona, he had from his infancy been imbued with the speculative humanising spirit of the Renaissance, and was of a disposition gentler and more pliable than his father's had been. He was known to be familiar with the writings of the leading Reformers, and to delight in religious discussions; he was surrounded by Protestant counsellors; and, most promising symptom of all, he had become enamoured of Barbara, daughter of Prince Michael Radziwill (Black Radziwill), the all-powerful chief of the Lithuanian Calvinists. On the other hand, it was not so generally known that Sigismund Augustus was by conviction a sincere, though not a bigoted Catholic; and nobody suspected that beneath his diplomatic urbanity lay a patriotic firmness and statesmanlike qualities of the first order.

Indeed, the young King had need of all his ability to cope with the extraordinary difficulties of the situation. Poland was at this time on the threshold of a period of political transition of an almost revolutionary character, the most remarkable feature of which was the elevation to power of the Polish *szlachta*, or gentry. In Poland, as elsewhere, the growth of political liberty was originally due to the impecuniosity of the Sovereign. The proverbial extravagance of the bountiful Jagiello Kings had encumbered at last even their vast estates, and they were consequently compelled to depend more and more upon the nobility and gentry for aids and subsidies. Naturally, such accommodation was not to be had for nothing, and the price which the monarchs paid for it was the liberal bestowal of special rights and privileges on the popular representatives. Thus in the course of the fifteenth century an elaborate parliamentary system grew up in Poland, although for a long time the *szlachta*, still uncertain of its own strength, permitted its "elder brother" the Senate, or Royal Council, composed of the wealthier magnates and prelates, to monopolise the chief dignities of the State. But as, towards the beginning of the sixteenth century, the parliamentary representation became more thorough and extensive, and the *Sejm*, or Diet, was dominated by the lesser gentry of Great and Little Poland, and especially by the grey-coated squires of the well-to-do and populous central province of Masovia, whose chief town, Warsaw, was now becoming a formidable rival of the old coronation city Cracow, the

szlachta began to assert itself despotically and to look askance at all privileges except its own. For it must not be forgotten that the new representative movement was never popular in the full sense of the word, stopping short, as it did, at the gates of the towns and the huts of the peasantry. The mental horizon of the *szlachta* rarely extended beyond the limits of its own particular province; and the way in which the triumphant gentry, after a brief but bitter struggle, succeeded, in the course of the sixteenth century, in depriving the great boroughs of the franchise, is one of the most melancholy pages in Polish history. Still more jealous were the gentry of the clerical estate, whose privileges far exceeded their own; and this jealousy, accentuated by a strong feeling of personal independence, was after all the principal cause of the early successes of the Reformation in Poland. Any opponent of the established clergy was the natural ally of the *szlachta*. But although the principal, it was by no means the only cause, the scandalous state of the Church itself seeming to excuse and even justify the far-reaching apostasy which was now to shake her to her very foundations. It is not too much to say that the condition of the Roman Catholic Church in Poland had never sunk so low as at the time of the Reformation. The Bishops, who had grown up beneath the demoralising influence of the corrupt and avaricious Queen Bona—elegant triflers for the most part, as pliant as reeds, with no fixed principles and saturated with a false humanism—were indifferent in matters of faith, and regarded the new doctrines rather with philosophical toleration than with orthodox aversion. Some of them were notorious evil liver. "Pint-pot" Latalski, Bishop of Posen, had purchased his office for 12,000 ducats from Queen Bona; while another of her creatures, Peter, popularly known as "the fornicator," was appointed Bishop of Przemyśl, and promised the reversion of the still wealthier see of Cracow. To many, indeed, the office of a bishop was but the occasion for amassing wealth or gratifying personal ambition; and nepotism flourished as it had never flourished before in Poland. Moreover, despite her immense wealth (in the province of Little Poland alone, she owned at this time twenty-six towns, eighty-three landed estates, and seven hundred and seventy-two villages), the Church claimed exemption from all public burdens, from all political responsibilities, although her prelates, sitting as they did in the Senate, and claiming the chief offices of the State, continued to exercise an altogether disproportionate political influence. Education was shamefully neglected, the masses being left in almost heathen ignorance—and this, too, at a time when the upper classes were greedily appropriating the ripe fruits of the Renaissance, and when, to use the words of a contemporary, there were "more Latinists in Poland than there used to be in Latium." The Akademia Jagiellonska, or University of Cracow, the sole source of knowledge and enlightenment in the vast Polish realm, still moved in the vicious circle of scholastic formularies, and

clung tenaciously to methods of teaching which had long since grown obsolete. The provincial schools dependent upon so decrepit an *alma mater* were for the most part suffered to decay. This criminal neglect of national education brought along with it its own punishment. The sons of the gentry, denied proper instruction at home, betook themselves to the nearest High Schools and universities across the border, to Goldberg in Silesia, to Wittenberg, to Leipzig. Here they fell in with the adherents of the new faith, for the most part grave, God-fearing men who professed to reform the abuses which had grown up in the Church in the course of ages; and a sense of equity as much as a love of novelty moved them, on their return home, to propagate wholesome doctrines and clamour for the reformation of their own degenerate prelates. Finally, the poorer clergy, hopelessly cut off from preferment, and utterly neglected by their own Bishops, were also inspired by the spirit of revolt, took part with the *szlachta* against their spiritual rulers, and eagerly devoured, and imparted to their flocks in their own language, the contents of the religious tracts and treatises which reached them by devious ways, from Goldberg and Königsberg. Nothing indeed did more to popularise the new doctrines in Poland than this beneficial revival of the long neglected vernacular by the Reformers.

Such was the situation when Sigismund II began his reign. The Bishops, desiring to conciliate a prince whose antecedents were more than suspicious, at once made a high bid for the favour of the new King by consenting to his marriage with his fair Calvinist mistress; and, on December 7, 1550, Barbara was solemnly crowned Queen of Poland at Cracow by the Primate Dzierzgowski himself. Five days later Sigismund II issued the celebrated edict in which he pledged his royal word to preserve intact the unity of the Church and the privileges of the clergy, and to enforce the law of the land against heresy. Encouraged by this pleasing symptom of orthodoxy, the Bishops, with singular imprudence, instead of first attempting to put their own dilapidated house in order, at once proceeded to summon before their Courts all persons suspected of heresy, and threaten them with various pains and penalties. The *szlachta* instantly took alarm. They had not uttered a word of protest when Bishop Peter had burnt the wife of a town-councillor of Cracow, an old woman of eighty, for heresy; they had regarded with supine indifference the debasement of the essentially middle-class University of Cracow by the clerical authorities, culminating, in 1549, in a wholesale exodus of the students because of the unpunished murder of one of their number in the streets by the servants of Canon Czarnecki. But when they saw their own privileges, already confirmed and guaranteed by the King, jeopardised by the precipitancy of the ecclesiastical Courts, their alarm and indignation knew no bounds. In the midst of the general agitation the *Sejm* met at Piotrkow in January, 1552. The temper of the assembly may be gauged from the fact that, during the

whole of the customary solemn mass before the opening of the session, the magnate Raphael Leszczynski remained covered. The debates which ensued were passionately uncompromising. Leszczynski compared the clergy to wolves in sheep's clothing. Jan Tarnowski, Castellan of Cracow, a devout Catholic all his life, inveighed bitterly against the Bishops, and denied their right of summoning the *szlachta* before their Courts. On this head, indeed, the whole Estate was unanimously agreed, the Catholic gentry, without exception, energetically supporting their Protestant brethren against what they considered the usurpations of the clergy. The Bishops, timid and vacillating, bent before the storm; and when the King proposed, by way of compromise, that the jurisdiction of the clerical Courts should be suspended for twelve months, on condition that the gentry continued to pay tithes, the prelates readily sacrificed their convictions in order to save their revenues. Thus began a religious *interim*, which, as matters turned out, was gradually prolonged for ten years. It was at this *Sejm*, moreover, that Orzechowski, who had been excommunicated by the Primate for breaking his vow of celibacy, pleaded fearlessly in favour of the marriage of the clergy; and the Bishops, for fear of irreconcilably offending their ablest opponent and driving him altogether into the heretic camp, annulled his excommunication and proposed to submit the whole affair to the decision of the Holy See.

Thus relieved from all immediate fear of persecution, and imagining, moreover, that the politic and temporising King was secretly on their side, the Reformers began to propagate their opinions openly. Soon they felt strong enough, with the assistance of the sympathising *szlachta*, to assume the offensive and molest the Catholics. Those of the Protestant gentry who had the right of presentation to benefices began bestowing them upon chaplains and ministers of their own persuasion, in many cases driving out the orthodox incumbents and substituting Protestant for Catholic services. Presently Reformers of every shade of opinion, even those who were tolerated nowhere else, poured into Poland, which speedily became the battle-ground of all the sects of Europe. Indeed, the Protestants soon became numerous enough to form ecclesiastical districts of their own. The first Calvinist Synod in Poland was held at Pinczow in 1550, when Felix Krzyzak was elected Superintendent. The Bohemian Brethren, too, now proceeded to evangelise Little Poland and found schools and churches, and finally, at the Synod of Kozminek (August, 1555) they formally united with the Calvinists. A Catholic Synod held the same year at Piotrkow, at which the famous Hosius, the youngest but by far the most capable and conscientious of the Catholic Bishops, appeared prominently for the first time, proved utterly helpless to stem the rising tide of Protestantism. In the *Sejm* itself the Protestants were absolutely supreme, and they invariably elected a Calvinist or even a Socinian to be their Marshal. At the Diet of 1555 they boldly demanded a national

synod for the cleansing and reforming of the Church, and presented nine points for the consideration of the King and Senate, amounting to a demand of absolute toleration and of the equalisation of all the confessions except that of the Anti-Trinitarians. The Bishops naturally refused to entertain this revolutionary programme; and, the King again intervening as mediator, the existing *interim* was, by mutual consent, indefinitely prolonged. The violent and unscrupulous proceedings of the bigoted Ludovico Lippomano, sent from Rome to Poland as Nuncio in 1555, still further damaged the Catholic cause by provoking universal indignation, the very Bishops refusing to obey him. At the subsequent Diet of Warsaw (1556) the whole of the *Izba*, or Lower Chamber, clamoured furiously against "the Egyptian bondage of the prelacy," and demanded absolute freedom of discussion in all religious questions. Again, however, the King adopted a middle course, and by the edict of Warsaw (January, 1557) it was decreed that things should remain as they were till the following Diet. At that Diet, which assembled at Piotrkow in December, 1558, the onslaught of the *szlachta* on the clergy was fiercer than ever; and a determined attempt was even made to exclude the Bishops from the Senate on the principle that no man could serve two masters. True loyalty and patriotism, it was urged, could not be expected from prelates who were the sworn servants of a foreign potentate—the Pope. The King and the Senate, however, perceiving a danger to the Constitution in the violence of the *szlachta*, not only took the part of the Bishops but quashed a subsequent reiterated demand for a national synod; and on February 8, 1559, the Diet dissolved without coming to any resolution whatever. The King, in his valedictory address, justly threw all the blame for the utter abortiveness of the session upon the intemperance and injustice of the *szlachta*.

The *Sejm* of 1558-9 indicates the highwater-mark of Polish Protestantism. From this time forward it began to subside, although very gradually, yet unmistakably. The chief cause of this subsidence was the divisions among the Reformers themselves. The almost absolute religious liberty which they enjoyed in Poland, proved, in the long run, far more injurious to them than to the Church which they professed to reform. From the chaos of creeds resulted a chaos of ideas on all imaginable moral and social subjects, which culminated in a violent clashing of the various sects, each one of which naturally strove for the mastery. The first to sow discord among the Polish Protestants was Francis Stankar, professor of Greek at Cracow, who published a treatise against the divinity of Christ entitled *De Mediatore*, which was condemned by a Calvinist Synod in 1554. Crypto-Socinians were, however, very numerous in Poland (Socinus himself had spread his doctrines there as early as 1551). They held at first with the Calvinists, although their peculiar opinions gave rise to fierce debates in the Calvinist synods. Their leaders, Blandrata, Ochino, Abyat and others, although differing more

or less widely among themselves, were loosely connected under the general term of Anti-Trinitarians. They gradually succeeded in winning over some of the principal Protestant ministers of Poland (*e.g.* Lismanini, Lutomirski, Pauli), and at last became even more obnoxious to the less extreme Protestant sects than were the Catholics themselves. At a Calvinistic synod held in 1562-3, things came to an open rupture; and the Anti-Trinitarians were formally expelled from the community, and became the objects of the most bitter persecution at the hands of their former co-religionists. Moreover, it was a common hatred of the Anti-Trinitarians which at length drew the hitherto fiercely jarring Calvinists and Lutherans together. But despite the holding of a united synod of the two Confessions at Posen (October, 1560, and November, 1561), the relations between the two principal Protestant sects still continued to be rather fratricidal than fraternal.

An auxiliary cause of the decline of Protestantism in Poland was the beginning of a Catholic reaction there. Not only the far-seeing statesmanlike monarch himself, but his chief councillors also, could no longer resist the conviction that the project of a national Church was a mere Utopia in view of the interminable dogmatic disputes of the hopelessly irreconcilable Reforming sects. The bulk of the population, moreover, still held languidly yet persistently to the faith of its fathers; and the Holy See, awakening at last to the gravity of the situation, gave to the slowly reviving zeal of both clergy and laity the very necessary impetus from without. Never, indeed, was the immense value of an independent external authority in ecclesiastical government so strikingly illustrated as at this critical period; for there cannot be any doubt that in the first instance it was the papal Nuncios who reorganised the scattered and faint-hearted battalions of the Church militant in Poland, and led them back to victory. The first of these reconstructing Nuncios, Berard, Bishop of Camerino, who arrived in 1560, was charged by the Pope to put an end to the paralysing dissensions of the Polish prelates, to enquire into the alleged heresy of the Archbishop designate, Jakob Uchanski, who was actually under the ban of Rome, and to induce the King to send deputies to the Council of Trent. The diplomatic *finesse* of the gentle and insinuating Berard proved far more efficacious than the blustering zeal of his predecessor. Perceiving that Uchanski was so powerful and so popular as to be practically unassailable, he skilfully enlisted him on the side of Rome by absolving him from all ecclesiastical censures and warmly espousing his cause, with the result that Uchanski's translation to the primacy was confirmed. He also persuaded the King to send delegates to the Council at Trent, where Hosius was already actually engaged not as a Polish Bishop, but as a Cardinal Legate. Moreover at a Catholic synod held in 1561, he opposed all violence and persecution, and persuaded the Bishops to respond liberally to the financial requirements of the King. His efforts were less successful at

the Diet which met at Piotrkow in 1562. On this occasion Sigismund completely won the susceptible hearts of the *szlachta* by appearing in the grey coat of a Masovian squire. Needing the subsidies of the deputies—for the incorporation by Poland of most of the territories of the defunct Order of the Sword had excited the jealousy of Muscovy and the Scandinavian Powers, and the whole north-eastern frontier of the Republic was consequently in danger—Sigismund was prepared, as the lesser of two evils, to sacrifice the clergy; and with his consent the jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical Courts was practically abolished, it being declared that henceforth no confiscations consequent upon condemnations for heresy could be executed except by the secular Courts as administered by the *Starostas* or provincial governors, many of whom, by the way, were Protestants. The Bishops warmly protested, but the King was inexorable. "You must," he said, "take the plunge." One result of this reverse was the recall of the Nuncio Berard, to whose incompetence the passing of such an anti-clerical measure was attributed by the Curia; and, at the suggestion of Hosius, Giovanni Francisco Commendone, Bishop of Zante, one of the most experienced and devoted of the Roman diplomatists, was appointed his successor.

Commendone arrived in Poland at the end of November, 1563. His earlier dispatches were anything but reassuring. The higher Catholic clergy were described as disunited and disaffected, and strenuously adverse to the Tridentine reforms which it was his mission to impose upon them. The Protestants, with the audacity of perfect impunity, were guilty almost daily of outrages against the Catholic ceremonies and religion. The childless King, to the delight of the Protestants, seemed intent on a divorce from his third wife (his first wife's sister), Archduchess Catharine of Austria, widow of the Duke of Mantua, whom he had married for purely political reasons in 1553—two years after the death of his beloved second wife Barbara, when she had been crowned only six months—and who was now living apart from him at Radom, an incurable invalid. According to Commendone, moreover, the condition of the country parishes was deplorable. One-third of the churches had been turned into meeting-houses; whole monasteries were infected with heresy; in many places mass was said as rudely and clumsily as if it were now being celebrated for the first time; the people at large were steeped in drunkenness and debauchery. Nevertheless, these manifold difficulties seemed to melt away at the touch of the capable and courageous Nuncio, whose consummate tact and indefatigable energy speedily worked wonders, especially as the King, despite the strong influence of Black Radziwill and his Calvinist surroundings, despite even the alluring precedent of Henry VIII of England and the Scandinavian Princes, did not press to an issue the much dreaded question of the divorce. In August, 1564, Commendone presented the Tridentine Decrees to Sigismund, who promised to accept and promulgate them;

and, thus encouraged, the Nuncio now proceeded a step further and persuaded the King to issue an edict banishing all foreign heretics from the land, and forbidding conversions to the new doctrines, especially to the doctrine of the Anti-Trinitarians. These were especially designated in order to reconcile the Calvinists to this decree, which, moreover, at first was interpreted so leniently as to remain practically abortive so far as the latter were concerned. At the subsequent Diet of 1565 the Protestants presented a petition for a national pacificatory Synod; but the King rejected it as unnecessary, inasmuch as the Council of Trent had already settled all religious questions. He declared at the same time that he was resolved to live and die a Catholic. But the most reassuring feature of this Diet, from a churchman's point of view, was the presence in the *izba* of a zealous Catholic minority which, while willing enough to keep the clergy within bounds, energetically protested against any attack upon the Church's ceremonies or dogmas. It was quite a new thing to see the Polish gentry marshalled round a papal Nuncio and drawing their sabres, in full session, against the gainsayers of Catholic truth. At the same Diet, moreover, Sigismund, yielding to the persuasions of Commendone and of Hosius, who had now returned to Poland, consented to the introduction into Poland of the most formidable adversaries of the Reformation, the Jesuits. Noskowski, Bishop of Plock, had already indeed installed them at Pultusk; and, after the Diet had separated, the Society was permitted to found establishments in the dioceses of Posen, Ermeland (Warmia), and Wilna, which henceforth became centres of a vigorous and victorious propaganda. In December, 1565, Commendone quitted Poland, well satisfied with the results of his mission; and indeed the Catholic cause in Poland, though still beset by many difficulties, was henceforth free from danger.

The great political event of Sigismund's later years, the union of Poland and Lithuania into a single State with a common Diet and executive, accomplished at Lublin in 1569, threw purely religious questions somewhat into the background; but the Catholic revival gained in strength every year, although the King continued judiciously to hold the balance between the opposing parties, and preserved order by occasionally nominating Protestants to the highest offices of State, and always preventing persecution. Moreover, a new order of bishops, men of apostolic faith and fervour, such as Konarski of Posen and Karnkowski of Cujavia, were gradually superseding the indolent and corrupt old prelates of Bona's creation, and, under the skilful leadership of Cardinal Hosius, and with the silent cooperation of the Jesuits, were everywhere recovering lost ground. Many of the magnates were about this time reconverted to the Catholic religion, the most notable acquisitions being Adalbert Laski and Jan Siewakowski, both of whom the Protestants could ill afford to lose. The long-deferred union of the Bohemian Brethren, Lutherans, and Calvinists (Consensus of Sandomir, 1570), points to an effort on the

part of the Protestant sects to concentrate their forces likewise; but at the same time they played into the hands of their Catholic adversaries by their violent persecution of the Anti-Trinitarians, whom Hosius, from motives of policy, ostentatiously took under his protection. In the *Sejm* itself the attacks of the Protestants upon the Catholics grew feeblér every year, ceasing at last altogether. Nay, at the Diet of 1569 the Protestants actually made overtures for a union with the Catholics, which the latter postponed till the reformed sects should have become "quite agreed among themselves as to what they really believed." At the Diet of 1570 Sigismund, strong in the support of a large and zealous Catholic party, rejected a petition of the Protestants that their Confession should be placed on a statutory equality with Catholicism, and postponed to the following Diet the enforcement of the decrees against the Anti-Trinitarians and Anabaptists, which were never carried out, owing to the vigorous interposition at the Diet of 1572 of Commendone, who had been sent on a second mission to Poland in November, 1571. A few months later Sigismund II died suddenly, without leaving any regulations as to the election of his successor. The decease of this prudent and tolerant monarch was a serious blow to Protestantism in Poland. Henceforth, as we shall find, the Reformers had to deal with princes more or less hostile to them, and to abandon all hope of domination. It remained to be seen whether they could even hold the ground they had actually won.

Fortunately for Poland, the political horizon was absolutely unclouded on the death of Sigismund II; otherwise, the situation would have been serious, for domestic affairs were in an almost anarchical condition. The Union of Lublin, barely three years old, was anything but consolidated, and in Lithuania it continued to be extremely unpopular. In Poland proper, too, the *szlachta* was fiercely opposed to the magnates; and the Protestants seemed bent upon still further castigating the clergy. Worst of all, there existed no recognised authority in the land, to curb and control its jarring centrifugal political elements. It was nearly two hundred years since the Republic had last been saddled with an inter-regnum, and the precedents of 1382 were obsolete. The Primate Uchanski, on hearing of the demise of the Crown, at once invited all the senators of Great Poland to a conference at Lowicz, but passed over the *szlachta* altogether. In an instant the whole Republic was seething like a cauldron. Jan Ferlej, Grand-Marshal of the Crown and the head of the Protestant party, simultaneously summoned to Cracow a confederation of the gentry, which received the support of the senators of Little Poland, who resented the exclusiveness of the Primate's Assembly. Civil war was happily averted at the last moment by the mediation of Peter Zborowski, Castellan of Sandomir; and a convocation or National Convention, the first of its kind, composed of senators and deputies from all parts of the kingdom, assembled at Warsaw, in the heart of Catholic

Masovia, in April, 1573, for the purpose of electing a new King. The Protestants had proposed Calvinistic Lublin as the place of meeting, but were outvoted.

Meanwhile, five candidates for the throne were already in the field. Lithuania was in favour of her near neighbour, Tsar Ivan IV, whose election would have guaranteed her territories against the chronic Muscovite incursions. In Poland the Bishops and most of the Catholic magnates and senators were in favour of an Austrian Archduke. But the tyrannous and persecuting House of Habsburg was so obnoxious to the nation at large, that the *szlachta* was disposed to accept almost any other candidate, except a Muscovite, who came with a gift in his hand. It was therefore no very difficult task for the adroit and energetic French ambassador, Montluc, who had been sent to Poland (October, 1572) by Catharine de' Medici, to promote the candidature of her favourite son, Henry, Duke of Anjou, to win over the majority of the *szlachta*, especially as it was notorious that Poland's most dangerous neighbour, the Ottoman Porte, while inclined to tolerate a French Prince on the Polish throne, would certainly regard the election of an Austrian Archduke as a *casus belli*. Montluc, well provided with funds, had already succeeded in purchasing many of the leading magnates, notably Adalbert Laski, Palatine of Siradia, a dashing adventurer of heroic courage, but absolutely devoid of conscience in money matters. He placed his chief hopes, however, in the ignorant and credulous masses of the *szlachta*, in whose hands, as he acutely perceived from the first, the issues of the election really lay. He therefore devoted his energies to captivating all the lesser gentry, irrespective of religion. The Protestants were reassured by his exaggerated accounts of the tolerant policy adopted just then by the French Court towards the Huguenots, while he insinuated mysteriously to the Catholics that the French candidate, as a loyal son of the Church, would leave nothing undone to promote the glory of God. Montluc's popularity reached its height when he strenuously advocated the adoption of the *powszechne prawo glosowania*, or open popular mode of election by the gentry *en masse* (which the *szlachta* now proposed to revive), as opposed to the more orderly "secret election" by a congress of senators and deputies sitting with closed doors. It was mainly due to his efforts and the impassioned eloquence of young Jan Zamoyski, Starosta of Belz, now on the threshold of his brilliant political career, that the *Sejm* decided in favour of the more popular method. The religious difficulty, meanwhile, had been adjusted to the satisfaction of all parties by the Compact of Warsaw (January 28, 1573), which granted absolute religious liberty to all non-Catholic denominations ("*Dissidentes de Religione*," as they now began to be called) without exception, thus exhibiting a far more liberal intention than the Germans had manifested in the Religious Peace of Augsburg, eighteen years before. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Compact was eventually vitiated by the clauses which reserved to every

master, spiritual or secular, the right "to punish according to his judgment" every rebellious servant, even if his rebellion were entirely due to his religious convictions. This unlimited power of arbitrary correction speedily resulted in the absolute serfdom of the rural population; and eventually, when the Protestant proprietors were gradually won back to the Church by the Jesuits, their dependents were of course forced to follow their example.

Early in April, 1573, the Election Diet began to assemble at Warsaw; and across the newly-built bridge, the first that ever united the banks of the Vistula, flowed a stream of 40,000 electors, swelled to 100,000 by their retainers and dependents, hastening to pitch their tents in the plain of Kamienie near Warsaw, where the fate of the Republic was to be decided. The next fortnight was passed in fierce debates and in listening to the orations of the foreign ambassadors. The Imperial ambassador, who spoke in Bohemian, first addressed the electors in favour of his candidate, the Archduke Ernest. But, though he had a very great deal to say, he had very little to offer. Consequently the electors soon found him tedious and clamoured impatiently for Montluc to speak. But it was now late, and the sagacious Frenchman, to avoid addressing a tired audience, feigned illness and postponed his harangue till the following day, when he exceeded the fondest expectations of his admirers by delivering an oration "worthy of eternal remembrance," which took the whole assembly by storm. The speeches of the Swedish envoys which followed were considered tame and sober in comparison, especially as they were not reinforced by golden arguments. Nevertheless, as the prospects of the Duke of Anjou approximated to certainty, the more cool-headed of the electors began to feel some natural anxiety as to how far this foreign prince, the offspring of a despotic House, would be likely to respect the liberties of the Republic. The tidings of the Massacre of St Bartholomew had come as a shock to many, especially to the Protestants, although to them Montluc plausibly represented the catastrophe as a spontaneous and unauthorised endeavour of the loyal city of Paris to crush a dangerous Huguenot rebellion. It was therefore decided that the election should be postponed to a "*correctura jurum*," or reform of the Constitution; and a special Commission was appointed for that purpose. This precautionary measure was, however, by no means to the liking of the Catholic party; and accordingly Montluc instigated "his pretorians," the 10,000 enthusiastic but grossly ignorant Masovian electors, to protest energetically against any further delay. The Commission was consequently obliged to confine itself to drawing up certain preliminary conditions considerably curtailing the royal authority.

The "Henrican Articles," as they were called, deprived the future King of the privilege of electing his successor; forbade his marrying without the previous consent of the Senate; required him to protect all the

religious sects equally and maintain the *sady wojewódzkie*, or temporal tribunals; considerably restricted his authority as commander-in-chief; and bound him to accept a permanent council of fourteen Senators, elected every two years by the Diet, four of whom, in rotation, were to be in constant attendance upon him. The debates evoked by these constitutional changes were still proceeding when the Masovian deputies, instigated by Montluc, proceeded in a body to the pavilion of the Senate, and threatened to choose forthwith a King of their own, if the election were postponed much longer; and, yielding to this pressure, the Grand-Marshal Firlej fixed May 4 for the election. On that day the ten thousand Masovians voted unanimously for Henry, and their example was followed by the electors of the Palatinates of Plock, Dobrzyn, and Podlasia, and most of the Lithuanians. On the other hand, the Prussian and Kijowian electors voted for the Archduke Ernest, while a large number of the electors of Great Poland and a considerable minority of the Lithuanians demanded a Piast or native Pole, and declared for Jan Koska, Palatine of Sandomeria. The Henricans, with a powerful majority behind them, now urged the Primate to proclaim their candidate King; but this demand was vigorously opposed by the Protestant party headed by Firlej, who formed themselves into an armed Confederation and retired *en masse* from the field of election. Sabres were drawn on both sides and civil war again seemed imminent; but negotiations were ultimately opened between the contending assemblies; and the Protestant terms were being considered when the armed Masovian mob again surrounded the pavilion where the Senate was deliberating, and forced on the nomination of their candidate. "Then for a whole hour," says an eye-witness, "there was nothing but a hurrying and a scurrying, the beating of drums, the blaring of trumpets, the firing of guns, and after that we all mounted our steeds, and rode off to sing a *Te Deum* at the Church of St John." Thus in the midst of intrigue, corruption, violence and confusion, Henry of Valois was, on May 11, 1573, elected King of Poland.

A few days later, *pacta conventa*, corresponding to our coronation oath, were laid before the French ambassador at Warsaw for signature. By these articles the King of France was to bind himself within six months to keep on foot in Poland 4000 Saxons for service against Muscovy. Henry was to maintain a fleet in the Baltic at his own expense; place 450,000 ducats at the disposal of the Republic; provide learned professors for the Cracow Academy; educate one hundred of the young Polish nobles abroad; espouse the late King's sister, the Korolewna Anna, a Princess eighteen years his senior, immediately after his arrival in Poland; confirm the Compact of Warsaw, and obtain religious liberty for the French Huguenots. Onerous and extravagant as these conditions were, Montluc instantly accepted all of them except the last, whereupon Firlej's party also proclaimed Henry King of Poland; and a magnificent

embassy, consisting of the leading senators of the French party, was forthwith dispatched to France. They arrived at Paris on August 19, after being detained for a time, on their way through Germany, by the disappointed and vindictive Emperor. But even now their difficulties were not over. The very ample demands of the Polish democracy seemed monstrous to French absolutism, and it was not till after three weeks of incessant disputation and explanation that Henry was finally persuaded to sign the *pacta* at Notre Dame on September 10. What he objected to most of all was that he, who was only twenty-two, should be compelled to marry a woman of forty, at the simple bidding of his Polish subjects. Indeed he absolutely refused to bind himself on this head, although willing to promise that he would never marry without the previous consent of the Polish Senate and *Sejm*, and with this concession the deputation had at last to be content.

"Many of us," writes the contemporary Marcin Bielski in his Chronicle, alluding to the new King, "promised ourselves all sorts of good things from this gentleman, and had such an opinion of him as to make us fancy that nobody could rule us better or more profitably. So thought we, but the Lord God ordered it otherwise." And indeed Catharine de' Medici's corrupt, frivolous, and despotic son was not equal to the double duty of curbing and conciliating his unruly subjects. The Polish *szlachta*, who had grown up in the austere dignified Court of the Jagiellos, were revolted by Henry's nocturnal vagabondage in the streets of Cracow, by his bacchanalian debauches at the castle, and by his indecent revels in the presence of the Korolewna and her ladies. Henry himself, moreover, nurtured as he had been in the hotbed of luxurious absolutism, could not breathe freely in the rude and boisterous atmosphere of Sarmatian liberty; and, with the new papal Nuncio, Vincenzo Laureo, perpetually at his elbow and urging him to perform some great act of faith in the eyes of all men—such, for instance, as closing the dissenting conventicles of Cracow, or publicly revoking the oath imposed upon him at Paris by the Polish delegates, which bound him to confirm the statutes of the Diet of Warsaw in favour of the Dissidents—the new King's position, in view of his obligations to the Protestants, was difficult to desperation. Indeed, the violent scene which took place at his coronation in the Cathedral of Cracow on February 21, 1574, three days after his arrival, convinced him that the Dissidents would never submit tamely to any such cavalier treatment. The oaths having been duly administered, Henry had risen to his feet again, when the Palatines of Cracow, of Wilna, and of Sandomeria, the leaders of the Dissidents, came forward, and with great importunity, pressed the King to confirm the oath which he had made at Paris; but the Archbishop would hear of no such innovation, and withstood them with high words. Thereupon Grand-Marshal Firlej rose, and, placing his hand upon the crown, insisted categorically that the coronation oath should be recited in full before the

ceremony proceeded. A fearful tumult at once ensued. The clamour soon spread from the altar to the choir, and thence into the nave, so that many feared a conflict, when Jan Chodkiewicz, the Palatine of Samogitia, cried that it would suffice them "*quod rex conservaret pacem et tranquillitatem inter dissidentes de religione.*" The King, without taking a set oath, thereupon confirmed what Chodkiewicz had said, adding: "*Conservare curabo.*" Against this the Archbishop protested, while the Bishop of Cujavia exclaimed "*Salvis juribus nostris,*" and the King, "*Salvis juribus vestris.*" Meanwhile the Palatine of Cracow, as Grand-Marshal of the Kingdom, quitted the chancel, and, addressing the people in Polish, in a loud voice asked whether, the King having now done all that it behoved him to do, it was their good pleasure that he should be crowned? Whereupon the people exclaimed with a shout: "Crown him! Long live the King!" and so he was anointed and crowned without further misadventure.

The position of the new King between such jarring elements was therefore difficult at the best of times, and might at any time become really dangerous. Every moment he had reason to regret his haste in accepting so thorny a crown. For seven hours a day he had to endure the interminable and only half-intelligible debates in the Senate, whose president he was; while the fierce dissensions of the coronation Diet, which assembled at the beginning of April to confirm the *pacta conventa*, and in which a bare Catholic majority stood face to face with a strong and aggressive Protestant minority, distracted and dismayed him. Moreover, his gross partiality for his chief supporters, the powerful Zborowskis, speedily and completely alienated from him the hearts of the gentry. At a tournament held in his honour shortly after his coronation young Samuel Zborowski, in a fit of pique and without any extenuating circumstances, mortally wounded Wapowski, Castellan of Przemyśl, who died a few days afterwards. The kinsfolk of the murdered man clamoured for justice, well aware that death was the statutory punishment for the homicide of a nobleman; but the King allowed himself to be influenced by the powerful friends of the accused, and the sentence finally pronounced—perpetual banishment without either loss of honour or forfeiture of goods—was received with general astonishment and indignation, the *szlachta* regarding it not only as ridiculously inadequate, but as an outrage upon their whole order. The result was a general revulsion of feeling against the entire French party. Hundreds of pasquinades began to circulate against the King and his following; and members of the royal suite were frequently assaulted in the street. Yet still the King continued to lean almost exclusively upon the Zborowskis, and all the principal offices at his disposal were bestowed upon their friends and relations. His uniform coldness towards the Korolewna, moreover, did not tend to make him less unpopular. He continued to stay at Cracow, in order to be nearer to France in view of the speedy

decease of his brother Charles IX, who had been long ailing, and on June 14, 1574, a courier from the Emperor brought to Cracow tidings of the death of that monarch. On the following morning Henry, dressed in violet after the French custom, appeared in the Senate, received the condolences of a deputation of magnates who there awaited him, and in solemn and affecting words, "not without tears," declared himself more than ever resolved to provide for the safety and glory of the Republic. He had at first intended to act constitutionally, and obtain permission from the Diet to revisit his native land; but the fear of a humiliating refusal led him to change his mind at the last moment and resolve to escape by stealth.

On Friday evening, June 18, 1574, the King, having gone to bed and dismissed the Polish gentlemen-in-waiting on the plea of weariness, issued secretly from the castle by a little gate, and having taken horse near the stables, departed half-an-hour after midnight, accompanied by a few French lords. He took the shortest way to Silesia; was joined on the road by a party of French gentlemen mounted and well armed, who had been waiting for him, and made such haste that he had passed the frontier and entered Silesia before he was overtaken by any of those Polish lords who, with a great company of horsemen, had set out in pursuit two hours after his Majesty had quitted the castle. Of these only the Count of Tenczyn, his under-chamberlain, overtook him (about a league beyond the frontier), and, with all due submission, used every argument to persuade the King to return. Henry excused himself with words full of deep emotion, saying that he must needs hasten on to France, as otherwise he ran a great risk of losing that kingdom altogether, but gave hopes that he would speedily return, and referred Tenczyn, in the meantime, to the letters which he, the King, had written to the Senate, and left behind him, accounting for his sudden disappearance. A week later Henry was dancing at a ball at Chambéry, to which place he was pursued by a troop of cavaliers sent after him by Karnkowski, the militant Bishop of Cujavia.

The indignation of the Poles at this disgraceful flight was vehement and alarming. Perjurer, swindler, craven, were the mildest epithets bestowed upon the defaulting monarch; all who were compromised in his support went for weeks in terror of their lives. The wealth, dignity, and influence of the Palatine of Sandomeria could not save him from insult. The Bishop of Cujavia narrowly escaped stoning in the streets of Cracow, while the Nuncio was reviled to his face, and threatened with death or banishment. The Senate, after a turbulent session, agreed to address a solemn remonstrance to the King, and the Primate (Jacob Uchanski) as *interrex* convoked a new Diet, which was to meet at Warsaw on August 24, 1574.

The Diet of Warsaw was short and stormy. The vast majority of the deputies, both Catholic and Protestant, were of opinion that the

King was civilly dead, and that the public safety demanded the instant election of his successor. The majority of the Senate, however, and most of the prelates, including the Primate, were of the contrary opinion. Meanwhile audiences were given to the ambassadors of the competitors for the crown, no fewer than three of whom were already in the field, viz., the Emperor Maximilian II of Germany, King John (Vasa) of Sweden, and Duke Alfonso II of Ferrara. The Emperor, from his vicinity, dignity, and power, was most acceptable to the Senate; but the lesser nobility declared they would rather die than accept a German, and they found an ally in no less a person than Sultan Amurath III, who had also sent a *chiaus*, or special envoy, to the Diet. The Turkish envoy, on this occasion, displayed a tact and *finesse* very unusual just then with the envoys of a nation which, invincible in arms, affected to despise the circuitous methods of diplomacy. The Sultan well knew, he said, that there was no hope of Henry's return. A new King must therefore be elected, but he was not to be taken from among the Sultan's enemies, of whom the Emperor was the chief. Their choice must fall upon one who would live at harmony with the Porte. His master had heard that in the confines of Danzig there was a man in every way worthy of the royal dignity. This was Jan Kostka, Palatine of Sandomeria. Why not elect him? Or there was the Swedish King, or Báthory, prince of Transylvania, the Sultan's trusty friend and ally, renowned for his courage, integrity, and prudence. Elect any one of these three, and the Sultan would not only not disturb but even actively assist the Republic.

The Diet was much flattered by the tone and manner of the *chiaus*. All three of the proposed candidates were agreeable to the Poles, though for different reasons. The Palatine of Sandomeria, perhaps the most popular, certainly the most powerful magnate in the land, was one of themselves. King John of Sweden was connected by marriage with the ancient and illustrious Jagiello dynasty which had ruled Poland gloriously for three hundred years. Lastly, the Hungarian, Báthory, though a stranger, could scarcely be called a foreigner, for he belonged to a nation which had much in common with the Poles, and had stood by them in weal and woe for centuries; besides, he had the additional personal recommendation of being one of the greatest captains of his age. The multiplication of candidates, however, so divided and perplexed the Diet, that no resolution could be come to; and the Nuncio's party, aided by the machiavellian Palatine of Podolia, skilfully took advantage of the general confusion to carry through a compromise whereby King Henry was given till Ascension Day, May 12, 1575, to return and resume the government; failing which he was to be degraded and dethroned, and a new Diet convoked to meet at the little town of Steczyc, which the Nuncio dejectedly describes as the "most heretically infected hole in the kingdom." The Steczyc Diet, which met on May 12, 1575,

could in no sense be called a fairly representative assembly. Out of more than 50,000 Polish gentlemen entitled to deliberate and vote in the national council, scarcely 5000 made their appearance. The Lithuanians and Prussians, however, who represented at least one-half of the population and more than three-fourths of the territory of the Republic, but who had consistently refused not merely to recognise but even to attend the previous Diet, naturally disputed the validity of the present assembly also, and merely sent a handful of delegates to protest against its proceedings altogether. It was the almost unanimous opinion of the Diet of Steczyc that Henry of Valois, by failing to appear, had forfeited the throne; and he was accordingly deposed on the very first day of the session. When, however, the question arose how to fill the vacancy, the assembly at once split up into half-a-dozen fiercely antagonistic sections; anything like agreement was absolutely hopeless. The audiences given to the ambassadors of the various competitors only increased the prevalent confusion. The Swedish envoy had nothing but vague words of benevolence in his mouth. The Muscovite envoys had neither money nor definite instructions, and were obliged at the eleventh hour to throw themselves into the arms of the Emperor, who could already count upon the votes of the prelacy and higher nobility. But the Polish gentry's ineradicable hatred and suspicion of the crafty semi-Spanish Habsburgs defeated all the calculations of the Imperialists. No sooner were the Archduke Ernest and his father the Emperor Maximilian proposed to the Diet by the Senate, than the 5000 deputies rose as one man and exclaimed, "*Nie chcemy Niemcza!—Nie chcemy Niemcza!*" (We won't have a German! We won't have a German!) For the moment it seemed not improbable that every member of the German faction would be put to the sword. Finally, the majority of the Polish deputies (the Lithuanians had already seceded from the assembly) quitted the Diet and marched in a body to the ruins of the castle of Sieciech on the banks of the Vistula. Here they strongly entrenched themselves, and for the next four days kept up a rolling fire of musketry to terrify their opponents. Deputations now went backwards and forwards daily between the castle of Sieciech and the Senate, but for a long time without the slightest result. At last, however, it was resolved that the whole question should be referred to another Diet, a compromise very welcome to the Imperialist party; and on June 27, 1575, after a session of twenty-six days, the Steczyc Diet dissolved amidst the wildest confusion, and the *interrex* summoned a new Diet to meet at Warsaw on November 7.

A few weeks later the Poles were taught the evils of anarchy by a terrible lesson. In the beginning of October, 1575, the eastern provinces of the Republic were ravaged by a predatory Tartar horde, said to be 120,000 strong. The gentry shut themselves up in their strongholds; the common people fled to the nearest fortified towns, while "the scourge of God" swept over the rich plains of the Ukraine, leaving a smoking

wilderness behind them, and disappearing into their native steppes with 55,000 captives, 150,000 horses, and countless herds of cattle, long before the frontier palatines could rally sufficient cavalry to oppose them. This lesson was not thrown away. At the next Diet a King was really elected—though not the King that all the world had been led to expect.

The great plain round Warsaw was the meeting-place of the new Diet. The Senate, anxious for the maintenance of order, and with the warning example of the last Diet before its eyes, had issued a proclamation limiting the retinue of each magnate to fifty persons, and strictly forbidding the lesser nobles to carry any other arms than the sword and halbert, without which no Polish gentleman considered himself fully dressed. But a decree that cannot be enforced is so much waste-paper. And so it was now. Everyone of the Palatines who came to the Diet was surrounded by a body-guard of at least 1000 horsemen, Cossacks, Heyduks, or Wallachs. The gentry also came armed *cap-à-pie*. The prohibited arquebuses and spiked battle-axes were in everybody's hands, and there were whole forests of lances.

On November 7, 1575, the assembly marched in solemn procession to the cathedral, where mass was celebrated by the Primate, who accompanied the deputies back to the *kolo*, and, after invoking the aid of the Holy Spirit, declared the Diet opened. From November 13 to 18 audience was given to the ambassadors of the various competitors, who extolled the virtues of their principals, and sought to outbid one another for the support of the Senate and the Diet. The Bishop of Breslau spoke first on behalf of the Archduke Ernest. He eloquently expatiated upon the gifts, the graces, the martial virtues, above all upon the linguistic accomplishments of the young prince. So well versed was he in the Bohemian tongue that the acquisition of the cognate Polish language would be a mere trifle to him. Then, too, his great experience of affairs and his religious tolerance should not be overlooked. Where else would the Poles expect to find a prince of such majesty and influence? The support of the Emperor, the alliance of Spain and the Empire, the union of Bohemia, the friendship of the European Powers—all these things were at his disposal. He would also solemnly engage to keep inviolate the laws, the liberties, the ancient constitution of Poland; to live at peace with the Turk; to make new and more advantageous commercial treaties with Denmark and the Hanseatic League; to erect new fortresses for the defence of the frontiers; to rule through none but natives; to send one hundred noble Polish and Lithuanian youths annually to the foreign universities; to pay the arrears due to the army and the debts owing by the State—in short, he not only promised “mountains and seas,” as the Nuncio expresses it, but anticipated his rivals by engaging, in the Emperor's name, to grant everything that any of them might subsequently offer.

Count Francis Thurn, “with all the dignity of age and all the

vivacity of youth," then delivered an extravagant panegyric on the Archduke Ferdinand. According to the orator, the world had never seen the equal of this young prince. He was the pillar, the oracle, the shining light of the House of Austria; he spoke Bohemian like his mother-tongue; and, without disparaging the other members of the Imperial family, the speaker would boldly assert that Ferdinand was by far the most distinguished of them all. Thurn promised on behalf of his principal 200,000 florins towards reconstructing the Polish fortresses; and, if agreeable to the Diet, Ferdinand would also raise and maintain, at his own cost, a standing army of German mercenaries wherewith to fight the battles of the Republic.

The ambassador of John of Sweden, who had nothing to offer but an alliance against the Muscovite, was, despite his connexion with the Jagiellos, but coldly received; whereas the spokesman of the fabulously wealthy Duke of Ferrara, whose "indescribable love for the noble Polish nation" prompted him to promise to restore the cathedral of Cracow at his private cost, to lead 6000 horsemen, equipped out of the revenues of his Italian estates, against the Muscovite, to replenish the exhausted Polish exchequer, and to educate fifteen young Poles every year in Italy, was held to have spoken much more to the point.

Last of all came George Blandrata, the ambassador of Stephen Báthory, Prince of Transylvania, who spoke with soldierly frankness and precision. It was no time, he said, for meretricious words, but for meritorious deeds. The safety of Christendom, of which Sarmatia was the iron bastion, depended upon the prudence and concord of the Estates of Poland. It was their bounden duty to lay aside all private ends and personal animosities, and, with uplifted hands, seek the Divine counsels. The prince, his master, was animated by no vain lust of power. He was well aware of his own deficiencies, and none knew better than he that the Sarmatian diadem must always be a constant care and a heavy burden to the wearer. The orator then briefly alluded to the well-known homogeneity of Hungary and Poland; to their frequent union, fraternal concord, ancient alliances; to their time-honoured fellowship in peace and war. Still more briefly he touched on the merits of his master, for whom he justly claimed all the requisites of a great soldier and statesman, adding that his ignorance of the native language of Poland was more than atoned for by his perfect command of Latin, her official tongue. Next, with great skill, he anticipated the objection which might be taken to Báthory as being the Sultan's nominee. The Sultan, he said, did not command them as a master; he advised them as a friend. If his advice were good, why not thankfully embrace it with both arms? If they thought it injurious, however, who prevented them from rejecting it? Finally, he promised on behalf of Báthory to preserve the national liberties, to pay the national debt, to recover all the Muscovite conquests, to make the frontiers of Poland invulnerable,

to pay 200,000 florins into the treasury, to wage war, not by deputy but personally, against all the enemies of the Republic, and, if necessary, to sacrifice his life on the battle-field for her honour and glory.

Blandrata's oration made a profound impression upon the Diet, and was greeted with loud applause. The Emperor's party, which began to despair of winning over the countless host of deputies, now placed all their hopes on the Senate, where, chiefly owing to the skill and audacity of the Nuncio they were very strong. Laureo, indeed, had so far compromised himself in support of the Emperor, as to run the risk of banishment in case of failure—nay, on one occasion, he had even thought it necessary to obtain a special absolution from the Pope for sundry diplomatic irregularities. Yet there is no reason to suppose that he was guided by other than the highest motives; and, though only the most signal success could justify his conduct as a whole, he never seems to have faltered for an instant on his self-chosen path. To extirpate Polish Protestantism, to form a grand league against the Turk, had all along been his objects; and the shortest cut to them both now seemed to him to be the establishment of a Habsburg on the Polish throne. His exertions were so far successful that, after a few days' debate (November 18–21), the Senate by a large majority declared itself in favour of the Emperor Maximilian.

But the Diet had yet to be reckoned with. The debates in that turbulent assembly began on November 22, and lasted till November 30. The numerous factions, which had so long divided it, now resolved themselves into two—those who were for the Emperor and those who desired a Piast. Most of the Lithuanians and Prussians were for the former; but the Poles (who formed three-fourths of the Diet) were, almost to a man, against a German, and they found an eloquent and intrepid champion in Jan Zamoyski, Castellan of Belz, whose intellectual superiority was already generally recognised, and who was destined to become Poland's greatest Chancellor.

Jan Zamoyski belonged to one of the most ancient and illustrious families in Poland. After completing his education at Paris, Strassburg, and Padua, he returned home one of the most consummate scholars and jurists in Europe. But his essentially bold and practical genius sought at once the stormy political arena; and he was mainly instrumental, after the death of Sigismund II, in remodelling the Polish constitution and procuring the election of Henry of Valois. After the flight of that prince Zamoyski seems to have aimed at the throne himself, but quickly changed his mind, and resolved to support one of his compeers. All his life long, both on the battle-field and in the council-chamber, he was the most determined and dangerous enemy of the Habsburgs, the rock on which all their anti-Polish projects went to pieces.

Zamoyski now delivered an impassioned harangue against the Emperor and his family. After holding up to the Diet the warning examples of

Bohemia and Hungary, the historical victims of Austria's craft and cruelty, he asked whether it was prudent to irritate their good friend the Sultan, all for the sake of a decrepit old man (Maximilian II) who could not defend them, or of a sickly youth (Archduke Ferdinand), inoculated from his cradle with Spanish bigotry and superciliousness. Zamoyski's speech was decisive. Despite the counter-arguments of the opposite party, the Diet, on November 30, decided by an enormous majority to elect a Piast; and on the following day the Grand-Marshal officially informed the Senate of their decision. Negotiations now ensued. Zamoyski, as the spokesman of the Diet, eloquently declaimed in the Senate against the Emperor. The Polish deputies thereupon seceded from the Diet, and, encouraged by the accession of the minority of the Senate, sent a second deputation to the *interrex* and his faction, demanding the repudiation of the Emperor. The Senate retorted by requesting the Diet to name its candidates, and, after some hesitation, Jan Kostka, Palatine of Sandomeria, and Jan Tenczynski, Palatine of Belz, were nominated. Both these noblemen instantly declined the dangerous distinction; and the Primate, egged on by the Imperialists to proclaim the Emperor, rose from his presidential chair, raised the crucifix aloft, and had already pronounced the first words of the coronation formula, "*In nomine Patris*," when he was interrupted by the more cautious of his own party, who, to avoid bloodshed, postponed the proclamation till the following day.

By daybreak on December 10, the field of election resembled a field of battle. Both parties stood face to face in full panoply, behind entrenchments bristling with cannon—the outbreak of a bloody civil war hung upon a thread. A last attempt at a compromise was made by the Bishop of Cracow on behalf of the Senate, while Zamoyski, at the head of a deputation from the Diet, bitterly reproached the Imperial commissioners for sowing dissensions in Poland. "We are determined," cried the orator, "not to suffer the fate of Hungary, and will on no account have a German King." On the 12th the Senate, perceiving the futility of further negotiation, and fearing the violence of the armed nobility, barricaded themselves within the citadel of Cracow; but at sunset the Primate, secretly issuing from the gates with a slender retinue, proceeded a quarter of a league from the city to a sequestered nook, and there, beneath the uplifted crucifix, and in the midst of a little group of Senators, declared in the name of the Most Holy Trinity, Maximilian II of Austria, King of Poland, by the will of the Senate and nobility of Poland and Lithuania; then, returning with the utmost speed to Cracow, he closed the gates, planted artillery on the walls, and thereupon sang, with chattering teeth, a hasty *Te Deum* in the Cathedral.

But the triumph of the Senate was short-lived. At sunrise next morning 7000 Polish noblemen had assembled outside the city to protest, sword in hand, against the election of the Emperor. The

excitement was frantic, and a pacificatory deputation from the Senate narrowly escaped being massacred. The embarrassment of the assembly, however, was at last equal to its indignation. The question was, whom were they to elect? The Emperor they refused at any price, but no native candidate dared to come forward against the Habsburgs. At last, when the confusion was worse confounded, the Palatine of Cracow suddenly arose and proposed the Prince of Transylvania. In an instant the name of Báthory, whom no one had hitherto seriously regarded as a likely candidate, was on every lip; and a subsequent motion by Zamoyski, that the Prince should accept as his consort the Korolewna Anna, was carried by acclamation. On the 14th Sieniecki, the Grand-Marshal of the Diet, thrice put the question to the chivalry of Poland and Lithuania: "Do ye desire Stephen Báthory, Prince of Transylvania, to be your King?" Whereupon the whole 7000 thrice replied as one man: "We do! We do!!" "Then," cried the Marshal, "I herewith proclaim the said Stephen Báthory King of Poland and Grand-Duke of Lithuania, provided he take the Princess Anna to wife." Thus Poland had two Kings Elect, one supported by the Senate, the other by the Diet. It seemed as if nothing but the arbitrament of battle could decide which of the two was the rightful monarch.

And now began a sheer race for the Crown. The last act of the Diet was to despatch a deputation to Transylvania to congratulate Báthory on his election, and invite him to come instantly to Poland with as much money and as many men as he could get together. Escaping, as by a miracle, an ambush laid for them on the way by the Imperialists, the deputation reached Stuhlweissenburg, Báthory's capital, and delivered their message. Stephen acted with characteristic vigour. Fortified by a friendly letter from the Sultan, he prepared at once to take possession of his new realm, and, after drawing a military *cordon* along the Austrian frontier and appointing his brother Christopher vice-regent of Transylvania, he hastened with 2500 picked troops by forced marches into Poland.

Meanwhile his partisans had not been idle. By the advice of Zamoyski another Diet was summoned to confirm the decision of the Diet of Warsaw. It met on January 18, 1576, at Jedrzejow, on the Vistula, about ten leagues from Cracow; and here 10,000 Polish nobles, without awaiting the Lithuanians or Prussians, confirmed the election of Stephen and Anna, sent an embassy to Vienna forbidding the Emperor to enter Poland, and then, after a fortnight's session, remarkable for its unanimity and tranquillity, marched in a body to Cracow, put to flight all the Emperor's partisans, and sent another deputation to meet the King Elect, and escort him from the frontier to the coronation city.

Yet even now the Imperialists did not abandon all hopes. The Nuncio was the life and soul of this party. He did all that energy and adroitness could do for a badly beaten cause. He boldly pronounced

the election of the Transylvanian "seditious and invalid." He endeavoured, though in vain, to cajole the Korolewna into rejecting her appointed husband, and marrying one of the Emperor's sons. He persuaded the Primate, whose peculiar office it was to crown the Kings of Poland, to absent himself from the coronation altogether. He wrote letter after letter to the Emperor urging him to invade Poland at the head of a large army. He suggested that the Holy Father should forbid the *woywo*de of Transylvania (as he persistently called the new King) to accept the Crown. Nay, he even sent a special envoy to Báthory himself, adjuring him by his chivalrousness, his piety, his Catholic faith to give way to his Imperial rival. A splendid embassy, headed by Adalbert Laski, had been already sent by the Senate to Vienna to announce to the Emperor Maximilian his election. On March 23 (exactly a month later than Báthory) Maximilian II accepted the Polish Crown in the cathedral of St Augustine, in the presence of the Imperial family, the Court, the papal legate and the Venetian ambassador, and took the selfsame oath which had already been taken by Stephen in the parish church of Stuhlweissenburg. From the cathedral the envoys were escorted to the castle, where they were pompously regaled at a grand banquet which lasted till dawn of day, when three successive salvos from 700 cannon hailed the newly elected King. But the thunder of the artillery had scarcely ceased when other Polish deputies from the Diet of Jedrzejow arrived at Vienna to inform the Emperor officially that Stephen Báthory was now the lawful King of Poland; and they were speedily followed by a *chiaus* from the Sultan with a letter, in which Amurath III informed "the King of Vienna" that for the last 130 years Poland had been under the special protection of the Sublime Porte, and that he (the Sultan) had now been pleased to recognise his faithful servant and ally, Stephen Báthory, as King. The Sultan added that any attempt on Maximilian's part to disturb either the Polish or the Transylvanian possessions of the new Prince would be regarded at Stamboul as a *casus belli*, and that in such case the Pasha of Buda and the Beglerbeg of Temesvar were under strict injunctions to cross the Austrian frontier with 100,000 men.

In Poland, too, Báthory was carrying everything before him. He had postponed his coronation for a fortnight, as the day originally appointed fell within Holy Week, so that it was not till Easter Monday (March 23, 1576) that he made his State entry into Cracow. The procession was headed by George Banfy, captain of the Hungarian Hussars, the Palatine of Cracow, his brother the Marshal of the Diet, and the Bishop of Cujavia, who, in the absence of the Primate, was to crown the new King. Next rode 500 Transylvanian gentlemen, two abreast, with leopard skins over gold and silver cuirasses. In the midst of this brilliant retinue towered the herculean form of the monarch, distinguished by his manly carriage and majestic gravity. He wore

a scarlet damask attila, a sable embroidered scarlet mantle, grey hose and yellow buskins. A black heron's plume waved from the top of his *kalpag*, which was fastened by a diamond clasp. His huge bay horse, of the best Turkish breed, had a golden bit, and its bridle was encrusted with emeralds, rubies, and sapphires. Before the King were led three other Turkish thoroughbreds, in scarlet housings trimmed with ermine, their saddles embroidered with the royal arms in gold and precious stones. Each saddle was valued at 100,000 florins. Immediately after him came 1000 Hungarian heydukes, half of them in sky-blue, half in crimson uniforms, all veterans, not one of whom had fought in less than ten pitched battles. They were known as the blue and red *drabants*, but Báthory always called them "my strength." An imposing array of 8000 Polish noblemen brought up the rear, at the head of whom rode the young and handsome Tenczynski, Palatine of Belz, so gorgeously attired "that the like of it had not been seen in Poland within the memory of man." A glittering *banderium* followed him in gold and silver armour, mounted on fiery arabs.

On May 1, after making the customary pilgrimage to the tomb of St Stanislas, Stephen and Anne were crowned by the Bishop of Cujavia with the usual ceremonies, though not before Stephen had sternly warned the assembled nobles and prelates that he would hold them responsible for the possible consequences of their precipitancy. The coronation was followed by the nuptials of the sovereigns, banquets and tourneys, the distribution of offices and dignities (Zamoyski's appointment to the Vice-Chancellorship was one of the first), and the issue of circular letters summoning a general Diet to Warsaw in the beginning of June; all who failed to appear there at the appointed time were to be regarded as traitors and rebels. Immediately afterwards Báthory, who was determined, he said, to show that he was "neither a painted nor a ballad king," set off for Warsaw to meet the Diet.

The night before Báthory's entry into the Polish capital the Nuncio had been obliged to leave it. Stephen had done everything in his power to win over Laureo; but his protests, his remonstrances, and his threats, had alike been thrown away. Laureo, though sorely troubled and dismayed, never wavered in his allegiance to the Emperor. At last an ultimatum from the indignant King (already on his way to Warsaw) to the obdurate prelate, bade the latter either come and meet him forthwith or leave the kingdom. The legate chose the latter alternative, and was escorted to Silesia by a royal chamberlain. His banishment, however, was not for long. The sudden death of the Emperor Maximilian at the very moment when that potentate, in league with the Muscovite, was about to invade Poland, completely changed the face of things. Stephen, whose orthodoxy was unimpeachable (he had before this extirpated the Transylvanian Unitarians), had already satisfied the Pope of his perfect devotion to the Holy See, and Laureo was now ordered back to Poland.

It was with no small anxiety that he looked forward to his first interview with a monarch whom he had so grievously offended, and whose chief counsellor he regarded as his bitterest foe. Comforted, however, by "a most humane letter" from the King, who was too great a man to bear malice and too prudent a politician to make foes of possible friends (especially as his own position, for the moment, was insecure and even perilous), the Nuncio returned at last to Warsaw, where he was received with open arms. In many subsequent interviews Stephen detailed his political plans to his new friend. He justified his hatred of the Habsburgs by reason of the treachery with which the Princes of that House had always treated Transylvania, and convinced Laureo that it was simply and solely political expediency which attached him to the Sultan, but that he was resolved to break these bonds and take up arms against the Turk ("*quem odio habebat cane pejus et angue*") to the glory of God, on the first opportunity. Of the Poles generally he had a very poor opinion. He appreciated their valour indeed, and hoped to make the most of their splendid military qualities; but a man of his stern simplicity and sobriety could not fail to be disgusted with their vanity, flightiness, and extravagance. "I do not wonder," he said, "that Henry of Valois escaped from them, but if ever I go it shall be by broad daylight, and not in the dead of night."

All Laureo's efforts during the remainder of his stay in Poland were directed towards bringing about an amicable understanding between the King and the Emperor. He exhorted Báthory "to burn all past offences in the fire of Christian charity," and though Stephen's distrust of the Habsburgs remained invincible, he consented at last to enter into a defensive alliance with the Empire, which the Nuncio personally carried through on his way back to Rome in August, 1578, where the zealous, though not always successful, services of the aged prelate were rewarded by the red hat.

The leading events of Stephen Báthory's glorious reign can here be only very briefly indicated. All armed opposition to him collapsed with the surrender of the great city of Danzig, since 1454 a self-centred Free State under its own oligarchy and nominal Polish suzerainty. The "pearl of Poland," encouraged by her immense wealth and almost impregnable fortifications, as well as by the secret support of Denmark and the Emperor, had shut her gates against the new monarch, and was only reduced (December 16, 1577) after a six months' siege beginning with a pitched battle beneath her walls, in which she lost 5000 of her mercenaries, and the famous banner with the inscription "*Aurea Libertas*," long regarded as the palladium of the city. Danzig was compelled to pay a fine of 200,000 gulden into the royal treasury, but her civil and religious liberties were wisely confirmed. Stephen was now able to devote himself exclusively to foreign affairs, which demanded equally decided and delicate handling. In those days the Turkish Power was

still in the ascendant, and even States so important as Venice and Poland were inscribed in the registers of the Ottoman Empire as tributaries to the Sublime Porte. The difficulties with the Sultan were temporarily adjusted by a truce signed November 5, 1577; and the Diet of Warsaw was at length persuaded, though not without the utmost difficulty, to grant Stephen subsidies for the inevitable war against Muscovy—subsidies which as usual proved totally inadequate.

Two campaigns of wearing marches, and still more exhausting sieges, ensued, in which Báthory, although repeatedly hampered by the parsimony of the short-sighted *szlachta*, which could not be made to see that the whole future fate of Poland depended on the issue of the war, was uniformly successful, his skilful diplomacy at the same time allaying the growing jealousy of the Porte and the Emperor. But for the loyal support of his wealthy Transylvanian principality, however, and frequent loans raised on his personal credit from foreign Powers, he would have been unable to prosecute his sagacious Imperial policy. In 1581 Stephen penetrated to the very heart of Muscovy, and, on August 22, sat down before the ancient city of Pskov, whose vast size and imposing fortifications filled the little Polish army with dismay. But the King, despite the murmurs of his own officers and the urgent representations of the papal Nuncio Possevino, whom the Curia, deceived by the delusive mirage of a union of the Churches, had sent expressly from Rome to mediate between the Tsar and the King of Poland, closely besieged the city throughout a winter of arctic severity, till, on December 13, 1581, Ivan IV (the Terrible), alarmed for the safety of the third city in his dominions, consented to treat for peace. Negotiations were opened at Possevino's residence near Zapoli, and resulted, January 15, 1582, after nearly five weeks of acrimonious wrangling, in the cession of Wielicz, Plock, and the whole of Livonia, to Poland, whereby Muscovy was entirely cut off from the sea, and the Polish frontier pushed further forward towards the East than it had ever been before. It is a melancholy and significant fact that Stephen Báthory's brilliant services to his adopted country, so far from being rewarded by the dutiful gratitude of his new subjects, absolutely made him unpopular with both the magnates and the *szlachta*. Not one word of thanks did the King receive from the *stan rycerski* (estate of nobles in the Diet) for defeating Muscovy, acquiring Plock, and reviving the ancient glories of Poland, till the Chancellor Zamoyiski put the whole assembly to shame by rising in their midst and delivering an eloquent panegyric in which he publicly thanked his sovereign in the presence of "this ungrateful people" for his inestimable benefits. The opposition was marshalled round the immensely wealthy and powerful Zborowski family, which had grown to undeserved greatness and monopolised the principal dignities in the kingdom during the short reign of Henry of Valois. From the first they had treated the new King insolently. At a levée held soon after his coronation, as

the papal Nuncio tells us, Marshal Zborowski, the head of the family, fell to reasoning of good swords, drew forth his own blade from its sheath, and lauded it as one of the best in the presence of Báthory, who, justly taking offence thereat, suddenly loosed his scimitar from his girdle, and beating down with it the other's sword, flashed the scimitar in his face, remarking that it was a still better blade than his (Zborowski's) sword. Thereupon, the Marshal, perceiving his error in unsheathing his sword in the royal presence, straightway fell upon his knees and begged pardon of his Majesty. The Zborowsky resented being set aside under the new reign in favour of more meritorious persons, and conceived a fanatical hatred of the upstart Chancellor Zamoyski in particular. Stephen bore with them for a while; but at length their conduct became so seditious and defamatory that he was compelled in self-defence to take notice of it. His opportunity came, when the outlawed homicide Samuel Zborowski presumed to return to Poland. Zamoyski at once arrested him; and he was arraigned for high treason before a tribunal presided over by the King himself, and after a scrupulously fair trial was condemned to death and duly beheaded at the castle of Cracow, May 26, 1584. The Diet, which assembled on January 15, 1585, took up the cause of the Zborowsky, and its stormy deliberations seemed to be the prelude of a civil war, the whole session being little more than a determined struggle between law and order on one side, as represented by the King and his Chancellor, and anarchy and rebellion, as represented by the Zborowski faction, on the other. Ultimately, however, Stephen prevailed; the sentence of Samuel Zborowski was confirmed; and his kinsman, Christopher, was declared infamous and banished (February 22, 1586).

Stephen's policy in religious matters aimed at consolidation and pacification. Devoted Catholic as he was, he nevertheless respected the liberties of the Protestants, severely punished the students of Cracow for attacking their conventicles, and even protected the Jews from insult and wrong. A man of culture himself, moreover (Caesar's *Commentaries* was his constant companion, and he revised and corrected the ms. history of his Muscovite campaigns written by his secretary Heidenstein), he justly appreciated the immense value of education, and, at the beginning of his reign, entertained the ambition of reforming the University of Cracow by placing it in the hands of the ablest scholars of the day, men like Muretus, Zabarella, and Gregory of Valencia. His chronic poverty, due to the obstructive parsimony of the Diet, rendered this large and liberal scheme abortive; and he was therefore obliged to rely more and more upon the Jesuits, who happened to be the best educational instruments at his command. He established the Order in Wilna, Posen, Cracow, Riga, and other places, despite the protests of some of the Catholic Bishops and all the Protestant Superintendents; and from these seminaries, whose superiority was speedily and universally recognised

(the Protestants themselves sending their children to be educated there), issued those "lions of the Spirit," to use Skarga's expression, who, in the succeeding reign, were to reconvert Poland to Catholicism.

High political reasons also bound Stephen Báthory to the Jesuits. They alone had the intelligence to understand and promote his Imperial designs, which aimed at nothing less than incorporating Muscovy with Poland, and uniting the kingdoms of Poland and Hungary, with the object of ultimately expelling the Turks from Europe, and settling the Eastern Question once for all. These grandiose but, in view of the peculiar circumstances and of Stephen's commanding genius, not altogether impracticable designs, were first suggested by the death of Ivan the Terrible in 1584. Stephen's views found an ardent supporter in the new Pope, the vigorous and enterprising Sixtus V, to whom the King sent Sokolowski, Archbishop of Lemberg, and his own nephew, Cardinal Báthory, on a special mission to explain his plans. The King offered, in return for subsidies amounting to 3,648,000 ducats, to put on foot 84,000 men-at-arms for the Turkish campaign, and 24,000 for the conquest of Muscovy, at the cost of 200,000 ducats a year for four years. The Pope thereupon despatched Possevino on a second special mission to Poland and Russia, to pave the way for this vast undertaking; and a Diet was summoned by Stephen to meet at Grodno, in February, 1587, to consider the whole scheme, when the entire project was for ever dissipated by the sudden death of Báthory, who was carried off by a fit of apoplexy on December 12, 1586, in the flower of his age and vigour. No other Polish monarch (not even John Sobieski) ever deserved so well of his country. In his all too brief reign of ten years he had already approved himself one of the foremost statesmen and soldiers of his age. Not without reason does Poland reckon him among the most illustrious of her rulers.

CHAPTER IV.

THE HEIGHT OF THE OTTOMAN POWER.

THE failure of the Turkish attack upon Vienna in 1529 almost decided the Christian Powers to take advantage of this first check in the advance of all-conquering Islam. Near, however, as they came to such a decision, they failed to reach it. After as before the siege, the Habsburg sovereigns, the Emperor Charles V and his brother King Ferdinand, were restlessly eager to put down Protestantism and secure to their House an unassailable predominance in Europe. After it, as before, Francis I persisted in his efforts to prevent the realisation of this scheme.

Concerning the Habsburg policy it is interesting to note that Francis, the Most Christian King, and Solyman II's Grand Vezir Ibrahim Pasha expressed themselves in different words, indeed, but to precisely the same effect. "The power of Charles V," said Ibrahim, "is like a flood which, swollen by many a stream and fall, undermines the most solid foundations." "The Austrian brothers," wrote King Francis, "are bent on making the Imperial crown hereditary in their House and exalting themselves in every possible way. A new Emperor must be elected who will enthrone justice and restore the German nation to its ancient freedom."

Even as these words of the King and the Grand Vezir bore essentially the same meaning, so did the interests of France and of the Ottoman Empire point in the same direction. This was the formation of a Franco-Turkish offensive alliance against the Habsburg Power, which, not content with Spain, Italy, Austria, and the Netherlands, was reaching forth towards universal predominance. A preliminary agreement paving the way for an alliance was signed in February, 1535, at Constantinople. The formal treaty followed in February, 1536, negotiated by Laforest, the French ambassador at the Porte, and the Grand Vezir Ibrahim. So the way was prepared for that accord between France and Turkey which grew more and more intimate, until it afforded the world the spectacle of the fleets of Solyman and Francis united for common action in the Mediterranean. This, to the feeling of the time, was a heinous offence :

and the scandal would have been infinitely greater had it been known, or even suspected, that Solymán's siege of Vienna was the result, as the Grand Vezir Ibrahim revealed to Ferdinand's ambassador, of an appeal to the Sultan from Francis, his mother Louise of Savoy, and Clement VII, for help against the Emperor. Even in our days it is often said that Francis in allying himself with the Porte ranged himself on the side of the barbarism of the East against the civilisation of the West. This view, however, the impartial judgment of history must pronounce to be not wholly correct. It was not invariably barbarism and civilisation which were opposed when in the age of Solymán and Charles V Turk met Christian. Barbarism was often to be found on both sides and in rank plenty. It is true that the Ottoman method of carrying on war was as a general rule barbaric; but that of their opponents was not less so. The ill-disciplined hordes of Charles V in their rioting in Rome outdid the Turks; and the Emperor Charles himself, when he had taken Tunis (1535), handed over the town to a merciless loot in which thousands of men and women were killed or led away into slavery. Two years earlier Andrea Doria had devastated with fire and sword the shores of Sicily and Corinth, quite in the manner of the Turkish admiral, Chairedin Barbarossa, when dealing with the Spanish possessions in the Mediterranean. The laying-waste of the land, the ill-treatment of the populations of the countries with which Solymán was at war, and still more the practice of employing prisoners of war as galley slaves—a practice extending to Christians also—were alike indicative of barbarism. But the way in which the Spaniards, even contrary to their interest, seized every opportunity of fighting with the Moors, and of destroying or driving into exile that highly civilised portion of their population, was the height of a barbarity not less infamous than foolish. It was no doubt a barbarous act to send the ambassador of a Power with which the Porte was at war to the Alcasabah—the fortress of the Seven Towers. But surely it was outdoing Turkish barbarity to strangle Solymán's ambassador, as King Lewis of Hungary did five years before the battle of Mohács; or to murder the ambassadors of King Francis, Rincon and Fregoso, in time of peace, as was done in Milan (1541) by order of the Imperial administrator, the Marquis of Vasto, the act being justified by Charles V after its perpetration. In the matter of tolerance towards those of differing faith the Sultan was the superior of those with whom he fought. The exaction of a tithe of their boys from the defeated Christians was an act of cruelty, but apart from this no one was persecuted for his religion in the Ottoman empire in Solymán's time, when the Inquisition was carrying on its deadly work in Spain and in the Netherlands. In view of all this it cannot be said that in the wars of Solymán barbarity was to be found only on the side of the Turks. In several points it is undeniable that the Ottomans were better, the Spaniards and Imperialists worse than their reputation.

The raising of the siege of Vienna, fortunate as it was for the Emperor and his brother, brought them no political advantage. Ferdinand had had himself crowned King of Hungary two years before, but here he was, and remained, a King with only a fragment of a country. Solyman had bestowed the Hungarian kingdom as a fief upon John Zápolya; and the latter maintained himself in its possession by Turkish help. Charles V now found himself in a position which might be described by the French proverb, "*qui trop embrasse mal étreint*." Spain urgently demanded his presence. France kept the peace, but pressed on a course of action which rendered the Emperor's position more difficult. The Pope promised to summon a General Council, but secretly did all he could to prevent its meeting. In Germany the wishes of the Protestants stood in sharp opposition to those of the Emperor. The latter, finding himself in sore want of money, was at last induced to make concessions which he abominated to the Protestants, and to try to bring about peace with Solyman. He wrote again and again to his brother (April and November, 1531), advising him to come to terms both with the Turks and Zápolya, and to instruct his ambassador to yield the very utmost that he could in the negotiations.

Ferdinand, in accordance with his Imperial brother's wish, actually yielded as far as he could. The King's ambassadors at the Porte were instructed, if nothing else would serve to bring about peace, to give up the whole of Hungary to Zápolya on the single condition that at his death it should revert to Ferdinand. The ambassadors were received in state at Constantinople; but, when they had spoken with the Grand Vezir and had audience of the Sultan, they saw that, in spite of their utmost concessions, peace was not to be obtained, and that a new war was at hand.

Solyman made mighty preparations, hoping for an easy victory over the helpless Emperor and his brother; and the army which started from Constantinople at the end of April, 1532, was 200,000 strong. It was to meet this imminent danger that Charles made concessions to the German Protestants which, though ambiguously worded, induced the Imperial Estates to grant for the defence a levy of 25,000 men who were to muster in Vienna by the middle of August. This resolve on the part of the Estates was due in a great measure to Luther, who persuaded the Protestants to lay aside their distrust of his Imperial Majesty and be satisfied with his gracious concessions. Nevertheless we are assured by Charles' Spanish biographer Sandoval, that he did not allow any Lutherans among the Italian, Spanish, and Dutch levies which he himself joined in Vienna in September, lest they should contaminate the Catholics and help the Turks. Altogether, he probably had gathered in Vienna a force which, including the Imperial contingent, would have been strong enough for the defence, had the siege of the city—so universally dreaded—been renewed.

The siege, however, was not to be. Solyman had advanced as far as Güns by way of Belgrade, where 15,000 Tartars from the Crimea joined him, and Essek, where he was reinforced by about 100,000 men from Bosnia; seventeen strong places on the route had yielded to him without any serious attempt at resistance. Güns, however, before which Solyman appeared on August 9, made preparations for defence. It was well-fortified, but is said to have had a garrison of only 700 men. This handful of warriors held out for three weeks against a dozen assaults, defending heroically and successfully a breach of eight fathoms in length, and winning even the admiration of the enemy. The Governor Nicholas Jurischitz was invited into the Turkish camp on the security of two hostages and a written safe-conduct, and was cordially received by the Grand Vezir, who warmly acknowledged the bravery of the defence. In Solyman's name the town and castle of Güns were presented to Jurischitz with a robe of honour. At his request it was even granted that a guard of twelve Turks should be posted in the breach in the wall to prevent any others of the besieging force from entering. This episode carries one back to the Third Crusade, when Richard of the Lion's Heart did not hesitate to knight a kinsman of the Sultan Saladin, and when, after bloody fights, Crusader and Saracen met as friends.

The Sultan's experience before Güns probably helped to drive out of his mind the thought of besieging Vienna, now so well defended. He contented himself with overrunning Styria and some parts of Lower Austria with straggling bands of horse, turning the campaign into a plundering-raid in which the afflicted land was wasted, its people hunted into the woods or carried away into slavery. Solyman himself led the retreat with the main body of his army, and on November 18 reached Constantinople, where he was lauded as the conqueror that, on this occasion, he was not.

It would now have been well for the army concentrated in and around Vienna under the command of Charles V and Ferdinand to march in full strength against Hungary, free it from the Turkish overlordship, and hurl Zápolya, the vassal of the Sultan, from the throne. For this, however, money in the first place was lacking. Furthermore, the season was too far advanced, and the help of the Imperial troops was not to be had. Already at the Diet of Ratisbon, when the grant of reinforcements was under discussion, even the Catholics opposed it. The whole Turkish danger was attributed to Ferdinand's feud with Zápolya; and it was declared that if this could be brought to a satisfactory conclusion Germany would have rest from the Turks. The commander of the Imperial troops also pointed out that these had been levied against the unbeliever, and were ready to fight against him, but not against Zápolya. To risk the advance into Hungary with an army reduced by the withdrawal of the German troops was obviously out of the question.

While the Ottoman attack was checked at Güns, Andrea Doria,

Charles' admiral, had taken the offensive by sea. He had been successful in seizing Coron on the peninsula of the Morea, one of the strongest Turkish coast fortresses. Patras and two other sea-forts either submitted or were taken by storm, the Turkish fleet retiring before the Genoese admiral's victorious advance. But Doria could not maintain his position in these waters when winter drew near. He sailed westward, leaving behind in Coron a strong garrison of about 2000 men. To Solymán the success of the bold Genoese in the Spanish service must have been simply an annoying episode, which must soon come to an end, as the Christians in Coron were merely a fighting outpost, and could not maintain themselves against the superior Ottoman Power. It is incredible therefore that alarm at Doria's success inclined the Sultan to peace; and, indeed, there is evidence that a very different cause influenced him in this direction. He had conceived the idea of the Persian expedition which he actually carried out next year; and it was to avoid the necessity of carrying on war on two frontiers that Solymán lent his ear to the plea for peace offered by King Ferdinand.

In the beginning of January, 1533, Hieronymus Jurischitz, brother or step-brother of the defender of Güns, appeared in Constantinople as Ferdinand's ambassador. Two audiences, one with the Grand Vezir and one with the Sultan, sufficed to secure an immediate armistice. Even peace was not in principle refused, but the acceptance of formal proposals was made dependent upon that of certain conditions laid down in writing by the Sultan and despatched to Vienna by a Turkish agent (*chiaus*) together with the son of Jurischitz. Ferdinand received the *chiaus* as an Ottoman ambassador in all state, and, in order to forward the peace negotiations, found himself obliged to accept the Sultan's conditions. These were not difficult of fulfilment, but hard to bear for an independent sovereign such as Ferdinand felt himself to be. Solymán demanded the keys of Gran in token of submission and homage. These keys he would then generously return without insisting on the surrender of the fortress. The *chiaus* received a favourable reply; and shortly after his departure from Vienna a second ambassador was despatched to Constantinople. The latter was to take with him the keys of Gran, deliver them up, and, with Jurischitz, carry on the peace negotiations. This second plenipotentiary, Cornelius Schepper, was also the bearer of two letters to the Sultan—one from Ferdinand, who styled himself Solymán's son, and offered to mediate for the restoration of Coron, Doria's conquest, the other from Charles V trying to induce the Sultan to give up Hungary to Ferdinand.

When Schepper arrived in Constantinople the negotiations for peace followed the course marked out by the Turkish programme. The keys of Gran were handed over to the Grand Vezir with the words: "*Ecce claves illas, quas tu et Caesar Turcarum petivistis ad fidem et firmitudinem Regiæ Majestatis Domini mei declarandam.*" Upon this, the Grand Vezir

with a smile made a sign to Jurischitz that he might keep the proffered keys. The negotiations then proceeded and were drawn out for a month longer between the Grand Vezir Ibrahim and Alvise Gritti, a Venetian in the Turkish service, on one side, and Ferdinand's two ambassadors on the other. Charles' letter to the Sultan brought by Schepper gave great offence. Both in form and in substance it was highly displeasing to Turkish diplomatists. Schepper, moreover, in the Emperor's name insisted upon the surrender of the island of Ardschel, from which Chaireddin Barbarossa plundered the shores of Spain and Italy; and further declared that Coron could only be delivered up on condition that the whole of Hungary were left to Ferdinand. The result was, as might have been expected, that Ibrahim and Gritti cut short all discussion of the matter with the words: "Charles V, if he desires peace, must send his own ambassador to Constantinople." With Ferdinand's ambassadors an agreement was at last (June 22) drawn up which became the basis of the first Austro-Turkish treaty of peace. In virtue of this Solymán granted peace to King Ferdinand so long as it should not be infringed by Austria. In regard to Hungary the *status quo* had to be recognised; that is to say, Zápolya was to keep the kingdom and Crown, while, concerning the portion of the country which was in Ferdinand's hands, a compromise and delimitation of borders were to be arranged to which the Sultan's assent would afterwards be given. The final result of the negotiations, therefore, was a treaty which afforded a respite from the Turkish attack upon Austria, and enabled the Sultan in Asia to turn his full strength against Persia, and in Europe to renew his attacks by sea upon the Mediterranean possessions of Charles V.

Shortly after the conclusion of the peace Solymán despatched an army for the reduction of Coron, which yielded and was handed over by the Spanish garrison. Furthermore he made Chaireddin Barbarossa Commander-in-Chief of the entire Turkish marine force, laying only one binding injunction upon him (and this as a later addition), namely, to refrain from attack upon the shores of the ally of the Porte, the King of France. Chaireddin was supreme at sea, Doria's fleet being too weak to cope with him.

In the year 1533 Chaireddin, whose ordinary occupation was attacking, plundering, and ravaging the coasts of Spain and Italy, succeeded in carrying out an act of real humanity. Landing at Oliva on the Andalusian coast, he in the course of seven expeditions brought away 70,000 Moors, whose life at home had been made insupportable to them by the Spanish government in alliance with the Inquisition, and conveyed them across to the North African coast. Next summer (1534) he passed through the Straits of Messina, whence he carried off booty and ships to the coasts of Naples. Here he attacked several places, took thousands of prisoners, and narrowly missed carrying off, for Solymán's harem, Julia Gonzaga, widow of Vespasiano Colonna, celebrated at the time as

the most beautiful woman in Italy, and a loyal disciple of the brothers Valdés, of Castile and Naples. In her castle at Fondi the fair lady was surprised by the advent of the Turks, and in dire distress had to leap half-clad to her horse and ride for freedom, with one knight for her companion. For reasons best known to her she caused the knight with whom she had fled from her pursuers to be stabbed.

Chaireddin Barbarossa, meanwhile, sailed with a fleet plentifully provided with money by Solymán, to Tunis, which town, with its strong castle La Goletta, he easily seized (August 2) from the hands of Muley Hassan, a descendant of the Arabian family which had borne sway there for four centuries and a half. He was now, as the vassal and representative of Solymán, lord of Algiers and Tunis, and from this point could direct his attacks along the shores of the Mediterranean. Sicily, Genoa, Catalonia, and Andalusia all belonged to the Emperor; but to defend them against Barbarossa was beyond his power. The land indeed owed obedience to Charles, but Chaireddin commanded the sea and was a constant menace to the whole line of coast. The most dangerous aspect of it was that Francis I had entered into relations with Barbarossa, and shortly before October, 1533, had received his ambassadors. Further, that the King had just claimed Alessandria, Asti, and Genoa from the Emperor; while Pope Clement VII, who had married his niece Catharine de' Medici to the Duke of Orleans, was friendly to the French, and, though he indeed censured their friendship with the Turks in public, was quite the man to take advantage of it in the Medicean interest in private. During the first eight and a half months of 1534 Charles had to be on his guard against Francis, the Pope, and the Sultan. Against Barbarossa he might indeed devise schemes, and this in all seriousness; but the European situation forbade their being put into execution.

Happily for Charles, an event occurred which changed the entire situation. On September 25 died Clement VII, and on October 11, with rare unanimity and after a conclave lasting only an hour, Cardinal Farnese was chosen as his successor and took the name of Paul III. The plans of Clement and Francis I, arranged at a meeting in Marseilles in November, 1533, now fell to the ground. The new Pope had his family to think of, Piero Luigi Farnese, his son, and Ottavio, his grandson, and had far more to hope from the Emperor, who was all-powerful in Italy, than from Francis, who had to risk a war for his power in that country. During the first half of his pontificate Paul III maintained a neutral position between the two adversaries. Francis, deprived of all support on the part of the Pope, reduced his demands upon the Emperor, or at least deferred them to a more convenient season. Moreover, the King of France must still have had some scruple about hindering the Emperor from proceeding against Barbarossa, or attacking him in the rear while engaged in such an undertaking. The indignation of Christendom would have been aroused; and, from the French point of view, the formal

alliance with Solyman was not yet an accomplished fact. The German Protestants, too, had been quieted by the Emperor and his brother with the assurance that in matters of faith nothing should be carried by force, but all should be left to the Council which was to be called. Charles, then, had a free hand to begin operations against Chaireddin Barbarossa; and under his own command and that of Doria a fleet composed of Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese galleys set sail from Barcelona against Tunis on May 30, 1535. The strength of this fleet, after it had been joined in the harbour of Cagliari in Sardinia by six papal galleys, was stated by Charles himself at seventy-four galleys, thirty smaller vessels, and three hundred transports for the land troops. Such a force Barbarossa was by no means strong enough to face in the open sea. On land he would have at his disposal in Africa a force which in point of numbers might be a match for that of the Emperor, but in quality was greatly inferior. What did it profit him, therefore, that Francis sent an ambassador to announce that the French would attack Savoy and Genoa in the summer? He needed such a diversion immediately, for he was entirely dependent upon his own resources, and these were insufficient.

On June 14 the Emperor's fleet reached the Gulf of Tunis and cast anchor at a short distance from the fort La Goletta. The siege lasted a month. After a breach had been made a successful assault was delivered; and, though the garrison held out bravely for ten hours, the fortress was taken. Two hundred cannon and eighty ships in the harbour were the prize of the victor. In spite of the intolerable African heat the Emperor set out with his army on July 20 upon the march to Tunis. Before they reached the latter place they had to fight with Barbarossa, who had taken up an advantageous position and lay in wait for them. He was put to flight, however; and the fettered Christian slaves in Tunis (whose numbers are variously stated) broke their chains and opened the gates to the Emperor. On July 21 Charles entered the conquered city, and, yielding to the demand of the Spanish contingent, delivered it up to his troops for a two days' loot. The Spaniards behaved like wild beasts, plundering and murdering to their hearts' content, destroying mosques and schools, and laying buildings and precious sculptures alike in ruins. From the plundered town the Moslem inhabitants who had escaped the sword were led into slavery. Charles betook himself to La Goletta, where he reinstalled Muley Hassan, whom Barbarossa had banished, in the government of Tunis, on condition of homage and the payment of a quit-rent. In the fortress of Bona, which had also been surrendered, and in La Goletta, the Emperor left garrisons. He himself reembarked on August 10, but was detained in the Gulf of Tunis through unfavourable weather till the 17th, when he set sail for Trapani, reaching that place on the 22nd.

In certain quarters the rejoicing over the issue of this campaign was

too pronounced. The Emperor had indeed inflicted upon the hitherto invincible Chaireddin Barbarossa defeat and loss, but he was very far from having broken or even weakened his strength or his energy. Charles left Africa in August, and already by the end of September Barbarossa had reappeared in Spanish waters, where he surprised the island of Minorca, broke into the harbour of Mahon, carried away rich booty, and recaptured several thousand Christians who had been freed by the Emperor in Tunis. The next year affairs went on in much the same way. In August, 1536, Barbarossa made a sudden attack upon Calabria. A year later he descended upon Apulia, where, for a short time, he menaced Taranto, and even frightened Rome to such a degree that many people left the city, and Paul III made preparations for defence. The same fear prevailed there in 1543, when Barbarossa ravaged Calabria. It quickly died away, however, when, at the end of June, he landed at Ostia, did no damage at all, and even paid in cash for all given to him. This was because the Pope at that time was friendly to Francis I, and so came to be regarded as the friend of that King's ally, the Sultan. From all this it is clear that by his conquest of Tunis Charles had indeed won honour and glory, but little or no substantial advantage over Barbarossa. A striking exemplification of this fact was offered to the world in August, 1543, when the fleet of Barbarossa, placed by the Sultan's order at the command of the King of France, in company with the French, took the town of Nice, though the castle defied them. The Mediterranean at that time was a Franco-Turkish sea; and Charles V, who in October, 1541, had again fitted out and led in person an African expedition, was compelled by unfavourable weather to return from Algiers, which he had intended to wrest from Barbarossa's possession.

In the autumn of the year which saw the conclusion of peace between Solyman and Ferdinand the Persian war began. For the West this could only be regarded as a fortunate event. The Ottoman State was always prepared for war; but, if it were engaged with the Persian Shiites, it must perforce allow Christian Europe an interval of peace. In the autumn of 1533 the Grand Vezir Ibrahim for the first time took command of the forces gathered on Asiatic ground. While in winter quarters, he carried on negotiations with the traitorous commanders of Persian fortresses, with the result that, as soon as operations were resumed, a whole series of fortified places surrendered to the Turks. The latter directed their march towards Tabriz, which, after crossing the Euphrates and taking more than a month's rest, they reached on July 13, 1534, and at once occupied without striking a blow. A vigorous order of the Grand Vezir checked the loot of the town, and none of the inhabitants suffered the least injury. Only in September did the Sultan join the army, which by most difficult marches over mountains and through narrow defiles was brought to Bagdad. This city likewise surrendered without striking a blow, its Persian garrison

taking to flight; and here again Ibrahim succeeded in preventing all plunder. Bagdad on the left bank of the Tigris, far-famed as the former city of the Khalifs, now became a frontier-fortress of the Ottoman Empire, and remains in its possession to-day. Solyman wintered in Bagdad, and only at the beginning of April set out for Tabriz. From this place it took six months more to reach Constantinople, which the Sultan entered on January 8, 1536.

During the next two months important events occurred. In February was concluded the Franco-Turkish treaty of alliance, mentioned above; in March there followed the fall of the Grand Vezir Ibrahim. For fourteen years this statesman of Greek origin had stood rather beside, than beneath, Solyman, both in the possession of a rank only second to that of his sovereign, and in the actual exercise of power. The Sultan had given him his own sister in marriage, placed unbounded confidence in him, always allowed him to exercise influence in the affairs of the State, and frequently to express an independent judgment concerning them, and had shared with him both table and sleeping-room. On the evening of March 30 the Sultan and his favourite retired together, sharing the same apartments. Next morning the Grand Vezir was found strangled by the Sultan's orders. To seek the reason of such a sudden fall would be superfluous. The Grand Vezir—allowing for the difference in the manner of death—merely met the fate which befell Thomas Cromwell in England, from which Antonio Perez succeeded in escaping by flight from Spain, and which at an earlier time overtook Remirro de Orco, Caesar Borgia's minister in the Romagna. The practices of despotism, open or veiled, are the same everywhere, alike in Christian as in Mohammadan lands. It is often as dangerous to serve as to betray it.

Shortly after the Sultan's return to his capital from the Persian expedition, war broke out again between Charles V and Francis I. For the Emperor it took an unfavourable course from the beginning. The outbreak seemed to draw the Pope entirely over to the French side and directly to invite the Sultan, who had concluded neither peace nor armistice with Charles, to help his ally the King of France. This in fact was what happened. Barbarossa was let loose upon the lower Italian provinces of the Emperor and inflicted upon them various kinds of outrage. Fortunately for Charles, though unfortunately for Venice, the Turkish fleet repeatedly came into conflict with Venetian ships. The Sultan made complaints about this and sent Junisbeg, the interpreter of the Porte, as ambassador to Venice. Four Venetian galleys, however, gave chase near Corfu to three Turkish vessels, one of which had Junisbeg on board. Contrary to the law of nations, he was taken prisoner and ill-treated, though afterwards released with excuses. To appease the Sultan the Signory put the commander of the four galleys, Gradenigo, in chains and tried Contarini, his superior in command. This was not, however,

accepted as sufficient, the less so as, by the perfidy of Charles' admiral Andrea Doria, a letter written by the latter in which he feigned to be in communication with the Venetian Admiral Pesaro, fell into the hands of the Turks. Solyman resolved on war with the Republic, and proceeded to devastate the Ionian island of Corfu (August, 1537) and to lay siege to its fortress. The Signory entered into alliance with the Pope and Emperor against the Sultan—an alliance which was to end in bitter disappointment.

In the contemporary Venetian historians, Paruta and Sagredo, even in Paulus Jovius, who is disposed in other respects to be partial to Charles V, we meet with the complaint that the Emperor entrapped the Venetians into this war with Solyman in order to weaken them. It may be doubted, however, whether this was really Charles' design from the outset, though his conduct and that of his Admiral, Doria, could hardly have been different had such been indeed their object. The Emperor and Pope carried out their engagement with the Republic only so far as to order their galleys to join the Venetian fleet. Andrea Doria, however, as commander of the Spanish contingent, rendered such inefficient service that the great sea-fight with Chaireddin Barbarossa in face of the Ambracian Gulf near the ancient Actium was lost in spite of the numerical superiority of the allies (September 28, 1538). Soon after the news of this catastrophe the Signory must, thanks to French indiscretion, have heard some rumour of Charles' negotiations with Barbarossa about the end of 1538, of his offer to surrender Tunis to him, and of the despatch of two agents to conduct the affair. Three letters of Charles from Ghent (March, 1540) were subsequently found and published: one to Barbarossa himself, a second to Doria and Fernando Gonzaga, viceroy of Sicily, a third to de Tovar, governor of La Goletta. To these letters was added a note of what was in progress with Barbarossa. Whether, or how far, the latter had agreed to the Emperor's proposals cannot be discovered. The younger Granvelle, thirty years later (February 16, 1570), addressed a letter to Philip II from Rome in which it was openly affirmed that Charles had won over Barbarossa. If Doria's behaviour in the battle of Actium actually helped Barbarossa to gain the victory, this fact may be connected with the negotiations between Charles and the Turkish admiral.

Broadly speaking, the double-dealing of the Christian princes of the time is thrown into glaring light by the course of the Venetian war and the treaty of peace between the Signory and the Sultan. At the opening of the second year of the war a League had been formed in Rome (February 8, 1538), in which the Pope, the Emperor, King Ferdinand, and Venice joined in an offensive alliance against the Turks. The inclusion of Ferdinand *ipso facto* involved the breach of the treaty which he had concluded with Solyman four and a half years before. The Pope and Emperor gave their help to the Republic so half-heartedly that Chaireddin

could continue without interruption to conquer one island in the Aegean sea after another from the Venetians. When the allies finally hurled themselves against him they, as has been said, brought defeat upon themselves through Doria's tardiness and disloyalty. After this it is hardly surprising that the war-spirit died out in the Venetian Signory, and that a desire for peace took its place. They sent (January, 1539) a certain Lorenzo Gritti, a natural son of the Doge, on pretence of private business to Constantinople, there to attempt to open peace negotiations. He succeeded in concluding an armistice for three months, but got no promise of peace. When Charles V heard of Gritti's mission he asked the mediation of Francis I; with whom, since the conclusion of an armistice of ten years between them, followed by a personal interview at Aigues-mortes near Montpellier (July, 1538), he proclaimed himself one in heart and soul. Francis was asked to mediate with his friend Solymán for the inclusion of the Emperor in the peace with Venice, and for the grant of an armistice on the part of the Turks to the whole of Christendom. The French King did the Emperor's will, and despatched a special agent to Constantinople to obtain Solymán's assent. The agent, however, received an answer which might almost have been dictated by Francis himself. "Whereas Charles, King of Spain," wrote Solymán to Francis (May, 1539), "desires and would be gratified by the grant of an Imperial armistice, let him first give up and deliver into your hands all the provinces, lands, places, and rights, which he has taken from you and kept possession of until now. When he shall have done this and you shall have been pleased to acquaint our Porte therewith, then shall it be done according to your desire."

Charles did not admit himself either to have been vanquished or, as indeed he might have been, duped. When, on his way to put down the revolt of Ghent, he passed through France, he arranged with the King an agreement, into which they had already entered at an earlier time, for a joint embassy to Venice. The object of this was to persuade the Signory of the complete harmony prevailing between himself and Francis, and of his intention to throw his whole strength into the Turkish war, for which he could reckon on his new ally. With this mission Charles entrusted his deputy in the Milanese, the Marchese del Vasto, and Francis the Marshal d'Annebaut. These two arrived in Venice in December. At their audience with the Signory del Vasto spoke first, and said that the Emperor proposed to turn his whole strength against the Turks; that the peace with France was definitive though some points remained to be settled; and that the two rulers had resolved to unite their forces for the overthrow of the unbeliever. Annebaut in his turn confirmed del Vasto's statements, and emphasised the fact that his King was animated by a strong feeling for the welfare of Christendom.

What credence could the Signory lend to such representations? In

the first place, they knew that Francis I was allied with Solymán and was not at all likely to help the Emperor against the Ottomans. Secondly, they were well aware that the problem of the possession of Milan, which Francis desired at any price and Charles would relinquish for none, was insoluble, and lay as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of any real union between the two. Thirdly, they saw clearly enough that Charles pressed them to continue the war without the slightest intention of supporting them against the unbeliever, but simply for the reason that his own position, and more especially his perennial want of money, made it desirable to give Barbarossa occupation against Venice, in order that Spain might be left at peace. Moreover, a fortnight earlier, Francis, through his ambassadors at Venice and in Constantinople, had taken an active part in paving the way for a separate treaty between Venice and the Turks. The Signory must have been blind indeed if they had taken for genuine coin what del Vasto and Annebaut laid before them as such. They answered with phrases that committed them to nothing, neither affirming nor denying the necessity for a separate treaty.

Shortly after the reception and dismissal of del Vasto and his French companion in January, 1540, the Senate resolved to send Alvise Badoer as ambassador of peace to Constantinople. He took with him two sets of instructions. One was from the Senate, merely authorising him to offer a large sum of money to the Turks instead of the two places they demanded, Malvasia and Napoli di Romania (the ancient Nauplia in the Gulf of Argos). The second was from the Council of Ten, empowering him, if all else failed, and peace was not to be had in any other way, to agree to the surrender of Malvasia and Napoli di Romania, which the Turks had been unsuccessfully besieging for a year and a half. Of this secret portion of the instructions the French received treacherous information, which they communicated to the Porte—whether for the purpose of hastening the conclusion of peace, or of proving themselves faithful allies to the Sultan, it is impossible to say. Possessed of this knowledge, the Turkish diplomatists played an easy game with Badoer. He arrived in Constantinople in the middle of April, and was received by the Sultan on the 25th. By May 4 peace was virtually concluded, though formal sanction was delayed until October 2. Venice had to give up to the Sultan Malvasia, Napoli di Romania, Urana, and Nadin on the coast of Dalmatia, and to leave in Turkish possession the Aegean islands Skyros, Paros, Antiparos, Patmos, Ægina, Stannipalia, Nios, most of them already taken by Barbarossa. In addition, Venice had to pay 300,000 ducats as war indemnity.

This peace marks a stage alike in the decline of Venetian dominion and in the rise of the Ottoman power to the highest point it was destined to reach. It added one more to those blows of fortune which had stricken the Republic of St Mark since the opening of the century—the League of Cambray with its results in the second decade; and the

conquest by Selim I of Mesopotamia and Egypt, which cut the Venetians off from the latest route to India by Alexandria, Cairo, and Aden, and thereby diverted a large portion of their trade. To all this was added the loss of her maritime possessions—a loss which inflicted further damage upon the already shaken finances of the Republic, and, as an inevitable result, gradually reacted upon the political energy of the ruling aristocracy.

The treaty appears in a very different light, however, when viewed from the Ottoman standpoint. The war which preceded it had indeed brought no defeats to the Turkish troops but had been marked by constant ill-success. The siege of the Corfu fortress was given up by Solyman after it had lasted a week, while that of Napoli di Romania had dragged on without any result. In Dalmatia the conflict had been waged with varying fortune; now one series of small fortresses had been taken by the Turks, now another by the Venetians. On the sea indeed Barbarossa was supreme, and this wherever he showed himself. It was through him that Venetian trade had been thrown into hopeless confusion, and her sea-traffic rendered impossible while the war went on. Yet although the war with Venice by land hardly reflected credit upon Ottoman arms, the overwhelming power of the Turks was evident from the fact that they were able to carry on war on three other sides at the same time. In 1538 Solyman took the field in person against the tributary Prince of Moldavia, drove him into flight, burnt Jassy, seized the strongly fortified Suczawa and the treasure kept there, and placed a new prince over Moldavia, from which he cut off the district between the rivers Dniester and Pruth and the Black Sea, annexing it to the Ottoman Empire. At the same time he was persuaded by fugitives from Humáyún, the Mongolian Emperor of Delhi, to turn the Ottoman arms against India. A well-equipped fleet of seventy sail with 20,000 troops on board left Suez (June, 1538) by the Red Sea, successfully attacked Aden; landed on the coast of Gujarat; rapidly took two fortified posts; and then set to work against a place of which the Portuguese held possession. They bravely defended themselves; and running short of provisions the Turks had to raise the siege and retire to Egypt. On the return journey the Arabian town Yemen was compelled to accept Solyman's overlordship. When it is remembered that the year before, in spite of the peace with Ferdinand, Turkish governors of the frontier provinces had renewed the offensive and overcome 24,000 Austrians who opposed them, it becomes perfectly evident that the Turkish offensive forces were in the sixteenth century taken altogether greater than those of any other European State. Even Christendom as a whole could not compare with the Turks in this respect, for, in its deep-rooted divisions, a fragile system of alliances was everything it had to offer against the all-powerful unity of Islam.

Shortly after the drawing up of the Turco-Venetian treaty and

before it had reached its final form, King Zápolya of Hungary died (July 20, 1540). He left an infant son, born to him by his wife, Isabella of Poland. King Ferdinand at once attempted to make good his claim to the possession of the whole of Hungary on Zápolya's death. Though he had an ambassador already in Constantinople, Hieronymus Laszki, he promptly despatched the Italian Andronico Tranquillo as a second; and jointly the two ambassadors were to procure Solyman's assent to the incorporation of Hungary with Ferdinand's possessions. At the same time Ferdinand sent the Greek Remyro to the Shah of Persia to urge him to declare war against Solyman. He even marched into Hungary and sent a detachment of troops to besiege Buda. There, however, he met with a brave resistance, and had to retreat, contenting himself with occupying the towns of Pest, Waitzen, Wischegrad, and Stuhlweissenburg. His ambassadors to Solyman had no better luck. Laszki was put in prison; the royal dignity was awarded to Zápolya's little son as tributary to, and under the protection of, the Sultan; and war with Ferdinand was resolved upon.

It was very soon evident that the Sultan had not taken the field in the interests of a child, but in his own. This he clearly demonstrated in the first year of the war, when he transformed Buda into the province of a Turkish Pasha. It was in June, 1541, that Solyman left Constantinople and took the command in person. He marched by Nissa to Belgrade, where Hieronymus Laszki, whom he had taken with him, was left behind ill; then to Buda, of which place Ferdinand's troops had been compelled after heavy losses to raise the siege. On his arrival here the Sultan occupied the fortress with his Janissaries, banished the widowed Queen and her son to Transylvania, transformed the principal church into a mosque, and proclaimed the whole of Hungary under the rule of the Porte during the minority of the little John Sigismund Zápolya.

In September two new ambassadors from Ferdinand reached the Sultan. They were commissioned to promise a yearly tribute of 100,000 gulden for the grant of the whole of Hungary, and, in the event of this being refused, to stand firm upon the surrender of the places in Ferdinand's possession and occupied by his troops in return for a yearly tribute of 40,000 florins. Not a fraction of either did they obtain. "Let Ferdinand," ran the answer given them, "deliver up to the Sultan unconditionally Gran, Wischegrad, and Stuhlweissenburg, and then further proposals will be entertained." Soon after this a French ambassador, Paulin de la Garde, appeared before Solyman and, complaining of the murder of the ambassadors Rincon and Fregoso in the previous June by the Imperialists, pointed to Laszki as the person upon whom the Sultan could take vengeance. Solyman, however, gave a lesson in international law to the murderers in the Imperial service and professed Christians. He set Laszki, who had fallen ill, free from his imprisonment.

On September 22 the Sultan left Buda, where he had placed a garrison and appointed a Pasha. It remained in Turkish hands for a hundred and forty-five years. In the middle of November Solyman returned to Constantinople after his four months' campaign; and a month later Chaireddin Barbarossa sailed into the harbour with his fleet. The latter had been looking on from a safe haven while Charles V in person, with a fleet equipped at heavy cost for an African expedition, was beaten back in front of Algiers by storm.

The rest of this year and that which followed brought little change into the situation. King Ferdinand again sent (July, 1542) Tranquillus Andronicus as ambassador to Solyman with the offer of a yearly tribute of 100,000 ducats if Hungary were given up; but the embassy was entirely fruitless. Almost at the same time an army of respectable magnitude was despatched by Ferdinand to Pest, where it merely came to disaster. It was not until the spring of 1543 that the Sultan took the field again in Hungary. The conquest of a series of strong places followed; and the important city of Gran, after sustaining a siege of eleven days only, was taken. Solyman promptly dedicated the cathedral of the surrendered city as a mosque, and apportioned Gran to the province of the Pasha of Buda. The Turks then pressed on to the siege of Stuhlweissenburg, which withstood two assaults but was in the end forced to yield. The war brought to the Sultan success upon success, ever wider districts of Hungary submitting to his sway; and this extension of the Empire was actively carried on in the following years. Solyman had returned to Constantinople; but his troops took Wischegrad, which King Ferdinand had seized, with the Hungarian crown which was kept there. Seven other strong places fell to them by force or consent. Fights in the open field, in which now the Turks, now the Austrians gained the advantage, alternated with the monotonous course of the sieges. It was the final result of this campaign and of the two which preceded that Solyman was able to divide the part of Hungary which was in his power into twelve *sanjaks*, which, following the course of the Danube and the Theiss, extended on one side from Buda by way of Gran, Stuhlweissenburg, and Fünfkirchen to Slavonia, on the other by Szegedin to Syrmia. Each several *sanjak* received a special tax-register; and a *defterdar* established in Buda had charge of the whole system of the administration of the taxes. This was the half-military, half-civil and financial organisation which Solyman at the beginning of 1545 conferred upon the Hungarian portion of the Ottoman Empire. It remained in force with few changes—and these rather extensions of its sphere of operations—for a century and a half. In this aspect of his work Solyman deserves the title, given to him in the East, of the Lawgiver—and indeed that of a lawgiver whose work was permanent.

In their hopelessness of effecting anything against the superior

Ottoman arms, Charles V and his brother sought safety in peace negotiations. First in June, 1544, they succeeded in getting the Pasha of Buda to consent to an armistice, originally for a month only, but afterwards indefinitely prolonged. Then followed embassy after embassy from Charles and Ferdinand to Constantinople, which for two years were practically without result. It was not until the close of 1546 that Veltwyck, the joint ambassador of Charles and Ferdinand, succeeded in opening a negotiation which, after a year and a half, led to the desired end. The peace, or rather five years' armistice, was drawn up on the basis of the *status quo* on June 19, 1547. Solyman kept all his conquests, and for the small portion of Hungary which Ferdinand had managed to hold during the war an annual payment to the Porte of 30,000 ducats was stipulated—this payment being interpreted on the Austrian side as a free gift, while the Turks regarded it as a tribute. In the peace were included the King of France, the Republic of Venice, and Pope Paul III—the last, as a Venetian *Bailo* told the Council of Ten, at the instance, not of the Emperor or his brother, but of the Grand Vezir, Rustem Pasha. It is highly probable that this was the exact truth, for just at the time of the peace negotiations with the Porte, Charles V was on very bad terms with Paul III, and "the Pope felt himself," as Ranke expresses it, "the ally of the Protestants."

Humiliating as the payment of tribute to the Sultan was, brilliant days seemed dawning for the Habsburgs at this time. For Charles one lucky event followed another. In July, 1546, died Chaireddin Barbarossa; in March, 1547, King Francis I, and in the following month Charles was victorious over the Protestants at Mühlberg. To all this was now added the security of the five years' armistice which the Sultan had granted for 30,000 ducats a year.

After the treaty with the Habsburgs, Solyman allowed only a short rest to himself and his army. In the spring of 1548 he began a new campaign against Persia. The superiority of the Ottoman arms proved itself against the Persian Shiites, hated by the Turks as heretics. Fourteen years had passed since the Grand Vezir Ibrahim had taken Tabriz and saved it from loot. This time the town was taken by Solyman himself, and its inhabitants received a like forbearing treatment. From Tabriz the march went on towards Van, a strongly-fortified place which surrendered after a short siege of only eight days. Still more striking was the issue of the second campaign; and Solyman, on his return to Constantinople in December, 1549, was able to send a triumphant report to King Ferdinand and the Signory of Venice. "Thirty-one towns," the Sultan's letter announced, "have been taken from the Persians."

Not long afterwards the Shah of Persia attempted a counter-move; when, as will be seen, the war in Hungary again broke out between Ferdinand and the Sultan, the Shah seized the opportunity to take the

offensive in Asia. It remains an open question whether or not this was the result of a suggestion of Charles V; but it is an indisputable fact that Charles was already, and had been since 1525, in communication with Persia, and continued to be so for more than twenty years. At first the war went in favour of the Persians. They took two strong places, one of which was Erzerum, whose governor with his troops they decoyed into an ambush and totally defeated. With lightning speed the news of the Turkish ill-success reached Europe. Already in January, 1552, it was discussed among those assembled at the Council of Trent, where it was even stated that the Shah had seized the passes of the Taurus and was threatening the whole of Syria.

In the campaign of 1553 Solyman took the field in person. The character in which he appeared first was not that of a heroic leader, but of the murderer of his own son. Prince Mustafa, the child of the Sultan's first wife, was "a thorn in the flesh" to the second, the Russian Churrem, whom the French poets Marmontel and Favart call Roxolana. He was the heir not only to the throne, but to his father's good qualities without any of the bad. The popularity enjoyed by Mustafa with the people as well as with the Janissaries was immense, and proved his ruin. His step-mother Roxolana was scheming to put him out of the way in order to secure the succession of her son Prince Selim. In league with the grasping Grand Vezir Rustem, her son-in-law, she could easily beguile the aged Sultan, and make him believe that Mustafa was a conspirator in league with the Janissaries to oust his father from the throne. Rustem exerted his powers of intrigue, and Roxolana her blandishments; Solyman fell blindly into their net, and Mustafa's doom was sealed. In obedience to his father's summons he appeared in the camp at Eregli, and on entering his father's tent, without suspicion though not without warning, he was strangled before the Sultan's eyes (October 6, 1553). The horrible deed roused the Janissaries to madness; and Solyman only averted a desperate revolt by the deposition of the Grand Vezir. This terrible tragedy exercised an effect on Ottoman affairs resembling that which the Massacre of St Bartholomew had on the history of France. Prince Selim, in whose favour the crime was committed, was the first of a series of degenerate Sultans, sunk in pleasure-seeking or stricken with Imperial mania, under whose sway the Empire went to ruin.

From their winter quarters in Aleppo the Turkish army advanced into Persian territory. This they reached after crossing the Euphrates near the border fortress of Kars; and the war was begun with the total devastation of the enemy's country. The opening character of this expedition was maintained throughout. It was a march of incendiaries who turned happy fields into deserts, and was only now and then interrupted by a fight in which sometimes the Persians, sometimes the Turks got the upper hand. At last the superiority of Ottoman arms was

proved in so far that the Persians, in spite of some noteworthy successes, could neither wreck the invading army nor wrest from it the conquests it had made. In September, 1554, an armistice was arrived at; and in May of the following year a treaty of peace was concluded at Amasia in Asia Minor. Here also ambassadors of King Ferdinand appeared, but were not immediately successful in bringing to an end the war which had broken out again in Hungary in 1551.

The cause of this new outbreak of the Hungarian war was that neither side had scrupulously kept the terms of the peace of 1547. The Turkish Pashas in Hungary had raided Ferdinand's territories, while the latter had, in direct violation of the treaty, involved himself in a negotiation for the freeing of Transylvania from its feudal dependence on the Ottoman Empire. Solyman had conferred the lordship of Transylvania upon Zápolya's widowed Queen during the minority of her son; but in actual fact the monk George Martinuzzi had arrogated to himself the rule, reducing that of the Queen to a mere name. With this Martinuzzi Ferdinand opened secret negotiations, in the hope of making Transylvania a part of the Austrian dominions, and of securing its throne for himself. When the Sultan, in spite of Martinuzzi's cleverness, saw through his designs, he considered that the peace had been broken by Ferdinand, and equipped an army which, some 80,000 strong, crossed the Danube at Peterwardein in September, 1551. It was commanded by Mohammad Sokolli, who subsequently, as Grand Vezir, was of the utmost service to the kingdom. In the first attack he took twelve more or less fortified places—among them the important town of Lippa on the Marosch, for which before the end of the year another fight had to be fought. After this Mohammad Pasha went on to the siege of Temesvar, where Ferdinand had placed a mixed garrison of Germans, Italians and Spaniards. After two months, however, the siege of this place had to be raised; and the Turkish army recrossed the Danube to Belgrade.

Martinuzzi, for whom shortly before Ferdinand had procured a Cardinal's hat, took advantage of the departure of the Ottomans to push forward all the troops he could procure in Transylvania, together with those of the King, for the recovery of Lippa. He himself joined the besiegers without any foreboding of his approaching fate. It had, however, become known at Ferdinand's Court that the newly created Cardinal was playing a double game—for the King on the one side and to all appearance, but also on the other for the Sultan, from whom he hoped for pardon, favour, and reward. To spoil his game Ferdinand authorised his general Castaldo, in case of treachery on the part of Martinuzzi, to prevent him from carrying out his design by putting an end to his life. Castaldo thereupon planned the murder with another of the generals, Pallavicini, and Martinuzzi's secretary; and on December 18 the Cardinal fell, pierced by many daggers. He was the victim in part

of his own intrigues, in part of that morbid growth of princely power which in those days both in Christian and Mohammadan lands had taken upon itself to be the supreme judge in its own cause. From Lippa the Turkish garrison had departed in accordance with the terms of the capitulation agreed upon with Martinuzzi.

The campaign of 1552 opened for the King with failure and heavy loss at Szegedin; for the Turks, at this time under the command of the Vezir Ahmad Pasha, with a series of successes. Between April and September, Wessprim, Temesvar, Scolnok, and other places were taken; an army raised by Ferdinand was entirely defeated, and half of it captured and brought to Buda, where the prisoners were sold at a very low price, so overstocked was the market. It was not until October that the Turkish run of good luck was in a measure checked before Erlau, which defended itself so bravely that the siege of it had to be raised.

In the following spring an armistice of six months was signed; and in August a negotiation for peace was opened by Ferdinand's ambassador in Constantinople. The armistice was now prolonged, but neither before nor after this arrangement was there any pause in the fighting. IncurSIONS from one part of the country into another, and sieges of towns and fortresses incessantly continued, as if war were the normal state of things, and an armistice an unnatural episode. The negotiations for peace were interminably protracted. One of Ferdinand's ambassadors had again and again to journey between Constantinople and Vienna, for the purpose of obtaining fresh instructions. Three times this situation repeated itself with intolerable monotony during the years from 1553 to 1557. To this period belongs Pope Paul IV's strange prayer to the Turks to give up their Hungarian war, turn their forces against Philip II, and so help the Holy Father in the struggle he was waging with the Spaniards.

At last the ambassador Busbek, a Netherlander (whose invaluable letters concerning this legation throw much light upon the Turkish affairs of the time), succeeded in framing a project of peace, to which he committed himself in Ferdinand's name, without a similar obligation being incurred by Solyman. Again, years passed before the project ripened into a peace, which Ferdinand, who had become Emperor shortly before the death of Charles V, ratified at Prague on June 1, 1562. This negotiation brought a Turkish interpreter to Frankfort-on-the-Main; and during its tedious course Ferdinand steadily and in much detail proved his right to the possession of Transylvania. His demonstration was not less steadily met by the statement that the Sultan had won his overlordship by the sword. As a matter of fact the sword dictated the whole treaty. Nothing was given up of the conquests made in the Sultan's name during the war and also during the armistice. Transylvania was adjudged to the son of Zápolya, no encroachments being allowed here on the part of Ferdinand; the yearly tribute of 30,000 ducats to the Porte was to be paid, and in future punctually; the peace was to be

strictly kept, and any breach of it, whether proceeding from the one side or from the other, was to be punished. The war had brought the Sultan important acquisitions in Hungary—Temesvar, Scolnek, the mountain town Füleke, Tata and other places—and these he kept by the treaty. And, to crown all, after its conclusion the Turks demanded that Ferdinand should settle the arrears of tribute which had accumulated for three years by a payment of 90,000 ducats.

In the last years before the conclusion of this treaty a tragedy happened in the family of the Sultan which had its origin in the murder, instigated by his wife Roxolana, of Prince Mustafa. Roxolana had also contrived that Ahmad Pasha, who had been made Grand Vezir in the place of her son-in-law Rustem, should be executed and replaced once more by Rustem. This was, however, the last success Roxolana achieved, and the last murder she had on her conscience. She died two and a half years later, with the soothing assurance that she had secured the reversion of the throne to her own offspring, or perhaps with the foreboding that a bloody struggle for the throne must decide which of her two sons, Selim or Bayazid, should succeed to it. This strife, which had evidently been smouldering from the time of Mustafa's murder, blazed out in a furious flame while Solyman was still living. On the side of Selim, the elder brother, stood his father with all his power; but Bayazid also had a party, and was able to raise an army strong enough to maintain a hot fight with Selim at Konia in Asia Minor (May, 1559), before it gave way. Bayazid fled to Persia, where he was delivered up by the Shah Tahmasp to the executioners sent by Selim. The unfortunate prince was strangled, with four of his sons. A fifth, only three years of age, who had been left behind in Asia Minor, shared the same fate. As the price of blood the Shah received 300,000 ducats from Solyman, and 100,000 from Selim. But the debt of the Sultan was not in the Shah's opinion adequately paid in money. He demanded in addition that five sons of a Khan who had fled to Bagdad from Persian justice should be given up for execution. This demand was granted.

As he was now at peace with Ferdinand—though indeed the peace in Hungary was badly kept on both sides—the Sultan gave his attention to the maritime struggle with Spain. The warfare in the Mediterranean had continued up to this point without intermission, but with varying fortune to the combatants. An attempt made by Philip II in 1563 through the Austrian ambassador in Constantinople to gain an eight or ten years' peace remained without result. Fighting and looting went on; on the one side Turkish fleets and corsairs, and on the other Christian fleets, and more especially corsairs equipped by the Knights of Malta, carried on their operations, and made navigation unsafe. Solyman intended now, by seizing Malta, not only to strike at the piracy of the Christians, but to inflict heavy losses on the Spanish power. The island

would in Ottoman hands serve as a safe harbour from which the entire length of the coasts of Spain and Italy might be threatened or attacked at any point. Accordingly Solyman, in April, 1565, despatched from Constantinople for the seizure of Malta a fleet of more than a hundred and fifty vessels, with over 20,000 troops on board, and abundantly equipped with all necessaries for a siege. The greatest sea-captains of the Empire, Piale, Dorgut, and Ochiali, co-operated in carrying out the Sultan's will and organising the siege; but they had no luck in the undertaking. They succeeded, indeed, in obtaining possession of Fort St Elmo, but two other forts, St Angelo and St Michel, were so bravely defended by the Knights that all assaults were vain, and only entailed enormous loss upon the besiegers. Nevertheless, the Turks remained in the island from May to September, attacking the forts again and again, only to be flung back with severe losses. At last the viceroy of Sicily, Don Garcia de Toledo, brought help to the hard-pressed Knights. He had delayed long, and only when expressly commanded by King Philip put out to sea with an ill-equipped fleet. When, however, he did effect a landing in Malta the Turks could not maintain their position any longer, but were compelled to raise the siege and reembark with the loss of many thousand men.

While the fighting in Malta was still going on, everything pointed to a new war in Hungary. The Emperor Ferdinand had died in 1564, and the treaty of peace had to be renewed with his successor, Maximilian II. Unpleasant discussions arose in regard both to arrears of tribute due for the last two years and to events in Hungary. Here Zápolya from Transylvania had annexed Szatmar, and Maximilian had ordered an attack on Tokay, which belonged to the Turks. Unfortunately the peacefully-disposed Grand Vezir, Ali Pasha, died in June, 1565, and the vacant office was conferred upon Mohammad Sokolli. This Bosnian, a true statesman and an upright man (such a one as did not again fall to the lot of the Ottoman Empire till after a hundred years in Ahmad Koeprili), held from this time forward, under three Sultans, the office of Grand Vezir, with wise moderation and at the same time with all necessary boldness. At the time of his coming into power he favoured war, in order to restore the belief in the invincibility of Ottoman arms which had been shaken by the failure of the expedition against Malta. Solyman was the more easily won over to this opinion, as he was much incensed by the conduct of the troops of Maximilian, who, respecting the peace as little as the Turks, had made incursions into Hungary, and had either taken or besieged Weszprim, Tokay, and Tata. Shortly after the beginning of the new year (1566) war was resolved upon; and the Sultan, in spite of his seventy-two years and uncertain health, entertained the idea of placing himself at the head of the army.

On May 1 Solyman with the Grand Vezir left Constantinople and took the field. They marched by Sofia, Nissa and Belgrade to Semlin in

the first place, where the young Zápolya appeared to do homage, and was received very graciously. From this point the Sultan meant to advance to the siege of Erlau, but changed his mind and decided to turn against the strongly fortified Szigeth, whose commander, Nicholas Zriny, had just attacked a Turkish scouting party and handled them very roughly. On August 5 Solyman halted before Szigeth, with considerably over 100,000 men, and began the siege. The outer line of fortifications was soon in the hands of the besiegers; but the inner part of the stronghold offered an obstinate resistance, and Zriny was not to be moved to surrender either by promises or threats. A first and second assault having failed, recourse was had to the laying of mines, which were fired on the morning of September 5 and destroyed a large part of the surrounding wall. But during the night of September 5 the Sultan died in his tent. The Grand Vezir succeeded in keeping his death secret from the army for three weeks, as had been done, though not for so long a time, at the death of Mohammad II and Selim I, in order to prevent or, at least, to weaken mutiny among the Janissaries. The siege of Szigeth went on, and on September 8 the place fell; and Zriny, fighting bravely, chose to die a hero's death. To the Grand Vezir Mohammad fell the difficult task of both commanding the army and paving the way for the peaceful accession of the new Sultan.

Thus in the thirteenth of the campaigns conducted by himself Solyman II had sacrificed his life. To the dead monarch his contemporaries in the West gave the title of "the Magnificent," or "the Great," his fellow-believers and fellow-countrymen in the East, that of "the Lawgiver." In the case of Solyman the claim to greatness holds good merely when he is compared with the majority of the members of his dynasty, which in the person of Mohammad II alone produced a ruler of equal capacity. Quite unquestionably, however, Solyman stands first among Turkish Sultans as a legislator; and the traces of his legislative activity far outlived his own time.

Though, like his predecessors the Khalifs and earlier Sultans, Solyman united in himself all ecclesiastical and temporal power, his State had become a preponderantly military one, in which the warrior class drew its reinforcement, as well as its maintenance and support, from the subject peoples. The Ottoman Empire was a military State *par excellence*, inasmuch as it was built upon ever-extending conquest. It was its mission to spread Islam by fire and sword, and to subdue unbelievers who refused to accept the faith, to the extent of making them liable to the capitation-tax.

In the constitution of the army as it had come down to him Solyman altered nothing in theory. His purpose was to make it more efficient, to facilitate its handling in the field; and his endeavours were crowned with success. From a Venetian report, made at the beginning of the second decade of his reign, we learn that he had even then raised the

total of the standing Ottoman army to 86,000 men—double the number at which it had stood in his predecessor's time. The nucleus of the army, the infantry corps of the Janissaries, he gradually augmented from 12,000 to 20,000; and he succeeded in heightening the soldierly zeal of these troops by giving them a closer organisation, and granting a higher rate of pay. In regard to the cavalry Solyman regulated the distribution of the fiefs called *timars* in such a way that arbitrary rule in the administration of the widely-extended Empire was not indeed rendered wholly impossible but brought within very narrow limits. Moreover, his numerous enactments on feudal affairs were so systematic in character and so clearly laid down that directly after his death, in the reign of Selim II, a sort of Domesday Book could be compiled, in which the whole landed property of the Empire was entered according to the two categories into which it was divided for purposes of taxation, and the feudal tenures were enumerated together with their obligation of military service. Besides the regular troops, there was at the disposal of a Sultan when he went to war the mass of the irregular militia. In the enemy's country this arm, consisting of hardly less than 100,000 men, was under little or no discipline; but on the march and within the bounds of the Ottoman Empire Solyman knew how to hold in check these otherwise unbridled hordes.

Next to the military class in order of importance was that of the teachers. As not only the faith, but also the civil law of the Mohamadan peoples was founded upon the Koran, the appointed exponents of the Holy Book must be held to be also the best judges in cases of law whether actually disputed in court or not. These *Ulema*, well-instructed in all the law of the faith, experts in their knowledge of the Koran, holders of the best paid judicial posts, and administrators (seldom very scrupulous) of the incomes of many pious foundations, were an immensely rich and therefore influential class of the population. Before their sentences (*fetvas*) all bowed; and the mingled ecclesiastical and secular power vested in the Sultan only affected them in so far that the Sultan at his pleasure nominated to the supreme positions from which all such judgments whether of law or faith proceeded. The repute of the *Ulema* was in Solyman's time still untainted; and he did nothing to lower it, but much to secure the attachment of these half ecclesiastical, half secular men of business by the commanding motive of self-interest. As a faithful Moslem and a calculating statesman he could not dare to disoblige them; for among the Turks too the ancient Arabian tradition was current that on the Day of Resurrection the ink of the *Ulema* would be as efficacious as the blood of the martyrs.

The supreme head of the priestly body was the *mufti*, to whose *fetvas* both established modes of procedure and the regulations of daily life owed their legal validity. It is worth remarking that Solyman gave a certain permanence of tenure, and thereby a certain independence, to

this high office by not changing the *mufti* during the last twenty-one years of his reign. During this time he retained the same person in the dignity, namely, Ebusood El Amadi, who remained another eight years under Selim II, and in this office effectively cooperated with the Grand Vezir, Mohammad Sokolli, consistently showing himself possessed of a love of peace and a humane spirit. It was this *mufti* who with the Grand Vezir tried in vain to hinder the Cyprian war projected by Selim, and a little later prevented the seizure of all the Venetians in the Ottoman Empire, pointing out that even though the Venetians, contrary to all right and reason, had thrown subjects of the Sultan into prison, still the Mussulman should not follow the evil example of the Giaours.

For the training of the *Ulema* Solyman issued a new course of study, to be carried on in the different colleges attached to the mosques. A course of ten grades was drawn up through which an *Ulema* had to pass before attaining to the higher ecclesiastical dignities or to the higher judicial posts of the Empire. None of the ten grades was to be omitted. Nevertheless, this actually took place; for abuse crept in and the *Ulema*, having become an hereditary caste, registered their sons in their earliest childhood, even in the cradle, as scholars in the lowest class, so that as boys they might be at once declared ready for one of the higher forms. Things were not very different in the Catholic Church before the Reformation, when Giovanni de' Medici, afterwards Pope Leo X, as a child of nine became Archbishop of Aix, and as a boy of fourteen Cardinal, in spite of the fact that the very Pope, Innocent VIII, who made him a Cardinal, had established the rule that to have reached the age of at least thirty was requisite before attaining to the dignity of the cardinalate.

Apart from these institutions for theological training, little or nothing was done in Solyman's time for the education of the Ottoman people. The national demand for education was slight, and the responsibility of meeting it was taken easily. The Turks were far from resembling the Arabians, under whose government in Andalusia almost everyone could read and write, and could carry on his education in one of the many schools of grammar and rhetoric. This was in the tenth century, when Christian learning was outstripped by Arabian; whereas in the sixteenth the Mohammadans had in their turn been distanced.

Not only in regard to his fellow-believers did Solyman bear himself as the head of the faith, but in regard to the Orthodox Greek Christians of his realm. Mohammad II had thoroughly grasped the fact that the numerous Greeks in his Empire greatly preferred himself to the Pope, and willingly received their Patriarch at his hands. The conqueror of Constantinople, however, and his grandson Solyman, could as Sultans hardly regard themselves as other than supreme in all the affairs of the Christians, temporal as well as spiritual; and they appointed and deposed

the Patriarch of the Greek Church as they pleased. The Arabian Sultans in Spain acted in just the same way, confirming the election of the Christian Bishops and even summoning Councils. Out of the practice of appointing to the Patriarchate grew that of selling it; and Solyman raised the price of attaining to this dignity from 500 to 3000 ducats. Later, the candidates for the office tried to outbid one another. In the seventeenth century its price had risen to from eighteen to twenty thousand ducats and more. It must not, however, be supposed that it was only with the Christians that the Sultans so dealt and bargained. Government posts were already sold in Solyman's time, and the practice—a fatal one—grew, and was destined to have mighty influence in later days upon the decay of the Empire.

In other than Church affairs the condition of the Christian population, called *Raja*, was not much better than that of a subject-people which had to work for its lords at a very low wage. The *Raja* had to pay to the holders of the *timars* a tenth, often by abuse a higher proportion, of the produce of the ground. To the State they had to pay a poll-tax, and deliver up a tenth of their boys for the army. Moreover they were subject to a whole series of rents and taxes which, though reduced to a system by Solyman, formed, taken altogether, a sufficiently heavy burden. The mere names of these taxes—bride tax, hoof tax, pasture, bee, mill, herd, and meadow tax, compulsory or villein service, and provision for the army taking the field—recall the conditions of feudal dependence in the West, and the reality of the obligations implied fully corresponded with the evil sound of the names. Still, before a Turkish *Cadi*, who was obliged to observe the great lawbook of Ibrahim of Aleppo compiled at Solyman's command, the *Raja* would get justice sooner than would a serf in Germany or France from his hereditary judge; and, even if the law gave fewer rights to Christians and Jews than to Mohammadans, it still afforded the possibility for each man to secure in full those which belonged to him in law. Not without reason was this Sultan called “the Lawgiver” by his people.

In regard to Solyman's title of “the Magnificent” the case is quite different. In the high sense in which this epithet was applied to Lorenzo de' Medici, for instance, Solyman by no means deserved it. The Sultan was fond of splendour; and his magnates followed the example he set in this respect. He magnificently adorned the city of Constantinople by the building of six new mosques. By undertaking works of utility such as bridges and aqueducts he enhanced the comfort of its inhabitants, and by opening up new means of communication by road he greatly facilitated intercourse between different parts of the Empire. At the same time he had regard to the filling of his treasury and the steady increase of the income of the State, so that, to carry on costly wars, pay the cost of luxury, and heap up treasure, he must beyond doubt have tampered with economic laws without sparing the sources of the

public revenue. Though the figures of the Venetian accounts are not entirely to be relied upon, yet, by comparing them with others, we arrive at the clear fact that Solyman increased the income of the State to more than double the amount at which it had stood under Mohammad II, and that he must therefore have brought undue pressure to bear in the matter of taxation. It cannot be maintained that an increase in the wealth of the people, which might have taken place meantime, could of itself have produced the increase in the taxes; for Ottoman affairs were regulated for war and not for production. Instead of "the Magnificent" Solyman should have been called "the Prodigal." He unsparingly staked the whole strength of the Ottoman Empire on the game, engaging in war almost every three years during a rule of forty-six, and winning a series of victories which raised that Empire to a height of power which it was too exhausted to be able to maintain beyond a short period.

With all conceivable care and skill the Grand Vezir had concealed the fact of Solyman's death until the arrival of his successor Selim in the midst of the army at Belgrade. After the announcement of the mournful tidings a largesse according to custom was made to the troops upon the new accession. The Janissaries, however, grumbled and demanded more, but were appeased by the declaration that no more money had been brought from Constantinople. On the day of the solemn entry into the capital, however, the rebellion broke out; and the Janissaries by open force, as well as by threatening to loot the city, succeeded in obtaining a largesse of the value which was wont to be given in former times upon the accession of a new sovereign.

Selim II inherited the Hungarian war; and this went on a full year longer without a decisive result for either side. While the Emperor Maximilian II could not reckon on any considerable success, the Sultan was bent on embarking upon a war in another direction; and the Grand Vezir was satisfied with the fact that Ottoman arms had overcome Szigeth after an obstinate resistance, so that none of them had any desire to prolong the war. Maximilian therefore wrote to congratulate the Sultan on his accession and asked at the same time for a safe-conduct for the peace ambassadors whom he proposed to send to Constantinople. No objection was made to the grant of the safe-conduct: and at the end of the summer of 1567 a peace embassy, equipped with the inevitable presents, appeared in the Turkish capital. The three ambassadors of whom it was composed found themselves face to face with a surprisingly altered situation. The Sultan was full of warlike ardour—not, however, directed against Maximilian and Hungary, but against Venice—for he was intent upon the acquisition of the island of Cyprus. The Grand Vezir was in favour both of peace with the Emperor and the maintenance of the peace with Venice. As it was now of importance to the Sultan to have his hands free on all sides, so that he might turn his undivided

strength against the Venetian Republic, the ambassadors hoped (as one of them wrote on December 21) to secure more favourable conditions by opposing procrastination to the Sultan's haste. But they had to do with a diplomat of greater skill than that of the Sultan. Mohammad Sokolli granted peace for eight years (February 17, 1568), on conditions comprising certain formal concessions to Maximilian, and others of very real moment to the Sultan, who had to be promised the yearly payment of a tribute of 30,000 ducats under the designation of a gift of honour.

At the Court of the Sultan the game of intrigue already in progress as to the question of war or peace with Venice began to draw to an issue. The Grand Vezir, who was favourably disposed towards the Venetians, had already under Solyman I at their desire procured a formal prohibition to Turkish merchants to trade with papal Ancona, and had further brought about the renewal (June, 1567) of the old treaties with the Republic. But now all he could do was to try to delay the execution of the Sultan's will, and hope perchance by the delay to turn it aside from its original purpose. Selim, however, was influenced in a direction opposed to the opinion of the Grand Vezir by personal inclination, the suggestions of intriguers, possibly also by real political considerations, rightly or wrongly understood. Selim may or may not have remembered that in his scheme for the conquest of Cyprus he only proposed the execution of what Solyman had already contemplated, when in 1564 he proposed to Duke Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy the severance of the island from the Venetian dominions. In any case, Lala Mustafa had laid Selim under great obligations when he was prince; the admiral Piali Pasha had something to gain from a naval war; the renegade Miquez Nasi, who held in fief the island of Naxos, hoped for the investiture of Cyprus; and all these together plied the ear of the Sultan with representations as to the ease with which Venice could be conquered, and the importance of the acquisition of Cyprus for the security of Ottoman supremacy in the Mediterranean. Every Sultan, they said, should signalise his entry into power by a brilliant feat in arms, and such a feat might now be performed without risk; for Venice, enervated by a thirty years' peace, had almost forgotten the art of war.

Mohammad Sokolli would have been powerless against the war-party had he not been strengthened by the action of Philip II. As a result of this King's intolerable oppression, the Moors rose in wild revolt in the south of Spain, and in his attempt to suppress the insurrection Philip did not shrink from inhuman cruelty. The Moors appealed to their fellow-believers across the sea, and procured active assistance from the Turkish vassal States of North Africa. This, however, could only prolong the rebellion, it could not ensure its success. The Moors resolved to appeal to the supreme head of their faith, the Ottoman Sultan. In the spring of 1569 a Moorish deputation appeared in

Constantinople to claim the powerful intervention of the Padishah in their peril of subjugation and even of ruin. The feeling which this deputation met with in the Turkish capital was so deeply sympathetic, so powerfully fostered by the *Ulcma*, so widespread, moreover, and shared by such numbers of the faithful, that even the party which was urging war with Venice had to assume the appearance of taking for granted an expedition against Spain. They are said to have proposed that the Sultan should effect a landing in Neapolitan territory at Otranto, and thus, by making a diversion in favour of the Moriscos, compel Philip to desist from their pursuit. Had this proposal been executed it would simply have amounted to *ut aliquid fecisse videretur*. Of what advantage could it have been to the Moors in Granada if distant Otranto were besieged or taken by the Turks?

The attitude of Mohammad Sokolli was totally different. He saw that the moment had come for a great undertaking against Spain, and that it must be seized. Philip II was at war with the Moors, who, supported by the Sultan, would hazard their resources to the uttermost. He was also occupied with the revolt of the Netherlands, where Alva was carrying on his bloody work, and was without any European alliance, or any prospect of getting one. France, in scarcely concealed rivalry with Philip, was in friendly intimacy with the Sultan. The Emperor—weak, dependent on Spanish support, and yet estranged from Spanish policy—was hampered, indeed crippled, in every action by the German Estates. The Italian States, oppressed by Spain, were exposed all along their shores to Ottoman attack. Finally, England was under the sway of Elizabeth, for whom alliance with Philip against Selim II would have been suicide. Such was the condition of affairs, and such the state of relations among the European Powers. The opportunity must be seized, and a new line of action taken up to press forward the frontiers of Mohammadanism into the territory of its traditional foe, now for the moment sharply pressed and isolated. Solyman would have lost no time in delivering a blow against Spain at a time such as this, when it was so likely to be effective. Nor was Mohammad Sokolli the man to linger and allow the Moors to bleed to death. His will, however, was only that of the Grand Vezir, and had to bend to that of a Sultan who, at a moment which unmistakably called him to great deeds, was consumed with a feverish desire for the possession of Cyprus.

Two errors brought about the war with Venice. In the first place the *Diwan* in Constantinople was misled by the news of a devastating fire which broke out in the Venetian Arsenal in September, 1569. They believed that the whole Venetian fleet was destroyed, while in fact, though considerable damage was done, only four galleys were burnt. Secondly, the Venetian Signory was deceived, when it persuaded itself that not only was an alliance with the Christian princes within reach (which proved to be the case after prolonged efforts to this end) but

that it would also enable them to hold Cyprus. This latter conviction was accurately discounted by Mohammad Sokolli, who remarked to one of the Venetian negotiators at Constantinople, "I know well how little you can count on the Christian Princes." He had already at an earlier date said very truly to the Venetian *Bailo*, "What will Venice do, seeing that the island [*i.e.* Cyprus] is at a distance of 2000 miles by sea? The Sultan is fully resolved to have it, and it would be better for you to give it up to him than to exhaust yourselves in its defence."

At the end of January, 1570, the Venetian Signory received the news that the Sultan was not to be dissuaded from his design upon Cyprus, and that very shortly the surrender of the island would be demanded. In the hope of help from the Christian Powers, and encouraged by an earlier rumour that the Porte was behindhand with its maritime preparations, the Signory resolved definitely to refuse the demand and to abide the issue of war. When the bearer of the ultimatum, who left Constantinople on February 1, arrived in Venice and threatened that if Cyprus were not voluntarily surrendered it would be seized, he received the answer: "The Signory are firmly resolved to defend their legitimate possession of the island of Cyprus, trusting in the justice of God." This answer, given on March 27, must have arrived in Constantinople towards the middle of April; and in May a fleet under Piali Pasha's command, with 50,000 men on board, was on its way to begin the conquest of the island. War had broken out, and Venetian diplomacy was at work to obtain for the Republic the help of the other Christian States at war with the Crescent.

In the first place application was made in Rome to Pope Pius V to allow the Signory to levy a tenth on the property of the Venetian clergy for the purposes of the war. When the Pope showed himself inclined to organise a league of Powers against the Turk, the Signory immediately authorised their ambassador in Rome to enter into the negotiations necessary for such a purpose. These negotiations were unduly prolonged, inasmuch as for all concerned the matter had a very serious side. Only the Pope threw himself heart and soul into the affair; and without his pressure and exhortation it would to all appearance have fallen through, in spite of the imminent peril to be averted. Even Venice, which had to withstand the first Ottoman onset, was filled with anxiety lest the results of an anti-Ottoman league should prove scarcely less fatal than those of a Turkish victory. The Venetians had to fear that Philip II, if the Turks were beaten with his help and under his leadership (which could hardly be refused), would reap all the advantage; that he would strengthen Spanish domination in Italy, and do away with the monopoly of the navigation of the Adriatic tenaciously maintained by the Signory, and so offensive to Philip himself and his kinsmen, the German Habsburgs. The ruler of Spain had indeed an interest in the weakening of the Ottoman Power, but it was by no means his intention that this weakening

should, as a natural consequence, benefit the Republic of Venice. Moreover he was afraid that the Signory, if their influence were increased by the formation of an anti-Ottoman alliance, would make skilful use of it so as to obtain an advantageous peace from the Sultan, and would leave their allies in the lurch. Nor was this fear at all groundless, for we now know (what Philip probably did not) that at this very time, when the Signory were seeking alliances against the Crescent in Rome and Madrid—namely, in March, 1571—they were also attempting to find out in Constantinople, whether they could not arrive at a peaceful solution of the difficulty which would render the league with Philip unnecessary.

Such being the state of mutual suspicion of the two parties chiefly concerned, it is not to be wondered at that the negotiations concerning the league lasted from March, 1570, till May 20, 1571. On that day, however, the Triple Alliance against the Turks between Spain, the Pope, and Venice was at last signed in Rome. Though a difficult birth, it was destined to give a lusty proof of vitality in the battle of Lepanto, but was then to die an early death.

During the diplomatic turmoil from which the league was born the Turks had not been idle. Their fleet had in passing devastated the island of Tenos, and reached Cyprus, near the ancient Paphos, on July 1. After the disembarkation of the troops, who were well equipped with siege guns, the Turks, under the command of Lala Mustafa, undertook the siege of Nicosia, and brought it to a successful conclusion on August 8. The town was destroyed by fire and sword. The Turkish attack was then directed against Famagosta, where the garrison made so brave a defence that the siege took a long time, and was still going on when the triple alliance became an accomplished fact. Yet in the third month after the conclusion of the league Famagosta had to capitulate; and the news of the perfidious breach of the agreement for the surrender, the barbarous slaughter of the brave defenders, and the infamous defiance of treaty obligations shown in throwing the inhabitants and garrison into slavery, spread through Christendom. The Turkish commander, Lala Mustafa, at whose door this barbarity was laid, incurred the worst odium. But while he must have appeared to many as a sort of Mohammadan Alva, he should, in fact, only bear a portion of the blame, though the names of those who were responsible for the greater part are not to be ascertained.

The triple alliance now seriously gathered together its forces. In addition to papal, Venetian, and Spanish ships, it had at its disposal troops and galleys furnished by the Duke of Savoy, Florence, the feudatories of the Pope, Parma, Urbino, Ferrara, and the Republics of Genoa and Lucca. In Naples, on August 14, Don John of Austria, the half-brother of Philip II, received the admiral's flag at the hands of Cardinal Granvelle as commander of the united fleets of the league. The place

of meeting for the mighty armada was Messina; and from this harbour the whole fleet, which was joined by some Maltese ships, put to sea, and proceeded to seek the enemy in the eastern waters of the Mediterranean. They sailed first to Corfu, then to Cephalonia, whence behind the rocky islands of the Curzolari, the Echinades of the ancients, they saw the Turkish fleet lying at anchor in the Gulf of Lepanto. The latter numbered 200 galleys and 75 smaller ships, to which the allies opposed 200 galleys, six enormous galleasses supplied by Venice, and a few smaller vessels.

The whole number of troops—that is to say, of actual fighting men—on board the Christian fleet, is given at 30,000. On October 7 the fleets engaged, and, after a sharp struggle, the allies gained a victory more complete and more brilliant than had ever yet fallen to the lot of the Christian Powers when contending with the Ottomans. Nearly fifty of the enemy's ships were burnt or sunk, the number of the Turkish dead amounted to 8000, that of the captured to 7000, and that of the Christians released from bondage in the enemy's galleys to 10,000. On the whole it seems likely that the Ottoman fleet would have been annihilated if Gianandrea Doria, who commanded the right wing of the allied fleet, had not managed to fail in a manœuvre, and let Ochiali Pasha, with 40 galleys, escape. Recent research has placed beyond doubt the fact that Doria's manœuvre failed purposely, in order to spare Ochiali, with whom Philip II had formerly carried on a negotiation, as Charles V had once done with Barbarossa.

The battle of Lepanto proved the superiority of Christian arms, its results that of Turkish diplomacy. It made clear also the fact that the Ottoman State was still at the height of its power. The maintenance of this position was facilitated by the divisions, nay hostility, which broke out not only between the cabinets of the three allies, but between the crews of the different nationalities, which had united to win the victory but went asunder over the distribution of the spoil. How matters were going on after the victory in the allied fleet may be gathered from a communication addressed on October 26 to the Venetian Doge by Marco Antonio Colonna, commander of the papal squadron. "Only by a miracle," he writes, "and the great goodness of God was it possible for us to fight such a battle, and it is just as great a miracle that the prevailing greed and covetousness have not flung us upon one another in a second battle." According to the agreement in the league half of the booty gained was to go to the Spaniards. They, however, in the weighing and measuring of it, tried to overreach the Venetians. This beginning of strife was fostered, or, at least, permitted, by the Admiral-in-Chief, Don John of Austria, who had an earlier quarrel with Sebastian Venier, commander of the Venetians, which was renewed after the battle. We hear that upon one of the Spanish galleys each simple soldier received booty to the value of two or three thousand ducats; while Sebastian

Venier—so he affirms in his account to the Senate—only received as his share 505 ducats, a coral chain, and two negro slaves. Certainly not all Spaniards secured any gain there of money or money's worth. We know, for instance, that the immortal Cervantes fought at Lepanto and lost his left arm; but that he made anything out of the battle we do not know.

A very short time after the Ottomans had suffered their severe defeat, the alliance of the Powers went to pieces. Before the end of October Philip II ordered Don John to bring back the Spanish ships of the allied fleet to Messina, and to winter there. Don John sailed by Corfu to Messina, whither he also took the papal as well as the Spanish galleys. Next summer he received orders from Madrid to repair again to the Adriatic, and cooperate with the Venetians against the Turks. Once again the allied fleet faced the Turkish, which had been refitted in Constantinople and was under the command of Ochiali Pasha. But the two fleets only came within sight of each other, without attempting a serious engagement. Don John remained before Navarino until September, and then sailed with his fleet in the direction of Italy. This was the last expedition against the Ottomans undertaken in common by the triple alliance; and after its failure the burden of the war fell upon Venice alone. Venice was encouraged on all hands to persevere against the enemy of Christianity, but received support from none, even the papacy refusing its help. Pius V, the indefatigable promoter of the league, had died in May; and an application by Venice to his successor, Gregory XIII, for a loan of money was met by a cold refusal.

In comparison with this growing disintegration of the league the conduct of the Ottoman government in the hands of Mohammad Sokolli appeared worthy of all admiration. The Grand Vezir had not only to reckon with the difficulties of the moment but with a Sultan such as Selim II, whom a French ambassador at his Court described as "the most imbecile person who ever held sway over the Ottoman State." To instil energy into this person, or even to get him to allow any scope to the energy of others, was in truth no easy task. Yet a single word from the Grand Vezir sufficed to gain the Sultan's attention. Selim agreed with all that Mohammad Sokolli proposed, and in political matters did all he wished and allowed what he ordered. At this time every conceivable effort was being put forth for the restoration of the navy, which had been practically destroyed at Lepanto. The arsenal of Constantinople was enlarged, space and ground being obtained for this enlargement at the expense of the gardens of the seraglio, from which an enormous piece was cut off. The building of ships was taken in hand with feverish speed, however incredible it may appear, and in the summer of 1572 a hundred and fifty new galleys were ready, and Ochiali Pasha was sufficiently strong to put to sea against Don John. Two years later the Ottoman fleet had attained to such strength that Ochiali, with 250 sail, appeared off Tunis, and once more seized it from the

Spaniards, who had settled there a short time before. This achievement in shipbuilding astonished the world, for in the sixteenth century no Christian State was capable of equalling it. It showed clearly that the Ottoman Power still stood firm, and that, from the height to which it had risen under Solyman, it had not yet fallen in the very slightest degree. "I could never have believed," wrote the ambassador whose accurate summing up of Selim II has just been cited, "that this monarchy were so great, if I had not seen it with my own eyes."

This ambassador was the Bishop of Acqs, of the noble House of Noailles, an extremely anti-papal and anti-Spanish diplomatist. It was he who, when negotiations for peace were opened between the Porte and Venice, undertook the office of mediator. All that the Signory got from the triple alliance was the momentary intoxication of the victory of Lepanto. After this there was nothing but bitter disappointment. A commercial crisis had set in at Venice, paralysing trade, greatly strengthening the party of peace, and limiting the enthusiasm for the war within ever narrower circles. The hope of securing a fairly favourable peace gained ground, and took the place of the expectation of Spanish help, which had now quite died out.

The Council of Ten, which until 1582 held in its hands all the threads of State affairs, authorised the Venetian *Bailo*, Marco Antonio Barbaro, in September to enter into a negotiation for peace with the Grand Vezir, either directly or through the medium of the French ambassador, the Bishop of Acqs. But he happened to be for some time absent from Constantinople; and the negotiation was at first carried on through the interpreter of the Porte, Oram Bey, and the Jewish physician of the Grand Vezir, Rabbi Salomon. A little later it was taken up by the Grand Vezir himself and the *Bailo*. The negotiation lasted more than three months, in spite of the fact that peace was desired on both sides and that the relations of two negotiators, Mohammad Sokolli and Barbaro, were those of friendly intimacy; but at last, on March 7, 1573, the matter was settled. The treaty, which was signed in Constantinople, sealed the cession of Cyprus to the Sultan. It further arranged that the Venetians should give back to the Turks the hill-fort Sopoto, near Corfu, which they had taken; that they should raise the tribute paid to the Porte for the possession of Zante from 1000 to 1500 ducats; and should pay 300,000 ducats as war-indemnity. On the other hand, the treaties previously concluded were reconfirmed, and, in regard to the delimitation of borders, the principle of the restoration of conquests on both sides, and of the reestablishment of the *status quo ante* was adopted.

Even the Bishop of Acqs, one of the authors of this peace, admitted in writing to Charles IX how very badly it had turned out. The Signory had to accept it because they could not drive the Turks out of Cyprus, and had learnt by recent experience both that no reliance was to be

placed on their allies, and that their own forces were insufficient for carrying on the war. Moreover, Mohammad Sokolli had in the course of the negotiations promised that he would try to help the Republic to some indemnification for the loss of Cyprus. In the third month after the conclusion of the peace he began to prepare the way for the fulfilment of his promise. By his order Rabbi Salomon and the interpreter of the Porte, Oram Bey, appeared before Barbaro, and laid before him the proposal of a Turco-Venetian alliance. In the strength of such an alliance the Republic might annex the Neapolitan kingdom, conquering it from Spain with the Sultan's help. The *Bailo* answered evasively, and, when he had sent home information as to the situation, received instructions from the Council of Ten to decline all such proposals absolutely. But the Grand Vezir refused to let drop the design which he had conceived, though his first attempt to carry it out had been a failure. In the spring of the next year he sent his confidential agent, the Rabbi Salomon, to Venice, to lay the proposal for the Turco-Venetian Alliance directly before the Signory. The Rabbi came with an authorisation from the Grand Vezir, but, according to a resolution of the Council of Ten, was recognised and treated as an ambassador of the Sultan. He brought a formal offer of the support of the whole Turkish power to the Republic if it would go to war with Spain. The Signory, after four weeks of deliberation, thanked the Sultan for his most friendly offer, but said that they could not undertake a new war, that they had been at peace with Spain for many years, and that they wished to maintain the peace, as they would faithfully maintain that which they had just concluded with the Sultan. It was a refusal for the second time of the gift which Mohammad Sokolli had destined for the Republic.

For such a renunciation the Signory had no lack of weighty reasons. Who could guarantee that the Turks, after expelling the Spaniards, would leave the kingdom of Naples to Venice and not keep it themselves? From the Ottoman point of view the scheme, as proposed by the Grand Vezir, lacked neither logical consistency nor grandeur of conception. It aimed at the infliction of a crushing blow on Spain; and, though for the moment its realisation was rendered impossible by the refusal of Venice to cooperate, a little later and through a different channel, Mohammad Sokolli was still able to reach his foe. During the progress of the negotiations of the following year between the Prince of Orange and the Governor-General of Philip II in the Netherlands, the Grand Vezir sent a messenger to the former urging him to withhold his consent from the agreement, and assuring him that pressure would be brought to bear on Spain from the Ottoman side. When Philip, at the close of 1577 or opening of 1578, asked the Porte for an armistice, Mohammad Sokolli obstinately insisted that Orange should be included in it. To insist upon such a condition was, as he must have been aware, virtually a refusal of an armistice, since Philip would not accept the demand at any

price. Thus Mohammad Sokolli contributed his share to the support of the Revolt of the Netherlands, as an open sore in the Spanish body politic.

Selim II died in December, 1574. His love of pleasure, his idleness and drunkenness, had to a certain extent been of use to the Grand Vezir, inasmuch as the Sultan after he had, through the conquest of Cyprus, become the Extender of the Realm, amused himself in his seraglio and gave up the cares of State, without any demur, to Mohammad Sokolli. Under Selim's successor, Murad III, the situation was different. The new Sultan indeed owed his peaceful accession to the Grand Vezir, who however remained to the last without the recompense due to him. Though it is true that Mohammad Sokolli kept the management of affairs in his hands till his death (the result of an outrage) in October, 1579, he had a difficult position. His sworn enemies often found a hearing with the Sultan; and their malicious whispers could only be kept from him by unremitting care on the part of the Grand Vezir.

"With Mohammad Sokolli," says a Venetian ambassador, "Turkish virtue sank into the grave." It would be far truer to say that with his death began the decline of Turkish power—a decline which after him other vigorous and highly gifted Grand Vezirs, notably those of the Kuprili family in the seventeenth century, tried to check. But in spite of their efforts the downward movement took its course and has continued to the present day.

CHAPTER V.

THE EMPIRE UNDER FERDINAND I AND MAXIMILIAN II.

THE palpably incomplete and far from sincere settlement of the year 1555 between the Catholic and the Lutheran Estates of the Empire, known as the Religious Peace of Augsburg, had not pretended to be more than a truce. It represented in no sense an attempt to efface religious differences by means of a compromise. The Catholicism which the enthusiasm of Cardinals and Popes was, with the organised aid of the Jesuit and other Orders, proceeding to reinvigorate, reconsolidate, regenerate, was not to be treated or bargained with; while among German Protestants reconciliation almost ceased even to be an ideal with the death of Melancthon (1560). On the other hand, the agreement reached at Augsburg did amount to a distinct understanding that, until some authoritative decision—whether proceeding from a General Council, or a National Synod, or an Imperial Diet—should have been accepted by Catholics and Lutherans alike, both sides should be at liberty to exercise the religion of their choice. The principle had now been clearly laid down that the final issue of the struggle between the two recognised religious parties in the Empire must be determined by a mutual agreement between them; pending which, the Estates professing either form were equally to benefit by the institutions of the Empire, and to be protected by its Common Peace. The essence of the Treaty lay in its adoption of the principle of parity between the two rival religious parties—a principle beyond which the horizon of the age in which the Religious Peace was concluded cannot be said to have extended. No doubt this fundamental principle would not have been conceded by the Catholics but for their apprehension that a fresh resort to arms would be likely to end to their disadvantage; and thus the whole agreement was, after all, but a concession to necessity, which a decisive change in the balance of power in the Empire might at any time overthrow. The Protestant Estates, for their part, cherished conceptions of their territorial authority, which, should their power continue to grow, might lead to a complete exclusion of Catholicism from their dominions. The history of the Empire during the two generations which intervened between the conclusion of the

Religious Peace and the outbreak of the Thirty Years' War may be summarily described as a struggle between the religious parties for territorial predominance.

Still, the guarantee of public law meant much even in this period of a dwindling Imperial authority; and the degree of force attaching to it amidst fluid political surroundings remains a notable phenomenon. The misfortune was that the praiseworthy main principle of the Religious Peace was hedged round by restrictions materially impairing its value, and—which was of even worse omen for the security of the Empire—that rules and exceptions alike were enveloped by a haze of uncertainty, the result partly of timorousness and partly of design. In the first place, the Protestants benefiting from the Religious Peace were defined to be those who adhered to the Confession of Augsburg. Herein manifestly lay a twofold source of future discontents and troubles. For not only was Calvinism entirely excluded from the purview of the Peace at a time when it permeated the western borders of the Empire from Switzerland to the Low Countries, and was on the eve of formal establishment within the Empire itself; but, further, the compact drew no distinction between the original form in which the Confession of Augsburg had (in 1530) been first presented and the variations subsequently introduced into the Lutheran symbol by Melancthon. Above all, the freedom of choice allowed by the Religious Peace was granted only to the Estates of the Empire (together with the Knights), without being extended, independently of their consent, to their subjects. This memorable restriction inevitably had a different significance for each of the interests which it was intended to satisfy. The Protestant Princes and governments regarded the *cujus regio* principle as confirming the positive right assumed by them of establishing and administering territorial Churches of their own; in the view of the Catholic it corroborated their consistent claim to act as the suppressors of heresy in their dominions.

But the terms of the Religious Peace concealed other shortcomings of a kind which in such documents are not always chargeable to incompetent draughtsmanship. It was not made clear whether governments which set up Protestant Churches after the Treaty of Passau (1552) should be entitled to Protestantise or appropriate monastic or other Catholic ecclesiastical foundations. Again, in those Imperial towns where both forms of religion were practised, each party was to retain possession of its ecclesiastical property and rights in proportion to its relative numbers. As more than threescore of such towns were to be found in Germany, and the bulk of them in the south, where the diversity of religious creed was greatest, a perennial source of discord was thus left open. But though this clause too was to be productive of much trouble, the chief impediment to the maintenance of the Augsburg Treaty lay elsewhere—namely, in the so-called *reservatum*

ecclesiasticum, which stipulated that a prelate renouncing Catholicism must at once resign his ecclesiastical office. This "reservation" had never been accepted by the Protestants, and had in the end only been included in the Peace as a proposition promulgated by Imperial authority, reference being expressly made to the objection raised against it by them. Meanwhile, in return for their allowing the *reservatum* to be included in the settlement, the Protestants obtained the concession that nobles, towns, and congregations in the territories of Spiritual Princes who had previously enjoyed the privilege of Protestant worship were to continue there to enjoy it; but this not even as part of the agreement, only as a special declaration, which was not communicated to the *Reichskammergericht* as binding upon its procedure.

So defective, then, so waterlogged, and so directly provocative of controversy and conflict, were the instrument and its supplements, which were supposed to regulate the relations between the Catholic and the Protestant Estates of the Empire during a period of unreconciled differences and of an accumulating pressure, from both within and without, against the maintenance of peace. There were of course on the other side forces which resisted that pressure, and to which it was largely due that a renewed outbreak of the general religious conflict was so long postponed. The large and important middle party to which the conclusion of the Treaty was mainly due, was composed of both Catholic and Protestant Estates, Electoral Saxony forming its backbone, and both Mainz and Trier belonging to it. This party was held together, paradoxical as the statement may seem, by two mutually adverse impulses—the Imperial and the territorial. A desire to maintain the authority of the Empire and of its tribunals, natural to the long-enduring loyalty of many German Princes and populations, cooperated with a consciousness among the most intelligent of the Princes and their sagacious councillors, that the princely authority had never before taken a step in advance comparable in importance to the Religious Peace.

And, in this connexion, it should not be forgotten that the Diet of 1555, which accepted the Religious Peace also endeavoured to provide further guarantees for the maintenance of the general security of the Empire—that *Landfrieden*, on which its soundness as a political and social fabric depended. Many of the princely Houses of this period were wanting neither in Imperial sentiment nor in the consciousness that, as their feudal head, the Emperor might in certain contingencies intervene very potently in their destinies. Under Ferdinand I, and even under his successor, the cohesion of the Empire as a united polity was still an object of practical politics; and the existing desire for union displayed itself incidentally in the adoption of such a measure as the Imperial monetary ordinance (*Reichsmünzordnung*) of 1559, however imperfectly this was carried into effect. On the other hand, the difficulties in the way of strengthening the principle of Imperial union were considerable,

quite apart from the cardinal religious difficulty. They were of course mainly due to the growth of the territorial power of the Princes, who everywhere, with the advice of the doctors learned in the Roman law, from whom their councillors were in increasing numbers chosen, were elaborating and fortifying their administrative systems, establishing Courts of Appeal for themselves, and depressing an authority which had more than once held its own against theirs—that of the territorial Estates (*Landstände*). Another difficulty was however to be found in the increasing unwieldiness of the Diet of the Empire. The political authority of the Emperor himself was now specially circumscribed by means of the Compact of Election (*Wahlkapitulation*), which furnished the Electors with an opportunity of securing to themselves a distinct preliminary control of the internal government of the Empire and of its foreign policy. But, more than this, the Emperor could not so much as convoke the Diet without having previously obtained the consent of the Electors at a meeting of their body (*Kurfürstentag*). While the importance of this exclusive gathering necessarily rose with the advance of the territorial power of the several Electors, the usefulness of the Diet for Imperial purposes continued on the wane—excepting always with regard to the grant of aid against the Turk, which still remained the one great chronic defensive need of the Empire. Since the religious schism had ranged the political forces in the Empire so distinctly under the heads of contending Confessions, grievances drawn up for presentation at the Diet became in effect mere party manifestos, often arranged by the Estates of each Confession at meetings of their own. The abnormal dilatoriness of the Imperial Diet was in its turn attributable to the fact that the Princes of the Empire, swollen with a sense of their expanding political importance and consequently more and more disposed to determine for themselves the successive steps of their policy, as a rule abstained from personal attendance. Important questions could thus not be brought to an issue at the Diets without a reference; and the amount of business left unfinished by them at their breaking-up grew in proportion. This accumulation of arrears favoured the use of an expedient to which resort had been had already under Charles V, the so-called Imperial Deputations (*Reichsdeputationstage*), composed of a certain selection of Estates, including all the Electors except the King of Bohemia. When the Estates of a single Circle of the Empire at their meeting (*Kreistag*) found their resources inadequate for armed action, they might appeal for aid to the two Circles in their nearest vicinity; and these might in their turn call in the assistance of yet two other Circles. If the combined forces of all the five were still insufficient, the Elector of Mainz might be called upon to summon a *Reichsdeputationstag* at Frankfort. This body might bid all the Ten Circles of the Empire combine for the furnishing of military aid; but liberty was left to the *Deputation* to refer the matter to the Emperor,

who would then have to fall back again upon the summons of a Diet.

These cumbrous devices made it difficult for the sectional group of Estates known to the Constitution as Circles of the Empire to protect themselves against disturbance from within or irruption from without by prompt and effective action, whether separate or combined, of their own. At the same time the system of Execution (*Exekutionsordnung*) now promulgated put no stop upon voluntary alliances between Estates such as in one shape or another could only with difficulty be prevented. Nor had the Diet of 1555 laid any restraint on the liberty, granted by its predecessor of 1495 to the Estates, of concluding even foreign alliances, if these were not detrimental to the Empire. The practice had really established itself from an earlier date, when these alliances had been in substance contracts for the hire of soldiery. Yet sooner or later alliances formed within the Empire must take the shape of organisations identified with one or other of the rival forms of religion, and the schemes and rumours of alliances with foreign Powers, which never ceased to be rife, would, so soon as each side saw its opportunity, be translated into fact. Thus in matters political as well as religious the Augsburg settlement had left the door open through which the spirit of conflict must enter.

Finally, it should be noted that, in conformity with the principles adopted in the Religious Peace and in the new *Exekutionsordnung*, the Diet of 1555 remodelled the chief permanent judicial tribunal in the Empire, and the only one of which the composition was determined in common by the Emperor and the Estates—the *Reichskammergericht*. Adherents of the Lutheran Confession, trained at Lutheran universities, now sat among its judges by the side of Catholic colleagues, though the principle of an actual numerical equality between them was not yet adopted, and the presiding judge continued to be always a Catholic. The *Reichskammergericht* was now empowered to regulate its own procedure by “common decrees” (*gemeine Bescheide*), to which a binding force attached until they were revoked at an annual visitation by an Imperial deputation; and in these visiting commissions also it was provided that the Lutherans should be regularly represented. Thus in the judicial sphere too an advance had been made towards religious parity. From his own territorial dominions Ferdinand I sought to exclude the influence of the *Reichskammergericht* so far as possible. Down to 1559 he had endeavoured to exercise supreme judicial power in the affairs of the Empire as well as in those of his own dominions through the Aulic Council (*Hofrath*) established by Maximilian I; but in this year he deprived it of all territorial jurisdiction, so that it now became an Imperial authority proper (*Reichshofrath*). The competence of this tribunal, and of the Emperor’s ordinances concerning it, was steadily denied by the Estates; nor was it till the Peace of Westphalia that it received full recognition and became a permanent part of the Constitution of the Empire.

I.

In all these arrangements and rearrangements, the Emperor Charles V had no hand. He had never understood the German Reformation and its adherents, whom after the Schmalkaldic War he described as *ad gremium Ecclesiae redeuntes*, and he showed his disapproval of the principle of the Religious Peace by holding entirely aloof from the negotiations for its conclusion. From 1553 onwards he had really transferred his responsibility as Emperor to his brother Ferdinand, whose election as Roman King had taken place in 1531; and his formal abdication of the Imperial throne followed in 1558. The aged Pope Paul IV (1555-9) was at the same time able to give expression to his detestation of the compact with the heretics by refusing to acknowledge the accession of a Prince of the detested House of Habsburg, who had materially contributed to its conclusion. But Paul's successor Pius IV (1559-65) immediately recognised the new Emperor, who in his turn promised the traditional obedience to the Holy See. Already before his actual accession to the Imperial dignity Ferdinand had proved himself a Prince of a truly politic cast of mind, who, though without constructive genius (as indeed the Religious Peace itself showed), possessed a remarkable capacity for learning the lessons to be drawn from facts. Curiously enough, while the elder brother, who had passed the first seventeen years of his life in the Netherlands, had never entered into German ways of life and thought, the younger, born and educated in Spain, proved capable of accommodating his own political action to the demands of his position at the head of the German nation. No doubt the relations between him and the Germans had been drawn closer by the attempt of Charles V to secure the succession in the Empire after Ferdinand to his own son Philip, although Ferdinand's son Maximilian, the consort of Charles V's daughter Maria, had been already acknowledged as successor to the Bohemian Crown. Though Ferdinand had been obliged (1551) to promise his support to the scheme, in his heart he rejoiced at its frustration—to which he had very possibly himself contributed. If he never became quite a German either in mind or in speech, there could be no doubt as to his desire for peace, and for the maintenance of law and order. And even as to the all-dominating question of religion, he bore himself alike with sincerity and with moderation. In his public acts as well as in his private life he showed himself a good Catholic; and his desire to strengthen the Church by means of an inner purification was beyond doubt the motive with which he introduced the Jesuits into all his lands. Nor was the policy pursued by him in the closing years of the Council of Trent (1561-3) inconsistent with this purpose. He not only asked from the Council concessions as to disputed points of practice, conceived in the broad and

generous spirit of the Erasmian Pflug, but laid before it proposals for practical reforms which would have increased the popular influence of the Church in Germany, and have led both to the advance of education and to the improvement of the condition of the poor. In his personal relations he came to show a remarkably tolerant spirit, and even admitted Lutherans as members of his Court and household, without appearing to take any notice of their religious profession. All that he demanded from those around him was purity of morals, of which, different in this respect also from his more famous brother, he set an admirable example in his happy family life. Such was the goodwill conciliated by the mildness of his disposition, the probity of his conduct, and the trustworthiness of his character, that when his end drew near a Venetian ambassador foretold that it would be saddening to everyone.

Before Ferdinand had formally taken on himself the burden of Imperial responsibility another Venetian report had described him as “loved, but not feared, by some of the races over which he ruled; feared, but not loved by others; and by the Hungarians neither loved nor feared.” Of Hungary he never, except for a brief period immediately after his coronation as King in 1527, had under his sway more than a fragment. His vanquished Transylvanian opponent, the so-called “national King” John Zápolya, became a vassal of Sultan Solyman II, who refused his assent to the pacification between the two rivals; and in 1541, the year following that of Zápolya’s death, there set in the era of Turkish dominion, which continued for nearly a century and a half. During all these years—whether they were accounted years of war or of peace—Hungary remained the battle-ground of the Powers which, in the course of their unceasing strife for its possession, were constantly shifting their relative positions. Almost throughout Ferdinand’s public life the Turkish peril, and the necessity of defending the portion of Hungary held by him, as the bulwark of the Austrian lands and of Germany at large, preoccupied him in Council and in Diet. The Estates of the Empire took the danger more coolly; Hungary formed no part of the Empire, and they usually measured the sacrifices which they were prepared to make accordingly. In his own dominions, where Ferdinand did his best to establish a uniform taxation for their defence, his whole system of expenditure was clogged by the perennial Turkish warfare; he could collect military forces for no other purpose, nor spend money upon necessary diplomatic agencies. It was not till 1562—two years before his death—that he seemed at last to have reached an actual breathing-time in his relations with the Ottoman Power by the conclusion of a peace for eight years—as a matter of fact it only lasted four—containing the customary humiliating condition of the payment of an annual tribute to the Sultan. At the close of the sixteenth century, the King was master of less than a quarter of the whole former Magyar Kingdom and its dependencies, while more than one-third of it was under direct Turkish

rule, and nearly two-fifths subject to the Sultan's vassal, the *Voivod* of Transylvania. Besides suffering from the social disorder and distress inseparable from the periodical inroads of a foe intent above all upon the rape of human beings for his military service and his harems, the "royal" portion of Hungary remained during Ferdinand's reign politically unsettled. He was never able—even when, in 1563, he at last obtained the coronation of his son Maximilian as his successor on the throne—to secure a recognition of the claim of his dynasty to the right of hereditary succession; on the other hand he at least asserted the principle that the administration of the kingdom should in the absence of the King be in the hands of a governor appointed by himself, and not in those of a Palatine elected by the Diet. In Hungary as elsewhere Ferdinand's internal difficulties centred in his relations to the Estates; and nowhere were they more intensified by the question of religion. The Lutheran Reformation had rapidly penetrated into both Transylvania and Hungary proper, establishing an ecclesiastical organisation of its own, in the former in 1545, and in the latter in 1550. The Calvinist form, too, of the Reformed religion had already spread by the side of the Lutheran; it was formally organised in Transylvania in the year of Ferdinand's death and in Hungary proper two years later. During the whole of his reign Protestantism advanced unchecked in both countries; nor was it till a few years after his decease that a successful effort was made in Hungary by the Catholic Reaction to arrest this progress.

In Bohemia, while King Ferdinand was chiefly engaged in defending Hungary and Austria against the Turks, the Diets were likewise largely occupied with religious questions. Lutheran doctrines had continuously spread among the Utraquists; and the Bohemian Brethren too—a relic of the sectarian life of earlier centuries revived in the early years of the sixteenth—had discovered and openly avowed their near affinities to Lutheranism. Thus, when the Schmalkaldic War broke out, the Bohemian Estates were most unwilling to grant aid to the King in furtherance of the Imperial policy; and a serious constitutional conflict ensued. The stern reassertion of the royal authority at the "Bloody Diet" of August, 1547, ushered in a period of deceptive tranquillity. The Estates consented to acknowledge Ferdinand's son Maximilian as heir and successor to the throne, provided that during his father's tenure of it he took no part in the affairs of the realm (February, 1549). But they could not be induced to restore to the churches and convents the lands of which a long process of secularisation had deprived them; and the conflict of religious beliefs remained unextinguished.

The accession of Ferdinand as Emperor led to no material change in the affairs of Bohemia, though his firm and conciliatory conduct of them helped to strengthen his authority. In 1562 the Estates agreed to the coronation of Maximilian and his Spanish consort, the ceremony being performed by the newly-appointed Archbishop of Prague (Anton Brus),

whose office had remained vacant for a century and a quarter, while nearly all the landed property attached to it had long been dispersed into secular hands. The efforts of this prelate and his colleagues at the Council of Trent were steadily directed to obtaining for the Emperor's Bohemian subjects the concession of the Cup, by means of which he still hoped to bring about a reunion of Utraquists and Catholics. In the last year of Ferdinand's life, after an elaborate enquiry, this concession was granted to Bohemia (as well as to certain other parts of the Empire) by Pope Pius IV; and from this time forward the Cup—to the Bohemians a symbol of high national as well as religious significance—was in that country denied to the demand of neither Catholic nor Utraquist, even in the Jesuit Churches. Yet Ferdinand gave a steady support to the work carried on in Bohemia by the Catholic Reaction. The Jesuits, with Canisius at their head, found their way to Prague as early as 1555, and their College, established here in the following year, became a permanent nucleus of their indefatigable propaganda, and a rival to the Utraquist University, where many of the professors were more or less openly Lutherans. Some years earlier the administrative instincts of Ferdinand had provided the means of checking heterodox publications by the institution of a censorship.

The most promising field of operations for Ferdinand's centralising policy might have seemed to be the five duchies of Upper and Lower Austria, Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, with their dependencies; but the Turkish wars, and the absorption of his chief administrative energies in the provision of means for their prosecution, made it impossible for him to organise effectively the government of his hereditary dominions, or to develop their economical resources. Still, he never lost sight of his purpose. In 1556 he succeeded in assembling a Committee of the Diets of the five duchies; and in the same year he instituted a permanent military Council (*Hofkriegsrath*), distinct from that charged with the general affairs of his dominions (*Hofrath*).

In religious matters, the general drift of opinion and sentiment was at least as antagonistic to Ferdinand's own in Austria as it was in Bohemia and Hungary. To the ecclesiastical grievances reiterated by the Austrian Estates at their combined Diets, from 1530 onwards, and to the open demand in 1541 of nobility and towns for the free exercise of a form of faith virtually corresponding to the Augsburg Confession, Ferdinand had declined to yield; but he was gradually coming to recognise that the pressure was irresistible. During the whole of the latter half of his period of rule (and indeed for some time before) the nobility and the towns assumed not only the ordinary exercise of Church patronage, but also the general control of Church revenues. Admittance into the Austrian dominions was freely granted to a strange mixture of doctrinal teaching; and not only was the use of the Cup by the laity authoritatively permitted to the Austrian Estates (1555-6) some years

before this concession was approved by papal decision (1564), but the marriage of the clergy was allowed as an ordinary practice. Throughout the Austrian territories, as with perhaps rather more of restraint in neighbouring Bavaria, there ensued, together with a chaotic fluidity of religious beliefs and an anarchy in the forms of religious worship, a relaxation of social order and moral discipline among both clergy and laity. It was, therefore, in the true spirit of the Catholic reform that, as has been seen in an earlier passage of this work, Ferdinand in 1552—the year of the foundation of the *Collegium Germanicum* in Rome—summoned from Ingolstadt the Dutch Jesuit Canisius (Peter Kanes) and his companion Goudanus, and, after a year's residence, incorporated them in the University of Vienna, where Lutheran sympathies had hitherto prevailed. The plain and popular vein to which Luther himself owed so much of his power was not wanting in Canisius; but with an eloquence that secured to him the goodwill of large audiences in Vienna and elsewhere in the Austrian duchies he combined a singular aptitude for influencing the cautious mind and balanced judgment of their ruler. During his later years Ferdinand confided in Canisius as his chief adviser in matters of religion, and gave a ready support to the revival brought about in the ecclesiastical, and more especially in the educational, life of the Austrian populations by the great Jesuit's indefatigable labours. His efforts as missionary and Provincial must be reckoned among the forces making against a permanent reconciliation of the contending religious parties and interests in the Empire, or even a prolonged truce between them.

Such, then, were some of the elements in the personal action of Ferdinand I, and in his relations as a territorial ruler to the problems which largely occupied the Empire during his reign, and in particular to the religious difficulty which went near to swallowing up all the rest. As yet, during Ferdinand I's tenure of the weakened Imperial authority, there seemed some prospect of a settlement of questions arising out of the Religious Peace within the limits of the Empire, by its own reorganised machinery, and exclusively in the interests of itself or its members. This prospect grew less hopeful already during the reign of Ferdinand I's son, Maximilian II; and before the two decades, or thereabouts, with which this chapter is concerned had actually come to an end, the religious struggle in Europe at large was already approaching its acutest and intensest phase, in which the Empire was no longer to retain the control of its own destinies.

In the first instance, then, the progress of the religious struggle, or the arresting of that progress, must depend upon the distribution of political power and influence among the more important Princes and other Estates of the Empire, and upon the attitude taken up by them individually in matters ecclesiastical. Of the four Temporal Electors the

Emperor, as King of Bohemia, was the only Catholic. Of the three Protestant the most important was the Elector Augustus of Saxony, Maurice's brother, to whose calculated conservatism more than to any other cause was due the maintenance of the provisional settlement in the Empire. A powerful secret motive of the second Albertine Elector's loyalty was no doubt the possibility of the restoration, by an Emperor ill-disposed towards him, of the Ernestine branch of the House of Wettin. During the whole of his long rule (1553-86), he was steadily intent upon the increase and consolidation of his territorial power. Although he took a personal interest in religious controversy, both his action in the affairs of the Empire and his abstinence from any attempt to further the progress of Protestantism beyond its borders show how among the German Lutheran Princes territorial considerations were already beginning to overpower those of religion. Though he had some learning, the humanistic influences which had still been strong with his elder brother were in Augustus and his Danish consort Anna—a very Martha among princesses—exchanged for a beneficent care for the organisation of the material resources of his Electorate. For the rest, while he was careful to observe the principles of Roman law in dealing with the affairs of his subjects, he closely adhered to Germanic (*i.e.* feudal) usage in the maintenance of his princely rights and customs.

In his religious beliefs Augustus of Saxony was a convinced Lutheran, but not, at first, of a rigid cast. So long as Melanchthon lived, the Elector was ready to follow his elastic teaching; and the *Corpus Misniacum* (1559) was compiled in this sense. At a later time he changed his dogmatic standpoint; but under Ferdinand I, and nearly to the close of the reign of Maximilian II, Augustus favoured moderate Lutheran views, such as did not wholly preclude an understanding between the two main divisions of German Protestantism. Herein again he was influenced by the strongly marked views and conduct of the head of the Ernestine branch of the Saxon House. In 1557 Duke John Frederick summoned to the Ernestine University of Jena, and at the same time to the chief supervision of the Thuringian Church, the foremost teacher among the rigidly orthodox Lutherans, Matthæus Flacius, called from his place of birth, Illyricus. Not less vigorous than voluminous as a controversialist, Flacius was no doubt sustained by the conviction that he was a combatant for the truth, in face of which there are no *adiaphora*; and to him is largely to be ascribed the position of absolute intransigency which Lutheranism assumed alike towards Rome and towards Geneva, and to any form of dogma not distinctly adverse to Calvinistic conceptions.

The jealousy between the Ernestine and Albertine lines, and more especially between their respective chiefs, was by the restless energy of a revengeful and ambitious intriguer fanned into a flame which long menaced the peace of the Empire. In their origin the so-called

Grumbach quarrels (*Grumbachsche Händel*) are significant of the bitter jealousy still animating the nobility, and in Franconia, where Wilhelm von Grumbach was at home, the Knights, against the growth of the power of the territorial Princes. Grumbach had a long-standing quarrel with the Bishop of Würzburg, Melchior von Zobel, whose election he had on a former occasion thwarted and who, in the end, after the outlawry of the truculent *condottiere* Margrave Albert Alcibiades of Brandenburg-Culmbach, had as territorial prince seized his follower Grumbach's estates. It was at this time—in 1557—that Grumbach found a new patron in the dissatisfied John Frederick at Gotha; and in 1558 he carried out a long meditated raid upon the Bishop of Würzburg, who was killed in the fray. In the same year Grumbach, not content with John Frederick's protection, entered into the military service of the French Crown, and began to busy himself with concocting schemes both against the new Bishop of Würzburg and for supplanting Augustus as Elector by the Ernestine Duke, and Augustus' brother-in-law, King Frederick II of Denmark, by Duke Adolphus of Holstein. In accordance with the gross superstition of the age, which the Lutheran Reformation had by no means eradicated, magical charms were directed by Grumbach and his patron against the lives of the Elector Augustus, the Bishop of Würzburg, and the Emperor; and a Gotha peasant boy as "seer" regularly reported angelic communications. In obedience to one of these, Würzburg was attacked and taken by the confederates, and the restoration and augmentation of Grumbach's estates forced upon the Chapter, whose consent the Bishop had to confirm (1563). At last the Emperor intervened by placing Grumbach under the ban of the Empire. But neither the calling of a *Deputationstag*, nor the Emperor's injunction to John Frederick to renounce the protection of Grumbach, was of avail. On the other hand, the attempt of the Franconian Knights to use the occasion for pressing their grievances came to nothing, though the Swabian Knights were inclined to follow suit; and the Württemberg government called a conference of Palatine, Bavarian, and Baden councillors to Maulbronn to join in preventive measures (1564). Yet when, at this time, Maximilian came to the throne, John Frederick and his *protégé* were still residing unhurt at Gotha, where the latter was spinning fresh webs, designed to entangle Frederick II of Denmark in northern complications, and to isolate the arch-foe, the Elector Augustus. Grumbach's schemes grew wilder as they expanded, and the Imperial crown itself was promised to his Ernestine patron in a vision. Thus the new Emperor was induced by Augustus to renew the ban of the Empire against Grumbach and pronounce it upon John Frederick; and, after in vain looking for assistance to the Franconian nobility and Knights, to Brandenburg, to the Scandinavian North, to France, and even, it was said to the

Netherlands, the ill-starred pair were at last—early in 1567—run to earth by Augustus of Saxony, at the head of an executive army of some 16,000 men. Gotha capitulated on April 15; Grumbach was drawn and quartered in the market-place; and John Frederick passed into imprisonment in Austria, where he died in 1595. Vengeance descended on all who had had a share in Grumbach's schemes; while the Ernestine lands were repartitioned for the benefit of John Frederick's brother, John William. The entire story, which occupied contemporary attention to an extraordinary extent, casts a lurid light upon the insecurity of the institutions of the Empire at the time when the principle of territorial sovereignty was establishing itself there with sober but ruthless persistency. The victory of the Elector Augustus and his ally the Bishop of Würzburg redounded entirely to the advantage of that principle, and had no concern with the religious question.

In the period following upon the promulgation of the Religious Peace, Augustus is found steadily opposed to any tampering with its provisions, though unwilling to join in efforts to extend the Protestant sphere of influence. At first he took a leading part in the movement for the cancelling of the objectionable *reservatum ecclesiasticum*; but he failed to maintain this opposition with his habitual tenacity. At the same time, he acted with promptitude and decision, where the episcopal authority came into contact with his own. His territories surrounded the sees of Meissen, Merseburg, and Naumburg on all sides; and in 1555 he took advantage of a vacancy in the see of Meissen to introduce a Bishop of yielding disposition and Protestant tendencies. At Merseburg in 1561 an obedient majority of the Chapter postulated the Elector's son Alexander (then eight years of age) as their Bishop, and in the absence of a papal confirmation the father carried on the administration of the diocese in the child's name. Finally, on the death of the wise Erasmian Bishop Julius Pflug of Naumburg in 1564, the Chapter there was constrained to postulate the same Prince; and after his death in the following year both Chapters committed the administration of their respective sees to the Elector. On the resignation of the Bishop of Meissen the same course was pursued; and before he died the Elector might deem himself completely master in what he regarded as his own house.

The Elector Joachim II of Brandenburg (1535-71) was in complete accord with the settlement of the Religious Peace, and, though in a more or less timorous fashion, may be said to have generally seconded the policy of his Saxon neighbour. He had admitted the Reformation into his lands without precipitancy and in no spirit of animosity against Rome. He simply felt (as had his uncle the Cardinal-Archbishop Albert of Mainz, who also held the sees of Magdeburg and Halberstadt) that the current was not to be resisted. The religious change by no means impaired his loyalty to the Emperor; he held back from the League of

Schmalkalden; and after the Religious Peace he at first took no part in the consultations among the Protestant Estates, while there was much mutual goodwill between him and the Emperors Ferdinand and Maximilian. But the question of his territorial power was with him, too, paramount. In the case of the sees of Brandenburg, Havelberg, and Lebus the Electoral House had long assumed the right of nominating their Bishops, and here no voice was raised for the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*. But Joachim was also determined that the great archbishopric of Magdeburg and the bishopric of Halberstadt, whose occupants sat among the Princes of the Empire at the Diet, should be permanently in the hands of his House. Fortunately for this purpose, there had been no difficulty in securing from the more than half Protestant Chapters the election of Joachim's second son Frederick to both sees; and on his death soon afterwards (in 1552) the third son Sigismund succeeded in his stead. Under him both Magdeburg and Halberstadt were effectually Protestantised (1561-3); but, on the pretence that the convents in these dioceses had remained Catholic, a conflict with the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* was outwardly avoided. On the directly contrary plea that the provision was inapplicable to a see which had been Protestant long before his election, Joachim II's grandson, Joachim Frederick, held the archbishopric from Sigismund's death in 1566 till his own accession to the electorate in 1598, while Halberstadt was made over to the infant prince Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel. In his religious opinions the Elector Joachim II was inclined to a moderate Lutheranism; his able chief councillor Lampert Distelmeyer had himself formerly been a pupil of Melancthon.

In the remote duchy of (East) Prussia the Reformation passed through more violent vicissitudes. In 1549 Duke Albert had brought his favourite teacher, Osiander (Andreas Hoesemann), into his secularised duchy, where, in defiance of the orthodox Lutheranism of his subjects and of the University of Königsberg in particular, this theologian expounded his mystic deviations from the cardinal dogma of justification by faith. The resistance to these innovations, combined with the bitter jealousy of the Prussian nobility against the ducal government, caused a popular agitation to be savagely stirred up; and the Osiandrists were excluded from the Sacraments. After Osiander's death in 1552 a still stronger hatred accumulated itself against his associate Johann Funck, the ducal confessor, who with his camarilla was believed to control the Duke and his Duchess, with the aid of her treasurer, a charlatan named Skalich. Funck, who had caused the removal of the exorcising passages from the baptismal service, was charged with Calvinism; and the nobility once more took advantage of the fanatical excitement of the people. In October, 1566, Funck, amidst popular rejoicings, suffered the penalty of death in the market-place at Königsberg; a strict Lutheran formula of belief was promulgated as binding upon all holders of offices, whether

temporal or spiritual, in the duchy, and the privileges of the nobility were reconfirmed. The episode, one of the earliest to mark the depth of the fissures in German Protestantism, went to the heart of the Prince who had introduced the Reformation into Prussia; and there was some colour for the fiction that he died a Catholic (1568).

The territorial power of the Elector Palatine was inferior to that of the Elector of Saxony, and even more to that of the Elector of Brandenburg, although he enjoyed precedence over both. But the aspirations of the rulers of the western border-State already took a far wider range than those of their fellow Electors. The Reformation had been definitely introduced into the Palatinate by the Elector Otto Henry (1556-9); but this Prince, memorable for his scholarly and artistic interests and achievements, steadily adhered to the Augsburg Confession in its original form. It was not till with his death the Electorate passed to the Simmern line that its rulers began to identify themselves with advanced and militant Protestantism. Otto Henry had for the sake of his cherished University of Heidelberg cultivated relations with Switzerland and France, and had lent an ear to the proposals of his near neighbour, Duke Christopher of Württemberg, for the formation of a Union of the Protestant Estates.

A wholly new life was brought both into the internal government of the Palatinate and into its foreign relations by Frederick III (1559-76), whose mind was in a gross age stedfastly set on spiritual things. After beginning with the reform of the administrative system of the Palatinate he proceeded to the work of the establishment of Calvinism, which may be said to have been accomplished by 1564. In this year the Ecclesiastical Council, consisting of three clerical and three lay members, was set up as the chief authority of the Palatinate Church; and under it the Presbyteries began to administer the ecclesiastical discipline of the land. Often, no doubt, they displayed a spirit of intolerance that was vainly resisted by a high-minded member of the Council, Thomas Erastus (Lieber). In the same year, 1564, was promulgated the so-called Heidelberg Catechism, of which the joint authors were Olevian, a native of Trier, brought up in France, and Ursinus (Beer), a pupil of Melancthon. In this document the doctrine of the Eucharist was distinctly formulated in the spirit of pure Calvinism. This open establishment of a form of belief and worship abhorred by both Catholics and Lutherans called forth a formidable array of adversaries. A pertinacious resistance to these religious innovations was offered in the Upper Palatinate, where the autonomous pretensions of the nobility and towns cooperated with the convinced Lutheranism of the governor, the Electoral Prince Lewis. The Lutheran Princes in the vicinity of the Palatinate raised an angry protest; and Pope Pius IV pressed upon the Emperor the necessity of active measures against this sectarian reform. But Frederick III stood firm, adhering with immovable

fidelity to his position. Compromise in any direction was impossible to his nature; the Catholics in the Palatinate were only tolerated so long as they refrained from the public exercise of their religion. But he permitted no deviation into heresies outside his symbol; and an Arian movement which arose in the Palatinate was with his approval ruthlessly repressed.

In accordance with the spirit of the Calvinistic Reformation of Frederick III, perhaps also with the impersonal character of the Palatine government in this new stage of its history, he paid comparatively little attention to the augmentation of the territorial power of his dynasty. The sees around were in any case too firmly in Catholic hands to be within reach of princely ambition. The convents, however, hitherto under the control of these sees, and very numerous here on both sides of the Rhine, were unsparingly appropriated; but their revenues were mainly devoted to the purposes of Church and schools.

The religious isolation of the Palatinate, together with the positive spirit of a religious propaganda which animated the Elector and his councillors, made it inevitable that they should be intent upon the formation of foreign alliances. So early as 1562 Frederick III had offered a new home at Frankenthal to sixty refugee Calvinist families from the Netherlands; in the same year Condé is found in active correspondence with the Elector. The way was already opening before the Palatine House which was to divert it further and further from its allegiance to a Catholic Emperor.

The three Spiritual Electors in Ferdinand's reign could hardly be said to hold the balance against the three Protestants among the Temporal. Though none of them had as yet thought of defection from the Church of Rome, only one of their number—the least important in power or authority—strenuously upheld her interests. This was the Elector of Trier, Archbishop John von der Leyen (1556-67), who in 1559 had to quit his capital, where, in consequence chiefly of the teaching of Olevian, the followers of the Reformation were in the ascendant. Though he soon made his way back by force, and hereupon with Jesuit help (for Canisius had in 1565-6 appeared in these parts to urge the execution of the Tridentine decrees) imposed a Counter-reformation upon his subjects, it was only under his successor, Archbishop Jakob von Eltz (1567-81), that the old order of things was restored.

The Elector of Mainz, Archbishop Daniel Brendel von Homburg (1555-82), only gradually made head against the influences adverse to Rome by which he found himself surrounded both at his Court and in his Chapter. In time he too made effective use of the aid of the Jesuits, whom he established in colleges both at Mainz and at Heiligenstadt; but the general bent of his policy was not aggressive, and he might be reckoned as of the middle party in the Empire.

Finally, Count Anton von Schauenburg (1556-8) and Count

Gebhard von Mansfeld (1558–62), who in succession held the archbishopric and electorate of Cologne, were with more or less of reason supposed actually to incline to Lutheranism. Gebhard's successor Count Frederick von Wied (1562–7), a member of the family to which the former Archbishop Hermann had belonged, openly refused acceptance of the Tridentine decrees; and the papal confirmation was in consequence refused to him. His broken fortunes and shattered health, in combination with his impotence as a ruler, led to his resignation (1567). His place was taken by Count Salentin von Isenburg, whose more vigorous but pacific rule was ten years later to have a similar ending.

While the Electors were thus divided in opinions and sympathies, although the prevailing tendency in their lands was almost uniformly towards Protestantism, except where its advance was arrested by a reactionary propaganda, such was even more notably the case in the dominions of the Princes of the Empire. In the whole of northern Germany, indeed, only one princely House had a Catholic head. But the Catholicism of Ferdinand's son-in-law Duke William (1539–92), who united in his hands the inheritances of Cleves, Mark, Ravensberg, Berg, and Jülich, remained of a singularly tempered, eirenic type, until in the latter part of Maximilian's reign the collapse of the Duke's mental powers combined with the progress of the conflict in the Netherlands to favour an almost complete Catholic reaction. Thus at all events the outward cohesion was not broken among the States composing that great Catholic group which in the north-west of the Empire occupied a position of so much significance for both its religious and its political future. Besides the Jülich-Cleves duchies this group of territories comprised the three spiritual Electorates, and the Imperial towns of Aachen and Cologne, the solitary examples of their class which remained altogether Catholic—although in the former a violent expurgation of town council and municipal offices had to be effected so early as 1560—together with the Westphalian sees of Münster, Osnabrück and Paderborn (united under one Bishop from 1566 to 1574), and the Rhenish sees of Worms and Speier.

With the exception of Jülich-Cleves the princely Houses of northern Germany were either entirely or mainly Lutheran. Of the four principal lines into which the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg were divided, two were Protestant and two Catholic; but one of the latter was on the eve of extinction, and in the other, the Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel line, violently hostile to the Reformation, a change accompanied the accession of Duke Julius, in 1568. His son, the Emperor Rudolf's faithful adherent, Duke Henry Julius, was a typical later example of Lutheran Imperialism; and even the Catholic Duke Henry the younger had been obliged to grant to his subjects the communion *sub utraque*. He had lived long enough to help to establish Bishop Burchard von Oberberg in the diminished see of Hildesheim, which, after being for a few years

subject to the unconsecrated sway of Duke Frederick of Holstein, now (1557-73) stood out as the solitary really Catholic see in northern Germany, but was administered on tolerant principles. Between the Houses of Brunswick-Lüneburg, Saxe-Lauenburg, and Holstein, of which last the elder branch was represented on the Danish throne by King Frederick II, the great northern archbishopric of Bremen, and the neighbouring bishoprics of Verden and Lübeck, could not but forfeit their ecclesiastical independence. Under Archbishop George, the Catholic Duke Henry of Brunswick's brother, who was also Bishop of Verden and Minden, Bremen and the adjoining sees were all but wholly Protestantised; and, after his death in 1566, Bremen (and in 1574 Paderborn and Osnabrück) passed into the hands of Henry of Saxe-Lauenburg, who, though a trimmer, professed adherence to the Augsburg Confession. The Lübeck Chapter, though still Catholic, in 1561 accepted Frederick II's nomination of a virtually Protestant Bishop. So, again, the Dukes of Mecklenburg to all intents and purposes secularised as well as Protestantised the sees of Schwerin and Ratzeburg, and the Pomeranian Dukes that of Cammin.

In the border-lands of northern and southern Germany the most important princely House was the Hessian, of which old Landgrave Philip remained the head till his death in 1567, nearly twenty years after he had become the prisoner of Charles V. He was indisputably the most far-sighted of the German Protestant Princes of the Reformation age, and the real originator of the aggressive policy based on the use of opportunities arising outside the Empire. But the time had not arrived for realising the conception of a wide Protestant alliance of the Princes of western Germany with France and England, which his indomitable spirit formed in the last years of his life, and towards which, at the close of Ferdinand's reign, he actually took preliminary steps. The fourfold partition of his territories, ordered by him in his last will, was to exemplify the disastrous dynastic effects of the old Germanic system of subdivision; but his spirit was to survive in the eldest, or Cassel, line of the Hessian Landgraves. In the matter of the exercise of religion Philip, to whose private faults his public greatness may make us a little blind, showed a large-minded, and at the same time politic, tolerance, which recalls that of William the Silent. The head of the German branch of the House of Nassau, Duke John of Nassau-Dillenburg, though not himself inclining to the tenets of the Calvinists, regarded them as an organic portion of the Protestant body, and from an early date (1566) identified himself with the movement in the Netherlands headed by his brothers William and Lewis. The actual establishment of Calvinism in Hesse-Cassel belongs to a later date (1605).

In the immediate neighbourhood of the dominions of the bellicose Landgrave of Hesse lay those of the Prince Abbots of Fulda, who took precedence over all other Abbots in the Empire, and who through eight

centuries had continued to increase their wealth and maintain a high position among its Princes. But even they had not been able to resist the current of religious change, and under six Abbots who followed on one another in more or less rapid succession (1529-70) Protestantism spread without much let or hindrance. It was not till 1573 that, as we shall see, the Counter-reformation found an anchorage in Fulda.

In the German south the balance of strength between the religious parties in this period was by no means so decided as it was in the north, though here also, besides the House of Austria, only a single dynasty consistently adhered to the Church of Rome. In the south-west lay the large majority of the Imperial towns, nearly all more or less Protestant—even at Augsburg the Catholics were in a minority—and necessarily forming points to which a Protestant propaganda could most easily attach itself. Of the immediate nobility, too, whose representatives sat on the four Counts' benches in the Diet, the Swabian and Franconian Counts, and those of the Wetterau (north of Frankfort), were, like the Knights, mainly Protestant; though their interests were directly opposed to the territorial aggrandisement of the Princes. The great bishoprics of the south—Würzburg, Ratisbon, Passau, Salzburg—might seem so many fastnesses of the Catholic Church; and even in the case of Strassburg, while the Imperial city, after joining in the full flood of the Protestant advance, had, in 1532, formally adopted the Augsburg Confession, the Bishops of the diocese had steadfastly maintained their allegiance to Rome. Bishop Erasmus, a Count of Linburg (1541-68), who did honour to his name by the moderation of his conduct both at Trent and at home in his see, was, however, no better able to secure the continuance of Catholic worship, either in the city at large or in its minster, than was his successor, Count John zu Manderscheid, by means of his more vigorous rule.

It was inevitable that Catholicism should fare no better in the Swabian towns, among which Ulm as usual took the lead, although their oligarchical councils were in sympathy with the old order of things. For Duke Christopher of Württemberg (1550-68) whose territorial power pressed upon them, was—after his neighbour, the Elector Palatine—the foremost among the Protestant Princes of the west and south. The abnormally numerous convents within his territories, especially the fourteen great abbacies, were “reformed” in 1556, their revenues being seized by his government; but, as the constitution of Württemberg gave the controlling power over its finances to the Estates, these revenues were managed by committees practically representing the Lutheran clergy and the towns, and were appropriated by them to educational purposes, above all to those of the University of Tübingen. Thus the Protestant Church, which in 1565 the Württemberg Diet declared the sole Church of the land, was here, even more decisively than in the Palatinate, established on a broad basis of

stability. Unfortunately, however, on the question of dogma the Palatinate and Württemberg soon found themselves widely asunder; for Duke Christopher, a Prince of high character and ability, was a rigid Lutheran, and at one time advocated the exclusion of his Calvinist neighbour from the benefits of the Religious Peace. This strong dogmatic difference seems not to have remained without influence upon his relations with foreign Powers and parties—with France in particular—which for the most part were far more pacific in their tendency than those of the Palatinate government.

While to the west of Christopher's dominions lay those of the Elector Palatine and of the Baden Margraves, in whose Protestant partisanship the Counter-reformation had not yet made a breach, his eastern neighbour was the Prince whose House was under him first to become the mainstay of Catholicism in southern Germany. Duke Albert V of Bavaria (1550-79) united in his hands the whole of the dominions of both the Bavarian lines (Munich and Landshut); and his long reign, during the whole of which he had by his side his consort Anna, daughter of the Emperor Ferdinand, was marked by unbroken vigour of purpose and conduct. No contemporary sovereign showed a stronger determination than he of putting into practice the principle of the Religious Peace, that each territorial Prince should direct and control the religious faith of his subjects and its exercise. A spirit of revolt against the existing Church had first shown itself at the Landshut Diet in 1553, when the nobility put in the forefront a complaint as to the disciplinary and moral decadence of the clergy. At the Munich Diet in 1556 the temporal Estates decisively combined with this grievance positive demands for the concession of the Cup in the Sacrament, and the relaxation of the obligations of fasting. The Duke had to give way on these latter points, though maintaining the Catholic use at his Court; but with regard to the general condition of the clergy and its ministrations an anarchy ensued almost as intolerable as that prevailing on the other side of the Austrian frontier. It is noticeable that to this period belongs the conclusion of the so-called Landsberg League between the Emperor Ferdinand and the neighbouring Catholic potentates of Bavaria, Salzburg, and Augsburg (June, 1558). The Bavarian nobility continued their demands (which included the right of marriage for priests) at the Ingolstadt Diet of 1563; and soon afterwards (April, 1564) the papal brief arrived which here, as elsewhere, under certain conditions permitted communion in both kinds to the laity. But Duke Albert had already entered upon his twofold policy, of resisting the further advance of Protestantism in his dominions, and seeking to reform their religious condition in the spirit of the Council of Trent, where his own ambassador Baumgartner had (June, 1562), while urging the concessions demanded by his Duke, given a notable impulse to the effort for an inner regeneration of the Church. The opposition to his ecclesiastical

policy among the Bavarian nobility, and at the same time the chronic resistance to it in the Diets, were permanently broken by his vigorous action in the case of the so-called "Ortenburg conspiracy." Count Joachim von Ortenburg had openly introduced the Reformed worship into his possessions, part of which were asserted by him to be immediate to the Empire, when Duke Albert by a *coup-de-main* (early in 1564) occupied two of Ortenburg's castles, deported two of the Protestant clergy brought by him into the countship, and confiscated his Bavarian estates. The nobles who had been associated with Ortenburg—though there is no evidence either of his having aimed at supplanting the Duke, or of their having entered into negotiations with foreign Powers—were subjected to a six weeks' imprisonment, terrified into submission, and in part forbidden further attendance upon Diets. Though Count von Ortenburg's claims to immediacy and in consequence his right of determining the religion of his subjects was after a suit of nine years' duration allowed by the *Reichskammergericht*—Ortenburg is said to remain a kind of Protestant enclave to the present day—Duke Albert's high-handed action had answered its purpose, and he was able to carry out unhindered his endeavours for the Catholic reformation of his duchy. In this policy dynastic motives may have cooperated; for the election in 1565 of his son Ernest, the occupant of a plurality of canonries, to the bishopric of Freisingen opened an episcopal career in the course of which the sees of Hildesheim, Liège, and Cologne were successively secured by that Prince.

The exceptional success of the Catholic reformation in Bavaria—which within the first four years was such that Albert boasted to have brought back 10,000 of his subjects to their religious allegiance—is primarily explained by the fact that here Protestantism had not as yet, as it had in most other parts of Germany, become master of the situation. But it was also largely due to the direct intervention of the ducal authority, which asserted itself so systematically as to alarm ecclesiastical susceptibilities. The government instituted visitations both of priests and people; expelling recalcitrants, regularly inspecting the clergy, holding examinations for candidates for orders, and reorganising the whole system of primary and secondary schools. The chief combatants in the struggle were, not the native clergy, to a large extent unmannered and unlearned, and distinguishable from the peasantry chiefly by their greater licence of life, but the resolute and devoted external agency which had here early taken in hand what it regarded as its proper work. The Jesuits had made their entry into Bavaria so early as 1542, at the invitation of Duke William IV, in the person of Ignatius Loyola's companions Lefèvre and Le Jay; and in 1549 the latter, with Salmeron and Canisius, opened courses of lectures in Ingolstadt. The enterprise was resumed in 1556, when a Jesuit College was established in the same town, and brought into an organic

connexion with the University. The Order had now a firm footing, and gradually established itself at Munich and elsewhere in Bavaria, as well as at Dillingen, the University of the Archbishopric of Augsburg. Canisius, Lancius, the first rector of the Munich Gymnasium, and above all, Paul Hoffraeus, who in 1568 succeeded Canisius as Provincial of the Upper German Province of the Order, by their personal influence over Duke Albert helped to give completeness to his Counter-reformation; together with the learned convert Staphylus (Stapellage) of Osnabrück, who had been a pupil of Luther and Melancthon, but had afterwards done yeoman's service at Trent. This Counter-reformation addressed itself to the intellectual life of the population at large by the spread of orthodox publications and the exercise of a severe censorship over such as seemed dangerous, including many books and tracts on a favourite theme of contemporary Protestant writers—the devil and his processes; but the movement failed to effect a radical change in the ordinary character of the Bavarian priesthood.

The Cardinal Bishop of Augsburg, Otto Truchsess von Waldburg (1534-73), a prelate who enjoyed the confidence of a succession of Popes and of the Emperors Ferdinand and Maximilian, had been from the first thoroughly at one with the Bavarian House in his resistance to the Protestant advance, and had long protested against the Religious Peace. It was he who made over to the Jesuits the institutions which he had founded in his archiepiscopal capital of Dillingen—university, seminary, and gymnasium. Dillingen, from 1564 onwards, became a kind of second *Collegium Germanicum* as a training place for the Jesuit mission. Into Würzburg also the Jesuits were introduced in 1566 by Bishop Frederick von Wirsberg, the successor of Grumbach's victim (1558-73); and even to Ratisbon, after previous Bishops had been unable to prevent the spread of Protestantism in their diocese, the Jesuits found their way in 1587, under the sway of Bishop Philip, grandson of Albert V, and afterwards Cardinal. Finally, in the great Archiepiscopal see of Salzburg, where an elder Bavarian Ernest, uncle to Duke Albert V, and previously Bishop of Passau, had at a quite early date introduced the Jesuits Faber and Lainez, the Archbishop's wholesale expulsion of Protestant families from his see led to the intervention of King Ferdinand, and finally to Ernest's resignation (1554). But the same troubles continued under his successors, Archbishops Michael von Kuenburg and Johann Jacob Kuen von Belasi, the latter of whom refused to allow the papal concession of the Cup to the laity to take effect in his diocese (1564). A further forced emigration of Protestant families followed, while their children were detained, to be brought up in the Catholic faith. These persecutions reached their height in the reign of Rudolf II.

The above rapid, and necessarily incomplete, survey will have indicated

what main forces will be found in action and counter-action during the period of jealousy and imminent conflict between the religious parties of which the chief vicissitudes have now to be summarised. To the still continuing expansion of Protestant beliefs and forms of worship among the populations at large, and to the appetite of the Protestant dynasties for the absorption of ecclesiastical lands and revenues, Catholicism was beginning to oppose an active endeavour to reform the Church and its clergy in accordance with the decrees of the Council of Trent, and to bring the life of the people into harmony with this organic regeneration. The aggressive force of Protestantism was far from having exhausted itself in the Empire; and signs were not wanting of its entering into new and wider fields of action. But it was arrested by the determined refusal of some of the foremost Lutheran Princes to subordinate to the advancement of their form of faith dynastic interests which they regarded as bound up with a loyal adhesion to the Emperor and the maintenance of the established institutions of the Empire. It was moreover weakened in itself by the internal divisions among the Lutherans, due to a hardening and stiffening of dogmatic systems for which the idiosyncrasies of particular religious teachers and the arbitrary decision of the Princes were primarily accountable; and above all by the unwillingness of the Lutheran potentates to admit the Calvinists to a share in the privileges of parity which had been secured to themselves by the Religious Peace. In these circumstances an effective joint action among the Protestant Estates seemed as yet out of the question, while the experiment of foreign alliances was only beginning to suggest itself to the more enterprising or far-sighted of their number.

Threatened treaties, like threatened men, sometimes live long; and even the most obnoxious stipulation connected with the Religious Peace of Augsburg, the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*, was to survive the first trumpet-blast of Protestant wrath. The Diet of Ratisbon (1556-7), summoned by Ferdinand in the first instance for the grant of aid against the Turks, and in the second for giving to the Religious Peace what completeness it might still lack, was at once used by the more eager among the Protestant Estates for an attempt to remove the detested provision. But Augustus of Saxony had no intention of seconding the Palatine policy of making the Turkish grant conditional upon the acceptance of Württemberg's proposal for the abolition of the *reservatum*. An aid was granted larger than the Palatines and smaller than Saxony would have preferred; and the religious question was left over for the not very hopeful occasion of a religious colloquy. Such a colloquy was actually opened at Worms a few months later (September, 1557); but it broke down in consequence of a protest against heresies delivered by the Ernestine theologians, with Flacius at their head, which Melanchthon, who was also present in person, knew to be directed against himself. The Flacian position, which demonstrated the fallacy of Melanchthon's

hopeful declaration that no difference existed as to the Augsburg Confession among its adherents was restated in the *Confutationsbuch*, published early in 1559, and at first set up as a kind of symbol at Jena. This outburst justified Canisius, who also attended at Worms, having in 1557 become Provincial of Southern Germany, in demonstrating the futility of a settlement; and the colloquy came to an abrupt end.

At the Diet of Augsburg in 1559 the situation was very much what it had been at Ratisbon. The Protestant ambassadors met, as before, for separate consultation under Palatine leadership, the instructions of the presidents during part of the proceedings being supplied by the new Elector Frederick III. The attempt to postpone the Turkish aid till the religious grievances should have found redress was again made, and again defeated; and the treatment of the religious difficulty was put off to a more convenient season. The reopening of the Council of Trent was at hand; and, while under the exhortations of Canisius the Catholic Bishops prepared to meet its reforming decrees half-way, Ferdinand would fain have induced the Protestant Princes to be represented there. But of this there was no chance; and Germany had no part in the reforms promulgated by the Council.

The Protestant Princes in the meantime continued to apply their territorial policy to the ecclesiastical foundations within their reach; and the despoiled conventual bodies found it impossible to obtain redress from the *Kammergericht*. On the other hand, the Catholics successfully asserted their power in the towns within their sphere of influence; at Trier, as has been seen, the Archbishop-Elector recatholicised his conquered capital; and in the Imperial city of Aachen, whose vicinity to the Netherlands frontier had led to the intervention of an Imperial commission, the town council and all civic offices were declared open to Catholics only, while many Protestant immigrants were expelled from the place (March-May, 1560).

Before the Council of Trent was declared once more in session, the expediency of presenting something like a united front seems to have impressed itself so strongly upon the Protestant Princes that even Augustus of Saxony was found ready to take part in a meeting at Naumburg (January, 1561), where, though Melanchthon was now dead, an attempt was made to secure a doctrinal agreement on the basis of the 1540 edition of the Augsburg Confession. But the effort was frustrated by the zeal of the Ernestine John Frederick; and, instead of a welcome being accorded to the ideas of union advanced by Philip of Hesse, this failure led to a wider severance than before between Lutherans and Calvinists. The strict Lutherans of the Lower Saxon Circle at Lüneburg reaffirmed their opposition to Calvinism (August, 1561); and three years later Frederick III of the Palatinate put forth the Heidelberg Catechism, which proclaimed the breach as permanent.

It is needless to dwell here on the general significance for the Empire

and its subsequent ecclesiastical life of the last and decisive period of the Council of Trent, of the decrees on reformation which supplied a definite basis for the administrative practice of the Church of Rome, and of the machinery by means of which, as applied more especially to clerical discipline and to the education of the young, that Church, with an ardour augmented by success, strove to recover the ground which she had lost. In response to the demands of Ferdinand I the question of the use of the Cup by the laity had alone been reserved for the papal decision, and after minute enquiry and on specified conditions was favourably determined by a simultaneous series of briefs to the German Archbishops (April, 1564). The Emperor had withdrawn the proposal for a relaxation of the observance of fasts, while that for permitting the marriage of clergymen had been answered by a Conciliar anathema. Ferdinand had regarded this concession, together with that of the Cup, as offering the only prospect of preventing the further disintegration of the Church in his own and the adjoining lands; and he knew that in regard to the marriage of priests practice could not at present be accommodated to precept. Although, therefore, Canisius, whose counsel in religious matters he had long so willingly followed, had at Trent uncompromisingly opposed all concession, Ferdinand seems to the last to have clung to a policy of conciliation. As late as the summer of 1564—not many weeks before his death—he consulted George Cassander, a Flemish scholar of wide training and open mind, whose pacific treatise on points of controversy between Catholics and Protestants, undertaken at Ferdinand's request, was completed by the wish of Maximilian II, and in due course found its place in the *Index*.

Meanwhile, as the Emperor Ferdinand's life drew towards its close, and within the Empire and in his own dominions the elements of disturbance seemed to increase, the conflict had broken out beyond the borders of the Empire, into which, if religious differences continued to divide it into opposing camps, some at least of its members could not in the end fail to be drawn by sympathy or interest. In the Low Countries the thunder-clouds had not yet broken; but the religious situation created by the Inquisition had become intolerable; and already the fugitives for conscience' sake, a large proportion of whom found their way into Germany, were to be numbered by thousands. When William of Orange appeared at Frankfort in 1562, on the occasion of the election of Maximilian as Roman King, he counselled the Protestant Princes to be mindful of the Netherlands, and to seek to allay the contentions between the Protestant Scandinavian Powers. In France the First Religious War actually opened in 1562; and in April of that year a Huguenot embassy visited the Courts of the more resolute among the German Protestant Princes, the Elector Palatine, the Dukes of Württemberg and of Zweibrücken, and the Landgrave of Hesse,—money aid was given by some of them and by the Margrave Charles of Baden, and in Hesse recruitings actually

began. On the other hand Augustus of Saxony, when the Huguenot overtures reached him in his turn, was clear for non-intervention in a foreign quarrel. The Emperor, though he had always kept up a friendly understanding with his nephew Philip II, and showed little disposition to enter into closer relations with the fluctuating government of France, was on the whole, as he had ever been, anxious for the preservation of peace abroad as well as at home. But the prospect of a wider Protestant combination, in which Estates of the Empire would be united with foreign allies, was no longer remote; and how this contingency would affect the Empire was one of the most important of the problems of which the solution must needs largely depend upon Ferdinand's successor.

The choice of that successor was determined by the election of the Emperor's eldest son, Maximilian, as Roman King on November 28, 1562. We have seen that he was crowned King of Hungary in the following year, and that in Bohemia he had been acknowledged as successor at so early a date as 1549. It is true that by his last will Ferdinand, moved by parental feeling, assigned to his second son, Archduke Ferdinand, together with Anterior Austria, the countship of the Tyrol; while to his youngest son, Archduke Charles, who was a suitor for the hand of Queen Elizabeth, he left the duchies of Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola, with the countship of Görz. But Upper and Lower Austria remained to Maximilian, and due provision was made both for his supreme control in the matter of wars and alliances, and for the security of the succession in all its hereditary dominions of the male line of the Austrian Habsburgs. The solidarity of the power of the dynasty was thus assured.

II.

Maximilian II, like his great-grandfather and namesake, was not actually brought face to face with the national and European crisis which already during his reign seemed imminent. Nevertheless, his personal relation to the conditions of the conflict that was preparing and announcing itself is of signal importance, and makes it necessary to go back for a moment on his previous history. Like the earlier Maximilian, he was not a great man; but he was gifted with some of those qualities which justly bring an exceptional popularity to Princes possessed of them. Certain of the happiest features of his nationality—open-mindedness and a kindly humour—were united in him with equally marked characteristics of the age in which he lived. Unlike both his father and his uncle, he was enabled by his impressionable and flexible nature and by his varied training to accommodate himself to the manners and ways of many nations, and to exhibit an appreciative interest in divers intellectual currents of his times. His genuine sympathy with the religious movement that in the days of his youth had taken so strong a hold of the

lands over which he was destined to rule was patent to the world, and riveted the attention of all whose hopes or fears centred in that movement. But he was also, after the fashion of his age, a student of science; and the fashion of his age was observation and experiment, all too frequently degenerating into sciolism and quackery. But Maximilian seems to have loved research for its own sake, and both science and art (botany and music in particular) as refining and brightening life. At the same time he possessed what to a sovereign is worth nearly all other qualities and accomplishments—the gift of a spontaneous and never-failing courtesy, which made foreign Princes and their envoys pronounce him the most perfect cavalier in existence, while he had an opportune recollection and a kindly word for the humblest attendant at his Court. But the sceptical disposition of his mind affected, and no doubt weakened, the power of moral decision, which few men have been called upon to exercise in circumstances of greater gravity.

Born on July 31, 1527, Maximilian was the junior by ten weeks of his Spanish cousin. From the first, Philip's succession to the Spanish monarchy and Maximilian's to the Austrian lands transferred to his father by the Emperor Charles V had been regarded as settled. But, when in 1547 Charles consented to a marriage between his elder daughter, Maria, and her cousin Maximilian—it was actually celebrated in the following year—the hoped-for dowry of Milan or (what would have suited him better still) the Low Countries, was withheld. There is no evidence that at the time of the marriage either Charles V or Ferdinand suspected Maximilian of any inclination towards Lutheranism, such as is supposed to have been instilled in him as a boy or youth by a teacher named Schifer (Severus). During his two years' sojourn in Spain, where he and his wife in Philip's absence conducted the government, the great number of reports received by Ferdinand as to his son's more or less satisfactory observance of his religious duties may possibly point to some special anxiety on the subject. He was recalled from Spain by the Emperor towards the close of 1550 in order to take part in the deliberations which ended in the Family Compact of March 9, 1551, according to which Philip was to succeed Ferdinand on the Imperial throne—Maximilian administering German affairs as Roman King under his cousin. Ferdinand's consent had been most reluctantly given; and Maximilian, whose prospects were so injuriously affected by the Compact, was at once courted by Maurice of Saxony and by Henry II of France. When the crisis came, Maximilian as well as his father proved true to Charles V; but the collapse of the Imperial and Catholic cause was in part due to the unpopularity of the Spanish scheme in Germany, and perhaps to the inevitable coldness between the two branches of the House of Habsburg. In 1552, when, on his way to a Turkish campaign in Hungary, Maximilian fell ill, sinister suspicions were entertained by him of poison administered in the Spanish interest.

Cordial relations were not established between the German and Spanish lines till, as was shown by Philip's marriage with Mary of England (1554), the ambition of Spain was directed to the establishment of her supremacy over the west of Europe, and the Emperor definitively abandoned the project of securing the Imperial succession to his son. Though Ferdinand was allowed to take his own course in concluding the Religious Peace of Augsburg, his loyalty towards his brother and his devotion to Rome remained alike undoubted. It was otherwise with Maximilian. He showed himself—as for instance in the matter of his wife's household—fully possessed by an antipathy against Spanish influence, which was stimulated by his German courtiers and counsellors. But unmistakable indications now also began to appear that his religious views tended in the same direction. Much as has been written on the subject, it is perhaps impossible to date the beginnings of these symptoms; but it would seem to have been in the critical year 1555 that the rumours as to his religious opinions first took anything like a definite shape. They connect themselves, not with his jealousy of Spain, but rather with the religious agitation in Austria which about this time had reached a high point. There was in Austria an alarming lack of clergy capable of edifying their congregations either as preachers or by their godly lives; and Sebastian Phauser had been summoned to Vienna by Ferdinand as one who would help to meet this need. Soon, however, the King learnt that the preacher to whom he had listened with approbation was a married man, and dismissed him. But when, about 1554, he learnt that Maximilian had held discourse with Phauser, Ferdinand seems to have raised no objection. In March, 1555, we know that Maximilian attended a church where Phauser ministered according to forms and in a spirit approaching at least very closely to Lutheranism. Soon afterwards, being in charge of the government at Vienna during his father's absence at Augsburg, Maximilian declined to approve the Jesuit suggestion that a declaration of faith should be required from all ecclesiastics. Canisius hereupon denounced him and Phauser at Augsburg; and a serious correspondence ensued between father and son, as well as communications from the Emperor on the subject of his daughter, Maximilian's wife, with whose strictly Catholic life Maximilian appears not to have interfered. Nor did he absent himself altogether from Catholic services; but he preferred the discourses of Phauser and the study of Protestant writings, insisted on receiving the Sacrament in both kinds, corresponded with Christopher of Württemberg, and even exchanged letters with Melancthon.

Thus, although, some vague menaces notwithstanding, there was neither in peace nor in war-time any real fear of Maximilian's attempting to side with France against Spain, his conversion to Protestantism seemed to become more and more likely. Controversial argument having been tried in vain by the Spanish "Magister" Gallo, the Archbishop of Toledo

appeared on the scene to advise on the treatment of the case, even, it was whispered, to prepare for the divorce of Maximilian from his consort. After the death of Charles V (September, 1558) Paul IV would have been prepared to push things to extremities, had Philip II been ready to quarrel with his German kinsmen. The accession of Pius IV (December, 1559) caused more prudent counsels to prevail; but Ferdinand also had been alarmed, and in his last years never placed his eldest son in a position of permanent power. In 1559 he again bade Maximilian dismiss Phauser, but was answered by his son, that rather than give way against his conscience he would surrender all his lands and serve God in retirement. In 1560 the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg ventured to offend Ferdinand's pride by begging him to leave his son's religion unmolested. The sorely tried Emperor (Archduke Charles had recently refused to pledge himself on the subject of religion, should Queen Elizabeth listen to his suit) resolved, with the aid of Maximilian's Spanish wife and her Spanish confessor, to make one more attempt. We have Maximilian's own account of the alternatives that were now placed before him—on the one side a greatness which, if the life of the weakling Don Carlos were to be eliminated, might be like the greatness of Charles V himself; on the other humiliation and disinheritance.

Maximilian's character was not equal to the test. He no longer insisted on retaining Phauser, but was content to find him a refuge at the Court of Duke Christopher of Württemberg, whence he sent confidential messages to other Protestant Princes. Augustus of Saxony declared himself ready to make friendly representations to the Emperor, but advised Maximilian against active resistance; and no distinct promise of aid seems to have reached Maximilian. He accordingly now gave way outwardly, although there is no proof or probability that any change took place in his religious opinions. Even early in 1561, when the Protestant Princes were preparing for their meeting at Naumburg, they for a time entertained the thought of inviting him to send a representative there. But gradually his conformity with the Catholic Church became undeniable. He occasionally attended mass, heard Catholic preachers, and disputed, in varying moods, with zealous orthodox divines, including a succession of three papal Nuncios—Hosius, Delfius, Commendone. Except as to his consistent demand for the Sacrament in both forms—and for this too he consented to ask as a favour from the Pope—he was outwardly reconquered for the Church of Rome by his father's firmness, seconded by the personal and other persuasions of Philip II's ambassador, the Count di Luna, who seems to have succeeded in extracting from Maximilian a kind of pledge of adherence to his present line of submission.

Such a pledge was necessary, if the Catholic Electors were to be induced to vote for the election of Maximilian as Roman King; and

after having in the summer of 1561 asked the support of the hesitating Pope Pius IV for his election, in February, 1562, he in the presence of the envoys of the Spiritual Electors at Prague declared himself ready to remain a faithful member of the Church of Rome. Yet there can at the same time be no doubt that the Protestant Electors put faith in a promise made by him that when he sat on the Imperial throne he would openly declare his acceptance of the Augsburg Confession; for, when reminded of this undertaking after he had succeeded to the Empire, he only pleaded the impossibility of carrying it out. There is accordingly every reason for regarding the unanimous election of Maximilian as Roman King (October 27, 1562) as the result of a double game. Maximilian's subsequent conduct was so far consistent that henceforth he never really broke away from the common policy of the House of Habsburg. It was in 1562 that Philip II first informed his Austrian kinsfolk of the actual bodily and mental condition of Don Carlos—a confidence which was not made in vain. Maximilian not only gave his sons a Spanish education, but showed some assiduity on this head; while Philip II, whose third wife had borne him no son, was on his side desirous of maintaining the legitimate Habsburg succession in Spain. Dynastic ambition thus counted for much in Maximilian's conduct as to religion. Yet his intentions continued to remain suspected; nor was it till February, 1564, that he was at last officially recognised by the Pope in Consistory. The recognition had not come too soon, for in the following July Ferdinand died. Shortly after this event, the Venetian Ambassador Michele gave it as his opinion that just as the Catholic Ferdinand had protected the German Protestants in the enjoyment of the great concessions which he had made to them, so Maximilian, notwithstanding his own inclinations, would seek to preserve the remnants of the Catholic Church in the Empire. They were in truth little more than the remnants; but (as in the case of James I in England) the hopes of both sides ran high on the new Emperor's advent to the throne; and on the whole his reign certainly proved advantageous to the progress of the Catholic Reaction.

Maximilian's reign (1564-76), like that of his father, was overshadowed by the great Turkish trouble and peril. We have seen how, two years before his death, Ferdinand had concluded an eight years' truce with Solyman II, in whose hands he left a large part of Hungary and to whom he consented to pay a tribute. Solyman, though openly lamenting the death of so just an adversary as Ferdinand and protesting his pacific tendencies to the new Emperor, continued the negotiations into which he had entered with the young John Sigismund Zápolya for establishing him in his father's stead as *Voivod* of Transylvania, in dependence on the Ottoman Power. Maximilian resented this humiliating condition of things; and his commanders sought to anticipate the Transylvanian in the occupation of fortified places. Soon, as has

been related elsewhere, the real adversary took the field. In June, 1566, Sultan Solyman II was at Belgrade; and in August Szigeth fell after a heroic defence. During the siege Solyman died in his tent; but, owing to Maximilian's distrust of the report of the Sultan's death, the army of 100,000 which the Emperor had collected with so much effort, had done nothing to aid Zriny at Szigeth. A great aid, amounting to some three-and-a-half million florins, had been granted at Maximilian's first Diet; and his armada included contingents from Tuscany and from Savoy; the Dukes of Mantua and Ferrara appeared at the head of their cavalry; from France came the young Duke of Guise, eager to flesh his avenging sword; there were knights from England, from Poland, and from Malta. But Maximilian was without the genius for war which might have made him the victor by land of an earlier Lepanto. In the next years his experienced general Schwendi gained some advantage on the Turks, but not enough to secure from the new Sultan Selim II terms substantially different from those granted by Solyman to Ferdinand. Moreover, Maximilian's army dissolved; the Bohemian and Moravian levies went home, and so did the uxorious Archduke Ferdinand. The frontier was settled on the *uti possidetis* basis, the Turkish limits including Szigeth; and the Emperor continued to pay tribute to the Sultan. Zápolya remained in possession, but being dissatisfied with his share concluded on his own account a secret treaty with Maximilian. On his death in 1571 Stephen Báthory, with the Sultan's approval, took his place as Prince of Transylvania. Even after Lepanto (October, 1571) Maximilian made no attempt to resume the Turkish war; and on Selim II's death in 1574, when the Turkish inroads began to become frequent across the Croatian frontier, the Emperor was glad to be able to obtain a renewal of peace with his successor, Murad III. But Báthory's hostility to Austria caused the Transylvanian difficulties to continue, and the Eastern peace remained a broken one.

The really ineradicable opposition between the interests of Austria and those of the Turks contributed to give additional significance to the dynastic designs of Maximilian on the Polish throne, which have likewise been described elsewhere. On the death in 1572 of Sigismund Augustus, the last of the male line of the Jagello Kings of Poland, Maximilian would have gladly secured the election to the Polish throne of one of his sons, Archduke Ernest, and thus gained an influence which would have sufficed to keep Transylvania quiet; but Turkish advice and the fear of being drawn into the chronic strife between Emperor and Sultan ensured the election of the Duke of Anjou. After King Henry III of France had escaped from his Polish throne like a thief in the night, the Polish Diet had, in 1575, to make another choice; and this time, though once more the Porte intervened with a vigorous protest, Maximilian himself was actually elected by one faction, the other choosing the Transylvanian *Voivod* Stephen Báthory. The latter, as has been seen,

was crowned King (1576), while Maximilian was perpending the terms, certainly far from attractive, offered him by his supporters. The refusal of the Diet of the Empire to enter into Maximilian's Polish design would have made it impossible for him, had he lived, to urge war against Stephen Báthory for the Polish Crown. For the triple struggle which such a war would have involved the only ally who offered himself was Tsar Ivan the Terrible, himself a candidate for the Polish throne, who proposed a partition of Poland and Lithuania with the Emperor.

It seemed convenient to recall the Eastern pressure upon Maximilian's government, before adverting to the progress of those internal difficulties in the dealing with which that pressure could be ignored neither by the Emperor nor the Diet—the ultimate resort as yet of contentions in the Empire. Though the Turkish danger was after a fashion met by Maximilian's Diets, from his first in 1566 to his last in 1576, it was impossible that the religious struggle and the conflict of interests which intensified it should not injuriously affect the military efficacy of the Empire as against the Turk; and, even had Maximilian displayed capacity in the field, it would have been impossible for him, with the inadequate resources of a disunited Empire, to drive back permanently the Ottoman Power. But it was not only the Empire which was out of joint throughout his reign; for the religious discord that was the main cause of its troubles only reflected the conflicts which were now openly declaring themselves in its western border-lands. Maximilian's accession to the throne occurred midway between the outbreak of the French Religious Wars in 1562 and the first signals of the Revolt of the Netherlands in 1567 and 1568. With the sympathies or antipathies entertained in Germany towards the contending interests in these struggles there cooperated the ineradicable inclination of the Germans towards mercenary service in arms. In course of time a very considerable proportion of the combatants in France and in the Netherlands came to be drawn from the Empire. Now, while the right of an Estate of the Empire to conclude a foreign alliance remained practically unrestricted, the *Exekutionsordnung* of 1555 made the consent of a princely or city government a necessary condition for the levy of troops within its dominions, and the service of the Empire, or the Emperor's assent, for the transit of such troops through the territory of another Estate. This transit was a matter of the greatest consequence, inasmuch as the soldiers were only paid, not clothed or fed, by their employers, and, having to support themselves on the march, were in the habit of committing every kind of excess. The Princes who entered into foreign service persistently neglected asking the Emperor's assent for the transit of their troops; nor was the case much altered, when (in 1564) the assent of the Director of the Circle affected was made requisite. It was not till after many and serious excesses, especially in the archbishopric of Cologne and elsewhere on the Rhine, that in 1569 some vigorous

reforms were attempted by a *Deputationstag*; but with the fundamental question, whether Estates could be prohibited from entering into foreign service the Diet, though called upon to consider it by the *Deputationstag*, could not be brought effectively to deal.

When Maximilian II opened his first Diet at Augsburg in March, 1566, the grant of an aid against the Turks was, as has been seen, the purpose which he had most especially in view; and this he achieved. But he had also proposed in his summons that the Diet should take into consideration the best means of attaining to religious unity in the Empire. This meant different things to different parties and to different men. There were fervent and uncompromising Catholics—whose numbers were being steadily increased by the strenuous efforts of Duke Albert of Bavaria and his Jesuit *protégés*—fully prepared to accept the Tridentine Decrees; and Cardinal Commendone appeared at the Diet as Legate of the new Pope Pius V to call upon the Estates to carry these Decrees into execution. But Commendone found that at the Diet neither side had manifested any desire to put an end to the Religious Peace, and had nearly quitted Augsburg in disgust. He does not seem to have perceived how adverse the Decrees—in the matter of rules and restrictions concerning the episcopate—were to the territorial interests of most of the Princes. It is probable that Maximilian still thought the attainment of a common ground possible. Herein he was in a sense before, in another sense behind, his times. While he was willing to listen to the teaching of Cassander, on the Catholic side Cassander's earlier patron Duke William of Jülich and the Elector of Cologne, Frederick von Wied, whose election as Archbishop remained unconfirmed by the Pope, were in agreement with the views no doubt justly attributed to the new Emperor. But the future was not with this faction; and in the year 1567 the Archbishop-Elector had to resign, and was followed by a successor approved at Rome. When the Protestant Estates at the Diet proposed the holding of a National Council, the Catholics repudiated this as unnecessary, and fell back upon the validity of the Tridentine Decrees.

Meanwhile the Emperor's immediate attention had been directed, and was again brought back, to the preliminary problem of the suppression of Calvinism. As to this, he and the Catholics had not unnaturally expected the Protestant Estates to take the first step. But the Lutherans on their side hesitated to press home directly the exclusion of the Elector Palatine, Frederick III, from the benefits of the Religious Peace, although they were agreed not to include him among the signatories of the demand for a National Council addressed by them to the Emperor, unless he should previously have accepted a formula settled by them as to the true doctrine of the Eucharist. And it was now that the moderate policy, coupled no doubt with the territorial interests, of the Elector of Saxony decided the issue; for the Grumbach

troubles were not yet at an end, and menaced the Palatine and Saxon Electors alike. The Emperor, approving of Frederick III's attitude in the Grumbach question, hereupon contented himself with admonishing him on his unlawful processes of reformation; and, though the meeting of Protestant Estates denounced his Sacramental views, the more general assault upon his position broke down. The result was, in a word, that the Elector Palatine and the cause of Calvinism came forth from the Diet stronger than before; for room was now left them for further expansion in the Empire, and the breach between the Calvinists and the Lutherans had so far not been formalised. At the same time the cause of Protestantism was weakened by the perpetuation of discord and disunion in its midst. While Calvinism was left untouched, the divisions among the professed Lutherans were unhealed. The Ernestine John William restored Flacianism of the purest water at Jena; and doctrinal controversies recommenced between Electoral and Ernestine Saxony. Duke Christopher of Württemberg in 1568 put forth a *Concordia*, drawn up with such brevity by Jacob Andreae that its acceptance by both Philippists and Flacians seemed possible; but neither the missionary efforts of its author, nor the countenance of Duke Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel and of the Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel, nor the goodwill of the Emperor himself, could bring about its general acceptance. In the meantime the Counter-reformation, in Bavaria and elsewhere, continued its course; and the day seemed approaching when it was from the Catholic side rather than from the Protestant that aggressive movements were to proceed.

During the interval between the Augsburg Diet of 1566 and that of Speier in 1570 the progress of the religious conflict in France and in the Netherlands made it more and more necessary for the German Protestants to decide on their bearing towards it. Necessarily, this must largely depend on the attitude of the Emperor and the consequent chances of an intervention on the part of the Empire. In the earlier part of this period, at all events, such an intervention still seemed possible; for Maximilian had not as yet made it clear how he would shape his conduct towards Spain. Meanwhile, the tortuous policy of the French government in these years was likewise perplexing to the German Protestant Princes. The overtures which it made to them in 1567 were well understood to be prompted by no sincere goodwill towards the Protestant cause; and though some of them, at meetings held in that year at Heidelberg and Maulbronn under Palatine and Hessian direction, resolved on a French alliance, the ground was cut from under their feet by the outbreak in September of the Second French Religious War. But the Elector Palatine Frederick III better understood the nature of the situation in France, and had made up his own mind. In December, 1567, he allowed his ambitious second son, John Casimir, who by his early residence in France seemed fitted for the task, to lead a mercenary force

of 8000 horse and a regiment of foot to the assistance of Condé; an envoy sent to Heidelberg to protest in the name of the Emperor was put off with empty excuses. The die was cast; for not only was the result of the French Religious War materially affected by the fact of this reinforcement of the Huguenots; but the future policy of the Palatinate was pledged by this act, as Frederick and his counsellors meant it to be; and to them, in the transactions which followed, the moral as well as the actual leadership of the German Protestants proved to have passed. When in 1567 William of Orange resolved on the attempt to shake off the yoke of Alva from the Netherlands, his appeal to the German Protestant Princes to bring about the intervention of the Empire was coldly received by them all with the exception of the Elector Palatine. When in 1568 Orange returned, this time as a fugitive, to Germany, Frederick III alone came forward to support him with a loan, to which Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel afterwards added a contribution. But even before the dispersal of Orange's liberating army, the overbearing action of Alva, and his demand for the expulsion of the fugitives who were crowding into the German north and north-west, had caused great uneasiness among Catholic as well as Protestant Estates. In September, 1568, the Rhenish Electors appealed to Maximilian to adopt such action as might check the Spanish proceedings in the Netherlands; and it is noticeable that the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg added further representations on their own behalf.

Maximilian had many considerations to balance against one another; and in favour of intervention the strongest was perhaps the religious condition of his own hereditary dominions. We have seen how widespread the advance of Protestantism there had been before his advent to the Imperial throne, and how his own conduct in the matter of religion had been favourable to this advance. Since his accession Protestant feeling had continued steadily to grow in Austria; and, partly owing to a consciousness that the heavy taxation which the Estates had to undergo to meet the cost of the Turkish war warranted some concession in return, this feeling rose to its height in 1568. Maximilian would have preferred a scheme of comprehension on the lines favoured by his father; but the nobles of Lower Austria insisted on the right of a free exercise of the Augsburg Confession on their lands; and this definite right was conceded to them (August, 1568), the towns, as more or less dependent on the government, holding aloof. The elaboration of a code of religious worship and administration (*agenda*) for what was intended to be little or nothing short of an established territorial Church was entrusted to David Chytraeus, a Lutheran divine of unimpeachable orthodoxy, but of a conciliatory disposition; and the Emperor amended the draft in a similar spirit towards the Church of Rome. It may be added that a similar concession was made to Protestant feeling in Styria, where Chytraeus was

likewise employed in 1573; while in Upper Austria, where the Estates refused Maximilian's *agenda*, he had to content himself with leaving alone what he could not remedy, the use of the Cup by the laity being of course maintained. To the religious developments in Bohemia reference will be made in another place; in Hungary also, so far as the royal authority of Maximilian extended, Protestantism was allowed to advance unhindered.

It was during the negotiations as to the religious concessions to be made by the Emperor to the mainly Protestant nobility of Lower Austria that the embassy of the Electors urging him to intervene in the affairs of the Netherlands arrived at Vienna. There can be no doubt that Maximilian personally sympathised with the complaints on which this request was based, and that he would gladly have seen the troubles in the Provinces ended by the dismissal of the Spanish troops and an amicable settlement of religious and other differences. Furthermore, he was certainly prepared to undertake such a settlement himself, for the Netherlands had never ceased to attract him; and we know that before the actual outbreak he had been at least inclined to offer himself as peacemaker. He now unhesitatingly transmitted to Philip the representation of the Electors with a strong recommendation in their favour; and in August, 1568, he sent his brother Archduke Charles to Spain, to renew the proffer of the Emperor's personal good offices in bringing the troubles of the Provinces to a close.

Archduke Charles was relieved of the task of executing his other commission—that of pleading for Don Carlos—by the death of that unfortunate prince (July 23, 1568). This tragic event, it cannot be doubted, exercised a most important influence upon Maximilian II, particularly in his relations to the religious question. The death of the heir to the Spanish monarchy was anything rather than unforeseen; but there is a vast difference between expectation and event. Henceforth Philip showed himself much more desirous than before of strengthening the bonds between the two branches of the House of Habsburg; and, in return, the future interests of his dynasty became paramount with Maximilian. While Philip coldly rejected the proposals brought by Archduke Charles as to the troubles in the Netherlands, he was ready to discuss with him marriage projects of signal moment for the future of the Austrian line. The proposed marriage of his infant daughter to one of Maximilian's numerous sons must inevitably be long delayed in execution; but already in 1570 Philip married the Emperor's daughter Anne as his fourth wife. Obviously—even if the report that Philip sent warnings to his kinsman was not based on authentic data—so close a connexion with the King of Spain implied an unimpeachable orthodoxy, and could not fail to react upon the relations between the Emperor and Pope Pius V, who was so "well contented" with Philip's treatment of the Low Countries. The friendly influence of the Pope became of the most

direct value to Maximilian when the latter began to speculate on the chances of recovering the throne of Poland for himself or for one of his sons.

It is true that the matter of the Lutheran *agenda* for Lower Austria, after the protests of the Papal Nuncio Commendone had been met by a suspension of proceedings in November, 1568, was quietly taken up again and slowly and secretly carried to its conclusion by January, 1571. The Lower Austrian nobility were now both for themselves and for their subjects empowered to exercise their religion in accordance with the Augsburg Confession in its original form; and a decree followed promising the extension of this concession to the nobility of Upper Austria also.

But while in this matter Maximilian's policy of delay and secrecy seems to have beguiled the Pope and King Philip, he had been found ready to abandon the proposed intervention of the Empire in the affairs of the Netherlands. After the recommendations of the Electors had found their way to Spain, they had there been dispersed into empty air. The schemes for an intervention lost all Imperial basis, and were exchanged for the design of a great Protestant offensive combination in which England, the Scandinavian Powers, and even Switzerland, were to play their part as well as the insurgent Protestants in the Netherlands and France. The Thirty Years' War casts the shadow of its shifting designs back over nearly half a century; and the imagination of the *doctrinaires* of Heidelberg was already equal to the lighting-up of a war which would envelope the greater part of Europe in its flames.

John Casimir, whose own share of the salvage from this general conflagration was to consist of the three bishoprics of Metz, Toul, and Verdun, was about this time betrothed to a daughter of Augustus of Saxony; and the Saxon Elector was in conjunction with Brandenburg induced to assemble a meeting of ambassadors of Protestant Princes at Erfurt for the discussion of the highflown Palatine proposals (September, 1569). But the time was not ripe; the Brandenburgers took the lead in repudiating the designs put forward by the presiding Palatines; and nearly all the other ambassadors, including the Saxon, followed suit. In the same year a counter-attempt was made by the Archbishop of Trier to form a combination which should include the Rhenish Catholic princes and the Spanish Netherlands, and cooperate with the Landsberg Alliance, headed by Bavaria, which had just been renewed for seven years. Philip would willingly have inflated this design into a league of the whole Catholic West. But the Emperor Maximilian II, while pretending to favour this proposal, contrived to frustrate it; and after an equally futile attempt of Augustus of Saxony to convert the Landsberg Alliance into a league of both Confessions which would ensure the neutrality of the Empire in the Netherlands conflict, it was joined by nobody but the Electors of Mainz and Trier.

The effects of the change in the general tendencies of Maximilian's policy showed themselves distinctly enough at his second Diet, which met at Speier in July, 1570, and in the transactions which ensued, down to the opening, six years later, of his last Diet at Ratisbon. In consequence of the excesses committed by the troops led by William of Orange, John Casimir, and other Princes into the Netherlands and France in their transit through the Archbishopric of Cologne and other districts of western Germany in 1568 and 1569, a *Deputationstag* had called upon the Diet to apply an effectual remedy. But the Emperor's desire that it should henceforth be within his discretion to allow or disallow the levy of troops for foreign service—in other words that the direction of the policy of the Empire as to the French and Netherlands wars should henceforth be placed in his hands—was by no means to the taste of the Estates. It was merely provided that he should in future be informed of any such levy; and his proposals for organising the defence of the borders fell to the ground. The mistrust implied in these proceedings of the Diet is in part explicable by the fact that, while it was sitting, the marriage of Maximilian's daughter Anne with King Philip was solemnised (November). It is true that in the same month the Emperor's daughter Elizabeth was married to Charles IX of France, and that about this time the policy of Catharine de' Medici took a favourable turn towards the Huguenots, and towards the cause of the Netherlands, on behalf of which Orange was at this time continuously canvassing German support. The more ardent spirits among the German Protestants were for a time caught by the fantastic suggestion that Charles IX should be set up as successor to Maximilian on the Imperial throne, with Henry of Anjou as Roman King. But though these schemes were resumed after the first horror excited by the Massacre of St Bartholomew (1572) had subsided, and after Henry of Anjou had actually ascended the Polish throne (1573), they were too artificial to have a chance of success; and in the end the sympathies and hopes of militant German Protestantism attached themselves once more to the Huguenots and to Henry of Navarre, while the conservative and cautious section headed by Augustus of Saxony became more conservative and cautious than ever. In September, 1575, with the aid of English money, John Casimir concluded an important treaty with the Huguenot leaders for conducting 16,000 German and Swiss mercenaries into France; and in December he marched into that country, where the presence of his force helped to bring about the hollow peace which ended the Fifth Religious War (1576).

While the withdrawal of Maximilian from an attitude of unmistakable friendliness towards the progress of Protestantism at home and abroad had failed to benefit the interests of Catholicism as represented by Spain abroad, it could not but encourage the advance of the Catholic Reaction at home, and at the same time deepen the mistrust between the Imperialist section of the Protestant Estates, and that which cast to

the winds all care for the Empire and its integrity. The interests of the Counter-reformation in Germany were probably better served by Gregory XIII, who had in 1572 succeeded to the chair of St Peter, than by Pius V, who had fallen in with the conceptions of Philip II. But though Gregory came under the influence of fanatics, he was not one himself; and in Germany he favoured more gradual and in particular educational processes such as were set in motion by the Jesuit Order, whose *collegium Germanicum* at Rome he reendowed, and whose agents he caused to be sent forth to the annual number of one hundred. One of the Catholic centres in Germany whence a large number of pupils for the great Roman seminary were drawn was Fulda. Here Abbot Balthasar Gravel had by the year 1573 persuaded himself that it was his duty to bring back all his subjects to communion with Rome, and, encouraged by the Pope, though under the protest of his Chapter, introduced the Jesuits to Fulda, where they set up a seminary. This was followed by the expulsion of all Protestant preachers, and of all officials clerical or lay who refused to accept the Tridentine Decrees; and by 1576 the restoration of Catholicism in the abbacy was complete. In indignation at the Abbot's proceedings, the nobility of his principality and his Chapter combined to force him to renounce his abbacy in favour of the Bishop of Würzburg, who under the title of Coadjutor assumed its administration. The Abbot appealed to the Emperor Maximilian, who declared him to have been illegally coerced; but it was not till six years later that he was replaced in all his rights. The Bishop, the nobility, and the city of Fulda had then to pay a considerable compensation. Thus in the end this important position was reconquered by the Catholic Reaction. The Bishop of Würzburg, Julius Echter von Mespelbrunn, who plays so ambiguous a part in the earlier of these transactions, had by that time secured the complete success of the Reaction in his own prince-bishopric.

The Protestant clergy and their influence were likewise expelled from the Eichsfeld—a district in the electorate of Mainz, environed by Protestant territories. Here too the Jesuits found a new centre whence they spread into the sees of Paderborn and Hildesheim. The Archbishop of Trier and the Bishop of Worms were likewise active in suppressing Protestant worship; and, but for the Elector Palatine, some of the lesser Free Towns in these parts, where the Catholic interest prevailed, would have proceeded to imitate the example of these ecclesiastics. At the close of Maximilian's reign the Counter-reformation was ready for those further and still more provocative advances to which it was to proceed in the reign of his son.

Meanwhile, among the Protestants neither the steady advance of the Counter-reformation at home, nor the deadly earnest of the religious conflict abroad beyond the borders of the Empire, prevented the continuous growth of controversy and discord. Before the reign of Maximilian had ended, the mutual aversion between the Saxon and

Palatine Electors had been intensified into angry antagonism. Family jealousies and quarrels added, or were to add, to the bitterness between them. John Casimir's wife, the Saxon Elizabeth, a bitter anti-Calvinist, stirred up strife between her father and her husband and father-in-law. A violent quarrel also arose out of the unfortunate second marriage of William of Orange to Anne, the niece of Elector Augustus, and was heightened through his third marriage, negotiated by Frederick III, with Charlotte de Bourbon. But, before this, Augustus had made a final declaration of his hostility to Calvinism. The prevalent religious opinion in the electorate was undoubtedly anti-Calvinistic, though its Lutheranism under Augustus had not been of the rigid or Flacian type, such as obtained in Ducal Saxony, whence in 1573, on high-handedly assuming the guardianship of the two sons left behind him by John William, Augustus had summarily expelled the Flacian clergy and University professors. But in 1574 he suddenly became aware of the influence gained in his Court and Council by the Wittenberg theologians, whom Melancthon's teaching had disposed to an attitude of conciliation or compromise vehemently resented by the rigid Lutherans, and among them by the Elector's own consort. In an access of despotic rage the Elector hereupon conceived that he had discovered a crypto-Calvinist conspiracy, and proceeded with cruel severity against its supposed members. His foremost Privy Councillor, Cracow, was tortured and put into prison, where he soon died; the Elector's body-physician languished in custody for ten years; and others were treated with similar rigour. Then, determined to extirpate the pest from his land, he caused a declaration of belief concerning the Eucharist (the so-called *Torgau Formula*) to be drawn up and imposed upon all persons suspected of Calvinism, especially the professors and clergy of Wittenberg and Leipzig; and a series of expulsions ensued. From this time forward Augustus became more and more rigidly Lutheran, and sought to give the same character to the Saxon Church. His direct antagonism to the Elector Palatine reflected itself in his estrangement from the cause of the Huguenots and the Netherlands Protestants. The representatives and promoters of the Catholic Reaction now saw their natural opponents divided into two camps directly adverse to one another; and the effect of this division speedily showed itself in the settlement of the crucial question of the succession to the Empire itself.

Maximilian, though only fifty years of age, was infirm in health; and there was every reason for settling the succession as speedily as might be. After Augustus of Saxony had visited the Emperor in 1573, the Palatine scheme of delaying the election of his successor till after his death was swept aside; and Frederick III had to reconcile himself as best he might to the consensus of all the other Electors in favour of choosing as Roman King the Emperor's eldest son Rudolf, who had been crowned King of

Hungary in 1572. His succession to the Bohemian Crown was secured by his coronation on September 6, 1575; the assent of the Lutheran majority which dominated the Diet having been purchased by a verbal promise on the part of both father and son to approve the adoption of a Bohemian Confession, so comprehensive as to include the tenets of the Bohemian Brethren. Thus a complete religious settlement was here postponed by a provisional understanding. At Ratisbon, where the Electors assembled in October, 1575, Maximilian was still confronted by a difficult task. Interest was concentrated on the terms of the *Wahlkapitulation* which would precede Rudolf's election as Roman King, and which the audacious Palatine statesmen had at first aimed at making a kind of charter of religious liberty for Protestantism both within and beyond the borders of the Empire. Now, they had moderated their demands; and for a time it seemed as if they would carry Saxony and Brandenburg with them in exacting from Rudolf the twofold promise, that the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* should be cancelled, and the declaration of Ferdinand guaranteeing to adherents of the Augsburg Confession the continued exercise of their religion in the lands of Spiritual Princes confirmed. Undoubtedly, the whole question of the expansion of Protestantism in the Empire was involved in the former demand, and the latter distinctly implied that the Catholic reaction allowed at Fulda and in the Eichsfeld, and imminent in the electorate of Cologne, should not continue to be permitted. But in the end the resolute negative with which the spiritual Electors met these proposals, and probably his own reluctance to act with the Palatine, induced Augustus of Saxony to give way; so that, while the settlement of these matters was left over for the Diet, Rudolf, without having entered into any engagement concerning them, was unanimously elected Roman King (October 17, 1575).

The Emperor Maximilian had never had head and hands fuller of projects intended to enhance the power and influence of his dynasty than when he met his last Diet at Ratisbon (June 25, 1576). The Crown of Poland had been offered to him by a party which regarded him as representing the Catholic interest in opposition to the Protestant Stephen Báthory; and Maximilian cherished the hope that the Diet would approve the Polish design, besides granting him a liberal aid for the Turkish war which would be the inevitable result of its success. But the Diet had no wish to provoke the Turks to another series of costly campaigns; and even for the mere defence of the frontier Maximilian would have found it impossible to secure the requisite supply, had not Augustus of Saxony defeated the Palatine design of once more making the Turkish grant dependent on the satisfaction of the Protestant demand for the confirmation of Ferdinand's declaration. Almost unsupported, Augustus (fortified by a recent visit to Duke Albert of Bavaria) held out against the general wish of the Protestant Princes

to press this demand upon the Emperor; and the breach between the Saxon and the Palatine policy had become wider than ever.

But though the Turkish aid was granted, and to an unusually large amount, the Polish scheme of Maximilian had to be dropped. He would have been abundantly consoled for this, had he been able to carry into fulfilment another design which had been a chief ambition of his life, and which even now there seemed a prospect of his realising. For the last three years he had on his own account taken up the scheme of an effective mediation in the affairs of the Netherlands, to be conducted by himself in cooperation with the leading Princes of the Empire. Secretly he had cherished the hope that a member of his family, perhaps his youthful son Matthias, might be summoned to the government of the Provinces, which though now in open insurrection had not yet formally renounced their obedience to Philip's rule. An agent of the States, who were on the point of concluding the Pacification of Ghent, opportunely arrived at Ratisbon to urge some kind of intervention in the war on the part of the Emperor; and the Diet resolved that the Emperor's mediation should be offered to the Spanish government.

Many opportunities had come to Maximilian in his life and been lost to him; this, which would have exposed his European statesmanship to a test such as it had never fairly met, was snatched from him by the hand of death. While the message of dismissal was being read to the Diet the Emperor lay dying. He refused to receive the last Sacraments of the Church of Rome, and, in the words of one of those who stood disappointed at his death-bed, "died as he had lived" (October 12, 1576).

The situation which Maximilian II left behind him at home in the Empire was one which could not be remedied by good intentions, even if these sprang from a singularly clear intelligence and a generous aversion from intolerance and bigotry. In his last message to his last Diet he had declared himself to be, in the religious dispute, of no party; but if he had sought to place the Imperial authority above party by effecting a clear and equitable revision of the Religious Peace, it might still have proved possible to dispel some at least of the gathering clouds. As it was, the only settlement to which all parties could appeal was left dangerously open to misinterpretation and neglect; for the Protestant Princes were continuing their assault upon Catholic foundations; and Catholic authorities were beginning to force back Protestant subjects into the forms of worship of the Church of Rome, or to drive them from house and home. The Empire confessed its impotence to interpret, to pronounce, even to protest; and inevitably the mutually adverse parties and interests were looking for sympathy and support in return for services rendered or to be rendered beyond the frontier. Thus, a full generation before the outbreak of the 'Thirty Years' War, its germs are already visible in the reign of Maximilian II, who in the face of the conflict was unequal to choosing his side.

CHAPTER VI.

THE REVOLT OF THE NETHERLANDS.

IN 1555 an event occurred, destined to be of critical importance in the history of the Netherlands—the world-famous abdication of Charles V. The Emperor was but fifty-five years old, when, prematurely aged and already worn out by a life of incessant care and strife, he took the momentous resolve which he had for some years meditated, to hand over his dominions to his son Philip, and spend the rest of his days in the retirement of a monastery.

Philip, already invested with the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily and the duchy of Milan, and compensated for the loss of the Empire by becoming, through his marriage with Mary Tudor, King-Consort of England, was residing in that country, when in the early summer of 1555 he was summoned by his father to Brussels. Charles was the wearer of many crowns, but amongst them all, as a final token of his peculiar affection for his native land, it was his abdication of the sovereignty of the seventeen Provinces of the Burgundian Netherlands that he resolved to mark specially by an act of solemn and impressive publicity. The ceremony took place in the great hall of the palace of Brussels. Hither, on the afternoon of Friday, October 25, 1555, the deputies of the Provinces repaired. They took their seats before a dais, in the centre of which, beneath a canopy emblazoned with the arms of Burgundy, were three gilt chairs of state, the central one for the Emperor, that on the right for King Philip, that on the left for the Regent, Maria, Queen of Hungary. On one side sat the Knights of the Golden Fleece, on the other the great notables, in front the members of the Council of State, the Privy Council, and the Council of Finance. After executing the deed of abdication and attending mass in the private chapel Charles entered the hall, walking with difficulty, his right hand resting upon the shoulder of the youthful William, Prince of Orange. He was followed by Philip, Queen Maria of Hungary, his sister Eleanor, Dowager Queen of France, his nephew Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, and a resplendent train of great nobles and officials. The spacious hall was crowded to the door; and the vast assemblage, which had risen to greet their sovereign for

the last time, waited now breathlessly expectant for what was to follow. After Duke Philibert had stated, at the Emperor's command, the reasons for which the assemblage had been called together, Charles himself rose to speak. He gave an account of his long and eventful reign, thanked his subjects for their constant dutifulness and affection, and asked them to show to his son the same love and loyalty that they had exhibited towards himself. He specially commended to them the maintenance of the true faith and obedience to the Church, and concluded by asking them to forgive any errors into which he might have fallen, and any wrongs which he might have unwittingly committed.

At this point, overcome by his growing emotion, the Emperor's voice refused to proceed. The delivery of a lengthy and fulsome reply on behalf of the States General by Jacques Maes, Pensionary of Antwerp, despite its prolixity, came no doubt as a not unwelcome interlude between the outburst of deep feeling which Charles' words had aroused, and that which was called forth when the Emperor again rose, and proceeded to invest his son, who knelt before him, with the sovereignty of the Netherlands. It was a moment when, in the tension of men's minds, Philip might have seized his opportunity to use gracious language, which would have gained him at once a place in the hearts of his new subjects. That he did not do so was less due to his coldness of temperament than to his inability to express himself in any language but Spanish. Flemish he could not speak at all; and, after a few words in French, he found himself obliged to call upon Antoine Perrenot, Bishop of Arras, to address the audience in his place. The contrast between father and son could scarcely have been more strikingly exhibited.

The new ruler of the Netherlands, who had thus publicly proclaimed himself a foreigner in their midst, was twenty-eight years of age. His general outward appearance was not unlike his father's, and distinctively that of a man with Teutonic blood in his veins. But it was not possible for two human beings to be further apart in temper and character than were the grave, silent, sedentary, undecided Philip, and the restless, purposeful, energetic warrior-statesman, whose promptitude of resource alike in the Cabinet and in the field was no less conspicuous than the good-humoured geniality of his manner, which subdued men's hearts.

On October 26, 1555, the day following the grand ceremony of the abdication, Philip received the deputies of the seventeen Provinces, who renewed the oath of allegiance they had already taken to him as heir-apparent in 1548; and he on his part again solemnly swore to maintain in each province all ancient rights, privileges, and customs, without infringing the same or suffering them to be infringed. Possibly, when he took those oaths, Philip had no intention of deliberately committing an act of perjury. The policy he adopted at the outset in the Netherlands certainly followed with precision the lines laid down by his father.

It was the man, far more than the measures, that was the inciting cause of the troubles that ended in revolt.

One of his first acts was to appoint his cousin Emmanuel Philibert, Duke of Savoy, to be Regent. Scarcely any but Spaniards were admitted to his intimate counsels with the exception of the Bishop of Arras, the son of Charles' trusted adviser, Granvelle. This statesman, though at first kept in the background, by force of sheer ability and proved usefulness gradually acquired greater and greater influence.

On February 5, 1556, through the mediation of the Queen of England, a truce for five years was patched up with France at Vaucelles. It was not, however, on either side intended to last any longer than was convenient; and in the following year it was wantonly broken by King Henry. War ensued, in which the English Queen, much against the will of her people, was induced by her husband to take part. It was marked by the great victories achieved over the French at St Quentin (August 10, 1557), and at Gravelines (July 13, 1558). Both of these were won by the impetuous valour of Lamoral, Count of Egmont, at the head of the Flemish cavalry, who at Gravelines was much assisted by the cannon of the English fleet. These two crushing defeats brought France to her knees; and a peace was concluded in February, 1559, at Cateau-Cambrésis. The terms were entirely to the advantage of the Spanish King, who had no scruple in allowing the French to recoup themselves at the expense of his English ally. In the course of the war Calais had been captured in the winter by a *coup-de-main* by a French force under the Duke of Guise. The death of Queen Mary severed the only link which bound together the interests of Philip and the island realm. The restoration of all the French conquests of the previous eight years and the hand of the Princess Elizabeth of France were cheaply purchased by acquiescence in the surrender of a town, whose fate was now to the Spanish negotiators a matter of little or no moment.

The success of Philip in thus triumphantly dictating terms to the ancient enemy of his House was not accompanied by equal success in his efforts to enforce his will on his subjects within his own borders. It was during this time that the first seeds were sown of that dissatisfaction and discontent which were to bring forth so terrible a crop of misfortunes and bloodshed. The outbreak of the Revolt of the Netherlands has been almost universally assigned by historians to a series of well-defined causes, all of which are to be traced to the course of internal policy pursued by Philip during the opening years of his rule.

These causes may be discussed under the following heads: financial embarrassments; the placards against heresy; the Inquisition; the new bishoprics; and hatred of foreign domination.

Charles V had drawn from the Netherland Provinces the necessary supplies for carrying on his wars. To this end he was obliged to impose heavy taxation. By a tactful admixture of persuasion and of force he

succeeded in wringing from his subjects vast sums, which they grudged because they were so often expended on objects in which the Netherlands felt no interest and had no concern. He left the country and the treasury burdened with debt. Philip, on ascending the throne, found himself face to face with a most difficult financial situation, and, despite his dislike of popular assemblies, was compelled to call together the States General to vote supplies. They met accordingly at Brussels, March 12, 1556. He asked for a grant of 1,300,000 florins to meet the charges that must be paid, and proposed the levy of a tax of one per cent. (the hundredth penny) upon real estate and of two per cent. upon moveable property, to be paid in three instalments. This proposition at once aroused strong opposition, and was rejected by all the larger Provinces. Philip was too haughty to follow the example of his father in using personal means for securing the support of influential members of the States to his proposals, his ignorance of the language being in itself a considerable hindrance to his attempting such a course. He was thus obliged to accept a commutation offered by the States, and to submit at the outset of his reign to a rebuff, which was the prelude to others of a like kind. The debt which Philip had to discharge was not of his own making; the sum he asked for was no larger than the grants that had been frequently voted at the demand of Charles. Yet such was the prejudice excited from the first by their new ruler's manner and temper that, in the eyes of his suspicious subjects, when he lifted up his little finger it seemed to be thicker than his father's loins.

In the matter of the placards against heresy, Philip again simply followed in the footsteps of his predecessor, and endeavoured loyally to carry out the solemn injunctions laid upon him by the Emperor on the day of his abdication. Charles had issued during his reign a succession of Placards, or edicts, to put down the spread of the reformed doctrines in his dominions, the last and most severe of these bearing the date September 25, 1550. This edict abolished all previous enactments as not sufficiently thorough, its object as stated in the preamble being "to exterminate the root and ground of this pest." It decreed the punishment of death, by the sword, by the pit, and by fire, against all who sold, read, copied, or received heretical books, who broke or injured images of the Blessed Virgin or of the Saints, who held or permitted conventicles, who disputed upon the Holy Scriptures in public or secretly, or who preached or maintained the doctrines of condemned writers. It offered to informers half the property of the accused, and it expressly forbade the judge to mitigate the punishments on any pretext whatsoever. It even threatened with the same fate as the delinquents any person or persons who should presume to intercede on their behalf. During the regency of Maria of Hungary thousands had miserably perished by the hand of the executioner under these terrible decrees. That Philip was nothing loth to undertake the charge laid

upon him we may well believe. The doctrines which Charles had so strenuously endeavoured to repress, chiefly from motives of political expediency, his son wished to extirpate under the burning impulse of bigoted religious zeal. Nevertheless he made at first no innovation. He merely confirmed the edict of 1550, just as it stood, and directed that it should be enforced.

In an exactly similar way the papal Inquisition was introduced into the greater part of the Netherland Provinces by Charles, and was handed on as a legacy to his successor. The first Inquisitor-General was commissioned at the request of the Emperor by Pope Adrian VI; and the system thus begun continued with gradually extended powers until, by the instructions issued in 1550, all judicial officers were made subservient to the Inquisition, and they were ordered to carry out its sentences, notwithstanding any privileges or charters to the contrary.

In the matter of the increase of the episcopate Philip again was but attempting to remedy an admitted evil, which the pressure of other affairs had alone prevented his father from dealing with. In 1555 there were but three dioceses in the whole of the Netherland Provinces, those of Tournay, Arras, and Utrecht, all of unwieldy size, especially the last-named, which comprised the whole of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht, besides the greater part of the provinces of Friesland, Overijssel, Drenthe and Groningen. A considerable portion of the Netherlands moreover lay outside the boundaries of these three dioceses, and was under the jurisdiction of foreign prelates. Luxemburg for instance was divided between six Bishops, none of whom resided in the duchy. Charles early in his career sought to remedy this state of things; and but for the sudden demise of Adrian VI a scheme for the erection of a number of new sees would in all probability have received the papal sanction in 1522. The Emperor's quarrel with Clement VII and other causes rendered the later efforts of Charles abortive, though they were renewed at intervals, his last instruction on the subject bearing the date of 1551.

Philip, then, when he obtained a bull from Paul IV for the erection of a number of new bishoprics, was merely carrying out a previously conceived plan. His scheme differed from his father's only in proposing that the number of sees should be fourteen, instead of six. In 1522 the change would probably have been accepted readily as a much needed reform. In 1557 both the man and the time had altered. Everything that Philip did was viewed with mistrust; and the great increase in the number of bishops was looked upon as a first step to the introduction of the dreaded form of the Inquisition, as established in Spain. The Spanish Terror had in fact already gained possession of men's minds and aroused a feeling of instinctive opposition, mingled with antipathy to the Spanish King and all his countrymen. Here we come upon the cause which underlies all the other causes of the troubles in the Netherlands,

and which furnishes the key to the right understanding of all that follows. It was not so much the measures of Philip, however questionable these might be, which stirred up a sullen resistance, so soon to be fanned into open revolt, as his personality, that of a foreigner and the representative of a hateful foreign despotism.

These various causes of dissatisfaction were already stirring up widespread discontent throughout the provinces, when with the departure of the King a fresh stage began. Philip after his accession spent four years in the midst of his northern subjects, but he had never loved them or their ways; and the treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis was no sooner signed than he determined at the earliest opportunity to return to Spain. By the provisions of that treaty the Duke of Savoy had once more entered into the possession of his ancestral domains, and was therefore no longer able to fill the post of Governor of the Netherlands. Philip had some little difficulty in selecting among many aspirants a suitable person for the vacant dignity. His choice finally fell upon his half-sister, Margaret, Duchess of Parma. This question settled, the King at once made his arrangements for a speedy leave-taking. In July, 1559, he summoned the Chapter of the Golden Fleece (the last that ever met) to assemble at Ghent. Over this assembly, which filled up no fewer than fourteen vacancies in the Order, he presided in person. A few weeks later he bade farewell in the same town to the States General; and finally he set sail from Flushing on August 26 for Spain. He was never again to visit the Netherlands.

Margaret, Duchess of Parma, into whose hands the reins of power now fell, was at this time thirty-seven years of age. She was a natural daughter of Charles V. Her mother was a Fleming, and she had been brought up in the Netherlands under the charge of her aunts Margaret of Austria and Maria of Hungary. At the age of twelve she had been married to Alessandro de' Medici, who died a year later. After eight years of widowhood she had to accept as her second husband Ottavio Farnese, nephew of Pope Paul III, while yet a boy of thirteen years. Margaret was a woman of masculine character and marked ability, a worthy niece of the two eminent women who had been her predecessors in the regency. The reasons which influenced Philip in his choice were doubtless, in the first place, that Margaret was a native of the country and could speak the language freely; in the second, that owing to her long residence in Italy she had no connexion with any of the parties or party leaders in the Netherlands, and was moreover through her position entirely dependent upon himself. The power entrusted to the new Governor, though nominally extensive, was in fact strictly limited by secret instructions, which bound her to carry out the edicts against heretics without infraction, alteration, or moderation, and enjoined her to follow in all matters the advice of the three Councils—the Council of State, the Privy Council, and the Council of Finance. These three

Councils were supposed to be quite independent of each other; but in reality the wide range of the functions of the Council of State caused it to overshadow in importance the other two. The President of the Council of Finance, which had the superintendence of the public expenditure, was at this time Baron de Barlaymont; the Privy Council, which had the control of law and justice, was under the presidency of Viglius, the author of the edict of 1550; the Council of State, to which were entrusted the conduct of foreign affairs, inter-provincial relations, the making of treaties, and all other affairs of the highest national importance, consisted at first of Viglius and Barlaymont, and the Bishop of Arras, together with the Prince of Orange and Count Egmont. It was soon found however that the last two, though it was deemed advisable because of their great influence with the people to make them nominally Councillors of State, were as a matter of fact rarely consulted. The whole power rested with the inner conclave of these three colleagues, devoted adherents of Philip; and of these the Bishop of Arras held indisputably the first place, alike from his preeminent abilities and tried experience in affairs.

Antoine Perrenot de Granvelle was born on August 20, 1517. He was one of the numerous children of Nicholas Perrenot, afterwards Seigneur de Granvelle, who, springing from a middle-class family of Ornans in Franche-Comté near Besançon, attracted by his talents and capability the favourable notice of Charles V, and became for thirty years that sovereign's chief confidant and adviser. On the death of his father in 1550, Granvelle, who had at the youthful age of twenty-three been made Bishop of Arras, and had already been entrusted with many important commissions, was called by the Emperor to take his father's place. He now found such full scope for the display of extraordinary capacity as to win the entire confidence and esteem, not only of Charles, but of Philip. During the four years of Philip's residence at Brussels Granvelle had succeeded in rendering himself indispensable to his master. Such was his facility that he was said to be able to tire out five secretaries while dictating to them in five different languages at the same time. A keen observer, the Venetian ambassador Michele Surraïno, when describing the chief counsellors and favourites of Philip, said that "all of them together were not worth the Bishop of Arras." It was in the hands of this man that the King in a large measure placed the government of the Netherlands when his sister was appointed regent. Viglius and Barlaymont were his trusty coadjutors, but the direction of affairs and of policy remained with Granvelle alone. He corresponded directly with Philip on all matters of State; and all dispatches and letters passed under his eyes before they were submitted to the Regent, or were discussed by his colleagues. Only such documents, or portions of documents, as were indicated by the Bishop were laid by Margaret before the Council of State. It is not to be wondered at,

therefore, that many of the leading members of the ancient nobility of the country should resent the virtual monopolisation of the Regent's ear and of the administration by this small body of the King's friends, and should view with particular jealousy the ever-growing power of the ambitious and masterful ecclesiastic, who in the privacy of his cabinet secretly controlled all the springs of government. Foremost among these dissatisfied nobles stood the Count of Egmont and the Prince of Orange.

Lamoral, Count of Egmont and Prince of Gavre, the victor of St Quentin and of Gravelines, was the head of an ancient and distinguished family, and possessed of large estates. Through his mother, Françoise of Luxemburg, he had inherited the principality of Gavre, and through his wife, Sabina of Bavaria, he was brother-in-law of the Elector Palatine Frederick III. Born in 1522, he had from his youth devoted himself to the pursuit of arms, and gained early distinction in the field. So early as 1546 Charles V recompensed his services with the collar of the Golden Fleece. In 1554 he went to England to ask the hand of Mary Tudor for his master's son, and was present at the marriage celebrated in Winchester Cathedral. His greatest fame was won in the campaigns of 1557 and 1558, when by his conduct and courage he so largely brought about the complete defeat of the French arms. He had been since appointed Stadholder of Brabant and Artois. His fine presence, open manner, and splendid exploits combined to make him a popular hero. Unfortunately his intelligence was not deep; he was vain, easily led, and not endowed with a firm will. His intentions were good, but the resolution to carry them out was sometimes wanting at the critical moment.

A very different man was his younger contemporary, William of Nassau, Prince of Orange. Born at Dillenburg on April 25, 1533, he was, when Margaret came to the Netherlands, but twenty-six years of age. The family of Nassau had long held a very high position among the ruling families of the Rhineland; and by a series of splendid marriages the younger branch of Dillenburg had during successive centuries acquired vast possessions not only in Germany, but to an even larger extent in the Netherlands. At the beginning of the fifteenth century Engelbert I, by his marriage with the heiress of the lord of Polanen, became possessed of great estates in Brabant, which included the town of Breda, henceforth the family home. His son Engelbert II, who during a long lifetime served the Houses of Burgundy and Habsburg with the highest distinction, was succeeded by his brother John, who on his death bequeathed his Netherland possessions to his elder son Henry, and his German to his second son William, the father of William the Silent. Henry became the foremost member of the whole House of Nassau. He was one of those appointed to take charge of the education of the young Archduke Charles, and remained through life his most trusted friend and servant, being largely instrumental in securing for him in 1520 the

Imperial Crown. In 1515 Charles obtained for Henry the hand of Claude, sister of Philibert, Prince of Orange-Châlons. This Prince, dying childless, by his will left his nephew René, the son of Henry and Claude, his heir; thus this small principality, situated in the midst of French territory, passed into the hands of the House of Nassau, with which the titular dignity has been ever since. The intrinsic value of the territory was trifling, but to their rule of it, dependent on no over-lord, the possessors of Orange owed their status of sovereign Princes. René, who had succeeded to his father's place in the Emperor's affections, was at the early age of twenty-six years mortally wounded at the siege of St Dizier in 1544, and having no legitimate children, bequeathed by will all his titles and immense possessions to his cousin William. The boy had up till this time lived with his parents at the ancestral home, the Castle of Dillenburg. His mother, Juliana of Stolberg, had first been married to Count Philip of Hainault, then to Count William of Nassau; by her second husband she had five sons, of whom the new Prince of Orange was the eldest, and seven daughters. Both William and Juliana had embraced the Lutheran faith; but they were obliged to allow their son to go to Brussels to be henceforth educated as a Catholic under the eye of the Regent, Maria of Hungary. This was a condition imposed by Charles in giving his ratification to René's testamentary dispositions. The Emperor from the first showed a remarkable interest in the boy, who, under the tuition of Jerome Perrenot, a younger brother of the Bishop of Arras, made rapid progress in his studies, and learnt to speak and write with ease in five languages, Flemish, German, Spanish, French, and Latin. In 1550, when he was seventeen years of age, Charles had given him the hand of Anne of Egmont, only child and heiress of Maximilian, Count of Buren. The marriage, to judge from the extant correspondence between them, would seem to have been a fairly happy one. Eight years later Anne died, leaving as the issue of their union a son Philip William and a daughter. As favourite page of the Emperor, William early became acquainted with the ways of Courts, and at nineteen he began to serve his military apprenticeship. So well did he acquit himself under the critical eye of the most experienced soldier of his day that, when William was only twenty-one years of age, Charles gave him the command-in-chief of an army of 20,000 men. It was from this command that he was called away to take so prominent a place at the ceremony of the abdication. As a general William did nothing brilliant during this time, but he committed no false step, and secured the country from threatened invasion.

He was even more successful as a diplomatist, when named with Ruy Gomes and Granvelle as a plenipotentiary for concluding peace with France; and the treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was in no small measure due to his skill as a negotiator. He was one of the State hostages, the others being Count Egmont and the Dukes of Alva and Aerschot, who went to

Paris as a security for the carrying out of the terms of peace. It was at this time, according to the account given in his own famous *Apologia*, that he first became aware of a secret understanding between the Kings of Spain and France to extirpate heresy by fire and sword from their dominions, and, although still nominally a Catholic, was so filled with pity and compassion, as to resolve henceforth to try and drive away, to use his own words, "this vermin of Spaniards out of my country." At this time, too, apparently by his habitual discreetness he first gained that sobriquet of "*le Taciturne*," "the Silent," which has ever since been attached to his name. There had doubtless never been much sympathy between Philip and William. The King had indeed on his assumption of the sovereignty made his father's youthful favourite a Councillor of State and a Knight of the Golden Fleece, had employed him on important missions, and had appointed him Stadholder of Holland, Zeeland, and Utrecht; but there was a feeling of coolness between them, which gradually passed into antagonism. Already before the departure of Philip the Prince had assumed the leadership of constitutional resistance to royal despotism. It was he that had urged the States General in 1559 to press for the withdrawal of the Spanish troops and to make this withdrawal a condition for voting supplies. The King knew to whom he owed this rebuff; for, when he was bidding farewell to the nobles before setting foot on the ship that was to carry him to Spain, he took the opportunity of publicly upbraiding the Prince for his action. In vain William with all deference submitted that what had been done was the action of the States. "No, not the States, but you, you, you," shouted Philip in fierce anger.

Margaret of Parma was most assiduous in her attention to her new duties, and, had circumstances been more favourable, would doubtless have made a good Regent. From the beginning, however, her path was beset with difficulties. The presence of the Spanish troops, the enforcing of the edicts against heresy, and the carrying out of the Bull of Paul IV, renewed by Pius IV in January, 1560, for the formation of the new bishoprics, irritated the people. Margaret with her *Consulta*, as it was called—the three confidential advisers Granvelle, Viglius, and Barlaymont imposed on her by the King—found themselves confronted with opposition on every side. Orange and Egmont resigned their commands of the Spanish regiments, as a protest against the continued presence of the foreigners in the land. They absented themselves from meetings of the Council of State, and finally (July, 1561) wrote to Philip, himself protesting against matters of great public importance being transacted without their knowledge or concurrence, and asked to be relieved of functions which were merely nominal. At this stage of affairs both the government and its opponents were manifestly, in their own belief, acting loyally in the best interests of King and country. The attitude of Orange and Egmont was no doubt in part due to jealousy

of Granvelle; and Granvelle on his side was certainly ambitious of power for its own sake and provokingly overbearing in the exercise of it. But the voluminous correspondence still extant, from a period prolific in letter-writers, enables the historian of to-day to judge the motives and conduct of the principal actors in the Netherland drama with an impartial clearness impossible to contemporary writers, however painstaking or well-informed. The published records of the time reveal much that is commendable not only in Margaret, but in Granvelle and Viglius likewise. Both the Regent and Granvelle urged the withdrawal of the Spanish troops; and it was by their action that the regiments, which had been marched from the frontiers to the island of Walcheren, were, without awaiting direct orders from Madrid, embarked for the Mediterranean. Cardinal Granvelle (he had obtained the hat in February, 1561) was not at heart a persecutor; he did not believe, nor did Viglius, in the efficacy of repressing opinions by brute force and cruelty; and they would, if left to themselves, have exercised a politic discretion and moderation in inflicting punishment. They were, however, only the servants of a master, who, though undecided in will and procrastinating in temper, kept all authority in his own hands. In the recesses of his cabinet in far off Spain every detail of policy in the Netherlands was weighed and considered by the King himself; and none dared act or refrain from acting without his permission. All who held office under Philip knew well that to show the smallest mercy to heretics would forfeit for ever the favour of the King.

Orange on his side was certainly at this time perfectly loyal to his sovereign, and conformed outwardly to the Catholic faith. In urging Egmont, as to whose fidelity alike to King and faith no question can be raised, and other great nobles to stand up in defence of the chartered liberties of Brabant, of Flanders, and of Holland against despotic rule, he was acting with perfect constitutional propriety. How far the local independence of provinces and municipalities was compatible with the good government and welfare of the Netherlands as a whole was not the problem which he had just now to determine. It may fairly be pleaded that he was acting entirely within his rights as a great magnate and officer in using these charters and privileges, sanctioned as they had so lately been by the King's solemn oath, to prevent the encroachments of foreign and autocratic rule. The blame for everything that was wrong, notably for the increase in the number of the bishoprics, was placed on the shoulders of Granvelle by the malcontents, foremost among whom, with Orange and Egmont, was now to be found Philip de Montmorency, Count van Hoorn and Admiral of Flanders. By his contemporaries the Cardinal was believed to be the author and proposer of the bishoprics scheme. The archives of Madrid and Besançon tell us, however, that it was not so. The Bishop of Arras had been kept in entire ignorance of the proposal until the Pope's Bull had actually been obtained, and at

first he was not in favour of it. "It is more honourable," such were his own words, "to be one of four than one of seventeen." But he yielded to the King's wishes and accepted with some demur the offer of the primacy, as Archbishop of Malines, and having done so henceforth exerted himself to the utmost to carry the matter through. Nothing that he did probably cost him so much unpopularity. Soon he and Orange grew estranged from one another, and finally ceased further intercourse.

During this time the negotiations for the second marriage of William were proceeding; and they occupy a very large space in contemporary records. His first wife died in March, 1558, and only a few months later we find him again turning his thoughts to matrimony. As an ambitious politician, he probably looked upon a good match as a matter of great importance for his future prospects. After being disappointed in obtaining the hand of Renée of Lorraine, he turned his eyes in another and somewhat unexpected direction. The object of his choice was Anne, daughter and heiress of the Elector Maurice, of Saxony, and grand-daughter of Philip of Hesse. She was in her seventeenth year, not well favoured, and only fairly well endowed; but from her near relationship to the two great German Protestant leaders her alliance carried with it great potential influence. For almost two years the Prince had to use all his diplomatic talents to secure his end. King Philip objected to so important a subject marrying a heretic, and, above all others, "the daughter of a man who had conducted himself towards the Emperor his father as Duke Maurice had"; while the old Landgrave of Hesse, who for his faith had suffered cruel treatment from Charles, was even more strongly opposed to his grand-daughter's union with a papist. At last William had his way. No pressure was to be put upon Anne in the matter of her religious opinions and worship, but she was to live "catholically." The marriage ceremony took place with Lutheran rites at Dresden, August, 1561; and so lavish was the expenditure on the occasion, that it was said that the bride's entire dowry would not cover the cost.

In December, 1561, Granvelle, as Archbishop, made his State entry into Malines, but found a cold reception. No nobles or Knights of the Fleece were there to greet him. The new bishoprics aroused general opposition. A protest was raised against the diversion of the revenues of the monasteries, and against the nomination by the King of so many official members of the States; but it was the increase in the number of episcopal Inquisitors that was especially dreaded. The Reformation had been making great headway in the Netherlands, more particularly in the commercial centres; and a considerable minority of the population were more or less infected by the new Protestant doctrines. Philip continually urged the government to enforce the edicts in the most rigorous manner. Strenuous efforts were accordingly made, with the result that the Inquisition, papal and episcopal, whose delegates were to

be found in every district, daily rendered itself more and more odious to the people by its merciless persecution. Notorious among its agents was a certain Peter Titelman, of whose barbarities the annals of the time are full. The Regent found, however, the greatest difficulty in getting the civil authorities to carry out the executions. More especially the Marquis of Berghen, Stadholder of Hainault, Valenciennes and Cambray, and Floris de Montmorency (brother of Hoorn), Baron of Montigny and Stadholder of Tournay, expressed their detestation of the system by declining, as far as possible, to give effect to the sentences of the Inquisitors. All the blame was laid on Granvelle, and discontent steadily grew.

Hoorn, who on his return from Spain had been made a Councillor of State, proposed the formation of a league against the Cardinal, and allied himself closely with Orange and Egmont in their efforts to overthrow his authority. The three nobles henceforth worked together, and had no difficulty in securing the active cooperation of Counts Meghem, Hoogstraeten, Brederode, and Mansfeld, and the Seigneur de Glayon, the last a Councillor of State. Overtures were made to the Duke of Aerschot, Count Aremberg, and Baron Barlaymont; but these threw in their lot with the attacked Ministers, and Barlaymont went so far as to reveal all he knew about the malcontents and their plans to the Regent. The league was a declaration of war by the nobles against the Cardinal; and henceforth they did their utmost by secret intrigue as well as by open opposition to wreck his influence. But little scruple was shown on either side as to choice of means.

In the autumn of 1562 Montigny went to Spain to expose the grievances of the nobility against Granvelle to Philip. He achieved nothing. Philip denied that he had made out any cause for complaint, but promised that he would himself visit the Netherlands, and then make enquiry. Finding, however, that there was little immediate prospect of a royal visit and meanwhile no redress of grievances, the three leaders determined (March, 1563) to write to the King, stating that they declined to sit with Granvelle in the Council, and begging, as loyal Catholic subjects and vassals, that the King would save the country from ruin by the removal of a man who was detested by all. They had no complaint, they added, against the Duchess of Parma. The letter, though approved by Berghen and Moutigny, was only signed by Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn. After a delay of some months the King (June 6) answered shortly that he was not accustomed to aggrieve any of his ministers without cause, and invited one of the signatories to go to Madrid to discuss the matter by word of mouth. He also wrote privately to Egmont asking him to undertake the mission. This was done by Granvelle's own advice, who believed that Egmont might by skilful flattery and promises be induced to detach himself from his friends. But after consulting with Orange and Hoorn, he made bold to decline the

royal invitation. From this time all three abstained entirely from attending the sittings of the Council of State.

The next step taken by the confederates was to press upon the Regent the advisability of convoking the States General, and in an interview attended by Orange, Egmont, Hoorn, Berghen, Mansfeld and Meghem (Montigny was ill), the Prince, as spokesman, discussed the position of affairs at length, and reaffirmed the determination of himself and his colleagues not to take any part in the Council of State, as their advice was disdained and so many things of moment transacted without their cognisance. Margaret replied that she could not summon the States General of her own initiative, and tried to defend the Cardinal and to persuade the nobles not to persist in their resolution. It was in vain. Three days after this interview (July 29, 1563) another letter was despatched to the King by Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn, reiterating their complaints against Granvelle, and asking outright for his dismissal.

Meanwhile, the Duchess was beginning to feel overwhelmed by difficulties out of which she saw no way. Little by little her confidence in the Cardinal began to wane; and, tired perhaps of his arrogance and dominating manners, she determined to send her own secretary, Armenteros, to Spain to consult with the King. On September 15 he reached Philip at Monzon, and was at once granted an interview of four hours' duration. Margaret, in her letter, laid before her brother the miserable condition of the finances and the failure of the edicts to check the rapid spread of heretical opinions, and discussed at length the quarrel between the Cardinal and the nobles. She had, she said, the highest opinion of the minister's merits, devotion, and capacity; but to keep him in the Netherlands against the will of the nobles would entail grave inconveniences and might lead to insurrection. Alarmed and puzzled at the course that affairs were taking, Philip at this juncture sought the advice of the Duke of Alva. "Every time," he answered, "that I see the missives of these three seigniors they fill me with rage, so that unless I exerted the utmost control over myself, my opinions would appear to your Majesty those of one frenzied." It was, he urged, simple effrontery to propose that the Cardinal should retire, and very inconvenient. The right method to deal with them was chastisement; but since it was not practicable at the moment "to cut off the heads of the leaders as they deserved, it would be best to dissemble with them," and try to divide them, by gaining over Egmont. Meanwhile, as the King was deliberating, things in the Netherlands were going from bad to worse. It happened that on December 15 Egmont, Berghen and Montigny were present at a banquet given by Gasper Schets, Seigneur de Grobbendonck, the King's financial agent at Brussels. During dinner the conversation chanced to fall upon the sumptuousness displayed by the Netherland nobles, more particularly in the matter of liveries, as compared with what was usual in Germany. The ostentation

of the Cardinal was specially dwelt upon, and on the spur of the minute it was resolved by the guests that they would set the example of a simpler style by all agreeing to adopt a quite plain livery. The question arose, who should choose it? It was agreed that the lot should decide. This fell upon Egmont. In a few days, accordingly, his servants appeared clad in coarse grey frieze with long hanging sleeves. On the sleeve was embroidered, what might have been taken for a monk's cowl or a fool's cap and bells. The device caught hold of the popular imagination, and was rapidly adopted as a party badge by the anti-Cardinalists. The Regent protested to Egmont against the badge, which was supposed to caricature Granvelle, and it was replaced by a bundle of arrows. This emblem, being found on the escutcheon of Castile, was taken to signify that the wearers were bound together in dutiful obedience to their sovereign. Whatever it might mean, the new liveries caused an extraordinary excitement.

Philip at last felt that, despite the advice of Alva, Granvelle must be sacrificed; but it must not appear that he was dismissed by the King. After some months of cogitation, Philip on January 23, 1564, despatched Armenteros with a reply to his sister's letter, in which he touched upon the various points she had raised, expressed his strong displeasure at the letter received by him from the three nobles, and added that, as to Granvelle, since they would not specify the grounds of their complaints, he must deliberate further. He also sent a private note to Margaret, stating that for a special reason he had kept back his reply to the lords, as he wished her letter to arrive first. He enclosed two private letters for Egmont—one of which only the Duchess was to deliver, as seemed to her judgment preferable—severally accepting and declining a recent offer of Egmont to visit Spain. It was the latter that the Regent handed to Egmont. There were letters also both for him and for Orange written by the Secretary Erasso, in which the King said that he placed great confidence in them, and flattered himself that they would not only be obedient to his orders, but would do their best not to compromise his service and the good of the land. But Armenteros was the bearer of yet another dispatch addressed to the Cardinal, containing a letter headed, "By the hand of the King. Secret." In this Philip, after expressing his regret at the ill-will shown to his minister in the Netherlands, proceeds: "For these causes I have thought it would be well, in order to allow the hatred which they bear you to grow calm and to see how they will remedy matters, that you should leave these Provinces for some days in order to see your mother, and that, with the knowledge and permission of the Duchess of Parma, you should beg her to write to me to obtain my approbation. In this manner neither your authority nor mine will be touched." On March 1, about a week after Armenteros had reached Brussels and delivered his missives, the courier arrived bringing the King's reply to the nobles. It briefly ordered them

to resume their seats in the Council of State, and said that with regard to Granvelle the charges must be substantiated and time given to consider the matter maturely. This letter, though written at the same time as the others, bore a date, February 19, more than three weeks later. Such was the complicated arrangement by which Philip hoped to accomplish the removal of the Cardinal without anyone but Granvelle himself knowing that the dismissal came from the King. He succeeded; for Granvelle, who had for some time perceived that his day was over, loyally and submissively bowed to his master's decision. So well indeed was the secret preserved that, until Gachard's discovery in 1862 of the minute of Philip's letter at Simancas, the truth, although suspected, was never actually revealed.

All happened according to the prearranged plan. Granvelle asked leave to visit his mother, whom he had not seen for nineteen years, and on March 13, accompanied by his brother, the Count of Chantonnay, and a brilliant suite, he left Brussels, never to return. The demonstration of public rejoicing at his departure was almost indecent. "The joy of the nobles," writes Viglius, "was like that of school-boys on getting away from their master." The Cardinal retired to his paternal estates near Besançon, without indeed withdrawing from public affairs, for he corresponded with rulers and statesmen in many countries; but the tone of even more than philosophical resignation which breathes through the Cardinal's letters during this quiet interlude in his busy life was probably no pretence. There is much that is really great in his character; and the odium which was aroused against his administration was largely due to misrepresentations wilfully disseminated as to his conduct and his motives. Many of these emanated from Simon Renard, a Burgundian like Granvelle, who had, by the friendship of the Cardinal and his father before him, become Spanish Ambassador in France and England, but who, disappointed at not being made Councillor of State, had turned on his benefactor. A study of the great minister's correspondence makes it quite clear that nearly all the grievances alleged against him were without foundation, and that, so far from being cruel or vindictive, his counsels were always on the side of moderation; and his conduct towards his enemies, with the single exception of Renard, who may be said to have been undeserving of clemency, was magnanimity itself.

The immediate result of Granvelle's departure was the reappearance of Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn in the Council of State, and the complete discomfiture of the Cardinalists. The Regent, tired of the tutelage in which she had been held, welcomed the change, and at once admitted the nobles to her full confidence and favour. She advised Philip to employ Granvelle elsewhere, and constantly invited the leading lords, especially Egmont, to her table. Orange and Hoorn wrote to the King (March 27), expressing their desire to serve him with zeal and devotion; and Orange

sent a private letter to the same effect, in which he recalled the constant fidelity and brilliant services of the Nassaus to the House of Austria. For a short while things looked more hopeful—but it was in appearance only. The nobles as a body were self-seeking, and many of them burdened with debts and eager to replenish their empty purses by getting hold of lucrative appointments at the hands of the government. One of the consequences of the fall of Granvelle had been the abolition of the *Consulta*. This was the name given in Spain to the body whose duty was to submit at regular intervals to the King's approval the names of persons to fill vacant preferments. This Spanish institution had been transferred by Philip to the Netherlands; and the duty was discharged by Granvelle, Viglius, and Barlaymont. The power thus delegated to them was a distinct invasion of the privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Stadholders and the Regent, and was deeply resented not merely by the nobles, but by Margaret herself. The time had now come to make up for lost opportunities. Granvelle was gone, Viglius and Barlaymont thrust on one side and treated with contumelious indifference.

But if the appointments made by the *Consulta* were dictated by political motives, those of their successors were tainted by sheer corruption and venality. The public sale of offices became a matter of common talk. The chief offender was Tomas Armenteros, the private secretary of the Regent. This man lodged at the Palace and was consulted on all public matters by the Duchess, who allowed the bestowal of all preferments and benefices to pass through his hands. His nicknames, "the Barber of Madame" and "*Argenterios*," sufficiently point to the contemptuous hatred which he excited, and to the cause of it. But he was not alone in filling his pockets with bribes and largesses. Margaret herself stooped to share the spoils, and the nobles connived or shut their eyes so long as their own greed was satisfied. The scenes at the Council were far from edifying; and it is scarcely to be wondered at that Philip, who had spies everywhere and was fully informed by Granvelle and his other correspondents of all that was taking place, should have felt small confidence in the new order of things. It probably pleased him to see the weakness and faults of the administration, since it thus became less likely to offer opposition to his will. But a collision was soon to follow.

An order arrived from Philip for carrying out the Decrees of the Council of Trent throughout the Netherlands. The Council had held its last sitting on December 4, 1563. On August 18, 1564, Philip issued his order. It caused a great sensation. The nobles protested. It was urged that the Decrees, which dealt with a number of matters relating to the doctrine of the Church, the reform of ecclesiastical abuses, and the education of the people, could not be imposed on the Netherlands, as they contained provisions which constituted a breach of the privileges of the Provinces and an invasion of the Royal prerogatives. At a joint

meeting of the Privy Council and the Council of State, despite the opposition of Viglius, it was determined to suspend the publication, and to beg the King not to insist on such ordinances as were not in conformity with the fundamental laws of the country. Philip, however, was inexorable. Throughout the country public opinion expressed itself with increasing bitterness against the Inquisition, the Placards, and the Decrees. In the Council Orange pleaded earnestly for a mitigation of religious persecution. The Regent did not know what course to take. In this emergency it was determined to send Egmont on a special mission, to lay before the King an exact account of the state of affairs, and to endeavour to obtain from him redress of grievances. Egmont expressed his willingness to go. Viglius performed the duty of drawing up his instructions. When the draft was laid before the Council for approval, Orange was far from satisfied with the tone and character of the document, and expressed his opinion with boldness and force. It was his wish, he said, that the King should be plainly informed that it was impossible to carry out the Placards or the Decrees of the Council of Trent. Although a good Catholic, he denied to human authority the right to crush out by force liberty of conscience and of faith. He desired that the King should be asked plainly and directly to moderate the Placards, to enquire into the prevalent venality and corruption, to reform the administration of justice and finance, and so to reorganise the Council of State as to increase its authority and pre-eminence. He spoke with an eloquence and earnestness which made a deep impression on his audience. It was a truly revolutionary proposal. Such was its effect upon Viglius that at night, when engaged in preparing his reply, the President, now an old man and in broken health, was struck with apoplexy. Next day the instructions were revised by the Council in accordance with the suggestions of Orange.

Egmont started with a great train on January 18, 1565; but proceeded so slowly as not to arrive at Madrid till the first week of March. Philip resolved to receive him graciously. He knew the weak points of the victor of Gravelines, and thought it would not be difficult to cajole him with flatteries and blandishments. The Spanish grandees followed their sovereign's lead. Egmont was entertained magnificently, and gratified by considerable largesses, which, having a large family of daughters and being embarrassed with debts, he only too gladly accepted. But, although on other questions the King avowed his readiness to grant concessions, on the subject of religion he would not yield; and, if Egmont was deceived as to his Catholic Majesty's intentions, it can only have been that he was blinded by the splendour of his reception. The King had in fact called a gathering of some of the most learned theologians in Spain to consult them upon the religious position in the Netherlands. This conclave gave it as their opinion that the King *might* grant liberty of worship, to prevent the greater evil of revolt. Philip

replied, "He had not asked them whether he *might*, but whether he *must*." On receiving a negative answer, the King prayed aloud to be enabled always to persevere in his resolution never to consent to be called the master of those who rejected God as their Lord. From this solemn moment Philip's course was inexorably marked out. Henceforth and through life he was resolved never to allow personal or political considerations to weigh for a moment against that which he conceived to be his simple duty to God, whose anointed minister he was.

In any case Egmont's mission was doomed to inevitable failure. On the subject of the greatest of all the grievances from which the Netherlands suffered the King had inflexibly made up his mind never to yield, cost what it might. However much he temporised and dissembled as to other reforms, in the letter which Egmont carried back with him Philip gave the malcontent nobles no hopes in the matter of religion; for he plainly stated that he would rather sacrifice a hundred thousand lives than make any change of policy. Only in some small points of detail was he willing to modify the Placards, and he suggested a conference of bishops and theologians to consider the best course to adopt.

The Regent took steps to carry out the Royal wishes; but the conferences led to nothing. Egmont was angry at the deception which he thought had been practised on him; and Orange and Hoorn refused to have anything to do with the matter, as the Council had not been directly consulted. Margaret was fully aware of the dangers of the situation and did her utmost to persuade her brother either to make her position easier by concessions, or to visit Brussels in person. He could then, she urged, learn for himself the true state of men's minds; the Royal influence and authority could alone allay the spirit of unrest and discontent that was spreading through the Provinces. But Philip was not like his father. Though he always professed his intention of visiting the recalcitrant Provinces, he did so, there can be little doubt, merely to gain time. He was a man constitutionally averse from adopting energetic measures or acting with decision. Of him the ambassador Chantonnay (Granvelle's brother) most truly said, "Everything is deferred from to-morrow till to-morrow, and his chief resolution is to remain irresolute." He had great belief in his powers of tortuous diplomacy; and, instead of taking the prompt measures which are essential in a crisis, he sat brooding in his cabinet at Segovia, and slowly evolving by what course of action he could best circumvent his difficulties, cajole his adversaries, and, it may be added, deceive his friends.

Amidst the prevailing gloom of this anxious autumn of 1565 the splendid festivities attending the marriage of Alexander of Parma with Maria of Portugal lit up the Court of Brussels with a passing semblance of gaiety. The wedding took place on November 11. On the 5th dispatches from Philip had been placed in the Regent's hands of such

fateful import that she resolved to keep them secret till the ceremony was over. On the 14th she informed the Council of State that the King required the strict execution of the Placards from all governors and magistrates, considered it inexpedient to extend the power of the Council of State or to summon the States General, and ordered that the proclamation of the Inquisition and of the Decrees of the Council of Trent should be made in every town and village in the Provinces. At last, after long delay, His Majesty had spoken, and no choice was now left between obedience and rebellion. All the members of the Council felt that the King's will had been expressed in such peremptory and unequivocal terms that discussion was useless. "Now," the Prince of Orange is reported to have whispered to his neighbour, "we shall see the beginning of a fine tragedy."

The proclamation was made; the Inquisitors displayed redoubled energy; but intense indignation and excitement were aroused among the people. Orange, Berghen, and the magistrates generally refused to carry out the edicts. Rather, they said, would they resign their functions than be responsible for the consequences of a policy bidding them to burn fifty or sixty thousand of their fellow-countrymen. Lawlessness spread rapidly. The populace was furious at the sight of the barbarous executions. Lampoons, broadsheets, and hand-bills fiercely denouncing the Inquisitors were scattered broadcast; and petitions were found affixed to the doors of the houses of Orange, Egmont, and other men of mark, asking them to intervene. The Duchess was utterly bewildered.

At this time a new order of men, the lesser nobility, began to take an active and leading part in fomenting the rising spirit of resistance to arbitrary authority. Foremost amongst these were Lewis of Nassau (William's younger brother), Henry Viscount of Brederode, Philip de Marnix, lord of Sainte Aldegonde, and Nicolas de Hames, King-at-arms of the Golden Fleece. The movement first took shape at a gathering of twenty young gentlemen at the mansion of the Count of Culemburg at Brussels, on the very day of the Parma wedding, to hear a sermon from the missionary preacher, François du Jon (Franciscus Junius), a disciple of Calvin, who had just taken charge at great personal hazard of the French Reformed Church at Antwerp. At this, and other secret meetings, it was agreed to form a confederacy of nobles, whose principles were set forth in a document, drawn up and early in 1566 circulated for signature, known as "the Compromise." It declared that the King had been induced by evil counsellors, chiefly foreigners, in violation of his oaths to establish in the country the Inquisition—which is spoken of as a tribunal opposed to all laws human and divine. The confederates bound themselves by a solemn oath to unite in resisting it in every form, and in extirpating it from the land. In taking this course they professed to be acting as loyal subjects of the King and in his interests. Finally they promised to help and protect one another against

persecution or molestation, as brothers and faithful comrades, with life and goods. This Compromise is generally believed to have been written by Marnix with the cooperation of Lewis and Brederode. The signatures soon amounted to more than two thousand, the most zealous agent of the propaganda being Nicolas de Hames, in whose custody the dangerous paper remained. The signatories comprised a goodly number of Catholics as well as Protestants, the majority belonging to the lower nobility and the landed gentry; but many were substantial burghers and well-to-do merchants. As in all insurrectionary movements, not a few who rushed into the fray were reckless and riotous youths and spendthrift adventurers.

Lewis of Nassau, “*le bon chevalier*,” as his brother well named him, brave, high-spirited, chivalrous, a good comrade, a loyal friend, and withal an earnestly religious, God-fearing man, was by birth and education a Lutheran. During a too short, but brilliant career, no one played a more noble or more distinguished part than he in defence of religious liberty against foreign oppression. Of a different type, but scarcely less conspicuous for the services he was to render, was Philip de Marnix, lord of Sainte Aldegonde, one of the most accomplished men of his day, poet, pamphleteer, theologian, orator, diplomatist, soldier, eminent in all the various fields of his many-sided activity. Both he and Count Lewis were at this time twenty-eight years of age, and alike full of restless energy and religious zeal; but with Sainte Aldegonde, who was a stern Calvinist, resistance to the Inquisition did not imply, as with the humane and kindly Lewis, any hatred of intolerance. To Marnix, not less than to Philip, liberty of conscience was an inconceivable thing. Henry of Brederode, the representative of the more reckless section of the confederates, was a lineal descendant of the ancient Counts of Holland; but of all the possessions that had once belonged to his House only the lordship of Vianen remained. Brederode was bold and downright by temperament, extravagant and dissipated in his habits, free of access, courteous, generous and convivial. He was a Catholic, but thoroughly at one in his opposition to tyranny with William of Orange and his brother Lewis, to both of whom he was deeply attached. Brederode had many faults, but his popularity and loyalty gave him for awhile a commanding place in the councils of the malcontents.

At the outset, however, the Compromise met with little favour in the eyes of the great nobles. Its methods did not commend themselves more especially to the cautious spirit of Orange. He himself, indeed, had not been reticent. On January 24, 1566, he had written with his own hand to Margaret: “I should prefer, in case His Majesty insists without delay on the Inquisition and the execution [of the edicts], that he place some other person in my place, who understands better the humours of the people, and has more skill than I have in keeping them in peace and quietness, rather than run the risk of staining the reputation

of myself and my family, should any harm accrue to the country through my government and during my tenure of it." He lays stress upon his loyal devotion to sovereign and land; but it is noteworthy, as pointing to the change that was already coming over his opinions, that he speaks of himself as a "good Christian," not as a "good Catholic." Under the pretence of festivity, conferences were held during the early part of March first at Breda, and afterwards at Hoogstraeten. The principal nobles, as well as a number of confederates, were present. Discussion turned on a petition or request drawn up by Lewis of Nassau, on behalf of the signatories of the Compromise, setting forth their grievances and aims. It was not without difficulty that Orange assented to the presentation of this petition to the Regent, and only on condition that the language was modified in many places. His moderation was, indeed, far from satisfying the more hot-blooded of the leaguers. But if William held aloof, others like Meghem and Egmont himself were alarmed and not a little alienated by the audacious and almost treasonable character of the Compromise movement. The conferences, in fact, rather intensified than otherwise growing divergences of opinion. On March 28 the Regent summoned a great assembly of notables, councillors, and Knights of the Fleece to the Palace to advise with her on the critical state of the country; and, courageous though she usually was, she proposed to them that the Court should be removed for the present from Brussels to Mons. From this project she was dissuaded. As to "the Request" which the Duchess had been asked to receive, while some urged that the doors should be shut in the petitioners' faces, Barlaymont did not scruple to propose that they should be allowed to enter and then be cut to pieces; but by the advice of Orange, supported by Egmont, more moderate counsels prevailed. On April 3 the confederates began to crowd into Brussels. On the 5th more than six hundred, mostly young men of birth, assembled at midday at the Hotel Culemburg; and a little later some two hundred and fifty of these marched in a serried column to the Council Chamber of the Palace. Lewis of Nassau and Brederode, as the leaders, brought up the rear. The Regent was at first disquieted at seeing the approach of so numerous a body, but was reassured by Barlaymont, who exclaimed, "What, Madam, is your Highness afraid of these beggars (*ces gueux*)?...by the living God, if my advice were taken, their request should be annotated by a sound cudgelling, and they should be made to descend the steps of the court more quickly than they came up."

Brederode was the chosen spokesman. The "Request" was couched in far more conciliatory language than the Compromise. Nevertheless the petitioners, while strongly protesting their loyalty and good intentions, pointed out the menacing condition of the country, and besought the Duchess to send an envoy to the King, asking him to abolish the Inquisition and the Placards, and to publish by the advice and consent

of the States General other ordinances less dangerous to the common weal. They further begged the Duchess to suspend the Inquisition and the Placards until the King's further pleasure should be known. Margaret, fully aware of the seriousness of the crisis, gave her reply on the following day. It was to the effect that she had no authority to suspend the Inquisition and the Placards, but would give instructions to mitigate their exercise until the King's answer on the subject had been received.

On April 8 the visit of the confederates to Brussels closed with a great carousal at the Hotel Culemburg, at which Brederode presided over three hundred associates. Hoogstraeten, who had come upon a commission from the Regent, was persuaded to remain for the feast. Brederode purposely turned the conversation upon the presentation of "the Request," and particularly dwelt upon the offensive term by which Barlaymont had stigmatised himself and his companions, Brederode loudly declaring that he for his part had no objection to the name, for that they were all ready to become "beggars" if need were, in the cause of their King and country. The words were taken up by the excited assembly, and the vast dining-hall rang with the cry, which the succeeding decades were to hear again and again repeated, "*Vivent les Gueux!*" There can be no doubt that this little episode had been carefully prearranged by the chief actor. Brederode knew well the value of a striking party appellation, and he seized the moment of enthusiasm to appear suddenly at the head of the table with a beggar's wallet suspended from his neck and a wooden bowl in his hand. Filling the bowl, he drank to the health of all present, and of the good cause. Redoubled exclamations greeted him; and the bowl passed from hand to hand, each guest as he drank pledging himself to be loyal to his friends and the League. It chanced that at the time when the excitement was at its highest, Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn passed the Hotel Culemburg on their way to attend the Council. Hearing the noise, they determined to go in, on the pretence of asking Hoogstraeten to accompany them to the Palace, really with the intention of getting the uproarious banqueters, if possible, to disperse. Despite pressure from Brederode and the other leaders, they refused to sit down; but, as they stood there, the confederates drank their health, and once more the hall shook with thunderous shouts of "*Vivent les Gueux!*" The three nobles quickly left with Hoogstraeten after saying a few words of caution to the revellers, little thinking that their well-intentioned visit would furnish a ground of accusation against them.

From this day forward the party of movement bore the name of "*Gueux.*" Many of the confederates at once adopted a costume of coarse grey material, and carried the emblems of their beggarhood, the wallet and the bowl, at their girdles or in their hats. The fashion spread rapidly, and the beggars' insignia were to be seen, worn as trinkets, among all sorts and conditions of men, especially in the large towns.

A gold medal was also struck for the use of members of the League. On one side was the effigy of Philip, on the other two clasped hands with the motto, "*Fidèle au Roy, jusques à porter la besace.*" A few days after the banquet the confederates left Brussels and dispersed to their various homes. Meanwhile the Council had been anxiously deliberating; and the Marquis of Berghen and the Baron of Montigny were, on the refusal of Egmont again to go to Spain, selected as envoys to Philip. Not without much difficulty were they persuaded to accept the task. Instructions were drawn up to moderate the execution of the Placards; and, in her letters to her brother, Margaret exposed to him fully the dangerous state of the country, and besought him either to expedite his proposed visit, or to allow the envoys to bring back such concessions as would avert the outbreak of a storm. She was somewhat relieved by receiving, on June 6, a letter dated May 6, in which the King declared that he had no intention of introducing the Spanish Inquisition, and announced his speedy arrival. On the subject of the Placards, whilst asserting that only by punishment of transgressors could the Catholic faith be maintained, Philip expressed his willingness to change the mode of chastisement so long as it was efficacious. "For God knows," he adds, "that there is nothing I so willingly avoid as effusion of human blood, especially that of my Netherland subjects, and I should reckon it the very happiest thing in my reign if there were never any need to spill it." The letter was read to the Council, who expressed their pleasure at the announcement of the King's visit and his benevolent intentions.

There was no eagerness on the part of either Berghen or Montigny to hasten their departure; and a slight accident to the former was the excuse for a considerable delay. Montigny at length started alone, and reached Madrid on June 17, Berghen following some time after; but meanwhile events had been moving fast. The apparent success of the confederates at Brussels gave great encouragement to the sectaries throughout the country. Refugees began to return in great numbers; and missionary preachers from France, Germany, Switzerland, and England to make their appearance, first in west Flanders and along the southern frontier, then in many other parts of the land. These men were chiefly Calvinists, trained in the school of Geneva; but there were also many Anabaptists. The Lutherans, though the smallest of the sects in numbers, had the largest following among the educated classes. The missionaries, some of them recusant monks and friars, others men of the people naturally gifted with homely eloquence, attracted ever-increasing crowds to their preachings. At first the conventicles were held at night in woods, or in inaccessible spots; but, growing gradually bolder, the sectaries ventured into the open country by day, then into the villages, and at last into the environs of the great towns. At Ghent, Bruges, and Ypres, and especially at Antwerp, thousands came out to hear them, arms in hand. Bands of men paraded the streets, chanting the Psalms

in the popular versions of Marot or Dathenus, and raising in the pauses of the singing loud shouts of "*Vivent les Gueux!*" The people laughed to scorn the so-called "moderation" of the Placards, and ironically called it "murderation." On July 3 the Regent, feeling that something must be done, issued a new Placard against the preachers and the conventicles. It remained a dead letter. Margaret was at her wits' end. She felt herself powerless without money, soldiers, or willing help from the nobility, all of whom, while professing their readiness to obey the King's orders, followed the lead of Egmont and declined to employ their armed retainers against the people. The Duchess complained bitterly to her brother of the position in which she found herself, and besought his speedy intervention. The only policy, she urged, was that of concession. To attempt to enforce the Inquisition and Placards would mean a revolution. "Everything is in such disorder," she said in a letter of July 19, "that in the greater part of the country there is neither law, faith, nor King." The majority of the Council of State demanded the summoning of the States General as the only adequate remedy, and declaimed against Philip's dilatoriness. He still let month after month pass by without taking any definite steps; and both the Regent and her advisers saw nothing but ruin staring them in the face.

The chief centre of disturbance was Antwerp. Crowds of armed Calvinists thronged to the preachings and bade defiance to the magistrates. Business was interrupted. It was feared that the reckless and disorderly part of the population might, under cover of religious zeal, attempt to pillage the houses of the well-to-do Catholic merchants. The simultaneous arrival of Meghem and Brederode in the town only added fuel to the flame. The loyalists looked to Meghem, the revolutionary party to the leader of the Gueux, as their champions. Thoroughly alarmed, the magistracy applied to the Duchess of Parma to save the city from threatened destruction. Margaret in this emergency turned to Orange, who was "burggrave" of Antwerp, and asked him to undertake the task of restoring order in that important centre of trade. Very reluctantly the Prince consented to the Regent's request; but he knew that he was already an object of distrust to the government. For a public declaration of his sympathy with sedition and heresy the times were not yet ripe.

As the Prince drew near to Antwerp thousands of the inhabitants came out to meet him. He was greeted with tumultuous enthusiasm and loud shouts of "*Vivent les Gueux!*" Such a demonstration was not to William's taste, and he did not scruple to say so. For some weeks he remained in the town, and succeeded in appeasing the discord that had raged so fiercely. The settlement arrived at was of the nature of a compromise. The Calvinists were at length persuaded to lay down their arms on condition that the reformed worship, though excluded from the city, should be tolerated in the suburbs. Armenteros was not far wrong

when about this time he wrote to the King that "the Prince has changed his religion." If "the Taciturn" had not yet become a Protestant, he had ceased to be a Catholic. The principles, which were to guide the rest of his life, were already clearly in evidence—those principles of toleration in matters of faith and conscience which mark him out from his contemporaries in an age of bitter intolerance.

About the middle of July a great meeting of confederates was held at St Trond, in the principality of Liège. About two thousand assembled; and a much more determined tone was adopted than previously. Lewis of Nassau was the directing spirit. By the express wish of the Duchess the leaders had an interview with Orange and Egmont at Duffel, near Antwerp, on July 18. As this led to nothing, the confederates resolved to send a deputation of twelve members, with Lewis at their head, to see the Regent herself at Brussels. With their grey costumes and "beggar" emblems suspended at their necks, they presented themselves before her on July 26. The courtiers, in derision, gave them the name of "the Twelve Apostles." Their language was far less conciliatory than before. They did not, they said, ask for pardon for their past conduct; what they had done and were doing was for the country's good, and deserved applause. They asked that Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn should be nominated upon a special commission to safeguard their interests, and to give counsel as to the best means for remedying the evils they complained of. In these three they were willing to confide; but, if their wishes in this and other matters were disregarded, they went so far as to hint that they might be obliged to seek foreign aid. Margaret, on her side, took no pains to conceal her anger. The threat of looking to the foreigner for assistance was no idle one. Lewis had for some time been in correspondence with the Huguenot leaders in France and the Protestant Princes in Germany. He now, with something more than connivance on the part of his brother, set to work to subsidise among the latter a force of four thousand horse and forty companies of foot-soldiers. William was quite aware of Philip's secret designs, and he was already preparing for the worst.

At Madrid Montigny and Berghen continued to be treated with all outward marks of courtesy. They were invited to attend the meetings of the Council of State at which the affairs of the Netherlands were discussed. To outward semblance their representations might have seemed to have been successful. In a letter addressed to the Duchess of Parma, dated July 31, Philip consented to abolish the papal Inquisition, and promised toleration so far as it was consistent with the maintenance of the Catholic faith, and a general pardon to all whom the Regent should deem deserving. He wrote almost affectionately to Orange and Egmont. To one thing alone he opposed an inflexible negative—the summoning of the States General. The archives of Simancas have revealed the duplicity of these concessions. On August 9,

at Segovia, the King, in the presence of the Duke of Alva and two notaries, executed an instrument in which he declared that the concession of a general pardon had been wrung from him against his will, and that he did not, therefore, feel bound by it; and three days later, August 12, in a confidential dispatch to Requesens, at Rome, he authorised his ambassador to inform the Pope secretly that his abolition of the papal Inquisition was a mere form of words, because it could not be effectual without the sanction of the authority which had imposed it, the Pope himself. As to toleration and pardon, his Holiness might rest assured; "for I will lose all my States, and a hundred lives if I had them, rather than be the lord of heretics." Philip was playing false, only until he should feel himself in a position to compel obedience by force. How long he might have procrastinated before he had made up his mind to act can never be known, for events forced his hand.

On August 14 the signal was given for an outburst of iconoclastic fury by the attack of a mob of Protestant fanatics upon the churches of St Omer. They wrecked the altars, smashed the images to pieces, and destroyed all the objects of art and beauty which fell in their way. On the next day a similar scene was enacted at Ypres; and the movement spread rapidly from town to town. At Courtray, Valenciennes, Tournay, and elsewhere, infuriated bands made havoc of churches and religious houses; and these deeds of savage and sacrilegious destruction reached their climax by the irreparable ruin which on August 16 and 17 befell the magnificent cathedral at Antwerp. The great procession on the Festival of the Assumption (August 15) had passed through the streets of the city amidst jeers and angry exclamations from the crowd. But the Prince of Orange was at the Town Hall, and no overt act of violence was attempted. Unhappily he left at night for Brussels at the urgent summons of the Regent. On the next day a small party of rioters found their way into the cathedral and created a scandalous tumult, which was only appeased after a struggle, that ended in the expulsion of the offenders. But nothing was done for the safety of the sacred edifice, which was the glory of Antwerp and the pride of the whole country. Thus emboldened, a small body of men, women, and boys, not more than one hundred in number, and drawn from the very lowest scum of the population, remained in the building after the conclusion of vespers, and were allowed with impunity to wreak their will upon its accumulated treasures. When at last the priceless contents had been with brutal contumely destroyed or carried off as plunder, the rioters, encouraged by their success, hastened to make the round of the other churches, which they treated in the same way. An English eye-witness declared that the parties thus engaged sometimes numbered not more than ten or a dozen persons. Not till the next day, when the work of destruction was accomplished, did the magistracy attempt to put an end to these disgraceful disorders. Hereupon the epidemic of iconoclasm ran

its course with a rapidity that was truly alarming. It broke out in the northern Provinces with the same virulence as in the southern, and for a fortnight ensued an orgy of outrage and plundering. No insults were too coarse, no indignities too gross to be perpetrated upon places and objects sanctified by the worship of centuries and dear to the hearts of all faithful Catholics. The penalty afterwards paid for these criminal excesses was not undeserved either by the offenders themselves, or by the cowardly magistrates and citizens, who, by standing aloof, connived at their atrocities.

The effect of this outbreak was in many ways disastrous. It alienated the more liberal Catholics from the cause of the confederates. It excited the fears of the Duchess Regent to such an extent that she made secret preparations to leave Brussels for Mons. Neither entreaties nor threats would have turned her aside from her purpose, had not the town magistracy, on hearing of her intention, ordered the gates to be closed. Henceforth Margaret looked upon the great popular nobles, whom she had so lately favoured, as her enemies. She denounced Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn to the King as secret traitors and instigators of revolt. For a while, indeed, she felt it necessary to dissemble, and to make a kind of compact with the confederates. She promised, for her part, that those of the Reformed faith should have liberty to worship in places where such worship had already taken place, and that members of the League should be held free from blame for anything that they had done. An instrument to this effect was signed by her on August 23; and two days later Lewis of Nassau and his allies solemnly undertook to assist the government in putting down disorder, and in bringing disturbers of the peace to justice. The iron entered deeply into Margaret's soul before she degraded herself, as she thought, by assenting to such an accord. Her intense indignation breaks forth in her correspondence with her brother; and she finds comfort in the thought that force had compelled her action, and that the King was not bound by her agreement. Nay, she besought him to come, and, arms in hand, make himself master in his own dominions. Meanwhile the concessions she had made, and the exertions of the various governors in their respective Provinces, secured for the moment an outward appearance of calm.

The news of the iconoclastic outrages, as may well be imagined, awakened vehement indignation at Madrid. The King for once forgot his habitual dissimulation, and broke out angrily, "It shall cost them dear, I swear it by the soul of my father." His councillors were unanimous in urging upon him the necessity of hastening in person to the Netherlands, and of taking with him such a force as to crush opposition, if conciliatory measures failed. Philip listened to their advice in silence. He had his own plans, which for the present he divulged to no one. He succeeded in keeping his sister and all his trusted advisers ignorant of his intention, but not his wary and wakeful adversary, the Prince of Orange. William learnt from his well-paid spies that Philip was secretly

gathering large bodies of troops together, and discovered that the King laid the blame for all the troubles that had arisen, not on the rioters, or the sectaries, or even on the confederates, but first and foremost on the great nobles. These, he had been heard to declare, had stirred up the spirit of disaffection; and exemplary punishment must fall on their heads, as the originators and sources of the evil. The Prince took his measures accordingly. On October 3 he arranged a conference at Dendermonde between himself, accompanied by his brother Lewis, and Egmont, Hoorn, and Hoogstraeten. On none of the accounts of what took place can absolute reliance be placed. One thing however is certain, that the chief interest of the discussion turned on an intercepted letter from Don Francis de Alava, the Spanish ambassador at Paris, to the Duchess of Parma. In this letter the King is represented as speciously luring on the Netherland leaders to their destruction by an outward show of gentleness, in order that he might with greater certainty visit them, and especially the three great lords, Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn, with the swift and condign punishment they deserved. Speaking for himself and his brother, Lewis of Nassau urged the necessity of armed resistance, and even went so far as to advise under certain eventualities the transference of the sovereignty to the German branch of the House of Austria. But his arguments failed to move Egmont or to convince Hoorn. Egmont refused absolutely to take up arms against the King; and Hoorn, though sullen and despondent, declined to commit himself to a policy of active disloyalty. Margaret, when confronted with Alava's letter, declared most indignantly that it was an impudent forgery. Such a denial proves little. Forgery or not, its revelations of the King's designs were in no sense fiction, but literally and entirely true.

William left the conference sad and disillusioned. He saw that he could count henceforth on no help from those who had hitherto been his chief friends and allies. He knew with his clear insight that they were walking straight into the jaws of destruction; and so, though now isolated and almost in despair, he went quickly on with his preparations to meet force with force, and to prevent his country from being trampled under foot defenceless beneath the heel of Spanish tyranny. With the ready help of the Counts John and Lewis, his brothers, he entered into active communications with the Elector of Saxony, the Elector Palatine, the Landgrave of Hesse and the Duke of Württemberg, with the object of forming a German League in defence of the cause of the Reformed Faith in the Netherlands. He met with many difficulties. Urged to declare himself a Lutheran, William at length in November, writing to the Landgrave of Hesse, went so far as to admit that it was his intention to inform the King secretly of his adhesion to the Confession of Augsburg. This he never did, but henceforth he may be regarded as having definitely given up his nominal conformity to the Roman Church. His own personal adhesion to the Confession of Augsburg was

not however enough; and for many weary months his pleadings and his arguments were exerted in vain. "Surely," he pleads, "the German Protestants will not permit these hapless Christians to be crushed without an effort." In this way the year ended amidst gathering storms.

On February 4, 1567, William, who had been since October energetically engaged in his own provinces of Holland and Utrecht in the task of repressing disorder and, by conciliatory measures, appeasing the minds of the people, returned to Antwerp, where his presence was urgently required. His moderation towards the sectaries in Amsterdam and other places did not meet with the approval of the Regent; but the States of Holland, consisting chiefly of Catholics, voted him a gratuity of 50,000 florins for the services he had rendered to the Province. The Prince, though at the time in sore straits for money, declined to receive any recompense. Arrived at Antwerp, he found the town thronged with Protestants, congregated there from many quarters, and in a most defiant and bellicose humour. Their number was placed by Thomas Gresham, Queen Elizabeth's agent, as high as 40,000. Margaret was at this time doing her best to render of no effect the unwilling concessions she had made to the Reformed congregations. She refused to allow their ministers to baptise or to marry, and she called upon the governors to aid her in keeping the sectaries in order. She had now in the country several German and Walloon regiments, recently levied. These she placed under the command of Aremberg, Meghem, and other loyalists, showing clearly that it was her intention to crush opposition by force. The measures of the government were calculated to provoke insurrections, perhaps were intended to do so; and it was not long in coming. John de Marnix, lord of Thoulouse (the elder brother of Sainte Aldegonde), one of the most hot-headed and able among the confederates, had no difficulty in gathering around him a band of 2000 Calvinist zealots, principally drawn from Antwerp, and with these he endeavoured to make himself master of the island of Walcheren. Foiled in this, he encamped himself at a place called Austruweel, about a couple of miles from Antwerp, with the hope of getting possession of that city. The Duchess-Regent, on hearing of this outbreak, lost no time in despatching a picked force of Walloons under the command of Lannoy with orders "to exterminate the miscreants without mercy."

On March 13 the conflict ensued. The rebels were utterly routed, and almost the whole of them, with their gifted leader, perished. This massacre—for it was little else—was perpetrated almost within sight of the walls of Antwerp; and the Calvinists in the town, hearing the sounds of battle, rushed to arms with the intention of helping their fellows. They found the gates locked and guarded by order of the Prince of Orange. The sectaries then gathered in threatening masses in the great Place de Meir. Here William, accompanied by Hoogstraeten, and followed by an armed force of Catholics and Lutherans, came to

parley with them. The gates, he declared, were shut to prevent the victorious cavalry of Lannoy from entering; and at great personal risk he endeavoured to persuade the angry crowd that only by abstaining from violence could they hope to be saved from destruction at the hands of the Regent's mercenaries. On this occasion the Prince showed himself possessed of extraordinary courage. He was greeted with cries of "false traitor," "soldier of the Pope," "servant of Antichrist," and the like, and one artisan went so far as to present a loaded arquebus to his breast. His efforts at accommodation were long in vain. The hostile bodies of citizens stood face to face, on the one side the Catholics and Lutherans, on the other thirteen or fourteen thousand fierce Calvinists. But at length Orange prevailed; and an accord was agreed to on the same basis as that of the previous September. William, as he proclaimed it, raised the cry of "*Vive le Roi!*" It met with a feeble and sullen response from the congregated masses, who then dispersed to their homes.

Meanwhile a strong force had been placed under the orders of Philip de Noircarmes, Governor of Hainault, to suppress certain seditious movements in that province. He had an easy task in dispersing some bands of undisciplined insurgents at Lassy, and then proceeded to lay siege to Valenciennes, the chief centre of disturbance. Here he met with obstinate resistance; and it was not until after a lengthy blockade that the city capitulated on April 2. The sufferings of the inhabitants were terrible; and a savage vengeance was taken, in order to give a lesson to other recalcitrant towns. For a while, indeed, the routs of Austruweel and Lassy and the capture of Valenciennes broke down the spirit of resistance in the country.

The time was now come, the Regent felt, for dealing with the Prince of Orange, whose doubtful attitude was particularly disquieting to her. His courage and tact in keeping the peace in Holland, and at Utrecht and Antwerp, far from gaining the thanks and recognition of the government, made him only appear the more dangerous. The terms he had offered, Margaret said, were "strange and preposterous"; and she insisted on putting his loyalty to the test by peremptorily, though with insinuating words, requiring him to take an oath, which had already been subscribed by many of the leading nobles, including Egmont, "to serve the King, and act for or against whomsoever his Majesty might order without restriction or limitation," on pain of dismissal from the service of the State. Brederode had already bluntly refused to take the oath, and had given up his military command. Hoorn and Hoogstraeten also had preferred to resign their appointments rather than commit themselves to such a declaration. But Orange had as yet by various excuses managed to avoid taking definite action. He now answered unequivocally that he could not undertake to do what might be contrary to his conscience, adding that he henceforth regarded himself as discharged from all his functions. Margaret however was still unwilling to

accept his resignation. She sent therefore on March 23 her secretary, Berty, to Antwerp on a special mission of persuasion, but with no effect. As a last resort Berty proposed that Orange should meet Egmont and Meghem to discuss the matter. He agreed, and the momentous conference took place at Willebroek on April 2 (the day of Valenciennes' surrender) in presence of Berty, who took notes of all that passed. These notes were seen by Strada, whose narrative of the interview may therefore be regarded as authentic. The deputed nobles did their utmost to shake the Prince's resolution, but he was immovable. In his turn William made overtures to Egmont. "Take arms," he said, "and I will join you." Much impressed by the earnestness of his old and trusted comrade, Egmont in his turn urged him not to leave the country; "It will be the ruin of your House" he said. "The loss of my property," William rejoined, "does not trouble me"; then, with tears in his eyes, he added, "Your confidence will destroy you. You will be the bridge over which the Spaniards will pass to enter the Netherlands." The two friends embraced in deep emotion, and parted, never to meet again. Two days after this meeting William wrote to the Duchess, asking that his posts might be filled by others, and withdrew his daughter, Marie of Nassau, from the Court. On April 11 he retired to Breda. Arrived there, and fearing for his personal security, he set to work to make preparations for quitting the Netherlands. On April 22 he started with his whole household and made his way into exile at his ancestral home of Dillenburg.

Circumstances were quickly to show that the step taken by the Prince of Orange was not dictated by groundless forebodings. Philip had not been brooding over the condition of the Netherlands for months without result. His mind was at last irrevocably made up. He determined to follow the relentless policy advocated by the Duke of Alva, and to send that stern and redoubtable captain in person with a picked body of troops to carry it out. The fiction of a royal visit was still sedulously proclaimed. The ships for the escort were actually got ready. "Alva," so Philip declared, "was only going to prepare the way for his sovereign." The deception was kept up to the last, and with such thoroughness that even now it is impossible to say positively—though the probability amounts almost to certainty—that the King never intended to leave Spain. Alva had his final audience with Philip about the middle of April, 1567; and a fortnight later (April 27) he set sail from Cartagena, where a fleet of 36 vessels under Prince Andrea Doria awaited him, for Genoa. Arrived in Italy, he assembled from the garrisons of Lombardy and Naples four *tercios*, about 9000 men, of veteran Spanish infantry and 1300 Italian troopers. With these, afterwards increased by a body of German mercenaries, Alva started in June upon his long and hazardous march across the Mont Cenis, and then through Burgundy, Lorraine, and Luxemburg to Brussels. The army threaded its way along dîcles and through forests in three divisions,

shadowed on the one flank by a French, on the other by a Swiss force, who suspiciously watched its progress northwards ready to repel any invasion of their respective territories. But all went well. On August 8 Alva crossed the frontier of the Netherlands. Such was the iron discipline enforced by him that no acts of depredation or violence were committed during the slow and toilsome march. Contemporary writers speak with admiration of the splendid armour and martial bearing of this choice body of veteran troops, which for the first time in the history of war included a corps of musketeers. To give his soldiers the very best equipment he could procure and to keep them under the strictest control was in the opinion of this wary and successful commander far more important than mere numbers. He preferred even to regulate the very vices of his army rather than connive at licence. With a train of some two thousand Italian courtesans organised into battalions and companies, the champion of the Catholic faith and the defender of the Divine right of Kings entered the Netherlands.

On his way to the capital Alva was met by many of the Flemish nobles. Among them was Egmont. When he saw him approaching the Duke was overheard to exclaim, "There comes the great heretic." The words were said loud enough to reach the Count's ears, but the subsequent cordiality of his reception did away with any bad impression. The Duke placed his arm round Egmont's neck, accepted from him a present of two beautiful horses, and afterwards rode side by side with him, both conversing apparently in the friendliest manner. On August 22, attended by a detachment of foot-soldiers, Alva made his entry into Brussels, and taking up his quarters in lodgings that had been prepared for him, at once proceeded to the Palace to pay his respects to the Duchess of Parma.

For some time the Regent had been doubtful as to the reception she should give to the new Captain-General. Not only were the man and his mission distasteful to her, but she looked upon the step taken by her brother as a direct insult and aspersion upon herself and disastrous to the country. Just after she had succeeded by extraordinary exertions in restoring order in the Provinces, she found herself, in what she considered a humiliating manner, superseded. In her letters to her brother she gave full vent to her indignation, and again and again requested to be relieved of her charge. "You have shown no regard for my wishes or reputation,...the name of Alva is so odious here that it is enough to make the whole Spanish nation detested....She could never have imagined that the King would have made such an appointment without consulting her; she was hurt to the very bottom of her soul by the King's conduct towards her." Her reception of Alva was chilling. The audience, according to the custom of the Court, took place in the Duchess of Parma's bedchamber. Margaret stood in the middle of the room, with Aerscot, Barlaymont, and Egmont by her side, without

advancing a single step to greet her visitor. The Duke, though a Spanish grandee, with deferential courtesy took off his hat, but was requested to replace it. The interview, which was of the stiffest and most formal character, lasted for half-an-hour. The next day the Council of State asked the Duke to exhibit his powers. He at once sent the various commissions he had received from the King. There was general surprise at the extent of the powers conferred upon him by these instruments. The bare title of Regent was left to the Duchess; but all real authority, civil as well as military, was placed in the hands of the Captain-General.

Alva at once proceeded to introduce garrisons into the principal towns. When Margaret protested against the quartering of Spanish troops in Brussels, the Duke quietly rejoined, "I am ready to take all the odium upon myself." Not at first, however, did he unmask his full intentions. To get his prey into his net, not to frighten it away, was his chief care. The nobles were attracted to Brussels by brilliant festivities; Egmont was soothed and flattered; all the arts of cajolery were used to draw Hoorn from his retreat at Weert to the capital. Egmont, though repeatedly warned of his danger, could not make up his mind to fly; and Hoorn, though full of suspicion, thought it the best policy not to refuse Alva's pressing invitation. He came to Brussels, and all was now ready for the carrying out of a daring and deep-laid plan. On September 9 Counts Egmont and Hoorn, with other councillors, were invited to the Duke's residence for the ostensible purpose of deliberating upon the plans of a citadel to be erected at Antwerp. After dining with the Prior Frederick of Toledo (a natural son of Alva) they accordingly went to the Captain-General's quarters about four o'clock in the afternoon. The Duke received them in the friendliest manner, and, after entering into a discussion with them and the other councillors and some engineers about the plans upon the table, suddenly withdrew, pleading indisposition. The consultation lasted for three hours. At seven o'clock, as Egmont was leaving the room, Don Sancho d'Avila, Captain of the Guard, saying that he had a communication to make to him, drew him on one side. At a signal the doors were thrown open, and the Count found himself surrounded by a company of Spanish troops. Thereupon d'Avila demanded his sword. With a gesture of surprise and anger Egmont threw it on the ground, exclaiming, "I have often done the King good service with it." He was then arrested and confined in a darkened chamber on the upper floor. Hoorn, who had been allowed to leave the hall of audience, was at the same time arrested in the courtyard and separately confined. Both remained thus immured for a fortnight, shut off from all communication with their friends, and were then taken under the escort of a strong military force, for greater security, to the Castle of Ghent. On the afternoon of this same day three other arrests of importance were made, those of Egmont's private secretary,

Bakkerzeel, of Antony de la Loo, who served Hoorn in the same capacity, and also of Orange's friend, Antony van Stralen, the well-known and influential burgomaster of Antwerp. The whole design had been so skilfully arranged that the victims were all secured at one swoop, without so much as a blow being struck or an effort made to escape.

This *coup-de-main* had a stunning effect upon men's minds; and absolute tranquillity, caused by terror, prevailed everywhere. Alva himself was astonished at the apparent completeness of his success. "Thank God," he wrote to his gratified master, "all is quiet in the country." The boast that he had made on entering the Netherlands seemed justified. "I have tamed men of iron in my day," he is reported to have said, "I shall know how to deal with these men of butter."

But Alva was not satisfied with arrests. He required a tribunal which should know how to execute summary justice upon his prisoners. He proceeded therefore to create one. It was known officially as the "Council of Troubles"; but it has passed down to history branded by popular repulsion with the terrible name of the "Council of Blood." Alva announced its formation to the King in the same letter in which he relates the story of the arrests. This tribunal exercised an authority overriding that of all other tribunals in the Provinces, even that of the Council of State; and yet it was an absolutely informal body, erected by the mere fiat of the Duke without any legal status whatsoever. Its members could show no letters-patent or charter from the King, not even commissions signed by the Captain-General. The Duke was president, and reserved to himself the final decision upon all cases. Two members, Vargas and del Rio, alone had the privilege of voting; and these two were Spaniards. Of the nobles, Barlaymont and Noircarmes, who had already shown that they were thorough supporters of the Royal policy, had seats on the tribunal, as well as the Chancellor of Gelderland, the Presidents of Flanders and Artois, and the Councillors Blasere and Hessels; but the authority of all these Netherlanders was practically *nil*; they were the tools, and unfortunately the willing and zealous tools, of Spanish tyranny. Both Vargas and del Rio were lawyers, and well fitted for the part they had to play, the former by his unscrupulous inhumanity, the latter by his subserviency. Of Juan de Vargas history has nothing to record but what is infamous; and nothing casts a darker stain upon the memory of Alva than his deliberate choice of this execrable instrument.

The Council of Troubles was not long in getting to work. A swarm of commissioners were appointed to ransack the Provinces in search of delinquents; and informers were encouraged to accuse their neighbours and acquaintance. Truck-loads of such information were not slow in arriving, and were duly placed before the tribunal. For the purpose of dealing with these the Council was divided into committees; but all committees reported to Vargas, and all sentences were submitted to Alva. The Council sat regularly morning and afternoon; and the Duke himself

was frequently present for seven hours in the day. From a judicial point of view the proceedings were a mere farce. Whole batches of the accused were condemned together off-hand; and from one end of the Netherlands to the other the executioners were busy with stake, sword, and gibbet, until the whole land ran red with blood. Barlaymont and Noircarmes were speedily disgusted with such wholesale butchery, and soon absented themselves from the sittings; their example was followed after a time by the Chancellor and the two Presidents. But their absence only served to accelerate the progress of the work of death and confiscation. Vargas was indefatigable in the execution of his congenial task, relieving its grim monotony from time to time with jokes and jeers in bad Latin; and he was almost rivalled in diligence and cruelty by his Flemish colleague Hessels. Alva reckoned on receiving 500,000 ducats in the year from confiscated property. He cared nothing for the impoverishment of the country, so long as the exchequer grew rich.

Meanwhile the Duchess of Parma, irritated beyond measure by the humiliation of her position, had sent her secretary, Machiavelli, to Madrid to demand the King's permission for her retirement. Machiavelli returned on October 6, bearing a dispatch by which the King informed his sister that he accepted her resignation, and in token of his satisfaction with her services raised her pension from 8000 florins to 14,000 per annum. Machiavelli brought with him another dispatch conferring on Alva the offices of Regent and Governor-General. The Duchess left the Netherlands in December for her home at Parma, amidst general signs of popular affection and regret. One of her last acts had been to write to Philip to beg him to temper justice with mercy, and not to confound the good and the bad in the same punishment. She had been an able administrator, and possessed many good qualities; but the praise of clemency can scarcely be claimed for her government. Her harshness, however, at this moment of her departure seemed to be mildness itself when contrasted with her successor's almost inhuman temper.

The Duchess gone, Alva's judicial murders and plunderings continued with growing energy. As a single instance of their sweeping character, it may be mentioned that in the early hours of Ash-Wednesday, when it was known that most people would be at home after the Carnival, not less than fifteen hundred persons were seized in their beds and hurried off to prison. Their fate is recorded in a letter written by the Governor, in which, after informing his master of the arrest, he quietly adds, "I have ordered all of them to be executed." One of the first acts of the Council in 1568 was to address a summons (which proved futile) to the Prince of Orange, his brother Lewis, the Counts Hoogstraeten, Culemburg, and van den Berg, and Baron Montigny to appear within a fortnight before the tribunal, on pain of perpetual banishment and confiscation of their estates. William replied by denying that either Alva or his Council had any jurisdiction over him. But though the

head of the House of Nassau was out of their reach, William's son and heir was, by an oversight of extraordinary imprudence on his father's part, at this time studying at the University of Louvain. A dastardly act of revenge was planned by the Spanish tyrant. In February, 1568, Philip William, Count of Buren, was kidnapped and conveyed to Spain, to be there brought up in the principles which his father detested, and taught to hate the cause for which that father sacrificed his life. When the professors of the University ventured to protest to Vargas against such a breach of their privileges, they met with the barbarous reply, "*Non curamus privilegios vestros.*" Vargas had an equal contempt for the laws of the land and for those of grammar.

The process of the two prisoners in the Castle of Ghent had been handed over to Vargas and del Rio; and in the middle of November, 1567, they were separately subjected to a lengthened interrogatory. Not till the very end of the year, however, were they furnished with a copy of the charges made against them. These consisted of ninety counts in the case of Egmont, of sixty-eight in that of Hoorn; and replies were demanded within five days. And this, although (in accordance, be it admitted, with the barbarous custom of a cruel age) they had been languishing all these months in solitary confinement, with all access to them barred, and with all their papers and documents in the possession of their accusers. The charges were met on the part of both prisoners by indignant denials of any treasonable or disloyal practices or intentions; and, as a concession to their remonstrances and those of their friends, the use of counsel was at length permitted to them. Meanwhile, ceaseless efforts were being made on their behalf to secure their pardon, or at least their trial, as Knights of the Fleece, before a Court of the Order. The wife of Egmont and the Dowager-Countess van Hoorn, the Admiral's stepmother, were especially active. The former, who was a Bavarian princess, had, with her eleven young children, been reduced to absolute penury by the sequestration of her husband's estates. She wrote most touching appeals to the King, to Alva, to the Emperor, and to different Knights of the Fleece. Her efforts were not without effect. The Emperor Maximilian wrote two letters to his cousin pleading the services of Egmont, and the privileges of both lords as Knights of the Fleece, and of Hoorn as a Count of the Holy Roman Empire. Several of the German Princes took a similar course. Even Barlaymont and Mansfeld, staunch loyalists, shrank from being parties to condemnation without a fair trial, and Granvelle himself counselled clemency. But nothing moved Philip or the stony-hearted Alva.

Before the latter left Spain the death of the nobles had been determined and irrevocably fixed. Neither privileges nor entreaties were of the very slightest avail. An armed irruption by Hoogstraeten from the south, and a more formidable one under Lewis of Nassau from Friesland sealed their fate. Hoogstraeten was easily overthrown, but Lewis gained on

May 11, 1568, a victory which necessitated Alva's departure for the north. He was, therefore, in a hurry to finish with his victims before he left. A decree on May 28 declared the two Nassaus, Hoogstraeten, and others, banished for ever from the land, and their property confiscated. This was followed by the execution of a number of distinguished persons, and by another decree on June 1, which suddenly announced that no further evidence on behalf of Egmont and Hoorn could be received, thus shutting out all the elaborate testimony in their defence collected by their counsel. On the following day, June 2, their case was submitted to the Council of Blood—in other words to Vargas and del Rio, who pronounced the prisoners guilty of high treason and sentenced them to death. The sentences were at once confirmed and signed by Alva. The next day the two lords were brought in carriages from Ghent to Brussels, escorted by three thousand troops, and were placed in separate chambers in the Broodhuis—a large building still standing in the great square of the Hôtel de Ville and facing that edifice. On the afternoon of the 4th Alva attended a meeting of the Council, at which the secretary read aloud the sentences: that the Counts of Egmont and Hoorn, as guilty of treasonable and rebellious practices, should be beheaded by the sword, their heads being set on poles and their estates confiscated. The Duke then sent for the Bishop of Ypres, and commissioned him to inform the condemned that their execution would take place on the following morning, and to prepare them for their fate.

Entreaties for delay were unavailing. The Bishop entered Egmont's chamber shortly before midnight, and found the unfortunate man, wearied after his long imprisonment by the fatigue of his journey, fast asleep. He awakened him, and unable to speak silently placed in his hands a copy of the terrible sentence. The Count had no suspicion that his doom was immediate. Of naturally sanguine temper he was even hoping that his removal to Brussels might be the prelude to his release. He was rudely undeceived, and was at first far more overcome by astonishment than by dismay. Then the thought of his devoted wife and young family rushed into his mind, and the idea of their being left desolate and penniless filled him with anguish. But he speedily grew calm, and listened attentively to the good Bishop's exhortations, confessed himself, and with much solemnity received the Sacrament. This done, and some hours of life still remaining to him, he composed himself to make preparations for his end. He wrote a touching letter to the King, protesting his loyalty and begging him to forgive him, and in regard for his past services to have compassion on his poor wife and children; it was signed, "From Brussels, this 5th June, 1568, at the point of death, Your Majesty's most humble and loyal vassal and servant, Lamoral d'Egmont." At 10 a.m. a body of soldiers came to conduct Egmont to the block. The great square was full of people, and every window and roof crowded, while the scaffold in the middle was surrounded by serried lines of Spanish

infantry. On this were placed two black cushions, and a small table with a silver crucifix. As Egmont walked along he recited the 51st Psalm. His countenance was serene, and he gravely acknowledged the salutations that were addressed to him. Following the advice of the Bishop, he did not attempt to speak to the people; but, after spending some time in earnest devotion and kissing the crucifix repeatedly, knelt down on one of the cushions. As the words were on his lips, "Into Thy hands I commend my spirit," the executioner struck off his head.

We know less of the last hours of Hoorn than we do of those of his more brilliant companion in misfortune. The Admiral was attended by the curate of La Chapelle. His first feelings on hearing the dread news were those of indignant resentment; but when this outburst was over he showed, like Egmont, the greatest fortitude and self-composure in facing the ordeal which awaited him. He had a pang to endure, which had been spared to Egmont—the sight of his friend's corpse covered with a blood-stained cloth. But he instantly controlled his emotion, and, after a few words of inaudible prayer, briefly asked the people to forgive his faults and to pray God to have mercy upon his soul. Before the stroke fell he was heard to exclaim, "*In manus tuas, Domine.*" Thus the two men, whose names have gone down to history so indissolubly linked, died with equal courage, and with the same solemn words, though in different tongues, made their parting appeal to the Divine mercy.

The heads of both the victims were exposed for three hours and were then removed. The bodies were placed in coffins and taken, that of Egmont to the convent of St Clara, that of the Admiral to the church of St Gudule. Here they were visited—especially that of the popular victor of Gravelines—by crowds of weeping people, who uttered vows of fierce revenge against the perpetrators of what they regarded as a judicial murder. The remains were finally transferred to the family vaults of the Egmonts and Montmorencys.

These executions were intended to serve as a great example and to strike terror into the minds of all opponents of the government. As a matter of fact, they aroused a perfect frenzy of undying hatred against the Spaniard and against Spanish rule, and surrounded the memories of Egmont and Hoorn with a halo of martyrdom for the cause of freedom which they had done little to deserve. There can be small doubt that neither of them was a dangerous enemy, and that Egmont at any rate, with skilful management, would have been found a most tractable tool in the hands of the King, ready to do anything that was required of him. By making them the victims of one of the most dramatic tragedies recorded in all history Philip and Alva committed an act which was not only an unnecessary crime, but an irretrievable blunder.

CHAPTER VII.

WILLIAM THE SILENT.

ON January 24, 1568, William of Nassau had by sound of the trumpet before the palace in Brussels been proclaimed an outlaw, unless within the space of thrice fourteen days he submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Council of Troubles; and this act of proscription had been followed by the kidnapping of William's eldest son from the University of Louvain. Before the allotted six weeks were out, the Prince, on March 3, replied to the proclamation by a manifesto in which, pleading his privileges as a Knight of the Fleece and a member of the Empire, he boldly refused to admit the competency of the tribunal before which he was summoned to appear. This was followed, a month later, by the publication of a lengthy defence of his conduct, entitled *Justification of the Prince of Orange against his Calumniators*. In this eloquent but somewhat prolix document, in the writing of which the well-known Protestant divine Languet had a share, William deals *seriatim* with the events of the previous years, which were the causes of the troubles in the Netherlands, and endeavours to prove that the whole blame for the disorders which had occurred lay at the door of the government. In saying this, he was careful to shield the King personally by throwing the whole responsibility upon his evil counsellors, and especially upon Granvelle. On the other hand, while upholding the loyal motives of the authors of the Compromise and the petition of the nobles, he declared positively that these steps were taken "*sans son aveu et à son insu*," and refused to admit that in anything that he had done, whether in the council, in his government, or at Antwerp, could he be accused of not serving his sovereign to the best of his power, or of being actuated by any other motives than the good of the country and the security of the public peace. This *Justification*, which was published in several languages, was, together with the previous refusal to obey Alba's summons, naturally regarded as an act of open defiance to the Spanish government.

Nor was the defiance confined to words only. At the very time when he wrote his *Justification*, Orange was busily occupied at Dillenburg

organising an armed force to attack the dominions of the sovereign to whom in his published apology he professed fidelity. Roused by the arrest of Egmont and Hoorn and by the arbitrary and vindictive measures of Alva, he did not scruple to issue commissions to his brother Lewis and others to raise troops for the avowed purpose of expelling the King's armies from the Netherlands for the King's own good.

William's chief difficulty was the financial one. In the smaller German States there were always plenty of mercenaries at hand; but the raising of money to pay them was no easy matter for an exile whose estates were in the hands of his enemies. However, he managed to get together 200,000 florins; half of which sum was subscribed by Antwerp, Amsterdam, and certain towns of Holland and Zeeland, the other half by private individuals. The Prince himself gave 50,000 florins, Lewis of Nassau 10,000, Culemburg, Hoogstraeten, and van den Berg 30,000 each. John of Nassau pledged his estates on his brother's behalf; and William sold a large part of his plate and jewels. It seemed a mad attempt with such limited resources to venture to invade a land garrisoned by a large veteran army under the command of the most experienced general of the day, the representative of the mightiest and wealthiest monarch in existence. It might have been deemed impossible that so far-sighted and prudent a man as the Prince of Orange would embark upon so hazardous an adventure; and, in fact, his first efforts ended, as they were bound to end, in hopeless failure. That they were made at all is susceptible of only one explanation. A change had passed over the once gay, pleasure-loving, lavish young nobleman, who with half-mocking indifferentism had lightly promised that he would teach his Lutheran bride to read *Amadis de Gaul* and other such amusing books instead of the Holy Scriptures. His spirit had been moved within him by the sufferings and the constancy of the victims of persecution. By slow degrees the Reformed doctrine had been gaining a stronger hold upon him. Since his exile he had not only given himself to the once despised study of God's Word, but had asked the Landgrave of Hesse to send him an Evangelical preacher to help him in his task. The whole tenour of his letters proclaims that his course was henceforth moulded not chiefly, far less entirely, by political ambition, but by deep religious conviction that he was an instrument in the hands of God to rescue his countrymen from pitiless oppression at the hands of the Spanish tyranny. At times, amidst the stress and strain of his great struggle, the conduct of the Prince of Orange may be open to reproach, his methods liable to the charge of opportunism; but it is scarcely credible that the man did not believe he had a sacred mission to discharge who could thus write in his hour of darkest misfortune to his wife, "I am determined to place myself in the hands of the Almighty, that He may guide me, where it shall be His good pleasure, since I see well that I must needs pass this life in misery

and travail, with which I am quite contented, for I know that I have deserved far greater chastisement; I pray Him only graciously to enable me to bear everything patiently, as I have done up to the present." His correspondence is full of similar passages.

William's plan in the spring of 1568 was to invade the oppressed provinces simultaneously from three directions. A force of Huguenots and refugees was to attack Artois from France; another, raised by Hoogstraeten, to cross the frontier on the south-east near Maestricht; another under Lewis of Nassau to enter Friesland from the Ems. The two first-mentioned corps, numbering respectively some 2000 and 3000 men, were ignominiously routed and dispersed by bodies of Spanish troops sent out by Alva to meet them. On the expedition of Lewis at the outset brighter fortune smiled. The Duke had ordered Count Aremberg, Governor of Friesland, to enroll a force of 2800 choice veteran troops; and he despatched Meghem with 1500 more to support him, giving strict orders that the two commanders were not to risk an action until they had united. Count Lewis, who had experienced much difficulty in keeping his undisciplined and irregularly paid mercenaries together, and had only succeeded in doing so by blackmailing the wretched inhabitants, had retreated before Aremberg to a strong position at Heiligerlee, approachable only by a single causeway across morasses. On the morning of May 23, the Spanish troops, pushing on in pursuit and feeling sure of an easy victory, found themselves suddenly floundering in the treacherous quagmire, and suffered a severe defeat with heavy loss. Aremberg himself was killed, as on the other side Adolphus of Nassau, the brave young brother of William and Lewis. The victory was a barren one, but it provoked Alva to take strong measures. The decree of May 28, announcing the confiscation of the possessions of the Prince of Orange and the other exiled nobles, was followed by a number of executions, culminating on June 5 in the deaths of Egmont and Hoorn on the scaffold. The Governor-General then prepared to take the field himself in Friesland at the head of an admirably equipped army of 15,000 men. He drove the discontented and almost mutinous bands of Lewis before him, until he succeeded in penning them up, to the number of 10,000, at Jemmingen, in a small peninsula of land washed on all sides but one by the estuary of the Ems. The fight took place on July 21. The resistance was slight; there was no way of escape; and an absolute butchery ensued. Seven Spaniards perished, seven thousand of their hapless opponents. Lewis of Nassau himself escaped by swimming. Alva marched back in triumph, plundering and burning as he went, to Utrecht, where he held a magnificent review of 30,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, with the view of striking terror into the minds of all would-be rebels. But though the Prince's forces had been shattered in detail, and all seemed lost, his indomitable spirit was not to be crushed even by a disaster like that of Jemmingen. "With God's

help," he wrote to Lewis, "I am determined to go on." In a series of manifestoes he appealed to the Emperor, to the German Princes, to Elizabeth of England, protesting that he was not a rebel, but was fighting, in the best interests of his sovereign, to preserve the civil and religious liberties of his countrymen from being trampled under foot by an illegal and pernicious foreign tyranny. But his appeals fell upon deaf ears. Despairing of help in any of these directions, he next turned to the Huguenots of France; and in August was feeling his way towards an alliance with Coligny and Condé.

Meanwhile he had by strenuous exertions succeeded in the beginning of September in collecting near Römersdorf a force of 18,000 infantry and 7000 cavalry, Germans and Walloons. There being a lack of ready money, this army of mercenaries was in constant ill-humour and not seldom on the verge of mutiny, and was only kept together by the leader's personal importunity and address, sometimes exerted at no slight risk to himself. With these troops Orange crossed the Meuse on the night of October 5 and 6, and advanced into Brabant, where he was joined by a reinforcement of French Huguenots. Knowing that time was on his adversary's side, William was anxious, as soon as possible, to join issue. But the cautious Alva, with a smaller but far better disciplined force, dogged the Prince's steps, following him like his shadow, but always avoiding battle. On one occasion, however, he seized the opportunity of isolating a rear-guard of 3000 men, and cutting them to pieces. It was here that Hoogstraeten received a slight wound, from which he died shortly afterwards. Finding that nothing was to be done, William, whose army was clamouring for arrears of pay, withdrew on November 17 across the French frontier. He then disbanded his forces, after selling what effects he had at his disposal to satisfy their demands. Followed only by a few hundred horse, he with his brothers Henry and Lewis reached the camp of Admiral Coligny. The two younger Nassaus fought like heroes at the bloody defeats of Jarnac and Moncontour; but William was not present at either of these fights. For some unknown reason he left the Huguenot army, and made his way back through countless perils, disguised as a peasant, to German territory. His enemies have most unwarrantably seized upon this withdrawal from the forefront of danger as a sign that William was a coward at heart. He left the Huguenot camp probably because he saw that he was doing no good there to the cause which lay nearest to his heart. But though he returned to Germany, what could he do? Well might Alva write, "We may regard the Prince as a dead man; he has neither influence nor credit." His failures, moreover, had well-nigh destroyed any reputation he possessed for ability and leadership. Afraid of assassination by the agents of Alva, afraid of his creditors, afraid of being placed under the Ban of the Empire, he wandered about from place to place, not daring to take up his residence permanently at Dillenburg. And, all this time, his

misfortunes were rendered doubly intolerable by the shameful conduct of his wife, Anne of Saxony. After the Prince's departure from the Netherlands in 1567 her occasional violent outbursts of passion had given place to a morbid state, bordering on frenzy. She poured forth incessant reproaches upon him; for some time she refused to live with him; and finally brought matters to a climax by absconding to Cologne, and giving herself up there to a disreputable life. Up to the last William had treated her with singular patience and kindness; but all in vain. At last, in despair, her husband handed her over to the tender mercies of her own family. After an imprisonment of six years, she died insane. The name of Anne of Saxony may nevertheless be gratefully remembered in the Netherlands as that of the mother of Maurice of Nassau.

With the complete failure of Orange's military enterprises Alva's policy seemed triumphant. The man of blood and iron had tamed "the men of butter." His emissaries and executioners were still at work throughout the Provinces; but no one any longer dared to resist. It is indeed noteworthy how slight was the support given to the invading armies of the Nassaus, and how apathetic was the attitude of the population. The object of Alva's coming to the Netherlands was at least as much political as religious—to crush out autonomy as a prelude to crushing out heresy. The first persons on whom the heavy hand of retribution fell were not the sectaries, but the great Catholic nobles, who had dared to make a stand on behalf of the time-honoured liberties of their native land; the conventual clergy, who had ventured to resist the taking away of their revenues for supplying incomes to Philip's new Bishops; and the magistrates of the great municipalities, Catholic almost to a man, who had upheld the immunities of the towns against arbitrary exactions. Emigrants fled away in crowds, yet these by no means consisted entirely of Protestant refugees, but comprised numbers of abbots and monks, and quite a considerable proportion of rich and influential burgesses, who had nothing to fear on the ground of their religious opinions. The fate of Egmont and Hoorn and of Antony van Straelen showed that the only way to escape the clutch of the Blood Council was to put oneself as speedily as possible out of the reach of its jurisdiction. Thousands therefore sought refuge from the tyrant in France, Germany, and England, while the bulk of the people bowed the neck to the yoke in the hopelessness of despair. But the very completeness of his triumph led the Governor to take a step which was to undo all his previous work.

Philip and his Viceroy were always in want of funds. This perennial impecuniousness of the Spanish treasury was at this time accentuated by Queen Elizabeth's seizure at Plymouth, where they had sought refuge, of five Spanish vessels, bringing to the Duke 450,000 ducats. This unlooked-for loss was a most serious blow to Alva. His troops had long been without pay. Money must be had; and the only way to get it was in the

form of taxes levied on the people. He therefore boldly proposed, at a meeting of the States General summoned at Brussels on March 20, 1569, that the delegates should agree to (1) a tax of one per cent., the "hundredth penny," to be levied immediately, but once only, on all property, (2) a tax of five per cent., the "twentieth penny," on all transfers of real estate, (3) a tax of ten per cent., the "tenth penny," on all articles of commerce, to be paid each time they were sold. The twentieth and the tenth penny were to be granted in perpetuity. The Duke counted on thus raising an income of at least 500,000 florins; and, as the assent of the States was in future to be dispensed with, it could be relied on to come in year by year without further trouble. It was, as he was good enough to explain, the Spanish system of the *alcabala* which worked very well in his own town of Alva. But he forgot that what a despotic government might exact in a poor, thinly-populated agricultural country like Spain, not even armed tyranny could compel in a thriving mercantile and manufacturing community like the Netherlands. This was not a question of theological creeds, or of musty charters, but one which touched to the quick the interests of a population which lived by commerce. The matter was referred back from the States General to the provincial States, only to meet everywhere with the same strong opposition. Petitions poured in against the taxes from the magistracies, from public bodies, from commercial guilds, from private individuals. At last, by dint of threats, the States were terrorised into voting the payment of the 100th penny, once only. But on the question of the other two taxes they were obdurate; and not till after prolonged struggles was a compromise agreed upon. Alva had to be satisfied with a payment of 2,000,000 florins for two years, the term ending in August, 1571.

From this hour the Duke's supremacy began to wane. His proposed taxes roused to fury the feelings of hatred against him. He had henceforth no friends. Even the pliant Viglius strenuously resisted him in the Council; and such faithful adherents of the Spanish *régime* as Barlaymont, Noircarmes, and Aerschot joined with Viglius in the general chorus of condemnation. The Bishops and clergy were on the same side; so too was Philip's Council at Madrid. "Everybody turns against me," wrote the Duke, but he swore nevertheless that he would have his own way. When the town and district of Utrecht refused to pay the tax, Alva quartered the regiment of Lombardy upon them; and, when the insolence and brutality of the soldiery failed to bring the citizens to their knees, the city and district were declared guilty of high treason, their charters and privileges were abolished, and all their property, real and personal, declared to be confiscated to the King's use (December, 1569).

All this time the Prince of Orange was hard at work through his agents, striving to rouse the people to active resistance, and, as a first step, to help in providing the necessary funds for equipping an army

of invasion. The chief of these agents was a certain Jacques de Wesembeke, formerly pensionary of Antwerp, between whom and William there was a constant interchange of letters. Wesembeke travelled from place to place, mainly in Holland and Zeeland, making collections for the rebel cause, and contriving plans for getting possession of various towns. In this correspondence we find William constantly expressing his willingness to come with an army, but reiterating that funds for paying the troops must first be raised, and Wesembeke as constantly regretting that his collections bring in little, that the rich give less than the poor, but promising that if once the Prince and his troops were actually in evidence they would be ready to open their purse-strings.

The general chorus of disapproval that arose against the continued brutality of Alva's treatment of the Netherlands led Philip, slowly as was his wont, to think that the time had come for proclaiming an amnesty. It was true that Alva himself, in claiming that he had restored the Provinces to their rightful obedience to their King, without the least intention of irony, added, "and all this without violence." Alva's views of violence were fortunately, even in that relentless age, quite exceptional. Granvelle from Naples pressed on the King the necessity of using clemency. Already in February, 1569, the subject of the amnesty had been broached with the Governor-General. It did not meet with his approval; and he found it easy to put forward, as soon as pressure was brought to bear upon him, various reasons for delay. At last the King formally announced to him his will that an amnesty should be proclaimed before the arrival of his fourth bride and niece, Anne of Austria, who was coming down the Rhine to embark at Antwerp for Spain. Accordingly, on July 16, 1570, in the great square of Antwerp, the Duke, seated on a throne covered with cloth of gold, and with the Bishops, Councillors of State and other dignitaries grouped around him, read before the assembled people the words of the royal proclamation. It was not a very indulgent document, since there were not less than six classes of offenders excepted; but to all others pardon was offered, on condition that they should within two months make their peace with the Church and receive absolution. This act of grace accomplished, Alva hastened to meet the new Queen. Anne, however, despite the brilliant festivities which greeted her at Brussels, was painfully reminded that the reign of terror had not yet ceased, when she was entreated by the Dowager Countess of Hoorn, to plead with Philip that her younger son, Montigny, might be spared from sharing his elder brother's doom of death. Anne promised that this should be one of her first requests to her husband. She kept her word, but it was too late. There is no act of Philip's that has cast a darker stain on his memory than the execution of Montigny.

From the moment when the Marquis of Berghen and Floris de

Montmorency, lord of Montigny, set foot in Spain, in 1566, on their mission from Margaret of Parma, it had been the settled determination of Philip that they should not return. Their names had been entered in the King's book of remembrance as those of the leaders of the Netherland national party, with Orange, Egmont, and Hoorn; and all five had been marked down for destruction. From the first they were virtually captives. Berghen died in 1567, but his colleague lingered on in confinement in the castle of Segovia. His case, like that of other nobles charged with treason in their absence, had been brought before the Tribunal of Blood. Not till the unhappy man had been in prison three years was he sentenced to be beheaded as a traitor, his property being confiscated. For six months no action was taken, but Philip was alarmed at the armaments of Orange; he had received intimation of the new Queen's promise to the Countess of Hoorn; and he resolved that Floris de Montmorency must die before her arrival. Philip hereupon arranged in his own cabinet in its most minute details an elaborate scheme by which Montigny should in reality be privately strangled in the castle of Simancas, and yet that all the world should believe that he had died from fever. On the very same day (October 1, 1570) on which Philip drew up the programme of the splendid ceremonies that were to attend Anne of Austria's entry into Segovia, he penned an order to the Governor of Simancas for the killing of his prisoner. Arrangements were made that a medical man should call at the castle for several days, bringing medicines for the treatment of one suffering from fever. It was represented to Montigny that a private execution was an act of special grace from the King; and he was allowed to write out a will, as if he were a sick man lying on his death-bed, and also to send a letter of farewell to his wife. On October 16, between one and two o'clock in the morning an executioner arrived and did his office. Thereupon the Governor, acting on his secret instruction, solemnly informed His Majesty that, despite the utmost care of the doctors, Montigny had unhappily succumbed to his disease. Philip affected sorrow, and ordered that the obsequies of the defunct should be performed with all the respect due to his rank, and that his servants should be supplied with suits of mourning.

In the years 1570 and 1571 William and Lewis of Nassau continued indefatigably active, the one at Dillenburg and Arnstadt, the other at La Rochelle and Paris, making preparations diplomatic and material for a new campaign. It was not however by military levies that the cause they championed was to gain its first solid successes. The year 1569 saw some eighteen vessels armed with letters of marque from the Prince of Orange in his capacity as a sovereign prince, cruising in the narrow seas under the command of the lord of Dolhain. It was the insignificant beginning of that sea-power which was destined ere long to cover the ocean with its fleets and to plant its colonies in every

continent. These corsairs—for such they really were—were manned by crews of many nationalities, mostly wild and lawless desperadoes, hating papists and Spaniards with a fierce hatred, and caring nought for dangers and privations so long as they were provided with plenty of fighting and plundering. The "Sea-Beggars" (*Gueux de Mer*) as they were called, speedily made their presence felt. Already in February, 1570, three hundred vessels had fallen a prey to them, and enormous booty. In April the number of their ships had risen to eighty-four. One great difficulty from the first confronted them—the lack of ports in which to take refuge and land their plunder. Everywhere they spread terror and alarm to such an extent that William, who found that no share of the spoil ever reached him, while their reckless acts of cruelty and pillaging brought disrepute on his name, determined, if possible, to subject them to better control. He accordingly drew up strict regulations, as a condition to his issuing further letters of marque. One of these prescribed that one-third of the booty was to belong to the Prince; the others dealt with matters of discipline, order, and religious observances. With the view of carrying these rules into effect, the lord of Lumbres was appointed to be admiral in the place of Dolhain. The regulations remained a dead letter, no commander could control the crews, even if he wished, and the wild excesses of the Sea-Beggars continued to be the dread of friends and foes alike.

Under Lumbres, their chief leaders were William de Blois, lord of Treslong, a man as capable as he was fearless, and William de la Marck, lord of Lumey, a worthy descendant of the famous Wild Boar of the Ardennes—bold, cruel, revelling in deeds of blood. Terrible barbarities were executed upon the hapless priests and monks and Catholic magistrates by the rovers, as they sailed up and down the coasts and into the estuaries, in revenge for Alva's persecutions; and vast stores of plate, church ornaments and treasures, and money ransoms, were carried back by them to their ships. The difficulty as to finding harbours of refuge had been partly removed by the secret connivance of Queen Elizabeth. The Beggars were allowed to put in at various English ports, there to refit and revictual their vessels, to dispose of their plunder and beat up recruits. But suddenly this privilege came to an end. Strong representations were made to Elizabeth by the Spanish government; and, as the Queen at the moment had no desire to irritate Philip, a proclamation was issued forbidding the rebels the use of the English havens. The consequences of this prohibition were momentous. A fleet of some twenty-eight vessels under Lumbres and Treslong, having been denied refuge in England, was cruising off the shores of Holland, when a strong westerly wind forced it to seek refuge in the estuary of the Meuse, and to cast anchor off Brill. Finding that the Spanish garrison had marched out to quell a disturbance at Utrecht it was hastily determined (April 1, 1572) to seize the town. One of

the gates was destroyed by fire; and the Beggars, to the number of six hundred, marched in, pillaging the churches and religious houses, and treating with their usual barbarity all priests, monks, and Catholic officials whom they met. After collecting all the spoil they could, the marauders were on the point of returning to their ships, when Treslong proposed that they should strengthen the fortifications, and continue to hold the town as a place of refuge. It was no sooner said than done. The inhabitants were forced to take the oath to the Prince of Orange, as Stadholder in the name of the King; and for the first time that flag was hoisted over the little port, which was the symbol of the new sea Power on that day born into the world.

Lewis of Nassau at Rochelle, with his keen and alert spirit, at once saw the importance of this bold stroke, and forthwith turned his eyes to the yet more important town of Flushing, the key of Zeeland, which commanded the approach to Antwerp. Alva, too, after in vain attempting to recover Brill, gave orders that the garrison and defences of Flushing should be strengthened, and that Pachecho, his famous Italian engineer, should do his utmost to complete the citadel, which he had already begun. But he was too late. The citizens, urged by a messenger from Lewis of Nassau rose in revolt. Treslong hastened to their assistance. His wild mariners forced an entrance into the town and put to the sword the scanty Spanish garrison. Pachecho himself was captured and hanged. The consequences of this success were enormous. The Sea-Beggars, whose ranks were now swollen by crowds of refugees, speedily made themselves supreme over the whole island of Walcheren, except the town of Middelburg. In a very short time they rendered themselves masters also of Delfshaven and Schiedam; and the movement of revolt spread like wildfire through Holland, Zeeland, Gelderland, Utrecht, and Friesland. The principal towns submitted themselves to the Prince of Orange as their lawful Stadholder, and acknowledged his authority.

Meanwhile, Lewis of Nassau, who had been for a long time conducting elaborate and intricate negotiations with the view of obtaining help for the cause not merely from the Huguenots, but from Elizabeth of England and from Charles IX himself, had been to a considerable extent successful. The French King was persuaded that it was to his interest to assist the Nassaus, at least to the extent of giving them a free hand in raising troops, and in invading the Netherlands from French territory. Lewis, however, with all his high qualities, lacked something of his brother's prudence and caution. His first move, by its very suddenness and daring, was at the outset successful. With a small force, raised in France and paid for by French money, he dashed into Hainault with such unexpected rapidity that he seized Valenciennes, and then captured Mons (May 23) before Alva had made any move to oppose him. At Mons he fortified himself. But the population was doubtful and suspicious; and Lewis found himself looked upon as an enemy, as

soon as he attempted to enforce discipline and raise supplies. An army under Don Frederick of Toledo, Alva's natural son, moved against him; and, unable to advance, as he had hoped, into Brabant, he found himself blockaded in Mons by a superior force. There was hope, however, that William would come to the rescue, and so Lewis prepared himself for sustained and vigorous defence. The almost simultaneous capture by the rebels of Brill and Flushing in the north, and of Valenciennes and Mons in the south, could not fail to distract and divide the Spanish forces, and open the way to the army which Orange had so long been collecting on the eastern frontier.

The Prince, with his usual circumspection, at first received the news of the capture of Brill with doubtful satisfaction. But the subsequent seizure of Flushing, followed as it was by a series of successes elsewhere, lent a different aspect to the operations of the Sea-Beggars. William now surpassed himself by the variety and activity of his correspondence. His agents and fellow-workers were to be found everywhere, many of their communications being written under feigned names and dealing apparently with ordinary business transactions. The two merchants George and Lambert Certain, for instance, were none other than William and Lewis of Nassau. Among those who toiled with the greatest zeal on his behalf were Sainte Aldegonde and Wesembeke, not only by their personal intercourse with others, as they moved about from place to place, but by their prolific pens, and by a skilled literary power, especially notable in Sainte Aldegonde. Two publications of this date had a great effect in stirring up the popular feeling in William's favour. The one was the famous war-song of the revolt, the *Wilhelmus van Nassouwen*, still the national hymn of the Netherlands, the authorship of which is almost universally assigned to Sainte Aldegonde. The other was the eloquent appeal to the people, which, soon after the taking of Brill was scattered broadcast through the country as if emanating from the Prince of Orange, but which recent evidence shows to have been written by Wesembeke in William's name and without his knowledge. But lack of funds was still the burden of the letters from Dillenburg. Contributions from Elizabeth and Charles IX had indeed helped to replenish the Prince's empty treasury, and to this had been added a portion of the booty captured by the Sea-Beggars; but the collections made in the provinces themselves had not as yet yielded much. But the sight of Brill and Flushing in the hands of Orange's followers not only caused other towns to throw open their gates, but led the rich burghers to open their purses. The first to offer from his private resources a large sum to William was Arend van Dorp, a man of position in Veere and Zevenbergen, who went in person to Dillenburg and on May 23 placed 10,000 florins at the Prince's disposal. It happened that at that very time a number of German Princes had met at the castle to discuss the question of raising

troops to serve under Orange. The action of van Dorp had no small effect in increasing the Prince's credit and in inducing them to give the permission that was required.

Such was the vigour with which the enlisting was now pressed on that on June 29 William set out from Dillenburg at the head of 1000 horse, and on July 9 was able to cross the Rhine near Duisburg with some 20,000 men and to penetrate into Gelderland. He quickly took Roeremonde; but this success was marred by the sacking of churches and the barbarous treatment of the priests and monks in the town. Though in all his proclamations William always laid stress on his desire for religious toleration, his lack of ready money made him dependent upon his unpaid soldiery. From Roeremonde the Prince advanced into Brabant; but here the news reached him that a force of 5000 Huguenots, which the Seigneur de Genlis was leading to the relief of Mons, had been cut in pieces by the Spaniards. Always timid as a general, William retreated and pitched his camp at Hellarde on the banks of the Meuse, close to Roeremonde, and did not move again till August 27. He then marched into Limburg; and again his course was marked by excesses and destruction of property, the desecration of churches, and the killing and maltreating of ecclesiastics. Herenthal, Tirlemont, and Diest fell into his hands, but Louvain shut her gates against him. Passing on, he arrived within a league of Brussels; but, although the Spanish garrison was very small, such was the terror created by the misdeeds of William's mercenaries that the Duke of Aerschot had no difficulty in rousing the inhabitants to resist. The Prince did not feel himself strong enough to besiege the town, which he had hoped would welcome him. At this moment of discouragement information was brought to him of the Massacre of St Bartholomew. All his plans had been framed on the confident expectation that Coligny, according to the understanding with him to which the French King had been a party, would come to his help with 12,000 arquebusiers. And now his hopes were dashed to the ground. "*Quel coup de massue cela nous ait esté!*" he wrote to his brother; "my sole hope was from the side of France." A bold dash southwards might still have saved Mons, but Orange turned to the north, where for a while he seemed successful. Archbishop Malines was surrendered to him; and shortly afterwards Termonde and Oudenarde shared the same fate. A considerable part of the southern provinces was already in his power. But Alva was pursuing a masterly game of his own. The issue of the campaign he knew well depended upon the capture of Mons, and to effect this he deliberately denuded the rest of the country of troops. William also saw that his successes elsewhere availed little if he allowed Lewis and his army to be taken prisoners, so at last he turned his steps towards Hainault.

On September 11 he reached the village of Harmignies, about a league from Mons. During the following night the Spanish captain,

Julian de Romero, at the head of a body of six hundred men, who, to prevent mistakes in the dark, each wore a white shirt over his armour, made their way stealthily into the camp of Orange, where the *Camisaders* all but succeeded in capturing William himself asleep in his tent. He was however awakened by a favourite lap-dog that lay at his feet, and escaped just in time. But some eight hundred of his followers were slain; and the moral effect of the blow decided the issue of the campaign. On the following morning the Prince gave orders to retreat, and ignominiously made his way back to Malines. The expedition so long and laboriously prepared thus utterly collapsed; and William was pronounced to be not only incapable as a general, but pusillanimous as a man. Six days after the affair of Harmignies Mons surrendered. Alva granted the garrison most favourable conditions, and showed the most punctilious courtesy to the chivalrous and unfortunate Lewis of Nassau, who, prostrate with fever, was borne out on a litter. Slowly he made his way to Roeremonde, and thence to Dillenburg, where under the skilful nursing of his devoted mother he once more recovered his health.

William, meanwhile, saw that, so far as the southern provinces were concerned, the game was up. But in the north the spirit of resistance to Spanish tyranny was still vigorous; and the Prince now made up his mind to throw in his lot for good and all with the brave Hollanders and Zeelanders, who were so gallantly struggling against overwhelming odds, "being resolved," as he wrote (October 22) to his brother John, "to maintain the affair there as long as possible and decided to find there my grave." From henceforth William, though in name a Provençal Prince and a German Count, became a Netherlander pure and simple, and absolutely identified himself with the interests and fortunes of the people, to whom he was already bound by so many ties.

After the success of the Sea-Beggars in capturing Brill and Flushing and the adhesion of a large number of towns to the cause of which the Prince of Orange was the champion, Alva's authority had practically ceased to exist in Zeeland, Utrecht, Overijssel, and Friesland, except in places garrisoned by Spanish troops. In the early summer of 1572 William, as Stadholder in the name of the King, had issued a summons to the States of Holland to assemble. Deputies were sent by eight towns, and met, on July 15, at Dort. Sainte Aldegonde, as the Prince's representative, addressed them in a long and eloquent speech, with the result that William was by a unanimous vote recognised as lawful Stadholder. Liberty of worship was to be established both for Protestant and Romanist. De la Marck was appointed to be Admiral; Paul Buys, so well known later, to be Advocate; and a large and liberal grant of supplies was voted for the prosecution of military operations. William, therefore, as he travelled from Enckhuysen through Haarlem and Leyden to Delft, where he fixed his permanent abode, found everywhere a

resolute people, and all the elements of a regular government, in which he exercised an almost dictatorial authority.

At the beginning of the year 1572 Alva had fallen considerably in his master's esteem; and the Duke of Medina Coeli had been sent from Spain to enquire into his conduct of affairs, and no doubt finally to supersede him, as Alva had himself superseded the Duchess of Parma. But Medina Coeli, after narrowly escaping capture by the Sea-Beggars, found that the dangers of invasion, which threatened the provinces from so many quarters, demanded the strong hand of a military chief rather than of an administrator; and Alva retained his governorship. In denuding the country of garrisons in order to concentrate a great army round Mons, and in refusing to be tempted by Orange's advance and successes from the prosecution of the siege, the Duke played at once a bold and a cautious game. He staked everything on the venture; but, when Mons was captured, and the mutinous army of his adversary melted away before its first reverse, Alva's thoughts immediately turned to vengeance. The danger had been great, the retribution must be exemplary. Malines was the most important of the towns which had surrendered to the Prince of Orange; and on it fell the first brunt of his wrath. In vain the clergy begged the Governor to have pity; the town was for three days handed over to the tender mercies of a brutal soldiery, who tortured, pillaged, and maltreated the inhabitants, without making any distinction between Romanist and Protestant, loyalist and rebel. At length, gorged with plunder, the troops under Don Frederick of Toledo moved northwards in search of other prey.

Worse still was to follow. The sack of Zutphen was even more horrible than that of Malines; and the utter destruction of Naarden by fire and by sword was more inhuman in its cruelty than either. In this little town nearly the whole population, men, women, and children, were deliberately butchered. "It has been by the permission of God," Alva wrote to the King, "that they have been so blinded as to wish to resist in a town that no one in the world would have thought of defending, so weak was it."

Naarden was near to Amsterdam; and, while Don Frederick was forcing his way to the Zuyderzee, another Spanish force under Mondragon had reconquered the greater part of Zeeland. At the head of 3000 men, this intrepid leader had at the end of October, 1572, marched at the ebb tide across the shallow channel, ten miles broad, which separates the island of South Beveland from the mainland, and had seized by surprise its chief town, Tergoes. The water, as they crossed, rose to the breasts and shoulders of the soldiers. But their deeds of horror had filled the minds of the stern Hollanders and Zeelanders with the fierce and indomitable courage of despair; and the long narrow strip of swampy, half-submerged land stretching from the Scheldt to the Helder became the scene of one of the most prolonged and ferocious struggles that the world has ever seen.

The great port of Amsterdam had remained loyal to the King; but only ten miles distant lay Haarlem, a very hotbed of fierce Calvinism. The road between the two towns passed along a narrow causeway following the dyke, which parted the vast mere, known as the Haarlem Sea, from the estuary of the Y, which was really an arm of the Zuyder-zee. Haarlem was thus protected by two great sheets of shallow water to the east and north; on the south was a large wood, and, a few miles to the west beyond the sand dunes, the ocean. Against this rebel town, at the beginning of December, Don Frederick advanced from Amsterdam at the head of an apparently irresistible army of thirty thousand Spanish, Walloon, and German veterans, expecting that he could easily carry the weak defences of the place at the first assault. But the fate of Zutphen and Naarden had roused in the citizens a stubborn and almost frenzied spirit of resistance and defiance. The garrison numbered about 4000 men; and their commander, Ripperda, was a man of conspicuous bravery and unflagging energy and resourcefulness. After a fierce bombardment, the Spaniards on December 21 tried to effect a lodgment in the town by storm; but the assailing columns were beaten off after desperate hand to hand fighting with heavy loss. Thus foiled, Don Frederick changed his plans. His engineers set to work for a formal siege by regular approaches. Amidst the bitter cold and icy fogs of midwinter, by night as well as by day, the struggle went on, above ground and below, as besiegers and besieged mined and countermined, and breaches were made in the ramparts only to be repaired under cover of the darkness. At last, on January 31, 1573, Toledo ordered another great assault. It ended, like that of December 21, in grievous loss and failure. Toledo was now disposed to give up in despair; but Alva threatened to disown him as his son if he retired. The siege was therefore turned into a blockade. Since Haarlem could not be captured by the sword, it must be reduced by famine. As week after week passed, the investing army was for some time in an even more sorry plight than that within the walls. Spaniard and Hollander strove to outvie one another in deeds of savage cruelty and vengeance. The gibbets on the town walls and in the Spanish camp stood face to face, each garnished with its crop of victims, neither side giving quarter. Toledo announced the defeats of the relief armies, by throwing into the town the heads of captured leaders with suitable inscriptions; the citizens replied by rolling a barrel into the Spanish lines containing eleven heads, with the statement that ten were for payment of the tenth penny to Alva, the eleventh for interest for the delay in discharge of the debt. The besieged also did their utmost to shock the religious feelings of their adversaries by parodying the Catholic rites and ceremonies on the ramparts. Savage religious intolerance was equally rampant on both sides; and, if the Spaniards exacted bloody reprisals on the garrison, no small provocation had been given.

Meanwhile, the Prince of Orange had been exerting himself to the

very utmost for the relief of the town, but in vain. A force of 3000 men under de La Marck was completely cut to pieces; a second under Batenburg subsequently met the same fate. At first, during the long, dark, foggy nights communication was kept up with the town by means of swift skaters over the frozen water; but as spring came on, this mode of approach had to be changed for that of shallow boats creeping through the rushes, protected by a flotilla on the lake. But the Spaniards succeeded in introducing a fleet under Bossu from the Y, which after a long and bloody engagement vanquished William's ships, and thus cut off all communication with the town from outside. A last despairing effort was made in July by a force of 4000 undisciplined volunteers, again under Batenburg; but these were easily routed by the veteran troops of Don Frederick, and their leader was killed. At last, on July 11, 1573, the town, after shoe-leather, vermin, and weeds had been consumed by the famishing inhabitants, surrendered.

Of the four thousand men who formed the garrison only sixteen hundred survived. All of these, with the exception of the Germans, were deliberately butchered in cold blood; and their gallant leaders, Ripperda and Lancelot Brederode, were hanged. Some four hundred of the principal citizens were likewise put to death; but the rest were spared, and the town was saved from pillage on consenting to pay a fine of 250,000 guilders. The Spaniards had suffered even more terrible losses during this seven months' siege, at least 12,000 men having perished, more by disease and privation than by the sword. William had to endure many reproaches for his failure in relieving Haarlem and for not having taken the field in person. But he knew that the continuance of the struggle depended upon his life. He had, indeed, a difficult part to play. The very staunchest of the patriots began to despair; but the spirit which breathes through all William's utterances at this time is that of absolute trust in God, and submission to His will. When his followers urged that the cause was hopeless without an alliance with some great potentate, he nobly replied, "When I took in hand to defend these oppressed Christians I made an alliance with the mightiest of all Potentates—the God of Hosts, who is able to save us if He choose."

The splendid defence of Haarlem had, however, wide-reaching effects; and Alva, already in bad odour with the King for his failure in pacifying the country, became more and more embittered when he found that the fall of that town, and what he was pleased to call his clemency to its inhabitants, did not lead to a general submission. He actually advised the King to allow him utterly to destroy and burn to the ground every town that showed resistance. In August he despatched Don Frederick at the head of 16,000 troops to attack Alkmaar, with orders to put every living creature within the walls to death. But the burghers, about 2000 in number, valiantly defended themselves. An assault, after desperate

fighting was driven off with heavy loss to the Spaniards. By the counsel of Orange the dykes were cut; and Don Frederick saw himself in danger of being hemmed in by the rising waters. So, after a seven weeks' siege, he abandoned the attempt to take the town. The retreat of his soldiers, mutinous for want of pay, was marked by rapine and disorders of every kind. With this defeat all hope of being able to advance victoriously through Holland was at an end. Even greater success attended the Beggars upon the sea. Off Enckhuysen the Spanish fleet was, on October 11, completely worsted by the Dutch; and Admiral Bossu himself was taken prisoner. William was thus able to make the admiral's life a hostage for that of Sainte Aldegonde, who had been surprised and seized by the Spaniards at Maaslandsluis.

The Duke of Alva, detested throughout the Netherlands, accused by the royalists of bringing disaster on the country, ill-supported by the King, with no money to pay his mutinous soldiery and with the fleets of Orange riding triumphant on the Zuyderzee and the Meuse, now besought his master to appoint a successor to him in a post in which he had sacrificed health, strength, and reputation. His request was granted; and the Grand Commander, Don Luis Requesens, was appointed to take his place. On December 18, 1573, Alva left Brussels for Spain, having persisted to the last in the truculent and pitiless policy which had marked the six bloodstained years of his rule.

The coming of Requesens was marked by repeated efforts to bring about a settlement through direct negotiations. Marnix, in his captivity, was prevailed upon to urge the Prince to make terms. Various intermediaries, Dr Leoninus, Hugo Bonticus, Champagny, and others, engaged with him in correspondence or had interviews with him on the subject. But it was all in vain. William could never be moved from the inexorable three conditions which he always laid down as the basis for any accommodation: freedom of worship and liberty to preach the Gospel according to the Word of God; the restoration and maintenance of all the ancient charters, privileges, and liberties of the land; the withdrawal of all Spaniards and other foreigners from all posts and employments, civil and military. Unless these conditions were granted, the Hollanders and Zeelanders would fight to the last man; and, as he wrote to his brother John, "If these poor people should be abandoned by all the world, yet, if they are obstinate in resisting as they have been hitherto, it will cost our enemies the half of Spain, both in money and in men, before that they have triumphed over us." Meanwhile the Stadholder identified himself yet more closely with the cause he had made his own by publicly, October 23, declaring himself a member of the Calvinist communion. There can be little doubt that this step was taken by William of Orange from motives of high policy to strengthen his authority in the Provinces, which he had just induced to give him almost sovereign powers and to vote him, what they had

refused to Philip II, a large fixed subsidy. The Prince was undoubtedly more sincerely religious than either Elizabeth of England or Henry of Navarre; but, in him as in them, the instincts of the statesman and the patriot were stronger than his convictions in favour of any particular creed. The impulse that led him in an age of bigotry and persecution to uphold consistently liberty of conscience to the individual and toleration of all forms of belief in law-abiding citizens, influenced him to profess openly the predominant creed of his followers, that he might thus be enabled the more easily to control their fanaticism. The same spirit is to be discerned in all his negotiations with foreign Powers. His one object was to obtain help; and to get this he was willing to make almost any concession or sacrifice, and to bear patiently any amount of false dealing, chicanery, and even downright rebuffs. With Elizabeth, with Charles IX, with the Emperor and the German Princes, he was in constant communication, indefatigably striving to obtain their good offices to the Netherland cause, by playing off the hopes and fears of one against another, and those of all against Philip of Spain. He was ready to acknowledge Elizabeth as sovereign of the Low Countries, and to hand over to her several towns as pledges, if she would openly give the rebels armed assistance. But Elizabeth, though at times she allowed both men and money to be sent from England, would not take any definite steps of hostility against the Spanish King or give any positive promises. The same offer was made to Charles IX. Compensation was offered to France in the southern provinces, and the sovereignty to one of the King's brothers. Here again, however, though help was given secretly, little could be achieved. Charles was nearing the end of his days; the Duke of Anjou had just been elected King of Poland; the Duke of Alençon was suing for Elizabeth's hand and intriguing with the Huguenots. If Orange's methods do not always commend themselves for straightforwardness, if he met duplicity with duplicity, and cunningness with greater cunning, it must be remembered that he was reduced at times to almost desperate straits, and that those with whom he had to deal were absolutely unscrupulous. The volumes of Gachard are full of evidence as to the continual plots that were on foot to end his life by the knife or bullet of the assassin, and prove moreover that Philip and his chief councillors deemed that such an act, if consummated would be not only excusable, but meritorious in the eyes of heaven. Requesens received repeated orders from Madrid to find some means of despatching both William and Lewis of Nassau; and, far from demurring, the Grand Commander only expressed regret "that there was small hope of success unless God should help him." The Prince on his part, fully informed through the agency of his paid spies of all that passed in Philip's inmost councils, was able to avoid all the traps laid for him; and, despite so much provocation to retaliate, there is not a shred of testimony to show that he ever

stooped to employ against his adversaries the same base and cowardly weapons which so frequently threatened his own life.

The beginning of the year 1574 saw Leyden invested by the Spaniards in great force, and Mondragon shut up in Middelburg, the last stronghold that remained to the King in Zeeland. The issue in the case of Middelburg depended upon the mastery of the sea; and its fate was determined by a bloody victory gained by the fierce Sea-Beggars under the command of Admiral Boisot near Bergen over the Spanish fleet under the very eyes of the Governor-General. Mondragon surrendered on honourable terms, after being reduced to the last extremity, on February 18; and Zeeland fell into the hands of the rebels. But this success was immediately counterbalanced by a heavy disaster. Lewis of Nassau had been busily engaged all the winter with his wonted energy in raising troops, with the intention of leading a force to the help of his brother, and of effecting a diversion for the relief of Leyden. He wrote personally to Charles IX, pleading eloquently for help, and not without effect. With a large sum of money received from the French King he hastily equipped a force of some seven thousand foot and three thousand horse—a force of mixed nationalities, partly volunteers, partly mercenaries, with no cohesion or discipline, and at once crossed the Rhine; with him were his brothers John and Henry, and Christopher, son of the Elector Palatine. After failing in an attempt to take Maestricht by surprise, he advanced along the right bank of the Meuse in the hope of being able to join William, who had set out to meet him at the head of six thousand men. But a strong body of royal troops under the command of the skilful and experienced old soldier, Sancho d'Avila, managed to fall unexpectedly upon the disorderly array of the Nassaus at Mookerheide near Nymegen, and with scarcely any loss utterly annihilated it. Count John escaped with his life; but his two brothers and Duke Christopher were never seen again. Scarcely less to be regretted than the chivalrous Lewis of Nassau, whose enthusiasm and restless energy had played so great a part in the stormy history of his times, was the gallant Henry, the youngest of the band of brothers and the third to lay down his life for the cause of liberty. The one was but thirty-six, the other twenty-four; and their loss was a grievous blow to William, who loved them both.

The invasion of Lewis, followed as it was by a mutiny of the royal troops, who, irritated by not receiving their arrears of pay, had chosen a general of their own and seized Antwerp, led to a suspension for two months of the siege of Leyden. Unfortunately the inhabitants failed to utilise this interval by laying in an adequate store of supplies. On May 26 a powerful Spanish army under Valdez again invested the town, and by means of a circle of redoubts completely shut out all hope of military relief. It was now that William conceived the desperate plan of submerging the land, and conducting a fleet across the flooded fields

to attack the Spaniards in their entrenchments. He succeeded in persuading the States of Holland to order, on June 30, that the dykes should be cut and the sluices opened, thus allowing the pent-up waters of the sea, the Rhine, the Waal, and the Meuse to swallow up with their devastating flood the fruits of the painful labour of centuries. "It is better," he said, "to ruin the land than to lose the land"—such was his convincing argument. The waters, however, spread but slowly, and hope began to sink in the hearts of the brave defenders of Leyden. At this critical moment, too, William was himself stricken down by a violent swamp fever. The report spread that he was dead; but his indomitable spirit even on his sick-bed never gave way, and he continued to write letters and dispatches and to urge on the preparations for relief. Two hundred vessels of light draught were collected under Admiral Boisot, armed and manned by Sea-Beggars of Zeeland. But contrary winds prevented the waters from rising sufficiently high to carry the ships to Leyden, through whose streets the gaunt spectre of famine was now stalking. Driven to despair, a number of the citizens gathered one day round the heroic burgomaster, van der Werff, who had been throughout the soul of the defence, and began reproaching him with their calamities. But he told the half-famished murmurers that he had taken an oath not to yield the city and would keep his word. "Here is my sword," he exclaimed, "plunge it, if you will, into my heart, and divide my flesh among you to appease your hunger; but expect no surrender as long as I am alive." From that day forth there was no more flinching. At last, on October 1, the wind changed; a furious westerly gale arose and drove the waters over the land; and Boisot's vessels, sailing through trees and farm-buildings across the intervening country, at length made their way to the Spanish lines. A succession of desperate combats placed the outermost forts in the assailants' hands. The strongest yet remained to be taken, but further fighting proved unnecessary. Seized by a panic, lest they should be overwhelmed by the rising flood, the Spaniards abandoned the rest of their defences during the night and fled. On October 3 the ships of Boisot, laden with provisions, entered Leyden in triumph. A letter was at once sent to the Stadholder and reached him at Delft in church. After the sermon was ended, the glad tidings were read out from the pulpit; and then William, still weak from his illness, hurried off to congratulate the citizens of Leyden on their marvellous defence, and yet more marvellous rescue. In honour of this great deliverance he founded the University which has since for three centuries made the name of Leyden illustrious in all branches of learning.

During the nine months that followed there was practically a cessation of hostilities. The Spanish armies were mutinous for lack of pay, Requesens with his empty exchequer being unable to satisfy their demands and hampered by opposition even from among the Belgian loyalists. "As to hatred for our nation, those who are in the

service of your Majesty do not yield in any way to the rebels," he wrote to the King. Requesens was a man neither of strong character nor of popular manners, and unable to speak the language of the country. Nor did Philip, who, after the death of his favourite, Ruy Gomez, had been seized by a distaste for affairs, do anything to make the Governor-General's task more easy. Something like a deadlock ensued. Requesens complained (April 7, 1575) that for five months he had not received a single communication from His Majesty. In these circumstances he endeavoured to find a way out of his difficulties by negotiations. Envoys were sent to the Prince of Orange to try to win him over by favourable terms. Conferences were held at Breda, but with no result. The utmost concession that Philip would make to adherents of the Reformed faith was that they should be allowed an interval of time in which to sell their property and leave the land. Neither the States of Holland nor Zeeland nor the Stadholder would listen for a moment to such conditions.

These months of comparative repose were not, however, spent by the Prince solely in futile negotiations. On June 24, 1575, he married Charlotte de Bourbon, daughter of the Duke of Montpensier, and thus a member of the royal House of France. This event casts a peculiar light on William's temperament and character. His wife, Anne of Saxony, was still alive; and Charlotte de Bourbon was a runaway and renegade nun. Having secretly embraced the Reformed faith, she fled from the Abbey of Jouarre, of which she was head, to the Puritan Court of Heidelberg, to place herself under the protection of the Elector Palatine and his wife. It was soon after this that during a passing visit to Heidelberg (1572) William had made her acquaintance. He had never seen her since, but he now asked her to be his wife, and she consented. In vain Charlotte's father angrily refused his consent; in vain the Elector of Saxony and Landgrave of Hesse stormed; in vain his own family remonstrated, and his only surviving brother wrote long letters of sorrowful reproach. Having obtained from five Protestant divines a formally attested statement that they held him "free to marry again by human and divine law," he sent Sainte Aldegonde to conduct his bride from Heidelberg to Emden, and thence to Brill. On the very day after her arrival on Dutch soil the wedding was celebrated with much ceremony and festivity at the church of Brill; and "*la nonne*," as his enemies called her, became Princess of Orange. The union proved to be one of the greatest happiness; and Charlotte was worthy, by her qualities of both head and heart, to share William's fortunes.

After the failure of the conferences at Breda, hostilities were renewed by the Spaniards with energetic determination. The royalist forces amounted to 50,000 foot and 5000 horse, and were irresistible in the field. Oudewater and Schoonhoven were captured in August; and then Requesens conceived the bold project of emulating the great achievement

of Mondragon in 1572, by marching a force through the shallow waters to seize the islands of Duiveland and Schouwen. Close to Tholen, which had remained in Spanish hands since Mondragon's adventurous conquest, lay a small deserted islet known as Philipsland, which careful soundings had revealed to be connected with Schouwen by a narrow ridge of submerged land. By following this ridge at low water it was possible to wade across the strait, four miles wide, which separated the islands. A narrower and yet more shallow piece of water divided Duiveland from Schouwen. For this enterprise Requesens selected three thousand men, consisting in equal parts of Spaniards, Walloons, and Germans, all picked troops. Half were placed under the old hero Mondragon, the other half under the equally experienced Don Osorio d'Ulloa, who was the actual leader of the forlorn hope. On September 27, in the dead of night, amidst thunder and lightning, with the water rising at times up to their necks and the Zeeland mariners harassing them with cannon and musketry fire through the darkness, and even assailing them with harpoons and boathooks, the veterans struggled on through the waters. Many were killed and wounded by the Zeelanders; a still larger number missed their footing on the narrow spit and were drowned; but at length the main body reached the opposite shore and made good their landing. The garrison, whose leader, Charles Boisot, was shot by his own men, was seized with panic and abandoned Duiveland to the invaders. These pressed on to Schouwen, which, with the exception of the capital, Zierickzee, was quickly conquered. For nine months Zierickzee, which was well fortified and provisioned, held out against Mondragon; but after a brave resistance it surrendered in July, 1576. Thus the Spaniards once more became possessed of an outlet upon the ocean, and had moreover effectually cut off all communication between Walcheren and South Holland.

Orange accordingly found himself hemmed in on every side. His sea-power alone enabled him still to hold out in a little corner of land of which Delft was the centre; but he lacked both men and money, and without help from outside saw no prospect of effectual resistance to the overwhelming forces around him. In these desperate circumstances he once more turned for aid, first to France and then to England. His own inclinations were towards France; but Henry III, who had just succeeded to the throne, was too much embarrassed at the moment by the civil commotions in his own kingdom to be able to lend assistance to others. William therefore had no choice but to fall in with the wishes of the States of Holland, and make approaches to Elizabeth. An embassy had audience of the Queen on November 14. They were authorised to offer her the sovereignty of Holland and Zeeland, on condition that she would assist them with all her power in their struggle against Spain. But Elizabeth was not fond either of rebels or of Calvinists; and, when Champagny, as special envoy from Requesens,

had arrived at her Court, she took care, as was her wont, to coquet with both parties without committing herself in any way to either. She declined the proffered sovereignty, but promised to the Dutch envoys her secret support. Elizabeth in fact looked at the matter from a purely English point of view. She wished to keep the insurrection alive, in order, first, that Philip might thus find his hands full and be prevented from taking any steps on behalf of Mary Stewart, and, secondly, that the Netherlands might not offer in despair the sovereignty of the Provinces to the King of France. From William's letters at this time it is plain that, though resolved still to fight to the last, his hopes of prolonging resistance had sunk very low. But a gleam of light came unexpectedly amidst the darkness. Requesens caught a fever and died suddenly, March, 1576. This unforeseen demise of the Governor-General for awhile threw everything into confusion in the royalist ranks; and, before a successor could take up the reins of government, a breathing space was thus allowed to the Stadholder.

His first step was to summon a meeting of the States of Holland and Zeeland at Delft to consolidate the union between the two Provinces which had been provisionally effected the previous year. They met; and on April 25, 1576 (the Prince's birthday), an Act of Federation was agreed upon and duly signed. This Act, which consisted of eighteen articles, may be regarded as the germ of the Republic of the United Provinces. By this compact supreme authority was conferred upon the Prince of Orange, as sovereign and chief (*souverein en overhoofd*). He was invested in fact, as *ad interim* ruler, with all the prerogatives belonging to the Spanish monarch as successor to the Counts of Holland. Thus this little group of republics (for each municipality was practically an independent entity) agreed to place in his hands a power, such as they had been unwilling to concede to any of their actual sovereigns. Not only in military matters was he, as commander-in-chief by land and sea, absolutely supreme; but he had in his hands the final appointment to all political and judicial posts, and to vacant city magistracies. As regards religion, William undertook to maintain the Protestant Reformed faith, and to put down all forms of worship contrary to the Gospel. This last, somewhat elastic, expression was inserted in deference to the Stadholder's disinclination to sanction any measures of persecution against the very considerable number of Catholics who were to be found even in Calvinist Holland and Zeeland. Another article gave William authority, should he deem it needful for the safety of the land, to confer the Protectorate of the Confederacy upon a foreign Prince. With his position thus strengthened in his northern fastness, Orange issued a series of appeals to the patriotism of the other Provinces. In these appeals he called upon them to join with Holland and Zeeland in expelling the Spaniards from the country and in securing for the Netherlands, under the King, the enjoyment of those local liberties and

immunities to which they were entitled by their ancient charters. In these skilfully drawn-up documents he laid particular stress on the necessity of allowing liberty of worship and of conscience to all, whether Catholics or Reformed. His arguments and pleadings met with the more favourable reception through the terror caused by the outrages of the Spanish and German troops, who were once more in a state of mutiny.

On the death of Requesens, the Council of State had perforce to take upon themselves the government of the country, pending the arrival of a new Governor-General. All of them, with the single exception of Jerome de Roda, were natives of the Low Countries; and several, among whom was the Duke of Aerschot, made no secret of being heartily sick of the presence of foreign soldiers in the country and bitterly opposed to any further interference by Spaniards in the government of the Provinces. They urged upon Philip the importance of sending a member of his family as Governor, with full powers. The King accordingly, in April, nominated his half-brother, Don John of Austria, the famous victor of Lepanto, and directed the new Governor-General to repair at once to his post. But Don John, whose ambitious brain was filled with high-flown schemes of self-aggrandisement, and who probably regarded his appointment as due to the King's desire to remove him from Italy, did not obey. Instead of going to Brussels he made his way to Madrid; and many months passed before he could be persuaded to undertake his new duties. The delay was most injurious to the royalist cause in the Low Countries, where events had meanwhile been moving rapidly.

At the end of June a last effort made by the Prince of Orange for the relief of Zierickzee, in which the gallant Admiral Boisot lost his life, had failed; and nothing was left to the commandant but to surrender on the favourable terms offered by Mondragon. This capture, however, proved to be one of those victories that are worse than a defeat. The Spanish troops in Schouwen, to whom large arrears of pay were due, finding themselves defrauded by the conditions of the capitulation from the hoped-for pillage of the town, mutinied. They entered Flanders, were joined by other bands of mutineers, and finally seized Alost, which they made their head-quarters. The excesses and outrages of which they were guilty roused against them a violent feeling of indignation throughout the country. The excitement of the populace, especially in Brussels, was intense; troops were raised to protect the city; and the Council of State, impotent and trembling for its safety, was compelled to declare the mutineers, who were the soldiers and countrymen of the King, outlaws. But the Spanish veterans were in possession of the principal fortresses in the country, and defied the Council. Orange saw his opportunity, and opened friendly communications with the States of Brabant assembled at Brussels, and with those of Flanders at Ghent, with a view to taking common measures against the common enemy.

The people were on his side; and, through his reiterated undertaking not to attempt anything subversive of the Catholic religion, he was able to win the support of the great majority of the deputies to his views and proposals. Two events greatly strengthened his position. On September 4 Baron de Héze, who was godson of William and had been appointed by the States of Brabant to the command of their troops in Brussels, seized those members of the Council of State who were suspected of "*espagnolisme*." The leaders, Mansfeld and Barlaymont, were confined in the Broodhuis. On September 26, at the wish of the States of Flanders, the Prince sent from Flushing a body of picked troops with artillery to occupy Ghent and cooperate in the siege of its citadel, which was in the hands of a body of mutineers. Meanwhile the States General had met at Brussels, and, largely through the influence of the Duke of Aerschot, between whom and Orange intimate relations had for some time subsisted, entered readily into negotiations for a union of all the Provinces on the basis of exclusion of foreigners and non-interference with religious belief. It was arranged that a Congress should be held at Ghent, at which nine delegates from the Prince of Orange and the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland should meet nine from the States General representing the other fifteen Provinces, with the object of concluding a firm union and alliance for the pacification of the country. The chief difficulty proved to be the question of the toleration of the Catholic cult in the Calvinist Provinces, and of the Protestant conventicles in those adhering to the ancient faith. The Congress met on October 19. The discussions were protracting themselves when the terrible news of the sack of Antwerp caused all minor differences to sink into nothingness in the presence of a common danger.

The famous citadel built by Alva to curb the great city of Antwerp was garrisoned in this month of October, 1576, by a body of mutinous Spanish troops under Sancho d'Avila, the victor of Mookerheide. Champagne was governor of the town; and, though he had with him a body of German mercenaries commanded by Count Oberstein, he represented to the States General that he could not answer for the security of the place in view of the threatening attitude of the Spaniards. A large reinforcement of militia, sent to his aid under the Marquis of Havré, the Duke of Aerschot's brother, arrived on November 2; and the preparations for defence were vigorously pressed on. But the garrison of the citadel on their side began to be alarmed for their safety. They lay under the ban of outlawry recently proclaimed, and an appeal was sent out to their fellow-countrymen in neighbouring fortresses for assistance. Strong detachments of mutineers from Alost and other places at once by forced marches joined their comrades at Antwerp, arriving at nightfall on November 3. The following day at noon an attack was made by the united force upon the troops of Champagne. After a brief struggle

behind their improvised defences, these were completely routed and dispersed. Champagne and Havré themselves escaped with difficulty to some ships of the Prince of Orange in the river. Oberstein was killed. The city with all its accumulated wealth lay at the mercy of the brutal conquerors, who for hours with unbridled rage and lust murdered, ravished, tortured, destroyed, and pillaged. Some seven thousand citizens miserably perished. Property of untold value was burnt or carried off as booty. Not in all the cruel and bloodstained annals of the Netherland troubles are any pages to be found more filled with horrors than those which tell the story of the "Spanish Fury" at Antwerp.

The report of what had happened reached the States General at Brussels on the very day when they were deliberating on the terms of a treaty provisionally agreed upon by the Congress at Ghent on October 28. The treaty was forthwith ratified both by the States General and by the Council of State. This treaty, known in history as the Pacification of Ghent, established a firm alliance and inviolable peace between the Provinces represented by the States General assembled at Brussels on the one part, and by the Prince of Orange and the States of Holland and Zeeland on the other. All were bound to unite their forces for the purpose of driving the Spanish soldiery and other foreigners out of the country. As soon as this should be accomplished, a new assembly of the States General of the seventeen Provinces after the likeness of that convoked by the Emperor Charles V at his abdication was to be summoned to consider the religious question. Meantime all the placards against heretics were declared abolished; the Prince of Orange was recognised as Governor with full powers and Admiral-General in Holland and Zeeland; and the confiscation of the possessions of the Houses of Nassau and Brederode was revoked.

At this very time Don John was posting through France in the disguise of a Moorish slave, to take up at last his duties in the Netherlands. On November 4 (the day of the Antwerp disaster) he wrote from Luxemburg to the Council of State to announce his arrival. Acting under the advice of the Prince of Orange, the States General declined to receive him as Governor, unless he would consent to the expulsion of all Spaniards from the country, approve the Pacification of Ghent, and swear to maintain the ancient privileges of the country and to employ none but Netherlanders in his service. Angry and disappointed at such a reception, Don John chafed during the winter of 1576 and the spring of 1577, negotiating and discussing, but never able to move the States or Orange from the position which they had taken up.

In January, 1577, the compact of Ghent, which was of the nature of a treaty between Holland and Zeeland and the other Provinces, received a popular confirmation by means of an agreement, which met with large support especially throughout the southern Provinces, and to which was given the name of the Union of Brussels. The signatories proclaimed

their determination, while maintaining the Catholic religion and the King's authority, to do all in their power to drive away the Spaniards from the Netherlands. This agreement, thus widely subscribed, strengthened enormously the influence of the Prince of Orange, who lent it his warm support. Don John saw that he must yield. Accordingly on January 17, at Huy he announced his readiness to accept the Pacification of Ghent; and on February 12, after much haggling on the one side, and firm insistence on the other, a treaty was signed, which bore the singularly inappropriate title of "the Perpetual Edict." By this Don John undertook that the foreign soldiery should depart at once by land, never to return, and that all the charters and liberties of the Provinces should be maintained; while the States agreed to receive the King's brother as Governor-General, and to uphold the Catholic faith. William thus found his authority in Holland and Zeeland confirmed in the name of the King; yet he did not see his way to recommend the northern Provinces to accept the Perpetual Edict. No one knew better than he, that neither Don John nor King Philip was in the very least sincere in the concessions they had granted, and that they only awaited a favourable moment to revoke them. At Dort he kept himself in constant touch with all parties and movements in the country, resolved that his enemies should not entrap him into sharing the fate of Egmont and Hoorn.

Don John made his state entry into Brussels on May 1, but found himself Governor only in name. "The Prince of Orange," he wrote to the King, "has bewitched the minds of all men. They love him and fear him, and wish to have him as their lord. They keep him informed of everything, and take no resolution without consulting him." On every side the impetuous and brilliant soldier found himself thwarted by the sleepless and indefatigable diplomatist. Don John, says a contemporary, "seemed like an apprentice defying his master." Irritated beyond measure, and unable either to intimidate his "silent" adversary by threats or to win him by blandishments, the fiery young Governor wrote in his indignation to Madrid: "that which the Prince loathes most in the world is your Majesty; if he could, he would drink your Majesty's blood." Brussels, full of Orange partisans, was in fact far from being a comfortable place of residence for Philip II's representative. Don John speedily found it unendurable. His impatient spirit rebelled against the shackles in which he was held; and, professing to be afraid for his personal security, he suddenly in July put himself at the head of a body of Walloon soldiery, seized Namur, and defied the States General. This suicidal act irretrievably ruined his reputation, even with the southern Catholics. For a while all was confusion. But the voice of the people demanded the presence of the Prince of Orange. All these months he had been consolidating his position in the north. Zierickzee had been retaken,

and the Zeeland islands freed from the Spanish yoke. The patriot flag floated over Breda, Utrecht, and Haarlem. The Spanish garrisons had been expelled from the citadels of Antwerp and Ghent. In Flanders and Brabant the Prince's influence was nearly as great as in Holland itself; and all men's eyes were turning to him as the saviour of the State. He was asked to come to Brussels; but not until after some dubitation, and with the express consent of the States of Holland and Zeeland, did he yield to the representations that were made to him. At length, however, on September 23, with every outward demonstration of joy, he made his triumphal entry into the capital, and once more took up his abode in the Nassau palace, from which he had been obliged to fly for his life ten years before. On this day William of Nassau, acclaimed as their leader by Catholic and Protestant, by south and north alike, undoubtedly reached the culminating point of his career. Yet the Catholic nobility, at whose head was the Duke of Aerschot, were jealous and suspicious of him; and it required all the tact and skill of the Prince not to ruffle their susceptibilities. Scarcely had he settled at Brussels, when the situation was farther complicated by the arrival at the Belgian capital (October 6), on the secret invitation of the Catholic party, of Archduke Matthias, brother of the Emperor.

Matthias, who thus came to assume the sovereignty of the Netherlands, was a foolish boy of twenty. That a member of the Imperial house of Habsburg should thus thrust himself into the troubled arena of the Low Countries was disconcerting not only to his relatives, Don John and King Philip, but even more so to the Prince of Orange. It was all-important that no split should take place which could injure the national cause; so William at once made up his mind to welcome the intruder, and to use him for his own purposes. The Orange partisans bestirred themselves (not without instigation from headquarters) to secure the nomination of their chief as Ruwaard or Governor of Brabant, and, as William was the idol of the populace, succeeded, despite the opposition of Aerschot and the Catholic nobility. By way of a counterpoise Aerschot had himself appointed Governor of Flanders by the States of that Province; but the townfolk of Ghent, led by Ryhove and Hembyze, two revolutionary demagogues, took up arms, and even went so far as to seize the persons of the Duke and other Catholic leaders, and throw them into prison. William disclaimed any share in this act of violence, but it is difficult altogether to exculpate him. He certainly did not exert himself to procure the release of the prisoners, and he remained master of the situation. He treated the Archduke with the greatest courtesy and deference, and secured on his behalf the goodwill of Queen Elizabeth, who promised her help to Matthias in men and money, provided he made the Prince his lieutenant-general, "because of his great experience in affairs."

Matthias in his turn made his solemn state entry into Brussels in

January, 1578, preceded by his lieutenant-general; and it seemed as if a real union of the entire Netherlands were now to be firmly and satisfactorily established under the nominal rule of a Habsburg Prince, but with all the reins of administration gathered together in the capable hands of William the Silent.

But, just as the sun of fortune, so long obscured, seemed at length to have begun to shine upon the Liberator's path, it was once more suddenly eclipsed. The King of Spain, at last aroused from his torpor by the urgent remonstrances of his half-brother, had been quietly preparing a vigorous counterstroke. A body of 20,000 veteran troops, Spanish and Italian, had been placed under the command of Alexander Farnese, the son of the Duchess of Parma, who had orders to conduct them to the Low Countries to the assistance of his uncle and old school-comrade, Don John. This time, Philip had found the right instrument for a difficult task; for Farnese proved himself to be the best general of his times, and at the same time a statesman and diplomatist scarcely inferior in astuteness and sagacity to the Prince of Orange himself. He joined Don John; and on January 31 the united force fell upon the federal army at Gemblours. A daring cavalry charge under the personal leadership of the Prince of Parma decided the day. The Netherlands were utterly routed, with the loss of not less than 6000 men, while on the side of the victors there were scarcely any casualties. Several towns in a short time opened their gates to Don John; and the States General in terror withdrew from Brussels to Antwerp. Once more all was conflict and confusion. The Duke of Anjou crossed the southern frontier with an army of Frenchmen and made himself master of Mons; while on the eastern side John Casimir, brother of the Elector Palatine, at the head of a force of German *reiters* in the pay of the English Queen, also forced his way into the unhappy country. The one came as the champion of the "malcontent" Catholics, the other as that of the ultra-Calvinist sectaries.

Amid so many contending parties William scarcely knew which way to turn. Matthias was already clearly played out. John Casimir and Anjou, representing contradictory interests, could scarcely be both countenanced. The antagonism between Catholic and Protestant was rapidly growing more acute, and it was essential to try and reconcile them; so Orange carried on negotiations with Germany, France, and England at the same time. Unless help came from without, nothing could be done against 30,000 royal troops; and to secure what was required he accomplished a task that might have been deemed impossible. He succeeded (August, 1578) in inducing the Duke of Anjou to accept the title of "Defender of the Liberties of the Netherlands," and to promise to bring a force of 10,000 foot and 2000 horse to act against the Spaniards if the Provinces on their part undertook to raise a like number. At the same time he managed to secure the alliance of

Elizabeth, of Henry of Navarre, and of John Casimir. This curious combination of selfish aims and rival aspirations formed a confederacy that was not likely to last; but at any rate it served the purpose of a makeshift. The defeat of Gemblours had been more than compensated by the acquisition of Amsterdam; the progress of the Spanish arms had been checked by the skilful tactics of Bossu, the General of the States; yet such is the disintegrating force of religious antipathies that nothing but the utmost personal efforts and the influence of the Prince was able to keep the national forces in line. All this time, however, Don John, though at the head of an imposing army, had been chafing for many months in compulsory inactivity, due to lack of funds. Disappointed at his ill-success, and deeply hurt by the coldness of his brother, he broke down in health, and, from his camp before Namur, sent despairing appeals to the King for money and for instructions. At last a malignant fever seized him; and, on October 1, 1578, the hero of Lepanto closed his brilliant and adventurous life at the early age of thirty-three. Philip at once appointed Alexander of Parma (Farnese) to take his place; and from that hour a new era commences which was to end in the formation of two groups of Netherland Provinces, each with a character and a history of its own.

Farnese at once began, deftly and subtly, to sow the seeds of dissension amongst the confederates; and he found the soil ready prepared to reward his labours by a speedy harvest. The seventeen Provinces which had been so laboriously bound together in defence of a common cause by the Pacification of Ghent were not homogeneous. In the Walloon Provinces of the south and south-east, the Reformed doctrines never succeeded in obtaining a firm and permanent foothold. Already, in 1576, the Walloon country had, under the stress of Alva's persecutions, practically reverted to Catholicism; but these very persecutions had inflamed the inhabitants with the same detestation of foreign tyranny with which they had filled the people of the Teutonic Provinces of the north and west. Orange, therefore, had been able to unite at Ghent all Netherlanders against the alien rule of the Spanish viceroys, so long as it was strictly provided by the "Pacification" that the Catholic religion should be maintained. Two years later, however, the schism, sure to arise sooner or later between allies so dissimilar in their views and aims, was hastened under Parma's fostering care by an outbreak of Calvinist fanaticism, which disgraced the capital of Flanders. This outbreak was in the first instance attributed to the encouragement given by William to the revolutionary leaders, Ryhove and Hembyze, who seized and imprisoned the Duke of Aerschot and other Catholic notables at Ghent. There can be no question that the Prince connived at this act of violence, only to repent bitterly what he had done. For, under the protection of John Casimir, a regular Calvinist tyranny was established at Ghent. Churches and cloisters were sacked and gutted; monks and

friars were burnt alive in the market-place; and the old Blood-Councillor Hessels and the ex-Procurator Visch were hanged without form of trial. For long the Prince struggled in vain to appease these disorders. He was denounced by Peter Dathenus and other red-hot gospellers as a Papist in disguise. The principles of religious toleration, which Orange now as always advocated, were rejected by both parties alike persistently.

Naturally, this spectre of bigoted Calvinism, dominant and aggressive in so important a centre as Ghent, alarmed the southern Catholics. A party rapidly came into existence, known as the "Malcontents." At its head were a number of Catholic nobles, Montigny, Lalaing, Capres, Héze, and others. These men were not moved by pure venality, as Protestant historians have frequently said, though no doubt the substantial rewards dangled before their eyes by the artful Farnese had some weight in influencing their decision to take the side of the King. Of the majority of them it may be asserted that they did not love their country less, but their religion more. Genuinely attached to the faith of their ancestors, they trembled at the thought of heresy rampant in the land, and preferred the risk of their political liberties being curtailed by their natural sovereign, to the prospect of seeing their dearest religious convictions flouted and outraged by the fierce Protestant sectaries. William of Orange, from his lofty standpoint of a universal liberty of worship and conscience, might still dream of reconciling the irreconcilable, but he only earned the condemnation of the zealots of both parties, who pronounced him an irreligious man, almost an atheist. Mutually repulsive forces were at work, and were not long in bringing about a cleavage.

On January 5, 1579, a defensive league was signed at Arras by the deputies of Hainault, Douay, and Artois, for the protection of the Catholic religion in those Provinces, and with the avowed purpose of effecting a reconciliation with the King on his approving the political stipulations of the Pacification of Ghent and the Union of Brussels. The treaty of Arras was of the nature of a challenge to the Protestants, and it was answered at once by the Union of Utrecht. On January 29, under the auspices and by the efforts of John of Nassau, now Governor of Gelderland, the representatives of the northern Provinces, Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and its district, Gelderland and Zutphen, at a meeting at Utrecht, bound themselves together "as if they were one Province," for the defence of their rights and liberties "with life, blood, and goods" against all foreign potentates, including the King of Spain. There was to be complete freedom of worship in each Province, and no one was to be persecuted for his religious opinions. These two compacts mark the definitive parting of the ways between the northern and the southern Netherlands.

It is important and interesting to note that, despite the claims he himself puts forward in his *Apology*, William was not the active author

of the Union of Utrecht. He was still struggling in the face of a hopeless situation for a larger confederacy on broader lines, nor was it until some months later (May 3) that he bowed to the inevitable, and appended his signature to the instrument of union which his brother had drawn up. The Malcontents on their part speedily took an equally decisive step. On May 19 their leaders concluded a treaty with the Prince of Parma, by which they submitted themselves to the authority of Philip II, and undertook to countenance in the Walloon Provinces no worship but the Catholic. All this time negotiations were being carried on in leisurely fashion at Cologne, under the mediation of the Emperor, at which the Prince was indirectly represented by his secretary Bruyninck. Interminable dispatches were exchanged; but, as the views of the principal parties in the discussion were diametrically opposed, no good result ensued. It was fully recognised at Madrid that the brain and the energy of William of Nassau constituted the real barrier to the reestablishment of the royal authority throughout the Netherlands. Through the agency of the Count of Schwarzenberg, one of the Imperial envoys at the Congress, to whom large rewards were promised if he would win over the Prince, secret negotiations were opened with him by the Duke of Terranova on the part of Philip II. It was hoped that William might be open to bribery, if only it were on a sufficiently large scale; and splendid offers were made to him on condition that he would quit the Netherlands, including the restoration of all his honours and estates and the payment of his debts. But William adhered firmly to the immutable terms which had so often on previous occasions been offered and refused. There can be little doubt that he deliberately prolonged negotiations which he knew from the first to be futile in order to gain time for his own projects. He had long come to the conclusion that the best hope of securing foreign aid for the struggling Provinces lay in the direction of France, and he wished to prepare men's minds for receiving the Duke of Anjou as their titular sovereign.

Meanwhile, after a terrible siege of four months, Maestricht, the key of the eastern frontier, had been taken by storm by the royal troops, despite the utmost endeavours of the Prince to relieve it. Its loss made a great impression on men's minds in Brabant and Flanders, and aroused a strong feeling of dissatisfaction against Orange. Ghent indeed had at last been reduced to order, and the Calvinist leaders, Hembyze and Dathenus, forced to leave the town by the personal intervention of William at no slight risk to his life. The position of affairs, as 1579 drew to a close, was moving from bad to worse; and in the spring of 1580 the hold of the patriot party even upon the north was most seriously shaken by the unexpected defection of George Lalaing, Count of Renneberg, the Stadholder of Groningen. Only in faithful Holland and Zeeland did William retain his old unchallenged authority and the full confidence of the people. The continued secession of so many

prominent Catholics unnerved the more timid and hesitating; and even the Protestants were not staunch in their support of a policy with which they did not sympathise. They could not understand the Prince's advocacy of the Catholic Duke of Anjou, and they were afraid lest a man so lukewarm in upholding the principles of the Reformation (at this time the Prince had deliberately abstained from attending any public worship for twelve months) might not after all be a Papist in disguise. From this suspicion he was once for all relieved by the promulgation of the Ban against him, dated Maestricht, March 15, 1581, by which he was denounced to the whole world by King Philip as a traitor and a miscreant and an enemy of the human race. After a recitation of the crimes of William of Nassau, a reward of 25,000 crowns in gold or land and a patent of nobility was offered to any one "who should deliver this pest to us, dead or alive, or take his life."

The instigator of this edict was Orange's old adversary, Cardinal Granvelle, who on the failure of the efforts of Terranova had not scrupled to suggest to his master the advisability of setting a price on the life of the arch-enemy. "Fear," he argued, "will unman the Prince and prevent him from quietly carrying out his plans." But King and Minister alike mistook the temper and character of their proposed victim. William was not content merely to take up the challenge. The famous *Apology* of the Prince of Orange, which was written under his direction by his chaplain, Pierre L'Oyseleur, Seigneur de Villiers, is, despite its prolixity and at times rhetorical verbiage, a most remarkable document. This defence, which was first presented to the States General at Delft on December 13, was afterwards published in French, Dutch, and Latin, and sent to every Court of Europe. In it the Apologist gives an account of his entire life and career, and not only rebuts *seriatim* the charges that had been made against him, but carries the war into the enemy's camp. With pride he dwells upon his Imperial descent, and points out that his ancestors were great lords in the Netherlands when those of Philip were still but petty Counts of Habsburg, and that in later times for a succession of generations they had performed great and memorable services to the Houses of Burgundy and of Austria. He further indulges in a scathing denunciation of the King's own misdeeds and crimes, even venturing to accuse him of the murder of his son and wife, of incest, adultery, and of an innate love of bloodshed and cruelty. He scoffs at the idea of being frightened at a price being set upon his head, as if he had not for years been surrounded by hired poisoners and assassins. He concludes by an impassioned address to the people for whom he had sacrificed his property, the lives of three brothers, and the liberty of his eldest son, and for whose sakes he had for years been holding his life in his hand day and night; and he protests that, if they think he can still serve them, then in God's name let them go forward together in defence of their wives and children and

all they hold dear and sacred. Instead of a signature, this eloquent and touching declaration of William of Nassau's absolute fidelity to the cause of the freedom of the Netherlands is signed with his motto, so appropriate to the sentiments he had expressed, "*Je le maintiendrai.*"

Many of the Prince's friends and relations, notably the excellent John of Nassau, who at this time relinquished the Stadholdership of Gelderland and returned to Dillenburg, thought the tone of the *Apology* too violent. But Orange was well aware of what he was doing; and even in his violence there lay concealed careful premeditation and reasoned motive. His aim was to stir up the minds of the Netherlanders against Spain, and at the same time to fill them with implicit trust in himself. The goal of all his striving was the severance of the ties which bound the United Provinces to the Spanish King. Already Holland and Zeeland had pressed him to become their Count instead of Philip; but William, anxious as yet to take no step which might alienate the Walloon Catholics, had refused. Now, however, that the southerners had proclaimed their reconciliation with their hereditary sovereign, he felt that circumstances had changed.

On September 19, 1580, a treaty had been signed at Plessis-les-Tours (ratified at Bordeaux on January 23, 1581) with the Duke of Anjou, by which the Duke accepted the proffered sovereignty of the United Netherlands on certain conditions, one of which was that "Holland and Zeeland should have the privilege of remaining as they were in the matter of religion and otherwise." These Provinces in fact refused to have the French Prince as their sovereign. William therefore, unwillingly and with no little demur, on July 24, 1581, agreed to assume provisionally the title of Count. He did this in order that he might be able two days later to join in the name of Holland and Zeeland at the public abjuration of their allegiance to Philip II, which he had already persuaded the States General of the other Provinces to make. On July 26, at the Hague, this momentous Act of Abjuration, by which the representatives of Brabant, Flanders, Utrecht, Gelderland, Holland, and Zeeland solemnly declared that the King of Spain was deposed from his sovereignty over them on account of his tyranny and misrule, and that they were henceforth absolved from all allegiance to him, was duly carried into effect. But Orange knew well that the newly proclaimed commonwealth could not stand alone. He exerted therefore all his influence and persuasiveness to press forward the coming of the Duke of Anjou. He was aware that the Duke was false, fickle, and depraved, but he hoped to be able to keep him under his personal control, and through him to secure at the same time the good offices of France, to whose throne Anjou was heir, and the friendship of England, whose Queen was for the moment treating him as her favoured suitor.

In January, 1582, the French Prince accordingly set sail from England for Flushing attended by a retinue of English nobles, and with Elizabeth's

recommendation to the States to receive him as "her other self." On February 19 he was solemnly inaugurated at Antwerp as Duke of Brabant. The Prince of Orange fastened around his shoulders the ducal mantle. "Monseigneur," he said, "you must button on this mantle so firmly that no one can tear it from your Highness." At this very time, Gaspar Anastro, a Biscayan merchant resident at Antwerp, whose fortunes were at a low ebb, had been tempted to save himself from ruin by plotting to win the large sum placed upon William's head. He had not the nerve to venture upon the deed of blood himself, but he opened his mind first to his bookkeeper, Antonio de Venero, and then, when Venero showed unwillingness, to another of his clerks, a youth called Juan Jaureguy, likewise a Biscayan. This man, having armed himself with a pistol, on March 18 (Anjou's birthday) presented himself before Orange as he was leaving the dinner-table, with a paper in his hand that professed to be a petition. As the Prince took it he fired off the pistol so close to his head that the hair and beard were set on fire. The ball passed under the right ear, through the palate and out by the left jaw. Utterly stunned at first, William quickly recovered himself sufficiently to cry out, "Do not kill him. I pardon him my death"; and, turning to some French nobles near him he added, "What a faithful servant his Highness loses in me!" Already, however, the assassin had perished, pierced through and through by many swords. The sufferer, whose terrible wound had fortunately been cicatrised by the blaze of the explosion, survived. He himself believed that his end was come; but by the devoted care of his doctors and attendants, after lingering for weeks between life and death, he slowly but surely began to mend, and at the end of April was convalescent. On May 2 a solemn service of thanksgiving for his recovery was held at Antwerp, at which his wife was present. But on the very next day Charlotte of Bourbon, upon whom the shock of Jaureguy's murderous attack had come while she was still weak after child-birth, was seized with a violent fever. Her last strength had been sapped by her unremitting care at her husband's bedside; she quickly succumbed to her illness, and expired on May 5.

The spirit of William of Nassau, which had so long and so often braved misfortunes, once more, however, rose superior to his personal afflictions. By his exertions Anjou was, in July, duly accepted as Lord of Friesland and Duke of Gelderland, and publicly inaugurated at Bruges as Count of Flanders. But this false and feather-brained son of Catharine de' Medici was far from being content with the narrow limits of the sovereignties conferred upon him. He hated his dependence upon the good offices of Orange, his subjection to the authority of the States General, and the restraints placed upon him by the provincial charters. He declared that he felt insulted and humiliated, and that he had no intention of becoming a second Matthias. And he listened readily to

the advice of his courtiers, who urged him to seize suddenly by force of arms the principal cities of his new dominions, and thus compel complete submission to his rule. To him the breaking of solemn oaths and the execrable treachery of leading his troops to the assault of peaceful towns, which had voluntarily placed themselves under his protection, counted as nothing. With elaborate secrecy the preparations for surprising some eight or ten places were carefully made. Antwerp, where Orange was residing, was to be the Duke's own special prey. The appointed day was January 17, 1583; and early in the morning Anjou paid a visit to the Prince. His object was to persuade him to be present at a review of the French troops at Bergenhout, just outside the gates, and so to get possession of his person. Rumours, however, were afloat, and William was suspicious and declined. Not long afterwards the town was aroused by a wild rush of armed men through the streets, crying, "The town is won! Long live the Mass! Long live the Duke of Anjou! Kill! Kill!" But the burghers, though taken by surprise, made a far more vigorous resistance to the "French Fury" than they had made to the "Spanish Fury" of 1576. Barricades were thrown up; missiles rained from the windows; and in the desperate fighting which ensued the French were utterly worsted. Nearly two thousand, among whom were two hundred and fifty nobles, perished, some fifteen hundred were taken prisoners. The *grand coup* which was to have placed absolute power in the hands of the Duke proved a ludicrous and disgraceful failure.

Henceforth the French protectorate, never loved by the people of the United Provinces, became an impossibility. And yet, despite his disillusionment and indignation, William still strove to effect a reconciliation between the States and Anjou, bringing thereby no small share of opprobrium upon himself. At first sight it appears almost inexplicable that so sagacious a statesman should have committed so great a mistake, and persisted in it. But the perusal of William's correspondence, papers and speeches during this period show him to have been fully aware of all that was to be said against the French alliance and its graceless representative, but to have been unable, after an exhaustive survey, to discover in any other combination besides this the slightest hope of salvation for the Netherlands against the power of Spain, when directed by so consummate a leader of men as Alexander Farnese. "You must make your choice between the Spaniard and the Frenchman," was his argument to the obdurate Antwerp Council. "But if you wish for the Spaniard, kill me first." However, not even his influence and powers of persuasion could prevail. Such, indeed, was the feeling excited against him by his continued advocacy of the detested French alliance that William was publicly insulted, and even in peril of his life. An event now took place which gave fresh proof of his leaning towards France, and which considerably increased his unpopularity. On April 7, 1583, he married, in fourth wedlock, Louise de Coligny, daughter of the famous Admiral

of that name, and widow of the Seigneur de Téliigny. Both the father and husband of the bride had perished in the Massacre of St Bartholomew. The new Princess of Orange was in her twenty-ninth year, beautiful, wise, full of a charm and tenderness, which were to endear her to her stepchildren and make her beloved in the country of her adoption for forty years to come. But, for the moment, it was only noted by the people of Antwerp that William had married a Frenchwoman; and this led to such renewed demonstrations of hostility against him that a further sojourn in the great commercial capital of Brabant became insupportable to him. He was deeply hurt by the want of confidence and gratitude shown to him; and, after enduring many outrages, on July 27 he quitted Antwerp and betook himself to Middelburg. Shortly afterwards he moved to Delft, where he once more made his settled residence in the midst of his loyal and sturdy Hollanders.

Meanwhile Parma had been taking full advantage of the dissensions among his enemies, and moving on from town to town had made himself master of Zutphen and the district of Waes. Had Orange been willing to accept for himself the dukedom of Brabant and the other sovereignties offered to him, and essayed to stir up a national resistance without the damaging assistance of the French, he might perhaps have longer held back the advancing Spanish tide. But he himself judged otherwise. On the ground that he would not accept any dignity unless he possessed the means to uphold it, he refused for some time to place any of the proffered coronets upon his head. But at last he made an exception. For more than a decade already he had ruled with sovereign power in Holland and Zeeland, and, as has been previously recorded, had provisionally some twelve months before accepted the title of Count from the States of those Provinces, in order to induce them to enter the French alliance. Now in changed circumstances he yielded to the urgent representations of the States, and agreed to accept from them the hereditary countship; and in December, 1583, the necessary documents were already drawn up, ready to be sealed and ratified. He did this because he was resolved to identify himself and his fortunes with those of these two "Sea Provinces," as they were called, which were rebel and Calvinist to the core, determined to perish rather than submit to the yoke of Spain. They served the Prince as an inexpugnable fortress from which to watch and control the course of events outside.

At Delft he fixed his residence, and thence mournfully watched the successive defection of the Catholic nobles and men of note drawn away by Parma's subtle fascination. Even his own brother-in-law, the Count van den Berg, who had succeeded John of Nassau as Stadholder of Gelderland, changed sides like the rest. But William still obstinately clung to the hope that the untrustworthy Anjou would belie all his antecedents by vigorous and straightforward action. Antwerp, with Marnix as its burgomaster, though it not unnaturally refused to acknowledge

the author of the "French Fury" as its sovereign, had no thought, with the memories of 1576 still fresh in the minds of its citizens, of submitting to the detested Spaniards; and, so long as Antwerp remained in William's hands, the way to the sea was barred, and Brabant was not lost. But it was a time of anxious suspense, during which the Prince, ceaselessly toiling, remained at his modest dwelling, the former cloister of St Agatha, from this time onwards known as the Prinsenhof, on the banks of the quiet, tree-fringed canal which is the chief thoroughfare of old Delft. Homely and domestic in his habits, plain in his attire, always easy of access, he lived like a Dutch burgher among his fellow-burghers. His union with Louise de Coligny had been blessed with a son (Frederick Henry); and, as if with a presage that this son of his middle age would guide the storm-tossed vessel of his country's freedom into the haven of peace, William at this time adopted as his motto the words "*Sævis tranquillus in undis.*"

Yet he was quite aware that the failure of Jaureguy's attempt on his life would not deter others from repeating it. By one means or another, poison, bullet, steel, assassins were always compassing his death. But it was not easy in Delft for suspicious strangers to find their way into the town, still less to the Prinsenhof, such was the care with which the citizens kept watch and ward over their beloved "Father William." A young Burgundian, Balthasar Gérard, in his devoted loyalty to His Most Catholic Majesty and the cause of which that monarch was the foremost champion, had long conceived a violent hatred of the man whom his training and principles had led him to look upon as an enemy alike to God and the King. The Ban was no sooner published than, fired with fanatical zeal to rid the world of the arch-heretic and rebel—"this monster and public pest," as he called him—Gérard set out for the Netherlands with the design of carrying into execution his holy purpose. Arrived at Luxemburg he there heard of Jaureguy's deed, and later of its failure. He thereupon proffered his services to Parma, and asked for money to enable him to follow in the steps of "the gentle Biscayan now defunct." But Farnese, though he promised the reward in event of success, had not sufficient faith in this insignificant, undergrown youth to advance him any cash in hand. Gérard, however, was not deterred by the coolness of his reception. Under the pseudonym of François Guyon he made his way to Delft, and by means of a carefully prepared fictitious story managed to get access to the Prince of Orange.

His enterprise, however, well-nigh miscarried, for he was ordered to accompany the Seigneur de Caron, and repeat his tale to the Duke of Anjou. As they were journeying, information came of the Duke's death; and Gérard begged eagerly that he might carry back the news to Delft. On his arrival the would-be assassin was at once conducted to the Prince's chamber, but such was the suddenness of the summons that the Burgundian found himself close to his victim's bedside totally unarmed.

After this his needy condition was brought to the ears of William, who sent him a present of twelve crowns. On the following day (July 9) Balthasar with this money bought a pair of heavy pistols (*mousquetons*). On July 10 he again gained access into the Prinsenhof on the pretext of obtaining a passport, and, while Orange was at dinner with his family, contrived to conceal himself behind the main staircase, the foot of which was opposite the door of exit from the dining-hall. When William, accompanied by his wife and followed by his sister, the Countess of Schwarzburg, and three of his daughters, came out from dinner to go upstairs, he had scarcely placed his foot on the first step, when a man suddenly appeared and, pointing a pistol at his breast, fired. Three balls passed through his body. The Prince at once fell to the ground, crying out in French, "My God, have pity on my soul; I am badly wounded. My God, have pity on my soul and on this poor people!" He was mortally struck, and within a very short time expired.

The feelings of mingled gratitude and vengeance excited by Balthasar Gérard's deed found vent in the splendid public obsequies accorded to the "Father of his Country," as William was affectionately called, and in the barbarous punishment of his murderer, who expired amidst inexpressible torments with courage and constancy. The interment of William took place in the Nieuwe Kerk at Delft at the charges of Holland, Zeeland, Utrecht and Friesland, with great pomp and amidst the tears of the assembled crowds. But the Prince had died almost penniless, and the States of Holland attested in a more practical form their deep obligations to the man, who had sacrificed all in their defence, by voting a provision for his widow and children, and by assigning to his son Maurice a position of high influence in the government of the country.

Thus tragically passed away from the midst of the scene of action its foremost figure. The Prince of Orange was but fifty-one years old; but from his earliest youth he had been in official harness and entrusted with important charges, and already appeared careworn and rapidly aging, in consequence of the ever-growing burden of a twenty years' struggle which would have crushed almost any other man. But at the time of his assassination, so his physicians said, he was thoroughly healthy and might have lived for many years. He had certainly shown no signs of decrepitude either in mind or body; and it is impossible to doubt that, had he been spared for another decade, he would have rendered almost incalculable services in organising and consolidating the infant State, which owed its existence to his courage and genius. Yet though cut off, with his task unfinished, William the Silent had really done his work. The foundations of that mighty Dutch Republic, which will ever be inseparably connected with his name, were already laid so strong and deep that on them men of his blood, successive Princes of Orange scarcely less great than he, were able to build up the edifice of a world-wide commercial and colonial empire.

CHAPTER VIII.

MARY STEWART.

THE spring of the year 1559 marks a notable turning-point in European history. On April 2 the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was signed by France and England, and on the following day by France and Spain. A great war was over. Italy had been freed from her invaders, Savoy had regained her independence, and Calais was lost to England for ever. But far more momentous changes than these were in progress. When the preliminaries of peace were under discussion at Cercamp, Mary Tudor was alive and England was united to the Church of Rome. Before the Treaty was concluded, Parliament was voting Elizabeth to be Supreme Governor of the Church in England, and substituting the Book of Common Prayer for the Mass. Elsewhere, Europe found herself in the face of new problems and a new order of things. Hitherto, as in England, the Reformation, where it was established, had arisen under the initiation or patronage of the sovereign power. Now, a religious movement of another kind, an aggressive militant Calvinism, springing from the people or from a malcontent aristocracy, and clamouring for civil as well as for religious liberty, had been coming to a head simultaneously in Scotland, France, and, in a less developed form, in the Spanish Netherlands. The revolutionary movement seemed contagious, and menaced the authority of the Crown as well as the established religion. It was the sense of this new danger insidiously creeping upon them which impelled the two Catholic Powers to seek for peace, and if possible for an alliance against the common foe—an alliance which was to be cemented by the marriage of Philip of Spain with the daughter of the King of France; and it was significant that the first article of the treaty between these Powers pledged them to bring about at once the convocation of a General Council “for the reformation and the reduction of the whole Christian Church to a true union and concord.”

We are, then, on the eve of the Counter-Reformation, when a reformed Papacy and an unlooked-for revival of ecclesiastical zeal throughout the Roman Church were to come as a formidable aid to the political forces now to be arrayed against advancing Protestantism.

The task before Catholic Europe was the suppression of the threatened revolt in France, Scotland, and the Netherlands, and the dethronement of Elizabeth as a heretic and illegitimate usurper of the English throne. This last was most imperative of all, for it was already clear, and became clearer as time went on, that the form of religion established by the Queen of England would be a powerful support and encouragement to the struggling sects elsewhere. Yet at this moment England as a European Power was impoverished, humiliated, and helpless. The Queen's title was insecure; she was without a recognised heir; her Catholic subjects were in a numerical majority; and, moreover, there was an active pretender to her throne in the person of Mary Stewart, recently (1558) married to the Dauphin of France; and Mary's claims seemed irresistible in the eyes at least of those who looked rather to hereditary descent than to parliamentary title. It was very decidedly in the interests of both France and Spain that England should become Catholic. Would, then, these two Powers set aside their former jealousies and unite in placing Mary on the throne of the United Kingdom, or would either Power give a free hand to the other to act alone? This was the problem which agitated Christendom for nearly thirty years. Round the Queen of Scots, as the representative and symbol of regenerated Catholicism, the contest of diplomatic skill and force of arms raged with remarkable vicissitudes of fortune. The end found Elizabeth the acknowledged champion of Protestant Europe, no longer weak and despised, but snatching from Spain the sovereignty of the seas, and within sight of the long-coveted union of Scotland and England under a Protestant monarch. What was accomplished by Elizabeth through good means or bad in her long conflict with Mary and her supporters has remained intact almost to our own time. The chapter, then, which deals with this important phase of the Wars of Religion rightly bears the name of Mary Stewart. To understand the shifting policy, the conflicting interests and influences which moulded her career and finally led to her destruction, it is necessary to go back to the days of her infancy.

Mary Stewart, from the moment of her birth (December 8, 1542), was destined to be a brand of discord. Henry VIII saw the fulfilment of his cherished dream of the union of England and Scotland in a marriage between the young Queen and his son Edward. He peremptorily demanded that the child should be sent into England at once, and under conditions which involved the immediate subjection of Scotland to the southern kingdom. Though these demands were rejected, the Regent, the pliable and at that time Protestant Arran, agreed by the Treaty of Greenwich (July 1, 1543), that Mary, when ten years old, should be placed in Henry's hands. But the King's overbearing and dictatorial tone so played into the hands of the dissatisfied party of Cardinal Beton and the Queen-mother that the Treaty was repudiated, and the alliance

with France formally renewed. The English party seemed almost at an end. The horror, devastation, and plunder of an English invasion followed. National independence in Scotland became identified with the French alliance and the maintenance of the Roman Church. Yet so keen was the English desire for union that, when by French help there was prospect of the tide turning in favour of the Scots, Somerset opened negotiations with Huntly (January, 1548), and proposed that in three years the child should go into England; that Protestants in Scotland should have liberty of conscience; that the very names of "England and English as well as Scotland and Scottish should be abolished, and that the two kingdoms henceforth should form one Empire, Great Britain, and the prince ruler thereof should be named the Emperor of Great Britain." But the distrust and hatred of the old enemy were too strong. Six months later d'Essé, the French commander, laid before the Scottish Parliament at Haddington his master's desire of marrying Mary to the Dauphin; and on August 13 the Queen landed in France. The victory of Mary of Lorraine and the Catholic party seemed complete.

The Protestant movement in Scotland had originated, as contemporary Catholic writers agree, in the revolt of a people, untaught and uncared for, against the idleness, cupidity, and scandalous lives of their clergy. The Church fell to pieces from its own internal decay, and Calvinism rushed into the vacuum created by the absence of all religion. The movement at a later time gathered outward strength by the accession of powerful nobles, eager to punish the delinquent clergy by appropriating their wealth. But it needed for ultimate success a single-minded and devoted leader, and a popular political motive. John Knox was to supply the first, and the ill-advised policy of Mary of Lorraine, or rather of her foreign counsellors, was eventually to give occasion for the second. The violent character of the struggle in its earlier stages appears in the assassination of Cardinal Beton by a number of gentlemen, mainly in revenge for the martyrdom of Wishart, and in the choice of the austere and perfervid Knox as preacher by the congregation of these zealots, when he was confined with them in the Castle of St Andrew's. Beton was slain on May 29, 1548. Knox was carried away captive in the French galleys in August of the following year. While Beton lived the Church was still politically strong; for under his masterly guidance it represented the extreme patriotic resistance to the domination in England. In April, 1554, Arran, now Duke of Châtellerauld, reluctantly handed over the regency to Mary of Lorraine. A true Guise, ambitious for her daughter, yet of her own nature inclined to toleration, her fatal error was the attempt to govern Scotland by Frenchmen. The inevitable reaction set in. The old hostility to England rapidly gave way to a greater detestation of France as menacing to the liberties of the nation. French rule came to be identified

with the rule of the Church. To the most strenuous part of the Scottish people national and religious freedom seemed one; and Knox, returning to Scotland for a while in 1555, organised Calvinistic Congregations, and convinced earnest and intelligent men, Erskine of Dun, Lord James Stewart, a natural son of James V, and the brilliant Maitland of Lethington, that it was their duty openly to resist idolatry. Under Knox's influence the Lords of the Congregation drew up their first bond or covenant, December 3, 1557; and the revolution became imminent. The Reformers demanded the free exercise of their religion; and the free exercise of this religion involved the suppression of the Mass as idolatry. Toleration on either side became impossible. Both sides fought for supremacy, and would be content with nothing short of it.

We now turn to the young Queen at the French Court. Her beauty, irresistible charm of manner, and intellectual gifts, made her a universal favourite. "She governs both the King and the Queen," said her uncle the Cardinal of Lorraine. While Scotland was being ruled by her mother in the interests of France, Mary herself became thoroughly French. In April, 1558, she learnt her first lesson in political duplicity. Commissioners arrived from Scotland to ratify the promises of France to support Châtelherault's claim to the Crown, failing issue of her marriage, and to preserve inviolate the liberties and constitution of Scotland. Mary spoke to the deputies, said Diane de Poitiers, "not as an inexperienced child, but as a woman of age and knowledge." On April 4 she signed certain secret papers. In the first she made over Scotland as a free gift to the King of France in the case of her dying without issue; and in another she declared that, though, before or after her marriage, she might in compliance with the Scottish Parliament sign papers in a contrary sense, the preceding documents should be taken to declare her genuine mind.

On November 17, 1558, Elizabeth succeeded Mary Tudor. The Queen of Scots at once quartered the arms of England and Ireland. The Commissioners of Henry II at Cateau-Cambrésis derisively asked to whom France was desired to restore Calais, seeing that Mary Stewart and not Elizabeth was the lawful Queen of England; and Henry urged upon the Pope the immediate excommunication and deprivation of the usurper. The peril of Elizabeth was indeed great. Her safety at the moment, strange to say, appeared to depend entirely upon the self-interested friendship of the champion of Catholicism, Philip of Spain. Such strength as she possessed at home was in her character. The Spanish ambassador hinted that she owed her crown to Philip. She replied that she owed it to her people. "She is very much wedded to her people," wrote Feria, "and thinks as they do." "She is incomparably more feared than her sister was." Philip, that he might preserve England to his Church, resolved "to do God a service," by marrying the Queen. Elizabeth refused him, and proceeded boldly with

her ecclesiastical reforms. The King bade his ambassador make it his main object to prevent a rupture between the Catholics and Protestants, "as this is best for our interests," and would deprive the French of an excuse for interference. If the Catholics were strong, he might secretly aid them and give fair words to the heretics. Meanwhile Philip engaged himself to Elizabeth de Valois, the French King's daughter; and the Venetian Chifanoja reported from London that the Protestants were trembling at the alliance of the two most powerful Princes in the world, and called for their extirpation at the coming General Council. England was the "sick man of Europe"—the phrase is Feria's, who promised to keep the sick man alive till Philip was ready to intervene. Yet, impatient with his master's policy of inaction, he repeatedly and indignantly reminded him of the "just claims of the Queen of Scots and the ease with which France could take possession of this miserable country." "For," he adds, "if the King of France gets this woman declared a heretic and bastard at Rome, how can your majesty go against God and justice and the Catholics, who will doubtless join France?" Philip could only reply that he had begged the Pope to hold his hand. Thus English Catholics did not stir, as they waited for the word from Spain. The jealousy of France made Philip afraid to interfere. The Pope was prevented from speaking, while France thought it prudent to crush out Protestantism in Scotland and establish Mary's position there, before making a descent upon England.

It was, then, upon Scotland that all eyes were now fixed. In April, 1558, the burning of the old man Milne exasperated the Protestants beyond control. The death, in November, of Mary Tudor led them once more to look to England for friendship or support. On May 2, 1559, Knox returned to his country. "I see," he wrote, "the battle shall be great, and I am come, I praise my God, even in the brunt of the battle." On the 10th a summons from the Queen-Regent to certain defiant preachers to appear at Stirling was the signal for the gathering of their friends in force. Knox's famous sermon at Perth excited "the rascal multitude" to break images and to pull down religious Houses. The Regent took up arms. The Lords of the Congregation for a time got the upper hand and occupied Edinburgh, but soon found that they were quite unable to sustain a contest with the trained troops of France. They now appealed earnestly to England for aid. Elizabeth was in great perplexity. She disliked the political opinions of Knox and had little sympathy with his creed. How could she assist such rebels against lawful authority without encouraging her own recusants to do the same? Moreover, she was ill prepared to risk war with France. Yet to remain neutral would be to enable the French to master Scotland as a province of France and thence march to the conquest of England in support of Mary's claim. On July 10, 1559, Francis II succeeded his father Henry II, and Mary wrote (so Throckmorton reported) that as she was now Queen of

France and Scotland, so she trusted to be Queen of England also. The Guises became supreme in France, and Elizabeth's danger was the greater. Kirkcaldy of Grange was justified in his warning to Cecil: "If ye suffer us to be overthrown, ye shall prepare the way for your own destruction."

Cecil understood this well. Elizabeth at length resolved to help the insurgents secretly with money, and to mass troops on the border, but if possible to avoid a rupture with France. No one was more keen for the English alliance, and the aid of English troops, than Knox. He implored the English to send from Berwick a thousand men to serve for wages, and so break no league with France; or "if that excuse avail not, you may declare them rebels when once they are in our company." He and his friends wished to make their grievance one of religion only. The Queen would not hear of religion. She would move only to defend the Scots from foreign tyranny and herself from invasion. To the remonstrances of Noailles, the French ambassador, she replied that it was the custom of her country to arm when her neighbours armed. The Queen of Scots had assumed her title and was aiming at her throne; and it was patent to all the world that the French preparations were directed against England through Scotland. In January, 1560, Elizabeth sent Winter with a fleet to the Firth with orders to pick a quarrel with the French, and so prevent their bringing reinforcements, but to do so on his own responsibility. With the extraordinary good luck which attended her at critical moments, the French fleet, while on its way to Scotland, was driven back or destroyed by storms. In February she entered into a formal league with the Congregation, nominally in defence of the national liberties against French encroachments. Statesmen on the Continent were aghast at her audacity. They believed she was rushing to her ruin. "You will be torn in pieces," said Feria to Challoner, "and other princes will fall out about your garments." It now became an urgent question whether Philip should not anticipate the French by first occupying England himself. "If," wrote the Duchess of Parma to Philip, "the French establish themselves in Scotland, England is theirs; with England they will have the Low Countries. How then will it fare with Spain and the Indies?" "Spain," said Cardinal Granvella, "must defend London as it would Brussels." In the same strain Quadra, the new ambassador in London, wrote to Feria: "Either this country will fall to the French or we shall have to take up arms in the most ignominious and shameful cause which Christian prince ever sustained." Meanwhile both English and French appealed to Philip. The King in his embarrassment sent de Glasion to England to insist on the Queen keeping the peace. He arrived in England on April 5, but too late. A few days previously Elizabeth had taken the decisive step of sending Lord Grey across the Border with an army to cooperate with the forces of the Congregation. The Tumult of Amboise (March 15) and the beginning of serious troubles with the Huguenots, following upon the disaster to

her fleet, had crippled France; and thus Elizabeth had been emboldened to take stronger measures. In two months' time the French were driven, not by English or Scottish prowess, but by their own misfortunes, to send deputies into Scotland with full powers to negotiate terms of peace, the King and Queen giving their royal words to ratify all that should be settled by them. The Treaty of Edinburgh was signed by the commissioners, July 6, shortly after the death of Mary of Lorraine (June 11). It was agreed that Mary, "seeing the Kingdoms of England and Ireland do belong by right to Elizabeth," should in all times coming abstain from the use of her title and arms. The foreign troops were to go, and the Scottish Parliament was to be held on August 1, to settle the affairs of religion; but the King and Queen were meanwhile to be advertised of this concession, and their adherence obtained.

The Parliament was duly held, though no authorisation came from Francis and Mary. The Calvinistic Confession of Faith was adopted, the papal jurisdiction abolished, and the saying or hearing of Mass prohibited, under the penalty of death for the third offence. The religious revolution was effected with scarcely a show of opposition from the prelates of the old Church.

Francis and Mary, humiliated by the unexpected turn of affairs in Scotland, refused to ratify the Treaty. The French troops had been withdrawn, and peace was reestablished. The refusal to ratify could therefore only mean that Mary maintained her pretensions to the English Crown, and so it was understood. On December 5 Francis died and was succeeded by his brother Charles. Mary was no longer Queen Regnant of France; Catharine de' Medici gained the upper hand; and the Guises lost their ascendancy. Disliked and suspected by Catharine, Mary for the moment had no home, no powerful party, no policy. The new Pope Pius IV sent her the golden rose, addressing her pathetically as "a rose among thorns." Overtures were now made for her return to her kingdom; and she placed herself, not perhaps without some misgivings, in the hands of her half-brother, the Lord James. Ambitious of power and wealth, but devoted to his creed and to the English alliance, Lord James Stewart was a statesman, shrewd, powerful, and yet moderate; and he might be expected to support his sister in everything except a conflict with England, or an attempt to overthrow the recent religious settlement in Scotland. Meanwhile Mary, to the increasing annoyance of Elizabeth, resolutely evaded every attempt to induce her to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh.

Mary landed in Scotland, August 19, 1561. Her eyes were from the first fixed upon the English Succession, and her policy at home and abroad now seemed entirely subservient to that end. As matters stood, the parliamentary sanction given to the will of Henry VIII—the very settlement under which Elizabeth now reigned—excluded or passed over Mary's line in the succession. Her first step therefore must be to obtain

from the English Parliament an acknowledgment of her natural right to succeed Elizabeth, failing heirs of her body. Mary had above all to conciliate the rival Queen. To make good her ground in her own kingdom, she must allay the suspicions of her Protestant subjects, gain their confidence, and let religious questions for the present lie dormant. For this purpose she could not have chosen a better Secretary of State than Maitland, "the Scottish Cecil," who, like her brother Lord James, was bent upon maintaining friendship with England, strongly supported her claim for recognition as next heir to the throne, and, though tolerant of the Queen's religious practices, was yet in the confidence of the leaders of the Kirk. On the other hand, knowing well that in the pursuit of her object, and especially in the event of open conflict, she would, apart from the aid of the Papacy and Catholic Princes, have mainly to rely on the strong latent body of Catholics in England, Mary found it politic to profess secretly to her foreign friends an ardent zeal for the Catholic cause, and to let them believe her ready to sacrifice her life in the attempt to restore the Church in her own or both kingdoms. Such protestations must not be taken too seriously. Mary had no idea of risking her position in Scotland by any premature display of zeal. Rather, it seems to have been her hope that she would gather round her in time a party strong enough to effect a change of religion by constitutional means. The Pope himself had reminded her of the example of Mary Tudor. Might not the Queen of Scots in her turn make a Spanish match?

Within a few days after her arrival in Scotland the Queen issued a proclamation, forbidding under pain of death any attempt at an alteration of the existing arrangement regarding religion, until a final settlement should be made with the consent of her Estates. She however deferred calling a Parliament, evaded the petitions of the General Assembly, and left the Acts of 1560 unconfirmed. She refused to hand over to the ministers the incomes of the old clergy or the Church property which had fallen to laymen, but claimed for the Crown one-third of these revenues; and this third was to be equally divided between herself and the Protestant clergy. She thus kept in her own hands the means of effecting another change should the opportunity occur. Attempts to revive Catholic worship were promptly checked; and the papal envoy, de Gouda, then secretly in the country, reported that the Bishop of Dunkeld had been impeached before the Queen for making preparations to administer the sacrament at Easter, 1562, and had been compelled to desist by the Queen's command. At another time, forty-eight priests, including the Primate of Scotland, were by her authority thrown into prison for venturing to say mass in secret. Yet Mary would not for a moment tolerate an invasion of her own privileges, nor suffer her priests to be wantonly insulted. The ministers in vain petitioned for the abolition of mass in the royal chapel; and, when

the Town Council of Edinburgh issued a decree in terms insulting to priests and nuns, Mary instantly deprived them of their offices and confined them in the Tolbooth.

Meanwhile, the Queen both amused her Court with the fashions and gaiety of France and attended seriously with her brother to affairs of State. She made progress through her dominions, put down the disorders of the border counties, kept a firm hand upon unquiet nobles, punished and got rid of the troublesome Bothwell, and, what is more surprising, marched with her Council to the north, and there humbled the powerful Earl of Huntly, who had aided his son Lord George Gordon in some resistance to the Queen's authority. Mary, who never seemed in higher spirits, delighted in the campaign and left the leader of the Scottish Catholics dead on the field of Corrichie. But it was this same Huntly, who, by his desertion of the Royalists for the side of the Congregation at a critical moment in the struggle of 1559, had in the mind of Mary of Lorraine turned the scale against the Catholic cause. Thus by one act Mary gratified and enriched her brother, now created Earl of Moray, displayed her impartiality by punishing a professed Catholic, and revenged herself on a traitor. At the end of three years, the English ambassador could report, "the Queen is strictly obeyed, perfectly served, and honoured by all"; and this after the imprudent conduct which lured Chastelard to the rash acts that cost him his life. She had indeed so managed that already her chief counsellors, Moray and Maitland, had drifted away from Knox and the extreme Protestant party. The Reformer himself, who found in her "a proud mind, a crafty wit and indurated heart," was the one rock which she in vain tried to move.

One of the grave political questions of Europe at this time was Mary's marriage. Was France to let the all-powerful Philip obtain control of her old ally, Scotland? Was Spain to submit without a struggle to the restoration of that connexion with France which had just been so happily dissolved; and what match could be agreeable to Mary which was not dangerous to England? The first thought of Mary's uncles, and her own constant wish, had been an alliance with Don Carlos. This scheme was so ably resisted by the intrigues of Catharine de' Medici that it fell through before Mary left France. Mary herself seemed to remain passive. She wished first to win the coveted recognition of her right to the English Succession. She declared that she would only marry according to the Queen of England's good will, or she would even say pleasantly that she wished that one of them were a man, to make an end to all disputes, or that she would have no husband but Elizabeth. The Cardinal of Lorraine was soon busily negotiating with the imperial Court to match his niece with the Archduke Charles. With this project Mary was not well pleased; and she made it clear that the Archduke was not powerful enough to assist her in her schemes. For this reason, among others, she would not think of any Protestant Prince. Catharine

now manœuvred to obtain her hand for Charles IX, if she would but wait a year or two; and this project naturally alarmed Spain. The Don Carlos match was revived. Philip's ministers and ambassadors urged the magnificence of such a union, which would add to the Spanish Crown the British Islands, secure the friendship of the Guises and the tranquillity of the Netherlands, and in short "lead straight to universal monarchy." Elizabeth meanwhile let Mary know that any union with the House of Habsburg would be taken as a direct act of hostility; and Knox from the pulpit menaced with the Divine vengeance any such infidel marriage. Philip finally (in August, 1564), to the intense disappointment of Mary, abandoned the scheme on the nominal plea of Don Carlos' health, having probably discovered that his uncontrollable and lunatic son was an impossible instrument of diplomacy, and would not serve the end he had in view.

But there was still another candidate in the field. The Countess of Lennox had intended that her son, Lord Darnley, whose claim to the English Succession was next to that of Mary, and who had the advantage of being a naturalised Englishman, should marry the Queen of Scots. The English Catholics, staunch friends of the Lennox line, had not by any means unanimously regarded Mary's claims with favour so long as she was connected with France. They were too much subjected to Spanish influence. They had rather favoured the pretensions of young Darnley; and, if Mary was not to marry the Prince of Spain, what marriage could be more acceptable to the party than one with Darnley? It would excite no continental jealousies, introduce no foreigner into the government, and would be the best guarantee for the restoration of Catholicism and the Union of the Crowns. Elizabeth, who had set one suitor against another, while fearing all, had lastly proposed her own favourite Leicester. Mary would not have disregarded even this match, had it been attended with the recognition of her right of succession, but this she could never obtain. To accede to such a request would on the part of Elizabeth have been to cut the ground from under her own feet. It would, as the Spanish ambassador saw, manifestly have resulted in a rising of the English Catholics and the reintroduction of their religion by force.

Darnley met Mary at Wemyss (February, 1565). She was already favourably disposed towards him on political grounds, but she seems to have been smitten with love at the sight of the beardless youth whose handsome figure and elegant accomplishments concealed the vacuity of his mind and the viciousness of his character. Castelnau, the French envoy, who was witness of the love-making, declares her infatuation to have been so great that it was set down to magic. But the political motive was uppermost. Thwarted on every side, Queen Mary at length determined to make her own choice. By her bold and independent move Elizabeth was outwitted. The "long lad" (as she said to the French

ambassador) was but a pawn in the game, but a pawn which threatened her with checkmate. She became seriously alarmed. A recent enquiry had shown that there were not Protestant gentry enough in England to supply the vacancies in the office of justice of the peace. The Privy Council (May 1 and June 4) denounced the proposed match as injurious to the interests of the country. In Scotland Mary had obtained the consent of a convention of her nobles. But Moray, although he had been ostensibly able to approve the Spanish match, now foresaw the Queen's emancipation from the control of the Protestant lords and the loss of his own influence. He drew once more towards Knox and the irreconcilable clerical party, entered into a bond with Argyll and Châtelhérault for the defence of religion, and in July was making preparation for revolt. The General Assembly had already (June 25) assumed a more actively hostile attitude towards Catholics, and demanded the compulsory attendance of all at Protestant worship. Elizabeth, who had offered to tolerate Mary's marriage with Darnley, if she would conform to the religion of the country, now encouraged the malcontents with money and promises of military aid.

On July 29 Mary publicly celebrated her marriage. Her opportunity had come. The first overt act of aggression had been on the side of her opponents. She was confronted with insurrection within her kingdom and with invasion from England. She acted with vigour, issued proclamations declaring her innocence of making any alteration in religion, solicited aid from the Pope and King of Spain, obtained money from the latter, and again assured the Pope that she and her husband would defend the Catholic faith to the utmost of their power. She recalled Bothwell, whom she made Lieutenant-general of the Southern Marches, restored George Gordon to his father's dignities, and took the Catholic Atholl to her counsels. She marched armed at the head of the troops to meet the insurgents with such alacrity that Moray and his friends, without risking a conflict, fled early in October into England, leaving her mistress of the situation. Elizabeth, seeing the weakness of the insurgents, dared not openly intervene. Castelnau let her know that, if she crossed the border, France would be bound to come to Mary's aid. The King of Spain was for the first time making a decided move in her favour. When Moray therefore appeared before Elizabeth in London, she, in the presence of the French ambassador, reprimanded him for his rebellion and disavowed all sympathy with his action.

Mary was now bent on the ruin of her opponents. In answer to Castelnau's appeal for leniency she declared she would rather lose her Crown than forgo her revenge on Moray. A Parliament was summoned for March 12, 1566, when she was resolved that the rebels should be forfeited; and then, as she admitted to Archbishop Beton, she hoped "to have done some good anent restoring the old religion." Her triumph certainly seemed within her grasp. It was now nearly six years since the

revolution which had set up Protestantism in Scotland. Very different indeed was the position of Catholicism from what it then had been. The Council of Trent had been brought to a close at the end of 1563; and one immediate outcome of the new sense of unity and moral strength imparted to the Papacy was a desire on the part of Pius IV, the Cardinal of Lorraine, the Emperor, and Philip of Spain to form a league of the Catholic Powers for the suppressing of Protestantism everywhere. If conflicting temporal interests prevented this league from taking definite shape, the idea and the wish were there. France too had recovered from her first Civil War, in which the Catholics had shown their superior strength; and Catharine was once more in friendly relations with the Guises. In 1564 she had contrived the conference at Bayonne with her daughter, the Queen of Spain, the Duke of Alva, and the representatives of the Pope; and it was well-nigh universally, though erroneously, believed that the contemplated league had then been actually signed and that Mary had secretly joined it. The situation was such as unduly to raise the hopes of the one side and to inspire the other with the deepest suspicion and animosity.

But the marriage which had promised to be the beginning of Mary's triumph was destined to be one of the main causes of her ruin. Before many months had passed, Darnley neglected his wife and disgusted her with his low vices. His vanity prompted him to covet the Matrimonial Crown, an increase to his power and right which Mary prudently refused. This refusal Darnley attributed to David Riccio, the Queen's private secretary. This man, a Piedmontese and a zealous Catholic, had occupied a humble position in her household and assisted in her choir. The unusual confidence and familiarity with which the Queen treated him, his arrogance and assumption of authority, made him an object of jealousy and suspicion to the nobles. The Protestant party especially regarded him as the promoter of Catholic intrigues and the chief obstacle to the progress of reform. He was even believed to be in the pay of the Pope and the secret correspondent of Philip II. Of any such correspondence or intrigue there is however no evidence. His name even seems to have been unknown to Philip. That he influenced Mary's policy is most probable; and Darnley was moreover induced to believe or to assert that "that villain David" had dishonoured his bed. He became the leader of a plot to put the favourite to death. A bond was entered into, signed by the King, Ruthven, and Morton, to slay Riccio as an enemy of the State; and in another bond the fugitive lords, Moray, Argyll, Glencairn and others in England, undertook to stand by Darnley, to procure him the crown-matrimonial, and to maintain the Protestant religion; while in return they were to receive pardon and restoration to their honours. On the evening of Saturday, March 9, 1566, three days before the appointed Parliament, the assassins, accompanied by Darnley himself, dragged their victim from the side of the Queen, to

whom he clung, and despatched him with some fifty blows, leaving the King's dagger in his body. Huntly and Bothwell with a few other friends of Mary made their escape, while she found herself a prisoner in the hands of the conspirators. Quickly recovering from her first movement of terror, she skilfully detached the weak Darnley from the rest, temporised with her captors, welcomed Moray, who now suddenly reappeared, and exclaimed: "Ah, my brother, if you had been here you never would have suffered me to be thus cruelly handled." She then slipped away, galloped with Darnley to Dunbar, summoned her lieges, and once more compelled her enemies to fly across the border.

The murder of Riccio, "an action worthy of all praise" in the mind of Knox, was, however, the deathblow to Mary's schemes. "All the wise ordinances" (wrote de Silva, now Spanish ambassador in London) "made by the good Queen with regard to religion have been upset, and it will be difficult to establish them again." The Bishop of Dunblane was on his way to Rome, conveying to Pius V the obedience and submission of the King and Queen and their earnest request for aid, when the news of the disaster reached him. He could only pray the Pope to excuse the Queen from attempting any alteration at present. The enthusiastic Pope praised in conclave this "woman with a man's heart," granted her 20,000 crowns, and commissioned Laureo, Bishop of Mondovi, to go into Scotland as his Nuncio, declaring that if possible he would go himself in person and gladly spend his blood and life in her service.

Mary now reverted to a policy of conciliation. Moray returned to her councils together with Atholl, Huntly, and Bothwell; and she even tried to win the good-will of the ministers by making better provision for their maintenance. Once more matters went smoothly for a while. On Wednesday, June 19, the Queen gave birth to her son James. Her position in England was thus greatly strengthened. She renewed her protestations of loyalty to Rome, and promised to bring up the child as a Catholic, while she invited Elizabeth to be his godmother, and opened negotiations with her for the recognition of her own rights and those of her son. Elizabeth with difficulty avoided a serious quarrel with both Houses of Parliament by her refusal to discuss either the matter of the succession or her own marriage. Instinctively, she saw that her security lay in remaining as she was, yet free to use any proposal of marriage as a convenient political instrument. Her best advisers, moreover, recognised that to name Mary as her successor would be to seal her own doom.

Never was the Queen of Scots to outward appearance held in higher respect than in the autumn of this year. Du Croc, the French ambassador, wrote: "I never saw the Queen so much beloved, esteemed and honoured, nor so great harmony amongst her subjects." Week after week de Silva reported to his master that all was well in Scotland. There was but one cloud in the horizon. The strained relations between Mary and her husband were notorious. She had been at first deceived

by him as to his share in the Riccio outrage. His confederates, who were one by one being brought back to favour by the entreaties of Moray and the counsel of the French envoys, enraged at their previous desertion and betrayal by Darnley, laid before the Queen proofs of his treachery and baseness which produced in her the bitterest resentment. Her trouble was the main cause of an illness which brought her to death's door at Jedburgh. Maitland wrote to the Archbishop of Glasgow, October 14. "It is a heart-break for her to think that he could be her husband, and how to be free of him she sees no outlet." She cried in her grief, "I could wish to be dead" (so Du Croc reported); and de Silva, much distressed, wrote to Rome in the hope that the Pope might effect a reconciliation. Meanwhile Mary had been much thrown with Bothwell, who won her admiration by all those qualities which stood in boldest contrast with those of her effeminate husband. He was an able and courageous soldier, a man of barbaric loyalty, faithful almost alone to Mary's mother, a persistent enemy of England, and now the Queen's staunchest adherent. Although he was an evil liver and an unbending Protestant, de Silva could write of him, when Bothwell was thought to have died of his wounds at Hermitage, "The Queen has lost a man whom she could trust, and of such she has but few." He was now through Mary's own acts her most powerful subject, and his ambition was boundless. Early in December took place the eventful Conference at Craigmillar, between Moray, Maitland, Bothwell, Huntly, and Argyll. Maitland proposed to Mary that she should obtain a divorce from her husband. She refused on the ground that the dissolution of her marriage would bastardise her son. Bothwell argued the point, and Maitland begged her to leave the question of how to get rid of Darnley in the hands of her nobles. "Moray," he said, "would look through his fingers." Finally "she willed them to do nothing by which any spot might be laid on her honour or conscience." The inevitable bond was now drawn up.

After the baptism of James at Stirling (December 17) Darnley, who felt himself slighted and had declined to be present, retired to his father at Glasgow, where he fell ill with small-pox. Rumours reached Mary that he and his father had been plotting mischief; and on January 20, 1567, she wrote to the Archbishop of Glasgow complaining bitterly of her husband and his inquisitorial spying upon her movements. On that day, or the next, however, she visited the sick man at Glasgow with the intention of bringing him back to Craigmillar. It was safer for her that he should be under her own eye. But at this point every word spoken and every movement of the chief personages in the history are the subject of controversy. We know at least that Darnley pleaded for forgiveness, and desired to live with his wife again. Since he disliked Craigmillar as a residence, and there would be danger of infection to the infant Prince at Holyrood, Mary brought him to Kirk o' field by the

walls of Edinburgh. Here she visited him daily and slept in a room beneath his own. On the evening of February 9 she left him suddenly to attend a wedding of a servant at Holyrood. About two o'clock in the night an explosion took place at Kirk o' field, and Darnley's dead body was found, untouched, however, by gunpowder, in the garden at some yards' distance from the house.

There could be no doubt whose deed it was. Placards on the city walls, and voices in the night, proclaimed Bothwell and his friends as the murderers. The question in everybody's mouth was, had the Queen any part in the crime? Suspicions which naturally arose were confirmed by her strange conduct. She acted as if her main endeavour was to evade enquiry and shield the culprit. She seemed to have lost all energy and discretion. Her best friends were amazed at her indifference and inaction. Archbishop Beton wrote to her plainly what was said of her complicity, and implored her to see that justice was done; otherwise it were better that she lost life and all. Morette, the ambassador of Savoy, who had just come from Edinburgh, could not conceal from de Silva his suspicions that the Queen had known of and consented to the plot. The Catholics in England were divided, and all were disheartened.

Meanwhile the reputed murderer, who with Huntly had charge of the infant Prince, acted as Mary's chief counsellor, kept up a close intimacy with her, received from her fresh grants of place and power and costly presents. The Queen evaded the demands of Lennox that the accused should be arrested, and finally appointed April 12 for the trial of Bothwell, at which not the Crown but Lennox was to be the prosecutor. In default of prosecutor and witnesses, Bothwell was acquitted; for he had filled the city with his troops, and Lennox had not dared to appear. In the Parliament which followed, Bothwell was further honoured; and on the day on which it closed (April 19) he entertained the chief nobles at supper, and there induced them to sign a bond affirming his innocence and recommending him to marry the Queen. Four days later at Stirling Mary saw her son's face for the last time; on the next day she was waylaid on her road to Edinburgh by Bothwell, and carried with Maitland to Dunbar. News of the intended capture had leaked out before it took place. De Silva reported to Philip that "it was believed the whole thing had been arranged." Murmurs had been already heard against the contemplated marriage with a man whose wife was living. Mary could not possibly hope to gain the consent of Spain, of France, or of the Pope to a match with a heretic and profligate—a match which would wreck all the hopes of the Counter-Reformation; nor could Bothwell, the most bitter enemy of England, be acceptable to Elizabeth. For Mary's own security the show of violence and the hurry seemed necessary. While she was at Dunbar on April 26 the new Commissary Court commenced proceedings for the divorce at the instance of Lady Jane Gordon, Bothwell's wife, on

the ground of his admitted adulteries; and on the 27th a suit was instituted before the restored Court of Archbishop Hamilton for the annulment of the same marriage on the ground of consanguinity, an impediment for which the Archbishop had himself, as apostolic legate, given the requisite dispensation ten months before. Mary entered Edinburgh with Bothwell on May 3. The Protestant minister, John Craig, publicly protested against the banns which he was compelled to proclaim; and Mary's confessor warned her that the marriage could not and ought not to be. On the 12th she solemnly declared before the Court of Session her freedom from restraint, and early in the morning of the 15th she was married according to the Protestant rite by the once Catholic Bishop of Orkney. Eight days later she renewed her proclamation of 1561 against any alteration in the religion then standing, and annulled any privilege or license ever granted to the contrary.

Catholic Europe was in despair at the depths to which their favourite had fallen. The Bishop of Dunblane in vain pleaded at the Court of France that the marriage was brought about by destiny rather than by free choice. His excuses were contemptuously rejected. The Venetian ambassador, Correr, felt that the Catholic religion had now no hope of ever again raising its head in Scotland. De Silva was alienated and distrustful. The Bishop of Mondovi had returned to Italy, recalled by the Pope. His mission had been a failure. He had never been allowed to set foot in Scotland. From Paris he had proposed to the Queen, as a test of her sincerity and as a sovereign remedy for her evils, that she should cut off the heads of six of her chief councillors, including Moray and Lethington. Mary had resolutely refused to do anything of the kind; yet the Nuncio still entertained some hope that another papal mission might be more successful. On receipt of the news of the Bothwell marriage this shadow of a hope vanished. "With this last act, so dishonourable to God and herself," he wrote to the Cardinal Secretary of State, "the propriety of sending any sort of envoy ceases. One cannot as a rule expect much from those who are subject to their pleasures." Mary's best apologists could only attribute her blind passion to love potions administered by Bothwell.

In Scotland the revulsion of feeling was almost universal. A sense of shame at the national disgrace and degradation of their sovereign, fear and hatred of Bothwell, a dread of the consequences of their own acts or the opportunity arising from the moment of Mary's greatest weakness, united all parties in a call to arms and to a revolution of which the projectors did not foresee the end. To punish the murderer of the King, to free the Queen from the thralldom of a disgraceful marriage, to protect the young Prince whose life seemed in jeopardy—these were among the avowed objects of the confederates. The Hamiltons, the next claimants to the throne after James, suspicious of the Lennoxes and of the ambition of Moray, almost alone gave a

self-interested adherence to the Queen. Bothwell fled from Borthwick Castle, in which he had taken refuge, and was quickly followed by Mary in man's clothes. On June 15 they were side by side at Carberry Hill with their troops. Du Croc, an eye-witness, describes her eagerness to fight, her fear of risking Bothwell in the duel proposed in lieu of battle, her acceptance of the condition that he should be allowed to escape, and her trusting herself to the hands of the confederate army by which she was led captive to Edinburgh, and thence, on the ground of her refusal to abandon Bothwell, to her prison at Lochleven.

The next step of the confederates was a difficult one. If she had consented to a divorce from Bothwell, many would have been willing to restore the government to her. But she acted as if passionately attached to her husband; and severer counsels prevailed. Knox, who had retired from the country since the Riccio murder, now reappeared on the scene. In a General Assembly held on June 25 the voice of the Church was heard with effect. The Queen was herself now denounced from the pulpit as a murderess; and the populace clamoured for her trial and punishment. On July 16 she was roughly compelled—the alternative being certain death—to sign a deed of abdication and to nominate Moray, then absent in France, as Regent. On the 29th the young James was crowned King by the Bishop of Orkney, Knox preaching the sermon. The revolution was complete. It was an act of defiance to the Catholic sovereigns and to the Queen of England. The Protestant party was acting for the first time with stern independence. Elizabeth's efforts on behalf of Mary were unavailing; and it was clearly intimated to Throckmorton, the English ambassador, that any act of intervention on her part would be the signal for Mary's execution.

Now, if ever, it would seem, was the opportunity for the Catholic Powers to come to Mary's aid. But so low had she fallen in the estimation of her foreign friends that all looked coldly on her misfortunes. Moreover, France was entering upon another civil war, and her hands were full. Charles IX, at least, thought more of securing the Scottish alliance than of saving the Queen. His envoys were instructed to bear in mind that the desired alliance was not with this or that Prince, but with the established government. The main object was, as always, to detach Scotland from England. Spain, too, was busy with the outbreak in the Netherlands. Alva's army of 10,000 veterans was marching from Italy to crush the revolt. But twelve months later, when appealed to for help, Philip replied that he was not sufficiently informed and could give his ambassador no instructions but to work for the good of religion; while, worst of all, Pius V, Mary's staunchest friend, believed himself duped, and would have nothing to do with her (July, 1567); and his Secretary of State, even so late as August, 1568, explained to the Nuncio of Madrid that "his Holiness is not well resolved in his mind which of the two Queens is the better." In strange contrast with this virtual

abandonment of Mary's cause by her natural allies was the attitude of Elizabeth. For once she felt genuine sympathy with her rival. She protested against the unwarrantable infringement of the rights of sovereigns, refused to acknowledge James, and made rash and impolitic offers to Mary of friendship and of help if need should be.

The need came, and the help was claimed, in an unexpected manner. On May 2, 1568, after ten months of confinement in Lochleven, Mary effected her escape. She revoked her abdication, and asked her lawyers how she could obtain her restoration. They replied, by Parliament or by battle. "By battle let it be," she answered. Joined by the Hamiltons and others she met Moray at Langside, fled defeated from the battlefield, and on the 16th crossed the Solway into England.

Yet the Queen came not as a suppliant craving refuge, but buvant, defiant, burning to renew the struggle and "to chastise her false accusers." She expected to be sent back by Elizabeth's troops in triumph to her throne. She demanded to be admitted to the Queen's presence. Sir Francis Knollys, who was sent to visit her at Carlisle, was fascinated by her eloquent tongue, discreet head, and the "stout courage which made pain and peril pleasant for victory's sake." "What is to be done with such a lady and such a Princess?" he asked. Elizabeth's embarrassment was great. Her first impulse was to receive Mary with the honour due to a sovereign; but Cecil and the Protestant party in her council were more far-seeing. Was Elizabeth to break with her former friends and by force of arms restore to Protestant Scotland a Catholic Queen who would use her first opportunity to snatch at the English Crown, her pretensions to which she had never abated? Or was Mary as an alternative to be permitted to cross over to France and there renew the situation of 1559, and with the aid of the Guises become a perpetual menace to England? While Mary had been shut up in Lochleven, Alva was threatening that, after crushing the Netherlands, he would cross over to France with his victorious army and there complete the annihilation of the Huguenots. England's turn would surely come next; and what hope would there be for England and the Reformation if Mary's hands were not kept tied, and the alliance with the Scottish Protestants were not maintained? Yet to detain Mary in England without some plausible ground might be as perilous as to set her free. Elizabeth's first object was to gain time, and meanwhile to keep Mary out of mischief. She found it therefore inconsistent with her honour to receive the Scottish Queen until she had proved herself innocent of her husband's murder; and step by step Mary was inveigled into submitting to some sort of conference or indirect adjudication upon her cause, in the course of which Elizabeth was to call upon Moray to justify his rebellion. Moray, on his part, was led to believe that the result of the enquiry would certainly be to confirm his sister's deposition; while Mary herself

was told that in any case she would be restored upon reasonable conditions and without dishonour.

The famous Conference was to be held at York. Norfolk, known to be a friend of Mary, was, with the Earl of Sussex, the Chief Commissioner, on Elizabeth's side. Lesley, the Bishop of Ross, and Lord Herries were the principal advisers of Mary; and Maitland, who accompanied Moray, also gave her secret assistance. Moray came prepared with the mysterious Casket Letters, purporting to contain in Mary's own handwriting damning evidence of her having lured Darnley to his doom, together with her contract of marriage with Bothwell in Huntly's hand, signed by herself and by Bothwell before his acquittal of the murder. But Moray was fearful of taking a false step by producing evidence, which, if not fatal to Mary, would surely be fatal to himself; and, having had bitter experience of Elizabeth's caprice, he was doubtful whether she might not yet restore Mary in spite of the Casket. Others also were implicated in the crime, and the consequences of opening the letters could scarcely be foreseen. A sight of the documents, or rather of an English translation of them, was furtively procured for Mary by Maitland. She implored him, according to Lesley's confession, "to stay these rigorous proceedings." He accordingly worked in her interests for some compromise.

Moray, frightened by Norfolk, finally made a feeble defence, and said nothing of the Casket or the murder. Meanwhile other intrigues had been carried on; and Elizabeth, fearing to be baulked of her advantage, removed the Conference to Westminster. Here (November 25) the proceedings, in spite of Mary's protests and withdrawal of her Commissioners, assumed undisguisedly the character of a trial, not of Moray for rebellion, but of the Queen for murder. Lennox appeared as an accuser of Mary; Moray produced the letters; and evidence was heard. Elizabeth took care that the contents of the Casket should be seen by the chief English lords favourable to Mary, including Northumberland and Westmorland. Her purpose was already sufficiently gained. It was no one's interest to push matters to an extremity. No satisfactory judicial examination of the documents ever took place. Even Mary's just demand to have sight of the originals was refused. Knollys was sent to induce her to avoid further trouble by confirming her abdication. This, after brief consideration, she absolutely refused to do. She would die a Queen. Then came the impotent conclusion of the whole. Elizabeth sent the Regent Moray back to Scotland, solemnly pronouncing that nothing had been brought against him and his party that compromised their honour and loyalty; nor, on the other hand, had anything been shown against the Queen, their sovereign, by which the Queen of England should conceive an evil opinion of her. Mary nevertheless, with her name sufficiently besmirched, remained a prisoner.

The Casket Letters now disappear from history. The question of their genuineness is beset with difficulties which in the absence of the originals it may be now impossible ever to solve. The casket was discovered upon one of Bothwell's servants, June 20, 1567. The earliest references to the form and contents of the documents which it contained are contradictory or inaccurate. On their evidence, however, the Scottish Parliament on December 15, 1567, declared Mary to be guilty of murder and to have forfeited her Crown. The tendency of recent discovery and research, rendering at least no longer tenable certain positions maintained by former opponents of their genuineness, is to suggest a large foundation of Mary's actual writing craftily altered or interpolated. This inference, based upon both internal and external evidence, would also explain in some measure Mary's manifest desire rather to keep the letters out of sight than to attempt the demonstration of their falsity to the ruin of her accusers. The hesitation or silence of Mary's supporters points to the same conclusion. Morton, in his declaration at Westminster (December 29, 1568), first published in full in 1889, asserted that the letters were "sichted," that is examined, on the morning after their discovery, in the presence of Atholl and Semple, both Catholics, as well as of Hume and others who had joined Mary's side, besides Maitland himself, who would be a most competent judge of their validity. It is strange that none came forward to dispute the facts alleged; strange that Huntly did not deny his writing of Mary's contract of marriage with Bothwell; strange, too, that, if the letters were forged, there should remain no clue to the forger or to the date at which such forgery was accomplished.

The interest of the letters is, however, mainly biographical. If rejected as forgeries, they leave the question of Mary's innocence or guilt just as it was when the friendly Du Croc, who knew the Queen and all the circumstances well, reported to the French Court that "the unhappy facts are too well proved." If genuine, they would exhibit Mary as something far worse than an ill-used wife conniving at the murder of a worthless husband who threatened to be her ruin. The letters had no effect upon international politics. The revolution at home was virtually effected before the discovery of the Casket. The judgment of foreign Courts was formed independently of its disclosures.

There were statesmen in England who, like the Earl of Sussex, saw clearly from the first that the retention of Mary was a political necessity. Her long captivity and the tragedy which closed her life were, indeed, the acts of the English nation, not of a rival Queen. Elizabeth herself, ever irresolute and waiting upon events, soon (May, 1569) entered upon negotiations, sincere enough at the outset, for her restoration to Scotland. But the dominant party in that country had something to say in the matter. Moray with a strong hand had reduced his sister's partisans to submission; and in a convention called by him at Perth

(July 25) Elizabeth's proposals, as she now probably hoped or intended, were utterly rejected. But, while the door was thus closed to Mary in her own kingdom, she was surprised at the strength of the party growing up in her favour in England.

In the ten years which elapsed since Elizabeth's succession the hopes entertained from her policy of compromise had hardly been realised. The Catholic majority of her subjects had by no means been reconciled. They were indeed without ecclesiastical leaders, without a definite policy, apparently crushed and helpless; but latent among them was a formidable power which at any moment might be evoked by favourable circumstances. There were divisions, too, within the Queen's Council. When she ascended the throne she had instinctively made her choice of Sir William Cecil (created Lord Burghley in 1571) as her chief secretary. Cecil was her mainstay in both home and foreign affairs. As if conscious of her own weakness and vacillation, and of the fact that her own private sentiments in religious and other matters were often opposed to those which her better judgment approved for the national welfare, she leant upon the strong man to keep her straight. With Cecil, she introduced into her Council Cecil's brother-in-law, Sir Nicolas Bacon, as Keeper of the Great Seal, Francis Russell, Earl of Bedford, and others favouring the Reformation. On the other hand, her personal favourite, and for many years her evil genius, was Robert Dudley, Earl of Leicester. The Council became divided between friends and enemies of Cecil. The country at large was exasperated by the Queen's refusal to marry; and the dread of a disputed succession drove men on all sides to look favourably on the claims of Mary Stewart, and to forget her past delinquencies.

Such was the condition of affairs at the moment when, in spite of a significant warning from Elizabeth, the Duke of Norfolk was secretly aiming at a marriage with the imprisoned Queen. A strong conservative party, attached to the old alliance with Spain, hostile to Cecil and to the advanced Protestants, and desirous of settling the Succession by Act of Parliament upon Mary, supported Norfolk's project as the best guarantee of peace, while the Catholics were led to expect the Duke's conversion and the restoration of their faith. Yet it could scarcely be expected that Elizabeth's very natural opposition to the marriage of a subject with a claimant to her throne—for such Mary continued to be—could be overcome without a revolution; and revolt would not have been thought of but for the changed relations between England and Spain.

Don Guerau d'Espes, who had taken the place of the more prudent and moderate de Silva (September, 1568), was instructed by Philip warmly to espouse the cause of the Catholics. His zeal outran that of his master. Since the peace of Cateau-Cambrésis there had been on the part of the great Powers a dread of provoking a general war. A diplomacy characteristic of the age was the result. While open war was avoided, each sovereign acted as if he were in secret alliance with one of

the conflicting religious parties into which the rival State was divided. Ambassadors were intended to play the part of spies or conspirators in the country to which they were credited. D'Espes accordingly set himself to intrigue with the malcontent subjects of Elizabeth, as her agents had done with the Calvinists of Scotland or the Huguenots of France. He at once reported to Philip that it would be easy to release the Queen of Scots and to raise a revolt against Elizabeth. But before long he became confident that the King of Spain, as legitimate successor of Edward III, could subject the country by his own efforts; and in every dispatch, to the alarm of Alva, who feared for Mary's life if such rash projects should be disclosed, he plied his master with arguments and motives for the invasion of England. Many Catholics, he said, had declared they would flock to the King's standard. Norfolk and Arundel were ready to declare themselves his. Mary had sent a message that, if Philip would but help, she would be Queen of England in three months, and Mass should be said all over the country. She urged the French Ambassador also to bid her friends act for her now or never. The Earls of Northumberland and Westmorland, the Lords Lumley, Mowbray, Dacre and others were in the conspiracy.

While these secret intrigues were being carried on, England's diplomatic relations with Spain were strained almost to the point of open rupture by the daring conduct of Elizabeth. She had seized the Spanish treasure-ships, which had taken refuge in English harbours when on the way to the Netherlands carrying gold for the payment of Alva's troops, and had appropriated or borrowed the money. D'Espes incited Alva to make reprisals; the Pope urged him to action. But Philip's Council, agreeing with Alva himself, decided that it was unwise to break openly with Elizabeth at this moment. While the King was slowly making up his mind "to encourage with money and secret favour the Catholics of the north and to help those of Ireland to take up arms against the heretics and deliver the Crown to Mary," Elizabeth had laid hands on Norfolk, and the northern Earls were being hurried into rebellion (November 14, 1569). Westmorland and Northumberland were summoned to Court. Making evasive excuses, they gathered their forces in haste. There was indecision in their counsels. Some of their adherents held back from scruples as to the legitimacy of the rebellion without more definite instructions from Rome. Others wished to see first the promised Spanish gold or Spanish soldiers. Nor was it clear whether the insurgents demanded no more than a change in Elizabeth's policy and the restoration of Catholicism, or whether they aimed at the deposition of the Queen and the substitution of Mary Stewart. On November 14, with 1700 horse, and 4000 foot, the Earls entered Durham, heard mass in the Cathedral, and publicly burnt the Book of Common Prayer and the English Bible. Six days later they were at Tadcaster, contemplating a dash at Tutbury for the release of Mary. Baffled by

the precautions taken by Elizabeth and the removal of her captive to Coventry, disheartened by the want of funds, while Philip characteristically was promising immediate aid "if they should keep the field," threatened by the Earl of Sussex who, as President of the North, was advancing against them with an army largely recruited from Catholics, the Earls retreated northwards; and their forces melted away without risking an engagement. Three months later, Leonard Dacre, a more skilful and dangerous leader, who had hitherto acted as if he were on the Queen's side, threw off the mask, fortified Naworth, and with 3000 men sought to entrap Lord Hunsdon, who marched against him with inferior forces. Dacre was however defeated at the battle of the Gelt, and made his escape for a time, as the Earls had done before him, into Scotland. Elizabeth's vengeance was swift and cruel. Gallows were erected on almost every village-green within the area of the rising; and Sussex himself reports that the number of his victims was between six and seven hundred.

The complete collapse of this ill-prepared and ill-supported rebellion did not, however, free Elizabeth from grave anxiety. It was clear that Philip was but biding his time. The Pope, who had egged on the northern Earls, was bestirring himself. The French King, again victorious over the Huguenots, was preparing to assist the Queen of Scots, when, to the deep sorrow of Elizabeth and the unconcealed joy of his sister, the Regent Moray was struck down by an assassin (January, 1570). A fierce civil war broke out in Scotland. Dumbarton and Edinburgh Castles were becoming in effect outposts in the great international war of religion which was raging round Antwerp or La Rochelle. The partisans of Mary, now comprising Maitland, Kirkcaldy, and the greater part of the barons, if left to themselves might well have gained the ascendancy. In February Pius V, without consulting Philip, issued his long-premeditated Bull, excommunicating Elizabeth and absolving her subjects from their allegiance. It was the supreme effort of the Counter-Reformation. Elizabeth had good ground for alarm. She quickly despatched troops into Scotland, by her influence secured the Regency for the Earl of Lennox (July, 1570), and in fear of France resumed at Chatsworth negotiations for Mary's restoration. Mary even agreed to ratify the Treaty of Edinburgh, to send her son as a hostage to England, and never to marry without Elizabeth's consent. Such conditions were calculated to ensure the failure of the negotiation. France, Spain, and the Scots, as before, made objections; and Mary's hopes, raised to the highest point, were again doomed to disappointment.

But at the moment when the Catholic Powers were most free to act, and the oft-threatened coalition seemed imminent, a change came over the international relations of France which cast to the winds whatever substance there had been in the Bayonne Conference, lifted England from her isolation in Europe, and gave to her a new political importance. France, fearful of Spanish aggrandisement, veered towards her ancient

enemy, and in the teeth of the recent Bull was projecting a union between the excommunicated Queen and the Duke of Anjou, the brother of King Charles, a negotiation which through the skill of Cecil, now Lord Burghley, led shortly to the treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive, between England and France, concluded at Blois, April 29, 1572. This alliance was intended to protect England from invasion even in the cause of religion.

In 1559 France had been the natural enemy of England, while Spain from political necessity was a friend. Now, twelve years later, the positions were reversed. The change was a momentous one for the Queen of Scots. Resuming her intrigues with the Duke of Norfolk, she placed herself in the hands of the Bishop of Ross and of Ridolfi, an influential Florentine banker in the confidence of the Pope. Ridolfi was despatched with instructions from both Mary and Norfolk to Alva, the Pope, and the King of Spain. France was to be kept in the dark. To make sure of Philip, Norfolk promised to restore the Catholic religion, and bound himself to do whatever the Pope, the Catholic King, and the Queen of Scots should command. He asked for troops, 6000 to land in England, 2000 in Ireland, and 2000 in Scotland, while he on his side would furnish an army. Ridolfi was to make orally certain communications not committed to paper. He went first to Alva, who, as usual, was cautious and suspicious. But while putting before Philip the difficulties of an invasion in the secret form proposed, and the danger that, if the project were discovered, Elizabeth would at once, and with apparent justice, put to death both Mary and Norfolk, Alva added suggestively that if Elizabeth should die a natural death, "or any other death," or if her person were seized he, Alva, would be prepared to act without further instructions (May 7, 1571). From the Netherlands Ridolfi went to Rome. How far he communicated the most essential feature of the plot to Pius V, may be uncertain; but the zealous Pope entered with ardour into the enterprise and sent Ridolfi to Madrid with a letter to Philip, conjuring him to carry it out and praying with his whole soul for its success. On July 7 Ridolfi disclosed his plan in the presence of the Spanish Council of State. As a first step Elizabeth was to be assassinated. The Council discussed when, where, and by whom the blow was to be delivered, and on what ground the war should be made; the Cardinal Archbishop of Seville urging the Bull of deposition, Feria preferring the natural claims of Queen Mary. Philip pondered slowly, and on September 14 left the decision in the hands of Alva. But already the whole plot had been discovered by Burghley. The Bishop of Ross was in the Tower, and under threat of torture confessed all. The Spanish Ambassador was dismissed, and Philip did not dare to resent the affront. Norfolk was tried and condemned for treason (January 16, 1572), and, after months of irresolution on the part of Elizabeth, was executed on June 2.

The successive blows thus aimed at Elizabeth—the Northern rising of 1569, the Bull of 1570, and the Ridolfi conspiracy of 1571—were followed (as has been said) by the Treaty of Blois (which was in effect an abandonment of Mary's cause by France); and almost at the same time (April 1, 1572) came the capture of Brill by the "Beggars of the Sea," which laid the foundations of the independence of the United Provinces. France was thus detached from Spain as well as from Scotland; and Spain, realising more keenly than ever that the pacification of the Netherlands depended upon the subjection of England, was for the present helpless against her.

Elizabeth from the beginning of her reign had rigorously but cautiously enforced the Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity passed by her first Parliament (1559). They made the practice of the Catholic religion impossible. The immediate effect was to drive from the country the most conscientious of the Catholic clergy and thus to deprive the laity of their natural leaders and guides. The aristocracy had no policy. Strange to say, little or no aid or instruction came from Rome; while the mass of the adherents of the old faith were helpless, there was little need to resort to extreme measures. Yet, if they but moved a little finger Cecil, ever on the watch, had means to crush them under his heel. Witness the apparent trivial incident of the miracle of St Donats. A few months after the Queen's accession an oak-tree in the park of Sir Thomas Bradleigh reft asunder by lightning disclosed in its centre the figure of a cross. Devout Catholics, taking this to be a miracle of good augury, made drawings of the cross and distributed them among their friends. The facts were brought to the knowledge of the Council in the spring of 1561; and Cecil at once despatched a commission of enquiry into Glamorganshire to take evidence on the spot, and to bring the piece of wood containing the cross to London. A raid was made on the houses of Sir Thomas' friends; and after a strict examination a number of gentlemen and ladies were thrown into prison for having had mass said for them in secret. There was reported to be current among Catholics some hope that Elizabeth would receive a papal Nuncio. In any case Cecil "thought it necessary to dull the papists' expectations by rebating of their humours." The letters and submissions of the offenders exhibit them as paralysed with fear.

Again, in 1568, the Court was disturbed by rumours that in Lancashire or thereabouts "religion was backward," mass commonly said, and priests were harboured. Pius V had in fact initiated some missionary movement in England by sending Lawrence Vaux into the country with certain faculties to absolve from heresy, and with instructions to make it clear that in no circumstances was it lawful for a Catholic to attend the Protestant service. A royal commission was set on foot resulting in the imprisonment of many of the leading gentry of the district; yet a rigorous inquisition failed to discover a trace of political intrigue, though

it was on the eve of the northern rising. That rising only failed, according to Dr Sanders, because the faithful had not been sufficiently instructed in the doctrine of the Bull. The Bull had now been launched; the Queen of England was excommunicated and deposed by the highest authority known to her Catholic subjects. Mary Stewart was at hand to take her place. Was it possible for Elizabeth and her Parliament to view the altered situation of affairs with anything but alarm? Parliament made it high treason to bring into the country any papal Bull, any *Agnus Dei*, or similar objects of devotion consecrated by the Pope. It further showed its temper by demanding that the axe should be laid to the root of the evil. The Queen of Scots, so it seemed, was the one perpetual focus of disaffection and conspiracy; and, if Norfolk had deserved to die, still more so did Mary. Both Houses brought in a Bill of Attainder against her, but Elizabeth forbade it. They then passed an Act excluding Mary from the succession; but the Queen would not hear of it and prorogued Parliament (June 30). The Bull of 1570, however, made loyalty to her throne logically incompatible with obedience to the Pope; and consequently every zealous Catholic was henceforward naturally regarded as a potential rebel. It was in self-defence and on political grounds that the Queen was driven, as she believed, to the merciless use of the rack and the gallows; and, indeed, at the worst of the persecution, Cardinal Allen could make it a matter of reproach to her and to her supporters that their contest with Rome was "not for religion, of which our enemies have not a bit, but for the stability of the empire and worldly prosperity." One result of the action of Pius V, which a later Pope "bewailed with tears of blood," was to make the country more Protestant and the Queen more popular.

Meanwhile, in the interval between the third and fourth civil wars of France, Catherine, jealous of Coligny's influence over the King and fearful of the Huguenots, prevailed on her son to be rid of all his Protestant enemies by one blow. The Massacre of St Bartholomew (August 23, 1572) filled England and Scotland with horror and dismay. The triumphant acclamation with which the news was received by the Pope and Catholic Princes led to the belief that the massacre had been premeditated as part of a scheme for the extermination of Protestants everywhere. The recent alliance with France scarcely survived the shock. Yet the massacre was a suggestive lesson to Elizabeth. Would not she at least be justified in ridding herself of her single enemy—that one personage who in the eyes of the nation already merited death? She accordingly proposed secretly to Morton and to the Regent Mar, who had succeeded Lennox, that Mary should be placed in their hands for immediate execution. The design was frustrated only by the death of Mar (October 28, 1573).

After 1572 there came about a lull in the conflict between the two Queens and the forces represented by them. Abroad, international

relations seemed to be governed for a while rather more by political than religious interests. In Scotland Morton succeeded Mar. The Pacification of Perth (February, 1573) prepared an end to the long period of civil war and anarchy; and shortly afterwards, though not without aid from English troops, Edinburgh Castle, which had still held out for Mary under Kirkcaldy and Maitland, capitulated. Protestantism was now supreme and unquestioned in Scotland. Morton's iron rule brought peace, and with peace commercial activity and prosperity. England herself, enjoying repose from the tranquillity of Scotland and the helplessness of Mary, was year by year gaining strength. A spirit of self-reliance and adventure and a new sense of patriotism were springing up in the heart of the people. The privateering in the Channel in aid of the Gueux and the Huguenots, the buccaneering exploits of seamen who were endeavouring to wrest from Philip the commerce of the Indies, were encouraged or connived at by Elizabeth, who profited by their gains, and thus laid the foundations of her navy.

During this period, however, a grave danger momentarily menaced England and gave new hope to the friends of Mary. Don John of Austria, who had succeeded the more conciliatory Requesens in the government of the Netherlands (1576), had none of Alva's fear of provoking war with Elizabeth. Ambitious himself of a crown and egged on by the Pope, he arrived with a fixed determination to take his army over to England, to marry the Queen of Scots, and to place her on Elizabeth's throne; and now Mary, altogether Spanish, as if mindful of what she had done twenty years before for Henry II of France, drew up a will (February, 1577) by which she made over all her rights in England and elsewhere to the Catholic King, or to anyone of his relations whom he might please to name with the consent of the Pope. But Philip was jealous of his half-brother's ambitious projects; and, as the Netherlands were now strong enough to insist on the withdrawal of Don John's army, England was once more saved from a formidable attack.

But towards the close of 1579 the period of seven years' comparative rest was succeeded by a like period of storm. Gregory XIII, determined to carry into effect the bull of his predecessor, was himself prepared to take the field. The war was to have the character of a crusade. Dr Nicolas Sanders had written (November, 1577) to his friend Dr Allen: "I beseech you to take hold of the Pope, for the King of Spain is as fearful of war as a child of fire. The Pope will give you 2000. If they do not serve to go into England, at least they will serve to go into Ireland. The state of Christendom dependeth upon the stout assailing of England." The Pope accordingly, after the failure of Stukeley's expedition which he had intended for Ireland, sent thither this same Dr Sanders with a body of Italian troops to raise the standard of rebellion. The Pope's soldiers were subsequently reinforced by Spaniards

sent clandestinely by Philip, who was still nominally at peace with Elizabeth. The Irish insurrection was crushed; but meanwhile in Scotland a reaction, which had taken place against English interferences and Morton's power, led to the assumption of the reins of government by the young King (March, 1578). The affairs of the country were thrown into confusion, and the partisans of Mary at home and abroad saw their opportunity. In September Esmé Stewart, lord of Aubigny, a Catholic and a friend of the Guises, arrived in Scotland from France, and at once gained an extraordinary influence over James, his cousin. Elizabeth had now lost the hold which she had kept for ten years over the governing power in Scotland. In spite of all her diplomacy and her threats Morton was arrested, December 31, 1580, and put to death six months later on a charge of complicity in the murder of Darnley. D'Aubigny was created Duke of Lennox; the King surrounded himself with new men; and Mary entered into negotiations with Lennox for her association in the Crown with her son.

While Elizabeth was thus simultaneously threatened in Ireland and baffled in Scotland, Gregory XIII and the General of the Jesuits were despatching into England forces of an entirely new kind. Many years before (1568) Dr Allen and other clerical exiles had founded a seminary at Douai—ten years later removed to Rheims—which was to supply England with a body of missionaries. In 1579 a similar seminary was established in Rome. The priests who had flocked into the country from these colleges since 1574 were men of no great mark and had excited comparatively little notice. One Cuthbert Mayne, to be known as the proto-martyr of the seminaries, was seized in Cornwall with a copy of an antiquated Bull of no political significance in his possession. He was executed (1571) as an example; but this was the only case of bloodshed under the recent statutes. Presently, however, the Jesuits were induced to take part in the spiritual campaign. Parsons and Campion, men of conspicuous ability and daring, landed in the summer of 1580. They were strictly enjoined by their superiors to refrain from meddling with affairs of State, and they pledged their oaths that their mission was purely apostolic. In a few months they had rekindled the zeal and raised the hopes of the down-trodden Catholics from one end of the country to the other. The government, disbelieving in their apostolic professions, and seeing in every convert a fresh recruit for the army of King Philip, filled the prisons with recusants and priests, captured Campion, and brought him with several of his companions to the gallows on the charge of a treasonable plot of which they were manifestly innocent. But Parsons, who escaped to the Continent, changed his tactics, and presently embarked upon a career of intrigue and conspiracy fraught with momentous consequences to the cause of Catholicism in England. Convinced that the road to the reduction of England lay through Scotland, he sent Holt, an English missionary and a member of

his Order, to Edinburgh to feel his way. Crichton, a Scottish Jesuit, after conference with Parsons and the Duke of Guise, followed; and the two Jesuits in the name of the Pope, the King of Spain, and the Catholics of England, urged Lennox to strike a blow for the liberation of Mary and the restoration of the Roman Church in England. Lennox threw himself into the scheme with enthusiasm, entered into communication with Mary, and offered to lead the army of invasion.

Mendoza, then Spanish ambassador in London, was at the same time secretly treating with six English Catholic noblemen, making use of missionary priests as his agents, and in active correspondence with Mary, who, as he wrote to Philip, April, 1582, is "virtually the mainspring of the war, without whose opinion and countenance Lennox and others will do nothing." Presently the Duke of Guise, the Archbishop of Glasgow, Dr Allen, the Provincial of the French Jesuits, and the papal Nuncio, met in conference in Paris to discuss the details of the campaign. Parsons assured them of his own knowledge that the English Catholics were ready to rise the moment the standard was raised in Scotland. It was now agreed that Guise should be the commander of the forces; and it is significant of the political chaos in France that the King was by no means to be admitted to the secret. Crichton was despatched to Rome, to gain the approval and pecuniary aid of the Pope; and Parsons carried the plan to Philip. The project met with a temporary check by the Raid of Ruthven (August 22, 1582), through which James became a prisoner in the hands of the partisans of the Kirk and the English interest; and Lennox was soon forced to fly the country. When the King recovered his liberty (June, 1583), the enterprise, at the earnest solicitation of Mary, was renewed, the plan being only so far modified that the principal invading force was to land on the coast of England instead of Scotland. Dr Allen and the energetic Father Parsons, who flitted from Court to Court under the disguise of "Melino," continued to be the moving spirits in the affair. Meanwhile, as in the Ridolfi conspiracy, the assassination of Elizabeth became a prominent feature of the enterprise. The papal Nuncio reported to the Cardinal of Como, and the Spanish agent Tassis informed Philip, that Guise and Mayenne had found an English Catholic ready to kill the Queen for 100,000 francs; and half of that sum was deposited in a box in the custody of Archbishop Beton (May, 1583). But Elizabeth's life seemed charmed. The project came to nothing. Mary, according to Parsons, was induced unfairly to lay the blame of the failure on the Duke of Guise and the Archbishop for omitting to supply the assassin with the promised bribe; but, as the Jesuit subsequently explained, "the party in question was a worthless fellow who would do nothing."

The death of Anjou (June, 1584), by which the Protestant King of Navarre became heir to the throne of France, once more effected a radical change in European politics. Philip had been all along but half-hearted

in his alliance with the Guises for this English enterprise. "Nothing," wrote Mendoza, "could be more injurious to Spanish interests and to the hope of converting the island than that the French should get their fingers in through the Queen of Scots and turn things to their own ends." He even hinted to Mary herself that it would be to the advantage of herself and her cause for her to remain as she was. But now the League was declaring it impossible for a heretic to ascend the throne of France; and the Guises were too engrossed in their own concerns at home to give much thought to the affairs of Mary. Philip accordingly saw his way to taking the whole enterprise upon his own shoulders, with the aid of the papal treasury. Sixtus V succeeded to the tiara in April, 1585. Allen, who with Parsons was summoned to Rome, wrote exultingly to Mary that now the whole execution of the attack was committed to the Duke of Parma, and that he, Parsons, and Hew Owen were to deal with no one else in the matter. Step by step the real object of Spain's ambition stood revealed. Was Philip to place Mary on the throne of England only that she might be immediately succeeded by her heretic son? It was imperative that the Pope should at once effect the deprivation of James and name in his stead a proper person and a Catholic, "in order that the Queen of Scots may not under the deceptive influence of maternal love think it good to introduce her son into the succession." Sixtus was on his guard against the too selfish aims of Spain. He had moreover an admiration for Elizabeth; and, to the disgust of Philip's Ambassador, Olivarez, he hoped to find a solution of the English difficulty in the Queen's conversion. "What a valiant woman," he exclaimed to the Venetian Pisany; "she braves the two greatest Kings by land and by sea." "If she were not a heretic," he said to another, "she would be worth a whole world." He even declared that he held in abhorrence the offers made to him for her assassination. But Allen, whom Olivarez described as "the man to lead the dance," was inspiring the Pope with zeal for the cause, and together with Parsons was drawing up pedigrees in proof of Philip's right to the English Crown. "There are few lovers of piety," he wrote to Philip (March 19, 1587), "who do not long to be once more under his Majesty's most sweet sceptre." But it would be better for the King to make good his claim by right of conquest; and, when he was secure in possession, then his relationship to the House of Lancaster might be urged in Parliament, and his title confirmed by the Archbishop of Canterbury (that is, by Allen himself), and by the Catholics, who, "from the death or dismissal of the heretics, would be supreme."

During the earlier stages of this foreign conspiracy (1582-3), the soul of which was secrecy, all Elizabeth's fences appeared to be breaking down. The shifting of parties in Scotland was such that she never could be sure of James or safe from attack on his side. There was no Anjou to do her work for her in the Netherlands. She was no longer able to play her old game of match-making with France; and now

(December, 1583) the arrest of Throckmorton and his disclosures revealed the gravity of Catholic disaffection at home, the continental preparations for invasion, and the complicity of the Spanish Ambassador in both. Mendoza was dismissed, threatening revenge. Then came the assassination of the Prince of Orange, at the instigation of Philip (July 10, 1584), a significant enough warning to the Queen, shortly followed by the capture of Father Crichton with papers which told more of the ramifications of the great "enterprise" (October). The whole nation was now moved with one impulse of defiant resolve. Elizabeth's life was in danger, her chief councillors were marked out for slaughter, and the country was exposed to the horrors of invasion or the worst of civil wars. An Association was formed, the members of which took oath to pursue to death, not only any person who should attempt the life of the Queen, but any person in whose favour such an attempt should be made. Parliament, which met in November, in an Act "for the surety of the Queen's Majesty's most royal person and the continuance of the realm in peace," virtually approved the Association provided that the culprit should be found guilty by a Court of Commissioners, and thus in effect rendered Mary incapable of succession in the event of Elizabeth suffering a violent death. The same Parliament, on the presumption that all the seminary priests were accomplices in the practices of Allen and Parsons and had come into the country "to stir up and move sedition, rebellion, and open hostility within her Highness's dominions," enacted that any subject of the Queen ordained abroad by the authority of the Pope and remaining in the kingdom after forty days should be adjudged guilty of high treason. This was the culminating point of the penal legislation against the seminarist clergy; and it was under this statute that the great majority of executions during this and the following reigns took place. It is noteworthy that it was not till the twenty-seventh year of her reign, after much provocation from foreign conspiracies fomented by Jesuits and missionary priests in exile, and after several grave attempts at bringing about her assassination, that she was driven to this extreme and barbarous method of persecution.

Elizabeth now made up her mind to strong measures in the Netherlands. In August, 1585, she entered into an alliance with the Estates, and subsequently sent an army under Leicester in defence of their liberties, still, however, pretending that she was not making war upon Spain. At the same time she made every effort to secure the friendship of James; and in the following year (July, 1586) concluded with him an alliance offensive and defensive for the protection of Protestantism in both countries. In this treaty Mary's name is not so much as mentioned. All her hopes of association with her son had already been dashed by James' own refusal to have anything to do with it (August, 1585). She herself was removed to stricter confinement. In the bitterness of her abandonment she wrote to Elizabeth that she would disown, curse,

and disinherit her traitorous son (May 23, 1585); and again in a letter to Mendoza, which was intercepted by Walsingham (May 20, 1586), she made over all her rights and claims to Philip of Spain.

In the spring of 1586 the English adherents of Mary, who were in the secret of the Spanish enterprise, and who believed that no invasion could succeed as long as Elizabeth lived, became desperate. Savage, an officer who had served under Parma, vowed to take her life. Ballard, a seminary priest, went to France to discuss the new plan with Mendoza, then Ambassador at the Court of France, who approved, and suggested that Cecil, Walsingham, and Hunsdon should also be killed. Antony Babington, a gentleman of good family and fortune, who became the leader in the plot, associated five other assassins with Savage, and undertook to rescue Mary as soon as the deed was done. Walsingham meanwhile held all the threads of the conspiracy in his own hands. His ubiquitous spies, the chief of whom was the priest Gilbert Gifford, had won the confidence of Morgan and other devoted adherents of Mary; and every secret of the conspirators was known. Walsingham resolved to force the hand of Elizabeth by possessing himself of proof of Mary's complicity in the projected assassination. With the aid of Gifford and the ingenious decipherer Phelippes he intercepted, copied, and forwarded every letter which passed between Mary and the confederates. Morgan had prudently let Mary know that Ballard had been warned "not to deal with her as long as he followed affairs which he and others have in hand which tend to do good, which I pray to God may come to pass"; and less prudently in a postscript to Mary's secretary Curle, he wrote, "there be many means in hand to remove the beast which troubleth all the world." Finally, throwing aside all caution he advised Mary to open communications with Babington, who wrote to her an account of the whole plan. She replied in a long and able letter (July 17-27) showing a masterly grasp of all the necessary details to be considered, adding: "Affairs being thus prepared, then shall it be time to set the six gentlemen to work."

Walsingham, now satisfied, arrested Babington and his associates. Mary was removed from Chartley, where she was then in custody (August 8); her papers were seized; and on October 5 she was indicted before a Court of forty-six Commissioners at Fotheringay, under the terms of the late Act, for having compassed or imagined acts tending to the hurt of the Queen. She confronted her accusers and judges, whose jurisdiction she refused to admit, with dignity, courage, and consummate ability. Her protest that she was no subject of Elizabeth was set aside. It was enough that she was a pretender to the throne of England, had broken the laws of the country, and had brought herself within the compass of the late Acts. She admitted having attempted to gain her freedom with the aid of foreign forces, but strenuously denied having sought the Queen's life, or indeed of having had any

communication with Babington, of whom she said she knew nothing. She demanded proof of the charge in her own handwriting. This could not be produced, as the originals when copied and deciphered had been forwarded to their destination. Babington, indeed, had admitted the accuracy of the copies; and to this Mary's secretaries, Nau and Curle, reluctantly testified. It has been argued that the incriminating passages were interpolated by Walsingham's cunning agent, and that the witnesses, in the hope of favour or from fear of torture, had given false evidence. If this could be shown to be probable, it would at least remain impossible to hold that Mary was not fully aware of what would be the consequence to Elizabeth in the event of a violent rescue of herself and a Spanish conquest of the kingdom. Judgment against her was pronounced on November 25 in the Star Chamber at Westminster. A few days later, the Parliament confirmed the sentence, and petitioned the Queen for Mary's immediate execution. Elizabeth hesitated. Mary alive was still a card in her hands to play against Scotland, against France and Spain, while there was no saying what political dangers might arise from her death. To Elizabeth's ministers, however, the possible succession of Mary meant utter ruin; and the people also saw before them in that event the downfall of their religion and the terrors of the Inquisition. The Queen asked Parliament if some other way could not be found for her security. Both Houses unanimously answered, none. Two months passed before the warrant was signed and sealed; and even then Elizabeth, who at this critical moment showed herself at her worst, desired that Mary's custodian, Sir Amias Paulet, should take upon himself the responsibility of despatching his prisoner according to the terms of his oath of the Association. When Paulet firmly refused "to shed blood without authority of the law," the Secretary Davison carried the warrant to the Privy Council, who, without further reference to the Queen, forwarded it to the Earls of Shrewsbury and Kent, appointed to be present at the execution. Mary was beheaded at Fotheringay in February, 1587. Elizabeth, whose annoyance may not have been altogether feigned, protested in vain to the foreign Ambassadors that the deed had been done in spite of her wishes and intention; but nevertheless she was able to persuade King James that for him to take any hostile action would be to imperil his chance of the Succession; and she as craftily pacified the King of France by convincing him that to quarrel with her would be to play into the hands of the Guises and Spain. Philip alone prepared in earnest for war—now, however, not on behalf of Mary's line of succession, or, indeed, primarily for Mary's religion, but for the conquest of the kingdom in his own interest.

Elizabeth's aim throughout her reign had been to make a united people. Her Church was intended to be a compromise between the contending creeds. Her foreign policy was essentially defensive. The

difficulties of her position were immense, and in her weakness she had recourse to the arts of the feeble. She seemed indeed to succeed politically, not in spite of, but by the very means of her unscrupulous methods, her mendacity, duplicity, and feminine caprices. Her personal interests were fortunately identical with those of the State. The heart of the nation—though not always the numerical majority—its youth, mental vigour, and enterprise were on her side. She knew her people well, and was proud of being altogether one of them—in her own phrase “mere English”—and few sovereigns have been so faithfully served by their ministers.

Her unfortunate rival, with a personality more attractive and gifts more brilliant if less solid, came into her kingdom virtually a foreigner; and a foreigner she remained—alien above all to the stern religious creed which she found there established. Her interests and ideals were those of the Guises. Her heart was not in her own country, but elsewhere; and the main object of her ambition, the Crown of her neighbour, she pursued with an all-absorbing passion, save for the moment when a more human passion, her infatuation for Bothwell, turned her aside on the path which led to her destruction. Every folly committed by her seemed to meet with an instant Nemesis. At her best she was surrounded by statesmen and advisers who could but give her a half-hearted support; and it was her ill fate to be betrayed or abandoned in turn by all in whom she had at any time put her trust—her brother, her husband, and her son. When all hope was lost, she represented herself as the victim of religious persecution; and sentiment has invested her pitiable sufferings and tragic end with the halo of martyrdom. Her evil destiny seemed to pursue her party and her cause beyond her grave. Disaster and humiliation befell her one avenger among the Catholic Princes. Her death broke up the unity and power of her English followers. Priests and laymen alike were divided into factions, Spanish and Scottish, Jesuit and Secular, whose quarrels brought disgrace upon the Catholic mission; and presently the sovereignty of the United Kingdom of England and Scotland, which she had coveted for herself and her Church, was to fall to the Protestant son whom she had done her best to disown and disinherit.

CHAPTER IX.

THE ELIZABETHAN NAVAL WAR WITH SPAIN.

In the middle of the sixteenth century the power of Spain was everywhere recognised as preeminent. Her diplomatists and statesmen, taught in the school of the Emperor Charles V, maintained its illustrious traditions; her troops, still trained in the discipline of the great Captain, were acknowledged to be the best in Europe; while her navy, exercised in the voyages of the Indies, seemed beyond comparison. And as time passed on, this preeminence, to vulgar eyes, became more marked. To her arms was attributed the glory of Lepanto. The annexation of Portugal transferred to her the wealth of the East and the huge carracks which brought it into Western seas. The defeat of the French fleet at Terceira seemed to prove her invincible; and when it was noised abroad that she was preparing for the invasion of England, the union of the ships of Santa Cruz and the soldiers of Parma promised an easy victory. This was the opinion of many capable statesmen; and even to those who took a more hopeful view of England's position the danger still appeared most alarming.

There were, however, many, and especially among the seafaring men both of England and Spain, who did not by any means accept the popular estimate. Among English sailors there were plenty who had met the Spaniards in home waters or distant seas, and had learned that the danger disappeared when it was boldly met. Among the Spaniards there were also plenty who knew, by hard experience, that when English ships fought with Spanish, victory had a way of favouring the enemy. The English of Elizabeth's reign had, suddenly, as it seemed, developed a new and aggressive maritime energy. Of nations, as of individuals, the memories are short; and no one remembered that the English were sprung from a race of rude pirates who had long been the terror of Europe, or that in later centuries they had crushed the navies of France and of Spain, had hailed their King as lord of the sea, and had stamped their coins with an effigy of the armed strength of England resting on her navy, which they styled *The Wall and Fence of the Kingdom*. The long war with France had given another direction to the restless energy of the people, and the Wars of the Roses had absorbed it.

The seafaring interest had been neglected; commerce had languished; King's ships no longer existed; and when the Tudors came to the throne, in the naval, as in all other departments of government, reconstruction or reorganisation was necessary. Something was done by Henry VII, more by Henry VIII; but even so, in the last years of his reign, the navy was wholly inadequate to the needs of the kingdom, and was unable to meet that of France on equal terms. But years of peace produced their effect; trade revived; shipping improved; and seamen learned that a voyage might have a wider aim than the fisheries of Iceland or the spices of Scanderoon.

Already, even under Henry VIII and his immediate successors, English seamen had ventured across the Atlantic—some in their own ships, more in ships of Spain. With the accession of Elizabeth the friendly relations of the two peoples rapidly cooled; religious hatred and commercial jealousy took the place of the old traditional alliance with the House of Burgundy; and the rigid, even cruel, enforcement of monopoly on the one side was met, on the other, by smuggling and piracy. The voyages of John Hawkins, which have attracted most attention among the maritime expeditions of the age, were not the only instances in which the Spanish monopoly was rudely broken down; and if the Spaniards gave but short shrift to such of the voyagers as fell into their hands, death was then everywhere recognised as the natural penalty of the crimes of which they were held to be guilty. The difference of opinion was as to the crime rather than as to its punishment. The story of the treacherous attack on Hawkins in the anchorage of San Juan de Lua had, in England, a very powerful effect in exciting popular indignation. It was a one-sided story, based on the statement that the English ships, after peacefully trading with the Spanish islands and the settlements on the mainland of South America, were homeward bound, when, off the west end of Cuba, they were caught in a hurricane, driven far into the Gulf of Mexico, and compelled to shelter themselves in the harbour of San Juan. This would be more easy of belief if we did not know, from Hawkins' own admissions, that he had falsely put forward a similar pretext in other places—notably at San Domingo in 1563, and at Rio de la Hacha in 1565—as a preliminary to forcing the trade on an unwilling governor; that in 1568 his business in the West Indies was so far from being finished, that his ships, on leaving Cartagena, had actually on board merchandise to the value of about £12,000, including 57 negroes "*optimi generis*" valued at £160 each, and that he had made particular enquiries as to the price of negroes at Vera Cruz. It is absurd to suppose that he intended to carry his 57 choice negroes to England, to say nothing of the "*pintados*" and other parts of his stock that still remained. There is little room to doubt that he went to San Juan of set purpose, with the same false excuse on his lips, and in his heart the same determination to force the trade.

Hawkins anchored in the harbour—a narrow inlet between the small, low island of San Juan and the mainland—on September 16, 1568; and on the next day a Spanish fleet commanded by Don Francisco de Lujan, and bringing out the new Viceroy of Mexico, Don Martin Henriquez, appeared in the offing. Hawkins afterwards declared, truly enough, that with the guns which he had mounted in battery on the island, and with his ships placed to rake the channel, he could have kept the Spaniards out; but he feared that if a norther should come on and the Spanish fleet suffer shipwreck, his Queen would not hold him guiltless of having caused this great loss to the navy of a Power with which she was in amity. On the other hand, Henriquez and Lujan were equally alive to the dangerous position of their ships if they remained outside; and thus, after some hurried negotiations, an agreement was easily come to. The Spaniards, recognising the English as friendly visitors, and approving of their continuing to hold the island, were permitted to enter the harbour. But once inside and in safety, neither Henriquez nor Lujan considered himself under any moral obligation to keep faith with men whom they both held to be pirates. Henriquez, in view of possibilities, ordered a large number of soldiers to be sent from Vera Cruz, and these were brought on board secretly during the night. He might have had some scruples about breaking the treaty; Lujan had none; and as soon as the Viceroy had left the fleet to go to Mexico he landed a strong party on the island, overpowered the men in the batteries, and turned their guns on the English ships. The Spanish ships, vastly superior in force, and in a close harbour where manœuvring was impossible, overwhelmed the English. One small vessel was sunk; three were captured, including Hawkins' own ship, the *Jesus*, which he had hired from the Queen. He himself, with some hundred of his men, scrambled on board a small ship, the *Minion*, and escaped from the scene of slaughter, closely followed by his kinsman, Francis Drake, in another pinnace, the *Judith*. But together with the captured ships, the profits of the voyage, the 57 negroes, and the rest of the unsold merchandise—to the value, it was said, of £100,000—remained in the hands of the enemy. This was on September 24. In the night the *Minion* and *Judith* parted company, and did not again meet. Drake, in the *Judith*, made the best of his way to England, which he reached on January 20, 1569; Hawkins, finding the *Minion* dangerously crowded and without sufficient provisions for the voyage or the possibility of getting any, put on shore about a hundred of the men; but even so, his crew was almost entirely destroyed by famine and sickness before he arrived in England on January 25.

The news of his disaster had outstripped him by several weeks, and had excited great indignation, especially among those who shared the loss of the expected profits. The *Jesus* belonged to the Queen, and, though the conditions of hiring carefully guarded her proprietary interests, the seizure of her ship could not but be galling. Leicester

and other men of influence at Court were shareholders in the adventure, and were injured by its failure. Above all, William Hawkins—the belligerent mayor and wealthy shipowner of Plymouth, whose vessels, with letters of marque from Condé or William of Orange, had for years been scouring the Bay of Biscay, plundering and slaying the Spaniards as they attempted to pass to Flanders—was John Hawkins' brother. He was a man of energy and decision, and when his semi-piratical squadron had driven Spanish ships, carrying treasure to the Low Countries for the payment of Alva's soldiers, to take refuge in Falmouth or Southampton, he suggested to the Queen that it would be only a fair reprisal to seize the money. The advice did not fall on unwilling ears; and the adoption of the proposed measure, at once an insult and an injury to Spain, by causing the Duke of Alva to lay the tax of the "tenth penny" on the Dutch rekindled the rebellion which his ruthless policy had previously well-nigh stamped out.

But what impressed the people of England more even than the loss of the money and of the ships, was the manner in which the attack had been made. They ignored, or perhaps were ignorant of, the lawless nature of Hawkins' traffic, his persistent smuggling, his occasional piracy; they conceived the Spanish attack to be robbery and murder, planned in falsehood and carried out with treachery; and their belief was confirmed and embittered when, some years later, they learned the hard fate of many of the prisoners, who, from the Spanish point of view, had merited death, and were, for the most part, treated with notable clemency in having their lives spared. Hawkins and Drake of course held that they had been robbed, and were entitled to such reprisals as they were able to make; out of which belief sprang the unworthy negotiations into which Hawkins entered with the Spanish ambassador and the King of Spain, and the fiercer determination of Drake to seek revenge and restitution by force of arms. Of two voyages which he made to the Spanish main in the years 1570-1 no particulars are recorded. The inference which Drake himself left to be drawn is that they were merely for scouting or prospecting; but as he had no funds wherewith to pay the expenses of such voyages, and makes no mention of any wealthy patrons, there is no difficulty in accepting the Spanish allegations that he was again engaged in smuggling, not unmixed with piracy. To the English, unlicensed cruising against the enemy in time of war had been habitual for centuries; and in time of peace letters of reprisal were often given a very wide interpretation, though, without them, private war was liable to be treated as piracy, especially if the pirate fell into his enemy's hands. Still, it would be an error to consider such a pirate akin to the no-nation scoundrels who infested the West Indies or the Eastern Seas in the years following the pacifications of 1713 and 1815. Drake conceived, and the general—even much of the official—opinion of his countrymen conceived, that he had just cause of war against the Spaniards; and international

law had scarcely come into existence to forbid it. It was thus that he attempted no secrecy as to the success of a third voyage in 1572, when he made his singularly bold attack on Nombre de Dios—an attack so bold that the story has by some been judged incredible; and when, having failed in that, he waylaid and captured the mule train loaded with treasure, on its way across the isthmus.

The riches he brought home encouraged others to similar ventures on even a smaller scale, and with less happy result. Little or nothing is known of them beyond the Spaniards' frequent complaints of English corsairs. Some may have perished in storm and tempest; some may have been killed fighting; the fate of Oxenham and his men may well have befallen others whose very names are lost in oblivion. And then came the wonderful expedition of Drake into the South Sea in 1578—wonderful alike in its design and its execution in spite of mutiny, desertion, tempest, and the efforts of the enemy. It has been freely said that in this he had direct verbal authority from the Queen. This is possible, though not probable. Elizabeth was not in the habit of committing herself in any such manner; but it is not altogether unlikely that she allowed Drake to understand that his adventure would not be displeasing to her. Assuredly his good success was not. When, after an absence of three years, he returned laden with the spoil of Spaniards—with whose country England was, officially, at peace—she received him with open arms. It was, perhaps, fortunate for him that his home-coming in September, 1580, was nearly synchronous with the landing of the so-called papal volunteers in Ireland.

These men, though Italians, were mostly Spanish subjects; their numbers were increased by Spaniards enlisted at Corunna under the King's implied sanction; and they were carried to Ireland in Spanish ships, commanded by a Spanish officer of repute, Juan Martinez de Recalde. They were put on shore at Smerwick, where they took possession of a dismantled castle called by them the Fort del Ore, and waited to be joined by the Irish insurgents; but Recalde, finding the support they were likely to receive fall far short of what they had been led to expect, reembarked the greater part of the Castilian volunteers, to the number of 300 or more. He put to sea only just in time to escape the English squadron under the command of Sir William Wynter, who effectually blocked the passage of the Italians by sea and deprived them of all hope of relief, while by land Lord Grey, the Lord Deputy, drove them back to their fort. This could not be defended, and they had no store of provisions; they attempted to capitulate, but all terms were refused; they surrendered at discretion—and in the sixteenth century surrender at discretion commonly meant death. As these men could show no authority nor commission for their invasion of Ireland—not even from the Pope, though they pleaded his orders—they were summarily put to the sword, to the number of about 600, some score of the officers being

excepted, apparently for the sake of the prospective ransom. The Queen made no comment beyond a regret that the officers had not shared the fate of the men; and the poet Spenser—a man of almost feminine delicacy of feeling—who was present as Grey's secretary, found no fault with what would now be called a horrible butchery. These facts would sufficiently prove the deed to have been in accordance with the usage of the age, even if we did not know that, in somewhat similar circumstances, Oxenham and his whole party had been hanged at Panama or Lima, and that, some twenty months later, the prisoners taken at Terceira were ruthlessly hanged at St Michael's.

Mendoza, the Spanish ambassador in London, took the position so carefully prepared for him, maintaining that the Italians were servants of the Pope, and that neither he nor his King had anything to do with the matter; but Elizabeth was not satisfied; and when he asked to see her on the subject of Drake's piracies he could get no further answer than that the Queen would not receive him, except in a private capacity, until she had cleared up the Irish business. She knew, in fact, that some of the Spanish prisoners at Fort del Ore had declared that they were enlisted and brought over by Recalde. As Mendoza refused to wait on the Queen in a private capacity, and as she would not see him in a public one, he was reduced to impressing his grievances on her ministers, whom he repeatedly and vehemently warned of the trouble and danger they were preparing for their country. He was an old soldier, who had served with Alva, and was, no doubt, capable, within certain limits, of forming an opinion as to the ability of an English army to resist the Spanish *tercios* if once landed; but he does not seem to have realised, either at this time or later, that there was an enormous difference between the threat of landing the *tercios* and actually doing it.

Others there were, however, who not only understood the absolute difficulty of landing on an enemy's coast in the face of opposition, but who could venture to tell the King that the Spanish power at sea was relatively inferior to that of the English. They warned him that the English ships, built after a new design, were fast and weatherly to a degree of which Spanish sailors had no conception; that their guns were numerous and heavy, and they carried them close to the water; that their men were seamen and gunners, able to work the ships and fight them, and that there was no need for crowding them with soldiers. It was not to be supposed that they would fight hand to hand, as the Spaniards would wish. They would fight with their great guns, and in so doing would have a very great advantage. No doubt, they said, there were many who would assure him that with the forces at his disposal—great ships, galleasses, and galleys—redress for such injuries as Drake's voyage was in his own hands. In point of fact his ships were very inferior to the English, and galleys were quite useless outside the Mediterranean. The difference in the power of the fleets was so great that it was open to the

English to insult his coasts at their pleasure. The only remedy was at once to build 100 galleasses and a dozen or fifteen ships of the new design. The cost would be but a small price to pay for the command of the sea, which these would give him; and indeed the cost of the guns could be saved by arming the ships with guns from the forts which the existence of such a fleet would render no longer necessary.

It was a matter of course that proposals so radical should not be approved. If they were ever seriously considered they would be referred to Santa Cruz; and Santa Cruz' predilections must have favoured the galleys, with which his most brilliant services had been performed. He was rather a soldier afloat than a sailor; and when, in the following year, he had to lead a fleet for the reduction of the Azores, although galleys could not be employed, the tactics of his victory were those of galley warfare, and were successful, because Strozzi had no higher understanding of the art of war by sea than Santa Cruz himself. It is this that makes it doubtful whether his death at a very critical period really made such a vast difference to the fortunes of Spain as has been often supposed. Assuredly the scheme for the invasion of England, which, at the King's command, he drew up in 1586, does not seem to mark a true appreciation of the conditions.

The dazzling success of Drake's voyage to the South Sea, and the favour shown him by the Queen, naturally gave rise to other ventures of a similar character. The first of these of any importance was intended for China in 1582, under the command of Edward Fenton; but it got no farther than the coast of Brazil, where one of the ships was lost. Fenton, whose principal claim to the command lay in his being the brother-in-law of John Hawkins, proved quite incompetent and returned to England with his men in a state of mutiny and his vice-admiral in irons. Another voyage which, by its tragic ending, has always excited great interest, was made by four ships which sailed in June, 1583, under the command of Sir Humphrey Gilbert, with the avowed object of founding a colony in Newfoundland. That part of the adventure failed at once. The intending colonists had pictured to themselves a life of ease under a genial climate; and, when they found the reality not quite so pleasant, they begged to be sent home. Some were sent off at once in one of the ships; another ship was wrecked. With the other two, Gilbert stood along the coast to the southward, and—apparently to examine it better—moved into the smallest vessel, a pinnace of 10 tons burden, named the *Squirrel*, and refused to leave her when he finally announced his intention to return to England. But whether that was really his intention, or whether he hoped to capture a homeward-bound treasure ship, it is impossible to say. The way to England did certainly not lie to the south of the Azores, but there the ships were on September 9, when in a great storm the *Squirrel* was overwhelmed and "swallowed up" by the sea.

There were, without doubt, other smaller expeditions of a more frankly piratical character, but nothing is known of them beyond the vague and untrustworthy reports of Mendoza, who—feeling deeply the insult conveyed in the Queen's recognition of Drake, in her visiting him at Deptford, and in her knighting him on board the *Golden Hind* under the standard—did what lay in his power to incense the King in Spain and to stir up intrigue and conspiracy in England, till, in January, 1584, his complicity with Throckmorton's plot led to his being summarily ordered to leave the country. Independently of other grievances on both sides, the exclusive colonial policy of the Spaniards and the depredations of the English privateers must be considered as provocative in a very high degree; and the expulsion of the Spanish ambassador was rather indicative of the angry feeling than, in itself, a cause of it. Even so, war did not immediately follow. It was not till more than a year afterwards that the Spanish King took the first distinctly hostile step by laying an embargo on all English ships in Spanish ports. Both before this and afterwards Elizabeth was prepared to interchange diplomatic inanities so long as they would prevent a declaration of war; but her willingness to do this did not hinder her meeting hostile deeds with their like; and the embargo on English ships was promptly answered by a corresponding embargo on Spanish ships, by an active interference in the war in the Low Countries, and by commissioning Drake to undertake a war of reprisals against the Spanish settlements in the West Indies and elsewhere.

But though fully authorised by the Queen, the expedition was in the main a joint-stock business. The Queen supplied two ships of war; nineteen merchant ships from London and the west country formed the bulk of the fleet; and there were besides some eight or ten pinnaces and private ships sailing on their own account. With Drake as commander-in-chief were Martin Frobisher as admiral of the London contingent, Christopher Carleill in command of the soldiers, Francis Knollys the younger, a near kinsman of the Queen and brother-in-law of the Earl of Leicester, Edward Wynter, son of Sir William, the surveyor of the navy, Richard, son of John Hawkins, the treasurer of the navy, and many others of less note. In all there were about thirty ships in the fleet which sailed from Plymouth on September 14, 1585. Capturing, plundering, and destroying as they went, they rested for a while in the Vigo river, sacked and burnt Santiago and Porto Praya in the Cape Verde Islands, gutted San Domingo, plundered Cartagena on the Spanish main and held it to ransom, burning all the ships and galleys which they could not take away; cruised for a month off Cape St Antonio, threatened Havana, the defences of which, however, were judged too strong; and, passing up the coast of Florida, took, plundered and burnt St Augustine, a town of about 250 houses, not one of which was left standing. They then relieved and took away from Wokokan the

colonists who had been sent out the year before by Sir Walter Raleigh, and finally returned to Portsmouth at the end of July, 1586. The booty brought home was valued at from sixty to sixty-five thousand pounds—small in comparison with what Drake had won with much smaller means; for, warned by past experiences, the Spaniards, at the first alarm, carried off their portable property to the woods or mountains in the background. But in the destruction of the Spanish settlements and in the heavy blow to Spanish trade the advantage from the point of view of impending war was very great. Whether more might have been done if the Queen had fully made up her mind is doubtful. Several years later Sir William Monson wrote that “had we kept and defended those places when in our possession, and provided for them to have been relieved and succoured out of England, we had diverted the war from this part of Europe.” Theoretically, this sounds well; but at the time it was utterly impracticable. Neither Elizabeth nor England could have furnished the money or the men that would have been required for the adequate maintenance of such garrisons at such a distance; and, though the power of Spain beyond the seas was afterwards proved to be, in great measure, a hollow pretence, it was still formidable.

Long before Drake's return news of the raid had reached Philip and had goaded him to retaliation. For many years past, all his accredited advisers had urged on him the necessity of crushing England as a preliminary to the subjugation of the Netherlands; and though, by reason of his own acquaintance with England, of his more comprehensive knowledge of what Englishmen had done even during his own reign, and of the humble but definite warnings which had reached him, he had a clearer view of the difficulties of the task than any of those about him, he was still unable to realise that, as against such an enterprise as he was contemplating, the advantage lay with the English. For many years—ever since the appropriation by Elizabeth of Alva's money in 1569—there had been distinct proposals for the invasion of England and general rumours of the design. Whenever a few ships were collected in a Spanish port, English agents sent over news that preparations were on foot; but it does not appear that Philip himself definitely entertained the project till driven to it by Drake's savage raid through the West Indies. It was then that the Marquis of Santa Cruz was called into council, and gave his opinion in favour of the enterprise. Politically, he agreed with the several governors of the Netherlands; Alva had urged it; Don John, to whose opinion the victory of Lepanto gave weight, considered that it would be an easy task; he had been willing to undertake it, to conquer England and marry the Queen of Scots—if Philip would only have permitted him.

And, from the naval point of view, Santa Cruz saw but little more difficulty than Don John. He had formed a very poor opinion of English seamen. He had seen them, he said, at Terceira, where they

had been the first to fly. It is, in fact, very uncertain whether there were any English ships with Strozzi on that disastrous day; and if any, they were only small privateers, whose captains showed much better judgment than Strozzi did. But this Santa Cruz did not know and could not understand. He believed that the English had been there and had behaved like dastards; and he believed that he might judge the whole nation by his experience of this small chance portion of it. Still, from the mere numbers of the enemy, he concluded that to carry out the business satisfactorily a great effort would be necessary, and he drew up a scheme for the invasion which, centralising the effort, was to call together all the shipping of Spain and her dependencies, to embark all the available troops, horse and foot, and send them out in one vast armada, consisting of 150 great ships of war, 360 smaller vessels and store ships, six galleasses and 40 galleys, or a total of 556 ships and 94,222 men of all arms. He had no liking for a divided command. The army in the Low Countries might stay there, and he himself, with the forces from Spain, would conduct the whole business in England.

But the magnitude of this proposal condemned it. To denude the kingdom of ships and soldiers, and leave it exposed to a sudden raid by a daring and desperate foe was not to be thought of, more especially as the King had been warned that such a raid would very probably be attempted. Moreover, to find the money for so vast a scheme was an absolute impossibility. In the opinion of all Europe, the wealth of Spain, based on the mines of Mexico and Peru and the trade of the East, was boundless; but in reality, owing to a faulty system, speculation and extravagance, the government and the Crown were miserably poor. Philip indeed hoped that, by judicious management, the Pope might be induced to subsidise the expedition. It was so easy to represent the invasion as undertaken solely in the interests of the Church and the true religion, that it might appear almost a duty for the Head of the Church to support it. To some extent Philip's diplomacy was successful at Rome. The Pope promised to contribute a million crowns; but he positively refused to make any advance, or to pay any part of the money, till the Spanish troops were landed in England.

But more even than want of money, political considerations made it imprudent as yet to advise the King to undertake an enterprise which would certainly be costly and might be dangerous, merely to establish the Queen of Scots on the throne of England, with the risk of so strengthening the Guises as to render them masters of France and independent of Spain. The execution of Mary Stewart early in February, 1587, resolved this difficulty; the claims of James of Scotland might be put aside, as they had been by his mother's will, and the conquest of England achieved in the name of the Infanta Isabel, to whom the King transferred his rights, hereditary or acquired.

For the first time the way for carrying out the project of invasion seemed clear, and the preparations were pushed forward. It was hoped that the expedition would be ready to sail by the summer. In any case it could scarcely have been ready; but on April 2 Drake, in command of a relatively small squadron, sailed from Plymouth with full and adequate instructions "to impeach the joining together of the King of Spain's fleet out of their several ports, to keep victuals from them, to follow them in case they should be come forward towards England or Ireland, and to cut off as many of them as he could and impeach their landing; as also to set upon such as should either come out of the West or East Indies into Spain, or go out of Spain thither." Before he sailed the Queen had so far wavered in her purpose as to issue contradictory orders, strictly enjoining him to "forbear to enter forcibly into any of the King's ports, or to offer violence to any of his towns or shipping within his harbours, or to do any act of hostility upon the land." These orders, however, Drake never received; we may presume that care was taken by Walsingham or by Hawkins that he should not receive them; and it was thus on the original orders that he acted.

Many weeks before, Philip had been warned that the expedition was preparing, either to look out for the fleet from the West Indies or to insult the Spanish ports; and, more recently, Cadiz had been distinctly named as the point aimed at. But nothing had been done; no preparations for defence had been made; and when, on April 19, Drake came off the port, he had no difficulty in beating back the seven galleys which alone attempted to oppose his entrance, and forcing his way into the harbour, which he found crowded with shipping. The further details have been variously reported. According to Philip the damage done was trifling, though the daring of the attempt was great; but Drake, who may be supposed to have had a more exact knowledge of what happened, wrote: "We sank a Biscayan of 1200 tons, burnt a ship of 1500 tons, belonging to the Marquis of Santa Cruz, and 31 ships more of from 1000 to 200 tons the piece, carried away with us four laden with provisions, and departed thence at our pleasure, with as much honour as we could wish." Fenner, in nearly exact agreement, wrote: "There were by supposition 38 barks fired, sunk and brought away, which amounted unto 13,000 tons of shipping"; and a French account estimated the damage, at the very lowest, at from three to four hundred thousand crowns. It continued: "It is supposed that the English fleet will now take its course for the Canary Islands, Madeira, or Terceira, and that it will there do all the damage it can and cruise for the fleets which are coming from the Indies, upon which Drake most likely has his main design." This, however, was not Drake's view. The cruise for the treasure fleets would be more lucrative; but the business on which he had come was to prevent the gathering of the Spanish ships for the invasion of England. There were several at Cadiz which, by flying up the creeks,

had escaped the general destruction; others were to come from Naples, Sicily, Tuscany, or Genoa, from Cartagena and other ports within the Straits; and the general rendezvous was Lisbon. Anticipating the strategy of Sir John Jervis two hundred years later, Drake understood that, as all these must pass Cape St Vincent, it was there that he should look out for them. He accordingly took possession of Sagres, destroyed all the batteries which commanded the anchorage and watering-places, and, having thus secured a base, passed on to reconnoitre Lisbon. He seems to have had no satisfactory information as to its defences, which he found too strong to be taken by an unsupported attack from the sea, or to be passed without a fresh leading wind. And this never came. He lay at anchor in Cascaes Bay while his pinnaces captured or destroyed every coaster that came in sight, and that under the very eyes of Santa Cruz, who, in Drake's words, "was content to suffer us there quietly to tarry, and never charged us with one cannon-shot"; the explanation of which is that his ships were not ready for sea, and that his galleys—even if they had their guns on board, which is doubtful—had no store of powder or shot. And so, finding that no taunts could induce the Marquis to come out, and judging that it was impossible to force his way in, Drake went back to Sagres, where he could give his men a run on shore and clean his ships, at the same time that he was holding a place of manifest strategic advantage.

"As long as it shall please God to give us provisions to eat and drink," he wrote to Walsingham, "and that our ships and wind and weather will permit us, you shall surely hear of us near this Cape of St Vincent....If there were here six more of her Majesty's good ships of the second sort, we should be the better able to keep the forces from joining, and haply take or impeach his fleets from all places." Similarly Fenner wrote: "Shipping we take daily which are bound with pipe-boards and hoops for Andalusia, which we burn, whereof they will have so great a want as will be to them a marvellous offence....We hold this Cape so greatly to our benefit and so much to their disadvantage that the attaining thereof is a great blessing. For the rendezvous is at Lisbon, where we understand of some 25 ships and seven galleys. The rest, we lie between home and them, so as the body is without the members; and they cannot come together by reason that they are unfurnished of their provisions in every degree, in that they are not united together." It is an interesting detail that of the great number of coasting vessels that fell into Drake's hands at this place nearly half were laden with hoops and pipe-staves, to the amount of about 1700 tons in weight, equivalent to casks of the content of near 30,000 tons of liquor, all which were burnt. The loss of these seasoned staves and the consequent necessity of using new ones had much to do with the ruin that afterwards fell on the Spanish fleet.

Meanwhile, Philip was furnishing an instance of the folly of attempting

to command the details of war from a distance. He, in Madrid, was controlling the movements at Cadiz and Lisbon, despatching new and contradictory orders on the arrival of every fresh piece of intelligence. Santa Cruz had rightly interpreted the meaning of Drake's occupation of Sagres, and was anxious to complete his ships' companies of soldiers, in order to put to sea and meet him. At Cadiz, where the soldiers had arrived, they wished to have the defeating of Drake in their own hands; and thus between them and the King at Madrid, nothing was done. And whilst they were wrangling, Drake quitted his station. His strategy, in its entirety, was in advance of his age. Theoretically, it was perfect; practically, the ships were not yet able to keep the sea for an indefinite time; and there was no provision for a constant succession of reliefs. The ships wanted refitting; the men were sickly and discontented; most of the merchantmen parted company in a gale of wind and took care not to rejoin. The fleet was reduced to ten sail; and, though six of these were Queen's ships and the force was still formidable, the men were clamouring to return and were on the verge of mutiny. Borough, the vice-admiral, had been for some weeks under close arrest for questioning Drake's authority; and now, at his suggestion—as Drake believed—the *Lion*, on board which he was confined, made sail away from the fleet. It was a sign which Drake could not misread in an age when the bonds of discipline were very slack, and when the recognition of mere service rank was ill-defined. So, leaving the Spaniards to evolve order out of confusion and contradiction as best they could, he went off to the Azores to look for a homeward-bound East Indiaman, of whose expected arrival he had sure intelligence. On June 9 he fell in with her near St Michael's and captured her. He was anxious to return to his post of vantage at Sagres, but with his fleet in its reduced condition deemed this to be impossible. He determined, therefore, to take his prize to England, in hopes of getting reinforcements to enable him to carry out his design. The value of the prize was enormous, great enough to make her capture in itself an important success; but the still more important work which Drake had done at Sagres was not continued, because the Queen, who, three months previously, had annulled the orders under which Drake had been acting, could not now resolve to wage the war against Philip with the singleness of purpose which is essential to good success. She had been willing to let the King feel her power to injure him; she was anxious not to provoke him to extreme measures.

But on these Philip had already determined. The general scheme of the enterprise had been formulated; ships, men, arms, stores, and victuals were being got together; and, though the destruction which Drake had wrought at Cadiz and the delay enforced by his holding Sagres and cruising off Cape St Vincent had rendered it impossible for the Armada to sail that year, there was every intention that it should sail early in 1588. So the preparations were pushed forward, and the fame

of them was spread abroad throughout Europe, telling with much exaggeration of the size and number of the ships and of the guns, the quantity of ammunition, of victuals, and of all other stores. Of the ships there could be no doubt: there they were, large, lofty, and imposing; built rather for carrying cargo than for fighting, though their towering poops and forecastles and defensive bulkheads rendered them formidable in close combat, with which the Spaniards alone were familiar. Their guns were merely auxiliary to the weapons of the soldiers, and were, for the most part, small and—in comparison with the size of the ships—few. They were only intended to fill up the time between nearing the enemy and finally closing with him; or, perhaps, to facilitate the movement by shooting away some of his spars and rendering it difficult for him to escape. To this end was devoted the training which the men had with the guns; but that training was extremely slight, for the soldiers, who formed the greater part of the crews, as well as their officers, who commanded the ships, despised the great gun as the weapon of cowards who would not willingly come to push of pike or stroke of sword. The soldiers, as such, were undoubtedly of the best; but on board ship their place would have been advantageously taken by seamen who could work the ship or the guns. As it was, the sailors were few in number, were looked down on by the soldiers as an inferior caste, and had neither zeal nor enthusiasm for the service. The guns being intended more for ornament than for use, the quantity of ammunition supplied was naturally small, as calculated on a scale which former experience had shown to be sufficient.

All these errors—serious as they proved to be—were due not to professional ignorance nor to a false economy, but to an inability to comprehend the new conditions under which the Spaniards were going to fight. It may be fairly presumed that the armament of the ships, the supply of ammunition, the proportion of soldiers to sailors, and other like technical details, if not actually ordered by Santa Cruz, were at least approved by him and by the distinguished officers who held command under him—such as Juan Martinez de Recalde, Alonso de Leyva, Miguel de Oquendo, Martin de Bertendona, Diego Flores de Valdes and Pedro de Valdes, all men of experience in naval war as it was understood in Spain. The victuals were supplied by contractors, and were afterwards found to be exceedingly bad. In all ages and in all countries, victualling contractors have been unable to resist the temptation to supply inferior articles for the use of sailors or soldiers, who will be far away before they find out the fraud, and may very possibly die or be killed before they can complain. It has everywhere been found that only the strictest supervision can be trusted to keep them straight; and in Spain, in 1588, that supervision was altogether wanting. Something, however, must be allowed for the ignorance of the age and the high pressure under which

things were got ready. The art of properly preserving meat, for instance, was not yet known. Moreover, Philip, after hesitating for years, was, now that his mind was made up, in a desperate hurry.

The preparations were, however, brought to a standstill by the death, on January 30, 1588, of Santa Cruz, which was attributed to vexation at an implied reprimand from the King for alleged want of zeal or energy. That this was a serious blow to the plan of invasion cannot be doubted. Santa Cruz was a man of long experience in war and in command. Malta, Lepanto, and Terceira had given prestige to his name; and, though he was not ready to accept the revolution in naval war which the English were preparing, he would at least have known how to apply the tactics with which he was familiar. His successor, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, was not familiar with any, and was ignorant alike of the art of commanding men and of ordering a battle. But he was a man of the highest rank and of great wealth; and in a Spanish fleet it was absolutely necessary that the Commander-in-Chief should be a personage of high rank. The great nobles who commanded the *tercios* would have considered themselves degraded by being called on to obey a mere gentleman, however high his professional qualifications; and the men would have rendered a very unwilling obedience to one whom they might have stigmatised as a mere sailor. Even in the individual ships the commanding officer was the officer in command of the soldiers; the captain of the seamen held a very subordinate position, not unlike that of the master in an English ship. As the mouthpiece of the King, carrying out orders which left little to his discretion, and as arbitrator between the pretensions of the arrogant nobles by whom he was surrounded, it was thought that Medina Sidonia would be a very suitable man, the more so as his gentle character was not likely to put forward his own opinion against the King's, or to question the King's appointment of the Duke of Parma as ultimate Commander-in-Chief of the invasion—a measure to which Santa Cruz had strongly objected, but which was an essential part of Philip's plan as finally determined on. The fleet was to go straight up the Channel, seize Margate, join hands with Parma, convoy his men across in their boats and land a proportion of soldiers from the ships as an addition to the army. As a further instruction, however, the King wrote to Medina Sidonia: "Even if Drake should have brought a fleet into these seas, to cause a diversion—as our advices from England say is likely—you are not to turn aside or delay the voyage to look for him; but if he shall follow you, or hang about you, then you may attack him; and so also if you meet him at the entrance of the English Channel; for it may be very advantageous to attack the enemy's forces whilst divided and so prevent their uniting." This was dated on March 22, when the English fleet was still gathering.

From motives similar to those which operated in Spain the command-in-chief of the English forces at sea had been given to the Lord Admiral,

the Queen's cousin, Lord Howard of Effingham, who had, however, had considerable experience of the sea and had done good service on shore. Drake had been sent to Plymouth to levy the shipping of the western counties; and there, on May 23, he was joined by Howard with the main fleet, including the greater part of the Queen's ships. Lord Henry Seymour, with Sir William Wynter and Sir Henry Palmer, was left with three ships of force—the *Rainbow*, the *Vanguard*, and the *Antelope*—and a considerable number of smaller vessels, to keep watch in the Narrow Sea and look out for any movement on the part of the Duke of Parma. In this he was to be assisted by a Dutch flotilla under the command of Count Justin of Nassau—an illegitimate son of William the Silent—whose force, though too feeble to take any part in the engagements with the Armada itself, was strong enough to act as a deterrent to Parma, and to render it impossible for him even to embark his men without the protection of the grand fleet. With Howard at Plymouth, besides Drake, were Hawkins, Frobisher, Fenner, Fenton, Crosse, Raymond, Warde—all experienced seamen; but several of the ships, and those among the largest, were commanded by young men of noble birth, whose chief qualification was that they were kinsmen of the Lord Admiral's. Contrary, however, to the Spanish custom, they were captains of the ships, not mere captains of the soldiers.

When the King of Spain signed the instructions to Medina Sidonia, his information that Drake was at Plymouth and Howard in the Narrow Sea was quite correct, and in fact continued to be so till the Armada sailed from Lisbon on May 20. It then consisted of 130 ships, having an aggregate tonnage of 57,868, and manned by 8050 seamen, 18,973 soldiers, with volunteers, galley slaves, etc., bringing the total up to 30,493. The gross numbers seemed and still seem imposing, though the small number of the seamen points at once to a dangerous weakness. Of the ships, 80 were reported as over 300 tons, but 18 of these were rated as store-ships; even of the remainder a considerable number were mere transports, carrying but few guns and those of the smallest size, and as fighting ships were useless except against an enemy who would be foolish enough to lay them on board. To give the number of ships which could, in the English sense, be called efficient men-of-war is impossible; but they cannot have been more than 50, and were probably not nearly so many.

Immediately the Armada put to sea, its troubles began. The weather was boisterous; and the ships, built and rigged for fine weather passages, with a fair, equable wind, to or from the West Indies, were overmasted and undermanned. The seamen were also of very indifferent quality, being, in great measure, mere fair-weather sailors. The ships made very bad weather, were strained, leaked excessively; some were dismasted, all were reduced to a deplorable condition, which the sea-sick soldiers thought worse than it really was. Their victuals,

too, failed: the bread was mouldy, the meat was putrid, the water-casks—made of green staves—leaked, and the water ran short. Sickness broke out among the men, and Medina Sidonia considered himself lucky in getting the bulk of his fleet safely into Corunna, where he anchored on June 9, but in such distress and confusion that he made no general signal, and took no pains to let distant ships know what he was doing; so that many kept on their way to the appointed rendezvous, south of the Scilly Islands, whence they were recalled, but not before they had been seen and reported, on June 19, by some English traders. He was not able to sail again till July 12.

Meantime Howard, with the English fleet at Plymouth, had been very anxious to visit the coast of Spain and work such havoc among the enemy's shipping that their design would have to be again postponed, if not altogether abandoned. This seemed particularly easy when it was known that they were congregated in the harbour of Corunna; and it now appears quite certain that an onslaught there, such as Drake had made at Cadiz the previous year, guided by the experience then gained and supported by a few fire-ships, would have utterly ruined the Spanish navy. But Elizabeth would not allow the attempt to be made. She professed to doubt whether the Armada was really coming; she affected to consider that the differences between the two nations might be settled by negotiation. Whether she hoped to hoodwink Philip, or whether she imagined that, if not further provoked, he would allow the war to conduct itself in the same semi-private, piratical, and economical way as during the last ten years, it is impossible to say; or may be she really believed that the danger of missing the Armada was too great; that if it had already put to sea it might be stretching to the westward while the English were crossing the Bay of Biscay; and might, without opposition, come into the Channel and off Dunkirk, while Howard or Drake was searching the Spanish coast from Corunna to Cadiz. She turned a deaf ear to the arguments of Howard and his council of war, and peremptorily ordered him not to go beyond Ushant.

Another and very pressing anxiety that filled Howard's mind was the frequently occurring want of victuals. There was no public store ready to hand; and the sudden call to supply a force numbering some 15,000 men taxed the energies of the victualling agents. By the utmost economy and putting the men on short allowance he managed to get together what might be called a private stock against an emergency; but whilst in the Narrow Sea, and afterwards, at Plymouth, he never ceased urging on the Queen's ministers the necessity for liberal supplies. It does not appear that there was any undue sparing of expense, though there was, of course, a strict attention to economy; but it was impossible to provide the larger supplies which Howard demanded. The practice, so far as there was one, was to send at one time victuals for four weeks,

and to replenish them by another supply for four weeks about a week before the earlier supply was exhausted. There was thus, as Howard pointed out, the continually recurring danger of the fleet being obliged to put to sea, in presence of the enemy, with not more than a few days' victuals on board. This was what did actually happen. The fleet had been out, spreading in a long line from Ushant to Scilly, when a fresh southerly wind blew it back to Plymouth. The victuals were running low and the ships busy provisioning, when, on July 19, the Armada was reported off the Lizard. The same southerly wind which drove the English fleet in, had carried the Spanish straight across the Bay of Biscay. The fresh breeze had, however, been too much for them. The ships were scattered; many had parted company, and it was not till the next day, July 20, that they had nearly all rejoined.

In accordance with the custom very generally followed in an age when the commander-in-chief of a fleet was often regarded as a president and moderator rather than as actual commander, and especially necessary under the conditions existing among the Spaniards, a council of war was held, but was unable to decide anything for want of intelligence. A proposal to look into Plymouth and attack the English fleet came to nothing, because it was not known whether it was there or not. In the afternoon they saw some ships under the land, but the weather was thick, with rain and mist, and they could not make out either their number or quality. It was not till night had fallen that one of the pinnaces picked up an English boat, and the Duke learned from the prisoners that the English fleet had been at Plymouth but had got to sea that afternoon. Their ships had, in fact, warped out into the Sound on the evening of the 19th; on the 20th they had plied out, to windward, against a fresh south-westerly breeze; and the Armada, running to the eastward all night, had by daybreak on the 21st given the English the weather-gage for which they had been working. The fleet with Howard at this time consisted of about seventy ships, a large proportion of which were small coasting vessels, useful as cruisers, as scouts, or to carry messages, but of little fighting value. Thirty of them belonged to the Queen; and of these, thirteen, though on the average smaller than the best of the Spaniards, were more heavily armed. Some seven or eight more were good and efficient ships, of a smaller size, but still heavily armed in comparison with the Spanish ships; and about a dozen or twenty of the merchantmen were sufficiently large and well armed to be able to take part in an engagement. This estimate shows the number of fighting ships in the two fleets to have not been very unequal; those on each side being superior to those of the enemy from their own special point of view; though, indeed, if the Spaniards could have dictated the manner of fighting, they would have had upwards of sixty effective ships, and their superiority would have been overwhelming. They themselves thought that it was; and what they believed was the general belief

throughout Europe. In reality, the superiority to which they trusted was more than nullified by the hopeless inferiority of their ships and their seamen ; it depended entirely on their being able to close with and grapple the English ships, and this they could never succeed in doing. The English ships of the new design had finer lines and were much faster ; they were lower in the water, and were stiffer and more weatherly ; they were rigged and were manned by seamen accustomed to the boisterous weather of the higher latitudes. The choice of the fighting rested with them ; and with that, also the superiority. The Spanish ships were so crank that, in a fresh breeze, their weather guns sent their shot flying through empty space or their lee guns plumped them into the sea, whilst the English, on a more even keel, racked the Spaniards through and through below the water line on the one side, or swept their decks with a murderous hail on the other. They could take their own distance ; and, when the Spaniards tried to close, could slip away from them with an ease that astonished and terrified their enemy.

At the first meeting of the two fleets on the forenoon of July 21 all this was at once apparent. To Drake and many of the others it was no new thing, though it is probable that even they had not realised how vast their advantage was. The fight continued from nine o'clock to about one, when Medina Sidonia, discovering that it was only wasting time, and that he was bound to avoid all delay, made sail before the wind. It was a fatal mistake—one we may be sure that Santa Cruz would not have made. He might not, probably would not, have been able to neutralise the vast superiority of the English ships and the English method of fighting ; but it is not conceivable that a man of his experience would have jumbled the transports, store-ships, and fighting ships in one heterogeneous crowd, or would have sought a pretext of flying before the enemy from a half-finished battle. As it was, the fighting on July 21 gave the keynote to all that followed. The Armada was to hurry on. The flag-ship of Pedro de Valdes, which had suffered severely in the engagement, lost her foremast by a collision with another of her squadron and fell astern. But time could not be wasted in defending the noblest ship in the fleet ; she was deserted and fell into the hands of the English. Another, the vice-admiral of Oquendo's squadron, was disabled by an accidental explosion of powder ; she, too, was deserted, was taken by the English and sent to Weymouth. And ever the Armada sailed heavily on with a fresh fair wind, the English following, ready to seize on any stragglers, or to fight if opportunity offered. There was thus a smart action off St Alban's Head on the 23rd, and another on the 25th off St Catherine's in the Isle of Wight, as a visible result of which a third large ship, Recalde's flag-ship, was so damaged as to be obliged to leave the fleet and make for the French coast, where—in trying to go into the Seine—she ran ashore and became a total wreck. Other ships had suffered much, both in material damage

and in men ; and without further fighting the Armada ran on to Calais, off which they anchored on the afternoon of the 27th.

The Duke then sent a message to Parma, urging him to embark at once ; but the tone of his letter implied that he expected Parma to help and protect the fleet, rather than that the fleet was prepared to ensure a safe passage to Parma. Parma's reply, which came on the 28th, was unsatisfactory. He was not ready to embark and could not be so in less than a fortnight ; but even if he had been ready he could not have started till the Dutch flotilla was out of the way. If Medina Sidonia would clear the sea of Count Justin, Seymour, Howard, and all the rest of them, it would then be time to think of crossing over to England. The report of this answer and all that it implied added to the discouragement which the week's experience had impressed on the Spaniards. They had started jubilant in the expectation of a triumphant advance up the Channel and across the North Sea from the Low Countries. The reality had been one succession of disasters and of battles, in which they had suffered terribly without appearing to have inflicted any loss on their nimble assailants. And the numbers of the enemy were increasing. Many small vessels had joined the English fleet on its course up Channel ; and, as Howard anchored off Calais, a gunshot to windward of the Spaniards, Seymour, with his squadron, rejoined, adding three capital ships to the fighting power. There were thus in the English fleet, of Queen's ships and merchantmen, from forty to forty-five that could be considered effective men-of-war—a fair match, so far as armament went, for the best forty or forty-five Spaniards, but in reality very superior, by reason of their mobility, steadiness, and gunnery ; qualities which, though too late, the Spaniards were beginning to appreciate and fear. Their nerves were already unstrung, when, about midnight of the 28th, eight hastily improvised fire-ships came down on them with wind and tide. As they burst into flames, Medina Sidonia made the signal to slip the cables, intending to return in the daylight and take up his old berth. But a panic seized the Spaniards. "The fire-ships of Antwerp !" they cried, and, cutting their cables, they drifted away to the north. They were, for the time, paralysed with fear. When morning came they were off Gravelines, closely followed by the English fleet, which now attacked in its full force, knowing that this was the crisis of the campaign. The Armada must be driven into the North Sea, past the coast of Flanders, beyond the reach of Parma. Seymour and Wynter, Drake, Hawkins, and Frobisher led the several attacks ; Howard, who had waited off Calais to ensure the capture or destruction of the admiral of the galleasses, the most heavily armed ship in the Armada, came up a little later. This galleass had injured her rudder in the confusion of the night, and in the morning was captured after a stubborn and hand-to-hand fight, in which her commander, Hugo de Moncada, was killed. The French, who had not interfered during the fight, now claimed the prize ; and Howard, satisfied with her being

lost to the Spaniards, left her, and joined the main battle, which raged fiercely during the greater part of the day.

But the superiority of the English was felt from the first, and the want of tactical guiding was as marked in the Spanish fleet as its many other shortcomings. The wind was at S.S.W. and the Armada had streamed off before it. The Duke made no real effort to collect the effective ships, many of which were far to leeward; and the brunt of the battle fell on some fifteen which clustered round their admiral, and fought valiantly but without avail. Of recorded incidents much might be written; we have them in Spanish and in English, but all to the same effect: the Spanish ships could not close with the English, and against the English guns the Spanish guns were powerless. Some sentences from Medina Sidonia's letter to the King put this in the clearest light. "In the rear, Don Francisco de Toledo (in the *San Felipe*) abode the coming of the enemy and endeavoured to grapple with them; whereupon they assailed him, and by shooting of ordnance brought him to great extremity. Don Diego Pimentel (in the *San Mateo*) came to relieve him and both were hardly pressed; seeing which, Juan Martinez de Recalde came to their assistance, with Don Augustin Mexía, and rescued them from this strait. But notwithstanding this, these ships returned and again assaulted the enemy; as likewise did Don Alonso de Luzon, and the *Santa Maria de Begoña*, in which was Garibay, and the *San Juan de Sicilia*, in which was Don Diego Tellez Enriquez. These came near to boarding the enemy, yet could they not grapple with them; they fighting with their great ordnance, and our men defending themselves with arquebuss-fire and musketry, the distance being very small."

When—partly from want of ammunition, partly from hopeless incapacity—the largest Spanish ships were reduced to answering great guns with arquebusses, it is not surprising that the Spaniards suffered very much, the English not at all; or that, after this terrible pounding, the *San Felipe* and the *San Mateo* tried to save themselves by running on shore on the coast of Flanders. The officers and most of the crew of the *San Felipe* escaped to Nieuport, but the ship was taken possession of by the Dutch and carried into Flushing; so also was the *San Mateo*, after a stubborn resistance which ended in the officers being taken prisoners and the men thrown overboard. Other ships went down with all hands; how many was never exactly known; so many in all were ultimately lost that the details were never fully made out. By nightfall the Spaniards were thoroughly, hopelessly beaten, and fled to the north. A few—Leyva and Oquendo are specially named—would fain have prolonged the fight, and did not scruple to hail the Duke and his advisers in most opprobrious terms; but they were unable to stop the rout, and were forced to fly with the rest. The English commanders were slow to realise the completeness of their victory. Howard was inclined to think the destruction of the great galleass the most important part of the day's

success. "Their force," he wrote the same evening, "is wonderful great and strong, and yet we pluck their feathers by little and little"; and again, as late as August 8: "Although we have put the Spanish fleet past the Firth, and I think past the isles, yet God knoweth whether they go either to the Nase of Norway or into Denmark or to the Isles of Orkney to refresh themselves and so to return; for I think they dare not return to Spain with this dishonour and shame to their King and overthrow of their Pope's credit." Drake, too, wrote on the evening of the battle: "God hath given us so good a day in forcing the enemy so far to leeward, as I hope in God the Prince of Parma and the Duke of Sidonia shall not shake hands this few days; and whensoever they shall meet, I believe neither of them will greatly rejoice of this day's service." But by August 8 he saw clearer and wrote: "Whether he mind to return or not I know not, but my opinion is that he neither mindeth nor is in case to do so. Certainly their people were many sick, and without doubt many killed; and by report of such as are taken, their ships, masts, ropes, and sails much decayed by shot, and more it had been had we not wanted powder."

This want of powder has been frequently adduced as an instance of the Queen's ill-judged economy or cruel parsimony. In reality it was nothing of the sort. The allowance of powder had been great beyond all precedent, but the expenditure had been so also. "Some Spaniards that we have taken," wrote Howard, "that were in the fight at Lepanto, do say that the worst of our four fights that we have had with them did exceed far the fight they had there; and they say that at some of our fights we had twenty times as much great shot there plied as they had there." Lepanto was fought, by the Spaniards, at any rate, on the mediæval tactics which they still favoured, the great guns adding thereto a mere unimportant interlude; the battles in the Channel and off Gravelines were a new departure, which before had been tried only exceptionally and on a very small scale. We know that, on the average, the English guns were larger than the Spanish; that there were, relatively, more of them, and that they were said to be fired quite three times as fast; and yet on the evening of July 29 the Spanish magazines were much more thoroughly depleted than the English. Nor was it of ammunition alone that the Spanish ships were destitute. They were short of victuals and of water; their hulls were torn by the English shot, their rigging cut, their masts badly wounded, their anchors left in Calais roads, and their seamen—too few at the beginning—fearfully reduced by sickness and slaughter.

It was then, and has ever since been, the fashion to say that England was saved from a very great danger by the providential interference of storms; to the Spaniards, it soothed the national pride; to the English, it seemed to point them out as the elect of God. In reality it was quite untrue. From the day on which the Spanish ships appeared off the

Lizard till a week after the battle of Gravelines there was no wind beyond what a well-found ship would prefer; nothing to prevent frequent intercourse by small boats. Subsequently, the weather was bad, and gave effect to the damage wrought by the English guns; for the Spaniards, with no thought of Denmark or Norway, and still less of returning south, were trying to reach their own coast by passing to the west of Ireland. But they were ignorant of the navigation; they had neither pilots nor charts; their ships were not seaworthy, and the weather was wild. As they passed between the Orkney and Shetland Islands they left one ship a wreck on Fair Isle. Some were lost among the Western Hebrides; some near the Giant's Causeway and on the coast of Donegal; twelve were driven into Sligo Bay and there totally lost; others on the outer isles. "And so I can say," wrote Sir Richard Bingham, the Governor of Connaught, "by good estimation, that six or seven thousand men have been cast away on these coasts, save some thousand of them which escaped to land in several places where their ships fell, which since were all put to the sword." Others were wrecked further south. One, driven again into the Channel, was thrown ashore near Salcombe. According to the Spanish estimate, two—in addition to the *San Felipe* and *San Mateo*—were sunk in the battle, nineteen were wrecked in Scotland or Ireland, and thirty-five were not accounted for. In all, captured or destroyed, the loss of ships was returned as sixty-three, and the loss of life was in even greater proportion; for to the men of these ships who were, for the most part, drowned or butchered, must be added the very large number of those who were slain in fight, or died of wounds, sickness, cold, and famine. Few such tremendous and far-reaching catastrophes have been recorded in history.

Nor had the English escaped without severe loss, though not in the battle or the storm. Their ships were uninjured; few of their men—about sixty in all—had been killed or wounded; but when they returned to Margate, after having followed the Spaniards as far as the Firth of Forth, a violent sickness broke out in the fleet. Such a sickness—probably of the nature of typhus or gaol fever—had already appeared in some of the ships while at Plymouth; these had been cleared out, fumigated, and had received new crews; but now, as the excitement of battle was ended, the sickness returned in a more virulent form and became more general. "The infection," wrote Howard on August 22, "is grown very great and in many ships, and now very dangerous; and those that come in fresh are soonest infected; they sicken the one day and die the next." Several of the ships seem to have lost fully half their men—dead or sent on shore sick; others lost a very large proportion; and on September 4 Hawkins wrote from the Downs: "The companies do fall sick daily...our ships are utterly unfitted and unmeet to follow any enterprise from hence."

If the Queen had been loth to begin the war, she now, at any rate,

showed no slackness in her determination to prosecute it. Before August was out she had ordered that measures should be taken to stop the treasure fleet; and, though she was obliged to yield to the assurances that the ships could not be cleaned and refitted in time, she was ready next spring to accept a proposal, which probably originated with Drake, to send an expedition to Portugal, with the nominal object of placing Don Antonio on the throne, and thus dealing a severe blow to Spanish power and Spanish prestige. She was, however, unwilling—or perhaps, rather, unable—to bear the whole expense; and it thus became a joint-stock undertaking, with the Queen as a large shareholder. Reckless, as other pretenders have been, Don Antonio was lavish in his promises and pledges to those who would assist him. To the Queen he would be a vassal; he would pay all the costs of the expedition and a large yearly subsidy. The amount named is of little consequence; it was meant to tempt Elizabeth, but was scarcely intended to be paid. English and Portuguese were to have equal trade rights in England, in Portugal, and in the Indies; several forts in Portugal were to be garrisoned by English, at the cost of Portugal, and between the two countries there was to be perpetual peace. We can see now that from the military point of view the whole idea was a mistake; that to attack Spain on land was relinquishing the advantage of the sea, where we had proved our strength, in order to meet the Spanish army with a mob of raw recruits; for England had no army to supply the force required, and the soldiers newly raised for any expedition were not only ignorant of their duty and of discipline, but were unskilled in the use of arms, and were of the most unpromising material. Some 3000 or 4000 old soldiers from the Netherlands were an efficient nucleus of the force; and about 1000 volunteers, men of good birth or of decent position, were admirable recruits; but the remainder, amounting to some 12,000 men, were the mere scrapings of the gutters and the outcasts of the gaols. And these made up the army, which, under the command of Sir John Norreys, was to vanquish the finest infantry of Europe and virtually establish English rule in Portugal. Afloat, the Queen supplied seven capital ships, round which were gathered twenty armed merchantmen; and transports, store-ships, and private adventurers swelled the number to nearly 200 sail. This was not the kind of expedition which the Admiral of England could be appointed to command; its principal numerical strength was in the land forces, and the whole business was a speculation for the profit of the shareholders—Drake, Norreys, Don Antonio, and the Queen holding the founders' shares.

February 1, 1589, was the date fixed for sailing; but it was the middle of April before the ships were ready, and by that time much of the victuals had been expended; further delay seemed unavoidable, but happily three or four Flemish vessels laden with barley, dried fish, and wine put into Plymouth. Their cargoes were promptly seized for the Queen's

service, and on April 13 the fleet put to sea. The orders to the commanders were contradictory and impossible, and any attempt to explain them on military or even political grounds must fail, because it loses sight of the joint-stock nature of the enterprise which rendered the victualling of the army at the expense of the enemy a measure of commercial economy, and the political objective subservient to the profits of the shareholders. It was suggested, on the one hand, that Spanish ships of war might be looked for at Santander or other ports on the northern coast of Spain; on the other, the advisability of losing no time in getting to Lisbon was impressed on the commanders. But the necessity of feeding the men and the prospect of plunder led to the sack of Corunna and to a delay which threatened the failure of the whole expedition; while it is at least probable that the wish to conciliate Don Antonio was a main reason for the landing at Peniche and the forty miles' march to Lisbon which completely broke down the troops—poor creatures as they were when they were enlisted, and further enervated by their excesses at Corunna and the long confinement on shipboard. From purely military considerations it is clear that the whole expedition should have at once entered the Tagus; that the troops should have landed above Belem; and that, to the combined attack of ships and troops, Lisbon must have fallen. This is so self-evident that it has been supposed that Drake wished it to be done and yielded only to the resolve of Don Antonio and Norreys. But the evidence is conclusive that Drake was in friendly agreement with his two colleagues, and that he promised to take the fleet off Lisbon in order to support them. Instead of doing so he lay in Cascaes Bay, making no attempt to force the passage, and we are obliged to suppose that he did not believe it practicable, though to us there does not appear to have been any insurmountable difficulty. Having been repulsed from the walls of Lisbon by the admirable defence of the Spanish governor, Philip's nephew, the Cardinal Archduke Albert, whose ruthless measures inside the town effectually prevented any rising of the Portuguese, the English troops—such of them as remained after the terrible sickness which had scourged them—fell back to Cascaes Bay, where they were reembarked; and, with their freight of sick and dying, the ships returned to England.

The loss of men was very great, though the exact number was never known. It was variously stated as 3000, 8000, and 11,000 dead; another account, which seems trustworthy, is that there were not 2000 effective men in the fleet on its return. In any case it was very terrible, and the Queen's natural anger at the failure was intensified and exaggerated by the total loss of all the money she had invested in the speculation. There were many others who mourned for the loss of their money; many, too, who mourned for the loss of friends or relations; there was much complaint, much recrimination. Drake and Norreys were put on their defence, and their stories were not always consistent. The

question with whom the blame should rest has been much disputed; but the verdict of the day was certainly unfavourable to Drake, who for the next five years was out of the Queen's service, if not actually in disgrace.

And yet, as engaged in the conduct of a partisan war, no other leader showed any distinguished merit. Privateers in crowds there were, who inflicted a very considerable loss on the Spaniards without any startling advantage to themselves; and the Earl of Cumberland, in a spirit of reckless gambling, fitted out many ventures on a large scale, but with no proportionate success. Even the Queen had no higher idea of what might be achieved by sea, nor were her ventures much more fortunate; and a squadron which she sent out in 1590 under Hawkins and Frobisher, brought back nothing to show as a return for the outlay. There seems no doubt that a more proper course would have been to send a strong fleet, the strongest possible fleet, to the Azores, when the capture, or even the stay, of the *flota*—the treasure ships—would have brought Spain to her knees. During the years immediately following on the defeat of the Armada it does not appear that Philip could have offered any serious resistance to such an attack; but the continued arrival of the treasure from the Indies and three years' respite enabled him to reestablish his navy in imposing numbers; and when at last, in the summer of 1591, a royal squadron, under the command of Lord Thomas Howard, was sent to the Azores to intercept the *flota*, he was able to send a comparatively powerful fleet to drive it away or destroy it. Howard, warned in time, weighed from Flores, where he had been lying, and avoided the intended attack; but one ship, the *Revenge*, by the ignorance, disobedience, or presumption of her commander, Sir Richard Greynville, was caught, beset, and overpowered. Greynville's obstinate defence against great odds has rendered the combat celebrated in story and in song; but its true moral is the disastrous effect of disobedience.

In the following year another attempt was made to command the trade-route through the Azores, but it was still more feeble than that of 1591, and the Queen had only a part interest in it; yet its success in the capture of a Portuguese East Indiaman—the great carrack, the *Madre de Dios*—and the enormous wealth which this one ship contained ought to have convinced her of the advisability of a whole-hearted effort in the same direction. But it did not; she was throughout unable to see that the operations of the fleet were, and must be, the deciding factor in the war, and she continued to believe in the effect of her diplomacy, which was laughed at, and of her army, which was insignificant. The relief of Brest by the capture of the Spanish fort at Crozon in 1594 had but little influence on the course of the war; and it was not till the end of the year, when Drake, having succeeded in making his peace with the Queen, was again called to active service, that any measure of importance was contemplated. It was resolved that he

should command an expedition against Panama, as the spring-head of the Spanish wealth; but the initial mistake was made of joining with him his veteran kinsman, Sir John Hawkins, whom Drake would not acknowledge as his equal and who would not accept the position of second. From the first there was thus a good deal of friction, which the very different and conflicting characters of the men intensified. And the Queen had not yet learnt that great results are not to be obtained without great pains, and apparently supposed that little was called for on her part beyond her sanction. She lent six of her ships and advanced some £20,000; but the bulk of the money required was found by Drake and Hawkins, and by various London or other merchants, who also provided some twenty or thirty ships, large and small. It was in December, 1594, that the expedition was definitely resolved on. If the ships could have been at once fitted, victualled and sent off, with distinct instructions, all might have been well; but this was not Elizabeth's way. She was loth to make up her mind for a distant enterprise, and could not persuade herself that the despatch of such an expedition would not give Philip the chance which she pictured him as waiting for.

In reality, during all these years, the King's chief anxiety had been the fear that he might be attacked at home; and the several reports of fleets fitting out which were brought to England were but exaggerated accounts of preparations for the defence of the Spanish ports. More than this: in addition to the ceaseless trouble in the Netherlands, and the wars and intrigues in France, an insurrection in Aragon was the cause of great embarrassment; and meanwhile, the utter impoverishment of the country was rendering any strenuous effort more and more difficult. While England, with a rapidly increasing commerce and a prosperous war, was rising once again to a foremost place in Europe, Spain, suffering from a faulty and ignorant administration still more than from an unsuccessful and harassing struggle, was fast sinking from the proud position she had held under Philip's father. With a diminishing population, a peasantry ground down, agriculture neglected, manufactures and commerce almost extinct, the pinch of poverty was everywhere felt. The revenues of the commanderies were pledged for the next ten years; the ordinary revenue and the bullion which might be expected from the Indies were mortgaged for three years in advance. Of ships there were still some; but seamen, gunners, money, and enthusiasm were all conspicuously wanting.

But neither Elizabeth nor her ministers knew this. They were quite unable to realise that the Spanish power was by this time little more than a hollow pretence, an inflated bladder which the growing strength of the English navy had pricked, and which it needed but persistent effort to flatten out; they believed, on the contrary, that it was a solid mass which, by its weight and by the force which impelled it, must bear down and crush any direct opposition. They thus accepted with a ready belief,

not unmixed with fear, all the stories of Spanish equipments and armaments which were sent to them by their agents in Spain, who on their side were anxious to justify their existence, and to show their employers a certain equivalent for their pay. It was probably this delusion that interfered with any direct action against Spain during 1593 and 1594, and that prevented Elizabeth from giving more than a half-hearted sanction, limited by very doubtful conditions, to a campaign in the West Indies. At last, after being driven from Brest, the Spaniards attempted from Blavet some petty raids on the English coast, and, in July, 1595, with four galleys, attacked the coast of Cornwall, landed some 400 men, burned Mousehole, Newlyn, and Penzance, and scuttled back, fearing to be stayed by the militia or cut off by a few ships which Drake hurried round from Plymouth. The Queen at once concluded that this was the advanced guard of a formidable expedition intended for Ireland or Scotland, if not for England itself, and sent orders to Drake and Hawkins to go round by the south of Ireland to look for the Spanish fleet; if it were not there, they were to look for it on the coast of Portugal or at Lisbon; and certainly to be home by May, 1596. They readily undertook to look for the Spanish fleet, but refused to wait for it on the coast of Portugal, or to pledge themselves to be back by May; and so, leaving the Queen torn by anxiety, they put to sea on August 28, 1595.

Had they made their way at once to the West Indies, they would apparently have found the Spaniards quite unprepared, and would certainly have been able to pay the costs of the expedition, with a handsome profit, out of the spoils of Cartagena, Porto Bello, and Panama. As it was they seem to have been short of provisions, and to have thus felt it necessary to make an attempt on Las Palmas—in the Grand Canary—if, indeed, they were not rather impelled by a mere desire for plunder. Necessary or not, it was a serious military mistake. The attempt failed; and from some prisoners who fell into their hands the Spaniards learnt enough to enable them to suspect the destination of the fleet and to send word to their settlements in the West Indies. A still greater, a fatal evil, was the quarrel between the generals. Drake, at all times bold to the verge of rashness, found himself hampered by his colleague, whose constitutional caution was rendered more obstinate by age. There may have been other reasons, personal or political, of which we know nothing, though some have been suggested. But the want of concord was a fact patent to the whole fleet. On no point of service could the two agree; and it almost looked as if the death of Hawkins, worn out by age, fever, and vexation, might prove a distinct advantage to the expedition. But the Spaniards, having been forewarned, were, for once in their national history, forearmed; and, from his now dilatory proceedings, it may be thought that the hand of death was already pressing on Drake. At Porto Rico he was beaten off; and when, after delaying seventeen days at Rio de la Hacha, he appeared before Cartagena, it

was thought too strong to be attempted. Nombre de Dios was taken possession of without difficulty, but all treasure had been cleared out of it. An attempt to march the troops across the isthmus to Panama was defeated, and the men returned to the ships dispirited. Nombre de Dios was then burnt; but a violent sickness broke out: men and officers were dying fast; Drake himself was ill and delirious, and off Porto Bello he died on the morning of January 28, 1596. Philip and the Spaniards, who had learnt to believe him the incarnation of the English power at sea, hailed the news of his death, but his name long sounded terrible to Spanish ears, and even now, it is said, the nurseries of Mexico are stilled by the warning, "*¡Ahí, viene Drake!*" Great man however as he was, the ultimate defeat of the Spaniards was due not so much to him as to the national conditions of the struggle, which Drake had indeed intensified, but which were not changed by his death.

Meantime Philip had been straining his resources to the utmost to fit out a fleet for the relief or defence of the West Indies. That it should be late was a matter of course; if Drake had succeeded in his first attempt, or lived to make and succeed in a second, Panama would have been sacked and the treasure on board the English ships long before the arrival of the Spanish fleet under the command of Don Bernardino de Avellaneda, a man of some experience at sea and more ability than was shown by the majority of Spanish admirals. But his force was not sufficient for the purpose for which it had come—the destruction of the English; who, on their part, weakened by the loss of great numbers of their men and, most of all, by the death of Drake, were desirous only of getting safely away. Weak as his fleet really was and badly fitted as were his ships, Don Bernardino appears to have been nobly anxious to perform his allotted task; and waiting for the English off the west end of Cuba, met them near the Isle of Pines on March 1. Sir Thomas Baskerville, the commander of the soldiers, who had succeeded to the command of the English fleet, seems to have manœuvred it with judgment, so as to let the heavier-armed Queen's ships take the stress of the fighting. It would appear that the advantage was entirely with the English; but their enfeebled crews were in no condition to push it home, and had to content themselves with being permitted to continue their voyage and return to England.

The expedition had failed; but so clearly by its own fault and weakness, not by any effort of the enemy, that it is almost curious to note that the inability of Spain to fit out a fleet equal to the defence of its American settlements conveyed no lesson to the English Queen and her ministers. They were unable to see that a nation so impotent was not one that could attempt an invasion in force; and the belief in the probability of such an attempt goaded the Queen to a resolution to forestall it and to strike a blow at the navy of Spain in its own ports. The resolution took effect in the expedition to Cadiz in 1596.

There seems no doubt that the design and the objective of this expedition originated with the Lord Admiral, who, in what was intended as a truly national effort, took his natural place as Commander-in-chief, though, much to his disgust, the Earl of Essex was joined with him, in more immediate command of the army. The expedition was on a scale not unworthy of the occasion. Eleven of the Queen's capital ships with some few smaller, twelve London and eighteen Dutch ships of war—two of them ships of force—constituted the fighting strength by sea. Seventy transports carried some 7000 soldiers with many volunteers; and of the names then eminent in war, afloat or ashore, most are to be found in the lists of this array. Besides the two Commanders-in-chief, Lord Thomas Howard was Vice-Admiral and Sir Walter Raleigh Rear-Admiral of the fleet; and with each of these were Vice and Rear-Admirals of the several squadrons, distinguished by flags of different colours—the genesis of the red, white, and blue squadrons so familiar in our naval history of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The troops are described as better equipped and presenting a better appearance than usual; it would seem, too, that they were well victualled. They were, in fact, commanded by men of Low Country experience—Vere, the Wingfields, Clifford, Blount, and others—all capable soldiers.

The instructions under which this expedition sailed are so straightforward, and in such contrast with the inferences and tergiversations of others, that they ought to be considered. They explain to the generals that the object of the expedition is “by burning of the King's ships of war in his havens, before they should come forth to the seas, and therewith also destroying his magazines of victuals and his munitions for the arming of his navy,” to provide that “neither the rebels in Ireland should be aided and strengthened” nor yet the King “be able, of long time to repair unto, and have any great navy in readiness to offend us.” The generals are therefore to make careful enquiry and to direct their first actions “to destroy such ships as they shall understand to be provided to repair to Ireland or to come by the narrow seas to Calais. And if you cannot understand of any such particular purposes...you shall direct your course to such ports...where the greater number of the King's ships of war are and where his provisions are in store; and there you shall use all good means possible to spoil and burn all the said ships...or as many of them as conveniently you may; and also, you shall destroy or get into your possession to our use, as many of the victuals, powder, ordnance, cordage and all other apparellings for war as you can.”

This destruction of ships, stores and magazines of naval provisions is the first object, “which we charge you shall be first attempted, before any other service”; but that being accomplished, if the town belonging to the port where those ships and magazines were “hath great riches, and you shall understand that it is not able to defend itself against you, and that the riches thereof are not wholly carried away into the inlands,

where you cannot recover the same—in such case, you may attempt the taking of such a town and possess yourself of the riches thereof.” And, after much detail as to the ordering of the expedition, and providing for the safety of “the riches...if, after this service done, in destroying of the King’s ships and of his staples of provisions, you shall hear of the likelihood of the coming from the Indies of any of the King’s carracks laden with riches, you shall send away as many of the ships and men as you shall not have need of, to be used to the taking of such carracks, which we must leave to your consideration.”

So, on June 1, the fleet weighed from Cawsand Bay and proceeded southwards. In Spain there was anxiety amounting to panic; the equipment of the fleet had been reported, but it was not known where the blow would fall, and nowhere were there efficient preparations for defence. The secret had been curiously well kept; and both in the fleet and in Spain it was thought that the objective was Lisbon. There the panic was so great that, it was said, any sort of a force might have entered and sacked it. Cadiz was practically defenceless. Fully twenty years before, the necessity of strengthening its fortifications had been urged on the King, but little, if anything, had been done. The walls were crumbling in decay; the few guns mounted on them were old, worn-out, and more dangerous to their friends than to their foes. Everywhere the country was drained of soldiers to supply the armies in France or the Low Countries; and the defence was left to untrained, half-armed citizens or local militia. At Seville they were trying to buy some powder for its weight in silver, and were scouring the neighbourhood, hoping to find some muskets. Gibraltar and Cartagena were equally helpless. The King and his ministers had been alternating between fits of nervous anxiety and baseless arrogance—at one moment fearing a repetition of Drake’s performance in 1587, at another discussing schemes for the invasion of England; but, through all, denuding the country for the maintenance of powerful armies abroad. Now, when the case that ought to have been first considered was imminent, there had been no provision, no preparation, and everywhere there was panic.

And thus, when the English fleet arrived off Cadiz, there was no possibility of offering any serious opposition to it. The English commanders could not bring themselves to believe this. They had for so long been taught the immensity of the Spanish power that they could not conceive that the defence of an important haven and of the wealth of the Indies had been absolutely neglected. Thus there were councils of war and consultations as to how the entrance was to be forced; but, once resolved on, all difficulty vanished, and our ships made their way in against a resistance which, though stout as the Spaniards and galleys could make it, was in reality little more than nominal. If the very clear letter of instructions had been obeyed, if the victory had been followed up, as common sense showed it ought to be, the whole of the

Spanish fleet—all the galleys, 19 ships of war and 36 great merchantmen laden for the West Indies to the estimated value of twelve millions of ducats—must have been taken. The headstrong and reckless vanity of the Earl of Essex spoiled all. Afloat, he was only second; ashore he would be first. A young soldier, with but little experience, anxious to flesh his sword, he immediately landed, with about 2000 men, for the assault of the town, which, on its side, drew out what forces there were and made a brave show. It was nothing more; and as the English advanced the burghers fled, shutting to the gates in their haste and fear, while several of their body were still outside. These sought safety by climbing over the ruined walls, closely followed by the advance-guard of the English, who opened the gates. The main army pressed in and forced their way to the market-place, where they established themselves. Though desultory firing went on for some hours, there was no concerted defence, and before nightfall the town was entirely in the hands of the English. The next day, the castle capitulated.

If the town and its ransom had been the first or principal objective of the expedition, perfect success was attained, and all was well. The instructions quoted above show that such was not the case; that the town was altogether a secondary consideration; and, as it could not possibly escape, it ought to have been left till the primary aim, the possession of the ships, had been secured. But when the Earl of Essex and his men rushed on shore, like a parcel of schoolboys let loose, the Lord Admiral—whether jealous of Essex, as has been said, or, as is more probable, conceiving that he was bound by the Queen's wishes to watch over her favourite and support him—followed to the shore, without leaving any orders as to the pursuit of the ships. These fled up the harbour. The galleys escaped to the open sea through the channel of San Pedro; the great ships and galleons sought shelter in the shallow water towards Puerto Real; and when it seemed likely that they might still fall into the hands of the English, they were set on fire and totally destroyed. To the English this frustration of their hopes of gain was cruel, but to the Spaniards the loss was absolute, even if—as was afterwards alleged, with very probable exaggeration—much of the merchandise belonged to foreigners, French or even Dutch, trading under Spanish names. Though the good success of the enterprise thus fell far short of what it ought to have been, it was nevertheless decisive; but the Queen's government was unable to realise the fact, and continued to believe in rumours of intended invasion, which were certainly false, probably set afloat by the Spanish government in hopes of saving their prestige.

It is unnecessary to speak here in any detail of the quarrel between the two generals which resulted from their action at Cadiz. When the excitement was past, Howard must have felt annoyed that he, a man of years and experience, had been led into such a serious blunder—a blunder

costing twelve million ducats—which he could be quite sure the Queen would angrily resent. And it must have been the more aggravating that Essex, an irresponsible boy, could not see that he had done anything wrong. Of course—he would say—the sea officers ought to have taken measures for securing the ships; that was no business of his. He was not to be bound by instructions drawn out by a doting old woman and mere office quill-drivers, and was now only anxious to continue his independent course and to raid the towns along the coast. To this Howard absolutely refused his consent, though later, sorely against the grain, he was induced to allow a plundering expedition at Faro, where the principal booty was the Bishop's library, which was brought home by Essex and presented to the University of Oxford. A Council of War judged it fitting that the generals should return to England; that a detachment of the fleet, under Lord Thomas Howard, should—in accordance with the instructions—sail to the Azores, to await the return of the *flota*; and that Cadiz should be held by a garrison of 3000 men under the command of Sir Francis Vere. But to this Essex, jealous of the distinction thus conferred on Vere, would not agree. He himself would stay, or Cadiz should be evacuated. With the fear of the Queen before their eyes, neither Howard nor the council of war would agree to leave Essex behind; so, as the ransom was not forthcoming, the city was set on fire and the fleet departed. It was then asserted that the state of the victuals would not permit Lord Thomas to go to the Azores; and the whole expedition, after ascertaining that there were no ships in Corunna, returned to England, where the Queen, while openly recognising the good service they had performed, was not slow to let the generals feel her anger at the loss of the “riches” which they ought to have brought home. There can be no doubt that this and the quarrel between the generals, which spread to the sea and land officers, prevented the advantage which had been actually secured in the wholesale destruction of Spanish ships and treasure from being estimated at its full value. It began, however, to be realised when, in the following year, it was seen that the Spanish government could make no effort to hinder the fleet which, under the sole command of Essex, was sent to the Azores to look out for the homeward-bound treasure-fleet, and missed it, partly, it might be said, by bad luck, but mainly by his own petulant conduct and because of the unseemly squabble between him and Raleigh, his Rear-Admiral.

This was as a matter of fact the end of the naval war. Philip II died in September, 1598; and his successor, notwithstanding the desire to continue the struggle, had neither the ships, nor the money, nor the grim determination which were needed. The English held command of the sea, not indeed with theoretical completeness, but with practical sufficiency. No Spanish fleets even attempted to contest it. It is true that in 1601 a force of 3000 men was landed in Kinsale; but the ships

which brought them withdrew panic-struck, and left them in a state of isolation. This was intensified when a small squadron, bringing them reinforcements and supplies, was caught by Sir Richard Leveson in Castlehaven and destroyed. A couple of months later the Spaniards in Kinsale surrendered on terms, and the rebellion in Ireland was virtually crushed. Elizabeth, on her side, was quite willing to leave the war to private enterprise, and did not send any squadrons to sea except those under Leveson and Monson in 1602, which missed the Plate fleet, but captured a rich carrack in Cezimbra Bay. But the work of the privateers continued. As long as the treasure ships crossed the ocean, the adventurers sought for a share of the spoil, and sometimes found it; often enough, in fact, to make the search a profitable speculation. And the Spanish loss was still greater than their enemy's gain. The privateers were bleeding their helpless victim to death; and thus, though the fleet, as a fleet, had no direct share in bringing the war to an end, it is quite certain that, after the grand fleets in 1588 and 1596 had broken the power and prestige of the Spanish navy, after the expedition to the West Indies in 1595 and the Islands' Voyage in 1597 had demonstrated its utter weakness, the privateers waxed bolder, and by their daring attacks, both on the Spanish coast and in the West Indies, struck such grievous blows and caused the Spanish such losses, that they could only regard King James' wish for peace—peace at any price—as a heaven-sent relief to their misery.

No doubt the war might have been fought very differently; possibly with results more grandly decisive. It is not difficult to picture Elizabeth as recognising the overwhelming influence of sea-power and the superiority of the English navy; as dealing crushing blows, as beating Spain to a standstill and seizing the sources of her American wealth. Neither is it difficult to picture England, with a small population, no manufactures, and but a nascent commerce, sinking under the burden of a colonial empire which, even two hundred years later, she could not bear. But of such speculations history takes no account; and we can only chronicle the fact that the result of the Elizabethan war contributed largely to the downfall of Spanish power, and strengthened the confidence which, centuries before, the English had learnt to place in their navy.

CHAPTER X.

THE LAST YEARS OF ELIZABETH.

THE concluding scenes in the drama of Queen Elizabeth's reign abound in exciting episodes. Complicated crises in the ecclesiastical and political spheres succeed each other with rapidity. Apart from all questions of foreign policy, each year produced domestic incidents which kept the mind of the nation on the alert.

No such momentous events presented themselves as the trial and execution of Mary Stewart or the dispersal of the Spanish Armada. But the causes which produced those stirring incidents were still powerful. The jealousy of Spain was stimulated rather than diminished by the campaign of 1588. The Catholic conspiracy against Queen Elizabeth's government was not crushed by the death of the Queen of Scots. "The dangers are not over yet," remarked the Queen in her latest years to her godson Sir John Harington, who noticed that to the end she always kept a sword beside her table.

By 1588 England had won two important victories which had inflicted serious wounds on her foes. But her old enemies were still defiant, and the need of vigilance was the same as before. Few new questions in foreign or home affairs occupied the attention of English statesmen. Even the critical domestic topic of the succession to the Crown had been present to them from the outset. Time now merely rendered its settlement more urgent, and gave it greater prominence. In other directions problems that had been surveyed from a distance now called for solution at close quarters.

The main distinction between England before 1588 and after that eventful year lay in no novelty of policy, in no change of national aspiration, but in a reinforcement of the sentiments which dominated the earlier epoch. The nation's confidence in its destiny, now that it was freed from imminent peril, gained in intensity: intellectual and spiritual energy was quickened, and moved more rapidly. Literature, while developing along the lines on which it had already set forth, scaled unprecedented heights. Probably the most notable feature of the era—the one which in the end contributed most to the increase of the national

reputation—was the literary activity, which found its highest embodiment in the dramas of Shakespeare, but proved its rare fertility in many other manifestations—notably in the achievements of Bacon, Hooker, and Ben Jonson. Meanwhile political and ecclesiastical principles, which had already won the allegiance of one or other section of the public, sought further advantage; and their advocates endeavoured more strenuously than before to impress their own convictions on the national conscience. Political and religious parties assumed a more aggressive tone in their attitude towards one another; their aims became more distinct and their tone more uncompromising.

Loyalty to the Crown was never more passionate. Sovereign and people were repeatedly exchanging protestations of mutual love. Yet sentiments of a type which conflicted with these assurances were gaining force. The professional and mercantile classes were manifesting a growing impatience of arbitrary government or constraints on personal liberty. City merchants were not backward in complaints of the burden of taxation. Nearly every parliament produced some champion of popular rights, who could only be silenced by imprisonment. The authority of veteran statesmen, who had long guided the national policy, was exposed in larger measure than in early years to vexatious criticism within the bounds of the Queen's Council. A new generation of courtiers had arisen, and they fought hard and not ineffectively with the old ministers for control of the Crown's influence. The slow and diplomatic caution which distinguished the old school of politicians was scouted by men of reckless daring and restless activity who were unburdened by official responsibility. Although the Queen's presence could restrain the impatient and abusive remonstrance with which the new-comers were wont to meet the proposals of their elders, not even her intervention in debate could always preserve her old advisers from defeat.

The Queen, as her years grew, seemed more accessible to the lover-like attentions with which youthful aspirants to political power flattered her vanity, and she gave many of them specious encouragement. But she was loyal to old servants of the State; she did not take the political pretensions of her younger admirers seriously, and by her delusive patronage she contrived to keep jealousy rife among them. The courtiers who stood outside the official hierarchy ranged themselves about the throne in rival factions. Their efforts to outwit each other limited their active influence, but kept the Court in perpetual turmoil and at times gave an impression of uncertainty to the action of the government. Another danger lay in the active adherence of government to the principle of force in dealing with antagonistic opinions; for the efficacy of coercion was an almost universal creed among practical politicians. It was constantly put to the test of experiment, and raised up an army of victims whose resentment and animosity were steadily increasing. There

were powerful critics of the accepted coercive principle in the last years of the reign, but they carried little weight on the active stage of public affairs.

A spirit of turbulence and unrest indeed brooded over the domestic affairs of the nation. But the tendencies to internal disorder, formidable although they were, were held in check by influences which were of old standing and showed no sign of decay. There was genuine sincerity in the regard and affection which the mass of the people felt for the Queen, although at the same time they groaned under oppressive burdens of taxation. Her increasing age accentuated her resolute bearing and gave her an added title to reverence. Zeal for the nation's independence and for the final dissipation of the foreign peril was an efficient bond of union among the Court factions, however sharply personal ambitions and predilections divided them. The House of Commons, when burning to discuss the nation's grievances, cheerfully postponed domestic questions, at a reminder from the government of the urgent need of providing supplies wherewith to resist some new threat of foreign invasion. Thinking men like Francis Bacon might well cherish the hope that such solvents of discord as these might ultimately assuage the heat of party, and that wise statesmanship might yet discover a *via media*, a means of general reconciliation. The flames of intestine strife were menacing; but with caution their progress might be stayed, and the equilibrium of the State might be preserved from overthrow.

The despotic principle of the Queen's government, in spite of signs of discontent, underwent little modification in her last years. The sovereign's strength of will never faltered. Her conservative temper resisted innovation. Although she gave proof in her latest years of anxiety to exercise the prerogatives of autocracy in the material interests of the nation at large rather than in the interests of any class or clique, her assertion of absolute authority in affairs of State was never qualified by doubt or fear. Fortune seemed to smile on her pretensions. Death wrought inevitable changes in the circle of her ministers and friends, but its action was slow and deliberate. Veteran supporters holding responsible offices passed from the scene, but it was after their work was done; and, when they were withdrawn from the stage of public affairs, the system to which they had ministered went on as before under the Queen's vigorous direction.

The Queen's chief councillor, Lord Burghley, was a zealous guardian of traditional policy, and he was long-lived. For forty years—from her accession till within five years of her death—he was at her side to give all the assurance of homogeneity that was possible to her foreign and domestic policy. Burghley's career belonged, in Horace Walpole's phrase, to "the annals of his country." At the date of the Armada he was sixty-eight years old. He had already enjoyed thirty-eight years' experience of high political office, and was to pass through another ten

years of service. In 1550, at the age of thirty, he had become Secretary of State to the Queen's half-brother Edward VI. Queen Elizabeth, on her accession, appointed him to the like post. Fourteen years later he rose to be Lord Treasurer, and was thenceforth in effect both the Queen's Prime Minister and her foreign minister.

Lord Burghley cherished through life a thoroughgoing and unfashionable contempt for the foreigner. He was unmoved by the foreign culture which won wide sympathy among his contemporaries. Yet it was his destiny in public life chiefly to concentrate his energies on foreign affairs. All the other business of government indeed passed under his survey. There was scarcely any personal or public topic about which the Queen failed to ask his opinion, and he never spared himself pains in elaborating in writing schemes of advice on every subject that presented itself. But it was in the capacity of foreign minister that the Queen chiefly valued his assistance. Not that she accepted any of his counsel unquestioningly; at times she brusquely rejected it. But he always retained her confidence. He was, she declared, her "spirit" and her "oracle"; and, in spite of occasional modifications which the Queen or some other adviser imposed on his plans, it was Burghley's scheme of foreign policy which governed Elizabethan England. Burghley was slow in speech and movement, and was no believer in heroic measures in domestic or foreign affairs. He regarded war as the last resort of statesmanship, and firmly believed in the virtues of diplomatic intrigue as a bulwark against aggression. In this faith he created and maintained an enormous secret service. An army of spies throughout Europe were for some thirty years in constant correspondence with him. Few Catholic agents in the pay of England's enemies at Paris, Rome, or Madrid escaped his observation. The Elizabethan system of espial was brought to the highest perfection by his astute colleague, Sir Francis Walsingham, the Queen's secretary. But Walsingham worked under Burghley's supervision and in subordination to him. The secret dispatches were usually annotated by the Lord Treasurer, and he alone took action upon them. When Walsingham died in 1590 he left a wide gap in the administration, but it was filled by Burghley's personal activity. He gave to the clandestine machinery a minuter attention than before, and its operations lost none of their efficiency.

Burghley outlived almost all the statesmen of his own generation. The thinning of the ranks of his contemporaries at once increased his dignity and intensified his isolation. His taciturnity, cynical temperament, and cautious bearing exhausted the patience of the younger frequenters of the Court, but they recognised his acumen by conferring on him the sobriquet of the "old fox." Attempts made to displace him ignominiously failed; but in the later years of Elizabeth's reign he more than once had to accept warlike solutions of foreign problems, which were out of harmony with his pacific and cautious temperament.

In his own household he had prepared for himself a valuable ally. His son Robert, who shared his cautious habits of mind, and combined them with greater alertness of thought and speech, was brought up to be his coadjutor. After 1590, when Burghley reached his seventieth year, his health declined by slow degrees. Though his industry was long proof against physical weakness, he grew more and more dependent on the assistance of his son. To the exaggerated mode of adulation which Burghley had constantly practised in his addresses to his sovereign Robert Cecil easily adapted himself; and the Queen was readily moved to extend to him—"her little Secretary"—the confidence which his father had long enjoyed. The partnership of father and son proved formidable from the first; and, when in 1596 Sir Robert Cecil was formally appointed Secretary of State, the Cecilian ascendancy, despite the jealousy it encountered, was in a position to scorn assault. The younger Cecil contrived to gather into his hands all the preferments of the Crown, and none could hope for promotion except by his favour. Burghley survived his son's elevation by two years. As his bodily infirmities grew, the Queen lavished on him enhanced marks of her gratitude and affection. She entreated him to spare himself the fatigues of Court etiquette, by which in other instances she set exaggerated store; she even helped to nurse him through his last illness. His death was a personal loss which grieved her acutely. But his removal caused no change in the method of her administration. Sir Robert Cecil carried it on, under her effective supervision, in his father's spirit and with somewhat greater ardour.

Yet the most obvious embarrassments which Lord Burghley suffered in his endeavours to control the Queen's policy came from the Queen herself. He was hampered not merely by her sudden displays at critical moments of an obstinate insistence on her own authority, but also by the vain hopes of exerting a rival political influence which her coquetries excited in ambitious courtiers outside the official hierarchy. Burghley was subjected to the hostility of the Queen's favourites throughout his official association with her. Until the date of the Spanish Armada her friend the Earl of Leicester had steadily endeavoured to thwart or misrepresent Burghley's advice and action. The endeavours had proved of small avail, but they increased the harassing cares of Burghley's official life. Although the Queen often quarrelled with Leicester and ridiculed his presumptuous pretensions to political power, through thirty years of her reign she never for long excluded him from her society. His sudden death after the defeat of the Spaniards in September, 1588, seemed to relieve Lord Burghley of a primary source of anxiety. Three years later Sir Christopher Hatton, another of the Queen's favourites, whose frank intimacy with her had been a crying scandal, passed away. She had rewarded Hatton's attentions with a liberality that with her was rare. She had, with doubtful wisdom, admitted him to the inner circle of the

government. For four years he had filled the great judicial office of Lord Keeper.

The places that the death of Leicester and Hatton left vacant were not empty long. Sir Walter Raleigh had already attracted the Queen's attention. His gallant bearing and felicitous power of flattering his sovereign in melodious verse had already fascinated her; and she had eagerly welcomed the compliment he paid her of giving in her honour the name of Virginia to the tract of land on the American continent which he was seeking to colonise. Raleigh remained to the end a member of the inner circle of the Court, though he suffered many times the customary fortune of the Queen's favourites, and was at intervals driven angrily from her presence. It was not however on Raleigh's shoulders that Leicester's mantle fell. The rôle that the Earl of Leicester had played in his relations to his sovereign was bestowed on a younger man, Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex.

Essex' kinship and education gave him some title to the succession. His father died when he was nine, and Lord Burghley then became his guardian. When he was thirteen years of age, his widowed mother married the Earl of Leicester, and he thus stood to the Queen's favourite in the relation of stepson. His "goodly person" attracted the Queen from the day that he came to Court in his youth. "When she is abroad," wrote a friendly observer in 1587, the year in which Essex attained his majority, "nobody with her but my Lord of Essex; and at night my Lord is at cards or one game or another with her that he cometh not to his own lodging till birds sing in the morning." His vanity was flattered by such proofs of the Queen's affection, and he formed a resolve to fill a predominant position in State affairs. With the versatility characteristic of the epoch he set no limits to the scope of his ambition. In the arts alike of war and peace he hoped to outstrip all competitors. Of cultivated tastes, he had a distinct measure of poetic genius. Endowed with much physical strength, he excelled in athletic exercises, and was well able to bear the fatigues of active military service. An exaggerated confidence in himself rendered him impatient of advice and control. With small capacity for detail, he formed decided opinions on political questions at home and abroad, and judged it practicable to impose his views, by dint of passionate iteration, on the Queen herself and those who held responsible office. His impetuosity blinded him to the obstacles which lay in his path, and his career promised storm and strife.

On all who stood high in the Queen's favour Essex declared in due time open war. He cared not what were the political views or personal merits of his fellow-courtiers. Sir Walter Raleigh was as enthusiastic an advocate of open war with Spain, and no less daring. Yet Raleigh was from first to last a formidable competitor with him in the race for the exclusive control of the Queen, and was consequently

treated by Essex as a mortal foe. But Essex was clear-sighted enough to recognise that Lord Burghley and his son were the chief barriers between him and genuine political power, and he devoted his main energies to counteracting their influence. Every movement which the Lord Treasurer and his official allies sought to check was encouraged by Essex. Every unsuccessful aspirant to promotion at the Lord Treasurer's hands could count upon Essex as an ardent patron and friend. He became the leader of opposition against the Queen's official advisers and a centre of much concealed disaffection. He fought only for his own hand. No large principles were embodied in his policy. He lived and fell as a soldier of fortune. His reckless pursuit of selfish ends failed to inflict any permanent injury on the administration of the country. But circumstances so evolved themselves as to render him a menace to domestic peace for nearly ten years.

There were attractive elements in Essex' personality which gave him for a time a specious strength. Although he could not subordinate himself to the authority of men in equal or superior stations, he was genial in intercourse with his inferiors, and respected in those who served him the powers of concentration in which he was himself deficient. He loved the life of camps, and no suspicion of his personal courage was possible. He showed to advantage in military society. When in the summer of 1591 he led a small army of English volunteers to Normandy to aid Henry of Navarre in his struggle with the army of the League, he easily won the friendship of that Prince and of his chief general, Marshal de Biron. His virtues and defects alike had the capacity of evoking popular sympathy.

Essex' position in the popular eye had been greatly improved by his marriage in 1590. His wife was daughter of the Queen's Secretary of State, Sir Francis Walsingham (who was lately dead), and the widow of Sir Philip Sidney. He caught from the union some reflexions of the glamour and prestige attaching to the names of Sidney and of Walsingham. Sidney's knight-errantry was indeed after Essex' own heart, and it was a grateful task to him to emulate it. His father-in-law's skill in detective diplomacy was not easy for him to acquire; but the example suggested to him one method of pursuing "the domestical greatness" after which he yearned, despite his unfitness to attain it. He saw that his purpose of predominance would not be gained unless he could induce the Queen to infuse something of his own warlike spirit into the cautious foreign policy of Lord Burghley. Expert knowledge of foreign affairs was necessary for effective criticism of the decisions of the Queen's advisers. The Queen herself was always anxious to obtain early and trustworthy information of events passing in foreign countries which concerned herself and her subjects. Essex consequently took into his pay a number of secretaries and clerks, who were to organise in his own house a bureau of foreign intelligence. He was fortunate in his choice of coadjutors.

Anthony Bacon, nephew of Lord Burghley's wife, who had travelled on the Continent and was in touch with English and foreign spies throughout Europe, was smarting under his uncle's cold indifference to his welfare. He was easily persuaded to enlist in Essex' service as foreign secretary. Under Anthony Bacon's direction Essex' house soon rivalled Lord Burghley's Record Office in the quality and quantity of the foreign intelligence which reached it. Essex for the time winged a lofty flight. He opened correspondence with his old friend Henry IV of France, and with James VI of Scotland. He promised to influence the English government in their interest. Lord Burghley and his colleagues were gravely embarrassed by the respect which the foreign sovereigns paid to their resolute critic, and Queen Elizabeth increased their difficulties by listening with interest to the foreign dispatches which reached Essex, and by inviting information from him in regard to critical foreign questions.

Essex illustrated his normal method of work as an amateur and self-appointed guardian of his sovereign by a charge which he brought against the Queen's Jewish physician, Roderigo Lopez, of conspiring against her life. Lopez had come from Portugal to England in 1559, and had reached the highest place in the medical profession. He had a large foreign correspondence and was politically useful to the government. In 1592 Essex welcomed to England a Portuguese adventurer, Don Antonio, who was a pretender to the Spanish throne, and Lopez acted as the fugitive's interpreter. Essex had already sought Lopez' aid as a collector of foreign news, but they had not worked amicably. Lopez cultivated the society of foreign visitors to London. Suspicion fell on him that he was in the pay of King Philip and was conspiring to poison Queen Elizabeth and Don Antonio. When the matter was brought to the Queen's attention she expressed incredulity; but Essex undertook to prove the accusation true, and he left no stone unturned to bring together sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It was with reluctance that the Queen signed the death-warrant. How far the facts justified the man's execution is doubtful. Essex pressed into his service anti-Semitic as well as anti-Spanish prejudice. But he claimed with pride to have rendered by his vigilance a great public service, which the responsible ministers would have been unable to accomplish without his cooperation. He believed that he had damaged the government's credit by doing voluntarily and more thoroughly than they their own work. He was sanguine of founding an *imperium in imperio*.

Anthony Bacon was not the only member of his family who joined forces with Essex and offered to aid his fortunes. Lord Burghley had alienated not only Anthony Bacon, but also his brother, Francis, the possessor of the most powerful intellect of the era, though at the moment he was known merely as a struggling barrister. Francis Bacon, with characteristic cynicism, believed that he might avenge himself on his neglectful kinsman by strengthening the hands of an ambitious rival.

Francis Bacon was no good judge of men at close quarters, and he misapprehended Essex' aims and character. He thought that under sagacious guidance he might reach his goal of political predominance and even, to the national advantage, enjoy power. In return for good counsel Bacon hoped to receive from his patron official promotion.

The partnership looked more perilous to the stability of the responsible government than it proved to be. Essex' erratic and impulsive temper was incorrigible. He was not long able to apply himself to details of foreign affairs. Nor was he attentive to the teachings of practical philosophy. Bacon bade him retain the Queen's favour by affecting submission to her will. He was to gain her confidence by his reasonableness in argument and width of view. Above all he was to subdue his passion for military glory. But Essex could not assimilate prudential maxims. Neither Anthony Bacon's tuition in details of foreign affairs nor the rules of practical conduct which Francis Bacon poured into his ears produced any real effect on his course of action. He was an impulsive knight-errant, and neither close study nor carefully regulated behaviour was adapted to his idiosyncrasy.

For a season, however, Essex' prospects steadily improved. Foreign affairs were in 1595 inclining the balance of domestic power in favour of those who were agitating for a spirited policy. A great opportunity seemed opening to Lord Burghley's censors. A renewal of Spanish activity had robbed France of Calais. England was threatened at closer quarters than ever by her pertinacious foe. The peace party in the Council was seriously embarrassed. It was difficult to justify inaction, with a Spanish army almost in sight of the English shore. The party of aggression was loud in condemnation of delay. They urged as a preliminary step active cooperation with France in an attempt to recover the lost seaport. But the opposition were not altogether at one among themselves. Essex and Raleigh both advised larger measures. They were doubtful whether northern France offered England an adequate point of attack on Spain. An expeditionary force for the relief of Calais was, however, collected at Dover; and Essex, anxious to engage in any manner of active service, accepted the command. But, before preparations were completed, the plea for a more extended scheme of operations was pressed forward with vigour and success. The extreme section of the Council won a victory over the cautious minister. Despite his hesitation, a thoroughgoing attack on the shipping in Spanish ports was authorised. Essex' position was strengthened by the course of events. In the expedition which followed he took a very prominent part. To his dash and energy the capture of Cadiz in 1596 was largely due. His repute rose high. He was the popular hero of the campaign, and he overflowed with self-confident elation.

Next year the aggressive party in the Council resumed its hold on the country's foreign policy, and Essex thought to repeat his stirring

exploits. He engaged in the Islands' Voyage—in the assault on the Azores. But the result was very different from that of the former expedition. Characteristic quarrels among the commanders, for which he was largely responsible, rendered the venture for the most part abortive. The Queen on his return reproached him with his difficult temper. He made no secret of his resentment. The insecurity of his footing at Court and the unreality of his political influence were patent to all but himself.

Thenceforth discussions in the Queen's Council increased in bitterness and heat. The breach widened between Essex and Burghley. The burning question of England's relations with Spain reached a new crisis in 1598, when it was known that France and Spain were resolved on peace. Lord Burghley deemed it prudent for England to follow the example of her neighbour, and to bring the long struggle with Spain to an end by treaty. To this proposal Essex declined to give a hearing. The problem was beset with difficulties. The Low Countries warmly protested against an accommodation which would leave them at the mercy of their ancient foe. To all the younger members of the Council it seemed a point of honour to prolong the war with Spain and continue an active alliance with the Dutch Protestants. Essex charged himself with the duty of defeating Burghley's pacific scheme. His biting taunts of cowardice and bad faith roused the veteran statesman's phlegmatic temper. Drawing a prayer-book from his pocket Burghley replied to one of Essex' harangues by quoting the text from the Psalms, "The bloodthirsty and deceitful men shall not live out half their days." The Queen favoured her minister's policy. She herself intervened in one debate on his behalf, and bitterly reproached Essex for his rashness of speech and bellicose sentiments. All his fellow-competitors for her favour were present. Stung to the quick, he turned his back on the Queen with a gesture of contempt, muttering an unpardonable insult. The Queen retaliated by striking him a violent blow on the ear. Essex loudly exclaimed against the indignity.

The incident had a disastrous effect on Essex' future. Hurriedly withdrawing from Court, he involuntarily forfeited to his rivals such influence as he had lately acquired there. The effect of the warm debates in the Council was the discomfiture of the peace party. The tedious war with Spain went on after that power had made peace with France. The policy which was largely of Essex' own devising triumphed; but his impulsive utterances had cost him the rich rewards which with discretion he might have reaped from the victory. He saw his error too late. He soon apologised to the Queen for his misbehaviour, and a reconciliation followed. But it was a hollow settlement. Essex never recovered the ground he had lost.

In spite of his loss of prestige at Court, Essex had many enthusiastic admirers in the country; and their frequent demonstrations of regard

buoyed him up with a strange hope that he might yet with their aid turn the tables on his enemies at Court. His sagacious advisers were beginning to despair of him. Francis Bacon perceived the quicksands that he was treading, and urged him to abandon his old courses and seek new avenues of political reputation. The office of Lord Deputy of Ireland was vacant. The English ascendancy there was threatened by rebellion. To give security in Ireland to English rule was a difficult achievement. It had baffled the efforts of a long series of Viceroy's. Success in such a task promised an impregnable position to him who won it. Bacon cynically told his patron that Ireland was his destiny, and under his advice Essex sought and obtained the embarrassing post of Governor of the distracted country. Essex himself seems to have recognised that failure meant ruin. But there was a bare chance of such success as would give him supreme influence hereafter. The appointment (1599) satisfied his popular admirers. Shakespeare gave voice to a general public sentiment, when in the Chorus to the last act of his new play of *Henry V* he promised an enthusiastic reception to the "General of our gracious Empress" on his home-coming from Ireland with "rebellion broached on his sword."

But the prognostications of evil came true. Essex' enemies were in his absence once again all powerful in the Queen's councils; and he returned home only to stand his trial for disobedience to royal orders and neglect of duty. After tedious litigation he was dismissed from all offices of State, and all his hopes were blighted.

Then there revived in his mind a desperate notion of forcibly removing from the Queen's councils those to whom he attributed his ruin. He would appeal from the Court to the people, whose regard he still believed that he enjoyed. Elements of discontent existed in the mercantile classes, who felt the burden of taxation, and among the Puritans, who were suffering from the penal laws. Essex and his friends vainly hoped to draw representatives of these classes into his quarrel. But with untanable presumption he aimed at enlisting the sympathy of a more influential ally. Why should not James VI of Scotland make common cause with him? Emissaries were despatched to Edinburgh to suggest that it was in James' interest to obtain definite assurances from the Queen's ministers of his title to the English throne. It was argued that this object could be best attained by the despatch of an army to London, which on its march might combine with troops to be drawn by Essex' private influence from Ireland, Wales, and the City of London. Essex and his Scottish colleagues would then compel the Queen and her advisers to abjure all rival claims to the succession. Such plans were clearly chimerical, but Essex had a delusive ground for hope. With King James his epistolary relations had long been cordial. He had played on the Scottish King's fear by warnings that his right to the English Crown on Elizabeth's death would be resisted, unless he himself

was at the head of affairs. Although the King declined to treat Essex' appeal seriously, he temporised with it. He was contemplating a mission to Elizabeth to discuss in general terms the relations between the two countries. He agreed to give secret instructions to his envoys to assist Essex in regaining the Queen's favour and to follow his guidance. But in the end the negotiations, so far as Essex was concerned, came to nothing. James was in no hurry to send his embassy. He committed himself to little, hesitating to embroil himself in a movement which had the aspect of a private feud at the Court of a royal neighbour. Essex prepared documents for the instruction of the Scottish envoys, in which he urged them to poison the Queen's mind against his enemies. But no active help reached him from Scotland. The Scottish mission did not reach England until Essex' rebellion had begun and ended.

The desperate design was doomed from the outset. The authorities were soon on the alert, and their activity forced Essex into a premature demonstration of rebellion. He believed that the citizens of London would rise at the cry that the Queen's ministers were compromising her relations with her people, and that the encroachments on her authority of which they were guilty ought to be brought to the notice of a free parliament. The manifesto evoked no response. Essex was arrested and, having been put on his trial for high treason, was convicted and suffered death. The country repelled the invitation to rise in arms in Essex' behalf. The episode, though of tragic interest, is of purely personal significance. The government was far too firmly founded to suffer from assaults of defeated ambition and personal resentment. Sir Robert Cecil was the protector of too powerful a tradition of rule to give any chance of success to a violent assault on his authority, which had no large public aim. The dissatisfaction of the people with absolutism was in an embryonic stage: it was not yet articulate. A leader of a calibre very different to that of Essex was needed to resist with effect the government's menaces of personal liberty.

The quarrels and rivalries of factions at Court closely affected the country's foreign policy, but directly they produced little disturbance in the general course of affairs at home. The issues at stake seemed to be remote from the substantial interests of the people, who regarded as of small moment to themselves the endeavour of this or that courtier to win ascendancy in the Queen's favour or in the Council. A different class of problems stirred the people's feelings. It was the attitude of the responsible government towards matters of property and religion that touched their lives most nearly.

The Established Church of England was in theory the most imposing embodiment of the nation's unity; and it was by a quarrel in which an important section of the people directly engaged with the Church of England that the internal peace of the nation was most seriously threatened in the years following the Armada. Discontent on the

part of a large section of the Protestant population with the formularies of the Church of England had been steadily gaining strength since the first decade of the reign; and a crisis which threatened national unity was reached near its close. The revised Prayer Book, which was legalised by the Act of Uniformity of 1559, had always savoured of idolatry and Popery to those Englishmen who, having accepted the tenets of Calvinism, regarded them alone as consistent with the truths of Christianity. The asserted right on the part of ministers of religion to follow the sole guidance of the Scriptures and to exercise among themselves equal and uniform authority conflicted with the pretensions of episcopacy, on which the Church of England was based.

The activity of dissent from the established religious doctrine was always a valuable weapon in the hands of the leaders of Court factions. It lent some popular colour to their struggle with the Queen's responsible ministers. The Queen's favourite, the Earl of Leicester, and his successor in the royal regard, the Earl of Essex, both patronised dissentient ministers of religion. But the cause of nonconformity secured aid in the middle years of the Queen's reign from a more authoritative quarter. For a time the highest ecclesiastical dignitary of the kingdom gave the nonconformists open encouragement. The Archbishop of Canterbury, Grindal, countenanced evasion of the law of the land on the part of ordained ministers who doubted the scriptural sanction of the Sacraments of the Church and the Prayer Book. Under Archbishop Grindal's weak rule the power of the Bishops was paralysed, and the Calvinistic opposition to the Anglican establishment advanced by leaps and bounds. Puritan members crowded the benches of the House of Commons. A Presbyterian organisation of the clergy on self-governing lines was inaugurated in many counties. One of the Puritan leaders, Robert Browne, established a conventicle, independent of episcopal authority, at Norwich. Separatism or independence became the watchword of a formidable band of clergymen and laity, who called themselves Brownists, after the name of Robert Browne. It was forcibly argued that Church discipline was dependent alone on the word of Scripture. "The discipline of Christ's Church," wrote Cartwright, the main advocate of Presbyterianism, "that is necessary for all times is delivered by Christ, and set down in the Holy Scriptures. Therefore the true and lawful discipline is to be fetched from thence, and from thence alone. And that which resteth upon any other foundation ought to be esteemed unlawful and counterfeit." The unity of the Church, and with it the unity of the nation were in imminent peril.

To the Queen all zeal or fanaticism was obnoxious. Of a cold, intellectual temperament, she ignored the warmth of spiritual feeling which moved her Puritan subjects. Her worldly nature was antagonistic to strict Puritan theories of life. Moreover the nonconformists appeared to her to call in question one of her cherished prerogatives. She set

immense store by the Act of Supremacy, which made her the head of the episcopal establishment. Supreme authority in ecclesiastical matters was for her no less valued a possession than supreme authority in secular politics. She identified the rising tide of Puritan enthusiasm with lawlessness and rebellion, and sternly prohibited the Puritan majority of the House of Commons from meddling with religious topics. She deemed it a primary duty of government to enforce at all hazards on the Protestant clergy and laity the law of the land, as embodied in the Acts of Uniformity and Supremacy. All questioning of the principles on which the religious establishment was based was in her eyes intolerable "presumption" or frivolous "newfangledness."

Grindal, who feebly temporised with dissent, was suspended from his archiepiscopal functions for five years (1577-82), and within a few months of his restoration he died. Grindal's successor, Whitgift, was a different type of churchman. If a resolute will and a genius for discipline in the chief ecclesiastical officer of the realm could restore unity to the divided Church of England, there could be no misgivings as to the result of Whitgift's promotion. He had first come into public notice as the strenuous opponent of Cartwright, the leading champion of Presbyterian forms of Church government, and had contrived to drive him temporarily from the country. A certain inconsistency of personal sentiment distinguished the new Archbishop. With those theological doctrines of Calvinism which were unconcerned with forms of Church government or ceremonies of public worship he was himself in agreement; but in the justice and necessity of episcopacy he faithfully believed, and no private predilections for Calvinistic theology touched his conceptions of ritual or discipline. The maintenance of the royal supremacy, of episcopal authority, of uniformity of practice in the Church, was the primary article in his ecclesiastical creed.

Whitgift was Archbishop of Canterbury from 1583 till the year following the Queen's death, and he powerfully impressed his strong personality on the internal history of England during the last years of the Queen's reign. He did not underrate the value of external dignity. Possessed of a private fortune, he restored to the primacy something of the feudal magnificence which had characterised it in earlier days. He maintained an army of retainers, and conducted his visitations in princely state. He practised a lavish hospitality. At once he won the full confidence of the Queen, whose sense of the importance of dignified etiquette increased with her years. She was frequently the Archbishop's guest at Lambeth; she playfully called him "her little black husband," and until her death the amity between them rarely knew interruption.

The stifling of Puritanism, especially in the ranks of the clergy, was Whitgift's accepted function. All opponents of the established discipline, all critics of the established ritual, merited punishment as disturbers of the public peace. No fear of stirring up intestine strife

was suffered to stay his heavy hand. He enunciated his convictions in the first sermon which he preached after he became Archbishop, at St Paul's Cross. The occasion was the annual celebration of the day of the Queen's accession on November 17, 1583. His text sufficiently declared his policy. It was 1 *Corinthians*, vi. 10: "Railers shall not inherit the kingdom of Heaven." A direct acknowledgment of the Act of Supremacy, a strict obedience to the Book of Common Prayer and to the Thirty-nine Articles, were enjoined on every minister of religion under the heaviest penalties for default. No laxity was permitted. No conscientious scruples were respected.

No scrupulous sense of justice was suffered to interpose obstacles to the fulfilment of Whitgift's purpose. Under his influence the Court of High Commission did its work with greater energy than before. Its powers were stringently employed with a view to discovering heretics and schismatics, and subjecting them, if detected, to deterrent punishment. Whitgift advised the administration to suspected ministers of an oath (called the oath *ex officio*), which bound them to confess on examination all breaches of the law of which they were guilty. The practice of forcing a man to convict himself of offences imputed to him has always excited disgust in England. The Archbishop's high-handed policy consequently evoked heated protests, not merely from the clergy and from many members of the Court factions, but from the House of Commons and responsible officers of State. Even Lord Burghley complained that Whitgift's *ex officio* oath "too much savoured of the Spanish Inquisition." The method lacked charity; it was not likely, the Lord Treasurer pleaded, "to edify or reform." But the Archbishop was obdurate and declined all suggested modifications. He replied to Burghley's criticism: "I know your Lordship desireth the peace of the Church, but it cannot be procured after so long liberty and lack of discipline if a few persons [*i.e.* the Puritan ministers], so meanly qualified as most of them, are countenanced against the whole state of the clergy."

Finally, the Archbishop put the seal on his repressive policy by an attack on the liberty of public criticism. He secured early in 1586 the passage of an ordinance by the Court of Star Chamber, prohibiting under severest punishment any printer from putting any manuscript into type until it had been licensed by himself or the Bishop of London. Over the Stationers' Company, which had been licensed by royal charter of Queen Mary to regulate the printing trade, the Archbishop asserted the fullest control. The number of presses was to be diminished to such a number as he and the Bishop of London should deem convenient; and their episcopal approval was decreed to be necessary to the choice of new master-printers for admission to the privileges of the craft. At the same time the Archbishop made it clear that, should such provisions as these fail to produce the needful effect, it was always possible to fall

back on the statute passed in 1581, whereby the publication of seditious or slanderous words was punishable on a first offence by the pillory and prison, and on the second offence by death.

At a first glance, the cause of Puritan dissent seemed unlikely to escape the toils with which the new Archbishop encircled it. Under his vigorous leadership the Bishops asserted their authority with unprecedented activity. John Aylmer, Bishop of London, exceeded Whitgift in the violence and rigour with which he ruled his clergy. Soon after the defeat of the Spanish Armada, on February 9, 1589, Dr Richard Bancroft, a member of the Court of High Commission, who became eight years later Bishop of London, and was ultimately Whitgift's successor in the archbishopric, declared in an uncompromising sermon at St Paul's the Divine Right of Bishops and their apostolical succession. Resistance to episcopal dominion was identified by the governors of the Church with heresy, and any truce on their part with Puritan practices was denounced as sin.

Whitgift and his friends were in the habit of asserting that Protestant dissent affected a very small minority in the country, and its extirpation was merely a question of administration. They ignored the plain fact that Puritanism had gained too powerful a hold on the nation's sentiment to yield to force. Whitgift's policy stimulated the Puritans to new assertions of their principles. The claims to independence or separatism were more stringently defined and urged by their advocates; and though two of the leading expounders, Henry Barrow and John Greenwood, who announced discipleship to Robert Browne, were promptly imprisoned, their arguments remained unanswered. Meanwhile a more direct mode of attack on the episcopal position was essayed. An endeavour was made to bring home to the public mind the conviction that the ecclesiastical politicians, who were committed to the paths of persecution and repression, were neglecting their spiritual duties. This mode of assault was gradually developed and proved peculiarly formidable.

While Parliament was in session in the late autumn of 1586, and chiefly concerning itself with the attainders of overzealous champions of Queen Mary Stewart, John Penry, a young Cambridge graduate of Welsh origin, drew up in the form of a petition to Parliament an elaborate statement, in which he described in moving terms the spiritual destitution of Wales, and professed to trace the responsibility for the pagan ignorance that prevailed there to the neglect of their just obligations by the Bishops and the obedient clergy. Whitgift replied by summoning Penry before the Court of High Commission. But his offence proved to be difficult of definition. The proceedings were inconclusive, and the offender suffered only a few days' imprisonment.

The balance of victory lay with Penry, and the attempt to silence him failed. Whitgift's repressive *régime* naturally suggested to its victims clandestine attack. Anxious to pursue his advantage

from a position of greater safety, Penry resolved to undermine the credit of episcopacy. At the end of 1588 a small band of Puritan clergymen and laymen, under Penry's guidance, devised a scheme whereby the country was deluged with secretly printed denunciations of the personal characters and pretensions of the Bishops. Printing-presses were set up in out-of-the-way districts, and a dozen pamphlets were hastily prepared, all bearing the single pseudonymous signature of "Martin Mar-prelate." The style employed by the writer was not unknown in theological warfare. Insolent personalities had defaced religious controversy earlier in the century; but the violent scurrility of the Mar-prelate tracts followed the worst models of abuse. The private lives and characters of the Bishops and their supporters were recklessly censured; and they were likened to historical characters to whom universal odium attached among churchmen. Whitgift, who received chief notice, was declared to be more ambitious than Cardinal Wolsey, prouder than Bishop Gardiner, more tyrannical than Bishop Bonner.

The country was startled by this open defiance of the recent endeavour of Whitgift and his colleagues of the High Commission Court and Star Chamber to suppress freedom of speech. All the detective machinery of the High Commission Court was at once set in motion, in order to track down and break up the pamphleteering conspiracy. Whitgift conducted the operations in person. But the task proved difficult of accomplishment. The Puritan advocates found numerous sympathisers, and the libellers were effectively protected. For more than a year they eluded pursuit of their episcopal foes.

Meanwhile Martin Mar-prelate excited reprisals in the press. It was difficult for the Bishops and their friends to reply to the onslaughts of the Martin Mar-prelate writers in the same unlicensed vocabulary. But they tacitly welcomed the support of professional men of letters, including John Lyly and Thomas Nash, to whom the preciseness and prudishness of Puritan ideals were obnoxious. The "Anti-Martinists," as the critics of Martin Mar-prelate were called, were not scrupulous in their diction, and their intervention added fuel to the flames. The controversy went on with increased ferocity. Each side lashed out at the other with vigour and received swingeing blows in return. Nonconformists of a philosophical turn regretted the degradation of theological discussion. Moderate men of all parties agreed that the interests of religion were compromised by the polemical vulgarities. But the rival pamphleteers were thoroughly exasperated, and the fire had to burn itself out. Whitgift and his officers redoubled their exertions. But it was the exhaustion of the actors that mainly closed the conflict. The net result of the pamphleteering war was to expose much weakness in the episcopal armour. The Bishops never succeeded in unravelling the whole conspiracy. Only a few of the pamphleteers were hunted down. Penry escaped to

Scotland for the time in safety. Public opinion, so far as it could be gauged, deprecated harsh treatment of the offenders; and, when John Udall, an aged minister, who was suspected of complicity with Penry, was capitally convicted of a seditious libel, he was promptly pardoned, although he died in prison. For the moment he was the Bishops' only victim. Despite all the legal machinery at their disposal, no means existed of avenging on a large scale this veiled attempt at rebellion against episcopacy. But Whitgift was not to be readily deterred from his goal. He had experienced a check; but the effect could be neutralised by greater vigour hereafter. In 1593 his opportunity arrived. Three leaders of the Puritan army lay at his mercy. His action was swift and certain. Henry Barrow and John Greenwood, separatists and censors of the Book of Common Prayer, who had long endured imprisonment, were tried and convicted, not as offenders against the law of the Church, but under the secular statute which was directed against disseminators of seditious libel. In the same year Penry was arrested in London and brought to trial, on a vague charge of traducing the Queen in notes for a sermon which were said to have been found in his study. The question of his complicity in the Martin Mar-prelate controversy was not raised. But sufficient was held to be proved against his loyalty under the criminal law of libel to warrant capital punishment. Three of the most strenuous enemies of episcopacy were thus swept from Whitgift's path.

But it was on the Parliament which met in the spring of 1593 that Whitgift relied to put the coping-stone to his repressive policy. An Act was passed professing by its title to have the object of "restraining the Queen's subjects in obedience." It was directed in unmistakable terms against Protestant nonconformists. Active support of practices to which their principles impelled them, and the avoidance of practices from which their principles restrained them, were alike declared categorically to be heinous offences punishable by the heaviest penalties, not excluding death. The Act included in its purview anyone who should dispute the Queen's ecclesiastical authority, who should abstain from going to church, or who should attend "any assemblies, conventicles or meetings under cover or pretence of any exercise of religion." Such offenders were to be arrested and imprisoned until they gave a solemn assurance of conformity. Should they fail to offer that assurance within three months, they were to quit the realm, on oath not to return. If they refused to quit the country on this condition, or if, having abjured the realm, they returned home, they were liable to be hanged.

Legislation so stringent if put into force could not fail to reduce the militant activity of nonconformity. Death was pronounced to be the doom of any Puritan who was loyal to his convictions. If he set any value on his life, he had to choose between renouncing his principles at home and adhering to them abroad. Although the penal law of 1593 was administered with some reservation, it went as far as was practicable

towards the end that Whitgift had in view. Leading nonconformists who were unable conscientiously to submit to the law of the Church quitted their homes. The less stalwart brethren were at liberty to remain in England in the equivocal guise of conformists.

As far as appearances went, the Anglican establishment was rendered homogeneous. The bounds of the Church might be narrowed; but the Archbishop argued that, by way of compensation for loss of numbers, she had gained the concentrated strength that comes of unity. There were, however, limits to the triumph of episcopacy. Whitgift was unable to change the tendency of public opinion which facilitated evasion of his oppressive law. Nor could he prevent dissentients who openly left the fold from pursuing the agitation openly and earnestly in a foreign country. The neighbouring country of Holland eagerly welcomed the Protestant exiles. Separatist congregations were formed at Middelburg, at Leyden, at Amsterdam; and there, instead of recanting or forgoing any of their enthusiasm, English Puritans systematised the theological principles which Whitgift deemed fatal to the peace of their own country. English Puritanism flourished in Holland in spite of Whitgift's efforts, and menaced the future of Whitgift's Church. Though manifestations of Puritan zeal might for the time be repressed at home, its growth was not stayed. Abroad it enjoyed new and unembarrassed opportunity of winning strength and consistency. By insisting on the irreconcilability of Puritanism and Anglicanism, Whitgift had in effect cleared the decks for a life and death struggle, and had indirectly and involuntarily prepared the way for the temporary ascendancy of Puritanism in the century that followed.

But Whitgift was content with the instrument forged by him against the spread of nonconformity in England. He deemed the coercive power of the government sufficient, and during the final years of the Queen's reign he turned his attention to schemes for improving the education of the inferior clergy, and for the remedy of the abuses of non-residence. At the same time he sought to confirm the independence of the Bishops' Courts, and he protested against appeals from them to civil tribunals. He also, with apparent self-contradiction, countenanced an endeavour to reform the Creeds of the Church and impart to them a more pronounced Calvinistic colouring. He wished to adopt the doctrines of predestination and election without qualification.

Whitgift had always distinguished in his own mind between principles of theology and principles of Church government. The offences at which he aimed in his penal laws were active infringements of the political laws of the Anglican establishment. He denied the title of martyrs of religion to his Puritan victims. They suffered punishment because they had challenged the law of the land and had rebelled against the cause of order. With a view to making his theological position clearer, now that a delusive order was established, he, in 1595, summoned to Lambeth three

Bishops and some old Cambridge friends, and devised a series of nine Articles which modified on Genevan lines existing dogmas of the Church. They were known as the "Lambeth Articles," and solely involved questions of doctrine. No topics of ritual or discipline were touched. But Whitgift's Lambeth Articles were never accepted by the Church of England. Queen Elizabeth showed a surer grasp than her Archbishop of the needs of the ecclesiastical polity which he had himself helped to frame. She hastily bade him disown a manifesto which seemed to offend by its incongruity with his past action. He yielded to the royal wish, and explained to her and to his friends that the new articles were mere pious opinions of personal import, not designed to carry legal sanction; but he at the same time assured his Cambridge friends with characteristic resolution that "he did concur with them in judgment and would to the end," nor would he suffer them to be impugned "openly or otherwise."

Few thoughtful men treated as final Whitgift's professed solution of the problem of Church government. To one sagacious contemporary Whitgift's acts and arguments presented as many false issues as might have been detected by an avowed champion, in the seventeenth or eighteenth century, of comprehension or toleration. Bacon entered the House of Commons in the year following Whitgift's acceptance of the office of Archbishop, and he at once surveyed the political situation. He perceived the dangers of a Puritan schism; but to the policy of repressing Puritanism by force he from the first announced himself as opposed. He disclaimed any sympathy with the "preciseness" of Puritan opinions. But it seemed to him that the Bishops were taking a dangerous course in pressing too hardly on the Puritan clergy. Extreme measures of coercion proclaimed to the world that the Protestant Church of England, which embraced the nation, was a house divided against itself. Such a confession injured the repute of the Queen and the country. In the second place, however little one might approve the narrowness of Puritan doctrine, yet the Puritans were stalwart enemies of the papist superstition, and by their preaching and teaching formed a stout bulwark against the spread of Roman Catholic error. Whitgift and his colleagues ignored Bacon's pleas. But he restated them in an *Advertisement touching the Controversies of the Church of England* (1589), when the Martin Mar-prelate agitation was at its height. The factious temper of the Puritans, he again asserted, merited no countenance; but a rigid insistence on conformity among all English Protestants jeopardised the Protestant cause and the country's unity.

It was not, however, from the Bishops, nor from Bacon, that the most imposing comments on the Puritan revolt proceeded. Richard Hooker, a student of divinity, who held a small and ill-remunerated preferment, made a strenuous effort to define the general principles which justified the predominance of the Established Church and rendered

untenable the Puritan position. Hooker wrote independently of authority, though his effort was favourable to the Church's pretensions, and consequently met with Whitgift's full approval. His *Ecclesiastical Polity* (1594-7), which was begun and completed during Whitgift's archiepiscopate, is the most important fruit of the contemporary struggle between Episcopacy and Presbyterianism. Hooker went far beyond the immediate needs of the situation, and made a contribution of first-rate importance to the theory of government, both civil and ecclesiastical. He anticipated the great Whig doctrine of the seventeenth century, that government had its origin in a primary contract between the governor and the governed, and he endeavoured to prove that the constitution of the Anglican Church rested on such an implied contract, from which there was no right of withdrawal.

An *Apologia* for the Church of England had come from the pen of Jewel, the learned Bishop of Salisbury, at the opening of the Queen's reign, in 1562. But it was framed on restricted lines. It mainly interpreted, in a sense favourable to the laws affecting the Reformation in England, a series of quotations from the Scriptures, the Fathers, and the Councils of the medieval Church. Narrow in conception, Jewel's *Apologia* only satisfied those who were already convinced, and excited more dissent than agreement. Hooker appealed to his readers from a wholly different point of view. He took little for granted. He sought to show that scriptural authority was not in itself the sole or the adequate test of ecclesiastical polity. In all relations of life man had to seek guidance from reason as well as from the Divine revelation. There was a moral law of Divine origin, which was not enshrined in the Bible; it was deducible from other sources, and derived its sanction from man's rational faculties. Christian Churches were under an obligation to organise themselves in conformity to both moral law and the scriptural word. Hooker's ultimate object was to show that the creeds, ritual, and discipline of the Episcopal Church of England had the sanction not merely of revelation but of reason. He couched his arguments in language of singular force and dignity, and by the cogency of his logical method, and command of learning, did far more than any penal legislation to strengthen the Church of England. From many points of view Hooker's work was in advance of the age and touched topics that were not of pertinence to current affairs. It set on a firm and rational basis the principles of orderly government. But Hooker addressed himself to a minority of his countrymen. The holders of office were content to diagnose the practical needs of the hour more roughly and readily than he.

The Queen's advisers had to deal not with Puritan dissent alone. They had to face the enmity of the Roman Catholics. The relations of the government with the English Roman Catholics both at home and abroad stood on a footing different from that of their relations with

the Puritans. Like the Puritans, the Catholics were dissentients from the Established Church. But the Elizabethan politician, while hostile to their theological opinions and practices, did not view them primarily as religious nonconformists or enemies of the Church. In his eyes they stood outside the ecclesiastical fold, and there was no likelihood of their inclusion within it. They were dissentients from the State rather than from the Church; they were political rather than religious foes. However pacific were the sentiments or habits of many professors of Catholicism resident in England, the English government reckoned all members of the faith to belong to a single category. In the eyes of the Queen and her advisers they were all strangers in the land, owing allegiance to a foreign power; they formed collectively an advanced guard of a foreign army which threatened invasion. Thus the Roman Catholic problem was an urgent political danger. Its solution did not fall within the ecclesiastical sphere, but solution was the first duty of the secular power in the country.

There was much to justify this view. Pope Pius V had in 1570 issued a Bull releasing the subjects of Queen Elizabeth from their fealty to her. That edict was never revoked. Pius V's successors, Gregory XIII and Sixtus V, treated it as of actively binding force. The Jesuits engaged as a body to do all that was possible to give effect to the papal decree. Philip II of Spain subsidised a strong force of English Catholics abroad, who were pledged to support the invasion and conquest of England. Both the Pope and the King of Spain undertook to lend material aid to the Irish rebels.

Queen Elizabeth's ministers were all agreed that in stringent coercive legislation lay the only safeguard against the Catholic peril; and they gave thoroughgoing effect to their conviction. In the last half of the reign, the urgency of the danger seemed to justify the expansion of the criminal law so as to cover every manifestation of Catholic sympathy. The observance of the ceremonies of the Catholic Church and the education of the children of Catholic parents in Catholic doctrine became legal offences. The rigour of the penalties at length menaced the property, the liberty, and even the life of every adherent of the faith.

The Act of Supremacy provided at the opening of the reign for the capital punishment of anyone denying the Queen's headship of the Church. But it was not till the year following the promulgation in 1570 of the papal Bull releasing the Queen's subjects from their allegiance that the Elizabethan era of penal legislation against the Catholics may be reckoned to have set in. Another ten years intervened before the work acquired full strength. The Parliament of 1571 replied to the action of Pius V by two statutes, of which the first rendered it treasonable to call the Queen a heretic, schismatic, or usurper, and the second punished with death the introduction into the country of any papal Bull.

Meanwhile the English Catholics abroad were, under papal patronage, forging an elaborate scheme for the reconversion of the country to Catholicism. The militant leader of the English Catholics on the Continent was Father William Allen. His chief contribution to his cause was the foundation in 1568 at Douay of a college or seminary for the preparation of Englishmen for the Catholic priesthood. Allen's college was temporarily transferred for greater security to Rheims for the fifteen years 1578-93; but until 1585 he remained its active head. By his influence, too, an offshoot of the Douay establishment was formed at Rome in 1577, and was ultimately placed by the Pope under the government of the Jesuits, with whom Allen was in full sympathy. Both the English colleges of Douay and Rome were designed to supply an English mission, an army of priests that should spread themselves over England, and reconcile the people to the Papacy.

Between 1574 and 1580 some hundred priests from the two seminaries had come to England; and the work of reconversion was reported to have begun. In July of the latter year the Jesuits Parsons and Campion arrived to take chief command, and the movement acquired new vigour. The English government deemed it needful to take action. A proclamation was at once issued imposing the penalty of death on any Jesuits or seminary priests who entered the Queen's dominions, and on any person harbouring them there; the seminaries were warmly denounced as places for the propagation of sedition. But the proclamation proved ineffective. The influence of the missionaries grew. In the following year (1581) Parliament was called together to strengthen the government's hands. An Act was passed, in the words of the title, "to retain the Queen's Majesty's subjects in their due obedience." Various clauses provided that any person reconciling another to the Church of Rome was a traitor, while the convert was pronounced guilty of misprision of treason, and was also liable to the capital penalty. Fine, or imprisonment in default, was imposed on any persons either saying or hearing mass.

The Act was at once put into execution, and thirteen persons, including the Jesuit leader of the mission, Campion, were convicted under its provisions. The sentence of death was passed upon all, and was carried out in the case of ten, Campion being one of those who suffered. The three whose lives were spared formally renounced the deposing power of the Pope. But the missionaries were not easily daunted. The threats of invasion by Philip II and the intrigues which centred in Mary Stewart rendered the general political situation alarming. The government deemed it necessary to give statutory force to the harsh proclamation of 1580, which forbade the presence of Jesuits or seminary priests in the country. In 1585 Parliament decreed that all Jesuits and seminary priests were to leave the kingdom within forty days, under the capital penalty of treason. Catholic laymen who

received priests into their houses, or gave them any kind of assistance, were declared guilty of felony, and were rendered liable to punishment by death. All students in the foreign seminaries were to return home within six months, and take the oath of supremacy, or be declared traitors. On their return and acceptance of the oath they were forbidden to come within twelve miles of the Court for ten years. Persons who sent youths to foreign seminaries were to forfeit £100, and to incur the penalties of *praemunire* if they forwarded money to any student already there. Seminarists were pronounced incapable of inheriting property from those who provided them with cost of maintenance abroad.

In this Act of 1585 "against Jesuits, seminary priests, and other suchlike disobedient persons" the tide of the anti-Catholic penal legislation reached its high-water-mark. Among priests and the harbourers of priests it claimed a heavy toll of victims in almost every one of the eighteen years that remained of the Queen's reign. But the legislation did not answer all the expectations that were formed of it. It proved inadequate to suppress Catholic worship. In spite of the coercive restraints of law, it was still found possible to perform clandestinely the ceremonial observances of the Catholic faith. Another turn of the screw was needed to meet such evasion of the intention of the legislature. In 1593 Parliament once again devoted its attention to "Popish recusants." They were ordered to keep within five miles of their own houses; a fine of twenty pounds a month was imposed on any omitting to attend the services in the parish church; inability to pay this fine was to be punished by banishment; and, should the offenders refuse to leave the country, they were to be tried for felony. One chance of escape from this repressive measure was, however, offered to those whom it affected. A formal recantation of their beliefs in the parish church would entitle them to pardon.

Despite the pertinacity with which the government pursued their coercive policy, neither its prudence nor its justice went unchallenged in the Queen's closing years. The coercive policy was based on the assumption that all Catholics were politically hostile to the Queen, and were at one with Allen and the Jesuits in seeking her deposition and the conquest of the country by Spain. The patriotic action of the Catholics at home through the crisis of the Spanish Armada proved the weakness of this assumption. In the hour of peril the English Catholics placed loyalty to their Queen and country before all other considerations. Catholic priests and laymen joined their Protestant fellow-countrymen in concerting measures for the defeat of the threatened invasion. The injustice of imputing treachery to the whole Catholic population was proved beyond question. By the government and nation at large that revelation was grudgingly received, and only a few men of sagacity acknowledged the manifest fact. To meet the just needs of the situation some test was clearly required to distinguish between those

who set fealty to the Queen above allegiance to the Pope, and those who allowed their religious obligations to override all patriotic sentiment. Francis Bacon grasped the situation more completely than anyone else then in public life. At the outset of his career he urged that only those men deserved to be treated as traitors who declined to bear arms against a foreign invader. An oath should therefore be imposed on all Catholics, binding them to take up arms in the Queen's name against the Pope or any foreign Prince who should threaten England's independence. Anyone who declined to make the solemn declaration deserved the stigma of treachery; but no other persons ought to be molested. The suggestion was statesmanlike and craved serious attention. But those in authority were suspicious of arguments that savoured of toleration; to the Protestant conscience the Catholics were disciples of a papal Antichrist. Loyal and disloyal Catholics continued to suffer persecution alike.

Not that Bacon's point of view could be wholly ignored by the Queen's ministers. Loyalty among the English Catholics steadily grew after the Armada. A large and increasing section showed a hearty dislike of the prospects of foreign dominion, and openly disclaimed sympathy with the disloyal intrigues of the leaders of the party abroad. It was impossible that Elizabethan statesmen should close their eyes to the change of sentiment which was moving a large part of the Catholic community in England and was leading the way to a revolution in its whole internal economy. The fact that the Catholic conspirators conducted their operations at a safe distance from England, outside the scope of the penal laws, was diminishing their credit with Catholics resident in England. It was only the missionaries in England and their followers who were exposed to risk of death or imprisonment. A hope was arising among some of them that if they disowned their disloyal leaders they might yet exercise their religion in peace in their native land. Aspirations such as these, in spite of the unreadiness of the Queen's ministers to acknowledge it, brought on a new phase of the Catholic question as the Queen's reign drew to its end.

The Catholic leaders abroad never withdrew from their original position. They naturally recognised an added danger to their cause in the spread of loyal sentiment among their fellow Catholics in England. A strong resident Catholic party, which should be ready to support a foreign invader, was essential to the success of their plans. The growing signs of loyalty among English Catholics at home were disconcerting to the political intriguers, but they preferred to risk division in the Catholic ranks rather than abate their hostility to Queen Elizabeth's government.

The leaders of the English Catholics abroad clung with vehemence to the policy of violence in which they placed all their hope. Father Allen had been made a Cardinal at the request of Philip II before the despatch of the Armada, in order that, so soon as the conquest of England was accomplished, he might reorganise the English Church on a Catholic

basis. He never modified his position, although he withdrew after the rout of the Spanish fleet from political agitation. His mantle as the chief instigator of foreign aggression fell on the Jesuit Robert Parsons, who excelled his predecessor in his passionate advocacy of a policy of physical force. He had won the ear of Philip II, and until the King's death in 1598 persistently urged him to renew the old schemes of invasion. Parsons paid small heed to the rising spirit of loyalty among English Catholics; he thought to shout it down. But his uncompromising action had an effect quite opposite to that which he intended. The increasing heat with which he continued to preach a crusade against Protestant England in printed books as well as by word of mouth precipitated a schism in the ranks of English Catholics at home and on the Continent. Parsons insisted on the doctrine that the Pope's Bull of deposition justified the Queen's assassination. Catholics in England who had rallied round the Queen in the time of the Armada viewed his arguments with constantly increasing dismay. His sinister influence fanned the flame of intestine strife throughout the Catholic world; and, while his malignity kept the English government on the alert, it greatly diminished the dangers to be apprehended from Catholic intrigue.

Parsons' supporters in England made at his instance a desperate bid for the control of the Catholic mission there. The extreme faction petitioned Rome for the appointment in England of a Catholic Bishop, who should enforce disloyal doctrine on all English Catholics. The Vatican was at the moment reluctant actively to pursue its old quarrel with the English government; but under Jesuit pressure the Pope agreed to create a new office, that of Archpriest. This dignity was invested with large powers over the English secular clergy, a majority of whom favoured a policy of peace.

The papal choice fell on George Blackwell, a secular priest, who was a partisan of the Jesuits. His nomination (1598) was regarded as a triumph for the aggressive party. But it proved a doubtful victory. The English government, without committing itself to any modification of its coercive methods, intervened with some astuteness in the internal quarrel and endeavoured to draw from it an advantage for themselves in their conflict with the Catholic Powers abroad. At least it seemed feasible with the aid of the pacific faction to patch up the long-standing quarrel with the Vatican. The leaders of the English mission had been placed in comparatively easy confinement at Wisbech Castle, and facilities were given to them in 1601 for the despatch to Rome of a delegation of four representatives of the pacific clergy, who were anxious to appeal for the cancelling of the Archpriest's appointment. The arguments which the four delegates urged on the papal judges were all that the Queen's ministers could have wished. It was explained to the Cardinals that disloyal Catholic books had brought odium on the Church in

England and provoked persecution; that attempts to reduce England by force had greatly injured the position of the faithful there; that the withdrawal of the Jesuits from the Courts and camps of princes and a prohibition of their interference in secular politics were essential to the security of Catholicism in England. But the Vatican was not prepared for any thoroughgoing accommodation. All that the delegates could obtain from the Pope was the cancelling of the clause in the Archpriest's instructions which bade him take counsel of the Jesuits. An official declaration against political intrigue was refused; the Archpriest was left at liberty to organise English Catholics for rebellion, at his discretion.

The proceedings seemed to Sir Robert Cecil and his colleagues to justify their settled policy of coercion which had for a moment caused some of their friends misgivings. Coercion had never been relaxed and was applied with greater rigour as the Queen's death approached. An Act of Parliament had in 1597 excepted from a somewhat illusory general pardon all schismatics, heretics, and offenders against the ecclesiastical government of the realm. No Catholic benefited by the Queen's clemency. In 1598 an alleged conspiracy against her life was discovered; and, although it is doubtful whether there was any genuine ground for alarm, the episode was used as an excuse for refurbishing the persecuting machinery. Edward Squire, a man of no account, who had held a post in the royal stables, was charged with having, at the instigation of a priest, rubbed poison on the pommel of the Queen's saddle with a view to her assassination. The evidence against Squire was far from conclusive; but he was executed, and the public was duly impressed with the danger of the situation, when a special order of prayer and thanksgiving to celebrate the Queen's escape was directed by the Council to be read in all churches. After the failure of the delegates of the pacific Catholic party to obtain from Rome any condemnation of the disloyal doctrines of the Jesuits, a proclamation was once more issued banishing Jesuits and secular priests alike from the country on pain of death.

In the course of Queen Elizabeth's reign Parliament met only eleven times. During the first thirty years it met seven times, during the last fifteen four times. With the rarest exceptions, each Parliament was dissolved at the close of a single session, which lasted on the average for six weeks. The national legislature enjoyed little independence. The majority of the members of the House of Commons were nominated by the Queen's responsible ministers; and any attempt on the part of constituencies to assert the right of a free choice of representatives was sternly reprobated. In 1597 Sir Robert Cecil officially warned the boroughs through their mayors against returning "unmeet men"; should such persons be sent up to the House of Commons, there would be "occasion,"

the Queen's secretary wrote, "to enquire by whose fault it so happened." The Queen deemed it the sole business of Parliament to vote supplies and to register without criticism or demur the decisions of herself as explained to Parliament by her ministers. "It is her Majesty's pleasure," the Lord Keeper stated at the opening of the Parliament in the spring of 1593, that "the time be not spent in devising and enacting new laws, the number of which are so great already, as it rather burtheneth than easeth the subject." Money was required for the better protection of the country from threatened invasion. There was no reason why the Commons should concern themselves with anything else. Yet, despite all the precautions taken by the government to restrain freedom of election or debate, much independent criticism of the Queen and her advisers managed to pass the lips of members of the House of Commons. It was only on one domestic subject that the bulk of the nation, so far as their views could be gauged by the declarations of Parliament, invariably seemed enthusiastic supporters of the government. Doubts of the necessity or prudence of the penal legislation against the Catholics were never countenanced by the House of Commons.

The economic condition of the country during the last years of the reign caused national concern. Public opinion asserted itself, and ministers were unable to resist a widespread desire among the people to bring economic grievances under the notice of Parliament, in spite of the Queen's impatience of parliamentary interference in affairs of State and her preference for enforcing her royal will by means of proclamation rather than by parliamentary statute. Bad harvests were of frequent occurrence; agricultural labour was at a discount owing to the steadily progressing conversion of arable land into pasture. Inhabitants of the villages were crowding into the towns. Men who had engaged in the foreign wars vainly sought employment on their discharge. The scarcity of employment was a constant menace to internal peace. It was with great reluctance that the government squarely faced the economic problems that beset the nation. The maintenance of the *status quo* was the only principle that appealed to them. In 1580 the Queen endeavoured to stem the incursion of new-comers to London by a proclamation forbidding the erection of any more houses there. Nine years later Parliament took the matter in hand, and in the spirit of the Queen's proclamation forbade the erection of any cottage unless four acres of land were attached to it. No new cottage, moreover, might be inhabited by more than a single family. Such measures, designed to keep the people distributed on the land, were ill-adapted to check the migration of the proletariat in search of work or to keep stationary the population of the towns. The causes of the popular restlessness were not faced. Later, it became necessary to approach more directly the problem of the unemployed. The policy of coercion was invoked. A law for the rigorous punishment of rogues, vagabonds, and sturdy

beggars—categories which were easily held to include the unemployed poor—was passed early in 1598. But the evil was not stayed. At length, in the last Parliament of the reign, the economic distress among the lower ranks of the population called for more effective treatment from the people's representatives. The result was a piece of legislation of the highest importance in the social and economic history of the country. The government acknowledged the responsibility of providing sustenance for that part of the nation which was unable to maintain itself. In every parish a body of overseers of the poor was created. These officers were to consist of the churchwardens together with from two to four householders to be nominated by the justices of the peace. The overseers were empowered to levy a rate on land, and with the proceeds to put to employment able-bodied men out of work together with indigent children. Persons who were incapacitated for work and had no near relatives to support them were to be relieved. Finally, houses of correction were to be built for the reclamation of vagabonds, and pauper children were to be apprenticed to trades. This Elizabethan poor-law was a very practical contribution to the solution of a pressing economic problem; and the principles on which it rested have never been abrogated by subsequent legislation.

But it was not only among the labouring classes that economic distress bred discontent and insecurity. The commercial classes complained bitterly of the demands made on them by the government. Many quasi-legal devices were resorted to by the Queen in her last years. The Council often raised money for the country's defences without appeal to Parliament, and protests were not unfrequent. In 1596 a royal letter directed the mayor and aldermen of London to fit out ten new ships. The Lord Mayor replied with a remonstrance to the Privy Council, in which complaint was made of the excessive demands of recent years. The City's wealth was diminished owing to a three years' dearth of corn. "Many persons," the Lord Mayor continued, "before known to be of good wealth, are greatly decayed and utterly disabled for all public service, being hardly able by their uttermost endeavours to maintain the charges of their private families in very mean sort." But such appeals failed to move the Queen's ministers, and the discontent grew. Next year, the Lord Mayor pointed out that the money borrowed by the government from many citizens for the equipment of the Cadiz expedition had not yet been repaid. The Lord Mayor reported to Sir Robert Cecil that there was great anxiety among the citizens to "enter into consideration, by what authority the said payments were imposed upon them by the governors and other ministers of State."

At the extreme end of the reign the Queen was herself roused to a sense of the imprudence with which in one notable direction she had exerted her fiscal powers. She had long been in the habit of granting to ministers and favourites the sole right to manufacture and sell one

or other article of commerce, with the result that the monopolist had it in his power to raise the price of the monopolised articles, to the injury of the consumer. The grievance was always real; but by the Queen's reckless distribution of patents of monopoly in the last decade of her life it had become an intolerable burden on the nation. When Elizabeth's last Parliament assembled in October, 1601, strenuous complaint was made in the House of Commons of the undue exercise of the prerogative in the matter of granting monopoly patents. An Act was introduced by a private member, Lawrence Hyde, declaring monopolies illegal and extortionate. Great frankness characterised the debate; the grants of monopolies were declared to be derogatory to her Majesty, odious to the subject, and dangerous to the commonwealth; the grantees were denounced as bloodsuckers of the commonwealth. The Queen perceived at once the seriousness of the situation, and showed infinite resource in her method of meeting the crisis. The Bill was well received in the House and had reached its committee stage, when the Queen sent down a message of singular astuteness. She understood, she declared, that the patents which she had granted were grievous to her people; they should be looked to immediately, and none be put into execution but such as should first have a trial according to the law, for the good of the people; she was resolved to defend her people from all aggression, and would take immediate order for the reformation of the grievance.

The tone of the message stemmed for the moment the tide of discontent. The tables were completely turned. Her superiority to parliamentary power was asserted with the full assent of the House of Commons. If genuine grievances needed redress she claimed the honour of performing the task, and that honour was thankfully accorded her. The parliamentary proceedings were abandoned. Three days later the Queen by proclamation suspended all patents of monopoly, until their legality should have been tested by the law officers of the Crown. The whole House proceeded to Whitehall to thank her for her prompt action. In a long, stirring speech she announced that her love for her people was the jewel of richest price. She spoke with informal indignation of the oppressions of which the patentees had been guilty, and declared that they should be well punished. Her subjects' good was her sole aim in life, and she did not wish to live or reign any longer than her life and reign should be for her subjects' advantage. It was Queen Elizabeth's last speech to her people. There was an equivocal ring in her heated condemnation of an oppressive practice for which she was herself largely responsible. But the masterful, yet pathetic assertion of her claim to her people's affectionate loyalty illustrated at once the causes and the effects of her personal popularity.

The physical activity and intellectual vivacity which the Queen showed during her last Parliament remained unabated until within a

few weeks of her death, two years later. Her energy seemed to the nation at large to justify the postponement of any final choice of a successor to her throne. It was not a question that she would suffer to be discussed. In 1593 Peter Wentworth, a member of the House of Commons, petitioned the House of Lords to join the Lower House in a supplication to the Queen to entail the succession. Elizabeth indignantly ordered the petitioner to the Tower, where he died three years later. Yet in spite of the Queen's attitude to the subject, her ministers, her favourites, and the Catholic intriguers abroad were for many years engrossed in secret by the critical topic which weighed unceasingly upon their minds.

The Catholic intriguers long thought to find in a solution of this doubtful and difficult question a final means of upsetting the equilibrium of the State. Their chances of overthrowing Queen Elizabeth's government were nearly extinguished. Their hopes of the future depended on their success in an endeavour to secure at her death a successor amenable to their influence. The topic was one which naturally divided the two Catholic factions. The party of peace desired to leave the problem of the succession alone. Only the party of aggression regarded it as essential to solve it in their own fashion. At first the choice of Cardinal Allen and his friends had fallen on King James VI of Scotland, the son of Mary Stewart. Philip II and the Duke of Parma had also been vaguely suggested, and a proposal was made to support Arabella Stewart, a more reasonable claimant, on condition that she should be married to the Duke of Parma. But these were mere empty fancies; and, when James of Scotland declared himself a Protestant, it was necessary to seek elsewhere a candidate in the Catholic interest. On Allen's withdrawal from active superintendence of the political business of the Catholic party, Parsons, who stepped into his place, urged that Catholic efforts should centre in the endeavour to place on the English throne the Infanta of Spain, Philip II's daughter. She was descended from John of Gaunt, whose second wife was a Spanish Princess. In 1594 Parsons published under the pseudonym of "R. Doleman" an English tract entitled *A Conference about the next Succession to the Crown of England*, which deeply stirred England and indeed the whole of Europe. Here, after endeavouring to prove the right of the people to alter the line of succession on the ground of religion and for other just causes, Parsons submitted to elaborate examination the genealogy of the royal house and reached the conclusion that the Infanta was Queen Elizabeth's rightful heir. By the Queen's government the manifesto was promptly denounced as treasonable and seditious, and its circulation in the country forbidden. The pacific Catholics repudiated it as pestilential, and disclaimed any manner of sympathy with a Spanish pretender to the English throne.

Parsons thought to take some obscure advantage of the rivalries of Court factions by dedicating his insolent plea for the Infanta to the

Earl of Essex. But both the responsible and irresponsible advisers of the sovereign were agreed in the resolve to exclude a Catholic from the throne. To the Queen the Infanta's name was of hateful import, and it was only heard at Court when one favourite endeavoured to steal an advantage over another by insinuating in the Queen's presence that his rival was toying with the fancy that the Spanish Princess was fitted to become monarch of England. Essex had long before his death made up his mind to support James of Scotland; and, when his hopes of controlling the reigning sovereign dwindled, he thought to secure future power by placing under some obligation to himself the Prince who was likely to succeed Queen Elizabeth. He constantly assured the Scottish King that he was working for his succession. But it was not Essex alone who set his heart on the choice of James. Lord Burghley's son, Sir Robert Cecil, committed himself to the support of the same candidate, and opened with him a secret correspondence which, more effectual than that devised by Essex, ultimately set the Scottish King on the English throne.

Elizabeth's defiant attitude of indifference to the question strikingly illustrated the lack of consistency in her character. The Crown of the Tudors had come to be regarded as the sovereign's personal property. It lay at the testamentary disposition of the wearer. Henry VIII, Edward VI, and Queen Mary each nominated with their dying breaths the person who was to succeed to the royal estate. Edward VI's dying directions were, it is true, set aside; but their rejection rested on a well-supported plea of his having submitted to undue influence, and the accession of Queen Mary in the place of Lady Jane Grey left the monarch's prerogative of choice in all essentials unquestioned. A Tudor Parliament had, however much some members chafed in secret under royal dictation, never refused to register the royal will. Thrice it sanctioned, at a word from Henry VIII, the changes in the succession which his matrimonial vagaries necessitated.

But no precedent succeeded in moving Elizabeth to confront the topic. The terms which Wentworth had used in his suggestion of a petition to her "to entail the succession" acknowledged her full ownership of the royal estate, but such an admission failed to mollify her indignation at his raising of the question. Strong as was her ultimate sense of public duty, it failed her here. Her egotism blinded her to the dangers to which her refusal to discuss the subject was likely to expose the State. The thought that her dignities must, by the efflux of time, pass to another seems only to have suggested to her the insecurity of her own tenure of them, and the coming extinction of her authority. Such a prospect she could not nerve herself to face.

Twice during the reign—in 1571 and 1585—the word "succession" found a place in Acts of Parliament. But both enactments were framed

after the Queen's own heart. Instead of indicating possible successors to the throne they created disabilities in the case of all possible claimants.

The work that the Queen left undone her minister, Sir Robert Cecil, took upon his own shoulders. The situation abounded in irony. A monarch whose jealousy of her prerogative seemed often to reduce her ministers' authority to a shadow, left them, by her own default, power to exercise at will one of the proudest of royal privileges. Nor did Cecil, in definitely arranging that James VI of Scotland should succeed to Elizabeth's Crown, defer to that settlement of the Crown which her father had devised—the only settlement to which a legal sanction attached, apart from the reigning sovereign's testamentary directions. There had been no repeal of the stipulation made by Henry VIII, both in Act of Parliament and in his will, that after the death without heirs of his three children, Edward, Mary, and Elizabeth, the Crown should descend to the heirs of his younger sister, Mary (who had issue only by her second husband, Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk), to the exclusion of the heirs of his elder sister Margaret (from whom her great-grandchildren, James VI of Scotland and Arabella Stewart, derived their claims). Consequently, the rightful heir, when Elizabeth lay dying, was no scion of the Scottish House, but the eldest representative of the Suffolk line—Princess Mary's great-grandson, Edward Seymour, Lord Beauchamp. But Elizabeth's ministers were not the slaves of legal niceties. The Queen's neutrality left their choice unfettered; and, though expectation of personal profit largely moved them, their action proved politic. Lord Beauchamp was a man of insignificant position and character; James VI, however contemptible in many respects, had experience as a ruler, and a contiguous kingdom to add to the endowments of the English Crown.

Every precaution to conceal the negotiation with Scotland from Elizabeth's knowledge was deemed vital to its success. A word from her could annul the plan, and her temperament might lead her to pronounce the word at any moment. Often did Sir Robert Cecil tremble at the chance of her discovering his design. The risk was great. Elizabeth, like himself, corresponded voluminously with her Scottish "cousin," and the latter's replies were often ill-considered. Fortunately no syllable about the succession escaped either royal pen.

On Wednesday, March 23, 1603, the Queen was dying at Richmond, and her Council then ventured a first and last despairing effort to obtain from her such assent to their negotiations as would place James' title beyond cavil. Representations have been made that the effort was successful; but there is small ground for crediting the Queen, even in her last hours, with any modification of her resolve to leave the subject of her succession severely alone. The French ambassador is responsible for the statement that at an earlier period of her illness she remarked that "the King of Scotland would hereafter become King of Great Britain." More

trustworthy witnesses merely depose that on two occasions in her latest weeks, when the comments of others in her presence compelled her to break silence, she took refuge in oracular utterances which owe all their significance to the interpretation that their hearers deemed it politic to place on them.

Before leaving London for the last time she is said to have told the Earl of Nottingham that "her throne had always been a throne of Kings, and none but her next heir of blood and descent should succeed her." "Her next heir of blood and descent" was, in the eyes of the law, Lord Beauchamp. The vague phrases attest her settled policy of evasion. According to Sir Robert Carey, on the Wednesday afternoon before her death at Richmond "she made for her Council to be called, and by putting her hand to her head when the King of Scotland was named to succeed her they all knew he was the man she desired should reign after her." Throughout her illness her hand had passed restlessly to and from her head; and a definite meaning could only attach to the sign in the minds of those who, like the reporter, were already pledged to seat James VI in her place. Her lady-in-waiting, Lady Southwell, gives a more disinterested account of this episode of the Wednesday afternoon. The Council were not invited to the royal presence, as Carey avers. They demanded admittance "to know whom" the dying Queen "would have for King." She was hardly conscious and could barely speak; but such preparation as her waning strength permitted for the interview was made by her attendants. The councillors desired her to lift her finger when they named whom she approved. They mentioned the King of France; she did not stir. They spoke of the King of Scotland; she made no sign. They named Lord Beauchamp, the rightful heir under Henry VIII's unrepealed settlement. Then only did Elizabeth rouse herself, and with something of her old vivacity she gasped, "I will have no rascal's son in my seat, but one worthy to be a King." These are the only unquestioned words which afford any clue to the Queen's wishes respecting her successor. At the best they are negative, and cannot be tortured into a formal acceptance of James. The presence of her Council at her bedside made her dimly realise that her reign was over, and it is perhaps juster to regard the utterance as a convulsive cry of anguish, wrung from her by the thought that an unworthy successor had it in his power to work injury to her fame. She died without speaking another word.

About 3 o'clock in the morning of the day following this interview (March 24, 1603) Queen Elizabeth passed away in the seventieth year of her age and forty-fourth year of her reign. Her father's and her own command of the arts of sovereignty implanted in the mass of her people a deeply-rooted respect for monarchical authority which rendered it easy for any accredited successor to assume her throne. At the moment of her death some of the awe which she herself inspired encircled those of

her ministers whom she had honoured with her confidence. The spirit of passive obedience which she had nurtured in the nation lent a validity that none contested to her Council's proclamation, on the morning of her demise, of James VI of Scotland as the new monarch of England. Prognostications of intestine strife seemed at once confuted. No tumult followed, no contradiction, no disorders; every man went about his business as readily, as peaceably, as securely, as though there had been no change.

The net result of the forty-four years of the Queen's reign thus appeared to have set the monarchical principle of government on unshakable foundations. But, even when James VI set forth from Edinburgh on his journey south to enjoy his great inheritance, an intelligent observer might have detected grounds for doubt of the monarchy's stability. The Tudor system of rule was likened by an ambassador from Venice at the Court of Queen Mary Tudor to that of the "Grand Turk" with his bureaucratic council; and there was more to justify the comparison in the closing years of the century than in its central decades. Elizabeth's political creed, even more avowedly than that of her father, brother and sister, was the creed of despotism; and she held it with increasing strength as time went forward. In 1591, when she issued letters-patent which set at defiance the ordinary law of the land regulating the recovery of past debts, she wrote of "our prerogative royal which we will not have argued nor brought in question." The country was frankly governed by her unfettered will. Her councillors, by whose advice and labour she profited, lived in dread of her, and only retained her favour by a sickening tone of flattery and obsequiousness. She acknowledged no power of restraint in Parliament. On rare occasions she summoned her people's representatives together, not, as she told them, "to make new laws, or lose good hours in idle speeches," but to supply her treasury when threat of foreign invasion required that it should be exceptionally full. Her appeal to Parliament was a concession rendered out of the abundance of "her mercy and grace." By prescriptive right she controlled revenues that sufficed for all the ordinary expenses of government, while additional expenditure could be met with comparative ease by forced or voluntary loans. In the result the people groaned under a taxation which was rendered the heavier by a steady rise in prices and a fall in wages. Justice, meanwhile, was administered with an almost oriental laxity. The Queen was unsparing in her exercise of an arbitrary power of arrest, which constantly involved persons obnoxious to her in restraint, without any pretence of legal warrant. Finally, gross corruption flourished at Court and in the government offices; and, if this sin could not be laid immediately at the Queen's door, her own tendency to avarice caused her to view indulgently her servants' venality.

But, although Elizabeth's rule was infected by nearly all the vices of absolutism, it had a saving grace. Her ruthless methods worked much oppression and injustice, but her aim was noble. She regarded her "princely authority" as an instrument given her by God wherewith to maintain her kingdom in honour and prosperity. She intuitively recognised that her ascendancy rested on her people's confidence in her ability to exert her vast power for their good. She made no concealment of this conviction. She never wearied of proclaiming her anxiety to secure her people's happiness and her consequent title to her people's affections. "Far above all earthly treasure," she said repeatedly, "I esteem my people's love." The speech sank deep into her people's heart, and enlivened their spirit, so that the heavy yoke of her government sat lightly on their necks. It was the potency of her complex personality that alone made possible a sovereignty like hers over a people alive with intellectual and physical energy. The paradoxical union in her of the extremes of masculine strength and feminine weakness fascinated a liberty-loving nation, and evoked an eager acquiescence in the bondage of an unlimited monarchy. But with her death the spell broke. Despotism, deprived of the halo of her genius, was seen in its native ugliness. Her successor's graceless attempts at autocracy awoke in the country a sense of loathing for irresponsible sovereignty, and, within half a century of Elizabeth's death, despotism, such as she had practised, was itself dead in England.

CHAPTER XI.

THE ELIZABETHAN AGE OF ENGLISH LITERATURE.

THE literary temper of Elizabethan England was distinguished by a splendid vitality and vivacity, a rare catholicity of taste and width of outlook. Prose and poetry alike rang with a fervid enthusiasm for life in its most varied aspects. The nation's intellect was permeated by a wealth of ideas and aspirations which were new. The powerful individuality of Elizabethan literature is unmistakable, and in the work of Shakespeare it scaled heights unsurpassed in the literature of the world. But Elizabethan literature is misunderstood when it is studied in isolation. Very many of its ideas and aspirations were the common property of civilised Europe, however much they were coloured by the national idiosyncrasy. The enthusiasm for the Greek and Latin classics, the passion for extending the limits of human knowledge, the resolve to make the best and not the worst of life upon earth, the ambition to cultivate the idea of beauty, the faith in man's physical, moral, and intellectual perfectibility, the conviction that man's reason was given him to use without restraint—all these sentiments, which went to the making of Elizabethan literature, were the foundation also of the Renaissance literature of Italy, France, and Spain. Elizabethan literature cannot be rightly appreciated unless it be viewed as one of the latest fruits of the great movement of the European Renaissance. The Elizabethan was gifted with an exceptional power of assimilation. He studied and imitated foreign authors with amazing energy. At times the freedom with which the Elizabethans adapted, often without acknowledgment, contemporary poetry of France and Italy seems inconsistent with the dictates of literary honesty. Yet in spite of the eager welcome which was extended to foreign literary forms and topics, in spite of the easy tolerance of plagiarism, the national spirit was strong enough in Elizabethan England to maintain the individuality of its literature in all the broad currents. The fervour of his temperament was peculiar to the Elizabethan, and in most of his utterances his passionate idiosyncrasy fused itself with the varied fruits of his study. Dependence on foreign example, so far from checking the fervid workings of native

sentiment, invigorated, fertilised and chastened it. The matter and manner of Elizabethan literature owed an enormous debt to foreign influence, but Elizabethan individuality survived the foreign invasion.

English literature in the sixteenth century was slow in proving its true capacity, though in its infancy the finest flower of the Renaissance literature of Italy and France lay at its disposal. In Italy, where of all the countries of western Europe the intellectual movement of the Renaissance matured earliest and flourished longest, the highest levels of literary achievement were reached long before sixteenth century England won any conspicuous literary repute. The Renaissance literature of France was junior to that of Italy, and its career was briefer and less distinguished. But the French Renaissance yielded a rich literary harvest while English Renaissance literature still lacked coherent form or aim. It is in the story of the Renaissance literature of Spain that the course of the Renaissance literature of England finds its closest parallel. The active career of Cervantes (1547-1616) was almost precisely contemporaneous with that of Shakespeare. In both Spain and England, too, the literary energy of the era devoted itself most earnestly to the same branch of literary effort; the finest literary genius alike of Englishmen and of Spaniards at the close of the sixteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth century was absorbed in the production of drama. In Spain and in England, alone among civilised nations, the literary Renaissance of the sixteenth century ran its course contemporaneously.

As in Spain, so in England Renaissance literature made some notable reconnoitring skirmishes before it gained the roads which led to decisive victory. Under Italian or French influence Henry VIII's courtiers sought to inaugurate a literary era in England in the first half of the sixteenth century. Blank verse and the sonnet, which were to play a large part in the Elizabethan epoch, were then first introduced from Italy. But the first harbingers of a literary revival in Tudor England proved disappointing heralds. Their utterances were for the most part halting. There was a want of individuality or definiteness in expression. The early Tudor experiments in poetry lacked harmony or complexity of tone. The prose was marked by a simple directness, which was often vigorous, but tended to monotony and tameness. It is even more worthy of remark that the work done by Surrey, Wyatt, Lord Berners, and their contemporaries practically ceased with their deaths. No one for the time being carried it further. The generation that followed the close of Henry VIII's reign was almost destitute of genuine literary effort.

Nor did the Elizabethan period of English literature begin with the accession of Queen Elizabeth to the English throne. Twenty-one years of her reign passed away before any literary works of indisputable eminence came to birth. There were occasional glimmerings of light in the course of the first two decades. Much was attempted which offered invaluable suggestion to later endeavours, but the stream of great literature did not

flow continuously or with sustained force until after Edmund Spenser (1552?-99) gave certain proof of his poetic power in his *Shepherds Calender* in 1579, and Sir Philip Sidney (1554-86) invited his fellow-countrymen in his *Apologie for Poetrie* to acknowledge the solemn significance of great literature.

In the opening years of Queen Elizabeth's reign the most notable literary work came from the pen of Thomas Sackville (1536-1608), at the time a young barrister of three-and-twenty, who in later life devoted himself exclusively to politics. He came to hold the highest offices in the State, obtained the title of Earl of Dorset, and outlived Queen Elizabeth's long reign by five years. Sackville made two interesting contributions to English literature, which bore testimony to a craving for a finer workmanship and wider scope than existed already; but his work stands practically alone. In the first place, he designed a long poem on the vicissitudes of great personages in English history who had reached violent ends. Sackville owed the main suggestion of his plan to Boccaccio, who had worked out a like scheme in Latin prose, while he drew from Dante and Virgil the machinery of a poet's imaginary visit to the regions which the souls of dead heroes inhabited. *A Myroure for Magistrates* showed, as far as Sackville's contributions to it went, a marked advance in poetic temper on any English poetry that had been produced since Chaucer's death. Sackville wrote only two sections of the long poem—the Induction and the story of Henry Stafford, Duke of Buckingham, a victim of Richard III's tyranny. Sackville's poetic aims are perhaps more remarkable than his powers of execution. Some of the stiffness which is inevitable in new methods of poetic exposition is apparent in his phraseology and versification. But his sense of stately rhythm, and his fertile command of poetic imagery, went far beyond the range of any preceding sixteenth century poet in England.

From the historical point of view Sackville's second literary endeavour is perhaps more notable than his first. With another lawyer, Thomas Norton (1532-84), he collaborated in the production of the first regular tragedy in the English tongue, and was thus a herald of the most characteristic feature of Elizabethan literature. A rudimentary form of drama had long been current in England. The medieval miracle plays, which were for the most part oral presentations of biblical stories, had yielded in course of time to moralities, in which personifications of vices and virtues illustrated in action the unending struggles of good and evil for the dominion of man's soul. In the early sixteenth century the moralities had been largely supplanted by interludes, in which homely anecdote or farcical character was scenically portrayed. Of true dramatic art, with its subtlety of characterisation and its poetic capabilities, practically nothing was known in England when Elizabeth's reign opened. A crude endeavour by a schoolmaster, in a piece called *Ralph Roister Doister*, to adapt to English idiosyncrasies Plautus' comedy

of *Miles Gloriosus* can only with many qualifications be allowed to have introduced comedy into England. Later efforts to disseminate a knowledge of classical drama gave Elizabethan drama its first true impetus. The tragedy of *Gorboduc*, of which Norton wrote the first three acts and Sackville the last two, was the earliest efficient attempt to familiarise the English public with the significance of drama in any artistic sense. Norton and Sackville took the late classical work of Seneca as their model. But they were not slavish imitators. No effort was made to respect the classical unities of time or place, although the action was for the most part narrated by chorus and messenger. The plot is drawn from mythical annals of primeval British history and points a moral of immediate application to contemporary politics—the perils of a nation which is torn by internal dissension. The dramatic feeling is throughout of an elementary type. Small capacity is betrayed of delineating character or of developing plot. The speeches are of monotonous temper and tedious length. But in spite of its manifest imperfections, the tragedy of *Gorboduc* has two supreme claims to honourable commemoration. It introduced Englishmen, who knew no language but their own, to an artistic conception of tragedy, and it revealed to them the true mode of tragic expression. Like Surrey's translation of the *Aeneid*, *Gorboduc* was written in blank verse, and first indicated that this metre, which Sackville and Norton borrowed, like Surrey, direct from its home in Italy, was alone consonant with the dignity of tragedy in the English tongue.

Sackville's efforts stand practically apart in the history of Elizabethan literature. His contributions to *A Myrroure for Magistrates*, were published in 1563. *Gorboduc* was written and acted in 1561, first printed in 1565. Sackville's literary career went no further; no certain promise of great poetry or prose characterised the work of such authors as were active at the moment when he laid down his pen. The torch that he had lighted found during many years few fitted to bear it after him. The versifiers Barnaby Googe (1540–94) and George Turberville (1540?–1610?) studied the classics and contemporary Italian literature with very small effect. Neither they nor Thomas Churchyard (1520?–1604), who reached a patriarchal age, gained a footing except on the lowest slopes of Parnassus.

The work of George Gascoigne (1525?–77), which belongs to the same epoch, stands in a different category. The variety of endeavour lends his career historic interest. He sought new inspiration from Italy in directions which no one before had followed. From his pen came both a comedy and a tragedy which were directly adapted from the modern Italian drama. His comedy, *The Supposes*, is drawn from Ariosto; his tragedy, *Jocasta*, from Lodovico Dolce. Ariosto's play is in prose, and if Sackville and Norton's tragedy first taught Englishmen the fitness of blank verse for the purposes of tragedy, Gascoigne's English presentation

of Ariosto's *I Suppositi* first taught his countrymen that prose was the fittest vehicle for the purposes of comedy. Gascoigne's tragedy—the second that was written in England—was in blank verse, like both its Italian original and its early English predecessor. It follows the classical model more closely than *Gorboduc*, for Gascoigne merely translates Dolce, who was himself slavishly adapting the *Phoenissae* of Euripides. At the same time Gascoigne showed his appreciation of another development of Italian literature. The novel had absorbed much efficient literary energy in Italy. Boccaccio, the earliest master of Italian prose fiction, had in the sixteenth century many disciples, among whom Bandello and Cinthio rivalled their chief in popularity. The vogue of both Bandello and Cinthio was great in England during the latter half of Elizabeth's reign; and Gascoigne inaugurated this fashionable interest in the contemporary Italian novel by translating one of Bandello's popular stories. Nor did this effort exhaust Gascoigne's pioneer labours. He wrote a satire in rhyming verse in emulation of Juvenal and Persius, which was the forerunner of a long line of English poetic satires, and he proved his serious interest in the general development of poetic art in his native country by producing a first critical treatise on poetic workmanship and technique.

Gascoigne died in 1577, and two years later Elizabethan literature definitely started on its great career. When the forward movement began, one form of foreign influence seemed likely to obstruct its progress. This obstacle had to be removed before the advancing army could command an open road. In cultured circles the zeal for classical study combined with the want of distinctive artistic quality in contemporary English verse to generate the fallacious belief that English poetry could only improve its quality by servile obedience to classical law or suggestion. The faith was universal that English drama was bound to respect the lines which Athens and Rome had glorified and which Italy and France had reinstated in authority.

So soon as Elizabethan literature was emerging from darkness, a strenuous effort was made to restrain its free development by forcing on it classical fetters, from which there should be no release. Gabriel Harvey (1545 ?–1630), a Cambridge tutor, who reckoned Spenser amongst his pupils and had a wide acquaintance among the cultivated nobility, imperiously ordered English poets to confine themselves to Latin metre as well as to Latin ideas. There had recently been developed in France a vernacular literature which deliberately fashioned itself on classical poetry. The comparative success of that movement, whose leaders took the corporate title of *La Pléiade*, seemed, at a time when the English poetic standard was low, to lend weight to Harvey's pedantic counsel. For a moment it appeared as if Harvey's advice were to prevail. At his instance a literary club was formed in London in 1579 to promote the naturalisation in English poetry of classical prosody.

The club, which was called "the Areopagus" and held its meetings at Leicester House, the home of the Earl of Leicester, was formed of men of rank and literary promise who had travelled in France and Italy and had acquired there their literary aspirations. Chief of these was Sir Philip Sidney, a man of great social eminence, in whom were concentrated all the aspirations of the Renaissance,—the love of art and letters, the philosophic curiosity, the yearning for novel experience. With Sidney there was associated the more imposing figure of Edmund Spenser, who was Harvey's old pupil and for a time served the Earl of Leicester as secretary. Much energy was spent by these and other eager disciples of Harvey on experiments in English hexameters, elegiacs, and sapphics. For a time both Spenser and Sidney seemed to accept the pedantic argument that accent and rhyme in English poetry were vulgar and ungainly, and that quantity was the only fit characteristic of verse. The clumsiness of the poetic endeavours which illustrated these principles happily proved their ineptitude and error. Spenser quickly acknowledged that poetry could only flourish if it were left free to adapt itself to the idiosyncrasy of a poet's mother-tongue. Sidney, too, as well as Spenser broke away from the toils of the classicists. A breach was essential to the healthy literary development of the country. It came as soon as Elizabethan poetry showed the real capacity of accent and rhyme.

The classical champions were slow to accept defeat. Their own incompetence brought about the ruin of their cause. The English hexameter which they eulogised as the finest vehicle of poetic expression readily lent itself to grotesqueness. Richard Stanyhurst's translation of the *Aeneid* (1582) into hexameters was deservedly laughed out of court, and its ludicrous clumsiness finally disposed of the claims of the classicists to regulate English literature. Twenty years later Thomas Campion in his *Observations on English Poesie* (1602) still persisted in denouncing rhyme, but he sufficiently confuted his own argument by the splendid harmonies of his own rhymed lyrics. George Chapman (1559?–1634), a fine classical scholar, spoke the last word on the classical theory with admirable point in one of his earliest poems:

Sweet Poesy

Will not be clad in her supremacy
With those strange garments, Rome's hexameters,
As she is English: but in right prefers
Our native robes, put on with skilful hands—
English heroics, to those antic garlands. (*Shadow of Night*, ll. 86–91.)

Spenser, whose muse rejected with some reluctance the trappings of Latin prosody, did more than any other writer to give Elizabethan literature at the outset its fitting cue. His *Shepheards Calender*, which was published in 1579, was the first great Elizabethan poem which was to stand the test of time. In it the poet offered ample evidence of foreign study. The twelve eclogues which it comprised were framed on foreign

models of acknowledged repute. The Greek pastoral poetry of Theocritus and Bion was its foundation, modified by the study of Virgil's *Eclogues*, and of many French and Italian examples of more recent date. The debt to Marot's French *Eclogues* was notably large. Spenser was at the same time alive to the literary achievements of his own country. Many times in the course of his poetic career he avowed his discipleship to the greatest of his English literary predecessors, Chaucer. But the value of *The Shepherds Calender* lies ultimately not in the dexterity of its adaptations, but in the proof it offers of the rich individuality of the poet's genius. The fruits of his reading were fused together and transmuted by his individual force and original genius. *The Shepherds Calender* shows a rare faculty for the musical modulation of words and the potency of the poet's individual affinities with poetic aspects of nature and human life. It proved how well the new aspirations of the age—the devotion to the Queen and the enthusiasm for the Protestant religion—lent themselves to poetic treatment. Contemporaries at once acknowledged that there had arisen in England one qualified to rank above all preceding English poets, save only Chaucer, who had died nearly two centuries before.

In the same year as Elizabethan poetry gave sure promise of its great future in *The Shepherds Calender*, prose also made a notable advance. John Lyly (1554?-1606), who was about the same age as Spenser, published the first volume of his moral romance of *Euphues* soon after *The Shepherds Calender*; the second and concluding volume followed within a year. It was Lyly's endeavour to weave a moral or educational treatise into a work of fiction. The design showed originality and boldness, if absolute success were scarcely possible. The methods of fostering in "a gentleman or noble person" "virtuous and gentle discipline" barely lend themselves to romance. But the chief interest of Lyly's book lies, not in its subject-matter, but in its style. The author deliberately sought to invest English prose, for the first time in its history, with a distinctive mannerism. His sentences, which are evenly balanced, present an endless series of antitheses, with a slightly epigrammatic flavour. Alliteration is employed with some frequency, and there is a ceaseless flow of similes drawn from natural history. The quaint pedantry of Lyly's method owes a good deal to the affectations of earlier Spanish prose, especially the mannered prose of Guevara. But the English writer adheres to his self-imposed laws of composition with a persistent thoroughness that is unknown to his masters, and gives him substantial claim to the honours of original invention.

Euphues was received with enthusiasm, and stimulated a taste for a subtler and a more characteristic prose style than already existed, as well as for contemplative romance. Few writers achieved at a bound so high a reputation in cultivated society. The ladies of the Court were soon described as Lyly's scholars, and only those who could "parley

Euphuism " gained repute for refinement. Lyly's pedantic style lent itself readily to caricature and exaggeration. Contemporary prose soon rang with strained antitheses and grotesque allusions to precious stones, stars, fishes, and plants. But, notwithstanding the absurd extravagance of Lyly and his disciples, he pointed the way to that epigrammatic force of which Bacon in his *Essays* showed the English language to be capable.

The matter of Lyly's *Euphues*, despite its confused aim, also exerted a prolific influence on subsequent Elizabethan literature. Elizabethan romance was compounded of many simples, among which were conspicuous the post-classical Greek novel (notably the *Æthiopica* of Heliodorus), the chivalric stories of the Middle Ages, and the novel and pastoral of Italy. Strongly marked features were derived from such foreign sources as these. Nevertheless, Elizabethan prose fiction readily assimilated Lyly's didacticism in addition. It was after Lyly's popular work had won public favour that Sir Philip Sidney, when in retirement from the Court, began his great fiction of *Arcadia*. Although Sidney was familiar with all foreign forms of romance, and directly imitated many of them, the ethical disquisitions which he grafted on his scheme were in Lyly's vein and proved his discipleship to Lyly. The *Arcadia* was not published till 1590, but it was freely circulated in manuscript seven or eight years previously, and its variety of topic, its wealth of adventurous episode, its poetic interludes, and its ludicrous situations, quickly rendered it, despite its length and frequent incoherence, a formidable rival to Lyly's earlier achievement. But Lyly's narrower scope more easily lent itself to imitation. The short romance, which was a popular literary feature of the decade following the publication of *Euphues*, drew thence such home-bred sustenance as went to its making. The fertile novelists Robert Greene (1560 ?-92) and his disciple, Thomas Lodge (1558 ?-1625), were content to announce to the public their chief efforts as sequels or continuations of Lyly's romance. One of Greene's volumes was christened *Euphues, his Censure to Philautus*, 1587; another was called *Menaphon: Camilla's alarum to Slumbering Euphues*. Lodge's familiar romance of *Rosalynde*, on which Shakespeare founded his play of *As You Like It*, bore the subsidiary title of *Euphues' Golden Legacy*.

The year 1579, which witnessed the emergence of Elizabethan poetry in Spenser's *Shepheards Calender* and of Elizabethan prose in Lyly's *Euphues*, gave one other somewhat equivocal hint of the coming greatness. English drama had not passed the limits set by the efforts of Sackville and Norton and Gascoigne. The drama was making no artistic progress in England. Servile adaptations of classical tragedy, which Sackville's and Gascoigne's experiments initiated, seemed destined to encourage bombastic presentment of crime without poetic elevation. Nicholas Udall's *Ralph Roister Doister*, commonly called the earliest English comedy, had had a successor in 1560 in an even cruder farce called *Gammer Gurton's Needle*, the work of a Cambridge graduate

who is now identified as one William Stevenson of Christ's College. Gascoigne had gone to Italy for a comedy of a more regular and ambitious type, but it had not attracted popular taste. The horse-play, rusticity, and burlesque of the native interlude could alone command unquestioned popularity. But signs were apparent before 1579 that the Elizabethan public was developing an interest in dramatic performances, which gave some hope of improved taste in the future. The actor's profession was in course of organisation under the patronage of the nobility and in 1576 a building in London was erected for the first time for the purposes of theatrical representations. A second theatre was opened in the following year. From a literary point of view this dramatic activity merited small attention, but evidence of an increased popularity of the infant drama could not be overlooked by any Londoner.

A section of the public saw in the primary principles of the drama a menace to public morals. Puritans identified theatres with paganism, and declared them to be intolerable in a Christian community. A bitter attack from the religious and ethical point of view quickly developed. In 1579 Stephen Gosson, one of the fanatical foes of the budding drama, published a virulent denunciation of plays, players, and dramatists; and he sought to give added weight to his onslaught by dedicating his work without permission to Sir Philip Sidney, who at the moment held a prominent place in fashionable and literary society. Sidney resented Gosson's sour invective. His knowledge of the classics taught him to regard the drama as an honoured branch of literature. By way of dissociating himself from Gosson's opinions he penned a reply to his jaundiced criticism, which gave a notable impetus to the liberal progress of contemporary literature.

In his *Apologie for Poetrie* Sidney did far more than defend the drama from fanatical abuse. He surveyed the whole range of poetic art and sought to prove that poetry is the noblest of all the works of man. In detail his treatise is open to censure. Reverence for the classical laws of dramatic composition shackled his judgment. He anathematised tragi-comedy and defended the classical unities. Nor did he foresee the greatness of the coming Elizabethan drama. On the other hand, he fully acknowledged the grandeur of Spenser's youthful genius, and made a stirring appeal to his countrymen to uplift themselves and look "into the sky of poetry." His work was published in 1580, and his exalted enthusiasm seems to lend him the voice of a herald summoning to the poetic lists the mighty combatants with whom the Elizabethan era was yet to be identified.

The implied challenge met with a notable response. During the decade 1580-90 there were new outbursts of activity in every direction. Both comedy and tragedy assumed for the first time in England a distinctive literary garb. Prose acquired dignity and ease. The sonnet and other forms of lyric poetry reached a new level of fervour, and the

last year of the decade was glorified by the publication of the first instalment of Spenser's *Faerie Queene*.

Spenser's great poem would have rendered the epoch memorable, had it stood alone. It was admirably representative of contemporary ideals in life and literature. The poet, while frankly acknowledging indebtedness to Homer, Virgil, Ariosto and Tasso, professes to present a gigantic panorama of the moral dangers and difficulties that beset human existence. But the allegorical design was not carried out with rigour. The adventures in which Spenser's heroes engage are often drawn from chivalric or epic romance, and are developed with a freedom which ignores the allegorical intention. Spenser, too, was a close observer of the leading events and personages of Elizabethan history, and he wove into the web of his poetry personal impressions of contemporary personages and movements. Hardly anywhere else in Elizabethan poetry does the fervid loyalty of the Elizabethan to the Queen find more expansive utterance. But it is by its poetic style and spirit that the *Faerie Queene*, as a whole, must be judged. It is the fertility of the poet's imagination, the luxuriance of the poetical imagery, and the exceptional command of the music of words, which give the poem its true title to honour. The poetic fervour of the age, with its metrical dexterity and exuberant style of expression, reached its zenith in Spenser's great work, which proved a potent stimulus not only to poets of his own day but to a long array of their successors.

To Lyly, the author of *Euphues*, the marked development of comedy which characterised the decade after 1580 was chiefly due. Nearly all his nine comedies were written and produced between 1581 and 1593. With one exception they are in prose, though all are interspersed with simply worded songs which ring with easy harmonies. The form that comedy assumed in Lyly's hand seems mainly of the author's invention. Dramatic force is not a predominating feature. The characters are mainly drawn from classical mythology: the plot is slender; there is little attempt at characterisation. Lyly's comedies are remarkable for the literary temper of the dialogue. The fantastic conceit, the clever word-play, the graceful similes, create an air of educated refinement which was new to dramatic composition in England. His example had far-reaching consequences. The witty encounters in verbal fence which distinguish many of Shakespeare's comedies bear the impress of Lyly's manner; and, although Lyly as a writer for the stage toys with life rather than interprets it, he revolutionised the native conception of comedy by investing its language with a literary charm.

While Lyly was creating an artistic tradition in realms of comedy, an even more impressive service was rendered to tragedy by another writer of greater poetic genius. Born only two months before Shakespeare, and dying before he had completed his thirtieth year, Christopher Marlowe (1564-93), the first English tragic poet, began and ended his literary

work while Shakespeare was still in his novitiate. His earliest tragedy, *Tamburlaine*, probably produced in 1588, first indicated the possibilities of Elizabethan tragedy. It was quickly followed by three other tragedies, *Dr Faustus*, *The Jew of Malta*, and *Edward II*. Other dramatic work came from Marlowe's pen, but it is to these four tragedies that he owes his commanding place in Elizabethan literature. In the prologue to his first piece, *Tamburlaine*, he announced his resolve to employ in tragedy "high astounding terms." He scornfully denounced "the jiggling veins of rhyming mother wits" whose pens had previously been devoted to tragedy. Not that Marlowe wholly cut himself adrift from the native dramatic tradition. He did not altogether reject even the machinery of the miracle play. In his *Faustus* good and evil angels and the Seven Deadly Sins are among the *dramatis personae*, and Hell is pictured on the stage with "damned souls tossing on burning forks." Many of his heroes bear, too, a specious resemblance to the leading characters in the old moralities. They are for the most part personified vices or ruling passions, and are far removed from ordinary humanity. At the same time classical literature left a deep impression on his work. Early in life he had rendered into fervid English verse a part of Musaeus' Greek poem *Hero and Leander*, as well as Ovid's elegics and the first book of Lucan's *Pharsalia*. His drama abounds in classical allusions; he assimilated much of the spirit of classical literature; at times, as in *Faustus*' address to Helen, he seems to emulate the beautiful simplicity of Greek poetry. But, in spite of his wide literary studies and sympathies, Marlowe was essentially a rebel against precedent. His conception of tragedy passed beyond the bounds of authority. His central aim was to portray men in tragical pursuit of unattainable ideals. *Tamburlaine* is ambitious of universal conquest. *Barabas* is avaricious of universal wealth. *Faustus* yearns for omniscience. In developing such ambitions in drama Marlowe often wanders into wild extravagances. But the Titanic force of his presentment of human aspiration is inextinguishable. Many qualities which are requisite to perfect drama were beyond the range of Marlowe's genius. There is practically no feminine interest in his plays; he is destitute of humour; a strain of rant is audible in his flights of eloquence. Nevertheless, the blank verse, which his example finally consecrated to tragic uses, has for the most part a poetic dignity, even a suppleness, of which no earlier writer had given any sign. Ben Jonson justly panegyricised his "mighty line." His latest tragedy of *Edward II* is cast in a far more artistic mould than its predecessors. The unqualified terror which *Tamburlaine*, *Faustus*, and *The Jew of Malta* excite is there conquered by a subtle pity. The monumental labours of Holinshed, following the earlier and slighter efforts of Hall, had lately made the political annals of the country generally accessible, and the patriotic enthusiasm encouraged poets and dramatists to seek material there. The practice of dramatising English history was not

inaugurated by Marlowe, but he was the first to invest with tragic sentiment historic episode. The increased mastery of his art which is apparent in *Edward II* renders Marlowe's death before he reached his prime one of the most regrettable incidents in literary history. But the work he lived long enough to accomplish bore golden fruit. It was as Marlowe's disciple that Shakespeare first gave proof of his unsurpassed genius for tragedy.

On lesser men than Shakespeare Marlowe's influence was conspicuous and immediate. Writers like George Peele (1558?-97?) and Robert Greene (1560?-92), who had already made some experiments in drama, seem to have hastily revised their effort in the light of Marlowe's example. Greene's *Friar Bungay* and *Friar Bacon* reflects something of the motive of *Dr Faustus*, though the two plays are worked out on different lines. Greene could not rise to Marlowe's sombre intensity, and the buffoonery of the old moralities corrupted his notions of stagecraft. Peele, like Marlowe, went to English history for a tragic plot. Peele's tragedy of *Edward I*, which was in all likelihood the offspring of Marlowe's *Edward II*, is unrelieved by artistic subtlety and defaced by political bias. The grandeur of Marlowe's style was difficult of approach, and, save Shakespeare, almost all who sought to emulate it, merely succeeded in echoing the bombast and crude rant with which Marlowe's work was mingled. Elizabethan audiences saw no defect in the sanguinary extravagances of *Tamburlaine* or *The Jew of Malta*, and many writers deliberately set themselves to better Marlowe's instruction in developing scenes of bloodshed and violence. Of these the chief was Thomas Kyd (1557?-95?), whose popular tragedies of horror, *The Spanish Tragedy*, and *Jeronimo*, emulated Marlowe's least admirable characteristics. Kyd clothed revolting incident in what a contemporary critic called "the swelling bombast of bragging blank verse," and his strident notes for a moment dominated public taste. But his triumph was short-lived. He was battling with the stream of progress, and suffered the inevitable penalty of neglect even before he died. The new artistic spirit of tragedy which Marlowe's best work inaugurated was not to be repressed.

It was in the last thirteen years of Queen Elizabeth's reign, 1590-1603, that Elizabethan literature shone in its full glory. In 1596 Spenser published the last completed books of his *Faerie Queene*, and his reputation was finally established. In all directions literary activity redoubled.

Never before or since was the country so prolific in lyric and sonnet. Foreign influences are here especially apparent. French and Italian poetry was pillaged for ideas and phraseology. But there was a simplicity and sweetness of melody in the best of the short Elizabethan poems, even where the ideas and phraseology came from a foreign source, which must be assigned to native genius. The poetic spirit was widely distributed.

Writers like Thomas Nash (1567-1601) or Thomas Dekker (1570?-1641?), who applied most of their energy to prose, showed in rare outbursts of verse genuine lyric intensity. The habit of writing lyrics spread high and low through all ranks of society; and the success of the amateurs rivalled that of professional writers. Politicians and men of action like the Earls of Essex and Oxford and Sir Walter Raleigh (1552?-1618) could occasionally turn as harmonious a lyric stanza as any of the young poets who devoted themselves to literature exclusively. The subject-matter of the Elizabethan lyric is mainly limited to amorous emotion, but there is an occasional tendency to reflexion on sterner topics. Indeed one of the most voluble and honey-tongued of Elizabethan poets, Samuel Daniel (1562-1619), developed a reflective faculty in verse which gives him some claim to rank with Wordsworth. How widely extended was the taste for lyrical utterance may be gauged by the ample miscellanies of brief poems which repeatedly came from the printing-press at the end of the period. All conditions of men figured among the contributors. At least two of these collections, *England's Helicon*, 1600, and Davison's *Poetical Rhapsody*, 1602, provide banquets of lyrical masterpieces.

The sonnet, the most difficult of all poetic forms in which to attain excellence, proved a more perilous attraction to poetic aspirants than the lyric. Sonnet-sequences of love, such as Sidney inaugurated in England in his *Astrophel and Stella*, and Thomas Watson developed in his *ἙΚΑΤΟΜΠΛΑΘΙΑ* (1582), and in his *Tears of Fancie* (1593), engaged an army of pens during the last decade of Elizabeth's reign. Few of the great poets of the day escaped the sonneteering contagion. Daniel and Drayton, Lodge and Constable, helped to swell the sonneteering chorus. Spenser and Shakespeare were drawn into the current and paid ample homage to the fashionable vogue. Like Sidney and Watson, the later Elizabethan sonneteers followed with fidelity foreign models, and most of them treated the sonnet as a literary exercise rather than a vehicle for the expression of personal feeling. The work of Petrarch and Tasso among Italians, of Ronsard and Desportes among Frenchmen, was the begetter of fully two-thirds of the quatorzains which saw the light in Elizabethan England. Spenser's long sonnet-sequence which he called *Amoretti* owed much to French and Italian poetry, and very sparse fragments of it bear adequate testimony to his great capacity. Among the Elizabethan examples only Shakespeare's *Sonnets* maintain for any space exalted levels of lyric melody or meditative energy. Like other Elizabethan sonnets, they owe a large debt to the vast sonneteering literature of sixteenth century Europe; but their supreme poetic quality sets on that literature a glorious crown.

The close of the Queen's reign also witnessed a wonderful expansion of the scope of prose literature. The literary fervour which distinguished the poetry of the epoch infected Elizabethan prose. Whatever the

subject to which the writer applied himself, whether theology or fiction, or social life or travel, an almost lyrical exuberance of expression manifested itself. The Elizabethan translation of the Bible, *The Bishops' Bible*, which had been published in 1568, was constantly reprinted until it was superseded by the *Authorised Version* of 1611, contributed to this effect, but the warmth of feeling reflected the enthusiastic spirit of the age. The most dignified contribution of the era to prose literature was made by the theologian Richard Hooker (1554?-1600); although his style is largely based on Latin models and is often stiff and cumbrous, it rarely lacks an harmonious rhythm, and often reaches heights of poetic eloquence. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was beginning his literary career when Hooker was laying down his pen. His great philosophical work was done largely in Latin prose, but whenever he essayed English prose he notably illustrated the adaptability of the language to the highest purposes of exposition. Bacon's English writing owes much to his facility in Latin composition; but it is impregnated by a native gift of imaginative eloquence. In his *Advancement of Learning*, his chief philosophical work in English, his vocabulary is exceptionally large, and his sentences ring with melody. Pithiness and terseness were rare characteristics of Elizabethan prose. But Bacon in his *Essays* proved his versatility by making an experiment in aphoristic style, which achieved triumphant success. His subtle reflexions on human nature are largely founded on Machiavelli's practical interpretation of life, and owe something also to Montaigne. But the place of Bacon's *Essays* in English literature is due to the stimulating and pointed brevity of his language.

In the lower ranks of literary endeavour prose also filled a large space. Pamphleteers abounded and supplied something of the place held by the modern journalist. Thomas Nash (1567-1601) was the most original personality among occasional writers in prose. He was a professional controversialist, and no subject that could be turned to polemical uses was foreign to his pen. He satirised contemporary society and all whom he believed to be impostors with effusive vigour and frankness. Though he expressed unmeasured scorn of the current practice of imitating foreign masters, the luxuriant bluster of Rabelais and Aretino strongly appealed to him. He was addicted, as he confessed, to a swelling and boisterous mode of speech, which at times descended to burlesque effects. But in spite of his reckless gasconading the literary spirit was always strong in him; and in his prose romance of *Jack Wilton* he produced a novel of adventure, the first of its kind in English, which has lasting literary value. Dekker subsequently carried on a part of Nash's work in quieter tones. His numerous tracts, describing the darker side of London life, are clothed in an untamable volubility. But his prose is thoroughly Elizabethan in the glow of humorous insight and vivacity with which it is illumined.

More impressive than any other feature of the literary history of the closing years of Elizabeth's reign was the rise to fame and fortune of William Shakespeare (1564–1616), and the final elevation of the drama to the first place in the literature of the age. The general trend of Shakespeare's career was not unlike those of many contemporaries who followed the dramatic profession. The son of a village tradesman, he received the ordinary education in Latin which was available to all boys of the lower and middle classes in the grammar-school of Stratford-on-Avon, his native place. After vain endeavours to gain a livelihood in the country, he made his way to London soon after he came of age, and opened in a very humble capacity a life-long association with the theatre. There is little doubt that at the outset he thought to win distinction as an actor. But his literary instinct quickly diverted him to the writing of plays.

His period of probation was not short. He did not leap at a bound to fame and fortune. It was probably not till 1591, when he was twenty-seven years of age, and had already spent six years in London, that his earliest original play, *Love's Labour's Lost*, was performed. It showed the hand of a beginner; it abounded in trivial witticisms. But above all there shone out the dramatic and poetic fire, the humorous outlook on life, the insight into human feeling which were to inspire Titanic achievements in the future. Soon afterwards, he scaled the tragic heights of *Romeo and Juliet*, and he was rightly hailed as the prophet of a new world of art. Thenceforth, he marched onward in triumph.

Shakespeare's work was exceptionally progressive in quality, few authors advanced in their art more steadily. His hand grew firmer, his thought grew richer as his years increased; and, apart from external evidence as to the date of production of his plays, the discerning critic can determine from the versification, and from the general handling of the theme, to what period in his life each composition belongs. The comedies of Shakespeare's younger days often trench upon the domains of farce; those of his middle and later life approach the domain of tragedy. Tragedy in his hands markedly grew, as his years advanced, in subtlety and intensity. His tragic themes became more and more complex, and betrayed deeper and deeper knowledge of the workings of human passion. Finally, the storm and stress of tragedy yielded to the placid pathos of romance. All the evidence shows that, when his years of probation ended, he mastered in steady though rapid succession every degree and phase of excellence in the sphere of drama, from the phantasy of *A Midsummer-Night's Dream* to the unmatched humour of Falstaff, from the passionate tragedies of *King Lear* and *Othello* to the romantic pathos of *Cymbeline* and *The Tempest*.

Shakespeare was no conscious innovator. The topics to which he applied himself were rarely quite new. The chronicle play, which dramatised episodes of English history, had already engaged other pens.

He based his comedies on popular Italian novels, most of which had furnished material for plays, not merely in England, but in Italy and France, before he took up his pen. His Roman tragedies all dealt with well-trying themes. But in the result his endeavours bore little resemblance to those of his contemporaries. The magic of his genius transmuted all he touched. His wealth of thought and his supreme command of language invested all his efforts with an originality and freshness which no contemporary approached.

The amount of work which Shakespeare accomplished in the twenty years of his active professional career (1591–1611) amply proves his steadiness of application and the regularity with which he pursued his vocation. His energy brought him rich pecuniary rewards. Returning to his native place as soon as his financial position was secure, he purchased there the chief house in the town, New Place, and obtained other lands and houses. No mystery attaches to Shakespeare's financial competency. It is easily traceable to his professional earnings—as author, actor, and theatrical shareholder—and to his shrewd handling of his revenues. His ultimate financial position differs little from that of his fellow theatrical managers and actors.

Shakespeare died at Stratford on Tuesday, April 23, 1616, probably on his fifty-second birthday. The epitaph on his monument in the chancel of Stratford-on-Avon Church bears convincing testimony to the reputation he acquired in his own day. "With his death," it is there stated, "quick Nature died." All contemporary art was declared to stand in the relation of a page-boy or menial towards his masterly achievements. The supremacy which was frankly allowed him in his own day has been amply vindicated by modern criticism.

Many attempted to wield Shakespeare's bow after his death, but none succeeded. The history of the post-Shakespearean drama of James I's and Charles I's reigns is a tale of degeneracy and decadence. A bountiful endowment with the poetic spirit of the age, an occasional flash of rare dramatic insight, an improved trick of stagecraft, were poor substitutes for Shakespeare's magical intuition, for his sustained command of dramatic expression, for what Coleridge calls his "omni-present creativeness." In his lifetime the ranks of the dramatists were greatly widened, and numerous younger contemporaries of his energetically pursued the profession of dramatist when he was laid in his grave. But, compared with Shakespeare, even the most accomplished Elizabethan dramatists are dwarfed saplings in the presence of a giant oak.

Of the younger generation of Shakespeare's contemporaries, Ben Jonson (1573?–1637) was the first to enter the dramatic arena, which he was one of the last to quit. Of strongly conservative temper, Jonson deliberately sought to stem the tide of the Shakespearean canons, which freely defied the old dramatic unities and declined to recognise any artificial restriction on the presentment of living experience on

the stage. On such principles Jonson declared open war. Comedy, as in the Greek and Latin theatres, was in Jonson's hands a satiric weapon. Plot or story counted for little; men's humours or foibles, which served the purposes of satire, dominated Jonson's efforts in comic drama. *Every Man in his Humour*, which was probably his earliest extant piece, as it was first acted in 1598, bore witness to his satiric force. His masterpieces in comedy, *Volpone* and *The Alchemist*, betrayed a fiery scorn of villainy and hypocrisy; the scenes and characters abounded, too, in strokes of effective humour. But Jonson's respect for the old comic tradition prevented him from abandoning himself freely to the varied dramatic impulses of the epoch. His Roman tragedies, *Sejanus* (1603) and *Catiline* (1611), despite the stateliness of the verse, more conspicuously sacrifice life to learning. The dramatic movement halts. With the versatility characteristic of the age Jonson at the same time exercised lyric gifts of a quality that places him in the first rank of Elizabethan poets. For intellectual vigour he may be placed above all his contemporaries save Shakespeare; but the development of English drama owed little or nothing to him.

George Chapman (1559?–1634), the translator of Homer, worked as a playwright somewhat in Jonson's groove, but he showed less vivacity or knowledge of life. Chapman's tragedies are obtrusively the fruits of studious research. He is by natural affinity a gnomic poet or philosopher who inclines to cryptic utterance. His plays often resemble a series of dignified and weighty soliloquies, in which the dramatist personally addresses himself to the audience in a succession of transparent disguises.

At least eight other able playwrights of Jonson's generation sought, on the other hand, to continue the Shakespearean tradition, and they at times echoed, albeit hesitatingly, their master's wondrous powers of speech. They were all faithful followers of the common contemporary practice of collaboration, and it is not always easy to disentangle one man's contribution to a single play from another's.

John Marston (1575?–1634), who began his career as a satirist, was in comedy a shrewd and cynical observer of human life, while as a tragic writer he could occasionally control the springs of pity and terror. Thomas Dekker (1570?–1641?) for the most part brought on the stage the society of his own time. He was far more realistic than most of his fellows, and a more truthful portrayer of character. His sentiment was more sincere. But he had smaller faculty of imagination. His language, if simpler, was less glowing or stimulating. Thomas Heywood (d. 1650?) and Thomas Middleton (1570?–1627) energetically competed with Dekker and Marston for public favour. Each, in one work, at least—Heywood in his *Woman Killed With Kindness*, and Middleton notably in his *Changeling*—proved that he cherished a great conception of dramatic art. Heywood excelled Dekker in dramatic handling of domestic episode. Middleton sought to turn to dramatic account picturesque

romance. But even the masterpieces of these two writers are defaced by carelessness in construction, and the rest of their work rarely rises above the level of fluent mediocrity.

None of these dramatists, save perhaps Heywood, achieved marked success in the theatre. Only John Fletcher (1579-1625), and Philip Massinger (1583-1640), inherited in permanence any substantial share of Shakespeare's popularity. Shakespeare's place at the head of the dramatic profession was filled on his retirement by Fletcher, who made his earliest reputation as a writer of plays in a short-lived partnership with Francis Beaumont (1607-11). Beaumont's career closed before that of Shakespeare, and Fletcher continued his work either alone or with other collaborators, of whom the most constant was Massinger. Fletcher's alliance with Beaumont produced rich fruit in *The Maid's Tragedy*, and in the tragi-comedy of *Philaster* (c. 1611), to both of which Beaumont was the larger contributor. Fletcher was better fitted to excel in comedy than in tragedy, and it is his brilliant dialogue and sprightly repartee that mainly gave his dramatic work distinction. His tragic endeavours revealed splendid powers of declamation, but wanted sustained intensity of feeling. Massinger shared many of Fletcher's characteristics, but excelled him in his appreciation of stage requirements, and at times intensified the passing interest of his work by making his plots or characters reflect episodes of current political history. The merits of Fletcher's and Massinger's labours are, however, those of a declining epoch. They show intellectual agility rather than intellectual fertility. Their picturesque utterance inclines to over-elaboration, and there is a steadily growing tendency to mannerism and artifice. Moreover their moral tone is enfeebled. Although Shakespeare is invariably frank and outspoken on moral questions, the moral atmosphere of his work is throughout manly and bracing. Fletcher and Massinger play havoc with the accepted laws of morality, and present vice in all manner of insidious disguises.

Another contemporary dramatist of unquestioned eminence, John Webster (1580?-1625?) gave similar proofs of decadence. Webster concentrated his abundant energies on repulsive themes: his plots centre in fantastic crimes, which lie out of the range of art and life. But Webster, of all Shakespeare's successors, approached him nearest in tragic intensity.

The last flickers of light which can be traced to the Elizabethan dramatic spirit are visible in the tragic genius of John Ford (fl. 1639) and in the miscellaneous ability of James Shirley (1596-1666). Ford's tragic romance of the *Broken Heart* was produced in 1633. It more closely accords with the classical canons of construction than with the Shakespearean, but the high poetic strain echoes the deep harmonies of Shakespearean tragedy. The name of James Shirley, who died in 1666 from fright and exposure during the Great Fire of London,

closes that chapter in the history of the English drama which opened with Marlowe. Though much of Shirley's work is lost, a great mass of plays from his pen survives. His comedies, tragedies, and tragi-comedies are shadows of the drama that went before them. But, however faint is the reflexion, Shirley kept the genuine tradition alive till the theatres were forcibly closed at the opening of the civil wars.

The Elizabethan age of English literature was one of such exuberant energy that only by slow degrees could the impetus exhaust itself. For a short space the highest intellectual and artistic ambitions of the English people had consciously or unconsciously concentrated themselves on literature. Before the second decade of the seventeenth century closed other interests supervened; questions of supreme political moment distracted and finally absorbed the nation's attention. But the spirit of the Elizabethan era had then done its work. It had given birth to a mass of poetry and prose which ranks in literary merit with the products of the greatest literary epochs in the world's history. Above all, it produced Shakespeare, whom the unanimous verdict of all civilised peoples pronounces to be the greatest of dramatic poets.



CHAPTER XII.

TUSCANY AND SAVOY.

I.

THE treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis (1559) brought little peace to France and Spain; but to Italy, the victim of the wars, it gave genuine solace for half a century and more. This difference was due to the direction taken by the religious conflagration. Calvin's influence set northwards and westwards; and thus Italy in the main was sheltered from the blasts which might cause the war embers to flame afresh. The fire in her neighbours' houses, far from endangering her own, favoured its reconstruction. Hitherto the aggressive Power had usually been France, but the treaty itself was a confession of failure in Italy; and internal faction was already giving France as much occupation as her most restless spirits could desire. The coming troubles of Spain could be foreseen, while her financial exhaustion was far advanced. If the restoration of the House of Savoy was an admitted check to French expansion, it gave no unmixed satisfaction to the Spanish Crown. Italian dynasties which had dreaded France had hitherto been forced to lean on Spain. Yet even the power of Charles V had been far from absolute. Ottavio Farnese and Siena had severally defied him; the Duke of Ferrara had conspired with Maurice of Saxony against him; Cosimo de' Medici, who owed to him his title, had extorted terms from him. Moreover, the transference of his Italian possessions to the Spanish line effectually changed the situation, though Philip might bear the title of Imperial Vicar. The two Habsburg branches seemed unlikely to act in close concert; and this was all in favour of a certain measure of Italian independence. Spain, in spite of her possession of Naples and Milan, was not quite predominant. Venice watched the vast Austrian *hinterland* stretching round her northern and eastern frontiers more anxiously than the impoverished Spanish province of Milan, which faced her short and defensible line of fortresses on the west. The loyalty of the Gonzaga of Mantua was by neighbourhood, by intermarriage, and by investiture with Montferrat, directed rather towards Vienna than Madrid. Genoa was, indeed, bound to Spain by her financial interests and the

influence of the Doria; but her remnant of independence was watched with jealous apprehension. Without control of Genoa Milan was "in the air"; and this control might be at any moment jeopardised by a French fleet, a holiday outbreak of the populace, a whim of the ruling House. The acquisition of Siena had largely increased the power, and therefore the independence, of the Medici. It is true that the coast towns had been lopped off to form the strange little Spanish State, the *Presidi*; but their garrisons, fringed by the wasted Maremma, must feed either on fish, or on such flesh, fowl, and grain as Cosimo might suffer. In the company of such native States as Venice and Savoy, Tuscany, Mantua, and Ferrara, even a Pope might pluck up courage and call himself Italian; a religious war in Europe might turn to the advantage of his temporal power, which the rivalry of France and Spain had preserved intact. Thus the outlook for Italian nationalism was hopeful. Naples was already asleep; and Milan would probably soon follow her example. Philip's character was believed to be tenacious, but not aggressive. In Italy this forecast found fulfilment. He wished the native States also to be left as undisturbed as possible. If it be true that Spain ruined Italy, her indolence rather than her interference was at fault. The pococurantism of the upper classes, a baleful inheritance from distant generations of Teutonic settlers, was to be the curse of Italy. The damages with which from 1559 she must debit Spain were rather mental and moral than military and political.

It is, nevertheless, an exaggeration to regard the Italy of the later sixteenth century as altogether decadent. The wars had produced one great Italian ruler, Cosimo de' Medici, and one great Italian soldier, Emmanuel Philibert. The peace was to convert the latter into an equally able statesman. Both were not merely rulers but creators. The Tuscany of the one and the Savoy of the other were politics totally distinct from those to which they had succeeded. Their character will be found greatly to resemble each other, although they were quite distinct in origin. The municipal despotism and the feudal lordship had reached the goal of absolute monarchy together. During the new epoch Tuscany and Savoy are the centres of purely Italian history, nor are they without importance in European politics. Venice, more powerful and wealthy than either, though she had emerged from the barbarian invasions with no very material loss of territory, was distracted by Eastern difficulties. The position of Mantua and Ferrara was not profoundly altered, though the Gonzaga dynasty had been strengthened by Austrian favour, and that of Este weakened by the withdrawal of France. Ferrara was illuminated by a brilliant literary afterglow, but the sands were running down; and papal greed reduced the oldest dynasty in Italy to the minor Imperial fiefs of Modena and Reggio. This proved that the Papacy was not indifferent to its temporal power, although most of its attention was diverted by the Catholic Reaction and the Wars of Religion. Within a

century the not inconsiderable State of Urbino was a voluntary captive within St Peter's net. Parma's one great product, Alessandro Farnese, was wasted on the Netherlands. The republic of Lucca and the lords of Piombino would be content if they could preserve their respective liberty and autocracy from the acquisitive instincts of the Medici. Thus it is that Tuscany and Savoy form the theme of this chapter. In each the government was intensely personal, and the stage was comparatively small; but until the rise of Henry IV it would be hard to find in Continental Europe more competent performers of most difficult parts than were Cosimo de' Medici and Emmanuel Philibert.

The elder Medici had prided themselves on their extension of the Florentine frontiers, but Cosimo by conquering Siena had surpassed them. The two most natural complements of his territory were Lucca and the principality of the Appiani, comprising the headland of Piombino and Elba. Lucca was almost an enclave, and hindered access to the coast north of Pisa. Cosimo, however, failed to annex the republic, as had both Medici and Albizzi before him. The city was rich; the country people were warlike and patriotic. Cosimo saw his chance when the Lucchese Gonfalonier Burlamacchi formed his quixotic conspiracy for Italian liberation; but the nationalist suffered death without inculpating his State, which put itself under the protection of the Infant Philip (1546). The only result was the formation at Lucca of a close and competent oligarchy which was to survive till the end of the eighteenth century.

Disappointment was greater in the case of Piombino, for twice it was actually in Cosimo's grasp. In hostile hands it would be a serious menace to Florentine commerce, of which Leghorn had become the principal outlet. Cosimo claimed it as being originally part of Pisan territory, and as devolving therefore to Florence with its ruling city. Its cession, however, to the Appiani by Gian Galeazzo Visconti preceded the Florentine conquest of Pisa by seven years. The young ruler Jacopo VI, Cosimo's first cousin on the mother's side, was little able to defend himself. Cosimo garrisoned Piombino against Barbarossa in 1543, and in 1548 Charles V gave him the investiture, but after a few weeks withdrew it. In 1553 Cosimo again had actual possession, but by the arrangement of 1557 he only retained the north-western part of Elba with Porto Ferraio, which became the chief protection of the Tuscan littoral, and the model naval port of southern Europe. Piombino itself passed by marriage from House to House until its annexation to Tuscany in 1814.

The history of Cosimo's acquisitions had been surprising; for who could have imagined that the mushroom despot would have warred down and annexed a large independent State, the old irreconcilable foe of Florence? He had imposed terms not only on Siena but on the Spanish House, for Philip fought hard against its cession. But all that the King rescued from the spoil were the coast towns Talamone, Port' Ercole, Orbetello, and San Stefano. When in 1559 the French garrisons

evacuated Tuscany, Cosimo could occupy Montalcino and other positions which they had retained. Sovana was alone withheld by its wild lord Niccolò of Pitigliano; but his violence later enabled Cosimo to annex it, while the little Orsini State itself fell to Tuscany under Ferdinand. A tempting invitation had to be refused from consideration for the European Powers: the Corsicans, in revolt against Genoa, offered Cosimo their island, but he was forced to avert his eyes.

Once lord of Siena, Cosimo did his utmost to heal its wounds, granting amnesty and restitution of property to all who would return. Siena was spared the humiliation of submission to a rival city; she remained a distinct State, with her elective sovereign magistracy, her rule over subject towns, her original custom lines. Her union with Florence, like her former union with Milan, was personal only; for Florentines and Sienese were equally Cosimo's servants. Nor was the Sienese constitution ostensibly much altered. Cosimo himself gave it, during a long visit, its permanent form. He did not suppress the *Monti*—parties which, without having any formal place in the constitution, had nevertheless by usage become the groundwork of the fabric; but he struck from the several party registers families whose poverty might favour corruption or disable them from public service. The Great Council was abolished; but each of the four *Monti* henceforth elected a quarter of the Council of a Hundred, and was represented in the same proportion in the curious Sienese institution called the *Balia*, a permanent committee of government elected from the Council. The *Signoria* and the office of Captain of the People were retained. Thus, as at Florence, the more democratic Council disappeared; but the total change was less, for the old sovereign magistracy remained. The form of the constitution, however, mattered little; for all real power was vested in the ducal Governor, who presided in councils and committees, but did his effective work through a bureaucracy dependent on himself, leaving to the native magistracies the less important patronage and non-political jurisdiction. The first Governor was Cosimo's intimate friend Agnolo Niccolini. Partly, perhaps, in consequence of this good beginning, Siena never hereafter gave trouble to the Medici, but became so welded to their House as later always to claim a member of it for Governor.

Cosimo's State was now strangely composite. He ruled Florence by virtue of popular election and Imperial investiture, while he held Siena as a fief of Spain. Interference from the Austrian Habsburgs seemed little probable; but the suzerainty of Siena and the King's retention of the *Presidi* formed an uncomfortable tie to Spain, which Cosimo keenly felt, when the outbreak of civil war in France weakened the chance of maintaining a balance of power in Italy. The desire to give some higher unity to his position prompted him to seek a more exalted title. To this end Pius IV wished to create an Archduchy of Tuscany; but he died before the Bull was issued. In 1569 Pius V created Cosimo Grand

Duke of Tuscany. The Emperor declared against the creation, and drew Philip II to his side. Foreign Courts hesitated, with the exception of England, while the Dukes of Ferrara and Mantua, and later the Duke of Savoy, clamorously protested. When, nevertheless, Cosimo was solemnly crowned at Rome, the Emperor's ambassador ostentatiously left the hall during the ceremony. His master ordered the German Princes not to recognise the title, but he was not generally obeyed; and his hopes of a reversal were disappointed, when Gregory XIII confirmed his predecessor's action.

The withdrawal of the French from Tuscany in 1559 relieved Cosimo from all fear of exiles without and malcontents within. Hitherto, he had ruled by terrorism: now, he could afford to slacken the reins and reduce the taxes. Yet it is impossible to divide his administration by this date; and this must be the justification of a wider survey of its character.

Cosimo's election after Alessandro's murder in 1537 was in accordance with Charles V's act of settlement of 1532; for he was the nearest legitimate agnate of the House after the murderer Lorenzino, who was debarred by public decree. On the father's side he was descended from the brother of the elder Cosimo, *pater patriae*, while his mother was grand-daughter of Lorenzo. His father, Giovanni delle Bande Nere, son of Caterina Sforza, may have inherited through her the military genius which had cast lustre upon Florence. This made Cosimo's election popular, though no one knew the capacity of the handsome athletic youth of eighteen, who had been well brought up on slender means. Very characteristic of the Italian despotism was the combination of hereditary right and election by the Council of Forty-eight, which now represented the Commune. Cosimo was the choice of the Moderates, headed by Guicciardini, against the extreme Mediceans, who preferred a bastard infant of Alessandro's, and against the republican aristocracy. The new ruler was not styled Duke, but head and chief of the Republic; the appointment to important magistracies was vested in the Forty-eight; and his income was limited to a fixed sum. The Emperor had a better security, for his general, Alessandro Vitelli, had on Duke Alessandro's murder seized the fortresses of Florence, Pisa, and Leghorn.

Guicciardini intended to lead the government, and would have granted an amnesty to the several groups of exiles of Alessandro's reign. When negotiations failed, Filippo Strozzi and his sons attempted to surprise the new ruler, but were themselves surprised and beaten at Montemurlo. Cosimo acted on Machiavelli's principle that cruelty should be short and sharp. The leaders in his power were executed in batches. Filippo Strozzi, who was Vitelli's prisoner, later committed suicide, or was possibly murdered. Henceforth there were few political executions, and these for ascertained conspiracies. Strozzi's sons in French service stimulated the resistance of Siena; but to the end of the Medicean dynasty there was no further civil war, no armed collision

between State and rebels. Cosimo's victory was not unpopular with the people, for he had avenged it on the nobles who had robbed it of its liberty.

Cosimo had won a victory, not only over the opposition, but over his own government. Guicciardini retired to his villa, to eat his heart and write his history; and the Prince gave his chief confidence to the mere business-man of the previous reign, the Secretary Francesco Campana. The Constitution could easily be ignored, for it had no roots in popular affection. Clement VII had swept away the older institutions, which Charles V in 1532 had spared, replacing them by the Councils of the Two Hundred and the Forty-eight. The more effective power rested with the latter, from which every three months were elected four members who formed the Prince's Privy Council. With him in conjunction with these Councillors lay the initiative power. The old departmental Committees, the *Otto della pratica*, the *Otto di Balìa*, the *Sei di Mercanzia*, the *Ruota*, had survived, but in strict subordination to the Forty-eight. The merit of this constitution was that administration for the first time really rested with citizens of experience. With time and an easy prince it might have hardened into an official oligarchy; but Cosimo was not the ruler to allow other powers to outgrow his own. He made few ostensible alterations, and the Forty-eight preserved its dignity; but he quickly learnt the older Medicean art of supplanting without destroying institutions that might become encumbrances.

The supposed functions of the changing Privy Council were soon usurped by the *Pratica secreta*, an informal committee of experts whom Cosimo might think fit to summon. From the nucleus inherited from Alessandro he developed his own bureaucracy. In this he took Lorenzo as his model, preferring men of lowly station, not Florentines but shrewd Tuscans from the provinces. Thus Campana came from Colle close to the Sienese border; Lelio Torelli, who succeeded him, was a foreigner, a Romagnol; Bartolommeo Concini, the trusted minister of later days, was of Terranova on the Arno. Lorenzo's hated secretary, Piero da Bibbiena, found a counterpart in Bernardo, of the same clever Casentino stock. Agnolo Niccolini, Archbishop of Pisa, the only noble to whom Cosimo gave high administrative office, recalled his namesake driven from Florence on the fall of Piero II. The old committees still did the executive and judicial routine work; but the permanent secretaries advised with authority on important cases, while measures receiving the Duke's approval after discussion in the *Pratica* passed for laws.

Both within Florence and without, order now began to reign. A check was put on the arbitrary injustice and corruption of the *podestà* and other Florentine officials who ruled the subject cities. Pistoia's sanguinary factions were ruthlessly pacified. In Florence criminal law was executed without fear or favour; there was no straining and stretching of the civil law in party interests. Magistrates were highly paid, and forbidden to receive presents. Justice was made the more effective by

being simplified; the varying laws of the territory were superseded by the Florentine criminal code, though the municipalities were propitiated by the profits of jurisdiction. Even the terrible law of treason, the *legge Polverina*, was but the codification of scattered and inconsistent ordinances or practices long in force; its severest penalties had precedents in those recently inflicted by the republic on Medicean partisans. Severity produced conspiracy among the more corrupt aristocracy; but those who conspired now at least knew their liabilities. For the law-abiding citizen justice had never been so even. Citizens in general, wrote Guicciardini, care little about forms of government, if only justice is well administered. The tyrant gave Florence the justice which liberty had denied her.

To Cosimo's intelligent and incorrupt magistracy his efficient police and elaborate system of espionage were invaluable adjuncts. His spies were everywhere, it was believed—in every household, in every church. Wherever Florentines congregated abroad, secret agents were in their midst. Each night the chief of police sent in a list of all men met in the streets, armed or unarmed, with lanterns or without. If a shot were fired or a knife thrust home, the gates were closed till the criminal was found. Cosimo's first act on rising was to scan the list of cases in the Courts. The envoy Fedeli, accustomed to the severity of Venetian justice, yet wrote with awe of the secret prisons from which news never issued.

For the ruler of Florence religion also had to be a matter of police. Twice a republican outburst had accompanied a religious revival at once anti-Medicean and anti-papal. The doctrines of Savonarola and of his more fanatical successors in 1527-30 were not technically heretical; but during each movement the Pope's authority was rejected, and heresy follows close on schism. If Florence herself was comparatively untainted by Italian Protestantism and Unitarianism, she was dangerously near to Lucca and Siena, the homes of prominent reformers. Cosimo was really religious in his Medicean way, and felt disgust at the wild reaction against religion and morality which had disgraced the restoration under Alessandro. His welcome of the disciplinary decrees of Trent, his efforts to reform monastic life, his introduction of the Jesuits, his choice of Lainez as confessor, were proofs of his desire to take the best that the Catholic revival could offer. Yet political motives doubtless underlay religious. In spite of some formalism and more superstition, the religion of Florence was genuine, and the feeling which had made Savonarola's triumph possible spread far beyond the *Piagnoni*. The churches were always full, the clergy generally popular. Thus Cosimo's respect for religion won the regard of the middle and lower classes, and of no small section of the higher. Through the clergy he could control the people. The parish priests acted as a religious secret service, furnishing lists of church attendance, and even, it is said, information of the number of wafers used in the Sacrament. Nevertheless if religious bodies seemed dangerous,

their character gave them no protection. Suspecting that San Marco and the associated Houses were keeping alive the republican spirit, he summarily ejected the Dominicans, and replaced them by Augustinians, whose convent of San Gallo, built for them by Lorenzo, had been destroyed during the siege. In this he went dangerously far, and was forced by threats of interdict from Paul III to restore the friars. No one more strongly insisted on the evils of episcopal non-residence. yet he kept Archbishop Altoviti out of his see of Pisa for seventeen years, because, though non-political himself, he was son of the anti-Medicean Bindo Altoviti. This action will recall Lorenzo's exclusion of Archbishop Salviati from the same see; while from the early Medici also Cosimo inherited his suspicion of the religious and charitable lay guilds, the secrecy of whose procedure undoubtedly offered opportunities for conspiracy. Of even longer standing was Florentine insistence on State control over the Inquisition. Cosimo's difficulty here was great, as he warmly sympathised with the objects for which the Council of Trent had strengthened it. Heresy found no favour with him, if only on political grounds; nevertheless, in the case of individuals he had a certain breadth of view. He has been blamed for allowing the Inquisition to arrest Pietro Carnesecchi at his own table. Cosimo had long protected him, and believed that his influence at Rome could save him a second time; but Carnesecchi's steadfastness rendered mediation abortive. Stranger still was Cosimo's continued regard for Lelio and Fausto Sozzini (Socinus), after their anti-Trinitarian tenets were suspected or declared. Abroad his sympathies were for orthodoxy. He assisted Charles IX with money in the First War of Religion, and in 1568 sent a strong contingent to the papal army employed against the Huguenots. Much doubtless depended on his political relations with the Papacy. To the Farnese he was always hostile; and under Paul III Rome was the breeding-ground for anti-Medicean plots. Cosimo avoided active collision with Paul IV, but on his death secured the election of Pius IV, who was brother of his own general, the Marquis of Marignano. Now he became the Pope's close friend and counsellor, visiting him at Rome, reconciling him with Philip II after their quarrels over the Council, persuading him to abandon the obstructive policy by which Paul III had alienated the Fathers of Trent and wrecked the earlier meeting. The Cardinalate of Cosimo's son Giovanni, when only seventeen, recalled to Florentine memory that of yet another youthful Giovanni de' Medici. The boy had not the high fortunes of his namesake; but on his tragic death his hat was conferred upon his brother Ferdinand, who was to become Grand Duke of Tuscany. Papal favour was continued under Pius V, who steadily supported Medicean interests against the Houses of Este and Farnese, and created the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in defiance of Imperial protests.

The national militia which Machiavelli had once raised to support.

his theory was by Cosimo revived on a larger scale. Of his 30,000 good troops the best 7000 were recruited from the conquered Sieneſe. Florence and Pistoia were exempt from ſervice, from precaution rather than from privilege; there was riſk in arming the capital and the neighbouring city, whoſe factions had proved infectious. Cosimo boated that he could mobilise his militia in five days. He praiſed their loyalty, aſſerting that, unlike the mercenaries, they never deſerted during the Sieneſe war. Had it been needful, he could doubtleſs have relied on them againſt Florence. His attempt to raiſe a yeomanry from the upper claſſes did not meet with like ſucceſs; but he kept in his pay German, Swiſs, Corſican, and Italian colonels, to raiſe mercenaries if required. His artillery was excellent, and the more expoſed ſouthern frontier bristled with well-armed fortreſſes. The peaſantry were forced to ſtore their grain and live in the walled cities, which ſecured their provision mart and alſo rendered the country-side inacceſſible to invaders.

A prince, ſaid Cosimo, ſhould be ſtrong alike by ſea and land. At Piſa he built docks, and he made Porto Ferraio a fine naval harbour. The immediate difficulty was the total lack of a national marine. The Republic of 1494-1512 had not owned a ſingle galley, and could only blockade Piſa by hiring Genoeſe pirates. To remedy this, Cosimo introduced a ſeaſaring element, eſpecially into Elba, from Greece, Sicily, and the Levant. Very ſucceſſful alſo was his new naval Order of St Stephen, whoſe members were pledged to war againſt the infidel. This Order was confined to the nobility, and intended to intereſt them in State ſervice, to attach them to the dynasty, to wean them away from faction and the purſuit of wealth. The Knights were endowed with Commanderies founded by the State or by wealthy private families. They won diſtinction at Peñon de Velez in 1564, and at Lepanto in 1571. But the little fleet never reached its intended number of twenty galleys, and could ſcarcely keep the ſea when the Barbaſcues appeared in force. On the other hand it paid its way, for Cosimo uſed it for his private commerce; while his ſucceſſor extended its functions to piracy which brought him into trouble with Venice.

In no department was Cosimo's abſolutiſm more conſpicuous than in finance. The long Sieneſe war entailed expenditure that few Princes could have borne. To meet it he added new ſources of revenue to old. Import and export duties kept riſing; the ſtanding property-tax was ſupplemented by a general income-tax of ſeven per cent. Among other expedients were a griſt tax, a meat tax, and State lotteries. Forced gifts and loans had been exacted under all forms of government; and by ſuch the war was largely financed. The gifts, which were not repayable, were widely ſpread; but the loans were levied only from the rich and were not unpopular, becauſe they bore good intereſt, and the capital, contrary to former experience, proved to be ſecure. So alſo Cosimo faithfully paid the arrears of the ſalaries of State officials, which he had

suspended at an anxious crisis. He knew the advantage of good credit: he could borrow in the European markets at a far cheaper rate than the Emperor or the Kings of France and Spain. Heavy as were the burdens, they were, perhaps, more tolerable than of yore. The taxes were not now used as daggers wherewith to stab political opponents: income rather than partisanship was the basis of assessment. The revenue was no longer farmed, but collected by ducal officials, rigorously supervised and audited. Cosimo told Fedeli that prevention of robbery had been his only difficult task; he believed, however, that now no minister could steal a farthing.

Cosimo was no mere fiscalist; he not only tapped but filled the reservoirs of revenue. He revived the decaying silk and woollen trades, and could boast of an unprecedented production of cloth. The smaller towns and villages, to which Florence had jealously forbidden manufacture, now plied their looms. By disobeying Charles V's orders to the Italian cities to eschew the fairs of Lyons, Cosimo drew trade from Genoa and Lucca, while he captured the lucrative trade in brocades with Sicily and Spain. Mercantilist as he was, he sympathised with the physiocratic leanings of the Florentine gentry, who had made the scientific development of their estates their chief interest. War had annihilated their efforts, but peace of itself did much to redress the balance; and Cosimo, like the earlier Medici, set a personal example in scientific farming and fruit-growing. He took a lively interest in the silver mines of Pietra Santa, the marble quarries near Carrara, and the anthracite discoveries on the Upper Arno; concessions were obtained for working the alum of Piombino and the iron of Elba. He endeavoured, as did the early Medici, to bribe Pisa to loyalty by material prosperity. The city was made quite healthy by good drainage; building materials were admitted free; and ships built there paid no harbour dues in Tuscan ports. Manufactures of glass and coral were introduced; Portuguese Jews and Greeks were tempted to settle by the promise of toleration. In 1543 the University of Pisa was reopened. Italy was ransacked for distinguished professors, and Tuscans were forbidden to take degrees elsewhere. Pisa became both an intellectual and social centre, for the fashionable Order of St Stephen had its headquarters there, and the Grand Dukes from Cosimo downwards made it a favourite residence. Nothing, indeed, could tempt the old nobility back to Pisa, and the river-port was too near the seaport of Leghorn to recover the commerce of the past; but at least her stateliness and brightness were restored.

The importance of Leghorn had been long recognised. When Maximilian besieged it in 1496 it was described as being of more vital importance than Pisa, as the very eye of Florence. Its population had dwindled to one thousand, but Cosimo made it one of the busiest ports in the western Mediterranean, although it was to owe yet more to his son Ferdinand. Siena at once recovered much of her prosperity and

population under Cosimo's level absolutism. From 1559 he set himself to reclaim the Sienese Maremma, and drain away the malarious waters pent up among the low undulating hills by impervious banks of sand and shingle. Not content with a generous scheme of repatriation, he brought agricultural colonies from the Friuli, from Mantua and Ferrara, from Parma and Piacenza; all necessities were imported free, and a fair was established at Grosseto. The grain trade was revived, but at a great sacrifice of life, for the Lombard colonists could not resist the pestilential climate. Among the victims of his brave attempt were two of Cosimo's sons and his wife.

There were, of course, drawbacks to this beneficent economic autocracy. It was calamitous, wrote Fedeli, that all the rich and noble families of Florence should be enslaved by one Prince who had in his power all private and public wealth—even though they believed that it served them right. Cosimo was not above contemporary prejudices or personal interests. He would make a revenue and a reserve at almost any cost. Before his death the industries which he had stimulated were somewhat waning, and trade was slipping away to the cheaper papal port of Ancona. He became a banker like his forefathers; and the banker's interest was not always coincident with the State's. Speculation in grain became almost a monopoly. Popular prejudice, indeed, had prevented free export from the Maremma, which might have made its colonisation a greater success; but the Duke himself, while liberally supplying the very poor, hampered production by restrictions on the market. His dealings in the woollen trade were in unfair competition with his subjects; he was suspected of elbowing the wealthier families out of trade, lest wealth should make them politically dangerous. On the other hand, he paid off from his private resources the debt of the Sienese war; and, while greater monarchs left their States in bankruptcy, Cosimo bequeathed a well-filled treasury.

In his personal life Cosimo retained much of the citizen simplicity of the elder Medici. There was no sumptuous Court, no exotic ceremonial, no separate establishments for wife and children. Domestic expenses were carefully watched; and the Duchess, though liberal in alms, was reported stingy. The Duke disliked the attentions in which most crowned heads appear to take pleasure. He travelled, he would say, with a large suite, because he wished to be self-sufficient, and so allow his subjects to attend to their own affairs. On occasion he could inspire awe; but he had inherited the Medicean sociability and love of town and country pleasures, the passion for tournaments, *pallone*, and the chase. He could then throw off his dignity, joke with his companions, and put them at their ease. But, amusement over, he withdrew into himself, assuming his austere air at any sign of forwardness, so that it became a saying that he duked and unduked himself at pleasure. His pride, however, was Italian, and not Spanish or German; and it was due to him and

his second surviving son, Ferdinand, that Florence and Tuscany escaped the fate of almost every other Italian province, that they never lost the air of freshness, freedom and simplicity, which Montesquieu in the eighteenth century found so pleasant.

Artistic and literary appreciation was a heritage from both lines of Medici; and, as with Cosimo the Elder and Lorenzo, it was politically valuable. Cosimo's new historical school comprised Varchi, Adriani, and Ammirato, while Paolo Giovio printed his histories under his auspices. The supremacy of Tuscan speech was all in favour of the ambitious Tuscan ruler. Thus to the amateur *Accademia degli Umidi* he gave the national title and official position of the *Accademia Fiorentina*, enjoining the duty of establishing rules which should give Tuscany a permanent classical prestige. Of this the *Accademia della Crusca* was the outcome in the immediate future, while Varchi and Gelli by their lectures on Dante and Petrarch refreshed the memories of the past; and the restored Cathedral once more echoed the tones of the medieval religious poet. Firenzuola and il Lasca contributed dimple and smile to the more serious aspect of literature. In Cellini and Vasari Cosimo can boast the autobiographer and biographer who of all Italians have, perhaps, the most enduring fame; and it is characteristic of Medicean versatility that in their persons Cosimo linked the art and letters of his reign. His eager interest in Cellini, his close friendship with Vasari, his friendly correspondence with other leading artists, prove at the same time a love for art above that of the princely patron and collector. He did his utmost to woo Michelangelo back to Florence, consulting him on all artistic enterprises, promising him any official honours that he might choose, visiting him with sympathetic reverence at Rome. The Academy of the Fine Arts, the *Arte del Disegno*, was the embodiment of his monarchical, organising spirit, giving social unity and collaboration to painters, sculptors, and architects. From Cosimo date the characteristically Florentine arts of mosaic and work in porphyry. His were the collections which formed the nucleus of the Uffizi gallery; he completed and opened the Laurentian Library. Yet nature, perhaps, appealed more to his practical turn of mind than even art or literature. He founded the School of Botany at Pisa, where the Botanical Garden (1544) is only just junior to that of Padua. Among his chief delights were his herbarium and his Physic Garden by San Marco; nor were the pleasure-gardens of the Pitti and the family villa at Castello without their scientific uses. At Pisa too Vesalius taught; while at Florence doctors and chemists underwent reforms as drastic as their antiquated remedies. A few years more life, and Cosimo would have been the lord of Galileo; but this honour was reserved for Ferdinand. This record of art, literature, history, and science would prove the steps of intellectual decadence to be at least extremely slow.

Cosimo's creation was entirely new, for there was no concealment of

the tyranny which stood confessed : the sham republicanism of the earlier Medicean period had vanished. Had Cosimo been more academic he might be suspected of having borrowed his principles direct from the new political philosophy. But he was an absolute prince in character, even in appearance. To those who obeyed he was a kindly ruler, and not ungenerous in offering opportunities for repentance. In his princeliness there was no smack of the Bombastes. A son of one of Italy's greatest soldiers, himself the creator of her best military force, he did not play the generalissimo. Under the ducal mantle he wore the Florentine civil cloak, and he preserved such of the republican customs of the past as were not inconsistent with the completeness of his absolutism. Florence, it was said, had neither the virtue to preserve her liberty nor the docility to bear servitude. It was a great feat for a single ruler to deprive her of the one, and to enforce the other. Within thirty years she seemed to have forgotten her republican aspirations ; but for this loss there was compensation. The people, torn by faction, now lived at peace, enjoying even justice and incorrupt administration, hitherto very rare. Abroad Florence was no longer the sport of every Borgia or Vitelli, but was feared by neighbours and respected by foreign Powers, defended by a national army, a national fleet, and modern fortresses. So indispensable had been Cosimo's alliance that Charles V had ceded to him at one moment the Florentine fortresses, at another Piombino. From Philip II he had extorted the investiture of Siena. He balanced the power of Spain by giving ear to French allurements, and by professing friendship for Philip's ill-liked cousin Maximilian, whose daughter he won for his heir. The city recovered much of its former commercial prosperity and artistic and literary pre-eminence. Greedy as the Duke was of wealth, he spent lavishly on public improvements, and was, not merely from interest, but by nature, generous in his charities. Tuscany, instead of being an aggregate of units hostile to Florence and each other, was now a modern State with common aims and a common order. She was to enjoy a long era of prosperity, and to become, as Venice once was, a model for less fortunate provinces. If in the Thirty Years' War and in that of the Spanish Succession she was subjected to grievous taxation and even to excursions and alarms, it was no fault of her own or of her dynasty.

Cosimo in 1564 resigned the routine of government, though not the control of policy, to his son Francis. He was still young, but had laboured incessantly. In the autumn of 1562 he had lost within a few days from Maremma fevers his wife and his two sons, Garzia and Giovanni. A year earlier his well-loved daughter, Lucrezia, died shortly after her marriage to Alfonso II of Ferrara. These natural misfortunes were in the following century caught up by scandal-mongers and Florentine exiles, and distorted into dramatic tragedies of adultery and poison, fratricide and parricide, which have passed muster as the inner history of the reign. After his resignation Cosimo deteriorated, degrading himself

by his amours with two Florentine ladies, one of whom, Camilla Martelli, owing to Pius V's appeal to his conscience, became his unofficial wife. The marriage displeased his sons, nor did it bring him peace, and on April 21, 1574, he died.

This incomplete and unsatisfactory regency of ten years opened a period of social demoralisation, which culminated during Francis' reign. Florence was permeated by an atmosphere of adultery, violence, and pecuniary corruption. As under Alessandro, she experienced the worst side of the Italian despotism. Moreover, Francis, born of a Spanish mother, and partly brought up in Spain, had no Tuscan geniality or simplicity. Either he withdrew himself to his studies in natural science and his amours, or in his magnificent and extravagant Court, formed on the Spanish model, surrounded himself with titled nobility. The consideration declined in which the untitled Florentine gentry and the higher magistrates had been held; and the craze for titles, from which Florence had been comparatively free, set in. Justice was excessively severe without being deterrent. Taxation reduced itself to fiscalism, and trading to a system of monopolies for the disreputable group surrounding the throne. Francis' passion for the Venetian runaway Bianca Cappello, and his mean and heartless treatment of his Austrian wife, disgusted the people of Florence and the Court of Vienna; nor did his marriage with his mistress immediately after his wife's death improve the situation. To increase the roll of family scandals, his sister was murdered by her brutal husband, Paolo Giordano Orsini; while his brother Piero assassinated his wife, who was also his first cousin. Francis was on bad terms with the Cardinal Ferdinand; but the latter visited his brother at Poggio à Caiano, and was reconciled. During the visit Francis died (October 19, 1587), and on the following day Bianca. Though it is certain that both died a natural death, the coincidence caused yet another scandal. The sole political fact of the reign had been the recognition of the Grand-ducal title by Maximilian II.

Within ten years four Cardinals exchanged their hats for crowns or their equivalent. Of these the Cardinal de' Medici alone justified the process. In the prime of life he accepted the full consequences of the charge, married, and left his dynasty amply provided with posterity. Trained in affairs at the Roman Court, a patron of oriental learning, and a collector of antiques, he was an ideal ruler for Florence, whose independence must rest mainly on diplomacy, and her prestige on culture. Ferdinand had learnt at Rome that subservience to Spain was not the only alternative for an Italian Prince; and his very marriage proved that he was not in leading-strings. His choice fell upon Christine of Lorraine, granddaughter of Catharine de' Medici, who had previously tried to wed her to the young Duke of Savoy. The marriage placed the Grand Duke in close connexion with both the Crown and the House of Guise; but Ferdinand was too wise to favour the disintegration of France, which

must entail dependence upon Spain. Although he dared not declare openly for Navarre, he secretly aided him with money, and actively contributed to his reconciliation with the Papacy and the House of Lorraine. He played, indeed, no insignificant part in the Civil War in Southern France. During the troubles of Marseilles in 1591, the commandant of the Château d'If invited Ferdinand to occupy the fortress in pledge for such Catholic King as France might choose. Tuscan troops and stores were shipped from Leghorn, and served to thwart the designs of Spain and Savoy. Philip's order to withdraw the garrison met with a flat refusal. In the final disturbances of 1596 Casaux, head of the ultra-Catholic democratic party in Marseilles, admitted Spanish troops. The Duke of Guise, now in the royal service, surprised the city; and such Spaniards as escaped fled on Doria's galleys under the fire of the Tuscan guns. The sudden revival of Spanish power in northern France made Ferdinand hesitate. He now expelled the French part of the garrison of the Château d'If, and seemed bent on a permanent occupation of the Îles Pomègues, which would have made him virtual master of the port; he would at least hold the fortress as security for his large advances to Henry IV. Hostilities between French and Tuscans had actually begun, when the King appeased Ferdinand by giving adequate security for the future payment of his debt (1598).

It was no time to quarrel with France, for in the autumn of 1597 Alfonso II of Ferrara had died; and Clement VIII refused to invest Cesare d'Este, also brother-in-law of Ferdinand, who zealously supported his claim. The Spanish party in Italy was urging the Pope to employ his large forces in a partition of Tuscany; and, to propitiate him, the newly-converted Henry IV had abandoned Ferrara, the faithful ally of a century and a half. Ferdinand feared that he might also sacrifice the Medici to the Aldobrandini Clement VIII, son of a Florentine exile of 1530.

Philip II's death gave Ferdinand hopes of friendlier relations with Spain, on which the investiture of Siena depended. However, Pietro de' Medici, restless and in debt, enjoyed high favour at the Spanish Court, and could not abandon his pretensions to an appanage at the expense of his brother's State. His influence stimulated Lerma's dislike of Ferdinand; and Philip III continued to refuse investiture. Turning towards France, the Grand Duke formed a close link with the now powerful Bourbon King by marrying his niece Maria to him (1600). Yet this brilliant alliance was but the source of disappointments. Ferdinand had urged Henry IV to insist on the cession of Saluzzo by Charles Emmanuel, offering to pay the expenses of war. The peace of Lyons, therefore, sorely rankled; for Ferdinand's Savoyard rival seemed as an Italian Power stronger than of yore, and France appeared to be abandoning Italy to Spain. In vain Ferdinand strove to court the Habsburgs by sending the Emperor a contingent for the Turkish war,

by risking his ships in the Spanish expedition against Algiers, even by surrendering one of the false Sebastians, who might trouble Philip III's possession of Portugal. The only result was the refusal of the investiture of Piombino on the death of the last direct heir, and the fortification of Porto Longone as a direct menace to Porto Ferrajo. At length Fuentes, governor of Milan, exhausted Ferdinand's patience by interfering in the Imperial fiefs and Florentine possessions in the Lunigiana. The Grand Duke resolutely sent his troops to the frontiers, and prepared to fight the power of Spain. He seemed isolated, for he was now on bad terms with France, partly owing to the brutality of Henry IV towards his foolish wife. Fortunately at this juncture Pietro died at Madrid. Philip III now granted the investiture of Siena; and the Spanish Queen favoured the marriage of her sister, the Archduchess Maria Magdalena, with Ferdinand's heir. Thus the reign ended happily with the marriage festivities, in the midst of which arrived the trophies of the brilliant capture of the great Alexandrian treasure-fleet by the privateering squadron of the Grand Duchess. The rejoicings, however, caused the Grand Duke's death, for they were incompatible with the spare diet to which he had perforce accustomed himself.

Florence had no happier reign than this. Ferdinand's gentle dignity and genial simplicity dispersed the fumes of Francis' morbid pride. The respectable family life of the grand-ducal pair corrected the evil taste left by the scandals of the last reign. Within reach of the capital cruel justice became no longer necessary. Ferdinand, conscious of bursts of passion, ordered that sentences given at such moments should be suspended for a calmer hour. Government was as absolute as ever; all affairs of State were transacted by the Grand Duke's personal will through agency of his secretaries. Meanwhile ordinary business was conducted by the normal constitutional magistracies without interference. Francis had pushed his own banking and trading speculations to his subjects' injury. Ferdinand zealously promoted his own and the public trade. He tried to obtain through a Spanish marriage a Crown for his second son and a Tuscan settlement in Brazil, and again a post in West Africa. Failing in this he invested largely in the Anglo-Dutch smuggling trade with the Indies, and to facilitate this revived the old Pisan alliance with the kingdom of Fez with a view to acquiring the port of Larache. Sully's protective measures had completed the ruin of Italian trade with France, while the acts of repudiation by the Spanish Crown had caused widespread bankruptcy in Florence. Ferdinand found compensation by opening up active commerce with England and the Baltic. In the ex-Cardinal the Porte found an unremitting foe. This entailed loss of the Levantine trade; but privateering was almost as profitable. All the Turk's enemies found support at Florence—Persia, the Druses, the rebel Bey of Aleppo, the Greeks of Cyprus. Tuscan squadrons, often commanded by French and English adventurers, performed no mean exploits.

They destroyed the Barbaresque ships under the guns of Algiers, stormed Prevesa, burnt Bona, and attempted Famagosta. With a little more support Ferdinand might have wrested from the Turk Cyprus and Jerusalem itself, for Christian piracy in the Levant had suddenly assumed formidable proportions.

At home in Tuscany Ferdinand was tireless in promoting agricultural and mineral development. The drainage of the Chiana valley and the Maremma were above the hydraulic experience of those days; and the former led to a brush with the Papacy, for it was believed that Rome was flooded by the operations on the upper Tiber. They had the indirect effect of making agriculture and gardening fashionable among the nobility, and of so reviving their taste for the fresh Tuscan life. Cosimo and Francis had encouraged the growth of the olive; but to Ferdinand was mainly due the extension of the mulberry, which provided the Tuscan silk-trade with its raw material. Yet of all his bequests the greatest was Leghorn; for it was he who really made the modern town, for which Cosimo and Francis had laid foundations. Leghorn became a home for all nations and all creeds, a shining example of despotic tolerance for free trade and free religion. Justly famous for the material blessings of his reign, the Tuscan Prince had shown himself no coward. He had bearded the Sultan, and confronted Spain; he had interchanged blows with the Pope, and with the King of France.

II.

The antecedents of Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy differed widely from those of Cosimo de' Medici. The latter, an unknown youth whose only claim to distinction was his father's military talent, was suddenly preferred to power by the assassination of a very distant cousin. The Savoyard, son of a most unmartial sire, was thirty years of age and the hero of Europe at the time of his restoration, which he owed to the blow struck by his own arm at Saint-Quentin. Nevertheless, the capacity of either for reconstruction and administration was almost equally unknown, and Emmanuel Philibert's task was the harder.

It had seemed inevitable that the House of Savoy should share the fate of Navarre. Mountain ranges divided the possessions of each House into two main blocks. As Ferdinand had annexed the Spanish and larger part of Navarre, and as the line of Albret had thus become a satellite of France, so the lion's share of the Savoyard territories had fallen to Francis I and Henry II, while the remainder was a mere dependency of Spain. There was, however, this difference, that here the mountains did not form the political dividing line, since the French occupied, not only the whole of the western lands which had not been previously seized by the Swiss, but also the bulk of Piedmont. This latter they fought hard to retain in the negotiations for peace; for it

gave them the entrance to Italy, and kept alive their pretensions to the Milanese. Finally, to save French pride, all questions of title to the duchy or any part of it were reserved for legal decision within three years. Meanwhile they retained five strategic points—Turin, Chivasso, Chieri, Villanova d'Asti, and Pinerolo. The Spaniards, who held the smaller eastern section of Piedmont, claimed as a counterpoise, until the French garrisons were withdrawn, Asti as covering Alessandria, and Vercelli to command the Sesia, but Vercelli was shortly exchanged for Santhià. Philip II had previously extorted another concession. He coveted Nice and Villafranca as halfway naval stations between Barcelona and Genoa. The Duke could not refuse; and thus their garrisons were paid by Spain, taking the oath both to Philip and the Duke. The battle of Saint-Quentin decided, not only the Duke's restoration, but his marriage. It seemed certain from the first that the nearly related House of France would supply the bride. The Duke would have preferred Henry II's daughter Catharine, but the King seized the opportunity of finding a husband for his sister Margaret, now verging on forty, and this Princess herself had set her heart upon the Savoyard. Emmanuel Philibert at first resisted, threatening to marry Elizabeth Tudor, in spite of heresy and illegitimacy, but ultimately surrendered. The marriage was celebrated by Henry's express desire, while he was dying of Montgomery's lance-thrust.

The restoration of the ruler was less difficult than the reconstruction of the State. The materials upon which the restored Duke had to work were most unpromising. Apart from a few hundred men in isolated posts, he possessed no military force, regular or irregular. The fortresses remaining to him were in ruins, while the French were authorised to dismantle those that they were ceding. The revenues were alienated or mortgaged at a ruinous rate, the very crown jewels pawned or plundered. Piedmont lay waste, its farms and cottages burnt, its country-side flooded by neglected rivers and canals. Ferrante Gonzaga had suggested the immersion of the whole plain to serve as a screen for Lombardy. The once flourishing industries in woollens and fustians had withered; a large part of the population had emigrated; the remainder were crushed by French and Spanish exactions and forced labour. Such money as there was—and the French had spent freely—had gravitated towards the Jews. The people, never as a whole industrious, had been demoralised by the war; they had lost all power of work, and all care for a higher standard of comfort. The parochial clergy were completely out of hand; the scandals of monasteries and nunneries cried for chastisement. Heresy had spread apace, not only in the Vaudois districts and those immediately influenced by Geneva and Dauphiné, but in the very heart of Piedmont, especially in the towns garrisoned by the French and their Swiss and German mercenaries. Of administrative machinery there was little, of public order less. The Courts of Chambéry and Turin and the Exchequer (*Camera de' Conti*) were huddled together at

Vercelli, striving to keep alive some show of justice in the scattered fiefs and towns which still owed allegiance. Their power and their procedure compared unfavourably with that of the French Courts established in Savoy and at Turin. Piedmont was cursed by the revival of the old Guelfic and Ghibelline factions, intensified by the real distinction between French, Spanish, and loyalist partisans. The loyalists expected the rewards of the restoration, and yet they were in so small a minority that the Duke must ignore past treason or indifference, and win back allegiance by peculiar favour. While feudatories had usurped privileges or lands, the larger communes of the old Lombard type, such as Asti and Vercelli, exaggerated their franchises. The Duke had no trained administrators or ambassadors. The Grand-Chancellor, Langosco di Stroppiana, owed his promotion to his own devotion to the Prince and the Prince's devotion to his daughter. The only other adherents who as yet rose above mediocrity were Emmanuel Philibert's intimate friend Andrea Provana, lord of Leynì, who had shown courage, self-sacrifice and diplomatic competence, and the Count of Montfort, whose cleverness was less doubtful than his orthodoxy and disinterestedness. In the Duke's favour was the enthusiasm of Piedmont; for, when the French garrisons refused to evacuate without their arrears of pay and gratuitous transport, the impoverished people made generous subscriptions. They expected to return to a golden age which knew not taxes nor military service, when the Duke had been the most free-handed among his "confederates," the nobles. In Savoy, from the first, the feeling was more sober; for Savoy had been spared the ravages of war, and had enjoyed a judicious blend of central and local administration. The inhabitants were akin by race and speech to their immediate French neighbours, and soon became aware that their Prince posed as an Italian.

The first requisite was an army, which must comprise a trained militia for defence and a mercenary professional force to stiffen defensive or initiate offensive measures. The Duke's fortresses must at least delay an enemy, and give diplomacy time to find allies. He had seen how some smaller Italian States, Mantua, Ferrara, Parma, and Florence, had made themselves respected by their military resources or scientific fortification. Military efficiency implied organised finance. The old duties and the revenues from domain land were totally inadequate to modern needs. To extract higher contributions from his subjects the Prince must develop their resources, agricultural and commercial. He must also rid himself of the shackles imposed by the complicated congeries of provincial Estates, costly alike to ruler and subject, productive of delay, entailing loans at ruinous interest and financial embarrassment. This change again implied a process of evolution in the somewhat inchoate system of courts and councils, and the differentiation of financial, judicial, and administrative agencies. Administration alone could give unity to Savoy and Piedmont, differing in language, in sympathies, in

occupations, in geographical connexions. Geographical dualism connected itself with political divergence, but far more dangerous was religious dissidence. To Savoy-Piedmont, of all States, it would be most dangerous, not only because it weakened a people which to be strong must at least be united, but because it was responsible for the loss of the dynasty's rights over Geneva, and of the northern Savoyard territories to the Swiss. Now that the religious question had become international, the spread of dissent in Savoy might give a Catholic Power a pretext for intervention, such as actually occurred in the neighbouring principality of Orange.

Apart from reconstruction or revolution—for the conversion of the feudal state into a modern monarchy was little less—the Prince must look to a process of recovery, and even of expansion. He could not be master while French and Spaniards held seven of his chief positions. He could not ignore the losses inflicted by the Swiss, the men of the Valais, and the citizens of Geneva. Charles V had broken his mother's heart by conferring the long-coveted Montferrat, the geographical complement of Piedmont to the east, on the rival House of Mantua. The rights of Savoy were, indeed, reserved; but reservation was only another word for repudiation. The question whether the Marquisate of Saluzzo, or any of it, were a fief of Piedmont or of Dauphiné had been merely academic, so long as there was a line of Marquises; but it was now all-important that its passes and fortresses should not furnish France with an inlet and a base, exposing the plain of Piedmont, and endangering the connexion with the sea-board and with Nice. The recovery of the occupied cities; that of the southern and northern shores of Lake Lemán; the re-establishment of Savoyard rights over Geneva; the realisation of claims upon Saluzzo and the Montferrat; the extension of the narrow strip of Riviera sea-board—such were the aims which must go to make the history of Emmanuel Philibert and his heirs.

It was believed that the Duke would begin by attacking Geneva and persecuting his heterodox subjects, the Vaudois. He did indeed at once take subtle measures against Geneva, and even when at Ghent he promised the Pope to extirpate heresy. Yet his hands were so full that he would scarcely have raised a finger against the Vaudois had their unorthodoxy been limited to their traditional doctrines. Both the government and their Catholic neighbours had long regarded the Vaudois as having a vested interest in these beliefs, and bore them no ill-will on that score. It was another matter when their teachers left their valleys to draw fresh inspiration from Zurich or Geneva, when Swiss and Genevese ministers and fugitive fanatics from France carried their propagandism along the mountain slopes and down into the plain. For centuries the Vaudois belief had remained unaltered, and their ministers, the *barbi*, were easily out-argued by the trained disputants, first of the German cities, and then of Geneva. Thus the Vaudois deserted their ancient

cult, and became, about 1530, Zwinglian, and, in 1555, ordinary Calvinists, receiving their scriptures and in great measure their ministers from the European Reformation. The primitive worship in the houses of the *barbi* gave place to the whitewashed temples, offensive to the eyes of the neighbouring Catholics in whose churches Vaudois children had formerly received baptism. Thus the old Vaudois villages had now become a link in the chain of heresy which was drawn round Piedmont on the north and west from the further end of Lake Geneva to the coast-line of Provence. It was not merely a question of religion. In spite of profession, perhaps even of intention, the new heresy was political and aggressive—aggressive above all to Savoy, for it was instinct with the old hatred between Geneva and the Dukes and their relatives the Bishops. The Vaudois, moreover, were backed by the warlike Huguenots of Dauphiné, and by the widespread heresy in the western Savoyard territories with which the Duke could never really cope.

The Piedmontese haunts of the Vaudois were the valleys of the Pellice and Chisone, two rivers which feed the Upper Po, and their smaller affluents, such as the Agogna. These valleys run down between ridges projecting eastwards from the backbone of the mountains which lies north and south. The population might number 15,000; but Catholics and Vaudois were interspersed. Neither the Duke nor his subjects desired the rupture which the Pope and the foreign ministers of the Vaudois were forcing. The mountaineers had powerful intercessors in the Duchess and the Counts of Racconigi and Luserna. If they would only have expelled their foreign ministers, the government would probably have been content. But the preachers urged armed resistance, persuading their flocks that they could never be reached among their snows. Meanwhile the Pope scornfully rejected the Vaudois Confession, promising, if instruction failed—and the Jesuit Possevin did egregiously fail—to grant a year's ecclesiastical revenue in Piedmont for the suppression of heresy.

In October, 1560, the Vaudois resolved upon resistance. It was the usual tale of such conflicts: on the one side sudden submission and rapid recrudescence, the capture of small garrisons and the desecration of Catholic churches; on the other small mobile columns working up the valleys and along the parallel ridges—here and there a serious check: but, to set against this, successful turning movements, seizure of stock, and consequent shortage of supply, as the Vaudois were forced back into the mountains. From the first the Duchess had begged for mercy; and Catharine de' Medici added her entreaties. In June, 1561, the rebels submitted on very favourable terms. In the fortified places within the Vaudois area liberty of conscience was conceded, and outside them liberty of worship also; but beyond the valleys no worship or propagandism was suffered. Foreign observers saw in the settlement a reverse for the Duke; but strong Catholic as he was, he had a political feeling for toleration;

he would not destroy his subjects, however heterodox, nor risk Swiss, French, or German intervention. Difficulties were not over, mainly because the question of the admission of foreign preachers was left obscure; and these set the people against the local leaders, who were inclined towards temperate agreement. There was a moment of alarm when Alva's army marched through Piedmont towards the Netherlands, and another when in 1569 Emmanuel Philibert with extraordinary speed built the fort of Mirabocco, to block the connexion of the Pellice valley with France. He wisely took little notice of the villagers' gatherings, was opportunist in the issue and suspension of edicts against foreign preachers, and faithfully kept his word on the unquestioned terms of the original peace.

An opportunist policy was also followed in dealing with ordinary dissent. The early drastic measures resulted in the flight of a considerable portion of the inhabitants in some Piedmontese towns to Saluzzo and Dauphiné. Depopulation was the last thing which the Duke desired. He recalled the fugitives, quashed most of the sentences, restored confiscated property, and henceforth connived at liberty of conscience at the least. In some cases he refused to surrender heretics to the Pope, or released them from the Inquisition. He gave refuge to fugitive Huguenots, even to those flying from the provincial massacres which followed St Bartholomew's Eve. While in Piedmont the Decrees of Trent were published, in Savoy, where heresy was more dominant, publication was withheld. Toleration might have been more complete but for the provocation given by native and foreign heretics, who formed plots against different places in turn, and who actually occupied the strong strategic position of Exilles.

Emmanuel Philibert's comparative tenderness towards heretics displeased both Philip II and successive Popes, while the occasional imprisonment of treasonable reformers brought lectures from the German Princes. To both parties he urged that circumstances alter cases; and he answered Philip's remonstrances by declining to depopulate his country, and to give a pretext for the intervention of the vigilant Huguenots of Provence and Dauphiné. Nevertheless, he was clever enough to retain or restore amicable relations with both religions abroad, and to prevent recrudescence of serious trouble at home. Even the wild Huguenots of Dauphiné respected his agents and messengers. Some precautions were, however, always taken. In later days in France the exclusion of Huguenots from royal favours proved a potent engine of conversion; and the same method was earlier tried in Savoy. Reform, moreover, was fought with its own weapons, and the high character and devotion of Girolamo della Rovere, Archbishop of Turin, made him a formidable foe. When the Jesuits and the associated Order of St Paul were firmly established at Turin and elsewhere, when the seminaries educated teachers as competent as those of the Piedmontese congregations, Catholicism began to recover ground,

and to drive nonconformity back to the Vaudois valleys. If Emmanuel Philibert had been a persecutor, he would scarcely have kept his throne; if he had given free course to heresy, his son would probably have lost it.

The shortest and easiest means to suppress heresy would doubtless have been the conquest of Geneva. The Duke's military advisers did, indeed, survey the possibilities of surprise or siege, while other agents, acquiring property in or near the town, stealthily manufactured a Savoyard party. It was, however, too dangerous to provoke single-handed the Protestant Cantons and the Huguenots, perhaps even some of the German Princes. Geneva could only be attacked with the cooperation of the Catholic Powers. The Pope was eager, and Philip II would probably have consented; but the French Court hesitated, and finally refused assent, for the very reason, perhaps, that the Guise party would have granted it. Thus the great opportunity was lost, though Emmanuel Philibert kept his claims alive. He refused, however, to acquiesce in the occupation of the whole of his northern territories by Bern, Freiburg, and the Valais, finding aid in the dislike of the other Cantons for the aggressive practices of Bern. The line of division was not religious for, while Catholic Freiburg shared with Protestant Bern the territories robbed from Charles III, Protestant Zurich concurred with the other six Catholic Cantons in the sympathy for Savoy, which in 1560 culminated in the Treaty of Luzern. Mediation was then entrusted to the eleven neutral Cantons; but when Bern proved recalcitrant, the Catholic Cantons began to exchange persuasion for threats. The Bernese at length saw that their opponent was a Prince whom even France thought well to propitiate, and they assented to a compromise regulated by the treaties of Nyon and Lausanne (1564): The Duke recovered Gex, and the territories occupied by Bern to the south of Lake Geneva, while he ceded those on the north from the entrance of the Rhone to Vevay, and also the Pays de Vaud. The middle of the Lake was fixed as the boundary. The Duke promised liberty of conscience in the recovered territories, reserving his rights to Geneva, but engaging not to prosecute them by force of arms, and to allow unrestricted commerce with the city. Five years later, the Duke recovered from the Valais the southern shore of the Lake between the rivers Drance and Morge, ceding the lands on the right bank of the latter. The Valais entered into an alliance for mutual support with a definite number of troops, and gave the Duke permission to move his forces through their territory from one part of his dominions to another. Both concessions were of great advantage; for he thus obtained a secondary means of communication between Savoy and Piedmont, and a most efficient auxiliary force at a very slight cost. Freiburg proved more obstinate, for the Duke had no means of attacking his lost territory of Romont, separated as it was by the recent cessions to Bern. The dispute dragged on until 1578, when he suddenly gave way, because it

was hindering the conclusion of a most essential league with the Catholic Cantons. This league was bought at the price of Romont, and was worth its price, for it assured to the Duke in case of attack a force of 12,000 Swiss, while the Cantons engaged not to admit Geneva into fellow-citizenship until the justice of his claims had been decided. As an outward token of the new alliances the Duke's person was henceforth guarded by sixty halberdiers recruited from the Catholic Cantons and the Valais.

The three years within which the French Crown had to substantiate its claims slipped rapidly by amid excuses, delays, and the revival of ridiculous pretensions. Should Emmanuel Philibert have no heir, as was thought probable, his Gallicised cousin, the Duke of Nemours, would succeed under totally different conditions. But on January 12, 1562, Margaret gave birth to Charles Emmanuel. The civil wars in France had now begun, enabling the Duke to press harder. He won the King of Navarre, the Constable, and Nemours, while Margaret secretly corresponded with the Queen-Mother. France was still too strong to abandon her hold on Italy; and the Duke saw that he must compromise. One proposal was an exchange of the fertile province of Bresse for Saluzzo and the five Piedmontese towns; but finally the French retained Pinerolo, receiving Savigliano and the valley of Perosa in return for the other cities. This gave them better access to Saluzzo, while it freed the centre of Piedmont from their annoying presence. Such was the growing demoralisation in France that the Crown's engagement found no acquiescence from its officers in Piedmont. Under great provocation the Duke had kept his temper for three years; he now with consummate judgment lost it. Accusing the French commandants of stirring his Protestant subjects to revolt, he threatened an appeal to Spain as guarantor of the treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis. This brought the Cardinal of Lorraine himself to Piedmont with peremptory orders for evacuation. The garrisons sulkily withdrew to their less comfortable quarters. On December 12, 1562, the Duke rode into Turin, henceforth the capital of a new European Power.

Through these weary negotiations Spain and the Pope had given Emmanuel Philibert no aid; the victory was all his own. He felt that his fortunes must depend mainly on the power of France and thus on the issue of the civil wars. Their continuance was to his interest; and, when trouble began for Spain in the Netherlands, his old intimacy with its promoters is said to have added force to this diversion.

After the Massacre of St Bartholomew it became difficult to steer a reasonably safe course. While professing proper Catholic enthusiasm, the Duke entered into close correspondence with Montmorency-Damville, Governor of Languedoc, who dissociated himself from the royal crime. The death of Charles IX made all things easier. The Queen-Mother begged Emmanuel Philibert to escort Henry III through Italy on his way from Poland. At Venice he was the King's inseparable companion;

thence he escorted him to Turin; and everywhere the Savoyard forces were ostentatiously reviewed. Their master was too great a gentleman to beg a favour in his own house, though, perhaps, the Duchess privately besought her nephew to make a gift of the districts still occupied by France. At Lyons Henry III promised their restoration, while the Duke offered a large force against the King's enemies in France. The moment of happiness was terribly marred, for Emmanuel Philibert was hurried home by the illness of his wife and his heir. The boy recovered, but the Duke's staunchest ally and counsellor was lost to him. To her, almost as much as to himself, the salvation of Savoy had been due, while she had made Turin a social and intellectual centre, worthy of old France. The political effects of the loss were felt at once, for the French ministers and the Duke of Nevers, a Gonzaga, now Governor of Saluzzo, strenuously opposed the cession of the Piedmontese fortresses. The King, however, held to his promise; and in the winter of 1574-5 Piedmont was clear of French garrisons. Margaret, with clear insight, had often twitted her husband on the respective greed of France and Spain. Though Philip had no conceivable pretext for retaining Asti and Santhià, their cession cost infinite trouble, and huge bribes to his factotum, Antonio Perez. But the evacuation was at last completed, and the Duke was ruler throughout the length and breadth of Piedmont.

In addition to the recovered cities, Emmanuel Philibert made some useful acquisitions by purchasing Tenda with the valleys of Prelà and Maro. The former was of much importance, as commanding the pass to Nice, while the Prelà opened a way to Oneglia, which was bought from one of the Doria. Thus was won yet another access to that much disputed Riviera, where France and Spain, Genoa and Savoy, each had a foothold. The Duke was suspected of designs upon Finale, already coveted by the Spanish King, and also upon Savona, which would gladly have revolted from Genoa, who was deliberately ruining its once thriving trade. His chief failure was Montferrat. In vain he appealed for a revision of his claim, visiting Augsburg in 1566 to press it. He found the Emperor so intent upon a Turkish campaign that delicacy held him back, though he thought it judicious to contribute a serviceable cavalry contingent. A less cautious statesman might have found his opportunity in the rising of Casale, virtually a free town, against the absolutism of the first Mantuan Marquis. After giving some encouragement he finally, from fear of Spain, left the rebellion alone, even expelling the refugees to whom he had given shelter.

In his designs upon Saluzzo the Duke was more venturesome, and at his death had some hold upon the Marquisate. Success depended on French favour, and this on French difficulties. His system was to court all parties. He was intimate with Montmorency-Damville, studiously amicable to the Queen-Mother, sympathetic towards the ultra-Catholics,

generous to proscribed Huguenots. During the earlier troubles of Henry III's reign Emmanuel Philibert offered to buy Saluzzo; but the French Court preferred the bid of Bern, Zurich, and Basel; and, but for the Duke's active influence upon French parties the bargain would have been struck to the imminent peril of his State. This terrible risk drove him to the first step in the attempted dismemberment of France, which was to cost his son so dear. He tempted Philip II to a joint attack, as the result of which Saluzzo, and perhaps Provence and Dauphiné, should fall to himself, while he would abandon to Spain his claims on Montferrat. For so bold a scheme Philip was too timid; and the Duke narrowed his aims to intervention in Saluzzo, where the governor Bellegarde was scheming to establish, with Spanish aid, an independent satrapy. Catharine de' Medici induced Bellegarde temporarily to resign his governorship; but in 1579 the adventurer with a motley force of Huguenots and Catholics reoccupied Carmagnola and the town of Saluzzo. In all this Emmanuel Philibert was concerned. He was glad to pay off his score against the Queen, who had balked his designs upon Geneva, but he feared the large Huguenot element in Bellegarde's army. Catharine, believing that he was the determining factor, interviewed him at Grenoble and at Montluel. Bellegarde was bribed to loyalty by the governorship of Saluzzo with wider powers, but straightway died (1579). The Duke professed to be the mainstay of French influence; yet Carmagnola was held, nominally for France, but really for himself, while in Centallo the Provençal adventurer Anselme with a strong Huguenot garrison was financed by Spain. Such was the situation in Saluzzo at the time of Emmanuel Philibert's death on August 30, 1580.

To a character so arbitrary and a genius so constructive as that of Emmanuel Philibert it was almost an advantage that the social and constitutional landmarks of his State had been swept away. Constitution, army, justice, finance, and education must needs be new creations. Not one of them was isolated; they must all form part of a single architectonic plan. The creator cannot be said to have brought to perfection his complicated structure; but he left it so far advanced that a careful and sympathetic successor with far less genius, but a due regard to the adaptation of ends to means, could have completed the design. Finance was the foundation; and this for a modern monarchy must be wider and deeper than that which had served for the frail superstructure of feudal Savoy. Burdens hitherto locally borne by feudatories and communes were now added to the liabilities of the central government. The Duke's foreign expenses were enormous, for he had to buy and keep partisans at Rome, Vienna, and Madrid, in the Swiss Cantons, in each French faction. Large sums were needed to buy out the French and Spanish garrisons, and to purchase the feudal territories which lay between central Piedmont and the coast. It is not surprising, therefore, that Emmanuel Philibert's taxation was quadruple or quintuple that of

his father. Throughout his reign he experimented in finance, ringing the changes on frontier duties, or imposts on articles of consumption, on direct taxation after the model of the French *taille*, and on the salt monopoly which took the usual form of forcing each family to purchase a specified amount. The object was as far as possible to bring the exempted classes into line with the middle and lower. To this there was of course much resistance; but the Duke's general friendliness towards the Papacy enabled him to draw large subsidies from his clergy.

The Estates of Piedmont would never have granted the taxes which the Duke extracted, but they had almost ceased to exist during the French occupation; and he made no effort to revive them, although he continued to summon the several provincial Estates of his Savoyard territories, where the question of subsidies was less important. In Piedmont he negotiated with the communes separately, and with committees of contributories in the country districts. He would listen to suggestions and remonstrances, and vary the methods and incidence of taxation, but on the sum total of revenue to be derived he was immovable. Much discontent there was. The Venetian envoy Boldù in his report of 1561 states that the Piedmontese longed for war again and cursed the peace, that in the towns still occupied by France they had no wish for evacuation, and that French officials fanned the flames. But there was no rising against taxation. The Duke had gained his object; towards the close his budgets balanced, while he had a large sum of gold in the treasury for emergencies. Few European rulers could boast as much.

Meanwhile, the resources of Piedmont were developed; and its prosperity perhaps increased in as high a ratio as its burdens. The Duke had the talent for detail characteristic of the best soldiers; nothing was too small for his attention in agricultural and commercial progress. He revived or created the manufacture of cloth and fustians, of hats, and more especially of silk. He is said to have forced his subjects to grow mulberries wherever it was possible; and a Venetian envoy reported that Piedmont was being denuded of timber by the introduction of mulberries and vines. Soap, glass, and porcelain were among other industries encouraged; and it was noticeable that the chief magnates were those most infected by this new spirit of enterprise. But, after all, minerals were the most rapid means of producing wealth; and in mining the Duke took the deepest, if most futile, interest. He with difficulty believed that he could possess so much mountain with so little metal, and at length in despair had recourse to alchemy. The production of native salt would at all events multiply the value of his monopoly; and he gave attention both to the mines of rock-salt in Savoy, and to the process of evaporation on the Riviera. The ducal edicts usually opened with an educational introduction in literary form, explaining the bearing of their contents. That which related to the attempted abolition of serfage was

peculiarly modern, beginning, "Since it has pleased God to restore human nature to full liberty." Nevertheless the philanthropy was spoiled by the fiscalism which strove to make a revenue out of emancipation fees, while the voice of freedom found little echo among the idle and ignorant peasantry.

In the armament of the recovered State, curiously enough, the Duke's fleet took precedence of his army. The first year of his actual reign he spent at Nice, the home of his childhood. Here with Andrea Provana's help he constructed his little fleet. As the lord of Nice and Villafranca, he was a valuable ally to the rulers of Barcelona or Marseilles. He was probably infected with Charles V's enthusiasm for a naval crusade, but apart from this a squadron seemed essential for coast defence. The Riviera was annually harried by the Barbaresques; the Duke himself was surprised at Villafranca and for a moment left alone among the enemy. In 1560 Provana could command ten galleys, and though this number was reduced his squadron remained a model of efficiency. The galleys were faster than the Genoese; their crews better fed and more humanely treated; the Duke himself invented an improved carbine for his marines. At Lepanto Provana and his three ships fought almost to their own destruction. To make naval service fashionable the Duke later obtained the Pope's consent to vest the Grand-mastership of the old and now corrupt Order of San Lazzaro in the dynasty on condition of creating and fusing with it the Order of San Maurizio. He gave the Knights two galleys and a training base at Nice; but, though Savoyard nobles were attracted by the commanderies of San Lazzaro scattered throughout Europe, they scarcely increased the efficiency of the fleet.

On land the Duke's first care was the fortification of critical positions. The great pentagon of Turin was so admired by Alva on his march to the Netherlands that he carried off its engineer, Pacciotti, to build the Antwerp citadel. The master's own craft was proved by his modification of the pentagon to suit the more limited space of the strong new castle of Bourg. Montmélian was believed to be impregnable; and the great fortress of the Annunziata rose as a menace to Geneva. The shattered defences of Cuneo were transformed; and Mondovì's monastic buildings, which occupied the dominant site, were replaced by fortifications. The Duke's artillery was partly founded from church bells bought cheap from neighbouring Huguenot provinces. He professed that his fortresses were designed to stem the flowing tide of heresy, of which the first rush would fall on him. But the military experts of France and Spain could see that the new fortifications concerned themselves; and the works at Vercelli had to be abandoned on Spanish protests. The fortresses were well garrisoned, absorbing some 3000 troops, who were so highly paid that Savoyard service became popular. Skilled gunners and artificers were imported from Germany, while cannon foundries and powder factories were established in the Duchy.

To support his scheme of fortresses the Duke created a militia of 25,000 men. In Piedmont these soon improved under a system of parochial, district, and provincial training, but all Venetian envoys agreed that in Savoy there was not a tolerable soldier; the people were poor-spirited and used their helmets, breast-plates, swords and lances as kitchen utensils. The small force of 700 yeomanry consisted mainly of gentry well mounted and of excellent quality. In case of invasion the Duke could fall back upon a feudal levy of 7000 horse who had the potentialities of a serviceable cavalry. Yet, after all, this was an age of professionalism; and every would-be military power must be in touch with the mercenary market. The Duke's distinguished service gave him a great advantage; he retained in his pay nine Italian *condottieri* of high repute, named "the Colonels," who at any crisis could find him as many seasoned troops as he could pay. Finally, his treaty with the Catholic Cantons and the Valais gave him a lien on a definite number of stalwart foot, while proportionately reducing the forces available by France or Spain.

It is remarkable that the victor of Saint-Quentin never fought again. Nor did he ever employ in active service the little army which he created, except in small numbers as mere auxiliaries of the Emperor or the French King, and this for political ends unconnected with the actual campaigns. The military resources of the new State were adapted rather for defence than offence. The militia was not sufficiently trained for conquest; the Swiss, though deeply interested in the preservation of Savoy, would not have fought for its expansion. Emmanuel Philibert would go to the very edge of an aggressive policy, but would never overstep it, however passionate were his desires. This may be illustrated from his attitude towards Genoa and Geneva, and from the self-control with which he kept his itching palms from Saluzzo and the Montferrat. He had the gift of measuring his possibilities.

Emmanuel Philibert's physical energy was marvellous. Most of his business he conducted standing or walking; he craved for fresh air, and hard exercise in blazing sun, vowing that fog was more wholesome than crowded rooms. After a nine hours' run which had brought stag, field and pack to a stand-still, he would split the logs to cook his supper, play quoits till dark, and rustic games till midnight. Naturally he was all bone and muscle; but he did not escape an hereditary touch of gout.

The Duke was not, so the envoys state, highly educated, being only a good mathematician, and a most accomplished linguist. His natural bent was practical, and his favourite employments military mechanics, chemistry, planting and grafting. Yet he fully appreciated culture, and if one ambassador heard Euclid read aloud, another must listen to Aristotle's *Ethics*. He delighted in history, and on an abstract theme could argue as if he had read all Plato. The education of modern Savoy dates from Emmanuel Philibert. While debarred from his capital, he

founded his new University at Mondovì, endowing all the faculties, and attracting eminent foreign professors. Transferred after a sharp local conflict to Turin, it rapidly forged ahead. Research and taste were fostered by the splendid library, collected from all the chief centres of the book-trade, by the museum of statuary, pictures, and gems, of scientific and mechanical appliances. The learned Pingone, whose labours students still utilise, collected documents from local Piedmontese archives; a ducal commission compiled an encyclopaedia, the *Teatro universale di tutte le scienze*. Turin was taught to make its own paper and set up its own type; and, to give it an admirable model, the Bevilacqua press was beguiled from Venice.

Personally religious, the Duke was regular at mass, and knew the service as well as the priest; sparing in all else, he was generous to the Church, especially to the newer and more active fraternities. Men kept their religion and their morals in separate compartments of their characters. From first to last the Duke was an unfaithful husband, though he treated his wife with playfulness, tenderness, and respect. No indecent jests ever passed his lips; and, in spite of service in Flanders, he never acquired the soldierlike habit of swearing. He plumed himself on truthfulness and observance of his promises.

No ruler ever carried further the principles of absolute monarchy. He regarded himself as having conquered his country, lance in rest, and felt no obligation to respect the liberties of nobles or communes. The duchy must be a new creation, his own handiwork, and the Duke as near a King as might be. The desire for a royal title, exaggerated in his son, was not the outcome of mere vanity, but an integral part of his political scheme. This explains his pride and exclusiveness, for by nature he was gracious and sociable. At church and at table he sat under a canopy. This contrast between his exclusiveness and his father's easy manners was far from popular; but some outward symbol of the new relation was perhaps necessary. On all grounds the Duke was resolved to keep his nobles in their place. There was nothing, he said, that a Prince should so carefully avoid as the grant of fiefs, for it was the creation of potential enemies. Until his power was firmly established he controlled the two parties, Guelf and Ghibelline, through the agency of their chiefs, the Counts of Racconigi and Masino. Later, however, he decided everything for himself, not even always consulting the most intimate of his friends, Andrea Provana. Men naturally regretted the old, easy times, but the day was past for the reconstruction of an old-fashioned and haphazard feudal State.

On Emmanuel Philibert's death the direct succession hung upon a single doubtful life. Charles Emmanuel, reared with difficulty, had finally been hardened into manhood by his father's passion for air and exercise. Small and thin, and pale of face, he could yet hunt or joust or fight with total disregard for the hours of food or sleep. He was

described at a later time as being "all muscle and spirit." Intellectually restless, he was already something of a poet and an artist, showing signs of the versatile taste and rapid intuition which enabled him to hold his own with experts on whatever topic. Latterly he had shared all his father's plans, and he took over his father's only confidential ministers, Bernardino di Racconigi and Andrea Provana. Thus Saluzzo and Geneva were still in the foreground of the ideal picture of the Savoyard State, and Montferrat in the middle distance. By birth and intellectual propensity the Duke leant towards France. Spain, however, seemed the more formidable, for the conquest of Portugal gave prestige and prospects of illimitable wealth; and the Spanish troops, poured into Lombardy from Genoa and Naples, were marched through Piedmont and Savoy to Franche-Comté on their way to the Netherlands.

Charles Emmanuel must obviously marry. The natural alternatives were a French and a Spanish match, but each was subdivided. Catharine de' Medici longed to give him her well-loved granddaughter, Christine of Lorraine. This would entail a close union with the Crown, and strengthen the old friendship with the Guises. Montmorency-Damville, governor of Languedoc, his father's friend, would have linked him to the opposition by marriage with Navarre's sister, Catharine. This was the Duke's own preference, but he was too Catholic and too prudent to wed a heretic in the Pope's despite. The Spanish nobility, hating closer connexion with the Habsburgs, would gladly have seen the elder Infanta, Isabella, marry the Savoyard, and so tighten the Spanish hold on Italy. Philip, however, reserved her for an Austrian marriage; so the Duke must be content with the second daughter, Catharine. As a sequel to the marriage he hoped for Geneva, Saluzzo, Montferrat; but in spite of lavish expenditure in Spain, he brought nothing home with his bride but promises of aid which always failed, and the contract for a dowry never paid in full.

The Spanish marriage might seem to decide Savoyard policy. Yet, though Philip often hampered or thwarted his son-in-law, he never gave a lead. The very marriage had been finally determined by Alençon's death; and Savoyard history, until Philip's decease, followed the fortunes of religious war in France. The Swiss were, indeed, often an important factor; but French politics controlled also the action of the Cantons.

The early years of the reign were occupied mainly in plots against Geneva. The conditions of success were complex. Surprise was almost necessary, and yet difficult, for a gathering of troops would alarm Bern and the Huguenots of Dauphiné. Spanish support and the neutrality at least of France seemed essential, yet these were incompatible, for a Savoyard occupation of Geneva would facilitate Spanish communications with the Netherlands to the prejudice of France. It would require large forces to take and hold Geneva in the teeth of the Bernese; they must therefore either be propitiated, or elsewhere employed, or counteracted

by the Catholic Cantons. Bern and even Catholic Freiburg had vital interest in Geneva's independence, for its capture would encourage the Duke to attempt recovery of the territories ravished from Charles III. The most natural ally against Geneva was the Pope, who could offer invaluable financial aid. But the Pope could not ignore French remonstrances, nor force Philip II's pace. Moreover, directly the Curia stirred, a war professedly undertaken for local Savoyard rights became a European religious conflict; German Protestants began to arm, and even England threatened. Thus Charles Emmanuel's schemes naturally failed, though he had secret supporters within the city sternly ruled by a Calvinist oligarchy, and in the Vaud, where the unsympathetic Swiss rule was far from popular. Du Plan, who was to surprise the citizens in church with the aid of soldiers concealed in barges plying with rice, was executed for treason. Henry III gave vague promises and withdrew them. Spanish aid was not forthcoming. Cardinal Borromeo, who strove to unite the Catholic cause in Lombardy, Piedmont, and the Forest Cantons, was eager for war; but the more prudent Gregory XIII thought the means of Savoy incommensurate with its ends. The formation of the Catholic League in France and the accession of Sixtus V offered better chances. The Pope roused the enthusiasm of the Catholic Cantons; and so closely was he concerned, that Geneva was to be conquered in his name and then conferred on Savoy. One Damilly promised to betray a gate on Easter Sunday, 1586. But a movement so extensive could not be concealed. Henry III, stronger abroad than at home, could at least delay the attack by pressure on the Pope. Philip II meant the scheme to be subsidiary, and not preliminary, to his own wider plans. Drake's ravages and the preparations for the Armada delayed the promised Spanish aid till the day for surprise was past. Then, when all was ready for a formal siege, the Governor of Milan suddenly announced that his troops were needed for the Netherlands.

Since 1584 the Duke had fitfully intrigued with all French parties for the possession or governorship of Saluzzo. Henry III's capitulation to the League on the Day of the Barricades stirred his ambitions into full activity. The royalist lieutenant-governor, La Hitte, harassed by Huguenot raids from Dauphiné, and endangered by the approach of the Leaguers under Mayenne, appealed to Charles Emmanuel. The latter professed to fear, above all things, a Huguenot occupation of Saluzzo, and so played upon papal sympathy. Yet from the first he had an understanding with Lesdiguières, now fully engaged by Mayenne's advance. Montmorency also, from fear of the League, urged a Savoyard occupation. Thus encouraged, the Duke on Michaelmas morning, 1588, surprised Carmagnola, taking possession in the name of Henry III, and posing in French dress as governor for France. Within two months the whole Marquisate was in his hands. The Spanish government had disapproved of the rash act, but admired the skill of its execution, and welcomed

the *fait accompli* as closing Italy to France. The news of the outrage reached Henry III while the Estates sat at Blois, and caused a cry for reconciliation at home and war on Savoy. Venice, Tuscany, and Ferrara were willing to pay the costs of the Savoyard's eviction; but in France each class and party hated its neighbour more than the foreigner; Guise told the Duke that he only urged hostilities for fear of being thought a bad Frenchman. The King alone was not to be appeased. His ultimatum reached Charles Emmanuel on Christmas-Day, only to be treated with contempt. Two days earlier Guise was murdered at Blois.

Saluzzo was the first and last substantial success of this adventurous reign. The Duke's elation was increased by a campaign against Geneva, in which his own generalship forced her Bernese allies to abandon her, while she was bridled by the fortress of Sainte-Catherine, built just outside her borders. He believed now that he could safely turn on France. The King's murder in August, 1589, offered him a complexity of chances too tempting for his speculative spirit. His father had known how to propitiate all French parties, and play on all; the son intrigued with all, and offended all. He offered aid and congratulations to Navarre. To Philip II he proposed to hold Provence for the Cardinal Bourbon, elect of the League. He promised Mayenne to employ all his strength in the national Catholic cause. Lesdiguières was tempted to yield him Dauphiné by the offer of a Savoyard bride. To gain a free hand in Provence, Montmorency was industriously cajoled. Why should not Charles Emmanuel be King himself? Was he not born of a French King's daughter? Could not his wife inherit her mother's claim, since her elder sister was so likely to succeed to the Spanish Crown that the French would never suffer her? More definite, however, were his views on a more modest kingdom—a revival of that of Arles, or an Allobrogian kingdom, comprising Savoy, Dauphiné, Provence, and the Lyonnais. He had long prepared his ground. In Dauphiné, indeed, his overtures to the Parliament of Grenoble met with rebuff; the Catholics, hard pressed by Lesdiguières, were urged by Mayenne to submit rather to the heretic than the Savoyard. Provence was more favourable; for here a small Savoyard force was already fighting for the League against the Royalist governor Bertrand de la Valette. The Duke received a formal invitation from the Parliament of Aix to hold the province for the Crown and the Catholic religion.

Charles Emmanuel's interference in Provence has quite erroneously been ascribed to Spanish influence, for Philip earnestly dissuaded it. He was unwilling to irritate the French nation into war, and to fritter away resources far from the centre of civil strife. He could not approve the dismemberment of France when he wished to win the whole for the Infanta Isabella. Sixtus V offered some cold encouragement, but his real wish was the reconciliation of Henry IV with Rome. Definite action was delayed by a revival of the Genevese war, by La Valette's

capture of Barcelonnette, which blocked the most practicable road to Provence, and by the necessity of relieving Grenoble. But in June, 1590, the skies were clearer. The Duke sent his best officer, Martinengo, to Aix with troops and money, and in November made his own triumphal entrance to the Provençal capital. Here he was invested with command by the four Estates, that he might maintain the province in the Catholic religion and under the authority of the King of France. This prosperous opening had a sorry sequel. The Duke's ministers soon discovered that his force was totally unequal to its task. The Provençal Leaguers were divided; and favour towards the faction of the Comtesse de Saulx determined the hostility of that of the Comte de Carces. Marseilles and Arles clamoured for a papal protectorate, which Sixtus V refused, for "the Marseillais were the most unstable people upon earth." The Duke had failed to realise how dangerous an enemy was Lesdiguières, the most resourceful leader that the Civil Wars had trained, whose Huguenot bands were hardened by years of mountain warfare to the perfection of mobility and daring. Round Dauphiné the Savoyard territories and Provence lay in a half circle. From this vantage-ground, acting on interior lines, Lesdiguières could threaten Savoy or Piedmont, Saluzzo or Provence. Everywhere he was pouncing on Savoyard and League garrisons, and since December, 1590, he was far stronger, for his capture of Grenoble made him master of his own province. Inaction and taxation strained Provençal patience; and Spain would give no aid.

As a last resource the Duke determined on a personal appeal to Philip; and at this conjuncture the irreconcilable virulence of the factions at Marseilles gave him the opportunity. Early in 1591 the Leaguers expelled the Royalists; and the Comtesse de Saulx gained access for the Duke, who persuaded the city to elect deputies to accompany him to Spain. Philip gave his son-in-law a cold reception, but Charles Emmanuel tempted him with the prospect of Toulon, and extorted a small military and naval force with which he sailed for Marseilles. Meanwhile La Valette and the Grand Duke of Tuscany had suborned his commandant; and the city refused admittance. The Comtesse de Saulx herself deserted him; but he forced his way into Aix and took her prisoner. This capture of his quondam devotee was his last success in his imaginary Allobrogian kingdom. General politics were now setting against Savoyard pretensions. The new Pope, Clement VIII, graciously received a deputation from Marseilles, offering him the Protectorate, and complaining that Charles Emmanuel had tried to betray the town to Spain. Parma's retreat from Rouen rendered possible a concentration of royalist forces in the south. In April the Duke retired to Nice, leaving a few garrisons to facilitate the return for which he always hoped.

Six years of defensive warfare were now to prove the Duke's best qualities—his resourcefulness, his unflagging courage in misfortune. Lesdiguières, crossing the Mont Genève late in 1592, won the Piedmontese

Vaudois, and began the systematic conquest of Saluzzo. Charles Emmanuel showed that he was still to be reckoned with, by dragging his guns up the heights overlooking Exilles and pounding the fortress into surrender (May, 1593). The Truce of Suresnes, which followed Henry IV's abjuration, was welcomed by Savoyards and Piedmontese, exhausted by Huguenot raids and war taxation, and disturbed by the Spanish auxiliaries from Lombardy, who were annexing the Eastern fortresses as in the disastrous days of Charles III.

In January, 1594, the Truce expired; in February Lyons declared for Henry IV—a source of great danger to Savoy; in March the King entered Paris. Charles Emmanuel was urged by his envoy at Madrid to make peace with France, for the action of “that old tree” Philip II was as weak, slow, and ill-regulated in France and Flanders as in Savoy. The Governor of Milan in genuine alarm urged Philip to give his son-in-law substantial aid. Philip then consented to the Duke's repeated petitions that he should command the Spanish troops in Piedmont, but he must confine himself to the capture of Bricherasio and Cavour. Thus decided, Charles Emmanuel fell upon Bricherasio, fought a drawn battle with Lesdiguières for the relief of Exilles, which he could not save, and then forced Cavour to surrender by his impenetrable cordon of block-houses. Piedmont was thus relieved; but Savoy was surrounded by hostile provinces, and had no adequate means of defence. The Duke's sympathies were becoming French; he convinced his wife that she should prefer her husband's and sons' interests to her father's. The papal Nuncio at Turin wrote that the Duke was by nature much of a Frenchman; while the Spanish Constable declared that he had French lilies planted in his breast.

This change of front resulted in the tedious conferences of Bourgoing, turning mainly on the possession of Saluzzo. The Duke and Sillery arrived at a reasonable compromise; and peace seemed certain. But Lesdiguières and Biron convinced the King of the ease of conquering Savoy and Piedmont. Henry IV curtly disavowed his agent; he had only waited till Lesdiguières was ready. The Huguenot now sprang upon Charbonnières, the key of the Savoyard province of La Maurienne. The Duke, as a counterstroke, built a fort at Barraux to threaten Grenoble. At this crisis he fell ill, nearly to death, at Chambéry. The Duchess, in her confinement, hearing that her beloved lord was dead, died herself of grief. Charles Emmanuel was no model husband, but he was truly devoted to the one counsellor in whose advice he trusted. His passionate sorrow could only be relieved by action. Forcing his way through the snows into La Maurienne in February, 1598, he retook Charbonnières. Nor was this all. Lesdiguières' son-in-law, Créquy, believing from the sound of continual firing that the fort still held out, was entrapped with his whole force—the most serious reverse, perhaps, that Lesdiguières had ever suffered. Yet the Huguenot would not be denied the last word, and his reply was the seizure of Barraux. These vigorous

exchanges were no unworthy termination of a war in which the Duke had proved himself an apt disciple of his enemy, the master of the art of mountain warfare. He emerged from the long conflict without apparent sacrifice of territory. Savoy was by the papal legate's agency included in the Peace of Vervins; Berre, the last place held in Provence, was surrendered; the question of Saluzzo was left to the Pope's arbitration.

Charles Emmanuel was determined to keep Saluzzo, Henry IV to have it back, and Clement VIII to postpone the responsibility of his award. The Duke's methods were to convince Spain of the necessity of keeping the French to the west of the Alps, to bribe the French Court, and especially the King's mistress, Gabrielle d'Estrées, and to enjoy the benefit of time. It was difficult to keep temper with the Spanish Court. Philip II on dying had left his son-in-law nothing but a crucifix and an image of the Virgin. The new King had his bellicose moments, especially when the treasure-fleet arrived; but he was ordinarily dominated by the Duke of Lerma, who was all for peace. Thus from Spain sounded an uncertain note. Henry IV, stroking his white beard, swore that he would play the father to the Duke, but he would only grant a few months' delay to the procrastinating Pope. At the close of 1599, when war was imminent, Charles Emmanuel resolved on a personal visit to Fontainebleau. Gabrielle, unfortunately for him, was dead; finding Henry obdurate, he professed to accept a potential treaty, with alternative proposals for an exchange of other territory for Saluzzo. With this, all but driven out of France, he returned home, not wholly discontented, for he had sown treason among the malcontents, such as Biron, Bouillon and Auvergne. An envoy was sent to Spain, nominally to ascertain the King's views on the alternative proposals, but really to protest against the validity of the treaty, to disclose his successful intrigues, and to urge immediate aid. Fuentes, Parma's best successor, was sent with good troops to Lombardy to defend the Duke if he were attacked; but Biron was wise in recommending either surrender or security for punctual and substantial Spanish support. Charles Emmanuel's intrigues were known to Henry; and an ultimatum was sent to him, to which he was too proud to yield. The campaign opened in August, 1600. Biron, postponing his treason, himself took the town of Bourg, while Lesdiguières surprised Montmélian, and before long forced the citadel, reputed impregnable, to capitulate. French and Genevese joined hands to destroy the fortress of Sainte-Catherine. Before the year closed, all Savoy was in French hands except the citadel of Bourg. This citadel's gallant defence and the repulse of Guise from Nice were the only creditable incidents in the war. Charles Emmanuel was no match for the King, Biron, and Lesdiguières combined, but he was unlucky, for his States had just been swept by the plague, which had exhausted his resources. Spanish aid had reduced itself to the occupation of Piedmontese fortresses under pretence of saving them. With rage in his heart, the Duke accepted the Pope's

mediation. Cardinal Aldobrandini found Henry IV at Chambéry, followed him to Lyons, and there forced the King's terms on the Savoyard plenipotentiaries. Henry was really anxious for peace, for, though so far the war had cost him little, Spain was now seriously threatening, and Fuentes about to take the field. In exchange for Saluzzo Savoy ceded Bresse, and in lieu of a war indemnity the bailliages of Gex, Bugey, and Valromey. The outlying fortress of Castel Delfino was restored to Dauphiné, while to Saluzzo were annexed Centallo, Demonte, and Rocca Sparviera, claimed by Provence. To propitiate Spain, Savoy purchased a passage from the Pont de Grésin through Gex to Franche-Comté, the route by which the Spanish troops marched to Flanders. Peace was signed on January 17, 1601. Charles Emmanuel exiled his plenipotentiaries, and long deferred to ratify, while Lombardy and Piedmont were being filled with Spanish troops. At length Lerma induced Philip III to sanction the peace, which in October was concluded at Turin.

"The King made peace like a huckster and the Duke like a prince," said Lesdiguières, who had his own reasons for preferring war. The Duke lost his richest territories and his most industrious subjects. The revenue of the ceded territories was tenfold that of Saluzzo, and the population probably a higher multiple. In a remarkable memorial Charles Emmanuel justified his policy or disguised his chagrin. One consolidated State, he said, was better than two separate territories; but he forgot that the bulk of Savoy was still his, and as impossible to defend as ever. It would be harder, he added, for the French to enter Italy, which would conduce to peace; with war in Italy Piedmont became the gaming-table; the policy for his House was neutrality between France and Spain, and this was found impossible in war. Here he, perhaps, correctly gauged the situation. The King had made the passage of Spanish troops to Flanders far more dangerous, and it was in Flanders rather than in Lombardy that he meant to attack Spain. Yet, whenever they so wished the French troops could pour from Dauphiné into Savoy, though in Saluzzo they had lost a permanent base of supply. Nevertheless, the Italian Powers naturally regarded the treaty of Lyons with consternation, as leaving them at Spain's mercy. Italy for the moment actually became more Spanish. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, mistrusting France, veered towards Madrid. Charles Emmanuel himself later sent his sons to be educated, or watched as hostages, in Spain. From the treaty of Lyons has sometimes been dated the Duke's championship of Italian independence; but it was not till a later period, when he was in arms against Spain, that he became the hero of an Italian patriotic and poetic revival.

No sooner had the Duke been extricated from one imbroglio than he deliberately plunged into another. He determined that Geneva should be the compensation for his lost western provinces. In spite of Henry IV's express declaration, he insisted that Geneva was not included in the

treaties of Vervins and Lyons. Spain was tempted by the prospect of a safer line of communication with Flanders than the road by the Pont de Grésin, which the French could close at will. He hoped for the assistance of the Spanish troops, who were quartered from time to time in Savoy, awaiting marching orders. Ledesma, Spanish envoy at Turin, was at first favourable to the enterprise, but later strongly dissuaded it. Fuentes, now Governor of Milan, was attracted by it, but refused to act without express orders. Upon Philip III the Duke put pressure through his close friend and ambassador, the Marquis of Este. In Spain, the Council was agreed upon the value of the scheme in the abstract; but during 1601 time and money were spent on a luckless Algerian expedition, and hesitation was now engrained in the Spanish administration. Finally, at a Council held December 12, 1602, Philip III left the decision to Fuentes; but the dispatch reached him too late.

For more than a year Charles Emmanuel had planned a surprise; and yet Geneva seemed profoundly ignorant. There were no Bernese at hand; the city was only defended by the small normal guard of mixed nationality. The French Leaguer Albigny, now Governor of Savoy, was entrusted with the enterprise. Don Sancho de Luna, commanding the Spanish troops at Moutiers, had general orders to obey the Duke; but he was not called upon. The Duke hurried across the Alps in disguise to Annecy, but, owing to bad weather, did not reach the attacking force. Albigny had some 1500 men, horse and foot; he was provided with expanding ladders painted black, the uppermost section sliding up the wall on small wheels. The longest night, December 22, was chosen; and it was calculated that the moon would disappear as the walls were neared. Snow in the mountains kept the Swiss at home, while the plain was hard enough to make marching easy. The troops were not told their destination till near the city. They were very nervous; but hurdles were thrown across the muddy moat and the ladders fixed. Albigny and a Scotch Jesuit stood at the foot encouraging the men, about two hundred, who first scaled the walls. They were to lurk in the darkness until 4 a.m.; but after a short hour a sentinel fired a shot. One party then ran along the inner side of the walls to surprise the guard of the *Porte Neuve*, by which Albigny and the bulk of his forces were to enter. They took the inner gate; but one of the watch in flying lowered the portcullis; and the petard which was to blow open the outer gate failed. Others tried to enter by the back of the houses facing the curtain, and so gain the streets. Meanwhile the citizens had rushed for the *Porte Neuve*, and ultimately drove the Savoyards out. There were four distinct little engagements, but at this gate and at the *Place de la Monnaie* the fighting was briskest. Here the citizens lined the houses, but could only see the foe by lighted wisps of straw which women waved from the windows. Three hundred men at most probably actually fought on either side; but the Savoyards, finding that they were not being

reinforced, gave way to panic. The ladders had been thrown down or shot to pieces. The runaways jumped from the walls, or slid down by ropes; many were bogged in the moat or caught in the fields next morning. A band of gentry within fought hard, but surrendered on a promise of their lives, which was not kept. Of the defenders eleven citizens and six aliens, the latter mainly belonging to the guard, were killed, and eight citizens and eighteen members of the guard wounded. The escalade took place soon after 1 a.m., and the fight was over by 4 a.m. As Albigny drew off his troops the Duke arrived. "You have made a silly mess," he said, and then rode fast for Piedmont.

Geneva hitherto had owed her safety to Catholic France. Now, she could truthfully thank Providence, and the handful of her own gallant citizens and mercenaries. The Bernese at once despatched troops to defend the city, and Henry IV allowed his subjects to volunteer; subscriptions were raised in England, Germany, and Languedoc. The Genevese and Bernese issued from the town, ravaged and occupied part of Savoy. The Duke's ill-executed raid might well have stirred a general European conflict. But Henry IV was unwilling to provoke a foreign war, when faced by growing disaffection at home. Philip III showed unwonted resolution. Sancho de Luna, who after the fiasco had kept his troops in quarters with great self-restraint, warned the Genevese that, if they did not come to terms, he knew how to make them. The Catholic Cantons and the Valais were outspoken in their resolve to defend the Catholic and Savoyard cause. All this explains the Duke's lofty attitude during the negotiations, skilfully conducted by the Pope, which led to the treaty of Saint-Julien (July, 1603) and practically restored the *status quo ante*. Charles Emmanuel did not abandon his ambitions; but Geneva henceforth was not in the forefront of his plan.

Here we must leave Charles Emmanuel, with resources exhausted, but hopes inexhaustible. Taxation had alienated his subjects; his father's treasure had given place to debt. Justice had deteriorated, for all offices were sold, and criminals could buy beforehand indemnity for crimes. Capable ambassadors there were, but no trusted counsellors or administrators; the Duke would consult now one man, now another, "changing them as he would his pictures, just for ornament." He could rely neither on France nor Spain, he was disliked by Medici and Gonzaga, and dreaded by Venice, not for his power but his spirit of disturbance. Misfortune had taught him nothing. Sanguine and without sense of measure, in his feverish dreams of conquest he had visions, almost prophetic, of the future greatness of his House. His name has, indeed, been stamped on history, not by his achievements, his personal courage, his endurance of reverse, but by the imaginative exaltation of his fevered brain, a startling contrast to the somnolence or apathy into which Europe, and especially Italy, seemed to be settling down. At least he was no decadent.

CHAPTER XIII.

ROME UNDER SIXTUS V.

THROUGHOUT the long history of the Papacy perhaps no century has witnessed so rapid and so deep a change as the sixteenth. The latent forces of Catholicism—those forces which in peaceful times do not appear, but which are, as it were, the vital sap of institutions that are really lasting—displayed their full vigour when the Reformation came to shake the foundations of the Catholic structure. The cry of protest that had been uttered by Luther expressed the feeling of many consciences besides those of participators in the religious revolution which was freeing them from Rome. The protest filled the hearts of even those nations too that remained faithful to her discipline. In the darkest periods of the Middle Ages ignorance and barbarity had degraded and corrupted the Papacy; but, when the shadows dispersed, it raised itself again, to reach the heights attained under Gregory VII, Alexander III, and Innocent III. The splendours of the Renaissance seemed, with one swoop, to take Rome back to Pagan times, and in a measure to renew the pomp and corruption of the Imperial age. But the Christian conscience was never dormant. Deeply moved, it returned by different ways to the ideal of a spiritual purification; and while, on the one hand, a large portion of Christendom became detached from Rome, on the other, new ties were binding to it another portion, which sought in the moral renewal of the Papacy a remedy for its waning power, a means of regaining the ground that had been lost. To the great Reformers were opposed the new saints and founders of religious Orders—to the Reformation the Counter-Reformation. The same austere spirit and strenuously severe view of life that inspired the followers of Calvin, seemed to exercise an influence in Rome itself, and on the conduct of the Popes and leading men who were furthering the new Catholic movement. While the Council of Trent was defining more precisely the Catholic doctrine, and was consolidating the unity of the Catholic Church by subjecting its organism to discipline, Rome underwent a significant transformation, and, having lessened the worldly display prevalent in the earlier half of the century, assumed a religious aspect more suited to

the changed times and to the political and religious struggles that were agitating the world.

Parallel with the religious movement, indeed, a great political movement was taking place in Europe, through which the nations were, almost unconsciously, trying to reach a settlement adapted to the new condition of things. While the star of Spain, after having reached its loftiest altitude, was slowly entering on its downward course, and the Empire was reduced to weakness by the heterogeneousness of the elements composing it, England was, with great vigour, laying the foundations of her power, and preparing for the marvellous development of her expansion; and France, amidst the throes of the religious strife that was tearing her asunder, with the instinctive craving for unity destined to be, in the succeeding centuries, her strength and one of the chief causes of her greatness, seemed to feel that the complete victory of one party over the other had now become a necessity for her. Among the minor States, some were either preparing for their independence or endeavouring to maintain it, while the others, lying eastward, were opposing the invasion of the Turkish Power, which had by now advanced as far as it could go, but did not lay down its arms, and remained a constant threat and peril to Christendom.

Italy felt the reaction of all these movements. Lombardy and the south, being bound to Spain, followed her fortunes and contributed to the influence of her policy. Piedmont, stationed by the Alps like a sentinel, was ruled by wise, ambitious, and tenacious Princes, who carefully balanced their actions between Spain and France, watching for every opportunity to widen their dominion, as though they even then foresaw the great future to which their House was destined. Venice, though she, too, like Spain, was on the verge of inevitable decline, was still a bulwark against the Ottoman Power; and, by her numerous and widespread interests, as well as by the adherence of her statesmen and of her diplomatists to the ancient traditions of her policy, she was still exercising in Europe a genuine influence. The minor principalities had no great weight in the inner life of the country, save, in a measure, Parma, which became important through the military genius of Alessandro Farnese; and Tuscany, owing to her central position, her frequently sagacious policy, and her relations with the House of France, which in various ways widened the scope of her interests.

Among these several Italian States, that belonging to the Church occupied a unique position. Owing to the vastness of the spiritual office of its head, the political interests, both favourable and hostile, of a large portion of the world were centred on Rome, while owing to its small extent the State could not exercise a real and peaceful influence unless it were ruled with a firm hand, and governed by a mind able to make up for its want of power and its material impotence by dint of moral influence. The conditions of the papal State made themselves

felt outside the inner conditions of Italy and of her recent history. If the Popes had, at the beginning of the century, consolidated their temporal power and placed on a firmer basis the possessions of the Church, these were still difficult to govern. The internal struggles which had divided the cities into turbulent parties always engaged in bloodthirsty contests; the continuous invasions of the foreigner; the soldiers of fortune who, as the military regulations were relaxed, gradually became bandits under the command of the wealthy lordlings dominating the country by their castles, and whose power grew excessive in the city by reason of their palaces, now a refuge of impunity for malefactors—all these were causes of an anarchy fatal to the order of public life and the source of lasting weakness to the papal rule.

The dominating thoughts which determined the political action of Rome in the latter decades of the sixteenth century were the application and development of the decrees of the Council of Trent, the war against Protestantism, and the defence of Christendom against the Turks. Pius V had devoted to these aims the whole ardour—unbending, nay, at times pitiless—of his asceticism and of an unswerving faith, promoting the change from the medieval ideas of the Church to the new ideas and to the new Catholic discipline with a thoroughness that has perhaps not yet been sufficiently gauged by any historian. Gregory XIII followed in his steps, continuing his ideas in his international relations and in the persecution of the heretics, and furthering the tendency he had imposed on the new culture by the reform of the Calendar, and by the support given by him to the Order of the Jesuits, who under him began everywhere to control the instruction of the Catholic youth, and who, by means of the formation of the Collegium Romanum, became for almost three centuries absolute masters of education in Rome. But if this Pontiff so far acted in harmony with the central tendencies of the Church, he was not equally efficacious as head of the government. The badly managed finances, the unceasing abuses, and the turbulent and disorderly state of the territories subject to the papal rule, had now brought things to an intolerable pass, with which the strength of the aged and vacillating Gregory was wholly unable to cope.

The need for a firm hand and a sure eye had become all-important; and when, on April 10, 1585, Gregory died, it was with a feeling of uncertainty mingled with hope and fear that Rome saw the Cardinals enter into conclave for the election of a new Pope. While the foreign Powers strove for the success of the candidates who appeared most favourable to their interests, the Romans, without being able to exercise much influence in the matter, felt that the new election might be of vital importance for them and for the whole state of the Church. They had not long to wait, and on April 24 Rome learnt that the new Pontiff had been elected. It was the Cardinal di Montalto (Felice Peretti) who took the name of Sixtus V.

There are moments in history which seem urgently to demand a strong personality, such as will sum up the tendencies of the time, and stamp them with its own character. The new Pontiff was one of these personalities. His father was descended from a family originating in Dalmatia, which had, like many others, fled across the Adriatic to seek refuge in Italy, when the Turks after invading Illyria were threatening the coasts of Dalmatia, and which had settled at Montalto in the Marches, being possessed of some competence. The father of the future Pope saw his patrimony ruined in 1518, when the Duke of Urbino took and sacked Montalto, and he withdrew to a place not far distant but higher up in the mountains,—the borough of Grottammare, where, on December 13, 1521, the son was born to him who was destined to rise so high. The Venetian ambassador Lorenzo Priuli, in telling the Republic what he knew of the new Pope, related how he had heard from a well-informed person that the father had called the child Felice because he had, before its birth, had an omen of its destiny in a dream. This is possible, and it is also possible that, according to the universal tradition, Sixtus in his early youth had charge of the pigs in his father's fields; but it is as well to bear in mind that, from the very beginning of his pontificate, the strange figure of the Pope was surrounded with a legendary halo which never left him.

At the age of nine Felice went to an uncle who was a friar in the Franciscan monastery of Montalto, and at twelve he took the habit of a novice. Intelligent, eager to learn, and devoted to his studies, he soon distinguished himself. While still very young he began to preach, quickly achieving a high reputation as a sacred orator, and was called from convent to convent in many parts of the country, in order to display his oratorical power. He had an easy and abundant mastery of words, considerable ecclesiastical erudition, and the torrent of eloquence that springs from great self-confidence and from strong convictions, passionately felt and relentlessly expressed. In the church of his convent of the Santi Apostoli at Rome, whither he went in 1552, being then a little over thirty years of age, his preaching was extraordinarily successful, and procured him friendships which were destined to have a great influence on his life and character. Cardinal Caraffa and Cardinal Ghislieri, both of them subsequently Popes, under the names of Paul IV and Pius V, Cardinal Carpi, St Ignatius Loyola, and St Philip Neri, became his friends at this time; and through his intercourse with them the mind of the young friar was inspired with a warmer zeal for the Catholic faith and with a deeper resolve to secure its triumph with all his strength. After having held the office of Rector in several convents, he was, in 1556, sent to Venice to rule the convent of the Frari. His instructions were to bring the friars back to a rigorous observance of the rules, and to restore the discipline that had become relaxed. So delicate a mission raised up against him a number of enemies, who attacked him with deceitful stratagems, while he went

his way, without heeding any man. At length, however, these accusations caused him to give up the office; but justice was then done him, he was invited by Rome to take up the post again, and appointed Councillor to the Inquisition at Venice. He revenged himself for the calumnies to which he had been exposed by conferring benefits on his principal adversary, a certain friar, who, however, went on plotting in his despite, and succeeded in raising new enemies against him. In this the very character of the Inquisitor aided his enemy; for Peretti brought to his office a zeal and a severity that appeared excessive to the Venetian government, which was always jealous of interference from the ecclesiastical authority, and, indeed, demanded and obtained his recall. He returned to Rome, and in these surroundings, which were better suited to him, was very well received, gained great influence, and rapidly rose. He again rendered a service to his Venetian calumniator, and his magnanimity made a good impression. Lecturer at the University, councillor to the Holy Office, procurator-general and apostolic vicar of his order, he displayed in all the posts held by him a zeal and an energy which made him more and more conspicuous among the heads of the Catholic reaction. He was appointed by Pius V to accompany to Spain Cardinal Boncompagni, who was to examine the charge of heresy against Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo, which subsequently resulted in his condemnation. During this voyage that deep antipathy between him and Cardinal Boncompagni first showed itself which was to declare itself more openly when the latter became Pope. On his return to Spain the new Pope, Pius V, made him a Bishop, and in 1570 a Cardinal. He took the name of Cardinal di Montalto.

The poor friar was now numbered among the great ones of the earth, and he might well feel in his inmost heart that he was called to exercise an influence on the history of the Church; but his aspirations were soon checked. Pius V, who had such confidence in him, was succeeded in the papacy by Gregory XIII (Boncompagni), who was decidedly hostile to Montalto and was not long in showing his aversion. Having been laid on one side, Montalto withdrew so far as possible from public affairs, and adopted an attitude of complete reserve, which was at times interrupted by bitter sarcasms that were not calculated to restore him to favour. He wrapped himself in his studies and endeavoured, so far as his somewhat scanty means permitted, to patronise the arts, as if by way of augury and preparation for the great works he was subsequently destined to accomplish at Rome. Learned as he was in canon law and in the study of the Fathers, he completed a work on Gratianus, and undertook a new revision of the writings of St Ambrosius. At the same time, employing a young architect of Como, Domenico Fontana, of whose ability and energy he had soon formed a high opinion, and whom he inspired with his own genius, he began to build himself a house surrounded by gardens near the basilica of Santa Maria Maggiore; and

in the basilica itself he erected a monument to the Franciscan Nicholas IV, and began the rich chapel in which his own sepulchral monument and that of his benefactor and friend, Pius V, were afterwards to be placed.

Thus, in the life of solitude and leisure to which the disfavour of the Pope forced him, Felice Peretti was maturing his thoughts, and, while watching the conditions of the State, he was meditating what steps he would take on its behalf if Providence were one day to call him to rule over it. Consciousness of a lofty destiny, suppressed energy, irritation at seeing the highest matters in weak hands when the utmost strength was needed—all these were so many spurs to his thought and prepared it for the future. A whole programme of government was forming in his mind. He thought how an orderly condition of things and a firm internal policy could not fail to aid the action of the Church in the world, and considered the means whereby to readjust the finances, to embellish Rome, and above all to put an end to the murderous anarchy which was infesting the papal provinces and making Rome itself the theatre of every kind of crime. He himself had been assailed in his warmest affections by an atrocious assassination, and the Pope had not had the power to see that justice was done him. When Peretti had begun to rise in the offices of the Church he had caused a sister of his, Camilla, who was very dear to him, to come to Rome with her two children, Francesco and Maria. The latter married Fabio Damasceni, a Roman gentleman, and had two sons and two daughters, who were all marked out for a high station. Her brother, Francesco, had married a girl of the lesser nobility, Vittoria Accoramboni, who had, by her grace and rare beauty, soon become one of the favourite ladies in Roman society. Paolo Giordano Orsini, one of the greatest lords of Italy, a man of mature age and of ardent passions, whom rumour credited with the murder of his wife, Isabella de' Medici, the sister of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, fell violently in love with Vittoria. This passion was encouraged by Vittoria's mother, who, being ambitious, and not foreseeing the future elevation of the Cardinal di Montalto, spurred on the ambitions of her daughter, seeking in some way to unite her to Orsini. One night, Francesco Peretti, having been drawn into an ambush by the brother of Vittoria, was killed and left lying in the middle of the street. The boldness of the crime, and the rank of the victim and of the assassins, whose names were on everyone's lips, caused a deep emotion in Rome, accustomed as the city was to deeds of bloodshed. Only Cardinal di Montalto, though moved to his inmost heart, appeared to be undisturbed. He comforted his sister, who, in her despair, demanded justice, and, on the day after the murder, presented himself at a consistory with a calm that astonished everyone; and to the Pope who turned to him, moved even to tears, he replied with dignity that one must be resigned to the will of God. Gregory XIII, touched to the quick, attributed this resignation to hypocrisy. Montalto, for his part,

expected that justice would be dealt out to the perpetrator of the crime; but, seeing that the Pope was too weak to inflict it on Orsini, he did not wish to humiliate himself by demanding it. A few days afterwards Vittoria Accoramboni fled to the castle of Bracciano, the home of Orsini. This appeared to be a confession of guilt, but perhaps the Cardinal di Montalto never held her directly guilty of her husband's murder. Having been forced to return to Rome, Vittoria was for a time kept prisoner in the Castello Sant' Angelo; but on being set free she returned to Bracciano, and in spite of ecclesiastical prohibitions and impediments, she married Orsini during the conclave which followed the death of Gregory XIII, on the very day of Sixtus V's accession to the throne.

According to the legend, which has survived in Rome to the present day, Sixtus, who had entered the conclave bowed down, like a weak and trembling old man, on hearing his name proclaimed, haughtily raised himself up, and, having thrown aside his crutches, cried out that he was now the master and that all were thenceforth bound to bend before his will and to obey him. It is a legend that symbolises the truth. The man who had matured his thoughts of government, while suppressing his own energy during the long years of forced inactivity, showed himself, by a singular contrast, from the very first day of his pontificate ready for his work and inflexibly determined. The first thought to which he turned his mind was the restoration of public order in Rome and in the whole State. With his rapid intuition he quickly saw that he must needs assert himself immediately and strike the minds of men by revealing himself in a kind of terrible majesty. Like Napoleon in a later day, Sixtus V possessed in a singular degree the gift of impressing his immediate surroundings with his personality and of passing this impression on to others at a greater distance. "Now he is gentle, now terrible," was said of him by Lorenzo Priuli, the Venetian ambassador, "now easy, and now difficult, now close and frugal, and now of the most generous disposition; prudently employing this diversity of character in his relations with private individuals and with princes, according as the times, the places, and the persons differ."

Indeed, during the early days of his pontificate, Sixtus displayed prudence and boldness at the same time. While, for the time being, he made few changes in the offices of the State, in order to become acquainted with the attitude of those occupying them and to familiarise himself with current affairs, and while he treated the various ambassadors with cordiality but with great caution, till he should have the threads of his policy well in hand, he of a sudden advanced straight on the object in which he was most deeply interested. When the representatives of the city of Rome went to pay homage to him, and begged him for justice and liberality, he replied severely that they would have both one and the other, but that as for justice it lay with them to exercise it, adding that, if they were not ready to do their duty, he was resolved, if need were, to have their heads cut off; and with these haughty words he straightway

dismissed them. Paolo Giordano Orsini received similar advice. He had falteringly presented himself to do homage to the new Pope, whose nephew he had caused to be murdered. He was received with an icy silence that terrified him. With the aid of the Spanish ambassador and of the Cardinal de' Medici Orsini obtained a second audience; but again the Pope, eyeing him haughtily, received his protestations of fidelity in silence; then, suddenly interrupting him, he exclaimed: "No one desires more than I that an Orsini should conduct himself as is fitting; ask your conscience if it has been so hitherto. Remember that I voluntarily pardoned all that you did against the Cardinal di Montalto, but that I shall not pardon what you may attempt against Sixtus. Go, and dismiss at once the bandits you have around you at Bracciano." Orsini felt that the time for resistance had passed. He immediately withdrew to Bracciano, and, obeying the order, dispersed the numerous bandits whom he had gathered during the conclave. But even so he did not feel himself safe. He left the papal State and retired to the territory of Venice, where he died after some time, and where his widow, Vittoria Accoramboni, was cruelly killed by another Orsini. The firmness of the Pope greatly impressed Rome, and this impression was deepened when, four days after his accession to the throne, Sixtus condemned to death four youths who were found carrying arms notwithstanding a decree prohibiting the practice. Every entreaty on their behalf was in vain, and the inexorable Sixtus had them hanged before the bridge of Sant' Angelo. Rome now felt the hand of a master, from which it was useless to attempt to escape.

Having thus vigorously seized the helm of the State, Sixtus devoted himself to the tasks which were of primary importance for the organisation of his government. He appointed the governors of the provinces, and surrounded himself with Cardinals who had stood well with Pius V, thus at the same time showing his gratitude to the memory of the Pope who had raised him to power, and removing to a distance and setting aside the friends of Gregory XIII, whom he did not trust. But even to those who surrounded him he did not leave much power, reserving for himself the principal affairs and every important decision. Endowed with inexhaustible activity and with great rapidity of thought, he began, while setting himself the task of restoring the public security without a moment's pause, to occupy himself with diplomacy, with finance, and with the great buildings which he intended raising in order to renew Rome and to erect for himself the monument of glory to which he aspired. He provided for his family with considerable liberality, and in his first consistory suddenly showed that he wished to exalt it, naming as a Cardinal his grand-nephew Alessandro, still a youth. The nomination caused displeasure, as an act of nepotism for which there was no excuse; and, though the new Cardinal di Montalto subsequently honoured the purple by high qualities and great nobility of character,

the censure called forth by his elevation was deserved, and showed that in ecclesiastical matters the public conscience was now opposed to abuses in favour of the personal and family interests of the Popes.

His earliest relations with the ambassadors accredited to the papal Court enabled Sixtus to become acquainted with them and to settle his policy more precisely. He was cautious with the ambassadors of Spain and France, but showed himself more open with the representatives of Venice and of the Grand Duke of Tuscany. He did not fail to impress upon the Grand Duke that he had not forgotten the ties of the old friendship and of the gratitude which bound them to each other, and that he was fully conscious of being largely indebted for his election to the Grand Duke's brother, the Cardinal de' Medici. He assured the ambassador of Venice, whom he received at once with great cordiality, that he always intended acting in harmony with the *Signoria*, that he was well aware of the difficulties of the Republic, surrounded as she was on the one side by the heretics and on the other by the Turks, and that he would always try to help her; and he kept his word, for during his pontificate he always showed himself favourable to the policy of Venice, and often followed her tendencies and counsels. His caution with the other diplomatists was not uncalled for. Philip II had not viewed the new election with a favourable eye, and dissembled the mistrust aroused in him by his ambassador, Olivarez, who was always hostile to Sixtus; while, on the contrary, King Henry III of France was, with his usual levity, expecting too much from him, and thinking that he would find in him an easy instrument for his fickle policy.

Having in view his immediate goal, that of restoring order, Sixtus was bound not merely to act with a strong hand in his own State, but to induce the neighbouring princes to act with him, which was no easy matter. Italy was a prey to a system of brigandage widely and strongly organised under the guidance of experienced and audacious chieftains, who had often sprung from the noblest families and were surrounded with that charm, made up of terror and of sympathy, which exiles of this type are wont to inspire in rough and imaginative minds. Alfonso Piccolomini, Lamberto Malatesta, Ludovico Orsini were real leaders of bands which were formed or dispersed according to the chance of the moment, and which infested Romagna, the Marches, the Campagna, and the sea-coast of the papal State, at times attacking even the cities, and devastating the regions rendered insecure through their invasions, and even more insecure by reason of the intervention of the soldiers sent by the government to oppose them, who often did more damage than the bandits themselves. When danger threatened the bands dissolved, and, crossing the boundaries, disappeared in Tuscany, the State of Venice, the duchy of Urbino, or the kingdom of Naples. The baneful plant that had long been tolerated had struck deep roots which it seemed impossible to pluck out. Gregory XIII had proved himself powerless; and the other

States were very weak, and perhaps at times even not a little pleased to add by their indifference to the embarrassments of the Pontiff, whose relations with them, especially in ecclesiastical matters, did not always go on smoothly. Under Sixtus, however, this aspect of things changed rapidly. His moderation in maintaining the rights of the Church in the States of his neighbours called for a return, and they became imbued with his own energy. His continuous representations to the princes and their ambassadors bore fruit. The bandits, no longer finding a secure asylum outside the State, were within its bounds hunted like wild beasts, without pity, and at times with a doggedness that resembled ferocity. Above all it was necessary to clear the infested districts immediately round Rome; and Sixtus committed this task to the Cardinal Colonna, who discharged it with a vigour and promptitude that paralysed all resistance. One by one the chiefs of the bands were captured and put to death with their followers and accomplices, no mercy being shown. Heads fell in great numbers, and were exposed in every corner of the district—a spectacle full of horror and of terror. The capture of the priest Guercino, who was called the King of the Campagna, and who, by the audacity of his crimes, had made himself master of it to such an extent as to force Gregory XIII to come to terms with him, struck a great blow at brigandage in the vicinity of Rome. When his severed head was exposed on the battlements of Castello Sant' Angelo, Rome felt that peace was returning, and applauded the severity displayed, more especially as it was aimed not merely at the brigands outside but also at the evil-doers of every kind within the city, without sparing the nobles, on whose overweening spirit the hand of Sixtus weighed resolutely and relentlessly.

Nor was it at Rome alone that his hand weighed heavily on the nobles; its sway extended likewise to the barons of the provinces, in order to wrest from them a power that was no longer justified and that had become an instrument for acts of private oppression and violence. Terrible above all seemed the condemnation of Giovanni Pepoli, a man who, with many faults, still had the reputation of a noble and generous mind, and who represented at Bologna one of the greatest and most famous families of the papal State. Being accused of having shown favour and given a refuge to bandits, and of having refused to surrender one of them, he was condemned to death and strangled, no heed being given to the prayers of many persons on his behalf, to the interest of several princes, and to the efforts of the powerful Cardinal d'Este, who was very indignant at his death and bitterly lamented it. The greatness of the family that was struck, the authority of the man, the swiftness of the penalty made a deep impression. The Pope was taxed with cruelty, and subdued murmurs were heard; but the nobles began to feel that it was no longer the time to make common cause with the brigands, nor to stir up too violently the factions into

which the families were divided, especially in Romagna. The Venetian ambassador, Priuli, always an acute observer, wrote to the Senate: "These princes of the Church, being moved by this example, will, it is said, keep at as great a distance as possible, seeing this severity on the part of the Pontiff, and the small respect that is shown them. But on the other hand it is fully believed that this severity is of great good to the peaceful public, seeing that every man will be warned to have his wits about him and to live with feelings of modesty and respect towards his Prince." The power of the barons, a remnant of feudal ideas and of democratic tyrannies, was indeed struck to the heart by Sixtus V, and supplanted by the modern conception of the unity and of the central authority of the State.

In order to overcome the brigandage which was growing more terrible in the provinces, the Pope, as we have said, required the cooperation of the States bordering on his own, and to that end he worked upon the ambassadors and also directly upon the princes. He endeavoured to show how dangerous an element of weakness was being introduced into the whole of Italy by these internal enemies, who constituted a kind of army which, as he used to assert, would be able, at any given moment and in one way or another, to ally itself and act in concert with the Turks or the heretics, to the injury of the Catholic States. Nor will this assertion appear greatly exaggerated if it is borne in mind that the number of the bandits in the papal State alone had during the last years of Gregory XIII risen at certain moments to twenty-seven thousand, a number corresponding very nearly to that of the regular soldiery in the pay of the Princes of Italy. By his urgent demands the Pope managed to obtain the assistance of Spain for the Neapolitan district, and of the Dukes of Ferrara and Urbino; the last-named, indeed, not satisfied with fighting against and capturing the bandits, succeeded in destroying an entire band by the horrible stratagem of causing poisoned food to fall into their hands. More difficult were the negotiations with Venice, who, though well disposed towards the Pope as he was towards her, yet found herself much hampered by the traditional and jealous regard which, like modern England, she cherished for the right of asylum. Sixtus V proposed a kind of treaty of extradition; and, after many difficulties, Venice came to an agreement by which the Republic pledged herself to refuse shelter to the bandits of the papal State, though not without certain reserves. Pressing on the brigands from every side, he overcame the last scruples of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, which had actually for a moment almost endangered the friendly relations between the two States, and obtained the extradition of one of the principal bandits, Lamberto Malatesta, who had for years terrorised the Romagna, and who, having been brought to Rome, was there decapitated. Thus, in little more than two years, with a relentless tenacity and firmness, by rigorous methods which

cannot be reviewed without repugnance, but may to a certain extent be justified by a condition of disorder that seemed otherwise irremediable, Sixtus V succeeded in bringing back security and restoring the life of the country to a normal condition. The inhabitants breathed again, and if the Pope's government appeared at times too harsh and cruel to the Romans to whom it was close at hand, it was in the provinces respected as a rule that carried freedom with it.

Speaking one day with the Cardinal de Joyeuse, and expressing his pleasure, as he often did with the diplomatists and foreign personages, at having brought back peace to the State and restored the papal authority, Sixtus observed that two things were needed to govern well, namely, severity and a great deal of money. The vast ideas he was revolving in his mind, both as regards the public works he proposed to complete, and the impulse that he wished to give to his policy, were of such a kind as could be realised only with the aid of a well-filled exchequer, whereas that of the papal State when he ascended the throne was exhausted. The same tendency to move straight towards his goal that had guided his action in the extirpation of brigandage seemed to dominate him when he entered upon the task of rearranging the finances. But this was a more delicate and difficult matter to regulate, and his financial system, though it achieved the aim he had set himself, and filled the State treasury with gold, appeared to many to be very imperfect. By wise measures he reduced many useless expenses; but these economies were far from sufficient for his needs, and he was forced to have recourse to the sale of the public offices, and to the development of the institution of the *monti*, which were practically a kind of public loan at a fairly high rate of interest. The offices and the *monti* were divided into *vacabili* and *non vacabili*. *Uffici vacabili* were those which ceased with the death of the purchaser, and in certain cases with his promotion to the cardinalship or to a bishopric; and *monti vacabili* were loans that were redeemable within a limited period under a system of sinking funds, while the *monti non vacabili* represented the permanent debt of the State. It was a defective system which he had not created, but to which he gave a very wide development; and, though during his lifetime he kept down the abuses to which it gave rise, they soon reappeared after his death. It need hardly be said that these sales of remunerative offices and loans went hand in hand with an increase in the taxation of the people, who often found it heavy and complained. But the magnificence of the public works, the roads opened to facilitate commerce, and the new industries that were encouraged and introduced, in a measure atoned for the burden of the imposts in the eyes of the people. In the course of a few years, in spite of his enormous expenditure during his pontificate, Sixtus might be considered one of the wealthiest sovereigns in Europe; and while princes who were so much more powerful than himself, such as the King of Spain, were hampered by their want of means and struggling

to find money, he complacently remarked, a short time before his death, that in the *Castello di Sant' Angelo* was lying stored, in gold and silver, a sum of four million and six hundred thousand crowns. The withdrawal of so vast a sum from circulation appeared to many, even in his times, as an error in finance, which indeed it was. It was realised that Sixtus was a politician and not a true financier, who has regard for the future development of the wealth of the State. It was considered absurd that the people should be heavily weighed down by taxes in order to accumulate millions destined to remain idle; but Sixtus knew the great power that accrued to him from this stored-up wealth, which gave him a special importance in the eyes of the other princes—always in want of money, in spite of their great revenues. For every undertaking that was proposed it was indispensable to have ready money, and all turned to him for aid, of which in truth he was not lavish; and thus the need of the others imparted authority to himself, and enabled him to intervene in every problem that interested him.

And these problems went on multiplying and keeping the thoughts of Sixtus V on the alert. His mind blended together, in a union by no means rare at certain periods of transition, the practical energy of the statesman and the fervour of the mystic. His monkish education, his first aspirations, his friendship with the most ardent and active champions of the Counter-Reformation, the struggle which he had seen raging, from his childhood onwards, against heresy and against the Turk, determined the currents of his policy and traced out his life for him. To bring back the erring Christians to the obedience of the Church, and to join together the Christian forces in repelling the Muslim invasion and in freeing for ever the sepulchre of Christ—these were the chief aspirations of his mind, which, like the contemporary muse of Torquato Tasso, was idealising in the future the forms of the past. Revolving these thoughts within him, he felt that, though not yet sure of the means whereby to achieve them, he ought to approach Spain, and that he would never be able to separate himself from that Power. He had been elected against the wish of Philip II; and his alert, energetic, and impetuous disposition was in absolute contrast with that of Philip, who was always so reserved, cautious, and procrastinating. There was a constant basis of mistrust in their relations during the whole of his pontificate; and assuredly no efforts to overcome it were made by the ambassador, Olivarez, whose dignified haughtiness was at every moment irritated by the blunt and imperious ways of the Pope, and by his opposition. But in spite of this mistrust, the Pope was too necessary to Spain, and Spain to the Pope, for it ever to be possible that they should separate and go entirely different ways. They were the two greatest and, so to speak, essential representatives of the Catholic principle. Sixtus soon turned to Philip and, with the ardour of a man new to the difficulties of State, began to communicate to him his plans, which appeared too vast to the

colder and more experienced Spanish sovereign. The point on which they differed from the very beginning, and which more than anything else gave rise to the mistrust between them, was the condition of France.

To the ambitious aims of Philip the religious discords opened the prospect of splitting up that kingdom to his advantage, on the pretext of restoring in it the unity of the faith; whereas the Pope felt that the excessive growth of Spain at the expense of France would be injurious to Europe, and, in the long run, to the cause of Catholicism. The condition of France was exceedingly precarious, and it was not easy to follow a definite and decisive policy with regard to her. Pending the development of events it was better in the meantime to employ one's energy elsewhere. To free the coasts of the Mediterranean from the Muslim by the conquest of Algiers, and to restore England to the bosom of the Church of Rome, were the two pivots on which the Pope would have liked to rest his policy; but the King of Spain saw the difficulties of the situation, and realised that the war with Flanders in which he was engaged was in itself a sufficiently great undertaking for the moment. Sixtus had to give up the idea of a conquest of Algiers, but he did not give up the conversion of England. It seemed clear that if this island were once snatched away from heresy, the victory of Catholicism on the Continent would be comparatively easy. Queen Elizabeth was to the heart and imagination of Sixtus a source of torment and of hope. She fulfilled his ideal—this sovereign whose woman's breast contained such virile energy, and who understood and seconded with so much decision and self-possession the impetuous strength of a people that was pressing forward to the conquest of a new world, along the unknown paths of the future. To convert her to Catholicism, to unite himself with her in action, to transform Elizabeth into a Countess Matilda, was his dream—the dream of a monk on the throne. It remained a dream, but during a great part of his pontificate it did not leave his thoughts, and several times he lent a ready ear to agents, especially Jesuits, who fed his illusion.

This illusion, however, did not prevent him from combating English Protestantism with various weapons. Some proposals which had, through the instrumentality of the Cardinal d'Este, been made by France to the Pope, for reuniting the principal French Catholics in an expedition against England, aroused the attention and anxiety of the Spanish ambassador, Olivarez; and the Pope availed himself of this to urge Philip to do something on his side. Spain's position with regard to England was such as to leave no peace in Philip's mind. The swift boldness of Drake and of the other English adventurers who ploughed the sea, paralysing Spain's maritime power, would have sufficed to incite him to act, even though he had not had other motives, other fears, and other ambitions. Rome encouraged him; and gradually the conception was matured and the preparations begun for the expedition of the

Armada, which was to invade England. This chapter is not the place for narrating this famous expedition and its results, which were of such decisive importance for England, but it is necessary to recall that Sixtus eagerly encouraged the expedition, especially at the beginning, striving to overcome the continuous hesitation of Philip II, and supporting the enterprise with money, and still more with promises of money, which, while awaiting the issue of events, the Pope was in no hurry to lavish, and which he subsequently refused to pay. The delays of Philip caused him anxiety, and fear lest the undertaking should fail. Writing on one occasion to Philip, he said bluntly: "Your Majesty wastes so much time over the consideration of your undertakings, that when the time comes to carry them out there remains neither time nor money"; and, another time, when lamenting this inactivity to the Venetian ambassador, he compared Philip and Elizabeth, saying of her that he would have loved her for her great valour more than any other Sovereign, if she had been Catholic, and adding that he had uneasy presentiments with regard to the Armada. The death of Mary Stewart appeared to him as a challenge, and, by irritating him against Elizabeth, increased his desire to hasten on events. He felt that England would not stand waiting without preparing herself, and redoubled his exhortations. In August of the year 1587, after the nomination of William Allen as Cardinal, he still wrote to Philip II: "This morning I held a Consistory and Allen was made a Cardinal in order to satisfy your Majesty, and although in proposing him I had a pretext that should have disposed of every kind of suspicion, yet I am told that people at once began to say, in Rome: 'Now they are preparing for the war against England'; and that this assumption is widespread. Therefore let your Majesty not delay, so that you may not do greater harm to those poor Christians [the English Catholics]; for by procrastination the wise decisions you have come to would turn out badly."

The destruction of the Armada, which showed the foresight of Sixtus, had increased the latent bad feeling between him and Philip, inclining him more and more to regard the affairs of France from a point of view that could not commend itself to the Spanish sovereign. The intimate and cordial relations between Sixtus and the ambassadors and the *Signoria* of Venice also caused Philip anxiety; for he knew how Venice favoured the pacification of France by means of bringing together Rome and the King of Navarre, with a view to his conversion. In the Italian politics of the Pope Venice played a part of overwhelming importance. She was not merely a bulwark against the heretics of Germany and against the Crescent in the East, but she was the chief centre round which it was possible to group the Italian forces, with a view to preventing the excessive influence of Spain and perhaps of France in Italy. Hence the efforts of the Pope to keep Venice and Tuscany united in a greater degree than was possible, and to draw them into cooperation with the minor Italian potentates, without bonds and formal alliances,

but by the natural harmony of reciprocal interests. And the same thought, together with his ardent desire to destroy every stronghold of heresy in the neighbourhood of Italy, induced him to favour in many ways, openly and covertly, the ambitions of Duke Charles Emanuel of Savoy, who by flattering the Pope's Catholic aspirations sought to make himself master of Geneva and of Saluzzo. The obstinate attempts of the Duke of Savoy to secure Geneva were destined to failure, though he was more fortunate in those that deprived France for ever of the marquisate of Saluzzo. In his undertakings Charles Emanuel always found help at Rome—both pecuniary assistance and a general kindly support against the opposition which he encountered in other directions. In spite of the bitter irritation of the King of France, the objections of the Venetian government, and the coldness, at times approaching hostility, of his father-in-law, Philip II, Charles Emanuel held firm, while he was gaining time, and Saluzzo remained in his hands. Sixtus thought that the heretics would be more easily put down by the hand of the Prince of Savoy than they could be by the King of France, distracted as he was on every side by the factions which were tearing his kingdom in pieces. If France were pacified, the marquisate of Saluzzo might be restored; but in the meantime Charles Emanuel was guarding it from the heretics, and keeping it safe for the faith, as though he were the vicar of the Pope. The shrewd prince availed himself of the Pope's views, and flattered them for the purpose of his own aggrandisement. Ready to seize every opportunity of making some attempt in the territory of Geneva, the Dauphiné, and Provence, he was at the same time striving, though without success, to change his ducal crown into a royal one.

We can in this place only rapidly indicate those events which supply material for other chapters in this volume. While these were developing, Rome, the papal State, and the Church called for attention of a different kind. To free the State from brigandage, and to lower the nobility to the level allowed by law was only, as it were, to smooth the way for the new duties of government in an age of transformation, which was substituting a more direct and uniform action for the variety of impulses and forces that characterised medieval life. The territory occupied by the Church State, which was fertile and for the most part well cultivated, could be made to increase its wealth by the development of industries connected with agriculture and by the sanitation of those malarial regions where the occupations of life were impeded by the stagnant waters which rendered them uninhabitable. With a view to this, Sixtus V undertook improvements in the marshes of the Maremma and in the Pontine marshes, devoting especially to the latter, which he visited during his Pontificate, a considerable amount of attention and of money, and draining off the stagnant waters into a canal, which took the name of *fiume Sisto*; this was a magnificent work, which, as Ranke justly observes, may be regarded as the best attempt to dry up the Pontine marshes that was made till

the time of Pius VI. He protected the Mediterranean coast by supplying Civitavecchia with good water, and by the construction of galleys, which, while forming the nucleus of a papal navy, served as a defence against the pirates of Algiers, and as a protection against the bandits who infested the shores of the Tuscan Maremma. At the same time, by means of the grant of privileges and advances of money, the craft of woollen manufacture that had long been discontinued was revived in Rome. Of still greater consequence was the introduction of the silk industry, which, having been introduced from Tuscany into the provinces of the papal State, rapidly increased, and, especially in the culture of silkworms, assumed an importance that has lasted to the present day. In order to develop this industry Sixtus spared no pains, and conferred numerous privileges, encouraging the producers, besides ordering the provinces and communes to contribute in various ways to the planting of mulberry trees, for the purpose of feeding the silkworms. In the meantime he endeavoured to secure and facilitate the means of transit in the State by opening up roads, and by various works such as the Ponte Felice over the Tiber on the Flaminian Road in Sabina; by his firmness he forced the Viceroy of Naples to revoke certain decrees injurious to the fairs and markets of Benevento; and in many ways he secured the increase of the maritime traffic at several seaports, and especially at Ancona, justly regarded by Sixtus as of great importance, because of its position on the Adriatic and its potential relations with Venice and the East. Being deeply attached to the province of his birth, he favoured the Marches in many ways, granting the title of city to several small towns, and creating some bishoprics, among them those of Montalto and of Loreto, the famous sanctuary of which he embellished and enlarged. This sanctuary, situated opposite Dalmatia, owed its origin to a legend that had transported the holy house of Nazareth to the Dalmatian and Italian shores of the Adriatic, and may also perhaps have recalled to the mind of Sixtus his twofold origin, Slavonic and Italian, and have connected this remembrance with his aspirations towards the liberation of Europe from the Turks—the long and unrealised desire of his life.

The disappearance of the Middle Ages marked out for Rome a period of transformation that largely changed her aspect. The city that had been the scene of baronial strife, of struggles between Popes and anti-Popes, between Guelfs and Ghibellines, with her massive fortified towers rising on every side and leaning up against the ruins of Imperial Rome—with her basilicas, in whose architecture the art of the Cosmati triumphed in its simplicity, its elegance and its fulness of religious piety, while in the gold of the mosaics glowed the Giottesque inspiration of the Roman painter, Pietro Cavallini—this old medieval city had entered a fresh phase of life, since she had yielded to the invading spirit of the Renaissance. The sojourn of the Popes in Avignon, and the consequent reduction of the

population and wealth of Rome, had brought about a deserted condition of the city; with the Pope there were taken away from Rome the greater part of the higher clergy and of the ecclesiastical officials, the principal source of its wealth, while the number of the inhabitants sank and the concourse of strangers diminished. From this decline Rome had gradually recovered during the fifteenth century. The impulse of humanism, passing from the field of letters into that of the arts, gave a notable character to the new buildings, and furthered the ever-growing development of the city. The movement began with Martin V—never again to stop. Under Nicholas V the movement grew and became accentuated; and though death prevented this Pope, humanist as he was and eager for glory, from completing the general restoration of the city for which in his mind he longed, yet the works initiated by him, and especially the reconstructions in the Vatican, opened the way for the succeeding Popes. Sixtus IV opened new roads, spanned the Tiber with the bridge that still bears his name, constructed or embellished a number of churches, built the Hospital of Santo Spirito, and in the Vatican built the library, in order to gather in it the manuscripts which he and Nicholas V had so lovingly collected, and that Sistine Chapel destined to be immortalised by the brush of Michelangelo. Throughout the whole of the sixteenth century the greatest artists of Italy, and amongst them Bramante, Raphael, and Michelangelo, poured forth in the buildings of Rome the treasures of their genius; and if, towards the end of the century, the prevailing taste was losing its old purity, there was no diminution in the power to provide for the needs and for the embellishment of Rome.

In the time of Sixtus V, though much had been done, much still remained to do for the exercise of his feverish energy. He loved building, and was desirous of raising monuments which should leave a lasting record of his name. From the days of his cardinalate he had, in the solitude of the villa built by him on the Esquiline, long been accustomed to ponder deeply on magnificent works, and, in his conversations with his architect, Domenico Fontana, who understood him so well, he had matured in his mind the plans for executing them. The thought of the colossal undertakings of which the history of Rome offered so many examples, and of which the very ruins were a speaking testimony, could not fail to stir his energies. On becoming Pope he set to work with his wonted rapidity; and Rome saw thousands of workmen labouring simultaneously at the various buildings he conceived and endeavoured to bring to a finish during his pontificate: for to begin a thing was with him to become intent upon its completion. The Popes of the earlier part of the sixteenth century had chiefly aimed at embellishing the city on the side nearest the Vatican, following as it were the course of the Tiber downwards from the bridge of Sant' Angelo. The upper zone of Rome, the greater part of which had remained desolate since the days of Gregory VII, when

it was burnt down by the soldiery of Robert Guiscard, was still very bare, although it contained not a few basilicas, and above all the mother church of Christendom at the Lateran. To bind together the higher city and the lower, to reunite in a measure the Lateran and the Vatican, was the magnificent conception which, having been furthered by Sixtus, was the beginning of that tendency to repopulate the higher part of Rome which was not fully carried out till our days. With this aim Sixtus opened up the magnificent roads that connected the basilicas of Santa Croce in Gerusalemme and Santa Maria Maggiore with the Trinità dei Monti, and the Quirinal with the Porta Pia; and other roads were made by him in order to join the Lateran with the Coliseum and the Viminal Hill with the Forum Trajanum, with a continuation along the road then called the Via Papale as far as the bridge of Sant' Angelo. In order to induce newcomers, and especially such as were not Romans born, to build houses along the new roads and to people them, he granted special privileges to the inhabitants: their houses could not be subjected to confiscation save for the crime of high treason; those who dwelt there could not be molested for debts which they might have contracted outside the papal State, and after two years of habitation they entered into the enjoyment of all the privileges enjoyed by the Roman citizens; those who were inscribed in a guild were exempt from any levy that the consuls of their corporation might exact from them.

From the earliest days of his pontificate Sixtus had shown his desire to erect a seat worthy of the Popes in the Lateran. During the ceremonies of his coronation he observed, in conversation with some Cardinals, how absurd and inconsistent it was that the basilica of the Lateran, *omnium ecclesiarum mater*, and the ideal and perpetual domicile of the Popes, should not have a building attached to it suitable for housing them. The idea of erecting one had occurred to two of his predecessors, Nicholas IV and Sixtus IV, both of them Franciscans like himself, but the idea had not been carried out; now he would put it into execution. And in truth he set to work, and the splendid palace designed by Fontana arose in a short time, as though by enchantment. Soon after there extended along one of the roads he had laid down another papal palace, the Quirinal, part of which had been built by his predecessor, and which was subsequently finished by Paul V; and to the square in front of the palace were transported the two colossal groups which are still so characteristic a feature of it, and have given it the name of Monte Cavallo.

In order to render salubrious this vast portion of Rome which it was proposed to resuscitate, a great supply of water was required, and here again the ancient Roman traditions served as a model. Sixtus decided to connect various springs of water in the district of Palestrina, and to bring them to Rome along a distance of about twenty miles, partly by subterranean channels, partly by means of an aqueduct on arches about

seven miles in length. When the enterprise was begun it seemed to many incapable of accomplishment within the period of a single pontificate; but Sixtus, as he said in a Bull relating to this work, "would not allow himself to be terrified by the difficulties nor by the greatness of the expense"; and before the third year of his pontificate was out, the water which, after his first name, he called *Acqua Felice*, sprang forth in copious streams from the monumental fountain which he had caused to be erected on the road leading from the *Porta Pia* to the *Quirinal*.

While he was attending to these great works, he also occupied himself with lesser reforms for the good conduct of the city, such as the reform of the carnival *fêtes*, which had degenerated into a display of licence that frequently gave rise to grave disorders; and he established useful and pious foundations. Remembering his Slavonic origin, he erected the church and hospice of *San Girolamo degli Schiavoni*. He restored the church of *Santa Sabina* on the *Aventine*. He improved the condition of the *Roman University*, the *Sapienza*, of which he had been Rector, by gifts of money and by enlarging the building. He created monasteries, strengthened and increased the fraternity for ransoming the slaves who had fallen into the hands of the *Turks*, founded a hospice for the poor near the *Ponte Sisto*, endowing it with a good revenue, and in the Bull of the foundation affirmed the obligation resting on every city to maintain such of its poor as are incapable of work, and to prevent mendicity and its abuses. He also added to the same hospice a place where the pilgrims who came to *Rome* might be received and entertained for three days.

Mindful of the benefits of *Pius V*, to whom he owed his elevation, and whose example and ideas had strengthened in him his fervid aspirations for the triumph of Catholicism and his implacable desire for the destruction of Protestantism, Sixtus contemplated erecting in his honour a memorial sepulchre worthy of the high esteem in which he held him. In the church of *Santa Maria Maggiore* he had, as has been said, already in the days when he was a Cardinal begun to erect a vast chapel consecrated to the cradle of the Lord; and this he completed after he had succeeded to the pontificate, lavishing on it a great wealth of marbles, statues, and paintings. In this chapel he had set up the monument to which, with solemn pomp, he transferred the ashes of *Pius V*, and in it he, too, desired to be buried, so as to rest, after death, by the side of the man who had been his friend and had inspired his actions.

The care bestowed on the upper regions of *Rome* could not obscure the fact that the basis of the papal City is always the *Vatican*, and that the transformation of *St Peter's*, on which the Popes of the sixteenth century had vied with each other in lavishing endless treasures, was not yet complete. The majestic cupola conceived by *Michelangelo* did not yet rear into the sky the solemn curves of its lines. From the year 1565, in which *Michelangelo* died, various architects—*Vignola*,

Pirro Ligorio, and Giacomo della Porta—had successively worked at the continuation of the cathedral, but the cupola remained unbuilt. Nor did the gigantic task appear an easy one, and, like the aqueduct, it was of such a nature that its completion was not considered possible in the course of a single pontificate, even though this should be a long one. Yet it was precisely this completion of the cupola to which Sixtus V, supplementing Giacomo della Porta by his faithful architect Fontana, who subsequently remained alone at the work, addressed himself as to his principal aim. He felt that in the cupola resided, so to speak, the soul of the entire church, and that its completion would suffice to secure and hasten on the completion of that superb artistic effort of the Catholic religion, which, entering into a new phase through the impulse of men who were for the most part Southerners, appealed to the imagination of the faithful by setting the pompous magnificence of its rites against the austere and bare simplicity of the Reformed worship. During the pontificate of Sixtus the architect Fontana was able to mould the vault of the cupola as far as the window of the skylight, and on the death of the Pope the work was so near completion that the first seven months of the pontificate of Gregory XIV sufficed to finish the skylight, and to put the last touch to the pinnacle of Michelangelo's grand creation.

But among the works executed in the time of Sixtus V none made so deep an impression on the imagination of the contemporaries and aroused their wonder to such an extent as the removal and erection on the open place in front of St Peter's of the obelisk which had formerly adorned the circus of Nero, and which stood half-buried near one of the sides of the cathedral. It was one of the first works to which the Pope turned his attention. To raise up from its base that huge block of granite, and to move it from its site without breaking it, had seemed impossible to Michelangelo and to Antonio Sangallo, when consulted by Paul III, who had designed to carry out the removal. The operation would involve raising the obelisk, inclining it horizontally, dragging it to its new site, and setting it up afresh. A commission of persons appointed to examine the numerous projects suggested selected that of Domenico Fontana, which seemed the safest and based on the most accurate calculations. Several attempts, suggested by the envy of rivals and incredulity in the success of the enterprise, were vainly made to dissuade the Pope and to intimidate the daring architect. In October of the year 1585, a few months after Sixtus had been elected, the work was begun, and soon there arose round the obelisk which was to be raised a forest of beams, and plates of iron, and cranes, and preparations of every kind. The task was hurried on, and already on May 27 in the following year everything was ready for proceeding with the more difficult part of the operation, namely the raising of the obelisk and placing it horizontally on the vehicle that was to carry it. An immense crowd attended the spectacle, among those present being the Cardinals and the greatest

personages of Rome. A severe edict of the Governor imposed the strictest silence so as not to disturb the work, and amidst deep silence and intense anxiety the cranes began to move and the obelisk to be raised. The work was proceeding when suddenly a voice broke the silence, crying, "Water for the ropes"; and it was seen that the ropes which bound the obelisk were actually on the point of breaking by reason of the weight laid on them. The counsel so bravely given, in spite of the prohibition, was at once followed, and the enterprise was saved. The courageous counsellor—according to some a lady, according to others a sailor—was a native of the coast of Genoa, and obtained for the family, named Bresca, the privilege, extant to the present day, of furnishing for the church of Saint Peter the palm branches used in the solemn procession of Palm Sunday. A few days later the obelisk was conveyed between two platforms to the site destined for it, and the preparations for its erection were begun. On September 10, 1586, amidst the wildest enthusiasm, while the ambassador of France, Pisany, and the Duke of Luxemburg, who were holding their solemn entry into Rome, were crossing the square and thus became witnesses of the spectacle, the obelisk rested on its pedestal; and after having, for centuries, commemorated Nero, the persecutor of the early Christians, it now served to celebrate the glories of the cross that adorned its summit.

The idea of making the Pagan monuments serve the glory of the Catholic faith was particularly attractive to Sixtus, who detested Paganism, and who, according to the phrase cut into the pedestal of the Vatican obelisk, expiated its impure superstition by consecrating its monuments to the Christian cult. Inspired by the same conception, he raised the obelisks of Santa Maria Maggiore, of the Lateran, and of Santa Maria del Popolo, and caused the Trajan and Antonine columns, which were in a very dilapidated state, to be restored, placing on the summit of the former the statue of Saint Peter and on the other the statue of Saint Paul, and thus dedicating them to the two apostles of Rome. But though he employed the ancient monuments for his religious ends when they could be of use to him, he neither set store on them for their own sake, nor cared for their beauty and historical value, but destroyed them with the indifference of a barbarian if he encountered them on his way, or if he could utilise them for the works he was having executed. He remorselessly made an end of the ruins of the Septizonium of Severus, of which three orders of columns remained standing, which he took from the Palatine to employ them for the embellishment of the Vatican. This was not his only act of vandalism; and he would have remorselessly destroyed the Velabrum and the tomb of Cecilia Metella if it had not been for the prayers and remonstrances of the Roman nobility. The account of this episode given by the Cardinal Santoro di Santa Severina in the records of his life is characteristic: "Seeing that the Pope had turned entirely to the

destruction of the antiquities of Rome, many Roman gentlemen came to me asking me to make representations to his Holiness to move him from so strange an idea; and the Pope had chiefly in view the destruction of the Septizonium, the Velabrum, and Capo di Bove, which was once the tomb of Cecilia Metella—the unique and only work dating from the times of the Republic. I joined with the Signor Cardinal Colonna in making such representations, and this reply was elicited from the Pope: that he wished to do away with the ugly antiquities while restoring those that had need of it.” The prayers of Santoro and Colonna saved the Velabrum and the noble tomb of Cecilia Metella, but they nowise availed for the Septizonium, the columns of which Sixtus required. Not even the beauty of the ancient statues found favour in his eyes, which saw in them the expression of the impiety and of the impurity of Paganism, so that he scarcely allowed some of the most beautiful of the masterpieces which had been previously discovered to be preserved and remain exposed to view. Ages might have been supposed to have elapsed between the bigoted hatred of this former Inquisitor and the humanistic enthusiasm of his predecessors for the loftiest creations of ancient art.

The library in which Nicholas V had arranged the manuscripts which he had collected, was now, although it had been enlarged by Sixtus IV, too small for the need of the new times and for the rapid accumulation of the books due to the invention of printing. At the close of the sixteenth century it was felt more clearly than has been understood at a later date that the Church of Rome, if she wished to hold her own against her adversaries, must needs, above all else, bring her doctrines into harmony with the existing condition of learned studies. To a continuous series of attacks, fierce and full of theological knowledge and historical learning, it was not sufficient to reply by abuse. A system of efficacious apologetics was indispensable, which should oppose theologians to theologians, historians to historians, and should defend and expound the entire mass of the Catholic doctrine, as it had been strengthened and confirmed by the Council of Trent. The champions of free investigation and the champions of an authority from which there is no appeal were to meet with equal weapons for the fray. To this need corresponded the requirement of books and libraries. Already, in the year 1581, the Portuguese Stazio, leaving to the Congregation of the Oratory in Rome his accumulation of manuscripts and of books, laid the first foundation for the collections of the Bibliotheca Vallicelliana, which was increased and made celebrated among others by Baronius and by Rainaldus, who wrote in it their *Annales Ecclesiastici*. Sixtus V, for his part, meant the Vatican to have a library such as need fear no rivals; and, spoiling without the slightest compunction a most beautiful court-yard, the work of Bramante, he erected after the design of Fontana the magnificent Vatican library, which is still admired to-day,

and on the walls of which he, with pardonable pride, wished the greatest achievements of his pontificate to be depicted.

To the library was annexed a printing-office, intended, in the words of the epigraph sculptured on the door, *ad sanctorum patrum opera restituenda catholicamque religionem toto terrarum orbe propagandam*. In this printing-office Sixtus V continued his publication of the works of St Ambrose, which he had, while still a Cardinal, begun to print at Milan, with the assistance of the saintly Archbishop of Milan, Carlo Borromeo; he promoted the printing of the works of St Gregory and those of St Bonaventura, whom he placed among the Doctors of the Church, and promoted the printing also of the great *Bullarium Romanum* of Cherubini. He likewise took in hand the publication of the Septuagint and of the text of the Vulgate, over which he presided in person. It was a work the completion of which he had much at heart, as one of the essential results of the Council of Trent. A year before his death he spoke of it to the Venetian ambassador, Alberto Badoer, saying to him that the Council had ordered the revision of the Bible, and that no one had occupied himself with it. He had therefore charged some Cardinals with the task, but, not being satisfied with their work, he had himself taken it in hand, and was in hopes that the printing would soon be finished. Badoer, reporting this conversation to the Doge, added that the Pope had told him that he was engaged on this very work just when he had entered his room, "getting through the labour with great enjoyment, and this was the plan he followed: after having completed a sheet he had it revised by Father Toledo and some Augustinian Fathers, men of the greatest distinction, who, after having diligently revised it, despatched it to the press. And he added that the Pope dwelt on this subject for some time with much gentleness." The Bible was really printed a short time before his death, but it did not appear sufficiently correct; and the definitive edition, still bearing the name of Sixtus Quintus, was published by the authority of Clement VIII in 1592.

To give movement and life to the decrees of the Council of Trent was the continuous thought of Rome during the struggle which she carried on against the Reformation for the unity and authority of the Church. With this end in view it became more and more desirable to organise on a secure and permanent basis the vast and varied machinery that was accumulating at Rome for the discharge of ecclesiastical business. Before the pontificate of Sixtus this business was generally despatched by the Pontiff with the aid of the Cardinals gathered in consistory, before whom the questions to be discussed were laid, so that they might express their opinion on them, prior to the final decision, which was reserved for the Pontiff. The part taken by the Cardinals in the affairs that concerned the general interests of the Church was undoubtedly large, and added considerably to the importance of their influence on

the ecclesiastical administration. But new needs were now arising owing to the ever-growing development of international communications and to the increase and complication of the questions that had to be treated after the formidable advent of the Reformation, which occasioned in the Council of Trent a tendency towards concentration that was destined to find its focus in Rome. It had become difficult to treat each matter as it arose by means of a discussion in a general assembly; and thus it became necessary to distribute the subjects into various sections, and to entrust their discharge to special offices, whose advice would, by virtue both of tradition and of continued study, be fully competent and authoritative.

On various occasions the predecessors of Sixtus V had appointed Congregations of Cardinals, charged to study certain special questions and then to report on them to the Consistory; but these were not really permanent appointments and provided only for particular cases. Sixtus V felt that the time had come to set up a new constitution for the government of the Church which should secure its expeditious and systematic conduct and avoid the many inconveniences of the old methods. By diminishing in all questions the interference of the Consistory, the notable result was also achieved of diminishing the excessive preponderance of the more influential Cardinals in the special questions affecting interests which they favoured or, under the name of Cardinal Protectors, represented officially in the Sacred College. This was a great advantage, in addition to that accruing from a conduct of affairs which was more rapid, more uniform, and, in certain cases where caution was necessary, more secret. Against these advantages, however, had to be set the danger of an excessive centralisation, which, by lessening the importance of the Sacred College, might succeed in stifling all opposition there, and, by rendering the Consistories all but useless, reduce them to a mere formality. It cannot be said, however, that this disadvantage was much felt during the pontificate of Sixtus, who liked frequently to assemble the Cardinals in Consistory, willingly discussed matters with them, and often followed their counsels. In the bull *Immensa aeterni Dei* he set out the reasons that induced him to institute the Congregations. There were fifteen of these, some of which were concerned in the administration of the Church, others in that of the State. The first was that of the Inquisition or the Holy Office, which had been instituted already by Paul III, to examine into the questions of dogma that arose from the movement of the Reformation; it now underwent re-organisation, and was charged with the treatment of all questions relating to faith, as the only tribunal that judged with final authority. The *Segnatura* occupied itself with the concessions of grace, the others devoting themselves to the establishment of the churches, the rites and ceremonies, the Index of prohibited books, the interpretation of the Acts of the Council of Trent, the Regular friars, the Bishops, and

the Press of the Vatican—which last, as we have seen, was, according to the Pope's view, destined to become a great centre of Catholic culture. Among the Congregations which occupied themselves with temporal administration, one, which was called that of the Wealth of the State, and to which Sixtus had assigned a special fund of two hundred thousand crowns, had to provide for cases of poverty and to prevent scarcity by supervising the equal distribution of commodities in Rome and in the provinces. The Congregation for the navy saw to the construction and armament of vessels ordered by the Pope and to the security of the seashore; three others were instituted to examine questions arising from grievances suffered by subjects of the State in the imposition of the taxes, for the custody of the roads, bridges, and waters, and for State consultations in cases relating to legal questions. Finally one Congregation was charged with raising the fortunes of the University of Rome, the *Sapienza*, which Sixtus wished to see committed to the special care of the Popes, as had, even in the Middle Ages, been the case with the Sorbonne at Paris, with the University of Oxford in England, and with those of Salamanca in Spain, and Bologna in Italy.

By means of these Congregations the new administration of the Church and of the Pontifical State may be said to have been organised in the form that has lasted to the present day, thus acquiring the characteristics of centralisation and of uniformity which have predominated in it till now. They were a strong bulwark for the unity of the ecclesiastical authority, and consolidated the work which the papal diplomacy and the religious Orders endeavoured to achieve, by putting an end to the prevalence of Protestantism in the districts most subject to its influence, and endeavouring to restore Catholicism in those that had detached themselves from it.

Being bound by friendship to the founders of the chief religious Orders that had arisen in his time, Sixtus could not but be cognisant of the full value of these orders in the struggle that was being carried on. The Order of the Jesuits, above all, that had risen so rapidly and was already firmly rooted in so large a portion of the world, was a formidable force which had to be reckoned with. The favour of Sixtus had on many occasions not been withheld from the Jesuits, and he had made use of them especially in propaganda and exploring work in the Protestant countries. But, having himself risen from a medieval Order, he never succeeded in being in complete sympathy with the newer Society, and foresaw that the rigorous discipline of the Jesuits, their passive obedience to their chiefs, and the unbending tenacity of their devotion to the interests and aims of their Order, might tend to transform it gradually into a kind of Church within the Church, and cause its sway to assume such proportions, at least from time to time, as would make the directing authority of the Papacy subservient to its interests. The Jesuits differed from the medieval Orders in this that, though moving in:

society and penetrating into every corner of life, they remained altogether divided from the men with whom they mingled, and appeared instruments of action deprived of every deep human sympathy. The abstract ideal that directed them, like the impulse of some impassive fate, conquered all feeling in them; and individual members of the Society seemed to become fused into a single whole of mysterious purpose and sectarian aspect. And thus from the very first they awakened around themselves those jealousies and suspicions that have clung to them ever since.

In a measure Sixtus shared these suspicions. Although he treated certain Jesuits personally with great distinction—Father Toledo, for instance, to whose sermons he liked to listen and whom he employed for the revision of the Bible—yet he remained cold towards the Order at large, especially in Italy and in the countries where Catholicism was most secure. On certain occasions he supported them, defending them against the attacks of the lay authorities, especially of Philip II, who availed himself of the complaints of the Spanish Inquisition and of the jealousy of the Dominicans to thwart the excessive authority of the General of the Order, who, without any possibility of control on the part of Spain, was from Rome directing his Jesuits according to his pleasure. But although at the beginning Sixtus V had found the claims of Philip excessive, gradually, moved by the King's firm attitude, by the persistence of his ambassador Olivarez, and by the Spanish Inquisition, more and more persistent in its complaints of the Jesuits' contempt for every authority, and more especially by his own deep repugnance against leaving so dangerous a power in the hands of a religious Order, he began seriously to seek an opportunity for revising its constitution and taking in hand its reform.

The Society of Jesus thus found itself in a position of serious danger; and all the wise steps taken by its General, Father Acquaviva, seemed insufficient to save it. Cardinal Caraffa, who was charged with revising the rules of the Order, was on the side of the Jesuits; and on their behalf representations were sent to Rome from every part of Europe, especially from the Princes of Germany, who regarded them as valuable auxiliaries, and were convinced that Philip II and the Pope were oblivious of the true interests of Catholicism in thwarting their activity. But the Pope stood firm, hereby only increasing the fervour of the defending party, although Father Acquaviva, who understood the difficulties of the situation better, endeavoured to restrain them. A Jesuit preacher, who, from a pulpit in Madrid, hurled the gravest charges against the Pope, asserting that he was in league with the heretics, only caused the Pope to continue more obstinately in the path upon which he had entered. Father Acquaviva received a formal notification of the papal decrees with regard to the rules of the Order, which were substantially modified, and with regard to their very name, of which they were deprived, the Order being compelled to relinquish the title of Society

of Jesus. The Society was affected at the most vital points; but, when this decree was proclaimed, Sixtus was in the last days of his pontificate, and his death nullified its whole effect. His successor without delay reestablished the constitution of St Ignatius on its former basis; and the Jesuits, without further hindrance, resumed the course of their singular career in history.

Even before constituting the Congregations of the Cardinals, Sixtus V had regulated the composition of the Sacred College, fixing the number of the Cardinals at seventy, and taking great care that the choice of them should accord with the importance and dignity of the office. Feeling that at the beginning of his pontificate he had himself not always adopted such a standard, and that he had on this account been the subject of reproofs, the justice of which he could not but recognise in his inner conscience, he subsequently endeavoured in the course of his pontificate to make amends; and the names, among others, of Cusani, Allen, Morosini, and Caetani were certainly such as conferred honour on the purple. Having in this way set up a precedent for his successors and for himself in a matter of high importance, he went on to expound the principles of the Council of Trent, and reinforced himself with assistants capable of aiding him, and of whom he had need, not only for the central administration of the Church, but also in the matter of the manifold international relations which the disturbed religious conditions rendered more delicate and complicated. These relations constituted the most difficult part of the papal activity at the end of the sixteenth century, and, by their uncertainty, reflected the political crisis which now existed in Europe.

Sixtus V, who had ascended the throne with such matured and definite ideas on every other point, for his part felt these uncertainties, and could not always overcome his hesitation as to the course which he should adopt. He had a clear idea of the ends which he strove to attain, but it was not possible for him at once to see clearly the means whereby he might reach them, even when his natural instinct indicated them to him. The essential idea in his policy was the return of the Protestants to the faith of Rome, and this always made him long for the conversion of those princes who had abandoned it. These, however, did not respond to his wishes; and, while at times he encountered strong opposition and hindrance on the part of the Catholic Princes who were moved by different experiences and different views, he was also involved in frequent difficulties with the most ardent partisans of Catholicism, who, especially in France, struggled against their adversaries out of party hatred even more than out of religious zeal. His mind, though thus firmly fixed, could not but fully acknowledge the superiority of the leading Protestant Princes over the vacillating disposition of many Catholic potentates.

Leaving aside for the moment his relations with Philip II, to which we shall return, we find that the Emperor Rudolf II appeared to the

Pope a source of weakness rather than of strength. The Emperor was displeased because, in a question between himself and the Farnese, the Pope had shown himself favourable to the latter, and because, instead of helping the Archbishop of Cologne to recapture Neuss from the Calvinists, he had urged Alessandro Farnese to make himself master of it; he was also dissatisfied with the attitude of Rome both towards the Protestants and in the questions concerning the succession to the Empire. He therefore exhibited increasing coolness in his relations with Sixtus, who, for his part, showed himself impatient because it seemed to him that the Emperor's shoulders were not broad enough to bear the burden of the projects he would have liked to see him put into execution. Far dearer to the Pontiff was the King of Poland, Stephen Báthory, on whom he had set many hopes that were soon to be disappointed. The death of this brave prince opened up grave questions with regard to the succession, which led to a war between the two principal claimants, Sigismund of Sweden and the Archduke Maximilian, who suffered defeat under the walls of Cracow, and was taken prisoner. Sixtus, who hoped for the conversion of Sweden, and had little faith in the Habsburgs, was at heart favourable to Sigismund, but he had to be prudent so as not to arouse the uneasiness and irritation of the Emperor, of Philip II, and of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, all of whom together were asking him to intervene on behalf of Maximilian. The Pope conducted the business with cautious tact, and sent the Cardinal Aldobrandini, who later became Pope Clement VIII, as his legate to Poland, to conduct the negotiations that resulted in the conclusion of peace. Maximilian obtained his liberation, but renounced his claims to the kingdom of Poland; and both the Empire, which acceded to the plan, and the kingdom of Poland mutually pledged themselves, in case they should separately conclude treaties with the Turks, not to accept conditions that might in any way be detrimental to the other Power. This clause did not please the Emperor, who regarded it as an inconvenient bond; but it appeared of great importance to the Pope, who understood the full value of making the two States mutually responsible in their relations as opposed to the Ottoman Power.

About this time, while death was robbing the Sacred College of several Cardinals who had played an important part in contemporary history, such as Sirleto, Cesi, and the great Cardinal Farnese, another of the most eminent Cardinals, Ferdinando de' Medici, in October, 1587, laid aside the purple and succeeded his brother Francesco on the throne of Tuscany. In spite of certain differences of character between him and the Pope, the new Grand Duke knew how necessary it was for him to maintain with the Pope the friendly relations that had been preserved by his brother; and Sixtus, on his side, supported him. They had common interests, and they knew full well that on the continuance of these relations between them, and of a good understanding with Venice was based the independence of their policy in Italy and much of their

power in international relations. This community of interests brought them together; and the union of the three Italian States was displayed principally in questions relating to France, where it may be said that in a measure the problem that was being agitated was the vital one of the future of Catholicism.

England and a large portion of the northern countries had been able to detach themselves from the Catholic Church without destroying its existence, but it is quite clear that the loss of France would have struck a mortal blow at Rome. During the brief pontificate of Sixtus V were developed some of the most decisive events in the civil war which was to settle the religious destiny of France; and the political direction of the Church with regard to them was for the aged Pontiff a constant care, a mental strain, full of doubts and of passionate and torturing anxiety. Round Henry III, the last scion of the Valois dynasty, a weak man, incapable and without prestige, the rival parties, moved by internal ambitions and stimulated by foreign greed, were in violent agitation. The Guises on the one side, and Henry of Navarre on the other, were aiming at the throne, the former with the support of Spain, the latter with that of the Protestant sovereigns; and the price of this support seemed to be the predominance of some foreign influence, and perhaps the dismemberment of France. On succeeding to the Pontificate Sixtus had found the tendency in the Sacred College very favourable to the Guises and the League, who, after having chosen the Cardinal of Bourbon to be the heir of the French crown, were making every effort to obtain from Rome a bull that should declare Henry to have forfeited his claim to the succession. The fitful attempts of Henry III to enter into friendly relations with the King of Navarre increased at Rome the influence of the League, which was skilfully supported by the ambassador Olivarez, and at that time not sufficiently counterbalanced by the opposition of the ambassador of France, of the Cardinal d'Este, and of the representatives of Venice and of Tuscany, who made every effort to demonstrate the danger of having recourse to extreme measures.

After some hesitation Sixtus, in September, 1585, issued the Bull which declared the King of Navarre and the Prince de Condé to be heretics, and excluded them from any claim to the kingdom of France. This was an action which he afterwards regretted, when he began to see more clearly the right course to adopt; but, while in this he simply followed the policy of Philip II, he realised from the beginning that it was necessary to bring about a union of Catholic France, freeing it from the insidious support of Spain. It had been his idea to unite Henry III with the League in a sincere spirit of reconciliation; but this was an illusion, and he soon began to recognise it as such. Almost in spite of himself the idea of a sincere conversion of the King of Navarre grew in the mind of Sixtus. Although the continuous wavering of the French Catholics made the policy of the Pope hesitating and changeable, and

although Philip II endeavoured to profit by it by making it serve his own ends, yet Sixtus remained firm in his purpose of achieving the triumph of Catholicism by overcoming its internal divisions and preserving the integrity of France. The revolt of Paris and the Day of the Barricades, which determined the flight of the King and delivered Paris into the hands of the Duke of Guise, increased the perplexity of the Pope. While on the one hand he held that Henry should have caused Guise to be taken prisoner and have had his head cut off without hesitation, it seemed to him, on the other, that, in face of so incapable a King, Guise was now the only defender of the Faith. By means of his Legate, Morosini, he endeavoured to make peace between the two parties, but his efforts came to nothing by reason of the suspicions and ill-will of those concerned; he also thought for a moment to effect an alliance between Henry III and Philip II, making himself the mediator: but Philip remained cold, and Henry did not know himself what he wanted. Everything was in a state of indecision, when suddenly there came news that the Duke and the Cardinal de Guise had been put to death, and that the Cardinal de Bourbon and the Archbishop of Lyons were prisoners of the King of France. The murders made a deep impression in Rome. Sixtus who, in the wonted impetuosity of his speeches, had not shown himself averse from the gravest measures against the Guises, when they appeared as rebels, felt disgust at these treacherous deeds, and horror at the murder of a Cardinal. The position of the Pope was difficult: the ambassador of Spain and the Cardinals who adhered to him endeavoured to exasperate him, and neither the ambassador Pisany nor the Cardinal Joyeuse could prevent him from delivering, in full Consistory, a violent address against the King of France.

Almost without wishing it the Pope was inclining towards Spain, who seized the opportunity and tried to draw him over to her side; but the thought of the integrity of France and of the interests of Italy always kept him in a state of hesitation, and he was further induced to delay by the representatives of Venice and of Tuscany, ever averse to the Spanish hegemony. Henry III was now inclined to come to terms with the Huguenots. The greater the contempt of Sixtus for the King of France became, the more insistently he was filled with the idea, a secret temptation as it were, of a possible conversion of the King of Navarre and of the pacification of France by his instrumentality. But as yet neither the idea nor the time was ripe. The truce established in April of the year 1589 between the King of Navarre and Henry III led to an open rupture between the latter and Rome. The Pope after much hesitation issued a monitorial in which he required the King of France under penalty of excommunication to liberate the Cardinal de Bourbon and the Archbishop of Lyons, and to present himself in person or to send his procurators to Rome in order to receive pardon. Diplomatic relations were interrupted on both sides. Sixtus V was, in spite of

himself, drawn into the vortex of Spanish politics, when the dagger of Jacques Clement, by ending the life of the last of the Valois, opened the way to the throne for Henry IV and plunged the Pope into fresh difficulties. It was necessary at all costs to preserve the Catholic faith in France; and, since Henry IV was proclaimed King without being converted, no other course appeared to be left but to support the League. The Pope named as his legate in France the Cardinal Enrico Caetani, a *persona grata* with Philip II and favourable to the League, to whose chief he was accredited, pending the liberation of the Cardinal de Bourbon, who was recognised as King. At the end of 1589 Sixtus, seeing no other course, had gone so far as to propose to the King of Spain an alliance, according to the terms of which a campaign was to be undertaken against Henry IV, and the question as to the succession in case of the death of the Cardinal de Bourbon to be then settled by agreement. However, the ultimate aim of Sixtus was again the union of all the Catholic forces within the boundaries of France, so that these, and not the party interests of the League and of Philip II, might have the upper hand; but it was an aim not admitting of realisation. In the meantime Tuscany, and still more Venice, were following a different path, and inclined, though with great caution to favour Henry IV, endeavouring to influence the mind of the Pope. For a moment the friendly attitude of Venice towards the heretical King threatened to disturb the relations between the Republic and Rome, but the skill of Venetian diplomacy succeeded in warding off the danger; and then there began round the Pope an eager and unending duel between the Venetian and Spanish diplomatists, and between the adherents of the two parties in the Curia. In proportion as Venice gradually gained ground, the mistrust of Philip II and the irritation of his ambassador, Olivarez, increased; and they were filled with the fear lest Sixtus should end by favouring Henry IV, in the hope of his conversion. The fear was justified. Sixtus returned to the Italian policy adverse to the universal predominance of Spain, and sought for other ways by which to preserve Catholicism in France.

The arrival at Rome of the Duke of Luxemburg, who represented the Princes and the Catholic nobility that had adhered to Henry IV, and who spoke in his name, assuring the Pope of his readiness to embrace the Catholic faith, made the struggle keener and more active. The large and influential Spanish faction of the Sacred College endeavoured, in agreement with the ambassador, Olivarez, to bring all possible pressure to bear on the Pope, to induce him to dismiss the Duke of Luxemburg. The Pope held firm and showed that he wished to listen to Henry IV and to see if it was possible to come to an understanding with him. Then Olivarez, relying on the compacts that had been entered into between Philip II and Sixtus V, insisted on their fulfilment, showing himself determined to have recourse to extreme measures. He demanded the immediate excommunication

of Henry IV and of all his adherents, and went so far as to threaten a schism in Spain, while in the meantime soldiers were collecting near the frontiers of the kingdom of Naples, and seemed by their presence to recall the troops of Charles V and the sack of Rome. It was a period of mortal anguish for Sixtus, who, being now discouraged, and crushed by the overwhelming power of Spain, was on the point of yielding. The victory of Henry IV at Ivry (March 14, 1590) served to relieve him of the load that was pressing on him. Although Philip II was more urgent than ever, Sixtus had taken courage to resist, and strove to escape him by temporising. He now felt that the conversion of Henry IV to Catholicism was assured, and that this was the man destined to reunite and to pacify France. In order to preserve her adherence to the Catholic faith it no longer appeared to him inevitable to deliver her over, together with Italy, to the absolute suzerainty of Spain. The Duke of Sessa, sent by Philip II, after many bitter discussions and prolonged negotiations, failed just when he appeared to be succeeding; and Sixtus, whose mind was now made up, refused all support to Spain and freed himself from every restriction as to France.

This was the last action of his life. It fell to one of his successors actually to receive Henry IV into the bosom of the Catholic Church. The long and implacable struggle with the Spanish ambassador which Sixtus had endured, the tormenting doubts and the anxieties to which he had been a prey for more than a year, had undermined his physical strength and worn him out. His work was done. On August 13, 1590, he held his last Consistory; on the 19th he still saw Olivarez and the Duke of Sessa and disputed with them; on the 20th he assembled the Congregation for the affairs of France. Though he still endeavoured for a few days to attend to affairs, he was now dying; and on the evening of August 27 he expired. He had reigned only five years and four months, but deep traces of what he had achieved remained behind him. At Rome, in spite of the great works he accomplished, his loss was not regretted; indeed the people tried to pull down a statue that had been erected in his honour on the Capitol. His severity weighed heavily on those who were in immediate contact with him; and even the nobles could not love a Pontiff who had curbed them so much, and compelled them to submit to the laws. He was, however, respected for his life, which was simple and austere, and disinterested, too, so far as he himself was concerned, although he had conferred a high position on the two grandsons of his sister, and elevated her two granddaughters by marrying them into the houses of the Orsini and of the Colonna. Spain rejoiced at his death as at that of an enemy, while other States regretted him, especially Venice, who felt that she had lost in him a faithful ally.

In the pontificate of this remarkable man is summed up the greater part of the life of Rome and of the Church in his time. His firm

intellect and iron hand gave to the structure of the Roman Church and to its temporal State the imprint for which his immediate predecessors, and especially Pius V, had longed, and which his immediate successors were able to mark more deeply after him. He was not a creator of events, if, indeed, one man by himself can ever be such; but he had an intuitive feeling for the direction to which the events of his time were tending, and knew how to guide the current of their advance. Having come late into power, after a life of seclusion spent in thought, he brought to the throne a wonderful spirit of organisation, and, together with well-matured and precise ideas, that lightning rapidity in executing them which struck the imagination of his contemporaries, and which has surrounded his name with legends and made it popular up to the present day. The world around him was transformed. He did not and could not see the entire import of so vast a transformation, but he felt what action he was himself called on to accomplish in the midst of the changes around him, and he accomplished it. He did away both with the bandits and with the overweening power of the nobility, which was clogging the authority of the State and hindering its centralising tendencies; he restored the exhausted papal finances and employed the wealth accumulated by him as a political instrument, which increased his power and influence in international relations, and also for the purpose of bringing about the transformation of medieval Rome into a new city. He reconstituted the State, established the text of the Sacred Books, reorganised the administration of the Church according to the decrees of the Council of Trent, and, while showing favour to the new religious Orders, maintained his sympathy for the old, from one of which he had sprung, and perceived the danger of the rising power of the Society of Jesus. He struggled in every region in order to secure the victory of Catholicism in Europe, and especially in France, when the necessity of the victory was vital for the Church of Rome. In the triumph of this Church as he conceived it lay, according to his view, the complete triumph of the faith of Christ. He could not see that he was the representative of one only of the great Christian forces which were then in mutual opposition, but which all strove together throughout the ages by mysterious ways for the new great advances of the Christian ideal. A few years after the death of Sixtus, from the slopes of the Janiculum, and in sight of the dome that he had raised, the great soul of Torquato Tasso, the last interpreter of the sacred ideals of the Middle Ages, was to take its heavenward flight; and a little later, on the square of the Campo di Fiori, amidst flaming faggots, the restless spirit of Giordano Bruno ceased to torment itself, leaving to his successors the painful heritage of modern philosophic doubt. Between the extreme phases of human thought that were being developed, a great preserving force of authority and tradition was, as it were, a necessity of the laws of history: Sixtus V consolidated this force, and gave it unity of form and of scope.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE END OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE.

THE period, or movement, which has in comparatively recent times come to be termed "the Renaissance," must of course in many senses be said not to have reached its end to this day; nor does it seem as if anything short of a new inroad of the barbarians could check or reverse the impulses which many causes combined to stimulate in the fifteenth century, or could arrest the development of thought, in all its branches, ethical, political, social, religious, scientific, along the lines then traced out—the lines, namely, of free and fearless enquiry, untrammelled by *à priori* conceptions or implicit deference to authority. If we consider the matter from the most obvious point of view, that of the revival of classical study, we find that the most modern scholar has done no more than enlarge the boundaries of the territory first acquired for learning by such men as Filelfo and Valla; while speculation and enquiry, which then first in modern times claimed the right to roam freely over the whole domain of possible knowledge (and sometimes beyond it), are still as unfettered as ever in western Europe.

Local and temporary reactions, however, there have doubtless been; and of these Italy affords the most conspicuous example. It was safer in 1500 to teach that the soul was mortal, than it was in 1550 to maintain the doctrine of justification by faith. Dante, with his ideal of a universal monarch ruling in righteousness, under whom each man should be free to develop his own faculties in the way he deemed best, might even have regarded Machiavelli's possibly more practicable conception of a State, in which, whether one man or a majority ruled, expediency should be the only motive and force the sole method, as a sad reaction towards the barbaric community.

Yet, though the seeds of political and moral decay were abundant in Italy when the sixteenth century opened, to outward appearance all was brilliant enough. This century, known to Italians as the *Cinquecento*, is regarded by them as the golden age of their literature. It is dangerous for foreigners to criticise this estimate; and, if quantity

of production and wide diffusion of literary culture alone be regarded, there is perhaps no reason against accepting it. If, again, we consider vernacular prose, an age which produced writers of the rank of Machiavelli, Castiglione, Guicciardini, Paruta, Ammirato, Vasari, can hold its own with any; when, however, the claim is made on the ground of its poetical production there is more difficulty in admitting it. Paradoxical as it may seem to say so of an age that gave birth to the two works which have placed Ariosto and Tasso third and fourth on the list of Italian poets, and even given them a conspicuous position among the poets of the world, the *Cinquecento* was not a poetical period. It turned out an immense quantity of verse, often of excellent quality: but of the poetry which stirs the nobler passions and emotions, which deals, as Dante puts it, with love (other than the merely animal), with courage, and with right conduct, we find, save in a sonnet or an ode here and there, few specimens. Always inclined to sensuality rather than to sentiment, to envy rather than to worship, to criticism rather than to admiration, cynical yet not reticent, the Italian genius had received stimulus more than chastening from the revival of letters in the previous century. Cleverness was abundant; character was lacking; and cleverness without character, while it may produce admirably finished verses, polished raillery, and even charming descriptions of beauty, is not a soil in which the highest poetry will thrive. Serious and cleanly-living men there were, no doubt, both clerical and lay. Among the former may be mentioned Giberti, Bishop of Verona, and Cardinals Contarini and Morone; among the latter the critic Ludovico Castelvetro, the scholar Aonio Paleario, and the artist Michelangelo Buonarroti. But the churchmen were preoccupied with the problem of reforming the Church without rending Christendom asunder; and the laymen, with the exception of the last-named (whom Wordsworth has, not without reason, coupled with Dante), had no very great poetic gift. Even in him it manifested itself but sparingly; it was there, however; and enough of his work remains to justify the momentary lapse into seriousness of the usually flippant and mocking Berni, when he calls him "at once a new Apollo and a new Apelles" and bids the commonplaces of elegant verse hold their peace for evermore—"He utters things, the rest of you mere words."

One great merit must be conceded to the men of the *Cinquecento*, the restoration—for Italy, it may almost be said, the introduction—of the vernacular to its rightful place in literature. Two hundred years before, Dante had both by precept and by example made an effort in this direction; but the flood of Humanism had quickly swept it out of sight, and even Petrarch based his hopes of fame far more on his Latin writings than on the vernacular poetry by which alone he is remembered, but which forms hardly more than an infinitesimal portion of his entire work. The tradition of Italian prose was indeed kept alive almost

entirely by the work of one man of universal genius, Leon Battista Alberti (1407-72); but verse practically disappears during the first two-thirds of the century, reviving towards its close in the vigorous, if rugged, romance of Boiardo and the burlesque of Luigi Pulci. The influence of these two writers on Ariosto marks their importance as pioneers in the revival of Italian literature. No man of their contemporaries, however, had more of the true poetic spirit than Lorenzo de' Medici (1448-92). His sonnets and odes (*canzoni*) are of finer quality than any similar verse since the death of Petrarch; and one seems to catch in them at times an echo of the less highly finished but also less self-conscious work of the pre-Petrarchian age, the *dolce stil nuovo* of the expiring thirteenth century. Both he and his friend Politian had felt something of the invigorating influence of the racy Florentine folk-songs; and, if Lorenzo had lived free from the entanglements of politics and statecraft, the course of *Cinquecento* poetry might have taken another turn. Unfortunately the fashion was left to be set by the courtly poets. Cariteo of Naples (1450-1510), a Catalan by birth, imbued with the artificial manner of the later Provençals, and a student of Petrarch, was the coryphaeus of the school. He was seconded by Tebaldeo of Ferrara (1460 c.-1537), the Court poet to the accomplished Marchioness of Mantua, Isabella of Este, and by two other Neapolitans, Serafino of Aquila (1466-1500) and Sannazaro (1458-1530). These, as a somewhat later writer observes, were cast into the shade by Pietro Bembo (1470-1547), the arbiter of letters for his age, who forms a kind of link between Humanists and Cinquecentists. By him, as much as by any man, Italian poetry was directed into the attractive but dangerous path of Petrarchianism, whence a straight track led downwards to the depths of *seicentismo*, with its conceits, its false taste, its insincere sentiment, and general lack of all masculine quality.

We need only glance at any of the numerous anthologies compiled towards the middle of the sixteenth century, to be assured that the faculty of producing verses, more especially sonnets, for the most part faultless in form, was then enjoyed by almost every cultivated person. Now and again one comes across verses bearing the stamp of sincerity, as in the case of Michelangelo (who however was not a favourite with the anthologists, and whose poems had to be "re-made" in order to win any popularity), and his friend Vittoria Colonna, Marchioness of Pescara (1492-1545); but such are rare, and rather than in these, or even in the lyrics generally, the true spirit of the age is to be found in the so-called *capitoli*, or burlesque essays in verse on every sort of subject, mostly trivial and frequently indecent, though more perhaps in the way of allusion and double meaning than in outspoken obscenity. That the metre in which these jocosities were composed was the *terza rima*, invented (as it would seem) by Dante for his sacred poem, and used by Petrarch for his *Triumphs*, possibly added to their piquancy.

This metre, which, save for a metrical chronicle or two, seems to have almost dropped out of use in the fifteenth century (Boccaccio's *ottava rima* being found more available for long narrative poems), had towards the close of it been revived by Lorenzo de' Medici for short, religious meditations, as well as for idylls in the classical style, and by the Venetian Antonio Vinciguerra for satires more or less after the manner of the Romans, in which kind it was presently used by Ariosto, Alamanni, and others. From the Horatian satire to the *capitolo*, at least in its more respectable form, is no very long step; and it is perhaps not surprising that this form of poetic recreation should have attained the popularity that it did.

For a time everybody wrote *capitoli*—prelates, artists, scholars, poets. The most notable exponent of the art was perhaps Francesco Berni (1497–1536), who has given his name to the spirit embodied in this class of literature. Berni is one of the most curious figures of the time, and in some respects typical of the forces at work during the later Renaissance, which, combined with the political conditions, were to bring about the change noticeable after the middle of the century. For the Petrarchians he had little respect. Unlike his contemporary Molza, who could turn out with equal facility an amatory sonnet and an indecent *capitolo*, Berni as a rule avoided any display of sentiment, whether real or fictitious. Even when he is serious the reader is never certain that he will not at any moment fly off into a tissue of whimsicalities. His *capitolo* “*In Praise of Aristotle*,” containing much sane and sensible eulogy of the philosopher, is addressed to a cardinal's French cook, and ends with burlesque regrets that Aristotle had not left a treatise on “roast and boiled, lean and fat.” Yet Berni was more than a flippant cynic. His sincere attachment to such men as Gian Matteo Giberti, the reforming Bishop of Verona, to whom he for a time acted as secretary, or the grave and pious Pietro Carnesecchi, shows that he could appreciate goodness; while the scathing sonnet, couched in a tone of unwonted ferocity, which he hurled at Pietro Aretino, at a time when that infamous personage was in high favour with powerful princes, proves that in the matter of cynicism he was prepared to draw a line. His words on Michelangelo, already quoted (which, curiously enough, he uses also of Aristotle), are evidence that he could respect seriousness in others; and he had a vein of it in himself. For the work by which he is perhaps, or for long was, best known, the *rifacimento*, or recasting, of Boiardo's *Orlando Innamorato* into a style more congenial to the fastidious taste of the *Cinquecento*, he wrote (about 1530) some stanzas, couched, in spite of a few outbreaks of his usual mirthfulness, in what seems a tone of genuine piety. Though we cannot, with Vergerio, regard the lines as evidence of anything in the nature of “conversion” on Berni's part, or, in spite of the phrase “Lutheran means good Christian,” or any definite adhesion to Protestant views, they show that

he had moods in which he regretted the lack of practical religion in Italy, and hoped for better things. Berni died in 1535, not yet forty years old. Had he lived a few years longer he might have shared, at the hands of the papal authority, the doom of his friend Carnesecchi.

Another writer of this period, who has received perhaps less attention than he deserves, is Teofilo Folengo, of Mantua (1492-1543). The mocking spirit which was as powerful in him as in Berni, but manifested itself in a somewhat cruder form, led him to make sport both of the romances of chivalry, long popular in northern Italy, which Boiardo and Pulci had lately brought back into the realm of literature, and of the classical revival, if, as seems probable, the "Macaronic" style, of which he was, though not the inventor, the most conspicuous exponent, was intended to burlesque the achievements of the fourteenth century scholars. Folengo, who began and after an intervening period of reckless and vagabond living ended his career as a Benedictine monk, also had his moods of spiritual perplexity. He has given an allegorical account of his own aberrations, moral and speculative, and of his subsequent conversion (which, as with Dante, appears to have come about at the age of thirty-five) to the right way, in the curious and highly enigmatical work called *Chaos del Triperuno*—a strange farrago of prose and verse, Latin, Italian, and Macaronic, abounding in anagrams and other fanciful devices, with passages of remarkable beauty interspersed here and there, justifying the author's claim that his verses, if not Tuscan, are sonorous and terse. Folengo had written his Macaronic poems under the name of Merlino Cocaio, and later a burlesque Italian epic, the *Orlandino*, under that of Limerno Pitocco. In the *Chaos* he introduces Merlino and Limerno debating the question of Latin *versus* the vernacular, and makes it clear that his sympathy is with the latter. Yet he could turn out a good Latin verse, and was well read in the Classics. The *Macaronea*, or romance of Baldus, has the credit of having given suggestions to Rabelais, and perhaps for that reason has alone preserved the fame of its author; but the *Chaos* is far better worth perusal by anyone who desires to understand a remarkable phase of later Renaissance thought. In the *Orlandino* the author had ventured upon some plain-spoken criticism of the Church and the Orders, such as was safe enough in the early years of Clement VII; in the *Chaos* the censure is repeated, though more covertly, and "evangelical" theology is favourably contrasted with "peripatetic."

No spiritual difficulties disturbed the mind of the one poet of that age whose name is known outside the circle of the closer students of its literature. Ludovico Ariosto, the son of a Ferrarese nobleman, was born in 1474 at Reggio, where his father was governor of the citadel. His natural bent towards letters was not encouraged by his father, a somewhat arbitrary person, who made him study law; and he was twenty before he had a chance of learning at all events classical Latin,

in which he presently composed with elegance and facility. He seems, however, at no time to have come under the influence of the Humanistic fashion, which probably took less root at Ferrara than in most of the other literary centres of Italy. Ferrara was rather the headquarters of the epic based on the medieval chivalric romances. The House of Este could boast by far the oldest pedigree of any of the ruling Italian families, and had a fancy, as it would seem, to claim descent from one of the legendary heroes. Matteo Maria Boiardo, Count of Scandiano (1434-94), the author of the *Orlando Innamorato*, which may be said to be the parent of not only the *Furioso*, but a long line of similar but less conspicuous works, was himself in the service of Dukes Borso and Ercole, and like the elder Ariosto was at one time governor of Reggio. Another citizen of the same State, Francesco Bello, known as the Blind Man of Ferrara, about the same time composed, it would seem, for the Marquis of Mantua, the *Mambriano*, another poem of the same cycle. Ariosto therefore grew up in the atmosphere of the narrative romantic school; and though he could on occasion Petrarchise with the most proficient follower of that style, and indeed acquired a reputation by his early essays in the lyrical line, his slightly cynical genius was not likely to find its expression in that direction. He was twenty years old when Boiardo died, and the *Innamorato* was in every man's mouth—quite a sufficient stimulus for a young man conscious of poetical talent.

The *ottava rima*, which had become the recognised medium for the romance of chivalry, was just the vehicle suited to an intellect like his: humorous, sensible, devoid alike of enthusiasm and of rancour. In this metre it is impossible to be pathetic, or even serious, for more than a very few lines together; the periodical recurrence at short intervals of the sudden interruption to the flow of the verse caused by the rhyming couplet with which each stanza concludes, by cutting the sense into lengths produces a monotony which would be intolerable, did not the same structure lend itself so readily to epigram, or to some quip in the form of a calculated piece of bathos. Of its admirable adaptability to avowed burlesque, Pulci in the last generation had given some evidence, and Tassoni a century later was to give full proof. The oblivion into which, in spite of the efforts of scholars to resuscitate it, Boiardo's really great poem has fallen, is not improbably due to the fact that he took himself too seriously; its best chance of surviving was probably due to Berni's treatment. Apart from the fluency of his diction and the felicity of his phrase, Ariosto lives, because (if the term may be allowed) he kept his tongue in his cheek. From his agreeable *Satires*, to a modern taste perhaps the most readable of all his works, we learn more about the character and circumstances of Ariosto than we know of any great poet since Horace, whom in some respects he resembles. He reveals himself as a sensible, tolerant, ironical man of the world; studious of his own comfort, though without any taste for luxury; devoid of ambition or enthusiasm;

excellent in his family relations; in matters of religion and morals conforming to the rather lax standard of the age, but not falling below it. His patron, Cardinal Ippolito of Este, has incurred much obloquy for a remark alleged to have been made by him to the poet on the appearance of his great work. Yet it is not difficult to believe that to Ariosto himself a considerable part of the machinery of his poem, a good many of the wondrous feats performed by heroes with enchanted arms and preposterous names, would appear most aptly described by the rude and unquotable term which the prelate thought fit to apply to them. Nor does it seem probable that the highly artificial and sophisticated society of an Italian Court can have been deeply moved by the recital of simple, not to say savage, motives, the elementary passions of an age which every reader knew to be mythical. Except in very primitive stages of civilisation fairy tales do not greatly move adults. Ariosto's vogue was no doubt mainly due, partly to the delicate flavour of burlesque which is never absent for many stanzas together, even in passages where one feels that he is really trying to be pathetic (for instance, the death of Brandimarte with the truncated name of his mistress on his lips), and partly to the episodical *novelle*, mostly licentious, but told with admirable wit, rather of the Bernesque order, however, than of the Boccaccesque. The chivalry of Ariosto is obviously as self-conscious and artificial as the Platonic love philosophy of Bembo or the pastoral raptures of Sannazaro.

Two writers indeed of this age leave an impression of absolute sincerity. Baldassare Castiglione (1478-1529) was one of the few men of his time of whom it can be said that all we know of him whether in public or in private life is wholly to his credit. As a young man he was for some years attached to the Court of Urbino, at that time, under Guidubaldo of Montefeltro and his Duchess Elizabeth Gonzaga, standing highest both in culture and in morals of any in Italy. There the best wits of the day, with Bembo at their head, met and debated questions of art, letters, ethics; soldiers, scholars and poets, churchmen and laymen—not always perhaps very distinguishable from one another—were alike welcome. Guidubaldo died in 1508; and a little later (but certainly before the date usually assigned, 1516), Castiglione, doubtless foreseeing that times were at hand which would end these cultivated recreations, set down his reminiscences of them in the form of a book, which he entitled *Il Cortegiano*—"the Perfect Courtier." Purporting to be an answer to a request from one Alfonso Ariosto, a kinsman (it is said) of the poet, for some account of the qualifications required to form a perfect courtier, it professes to narrate a discussion on this subject held at Urbino in the spring of 1506. How far it is founded on anything that had really taken place is uncertain, and the author had selected a date for it when he himself was absent in England; but we may safely assume that similar conversations were a common form of

diversion at the Feltrian Court, and that in many of these Castiglione had taken part. Reading it, one is transported into a world as remote on the one hand from the prurient indecencies of the *capitoli* as it is on the other from the treacheries and assassinations of which we have ample evidence elsewhere. A spirit of "sweet reasonableness" pervades the whole discussion; one might think that the cardinal virtues were taken for granted, and that the only question was how they could best be acquired. It is true that some of the jests and anecdotes used by way of illustration without disapproval on the part of either of the two eminently virtuous ladies who direct the conversation are somewhat freer than would now be permissible in a similar company; but they are open and above board. Nothing of the nature of innuendo or double meaning is to be found from one end to the other. The question as to the duty of a courtier in the case of his prince giving him an order to commit murder does once come to the front, and is, it must be said, fenced with; but this dilemma, of which examples must have been familiar to all the company, is avowedly put as an extreme case. Ultimately, after touching on many topics, some sufficiently remote from the main subject, the dialogue comes round to the character of the prince himself; and the good prince is sketched, in terms such as the moralists of all ages and countries had made familiar. "God," we are told, "delights in, and is the protector of those princes who will imitate Him not in display of power and demand of adoration from men, but in striving to be like Him in goodness and wisdom; whereby they may be His ministers, distributing for the good of mankind the gifts which they receive from Him." The good prince will give his subjects such laws as will enable them to live at ease, and enjoy what should be the end of all their actions, namely, peace. He will teach them the art of war, not out of lust for empire, but that they may defend themselves against a possible tyrant, succour the oppressed, or reduce to subjection, for their own better government, such as may deserve it. Penalties should be for amendment or prevention, not vindictive.

Castiglione's ideal of civil government is, it will be seen, not very unlike that expounded by Dante two hundred years before in the *De Monarchia*, and somewhat later sketched by Petrarch in his treatise addressed to Francesco da Carrara. Petrarch's maxims, "Nothing is more alien to the nobility of principedom than the wish to be feared," "Love, if you would be beloved," "Love your neighbour as yourself," are all implicitly contained in the idea which the interlocutors of the *Cortegiano* have formed of a good prince. The spirit of medieval chivalry (too seldom, it may be feared, exemplified in the practice even of the Middle Ages, but at any rate recognised and respected) pervades the whole book. The *Cortegiano* was privately circulated for many years before it was published. When it did appear in 1528 it was received with the applause of Christendom. Within a generation it had been

translated into all the principal European languages, and before the end of the century had been reprinted in one or another of them more than a hundred times. Castiglione, as has been said, was beyond doubt absolutely sincere. In him, as Charles V observed when he died, the world lost one of its best gentlemen, *los mejores caballeros*. He held that not the number but the goodness of his subjects makes the greatness of a prince. Upon prince and people he enjoins *le virtù*—the virtues, as generally understood, not *virtù*, “efficiency”; and in the teeth, as it now seems to us, of all contemporary experience, he sincerely believes that in this way the prince might achieve security and his subjects tranquillity. The influence of the *Cortegiano* cannot be traced to any great extent in subsequent history.

A very different destiny awaited another book written almost at the same moment. The *Prince* and its author have been fully dealt with in an earlier volume. Here it is only needful to recall that this work also circulated for many years in manuscript before it was given to the press; that, though it was then reproduced with fair frequency, its popularity never came within a long distance of that enjoyed by the *Courtier*; that it became at once the mark for a storm of criticism, and long before the century was out had made its author's name a by-word in Europe for all that was unscrupulous and dishonest in politics; while its maxims are those which have governed the practice of statesmen in general for the last three hundred years. Machiavelli, it may be noted, knows nothing of chivalry, and even less of the Sermon on the Mount. Do to others, not as you would they should do to you, but as you suspect they would like to do to you, is his principle of government.

From the publication of the *Prince* more than from the Sack of Rome, or the religious troubles in Germany, or any other of the events to which it has been referred, the end of the Renaissance may be dated. Both on its weaker and its stronger side it was countered by such views of social and civil relations as those which Machiavelli formulated. It had depended largely on make-believe; Machiavelli insisted on looking facts fairly in the face. It set a high value on a lettered and studious life, which Machiavelli, though enjoying it himself, held in small esteem. It encouraged individualism; and with individualism *raison d'état*, of which Machiavelli was the first great exponent, has never made any terms. The maxim, “It is expedient that one man die for the people,” would have commanded his instant adhesion.

Machiavelli at any rate was in earnest; Humanism had never been entirely so; still less, as we have seen, the greatest writers in the revived vernacular. The Renaissance had eaten enough, drunk enough, and played enough; it was time for it to be gone. Italy, too, had now begun to reap the full fruit of the fatal policy begun by Urban IV, when he called in Charles of Anjou to make an end of the Hohenstaufen dynasty in Naples. For nearly three hundred years the rivalry had

continued. Hohenstaufen had passed its claim on to Aragon, Aragon to Habsburg; while that of Anjou was defended by the Crown of France. The Peace of Crépy finally awarded the prize to Spain; and, though Paul IV made one more attempt to revive the traditional policy of the Popes, and a French army appeared once more on Italian soil, the ruler of Spain was now ruler also of Flanders, and a battle in north-eastern France decided that the "Kingdom" was to remain under Spanish rule. Milan was in the like case; the republic of Florence had fallen for the last time in 1530; Siena held out till 1555; but it may be said that from 1544 onwards Italy outside the republic of Venice was under the domination either of Spain directly, or of local despots, incapable, even if they had been so minded, of offering any resistance to Spain—a condition of things clearly unpropitious to the growth of original or vigorous literature.

Other causes too were at work, arising doubtless more or less directly out of this. With the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis wars ceased for the time to be waged for the acquisition of territory. Such as were waged during the remainder of the century were fought in a cause which pre-eminently withdraws men's interest from all other topics—that of their right to hold their own opinions. A man of letters can go on comfortably enough with his work, so long as he knows that the defeat of his own side will merely mean that he will have to pay court and taxes to another Prince; it is otherwise when it may involve the termination not of his literary labours only but of his life and liberty as well. Italy was indeed free from the actual war which in the course of the century devastated Germany, France, and the Netherlands; men had not even the opportunity of fighting for their opinions. But the danger was none the less pressing. The Church, which presently condemned Machiavelli's writings, showed itself an adept in his methods. That the end justifies the means, and that the prudent ruler will seek to be feared rather than loved, were maxims in favour no less with the spiritual than with the temporal powers. The Inquisition, imported from Spain by Paul III in 1542, and its companion institution, the Index of Prohibited Books, were not compatible with an independent literature. "The study of the liberal arts is deserted, the young men wanton in idleness and wander about the public squares." Such is the observation of Aonio Paleario, a scholar who in later years had good reason to know all about the Holy Office. Paul IV, to whom, as Cardinal Caraffa, the inception of the new system had been due, wielded its weapons with fresh vigour. The publication of one heretical work rendered all books issued by the same publisher liable to prohibition. Nor was the use of this "poniard drawn against men of letters" confined to official initiative. To shout or, better, whisper "heretic" was an effective way of getting rid of a literary rival. It was in this way that Ludovico Castelvetro of Modena (1505–71), the most eminent critic of his day, was driven to fly for his life and seek

an asylum in the territories of the Grey Leagues, where the papal writ did not run. Nor was safety in all cases attained by abstinence from publishing. Carnesecchi, imprudently venturing back to his native Florence, in reliance on the personal friendship of Duke Cosimo, was there arrested, it is said at the dinner-table of his patron, by order of Pius V, taken to Rome, tried on a number of charges, of most of which he had already under a former Pope been acquitted, and after many months of imprisonment, not without torture, executed in 1567. Yet Carnesecchi had, so far as is known, published nothing. The accusations against him referred entirely to matters of opinion, as expressed in private correspondence and conversation. As an illustration of the methods introduced by the so-called Counter-Reformation, the case of Carnesecchi is perhaps more notable than the more often quoted one of Giordano Bruno. The latter, as an apostate monk, a loose liver, the wielder of an acrid and often scurrilous pen, had at least given provocation and caused something of scandal in several countries of Europe. Nothing of the sort could be charged against the gentle and decorous ex-protonotary of Clement VII, who, whatever may have been his speculative opinions, had never broken with the Church, and, so far as appears, had kept all its ordinances blameless. Carnesecchi's relations with the Catholic reformers have been referred to in an earlier volume. But he was not only the friend of Giulia Gonzaga, of Valdes, Flaminio, and Pole; he was also on intimate and affectionate terms with the artists and men of letters who frequented Rome in the days of Clement VII. Friendly mention of him occurs in the *capitoli* of Berni, Mauro, Molza, and others; Michelangelo, Sebastian del Piombo, Benvenuto Cellini, were among his acquaintances. He was somewhat under sixty years of age at the time of his death; his adult life coincides almost exactly with the period from the Sack of Rome to the promulgation of the decrees of Trent; and a survey of his career and fate affords as striking an indication as could well be found of the distance which the world had travelled between those events.

By the middle of the century most of the more eminent names in the literature of its early years had disappeared. Ariosto, Berni, Molza, Machiavelli, Castiglione, had all been dead a longer or a shorter time. Bembo became a Cardinal in old age, and lingered till 1547. Among the veterans surviving was Giovanni della Casa, now Archbishop of Benevento, who atoned for the laxity of his earlier life and writings by the zeal he displayed in the suppression of heretics. He had yet five years to live; and it was three years longer before his most popular work, the *Galateo*, a manual of good manners, not devoid of humour, made its appearance. The long life of Sperone Speroni (1500-88) constitutes him a link between the age of Ariosto and that of Tasso, and perhaps accounts for the reputation which he enjoyed in his lifetime, but which posterity has not sustained. He received his education under Pomponazzo,

and lived to have his opinion sought by Ronsard and to receive a letter on the condition of Paris in 1582. The neglect into which his writings have fallen is perhaps scarcely deserved. He was an early champion of the vernacular against the claims made for Latin, and staunch in his admiration of Dante at a time when the academic taste of a decadent age affected to depreciate him. He also claimed to have made Italian a vehicle for philosophic discussion, for which Latin alone had hitherto been regarded as suitable. The dialogue was his favourite form of literary expression, and he managed it often with pleasing effect. His tragedy in the classical style, *Canace*, though now hardly readable, has a certain importance in the history of the drama. In it appears for the first time the irregular metre, composed chiefly of short, uneven lines, which was afterwards adopted by Tasso in the *Aminta* and by Guarini in the *Pastor Fido*; and which we now associate mainly with opera. Another of its characteristics, the blending of rhymed and unrhymed lines, has a singularly unpleasing effect to a foreign ear, but seems never to have lost its attraction for Italians. The piece is however chiefly notable for the protracted literary controversy to which it gave rise; of which to a modern reader the most curious feature is perhaps that it deals entirely with questions of literary form and dramatic structure.

The offensiveness of the subject does not appear to have struck the author (who, it must in justice be said, has treated it as decently as was possible) or his critics, as in any way unsuited to dramatic representation. This however is but characteristic of the period. The tragedies of Giovanbattista Giraldi, called Cinthio (1504–73), as well as his novels, afford constant testimony to the appetite of the contemporary public for sanguinary and horrible fiction. It would seem as if the taste of the age, seared by the horrors which it saw around it in actual life, required something very drastic to secure the purging of the passions which, its trusted authority had told it, was the aim of tragedy. One who had lived through the Sack of Rome would hardly obtain from the most revolting situations of the *Orbecche* or the *Selene* anything more than an agreeable shudder. For anything like true pathos or real insight into the human heart the reader of these productions will seek in vain. The artificiality which taints the whole imaginative literature of the time is here also conspicuous; and the heroes and heroines of tragedy are as conventional and as unlike the human beings whom we know as the shepherds and nymphs of the pastorals. Even the novels, in which the Italian genius is perhaps seen to most advantage, are full of “common form” and often wearisome from mannerism. Besides Cinthio, the most noted writers in this line were Matteo Bandello (1490–1561), a Dominican who became Bishop of Agen, and is judged by Italian critics to be the most successful imitator of Boccaccio; Anton Francesco Grazzini, called Il Lasca, who was also a copious writer of *capitoli* in the Bernesque style, and who, living from 1503 to 1584, forms another link between the days of

Leo X and those of Pius V, Sebastiano Erizzo, Gianfrancesco Straparola of Caravaggio, in some ways the most original of all, and Girolamo Parabosco. With the exception of Grazzini, whose stories did not see the light till the middle of the eighteenth century, all these published their collections of tales between 1550 and 1567.

This remarkable output of fiction points to a certain stagnation in speculative and other serious modes of literary activity. But the fiction itself illustrates the change that had come over society. From Boccaccio to Firenzuola every novelist had drawn much of his most popular and most scandalous material from the alleged doings of the clergy, both regular and secular. This had now become too risky a source of entertainment; and of the writers just named (with one exception in the case of Parabosco), only Bandello, who when his stories were published was safe in his French see, and Grazzini, who, as has been said, did not entrust his to the press, have ventured to avail themselves of it. In point of morals they are in no way better than their predecessors; and the taste for horrors already referred to is conspicuous, especially in the case of Cinthio, whose work, by the way, passed no less formidable a scrutiny than that of Cardinal Michele Ghislieri, the future Pope Pius V; but the Church is left alone. The principle was carried to its furthest point when a few years later the *Decameron* of Boccaccio was twice "reformed" by the substitution of lay for clerical personages throughout; the incidents, even the most indecent, remaining otherwise unchanged. Some outward improvement in morals probably did take place in the latter half of the century; it may be imputed as a merit to Pius V that he hung Niccolo Franco, once the friend, in later days the enemy, always the rival in obscenity, of Pietro Aretino; but the reputation which, as is proved by contemporary memoirs and letters, Italians enjoyed in a country so far from strait-laced as France, is enough to show that little real amendment of morals had been brought about.

Didactic poetry, so far as the modern languages are concerned, may be said to have been an invention of this period. Among the earliest of the didactic poets is the Florentine Luigi Alamanni (1495-1556), who in early years took a part in the heated politics of his native city, which led to his exile. He took refuge in France, where he spent the latter half of his life, and enjoyed the favour of two Kings. Here he published in 1546 his poem, *La Coltivazione*, which, though the *Api* of Rucellai had preceded it by a few years, may be regarded as practically the first example in this kind. For Rucellai's poem belongs more properly to another class, which was to become increasingly popular, as direct imitation of the classical authors in their own tongue went out of fashion—that is to say, the rendering of their works into the vernacular. *Le Api*, though expanded, it may be said diluted, by additions of the author's, is in substance, a translation of the Fourth *Georgic*. Alamanni, on the other hand, while borrowing freely from Virgil wherever his

matter afforded an opening, has introduced so much that is his own, both in the handling of the theme proper and in the more ornamental parts, that his work may fairly be called original. The influence of the classical tradition is plainly seen in the invocations of pagan deities with which every book opens, and generally in the exclusive employment of the pagan pantheon, as well as in the adulatory passages addressed to Francis I and other members of the French royal House. Something of the didactic spirit pervades Alamanni's chivalric romance, *Giron il Cortese*. In this curious poem the author attempts to adapt to the taste of a generation which had shed the last remnant of medievalism and had almost ceased to understand banter, a form of poetry which a large admixture of the humorous element had made acceptable to its fathers. He eschews all the supernatural business of wizard and fairy; and the narrative is constructed solely with the view of exhibiting the merits of its hero, and demonstrating by his example the beauties of the virtue which he illustrates. Alamanni keeps, it has been said, a school of courtesy open to all comers, and gives a complete course on the subject. In spite of the somewhat eccentric judgment of Varchi, who to the scandal of later Italian critics is said to have preferred it to the *Furioso*, the *Giron* is now forgotten; but the *Coltivazione* can still be read with pleasure by those upon whom the languid cadence of Italian blank verse (a recent, and perhaps not very fortunate introduction of Giovan Giorgio Trissino) does not pall. It has also a special claim on our regard as the first notable essay in a class of poetry for which the English genius has shown itself specially adapted. In a sense the *Coltivazione* may be said to be the spiritual progenitor of the *Seasons*, the *Task*, and the *Excursion*.

Something has already been said of the tendency shown by literature in the days of its greatest vigour and brilliancy to centre itself in the Courts of the various Italian Princes. To the Courts the custom was no doubt beneficial, humanising and refining a society which otherwise might not improbably have found its sole recreation in the coarser forms of animal enjoyment; but to letters it was not an unmixed advantage. The desire to please and amuse a patron, or to earn the immediate applause of a coterie, does not conduce to the production of the highest and most durable class of work. When the change in the political circumstances of Italy had shorn the Courts of their brilliancy, and at the same time rendered independent thinking dangerous, the tendency to fall back on the coterie for encouragement becomes more conspicuous; and it is from this time that we may date the widespread development of Academies in Italy. The idea was of course not new. Soon after the middle of the fifteenth century a number of humanists had founded an academy at Rome for the purpose of research and learned intercourse. For one or another reason, however, this had fallen under suspicion, and its members were severely treated by Paul II. It revived again in the

palmy days of Leo X, to be finally broken up by the Sack of Rome, which scattered its members, or such as escaped with their lives, abroad throughout Italy—many in a state of indigence, most with the loss of books and all portable property. The Platonic Academy, founded at Florence by Cosimo de' Medici, fostered by Lorenzo, and continued, perhaps in a somewhat more social and less learned form by the famous meetings in the gardens of Bernardo Rucellai, survived till 1522, when a conspiracy, in which several of its members were involved, against Cardinal Giulio de' Medici, then governing Florence, caused the execution of some, and the exile of others, among the latter being Alamanni. The Neapolitan Academy, which numbered among its earliest members the humanist Beccadelli, called Panormita, and Pontanus, lasted long enough to include Sannazaro, but seems soon after the beginning of the century to have broken up into a number of smaller societies. These, as often happened, came under suspicion as centres of heterodox opinions, and perhaps also of political disaffection; and the Viceroy, Don Pedro de Toledo, who had been baffled by the united opposition of the nobles and the commons in an attempt to introduce the Inquisition, found it expedient to dissolve them. In the place of these older institutions, founded for the most part in the interest of serious learning, there sprang up all over Italy a host of bodies, bearing fantastic names, and partaking largely of the character of mutual admiration societies. At best they occupied themselves with polite literature, laying down rules for composition and the use of words, or debating trivial points of taste. Among the best known were the *Umidi* of Florence (afterwards the Florentine Academy), the *Inflammati* of Padua, and the *Intronati* of Siena. The most famous of all, and the only one that has survived till the present day, was the *Accademia della Crusca*, founded in 1572 by Grazzini and other members of the Florentine Academy. Their great vocabulary of the language, though belonging to the prescientific era of philology, was the earliest attempt made to produce a full record of a modern language, and is still of great service. It was constantly reprinted with improvements between 1612 and 1738, and is at present under revision.

One not unimportant result of this close attention to style and structure was that Italian, having been the latest of the European tongues to come into existence as a literary language, was the earliest of them to complete the process and emerge in the form which has practically continued till our own day. Before the end of the sixteenth century, at a time when French to some extent, English and German still more, retained traces of archaism, Italian was being written to all intents and purposes, both in prose and verse, as the best writers write it now. This early perfecting of the instrument of expression, by making the thing to be said of less importance than the mode of saying it, doubtless contributed to the dethronement of Italian literature from the position which up till about the middle of that century it had held in Europe.

It is significant that among the host of translations from Italian into English which were made during the reigns of Elizabeth and James I., a very small proportion consists of works published after 1560. On the other hand, translations from ancient authors into Italian become increasingly popular. Anguillara's *Metamorphoses*, Annibale Caro's *Æneid*, Davanzati's *Tacitus*, have done as much for the fame of those translators as all their other works; while Francesco Strozzi's *Thucydides*, the architect Andrea Palladio's *Cæsar*, and Lorenzo Vendramin's translations from Cicero are examples of the same kind of work by less known writers. Even the Latin works of Italian authors began to appear in a vernacular dress. Thus Sansovino made a new version of the treatise of Peter Crescentius on agriculture, stating in his dedication to Duke Guidubaldo of Urbino that, though the Duke knew plenty of Greek and Latin, he was sure that he preferred "this most sweet and most honoured tongue," and reedited Acciaiuoli's translation of Leonardo Bruni's *History of Florence*, the Latin original being yet unprinted. A similar fate befell Dante's treatise *De Vulgari Eloquentia*, a translation of which by Giovan Giorgio Trissino appeared in 1529, while the original had to wait yet half a century for publication. The revenge of the vernacular may be said to have been complete.

The change which passed over literature in the period under consideration is perhaps nowhere better illustrated than in the careers of Bernardo and Torquato Tasso, father and son. Their joint lives almost exactly coincide with the century, extending from 1493 to 1595. Bernardo, the father, lost his own parents early, but showing literary promise was educated at the cost of his uncle, a bishop. Following the usual practice of men of letters, he attached himself in course of time to various persons of rank. In 1528 he was with the Duchess Renée of Ferrara, and was thus at that Court during the later years of Ariosto's residence in the city. Afterwards he was for many years attached to Ferrante Sanseverino, Prince of Salerno, with whom, or in his service, he went at various times to Tunis, Spain, Flanders, and Germany. At forty-six he married, and began to set seriously to work on the romantic epic which was the ultimate ambition of every poet at that time—more than sixty works of the kind are said to have appeared in the course of the century. He had already a reputation as a writer of the fashionable pastorals and sonnets. He had also experimented not unsuccessfully with various forms of stanza, shorter than those of the old *canzone*, including the Spanish *quintillas*. For the theme of his great work, at the instance of certain Spanish nobles, he adopted the tale of Amadis de Gaula, which in both Spanish and French versions had achieved such a popularity that the sage La Noue a little later felt obliged to inveigh against it as the type of the romances on which in his view his countrymen wasted their time. Its influence on the career of Don Quixote will also be remembered. Much of Bernardo Tasso's *Amadigi* was composed under

difficulties. His patron fell into disgrace as having taken a prominent part in the opposition to the Viceroy's scheme of introducing the Inquisition, and transferred to the French interest such support as after banishment and confiscation it remained in his power to give. Tasso, involved in the same condemnation, lost all his property. His wife died; and he with difficulty obtained the custody of his son Torquato, a boy of twelve. Finally he found hospitality at the Court of Urbino. Here the poem was completed, not without much consultation of Speroni (whose advice to write in blank verse Tasso had happily disregarded), Varchi, Giraldis, and many other eminent critics. Here we see the academic system in full operation. Rather than rely on their own judgment and face criticism, writers had come to prefer forestalling it, by shaping their work in accordance with the taste of all potential critics. The natural result followed. The *Amadigi*, published at Venice in 1560, was received with general applause, and has ever since sunk deeper and deeper into oblivion, in spite of the admitted beauty of its versification and the skill of its construction.

Torquato Tasso (1544-95), when his father died, had already achieved some reputation by his *Rinaldo*, published, somewhat to his father's regret, when he was but eighteen. He was then in the service of Cardinal Ludovico of Este. For him, as for so many of his predecessors, the Court of Ferrara provided shelter and livelihood during the greater part of his troubled existence; and, if his relations with its lord were less happy than those of earlier poets, there seems no reason to ascribe the fact to any intentional unkindness on the part of his patron, still less to any voluntary misbehaviour of his own. Tasso's life has been recorded more frequently and more minutely, perhaps, than that of any other poet ancient or modern; while his character and conduct, his personal affairs generally, have given rise to an all but unparalleled amount of discussion. Tasso was a man of true poetical genius, of a singularly refined and sensitive nature. His early life, surrounded by domestic troubles, and largely spent in wandering with his father from place to place, furnished the worst training possible for a nervous lad of precocious intellect. As he grew up, the prospect must, to a man of imagination, have been profoundly depressing. The only career open to a young man in Italy by which any fame could be earned was that of letters; and even there the chances were not very promising, with the inquisitor on the one hand, and the pedant on the other, ready to pounce upon all that showed boldness of thought or originality of expression. From the latter we gather that Tasso suffered much; of the Inquisition he had a constant, though causeless dread. In 1575, and again in 1579, we find him going out of his way to consult inquisitors as to some imagined heterodoxy which he fancied himself to have detected in his own opinions. Self-consciousness, the constant anxiety to know what people think of you, was the malady of the age; and Tasso

was its first and most illustrious victim. The sense of humour, which is, perhaps, its best antidote, had perished in Italy; nor has it often revived since. From one end of the *Gerusalemme* to the other there is not a laugh. On the contrary, the fountain of laughter is a perilous snare, which good knights are bidden to shun with disdainful visage as something impious and soul-destroying. It was this fatal tendency to take life too seriously, that, more than the vivacity of his wit or the keenness and accuracy of his apprehension, brought Tasso, at the age of thirty-six, to the pitiful condition which moved Montaigne to anger even more than to pity. Tasso has been called "the heir of Dante, gone astray in mid-Renaissance." With Dante's faith and moral seriousness, however, he failed to combine Dante's power of defiance; and the lack of it brought him to the madhouse. The possession of it, however, would probably have brought him to the halter and stake.

Montaigne praises Tasso for judgment and ingenuity. The former quality he showed very clearly in his selection of the theme for his great poem, and in his decision to adopt for its treatment the epic rather than the romantic manner. The Carolingian and Arthurian cycles had not perhaps possessed much "actuality," even for the generations which welcomed and enjoyed the *Morgante* and the two *Orlandos*; but they lent themselves admirably to the sub-flavour of burlesque, in which, as has been seen, those generations delighted. What could be made of them when treated seriously and with reverence the *Amadigi* was there to show; and Tasso, dutiful son though he was, could not but be aware that such success as his father's poem had had was due less to its own interest than to the personal esteem in which the writer was held by some whose verdict would set the fashion, and that it was not likely to be repeated. The Crusades, on the other hand, were sufficiently remote to have become heroic, yet sufficiently recent to retain some vital interest, especially at a moment when the Muslim power was a real and pressing terror to Christendom. It was characteristic of the age, but perhaps a testimony to the enduring qualities of the poem, that a controversy, futile but none the less animated, at once arose as to its merits in comparison with the *Furioso*. It lasted for at least two hundred years; by the end of which time critics began to see that the two were not *in pari materia*, and that personal preference was no fit canon of judgment.

If the Renaissance, with its materialism, its self-satisfaction, its reluctance to look facts in the face, had led to the decay of imaginative literature, it may claim, perhaps in virtue of these very qualities, to have cleared the ground in other directions, and made possible the development of other branches of literary composition, which in their modern form took their rise in the latter half of the century. Vasari's *Lives of the Painters* appeared in 1550, when its author had just entered on his fortieth year. Modern research may have detected blunders

in it ; but at any rate Vasari undertook his work, as his account of its inception shows, with a full consciousness of the value of accuracy, and we may suppose with an honest intention of achieving it. It marks the first stirring of the scientific spirit in history, the desire to get at facts first. Biography becomes increasingly common ; and, just as ordered history takes the place of the older chronicles, valuable in their way, and often charming in their artlessness, but for the most part devoid of criticism or arrangement, so the domestic records, which had been frequent in Italian families, pass into regular memoirs, like those of Benvenuto Cellini, the spiritual father it may be said of all who have written autobiography. The kindred art of letter-writing, not unsuccessfully cultivated by Berni, Casa, and others, reached, so far as the modern vernaculars are concerned, after the middle of the *Cinquecento* as high a stage as it ever held. The supremacy in this, as in memoir writing, subsequently passed to France ; but Italy holds her own at first with the elegant and copious correspondence of the younger Tasso, and the racy letters full of keen observation written to his friends at home by the Florentine merchant, Filippo Sassetti (1540-88), from Portugal and India, in 1580 and the following years. In reading these letters, which but for an occasional Florentinism, and a little more ceremony in address than is now common, might have been written in the last century, it is hard to realise that the writer might, so far as dates go, have received the episcopal benediction of Monsignore Bembo. The mere statement of the fact may serve to remind us that the real line of separation between the medieval and the modern world has to be sought, not in the fifteenth, still less in the fourteenth century, but about—rather after than before—the middle of the sixteenth.

CHAPTER XV.

SPAIN UNDER PHILIP II.

THE impossible task undertaken by the Emperor Charles V in his youth had worn him out, mentally and bodily, at an age when most men are in their prime. From the beginning he had proceeded on the assumption that he and his were the chosen instruments by means of which God's cause must finally triumph over impious rebellion. Popes, kings, and peoples, the institution of the Church itself, were but pawns to be used according to his inspired direction. The idea of a Christendom religiously unified, with a Spanish Caesar politically supreme, was the end aimed at; and the Emperor recognised quite early in the struggle that the life of one man was too short to see the fruition of the dream. His only son Philip had from his birth been schooled in the cynical distrust and wary patience which formed his father's system, and in the belief in his divine selection to succeed the Emperor in his great task. Philip inherited both the policy and the methods, neither of which he could have changed, even if he had desired to do so. The policy thus inherited was in the main Aragonese in its immediate political purpose. The dream of a Romance empire on the Gulf of Lyons under the King of Aragon had been destroyed by the advance of France southward to the Mediterranean; but the prevention of French extension eastward, which had always been the object of Aragonese policy, had become of vital importance to Spain when Charles had succeeded to the Empire and the Burgundian heritage, as well as to the championship of religious unity. Spain provided the bulk of the men and money required; and the hold of the Spanish Caesar over Italy had to be complete, in order to secure a passage for troops from one part of his dominions to another, and to prevent the Papacy from thwarting him by uniting France and Italy against him. This necessity imposed upon the Emperor and his successor the maintenance of a close friendship with England, and the preservation of contentment in the Emperor's Flemish dominions; the first, in order to hold France in check at sea, and the second, to render her innocuous on her northern land frontier. This was the position to which Philip succeeded. It was recognised, after much discussion, in 1551 that Philip's desire to succeed to the Empire must be postponed;

and one of the conditions imposed upon Ferdinand when he was placed before his nephew in the Imperial succession was that the suzerainty of the Empire over certain of the Italian States should be exercised by Spain. This, as will be seen, was absolutely necessary if Spain was to assume, as she did, the burden of carrying out the work of religious unification to which Charles and his son were pledged.

The vacant duchy of Milan had been conferred upon Philip in 1546, and he had been proclaimed King of Naples when he married Mary Tudor in 1554. Shortly afterwards his father granted to him the vicariate of the republic of Siena, when it should be conquered—as it was in 1555. The tentacles of Spain thus reached over Italy. The Farnesi, long estranged, were lured by the bait of Parma and Piacenza, whilst Genoa and Mantua remained as ever in the Emperor's pay.

While yet in England, Philip assumed the control of Italy. His position there was difficult and anomalous. The Emperor's viceroys had grown independent and resented interference; the duchy of Milan was a fief of the Empire; Naples and Sicily were independent kingdoms, except for a repudiated claim for papal homage; and in Siena Philip was his father's substitute, claiming suzerainty over the republic by virtue of force. Philip, when in England, took the bold course of sending the Duke of Alva to Italy as his representative, much to the Emperor's dissatisfaction. Alva's methods and his vast ambition for Philip and for himself were well known; but those around the King in England, especially his favourite Ruy Gomez, whose influence was in favour of peace, were anxious at any cost to get Alva away from England and Flanders, where he could have done most harm; and he was sent to Italy to hold it in his grip for its new master, and to humble Pope Paul IV (Caraffa), who hated Charles, Philip, and the Spaniards with true Neapolitan rancour.

When Philip left England on August 26, 1555, he knew that the master-stroke of policy which was to tie England to Spain for ever had failed, and that new devices must be adopted to hold that outpost of his fortress when his English wife should die. For the moment more pressing claims called him to his father's side. The Emperor could wait no longer for his rest. Philip was twenty-eight years of age, but prudent and experienced beyond his years. Thanks to the influence of Ruy Gomez he had freed himself from Alva's plans for the Imperial succession. With a burden thus lightened he dreamed that he might succeed better than his father had done in the main object of his life. He was never light-hearted, and he did not disguise from himself the difficulties of his task. An absolute and crushing want of means dogged him from the first; Italy was in a state of turmoil, and the Flemings were already frowning on their new Prince. But Philip shouldered his burden with a dull, plodding determination to do his best, and to sacrifice everything to his view of duty. There was no enthusiasm; only the conviction of inevitable destiny, that doomed him to labour patiently

with utterly inadequate means, assured of final triumph in the cause, because it was that of God, of Spain, and of himself.

On January 16, 1556, three months after the transfer of the Flemish sovereignty, the memorable assembly of Spanish grandees in Brussels witnessed the surrender to Philip of the historic Crowns of Spain, the Emperor retaining his Imperial title yet for a time at the prayer of his brother Ferdinand. But, though Charles might thus accede to Ferdinand's wish for delay, he was determined that nothing should stand between Spain and the dominion over Italy; and by two secret documents, now at Simancas, Philip's protectorate over Siena was confirmed, and all future Kings of Spain were authorised to exercise the Imperial suzerainty over Italy. Philip now stood alone. He was conscientious, clement, and well-meaning, and he loved peace; but his outlook was limited on all sides by his conception of his mission; and dissent from his will was impious blasphemy. Human suffering and earthly sacrifice were as nothing, if the divine cause triumphed and the sovereign appointed as its champion was acknowledged supreme amongst the sons of men.

Slowly and reluctantly, Philip was forced to understand after Mary Tudor's death in November, 1558, that England was slipping through his fingers. Politic always, but determined not to be patronised, the new Queen of England played and paltered with all the approaches which he made to her. Philip's English adherents promptly changed their colours; and the Spanish ambassador, Feria, could only tire his master's ears with the one theme, that England should be conquered by fire and sword before it was consolidated under the new dispensation. But Philip was slow, and hated violence; Ruy Gomez and the churchman Granvelle were by his side in Flanders; Alva was far away in Italy; and a new policy which commended itself to the peace party was adopted by Philip—a policy which, though it had been tried again and again and had failed, this time for a few short months looked as if it might bring to Spain the triumph upon which now depended almost its national existence. In his peace-negotiations with France Philip for some time stood out on the question of the restitution of Calais to England; but when it became clear to him that Elizabeth was not to be cajoled or coerced into accepting his protection, the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis was signed (April 2, 1559), and England's ancient foothold in France was lost. As had been the case with his father Francis I in the Peace of Crépy, Henry II was mainly moved in his desire for peace with Spain by the growing strength of the Reformation in France, and a desire to join the other great Catholic Power in its suppression. So long as any hope whatever remained to Philip of retaining his hold on England he had listened courteously, but coolly, to the French advances; but when the French King's fears had become acute and England was drifting ever further away, Philip made such a bargain as seemed, for the time at least, to promise a rich compensation

for the defection of his late wife's kingdom. By the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis France surrendered nearly all her Italian claims and conquests; Savoy (but without Saluzzo and Pignerol) was restored to its own Duke. Siena went to the Medici; Corsica was handed to the Genoese; and, to the dismay and surprise of Frenchmen, they saw themselves treated as vanquished after a war in which they had in the main been victorious. Henry II offered to give the flower of his flock, his child Elizabeth, not yet fourteen, to Philip as his third wife, as a pledge of future friendship between France and Spain, which Philip accepted with feigned reluctance; and for all this concession—apart from the conquest of Calais from England—all that Henry II obtained was the secret compact by which Philip bound himself to join hands with the French King for the purpose of opposing heresy throughout Christendom. The scheme, at least so far as Philip was concerned, was not directed specifically against England; for the presence of Elizabeth on the throne, so long as she was not actively aggressive, was infinitely preferable to the accession of the next legal heiress, Mary of Scotland, married to Henry's heir, the Dauphin Francis. But the union of the Catholic Powers would render the English Queen impotent for harm; and, what was perhaps of more importance still, it would secure Philip against French interference in favour of the Reformers, if he decided to begin his reign by stamping out ruthlessly any spark of heresy that might be kindling in his own dominions.

Philip in the meanwhile was impatient to get back to Spain, the country of his heart. He had no sympathy with the habits and traditions of the Netherlanders and Flemings whom his father had loved so well. He spoke French badly, and Flemish not at all: the outspoken roughness and the independence of his subjects in the Low Countries galled him, accustomed as he had been to an almost complete autocracy in Castile, where the parliamentary institutions, once so vigorous, had been fatally weakened forty years before when the Commons were beaten at Villalar. Above and before all money was needed for the work he had been set to do; and in his realms of Castile alone could money be had at his behest. Other reasons, beside his homesickness and his poverty, drew him at this time towards his own people so irresistibly as to make Feria, one of his closest friends, exclaim in July, 1559, "It is of no use saying anything more about the voyage to Spain; for if the world itself were to crumble there would be no change in that."

The main tie that bound together the various autonomous territories of which Spain consisted was the spiritual pride and religious exaltation cunningly promoted by Ferdinand the Catholic of Aragon and his wife the Queen of Castile as a means of unity. The activity of the Inquisition for seventy years since then (1490) had been popular with the majority of the people; for it had flattered their intensely individualistic pride to feel that they were of the elect, and that in the

system to which they belonged there was no room for those upon whose faith lay the slightest suspicion. The ruler of Germany might be forced to hold parley with vassals who dared to deny the religious infallibility of the Church; the King Consort of England might for political reasons smile upon courtiers whose heresy was but thinly veiled, and do his best to temper the burning zeal of the churchmen; he might indeed, as he did, seek in marriage his schismatic sister-in-law. But the King of Spain in his own land must be able to look around him and see every head in his realm bowed to the same sacred symbols, and hear every tongue repeating the same creed. The day that it ceased to be so the binding link of the Spains was broken, and the powerful weapon in the hand of the King to force religious unity upon Christendom melted into impotence.

Philip had been absent from Spain since June, 1554, and for these five years the country had nominally been governed by a gloomy widowed woman, his sister Juana, whose great sorrow had deepened the shadow of madness that had befallen her, as it had most of her kindred. In these circumstances it was natural that the Council of State should have exercised a more decided initiative in international relations than had previously been the case. The members of the Council were, so to speak, consultative ministers appointed by the favour of the King, and, as is usual in such cases, were more jealous of his prerogative than the sovereign himself. The traditional policy of Castile had been for many years to increase the hold of the Kings upon the patronage and temporalities of the Church in Spain, and to weaken the papal power even over ecclesiastical affairs. The struggles of Charles to this end against successive Popes had been bitter and almost continuous; but as he had usually been able to hold out rewards or threats, he had, especially with Clement VII (Medici) and Paul III (Farnese), on the whole been successful in his policy. With Paul IV (Caraffa) in the papal chair, and Alva and his troops thundering at the gates of Rome (1557), the persistence of the Council in their policy of encroachment upon the power exercised over the Spanish Church by the Papacy greatly strained the relations of the latter with the State; and they remained out of harmony until the death of Paul IV (August 15, 1559), when Philip was about to return to Spain.

But in the meantime ecclesiastical affairs had been seriously disorganised by the spectacle of the Council of State suspending the papal Bulls, and refusing permission to the Spanish Bishops to obey the Pope's summons to Rome; by the order given in the name of the Regent Juana for the Pope's messenger to Spain to be captured and punished; and by several other irritating measures which finally led to the excommunication of both Charles and Philip. The cloistered clergy and high dignitaries were scandalously corrupt; and the general tone of religion, notwithstanding the slavish obedience to ritual and lip service to the Church, was loose

and cynical. Philip, whilst yet in Flanders, had seen the danger, and had sent orders to Spain that the Inquisition there was to increase its vigilance. A few months before his return the effect had been seen in the presence of the Regent Juana and Philip's heir, Carlos, at the great *auto-de-fe* at Valladolid, where some of the greatest nobles in Spain were accused. That Popes might be treated curtly by Kings of Castile, and that ecclesiastical revenues might be used for political purposes under the pretext of religion, was quite in the nature of things; but if Spaniards once assumed a right to judge for themselves in matters of doctrine or religious procedure, the very foundations of Philip's system were threatened. Rumours had reached Philip that in his absence, and owing to the laxity of ecclesiastical discipline, the virus of heresy was showing itself even amongst his own people; and this probably was a more powerful reason than any other for his irresistible desire to return to Spain. The Inquisition in Castile had from the first been guarded on every side against papal interference, and it was more than ever necessary now that the King should be able to use it unchecked as a political instrument, to reinforce civil authority. When, therefore, shortly before Philip's arrival in Spain his own favourite churchman, who had been with him in England, Bartolomé de Carranza, Archbishop of Toledo and Primate, was with other Bishops, probably as truly orthodox as he was, accused and imprisoned by the Holy Office, the King raised no hand to help them, though he probably knew, as did others, that the persecution, which lasted whilst Carranza lived, was prompted mainly by the jealousy of the Dominican accusers. How unsatisfactory was the religious position in Spain at the time, is seen by Count Feria's vehemently indignant reference to Carranza's arrest in a private letter in October, 1559, to Bishop Quadra, Spanish ambassador in England. Philip's first need was to support authority, even that of fools against wise men; and his ardent desire to get back to Spain is thus quite comprehensible.

The situation which he was leaving behind him in the Netherlands was also ominous in the extreme. His gravity and known Spanish sympathies had produced a bad effect upon his new Flemish subjects. In the Belgic Provinces, at least, the people were strongly Catholic; but the whole country, which had grown rich and prosperous under its various autonomous local institutions, dreaded the centralising Castilian system and the inquisitorial methods which Philip was known to favour. His measures, however well meant, were therefore regarded with suspicion; especially when it was known that, against the Flemish constitutions, he intended to retain under arms in the Provinces 4000 Spanish infantry. The indignant Flemings presented a strongly signed remonstrance, to which the King was obliged to give a temporising answer: but, before he stepped upon his great galleon at Antwerp (August, 1559), he knew that some of the highest heads in Flanders must be humbled before he could have his way in the heritage of his Burgundian forefathers.

On every side of him, therefore, the prospect was gloomy when at length Philip landed in Spain (September 8, 1559). He had left his half-sister the Duchess of Parma as Regent of his Flemish dominions, with Granvelle as her principal minister, a man almost as unpopular as his master; and it was evident to all men that a storm was brewing there.

The Treaty of Peace signed with France had left Philip's Mediterranean coasts still harassed by the Turkish and Barbary corsair fleets which had joined the French coalition against Spain during the late war; and unless the commerce of Spain in the inland sea was to be destroyed, and her authority utterly humbled, a great effort must be made by Philip in this direction also. Called on to meet all these responsibilities, the new King had to face the fact that his country was beggared and his treasury empty. The vicious system of Spanish finance and the constant need for ready money had during the whole of the Emperor's reign led to the collection of revenue from the sources of prosperity rather than from its results. The great metallic wealth which came annually from America was in most cases forestalled, the King's portion being pledged to Genoese or German bankers, the merchants' share being hidden or surreptitiously sent abroad to avoid frequent seizures and other extortions. The greater part of the land of Spain was owned by the ecclesiastical corporations and the nobles, who were exempt from the regular taxation, but were fleeced intermittently and irregularly. The main revenue of the Castilian kingdoms was derived from the *alcabala*, a 10 per cent. tax upon all sales. Thus every time a commodity changed hands its value was raised by 10 per cent., which hampered business to such an extent that in the course of time Spanish manufactures could only be used at or near the places of their production, especially as the local tolls levied by each township through which the commodity passed added to its cost. This suicidal tax finally destroyed Spanish industry altogether, although many attempts were made to mitigate its rigour by fixing quotas for townships, to be raised and paid by local authorities and by other devices. In addition to this constantly decreasing source of revenue, the King received his royalty on the bullion sent from America, import and export duties on merchandise, an excise (subsequently called the "millions") on the principal articles of food, the proceeds of the sale of offices and titles, the dues arising from the sale of indulgences (originally for the support of the wars against the infidels), the State monopoly of salt, and the revenues of the royal patrimony. These taxes were difficult and costly to collect, in addition to being unwise in principle. The mistaken idea that industries handicapped by the *alcabala* and excise, with the addition of municipal tolls, could be protected by prohibiting the introduction of merchandise from abroad, and the export of bullion from Spain to pay for it, was persisted in for a century and a half. At a time when Spanish America with her abounding new

wealth was clamouring for luxuries, and Spain herself, in a whirlwind of sumptuary splendour, was squandering all her substance on fine stuffs and bullion embroideries, the manufacture of such things was prohibited in Spain to avoid waste, and the importation of them rendered illegal. The natural result was universal smuggling, and a ruinous loss to the national exchequer. But this was not all; the killing of the most productive industries, together with the drain of the best Spanish manhood for the armies and for America, reduced a naturally industrious people to habitual idleness and pretentious poverty.

Philip struck the keynote of his reign on the occasion of his first public appearance as King by presiding over one of the most splendid *autos-de-fé* that had ever been seen in Spain (Valladolid, October 18, 1559). The people, acclaiming their beloved Philip with frantic joy, knew that they had a King now after their own hearts, religious, grave, and stern, convinced, like themselves, of personal divine selection to stand in the forefront in God's battle—but one whose really kind nature and gentle instincts were surrounded, even as theirs were, by the confining walls that shut out pity and human charity, and whose eyes were centred solely upon what to him was the sacred cause of God and his country. Hunger reigned everywhere. Untilled fields cried out for patient labour, while hordes of idlers crowded the Court and hung about the palaces of nobles in the towns. The roads where they existed at all had decayed into rough mule-tracks, unsafe always, and often impassable. The inns were wretched and poverty-stricken, as they are painted in *Lazarillo de Tormes* and *Guzman de Alfarache*; and the only professions which ensured subsistence were those of arms, the Church, and domestic service in the households of the privileged classes. Still, the personal representative of the system that had brought Spain to this pass was, when he came to his own, hailed with a love and loyalty quite unfeigned; for he was a Spaniard born in the heart of Castile, with the faults and limitations of his people balanced by their virtues and exalted ideals.

So far, however, as the lights of Philip and his subjects allowed them to judge, his reign in his own land seemed to open propitiously. He had cleared Italy of the French by treaty; his old enemy Paul IV had just died of rage and grief at the crimes of his infamous nephews; the placid Pius IV was, on the whole, favourable to Spain; and, what no doubt appeared to Philip of the highest importance, he himself had his finger on the pulse of French policy for the first time in his life. Henry II had been quite sincere in his eagerness to commence a crusade against heresy and to attack Geneva as its centre. Philip had no intention of going so far as that, for religion was only one branch of his policy; but his new father-in-law's honest zeal had been a valuable guarantee that, strike at heresy wherever Philip might, and with whatever object he pleased, he had nothing to fear from French opposition. The accidental death of Henry II at the tournament in celebration

of the peace (June, 1559), while it had rendered French interference in favour of Protestantism even more improbable than before, owing to the now complete ascendancy of the Guise kinsmen of the Queen-Consort, had nevertheless increased the need for Philip's firmness in restraining active Catholic aggression on the part of his French allies, because such aggression would have now inevitably assumed the form of an attack upon England in the interests of Mary Stewart. While, therefore, Philip's diplomatic triumph was for the moment complete, and he was more free than his father had been for many years to strive for his ultimate objects, the utmost vigilance and patience were demanded to prevent the control of European events from passing into other hands than his own. In the first place, it was of the utmost importance to him that England should not fall under French influence, or on the other hand be driven to make common cause with the Protestants in general against Catholicism. Even before he left the Netherlands, he had made up his mind that the free-spoken Flemings must be taught a stern lesson of obedience, of which the primary principle was religious conformity. If the ambition and political levity of the Guises forced Elizabeth to look to the extreme Protestant elements for her support, it was obvious that she, or her people by her connivance, would do battle overtly or covertly on behalf of the Protestant Netherlands in the hour of their trial. Philip's present policy was to prevent this, and to effect the isolation of England by joint French and Spanish action, while behind the back of his allies he was striving to persuade Elizabeth that he, and not France, was her real friend.

The accession of Francis II to the throne and the Guises to power in France was promptly followed by the assertion of the right of Mary Stewart to the Crown of England; and in the consequent English attack upon the French and Scottish forces in Leith (early in 1560), Philip's strenuous efforts to bring about peace, notwithstanding Guise's prayers for his aid, are a clear indication of his intention not to allow the secret anti-Protestant part of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambr sis to be used for the benefit of any policy but his own. For him it meant that he was to have a free hand with his own Flemish Protestants, not that England should be crushed in the interests of the French Guises. This was the state of affairs when at the end of January, 1560, Philip travelled to Guadalajara to meet the child Elizabeth of France, whom in June Alva had wedded as his proxy in Paris with incredible splendour. The death of her father, and the almost endless political and ceremonial exigencies of Philip's agents in Paris, had delayed the new Queen's long winter journey to her future home; but when she came at length through the Pyrenean snows to meet her prematurely aged husband of thirty-two years, the child consciously bore within her sweet and dainty personality the springs of a secret diplomacy intended to change the balance of power in Europe and transfer the poise to the hands of her mother.

After years of neglect and contumely, patiently, almost cheerfully borne, the opportunity of Catharine de' Medici had come. Her natural tendency as the daughter of a great papal House would be in favour of the extreme Catholic policy which had led her husband to submit to the hard terms of the Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis. But with the accession of her son Francis II, under the control of the ultra-Catholic Guises, it became her advantage to side with the "*Politiques*" or Moderates, who had for their left wing the growing Huguenot party. Philip's consent to take the young French Princess as his wife had been prompted by a desire to keep in touch through her with the secret course of her father's policy. But the father had been in his grave for six months ere Elizabeth of France met her husband; and Catharine de' Medici in the meanwhile had entrusted her daughter with the intrigue by which she hoped to make Philip an instrument of her own triumph and of the preponderance of France in the councils of Europe. The young Queen was to gain her husband to a marriage between his heir the miserable Carlos, and her younger sister Margaret of France, and then to negotiate a union between Charles IX and the gloomy, widowed sister of Philip, Dona Juana. The objects she was to serve were, first, those of her mother against the Guises, and those of France afterwards; the crusade against heresy was to be used as Philip himself desired to use it, only to a different end, and was to be alternately pressed and slackened, as the changing circumstances might make it desirable in the interests of the Queen-Mother of France. Elizabeth promptly won the heart of her husband and of his people, as no other of his wives did. She was tender, prudent, and good; but Philip, much as he loved her, was not the man to allow himself to be made a tool of, even by her, for the advantage of her mother, whom he cordially detested and profoundly distrusted; and in the contest of cunning which followed, French and Spanish interests soon drifted apart, as if the religious part of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis had never existed.

The death of Francis II (December, 1560) relieved Philip of the danger that French national resources would be employed against England in the interests of Mary Stewart; and thenceforward for many years the three main factors in European politics were Philip, Catharine de' Medici, and Elizabeth of England. The frequent mutations of their relations towards each other, and towards the secondary factors, were ruled by the desire of each one of them to get the better of the other two. Philip's astute, though slow and over-cautious foreign policy, was only one of the means necessary for the attainment of his supreme end. His determination to establish unquestioned authority in his own dominions by the extirpation of religious dissent, and subsequently to secure Spanish supremacy in Europe by uniting the Catholic elements under his leadership, had primarily to depend for its execution upon the resources, and unflinching orthodoxy, of Spain itself. His presence at

the great *auto-de-fé* already mentioned was a proof that he was aware of this; and his mode of life from the day of his landing in Spain until his death was such as to impress upon his people the mysterious sacredness with which he sought to invest his mission in their eyes.

The ancient institutions of Spain had grown out of locally diverse conditions in the various realms. The Castilian Parliaments had been the outcome of a system of privileged autonomous towns strong enough to supplant a turbulent, but weak, disunited, and corrupt feudalism. The Cortes of Aragon and Catalonia, on the other hand, had originally sprung, like the Parliament of England, from a strong feudalism, to which the landed gentry and the burghers had rallied as a defence against the encroachments of the Crown. In Castile the removal of the nobles from the Parliament, and the reduction to eighteen of the number of towns sending members; the weakening of municipal institutions, upon which representation rested, by the introduction of royal patronage into the town councils; and finally, the crushing by force of arms of parliamentary resistance to the financial encroachment of Charles V, had before Philip's accession rendered the Cortes in a great measure effete as a financial safeguard: and under the fixed policy, which was that of both the Emperor and his son, to establish a complete autocracy the decadence of the Cortes of Castile continued, until they flickered out in 1812. The Cortes of Aragon and Catalonia, consisting of representatives of three Estates and secure in the possession of binding charters, were able to resist all attempts at encroachment until early in the eighteenth century; and from them Philip could obtain but a fixed vote at regular intervals, often at the cost of much wrangling and humiliation. Upon the Castilian kingdoms therefore—that is to say from Spain, exclusive of the Basque provinces, Navarre, Aragon, Catalonia and Valencia—the main burden of the cost of Philip's ambitions fell. The government theoretically consisted of a Council of State, selected by the King to advise him upon foreign affairs; a Council of Castile, to administer the interior government and the judicature; and councils of war, finance and so forth: though in practice, even the pettiest item in every branch of administration was submitted to Philip personally before and after exhaustive discussion and rediscussion by the respective Councils. With these the King usually communicated through his Secretaries of State, of whom there were several, each in charge of a particular department, and who were invariably persons of obscure birth. Legislation was usually initiated by petitions from the Cortes to the sovereign, asking that decrees should be issued remedying the grievances recited; but the assembly had lost the strength necessary for the refusal of supply until its grievances were amended; and Philip habitually disregarded the presentments of the Castilian Parliaments.

There was, however, one petition presented to him by his first Parliament in Toledo to which he was ready enough to listen. The

insolence of the Muslim in the Mediterranean had passed all bounds. Sicily, Naples, and the Balears, even the coasts of Spain itself, were raided with impunity by the Turk: and Tripoli, the African stronghold of the Knights of Malta, had been captured by the Barbary corsair, Dragut Reis. Let the Catholic King, prayed the Cortes, strike at the hereditary infidel foes of Spain, and reestablish the Christian power in the inland sea. But, willing as Philip was, and vital as the action suggested was for the success of his aims, enterprise was paralysed by the cumbrous system, introduced by him, of personal supervision on his own part of every detail of administration and of endless penmanship. Consequently, instead of a swift blow being struck, the Turks were given time to gather a great fleet before Medina Celi and the younger Doria (Gian Andrea) led the Spanish fleet to the Tripoli coast (February, 1560). After capturing the small island of Los Gelves, in the Gulf of Khabes, they were surprised the next day by a great fleet of Turkish galleys. The Spanish commanders lost nerve and fled. Panic seized their force, and 5000 men with 65 vessels fell into the hands of the enemy, while 8000 more, starved and hopeless, held out upon the island. After six weeks' siege only 1000 of them remained alive; and these, standing in the breach, with naked breasts defied the infidel assault, till all were dead or disabled. It was the first great blow that fell upon Philip. Thenceforward for eleven years the Spanish power in the Mediterranean was eclipsed; and throughout the calamities and anxieties which crowded upon Philip with respect to international policy and the struggle for Christian religious uniformity, the need of defending the ravaged littoral of his own land, and avenging his plundered and outraged subjects, was an ever-present nightmare. But, stolidly convinced that he was fighting God's battle which in the end he must win, Philip never despaired and was never elated: and, just as he heard of the disaster of Los Gelves with no sign of dismay, the crowning victory of Lepanto (October, 1571), which restored his Mediterranean supremacy, failed to wring from him a smile of exultation.

The almost simultaneous accession to power of Elizabeth of England, Philip of Spain, and Catharine de' Medici, Queen Mother of France, radically changed the problems of European politics. The religious divisions in France and Catharine's balancing methods removed for the first time for centuries the danger to Spain of French aggression in Italy, and the danger to England of French interference in Scotland. The severance of the Empire from the Spanish Crown relieved Philip of a crushing burden, though it rendered more difficult than ever the task to which his life was pledged, since his own kinsmen on the Imperial throne had been forced to recognise the rights of the Princes of the Empire in the matter of religious toleration. Central European politics therefore no longer turned on the enduring territorial rivalry between the House of Aragon-Austria and that of France, in which England and Scotland

had been the smaller shifting weights upon the balance. The religious divisions in each of the countries had driven new lines of cleavage athwart the old political alliances. For the first time England became a primary, instead of a secondary factor, because the Queen's peculiar position towards the Papacy placed her in sympathy with the Protestants in all countries; and, more important still, because the main point to be decided in the next fifty years was not political, but religious. The key of the position was no longer far-away Italy, as it had been, but Flanders and France, which were close neighbours to England. The Emperor's life problem had been by crippling France to make her harmless as against his dominions. There was now no fear of her encroaching on these any more than of a French domination of Scotland, which had been England's standing danger for centuries; for France had crippled herself and was no longer homogeneous. So long as France was kept divided both England and Spain were secure; and, if in addition English religious dissensions were fomented by the Spanish encouragement of Catholic revolt, there would be no Power in Europe to counteract Philip's plans. These plans were, first, to secure absolute religious uniformity and unquestioned obedience in his own dominions; and thereafter to side cautiously in turn with the Catholic elements in England and France, and probably also in the Empire, in order that his political influence might become all-powerful in those countries. We shall see how the strength and craft of Elizabeth of England and her officers ruined his plans and doomed Spain to decay, by vigorously counteracting his efforts to paralyse England by religious revolt, as France was paralysed by the ambition of Catharine and the ineptitude of her sons.

The net of the Inquisition was cast wide over Spain, to begin with. Rich and poor, great ecclesiastics and nobles, gentle ladies, professional men, craftsmen and tillers of Moorish or Jewish descent, were swept in by thousands, and paid in life or estate for the mere suspicion of heterodoxy. When Philip opened the Cortes of Madrid in 1563, he thanked God that "so much had been done, and such careful and minute intervention effected in religious affairs by the Holy Office, whose ministers had been so actively aided and favoured, that not only had the evil (of heresy) which had begun to spread been utterly extirpated, but such precautions had been taken that, with God's help, the country was now, and he hoped would remain...as pure, steadfast, and devout, as could be hoped." This reign of religious terror, popular as it was with the thoughtless masses, was not established even in Castile without some remonstrance. The Cortes, again and again, petitioned against the abuses and methods of the Holy Office, and especially against the enormous number of unpaid "familiar," who, in consequence of their nominal connexion with the institution, escaped civil jurisdiction and evaded civic responsibilities. Philip, however, paid but little attention to the petitions of the Castilian Cortes, for he extorted the regular vote

of supply, 450 million *maravedis*, every three years before discussion of grievances, and even laid on new impositions without the authority of the Cortes at all. So great indeed was his penury that at this period (1563) he assured the members of the Cortes that every national resource had been exhausted, his treasury was empty, and he had no money even to defray the necessary expenses of his own household. The Cortes in reply told him that the country itself was sunk into the deepest misery, and could provide no more than it had done. This was in poor agricultural Castile. In Aragon it was quite another matter. It was necessary that the three Parliaments of the Crown of Aragon should take the oath of allegiance to Philip's heir, Don Carlos; and the King summoned the Cortes to Monzon for that purpose in the autumn of 1563. The assembly had not met for ten years, though by the Constitution they should have been summoned every three years. Philip made no secret of his detestation of the claims to self-government professed by his Aragonese and Catalan subjects, and went to Monzon with the almost avowed intention of curtailing their privileges. He found the Cortes suspicious and sulky, and was at first met by a demand that the powers of the Inquisition in Aragon should be limited strictly to matters of doctrine, and that the oppressive methods of the institution should be enquired into. The King told the representatives to vote supply, and he would consider their requests later. But the Aragonese answered that no money would be voted until a satisfactory reply was given. Philip fell ill with rage, but he was powerless to coerce; and he had to give way and promise enquiry. Only then did the Cortes vote the 1,500,000 ducats that formed their three years' contributions to the King's expenditure. Shortly before this (December, 1562), even the Spanish Bishops grew restive, when power was granted by Pope Paul IV to the Inquisition to try them for heresy; and finally, the Pope himself, submissive as he had been to Philip, lost patience at the constant interference of the Spanish ambassadors with the action of the Council of Trent—then in session—to prevent its attempts to mitigate the methods of the Holy Office. But Philip resisted every power, from Pope to Parliament, that sought to weaken the instrument upon which he depended for working out the object of his life. Thus Spain itself was cleansed of expressed dissent, and all men bowed ostentatiously to one formula.

But if Spaniards were full of the exalted spiritual pride that made them accept with but slight opposition a system which increased the conviction of their own superiority at the expense of their independence, other subjects of Philip were equally proud of their local autonomy, of their enlightened institutions, and of the personal freedom which had rendered them prosperous and contented. The Flemings and Netherlanders had, under Charles V and his Burgundian forefathers, enjoyed vast prosperity protected by their provincial constitutions: and the known Spanish and centralising sympathies of Philip had from the first aroused

the distrust of his Flemish subjects. That his confidential minister, Cardinal de Granvelle, was a foreigner, increased the discontent which culminated in the gradual alienation of the nobles, the resignation of Margaret of Parma, the sanguinary rule of Alva, and the great insurrection, described elsewhere in this volume.

That Philip's plans to rule his Flemings on the same system as he adopted in Spain had been long maturing in his mind, is evident from the persistent efforts of Alva to effect a new Catholic league through the Cardinal of Lorraine and Catharine de' Medici, with the object of reviving the secret religious part of the Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis. Philip's French wife was to meet her mother at Bayonne; and under the cover of a family reunion the Catholic Powers were to bind themselves anew to extirpate heresy throughout Europe. At the very hint of the negotiations heterodox Flemings fled across the North Sea to England by thousands; and Elizabeth, alarmed at the prospect and at the talk of Philip's coming to Flanders with his fleet, developed an intense affection for Spain, and an attachment to Catholic principles which had not been apparent for some time before. Some sort of agreement was ostensibly patched up at the Conference of Bayonne in the summer of 1565; but Alva's demands frightened Catharine, and she easily found means to avoid the fulfilment of the conditions, as she had no desire to destroy the balance of her own power by making Catholicism permanently supreme. But for a time it looked as if Protestantism was doomed in Europe; and the prospect for the first time gave a purely religious character to the Flemish revolt, a character which Philip doubtless from the beginning had intended it to assume when the final trial of strength should come.

Tribulation had, in the meanwhile, continued to follow the King in other portions of his dominions. His attempt to introduce the Spanish form of Inquisition into Naples, as a political instrument, had caused a revolt which threatened his domination; and he had been forced to give way (1565). His struggle with the Muslim in the Mediterranean still drained his treasury, and well-nigh broke his heart. By a supreme effort of his Sicilian Viceroy, Garcia de Toledo, rather than of himself, he had succeeded in relieving Malta when the Knights were at their last gasp, besieged by a great force of Muslim (September, 1565); but the Turkish power remained unbroken, both on land and sea, and reduced Philip's pretensions to the supremacy of the Mediterranean to a dead letter. At home, too, his troubles gathered thick about him. His beloved young French wife had brought him two daughters, the elder of whom, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia, was ever his best-beloved child; but the heir to his crowns was his only son Don Carlos (born 1546), who was now approaching man's estate. We have seen that Catharine de' Medici dreamed of winning the lad for her younger daughter Margaret. The ideal marriage for him to suit his father's projects would have been with Mary Stewart after the death of her French husband; and for a short

time such an event seemed probable. But Philip would take no risks. While he was intriguing so that he alone should gain by such a match, and that the Guises should not benefit by it, the clever counter-moves of Elizabeth and Catharine upset his scheme. The condition of the Prince, moreover, made the negotiation of his marriage difficult. He was a lame, stunted, hydrocephalous epileptic, uncontrollable in his vicious passions, and alternately under the influence of his stepmother and his aunt Juana. When he was sixteen his father had hinted to the Imperial ambassador, who sought his hand for the Emperor's daughter Anne, that Don Carlos was not in his right mind; and his extraordinary and outrageous behaviour during the remainder of his life leaves but little doubt that this was the case. His violent and unprovoked attacks upon inoffensive citizens in the streets of the capital, his attempts to murder with his own hand Cardinal Espinosa and the Duke of Alva, and his threats to Don John of Austria, his young uncle, rendered his isolation necessary. It is probable that he may have been approached by agents of the Flemings, or of Ruy Gomez' party, opposed to Alva, with suggestions that he should go to Flanders on a mission of pacification; which would account for the attack upon Alva when the latter was about to start on his voyage, and for Carlos' violent threats to the members of the Cortes who petitioned that he should remain in Spain if Philip went to Flanders; but the deciding factor of his fate was his last resolve, which he confessed to Don John, to escape from and defy his father. Philip was a man of extremely strong family affections. His ambitions and hopes for his son had been boundless; but the task entrusted to him overrode all considerations, whether of suffering love or human instinct. When his only son had proved that he would be an obstacle and not a help to his father's task, Philip, with much consultation of churchmen, with prolonged prayer and many tears, decided to sacrifice his heir. Whether the young Prince was strangled by his father's orders, or, as is much more likely, killed himself in desperate apprehension of a lifelong incarceration, is not quite certain; but, whichever was the case, Philip's love and his pride alike suffered a heavy blow. Still he accepted this, as he did all his afflictions, humbly, and as a chastening discipline sent from his Master, the better to fit him for the work of his life. Another bereavement befell him three months after he lost his son (October, 1568) when his beautiful and beloved wife was sacrificed to the unskilfulness of Spanish physicians. This loss almost broke him down. "It is enough," wrote the French ambassador, "to break the heart of so good a husband as the King was to her." In the deepest grief, the bereaved husband retired for a time to a monastery and saw no one. For the rest of his long life little pleasure came to him; and though his fourth wife, his niece, Anne of Austria, brought him many puny children, the two daughters of Elizabeth of Valois always remained his chief solace.

We have seen how, in order that Philip should be able to effect his first great object, namely the forcing of religious uniformity upon his Netherland subjects, it was necessary for him to secure, at least, the neutrality of England and of the French Huguenots. The latter he could usually paralyse by intriguing with the Guises and Catharine de' Medici; but the Queen of England was more difficult to deal with. She was, it is true, desirous, as was her wisest minister, Burghley, to avoid a national war with Spain; but it was evident to both the sovereign and people of England, that the extirpation of Protestantism in the Netherlands would only be the first step to the suppression of religious dissent from Rome throughout Christendom; and that the unchecked supremacy of Catholicism, as represented by Philip and Alva, would mean the political supremacy of Spain throughout the world. From the first day of Elizabeth's accession Philip's ambassadors had exhausted all the resources of diplomacy to pledge her, either by means of marriage or by fear of her Catholic subjects, to a friendly neutrality towards Spain. The conservative nobles, with whom Burghley usually, though not invariably, acted, and the party of Leicester and the growing Puritan element, had alternately gained the upper hand in the English counsels, as Elizabeth's fears of Catholic solidarity waxed and waned; but, with the arrival of Alva in the Netherlands and the strong religious feeling aroused in England by his severities, it became daily more difficult to maintain an appearance of friendship between Spain and England. There arose, moreover, concurrently another reason for enmity, which eventually proved more powerful even than the religious question. From the latter years of Henry VIII the piratical attacks of English shipping upon Spanish commerce had been a stock subject of complaint and remonstrance; but during the religious war in France, and in the period following Alva's suppression of the first Netherlands rising, English seamen from the southern and eastern coasts had in large numbers eagerly seized the opportunity for plunder by preying upon Philip's subjects as privateers, authorised respectively by the Huguenot and Flemish Protestant leaders. Elizabeth, of course, disclaimed them, but she was fully aware that Philip could not afford to go to war with her while Flanders was simmering in revolt, and while the religious discord in France prevented the Catholics from wielding the national power at their will; so that, though she continued to profess friendship, she took less care than ever before to propitiate Philip. The English depredations on Spanish shipping had naturally been met by increased interference on the part of the Inquisition with English merchants and sailors in Spanish ports; and early in 1568 a crisis was reached when the English ambassador, Dr Man, was hampered in performing Divine service in the embassy according to the Reformed rites. In reply to a peremptory demand from Elizabeth that full liberty in this respect should be given, the English ambassador was expelled the country. The Catholic rising

which took place at the same time in Scotland, and the rumours of help sent thither by the Guises, furthered the giving of bolder and more open aid to the Flemings by the English, especially in their depredations at sea, and to the French Huguenots. These causes would have been sufficient to drive England and Spain into open war, had Philip dared to attack England while the Protestants of Holland and France were still unsubdued, and had Elizabeth not dreaded open war with her own north country, almost solidly Catholic and longing for an opportunity of rising in favour of the imprisoned Mary Stewart. But in 1568 the advent in England of Gerau de Spes, a violent bigot, as Spanish ambassador, simultaneously with a treacherous attack upon English seamen on the American coast, almost brought matters to a crisis.

The Spanish claim to commercial monopoly of the whole of America, although jealously enforced so far as was possible, had from the nature of the case become impracticable. The crushing of Spanish industry by an unwise fiscal policy had made it impossible for Spain itself to supply the growing needs of the settlers, whilst the galling restrictions imposed upon foreign sailors and vessels in Spanish ports had immensely hampered the importation into Seville, the centre of the whole transatlantic trade, of manufactures from abroad. The natural consequence was a widespread smuggling trade with America both from England and France. Sanguinary reprisals had been made, especially upon the attempted French settlement in Florida; but the business had proved a profitable one, especially in conjunction with the importation into Spanish America and the West Indies of negro slaves captured on the African coast. An expedition led by John Hawkins and his nephew, Francis Drake, consisting of five small vessels from Plymouth, was caught in September, 1568, by a greatly superior Spanish force at San Juan de Lua on the Mexican coast, and overwhelmed, in violation, as it was asserted, of a compromise that had been arranged. Two of the smallest vessels alone escaped with Hawkins and Drake; and thenceforward the latter devoted his great genius, skill and boldness, to harrying Spanish commerce from the seas. For the next thirty years the Spanish claim to a monopoly of transatlantic trade was laughed to scorn by the English sailors, whose ceaseless piratical depredations upon Spanish shipping increased a hundredfold the enmity between the nations which religious persecution had begun.

De Spes was known from his first arrival to be plotting with the English Catholics, and had endeavoured to frighten Elizabeth by threats of Alva's vengeance if she allowed the Huguenot and Flemish privateers to take shelter in her ports. It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that, when chance threw into her way an opportunity of crippling Alva and spiting the officious ambassador, she should have seized it. Philip, as usual, was in dire straits for money, but he had contrived to borrow a large sum from Genoese bankers to meet Alva's pressing requirements,

and shipped it in six vessels for Antwerp. They were chased by privateers in the Channel, and for safety ran into Plymouth, Falmouth, and Southampton. Two of the cutters, rightly believing that they had as much to fear from the English on shore as from the pirates at sea, escaped from port, ran the gauntlet of the pursuers and arrived at Antwerp; the others, being still assailed, though in port, requested permission through the Spanish ambassador to send the specie overland to Dover, and so across the Channel. Elizabeth not only accorded her consent but volunteered to give the protection of a squadron of her own ships if needful. Just as the bullion was being landed there came rumours from Spain, and a few days later a letter from William Hawkins at Plymouth to Burghley, telling of the destruction of Drake and Hawkins' squadron on the Mexican coast. The excuse was sufficient, particularly when Elizabeth learnt from Spinola, the banker in London, who was in association with the lenders of the money, that they had contracted to deliver the specie in Antwerp. Her credit, she said, was as good as that of Philip; she would borrow the money herself. It was a heavy blow to Alva, and when he retaliated by seizing all English property in Flanders, Elizabeth in her turn laid hands on all Spanish property in England, to a very much greater value. Thenceforward for some years trade between England and Philip's dominions was practically suspended; and English piracy in consequence enormously increased. The futile plots of de Spes and Alva to depose Elizabeth, by means of a rising of the English Catholics, were all known; and the ambassador was finally expelled with ignominy (December, 1571) after the discovery of the Ridolfi plot, in which he had been a principal. For the next five years Philip had no formal ambassador in England; and English aid to the Flemish "Beggars," both on land and sea, went across the North Sea almost undisguised.

Thus in the ten or eleven years that had passed since Philip arrived in Spain he had made practically no progress in the great objects of his policy. Far from securing religious uniformity in the Netherlands, Alva's cruelties had only made the reconciliation of the Protestants for ever impossible. The Huguenots in France, in close union with Elizabeth, were strong enough to paralyse any attempt of the Guises to join France with Spain for the suppression of Protestantism in general; while the course of events in England and Scotland enabled Elizabeth practically to defy Spanish threats of vengeance for her aid to the Netherlands and the depredations of English sailors. The Turks and North Africans in the Mediterranean, moreover, were still unsubdued, and raided almost with impunity the south-east coast of Spain, being doubtless abetted by the descendants of those Moors of the kingdom of Granada who only seventy years before, when the Catholic Kings had conquered their lands, had been solemnly promised toleration for their faith. These Moriscos were a standing reproach to Philip's boast that in Spain, at least,

the orthodoxy of every man was beyond reproach. Throughout the country the Moorish blood had mingled so much with the Christian as to be in many places undistinguishable; but in the kingdom of Granada the race, so recently conquered, was almost pure. Successive galling edicts had forced upon them the Christian garb, faith, name, and tongue; but in secret they still preserved their ancient beliefs and usages, to the despair of the bigoted churchmen who were the King's instruments. The Moriscos were the most skilful and prosperous people in Spain; and, especially in agriculture and horticulture on the fertile Vega of Granada, their success brought them the hatred and envy of their Christian neighbours. The Castilian Cortes vied with the Catholic Bishops in urging a constant renewal of measures of oppression against them, alleging their doubtful orthodoxy, their undue wealth, their sympathy with the marauding Muslim corsairs, and their utilisation of slave labour. At first the Moriscos bribed, and bowed sulkily to the yoke; but finally at the end of 1568 the storm, long gathering, broke, and rapine swept down from the Morisco fastnesses in the Alpujarras upon smiling Granada, desecrating Christian churches, and avenging on Christian Spaniards the hoarded wrongs of centuries. Philip's vengeance was prompt and terrible. Men, women and children were slaughtered by thousands by the Marquis de los Velez, and by Bishop Deza, who knew no mercy; and, when the danger was past, Philip's natural brother, Don John of Austria (born 1547), was sent to give the last blow to the lingering rebellion.

The young Prince was one of the handsomest and most chivalrous men of his time, the idol of his brother's subjects, and a soldier every inch of him. But the cruel work he had to do after he had finally vanquished the Moriscos in arms well-nigh broke his heart. Death or slavery were the only alternatives left to the conquered. Those Moriscos who escaped the bloodthirstiness of the Christians were driven forth, heavily chained, from their own fair land through the winter's snow to the bleak plains of Castile, to lifelong servitude; and by the end of 1570 the whole of Andalusia was cleared of those who bore the taint of Moorish blood or sympathised with the Muslim corsairs. This victory for the orthodox churchmen was not without political warrant; but it was one stroke more at the dwindling industrial prosperity of Spain.

While Philip was celebrating in Seville his brother's victory over the Moriscos, there came to him an envoy of the Pope to urge him to a crowning effort to chase the Turks from the inland sea. A great Ottoman fleet was before Cyprus, which island, unaided, the Venetians were powerless to save. The loss of the island to Christendom would be irreparable, and the Pope exhorted Philip to join a league with Rome and Venice to crush the Muslim. Philip had no love for the temporising mercantile Venetians, but the occasion was pressing, and Don John was clamorous to fight again against unbelievers. Philip ultimately consented to make a supreme effort to clear the Mediterranean of the scourge, although

he utilised the opportunity for extorting from Pius V one more concession diminishing the power of the Papacy over the Spanish Inquisition.

Europe rang with the preparations for the new crusade. The task of collecting the vast force needed was a long one; and Cyprus had fallen before Don John had gathered in the Bay of Messina the finest fleet of war galleys ever seen in the Mediterranean. The Turks were by this time harrying the Adriatic coasts (September, 1571) and defied the Christian forces. All that religious fervour could give to strengthen Don John and his force was lavishly poured out; and the young commander himself aroused the extravagant enthusiasm of Catholics throughout Christendom in his favour. Overriding the cautious advice of older commanders, he sought the Turkish fleet in the Bay of Lepanto (October 7, 1571) with his 270 galleys and 80,000 men. The spirit infused into the attack was irresistible; and in a few hours the Muslim power in the Mediterranean was broken, never to be fully restored. The religious exaltation that followed passed all safe bounds. Don John was to restore the throne of Constantine, and was to sweep the unbelievers from Europe and North Africa. Don John, then only twenty-four years of age, lost his head with adulation. Philip, almost alone in Europe, would not allow his judgment to be shaken; for he knew that his brother's dreams could only be realised at the sacrifice of his own.

In the meanwhile affairs were going badly in Flanders. Trade there was ruined by the suspension of the English commerce, and the flight of craftsmen under Alva's persecution; while the seizure by Elizabeth in December, 1568, of the Spanish remittances had driven the Duke to despair. In answer to Philip's statement that every national resource was pledged, and that he was absolutely without means to carry on his government, the Cortes of Castile protested (1570) that the people of the realms of Castile were sunk into so dire a poverty, as to make it impossible to raise a maravedi beyond the ordinary tribute. No money therefore could be sent to Alva from Spain; and he was driven to adopt in Flanders the fatal tax that had ruined Spanish industry, namely, the *alcabala* or 10 per cent. upon all sales of commodities; a step which united the Flemings of all classes and creeds in resistance to the commercial and industrial ruin that threatened them. Ultimately, the peace party in Philip's councils brought about Alva's recall and the experiment of a conciliatory policy under the new Viceroy Requesens (September, 1573).

The curse of poverty lay upon all Philip's plans; and yet Spain was a by-word for riches throughout Europe. The reason for this is to be found in the administration rather than in the amount of revenue and expenditure. The Emperor's ruinous system had depended largely upon arbitrary impositions crippling the Spanish commercial and industrial classes, and upon the pledging of specific sources of revenue at extravagant interest to foreign bankers. During his early regency of

Spain Philip had frequently protested against these oppressive methods. But when he succeeded to his father's task, he was obliged to follow the same evil course. Personally, he was extremely frugal, almost penurious, and was a notoriously bad paymaster to those who served him. He was grieved beyond measure at the distress suffered by his Castilian subjects, in consequence of the taxation which he was obliged to impose upon them. But he could devise no other scheme of finance than the vicious one he had inherited. By the middle of his reign the stifling of industry by the *alcabala* and local tolls, the depopulation of the agricultural districts by the oppression of the Moriscos and the great drain of men for America and the wars, had immensely diminished the sources of revenue; while the inability of Spain to supply manufactured goods to her colonies caused a great portion of the American treasure to be diverted to other countries through Seville or direct, notwithstanding the prohibition of the export of the precious metals. The arbitrary seizure of specie belonging to merchants, to meet sudden government emergencies, had also bred distrust; and much of the commercial wealth was smuggled abroad or concealed. The amounts received by the treasury therefore tended to become smaller as time went on. On the other hand, Philip's rigidly centralised system, which weakened the control and authority as well as the responsibility of his executive officers, inevitably encouraged corruption to an extent almost beyond belief; and much of the money sent for the payment of soldiers, the purchase of munitions and victuals, and the maintenance of fleets, was appropriated to the private use of the intermediaries. It was impossible for one overburdened man in the centre of Spain effectually to superintend, as Philip tried to do, the minute details of administration in all parts of the world. The amounts of money actually received from America, even before the English systematically plundered the galleons, were much smaller than public opinion at home and abroad imagined. Vast sums were stolen, hidden or surreptitiously detained, by the King's officers in America; and not only viceroys, but bishops and friars who had gone to the Indies penniless, returned laden with great ill-gotten booty. It thus happened that the vast revenues enjoyed on paper by the Catholic King dwindled by a faulty system, bad management, and peculation, to an amount almost absurdly inadequate to the demands made by Philip's objects. The Italian dominions produced practically nothing for the Spanish exchequer; the Netherlands, which had always managed their own resources, now constituted a terrible drain upon the King; Aragon and Catalonia stood stiffly by their parliamentary charters, contributing only their moderate fixed quota, and even that unwillingly. In Castile, moreover, the nobles were exempt from regular taxation, though large and irregular sums were extorted from them by various devices; while the enormous accumulation of property in ecclesiastical hands, which was also exempt from

taxation, cast by far the larger portion of Philip's enormous expenditure upon the commercial, agricultural, and industrial classes of the provinces of Castile.

Requesens prayed ceaselessly for money. The troops, he said, unpaid, were turning bandits, sacking and plundering at large; and even the Catholic Flemings could endure it no longer. The credit of the "rebels" was good, he complained, while no one would trust him or Philip: and, such being the state of things in Flanders, Don John's clamours for aid for his visionary ambitions necessarily remained unheard. Philip did not openly contradict: that was not his way. Evasion and silence served as well, and while he was thus paltering, the Calabrian renegade Luch Ali had, within nine months of the battle of Lepanto, raised another force of 150 galleys. Don John was alternately prayerful and indignant at his brother's coolness; and all the summer of 1572 was wasted in and out of Messina. The autumn and winter passed. Don John's force fell away and decayed; the Venetians patched up a peace with the Turk, but still no money came from Spain. Not until October 7, 1573, could Don John sail to relieve the garrison he had left at La Goleta. That was his ostensible object, but his plans were larger; for he made a sudden dash upon Tunis and captured it, in the hope of making it the base for the conquest of his new empire. Leaving there a garrison of 8000 men he sailed back to Sicily to summon all Christendom to his aid. Gregory XIII gave him his blessing and the golden rose, but Philip was aghast. The Prince's adviser, Soto, was recalled; and Don John was instructed to abandon and dismantle Tunis. He disobeyed these orders, and even asked Philip's permission to attack Constantinople. The reply was the stoppage of all supplies, both from Spain and from Naples. In vain Don John raved. No money and no help came; and, before a year had passed, Tunis and La Goleta fell into the hands of the Turks, and the soldiers who were to carve out Don John's new empire were massacred or made galley-slaves.

But Don John had tasted the sweets of victory, and his dreams of empire beguiled him still. A fresh adviser was sent to him of the strictest Ruy Gomez school, named Escobedo; but he too fell under the spell of the Prince's visions, and, like his master, entreated the Pope and the Christian Princes to subsidise the crusade. For three years longer Don John thus remained in Italy, his brother's resentful jealousy growing as his turbulent demands became more pressing, and his conduct more flighty and unstable. The Neapolitan nobility, indignant at Philip's treatment of Don John, established a league for the purpose of formulating for their country demands similar to those of the Flemish nobles, namely, provincial assemblies and the withdrawal of Spanish garrisons. Genoa, too, the now decadent Republic, which had always been the faithful servant of Philip and his father, rose in revolt against the Doria and Grimaldi, the Spanish King's henchmen, and threatened an

appeal to France, which Philip dreaded of all things; so that humiliating concessions had to be made to Doria's enemies.

In this dangerous condition of things Requesens died in Flanders (March, 1576). The Catholic Flemings had continued to press for the withdrawal of the troops, which Requesens had promised again and again. But without money the troops would not budge; and Philip was at the end of his resources. Walcheren had been completely lost to the Spaniards; the siege of Leyden had failed; and at one time, in his despair, Philip had resolved either to drown or burn all Holland. Tired out at last of the hopeless contest, and of the ceaseless demands of the Catholic Flemings, Philip bent to the inevitable, and summoned Don John from his dissolute life in Naples, to carry to Flanders the message of peace, offering any terms, so long as Spain's suzerainty over the Low Countries were retained.

The humiliation, bitter for Philip, was more bitter still for his brother. Don John was ordered to travel post-haste to Flanders direct, to withdraw the mutinous troops at any sacrifice, and to conciliate the Belgic Provinces. The task was repulsive to him; as he said, any old woman with a distaff could do it better than he; but it seemed to offer him a chance of reaching an ambition even greater than that of his visionary Eastern empire. Either the Prince or his minister, Escobedo, conceived the rash idea that the cut-throats who were ravaging Flanders, instead of being marched overland to Italy, might be withdrawn by sea, and suddenly be thrown into England, where, in conjunction with a rising of Catholics in the north, they might liberate Mary Stewart. Don John would marry her; and they would reign over Great Britain as Catholic monarchs under the ægis of Spain. It was a wild and impracticable plan, but to Don John real enough to make him disobey orders, and rush to Spain to beg his brother's aid to it. Philip's heart hardened at the coming of Don John with plans that would have set all Europe in a blaze; and with a cool, evasive answer to his prayer, he sent his brother in disguise through France to Flanders.

Before Don John arrived there the catastrophe had happened. Antwerp had been sacked and ruined by the revolted soldiery (November 4, 1576). There was no more hesitation. Flemings of all ranks and creeds made common cause to defend their homes and lives; and, when Don John reached the frontier, he found that he could only enter upon his governorship on terms dictated by the States. News had reached Orange of the great plan against England; and the first demand of the States was that the troops must be withdrawn by land and not by sea. Don John rebelled against his task. Wild prayers went to Spain that he might be allowed to fight the insolent rebels who thus defied their sovereign. But Philip knew better. He had no money, no credit; and an unsuccessful attack upon England now would have meant ruin. He distrusted Don John too, for Perez was hourly poisoning his

ear against his brother. At length, with infinite trouble, humiliation, and bitterness, sufficient money was borrowed in Flanders on Escobedo's credit to satisfy the soldiers, who marched out of the country in the spring of 1577. The "joyous entry" of Don John into Brussels marked the triumph of the Flemings; but there was no joy in Don John's heart. His prayers for recall were unanswered; and at length in despair he broke with the States, threw himself into Namur, and defied the Flemings, Catholics and Protestants, to do their worst. His greater cousin, Farnese, hurried from Italy to bring his generalship and diplomacy to bear, whilst Don John, heartbroken, sank and died (October 1, 1578).

There were other importunities besides those of Don John upon which Philip was forced to frown. The young King Sebastian of Portugal, his nephew, was burning with zeal for the conquest of Morocco for the Cross, and sought to persuade his uncle to throw the weight of Spain into the project. As we have seen, Philip was hopelessly bankrupt at the time, at close grip with the Flemings, and on most critical terms with Elizabeth of England. He dared not arouse all Islam against him anew, and did his best to divert his half-crazy nephew from his plans, but without success. Don Sebastian led his Christian host across the Strait, to the deep grief and discontent of his people; and met his fate, of which the mystery can never be revealed, at the battle of Alcazar-Kebir, on August 4, 1578. The next heir to the Crown of Portugal was the aged and childless Cardinal Henry, great uncle of Sebastian; after him came a host of claimants, amongst whom Philip II was the strongest, though not the most popular in Portugal or possessed of the best title. The possession of Portugal seemed to hold out the hope to the Spanish King of an accession of power that would enable him to have his way in Europe. The great wealth of the Portuguese Crown, the revenues from the East Indies, where the Portuguese were rapidly ousting the Venetians from their monopoly of trade, the mines of Brazil, and the great possessions in Africa, would provide resources, which, when added to those of Spain, would far exceed those of any other Power in the world; and the prospect of their possession opened to Philip a bright vista of success for the future, since all his previous failure had sprung from want of means. To him it mattered little that he claimed the succession through his mother, the daughter of Emmanuel the Great, whilst the other claimants descended from sons of the same King. He lost no time in sending trusty agents to Portugal to bribe his way to the throne whilst yet King Henry lived. The old King himself had vain dreams, notwithstanding his seventy-seven years, of founding a dynasty and disappointing all rivals; but Philip's ambassador in Rome promptly stopped the project of releasing him from his vows. Don Cristobal de Moura, Philip's ambassador at Lisbon, and the eager Spanish churchmen, were not long in worrying the old Cardinal King into his grave with their importunities (January 31, 1580); and, of the

five Regents left by the King to choose a successor, Philip's bribes and threats had won three. An army was standing ready in Andalusia; and Alvaro de Bazan, Marquis of Santa Cruz, the stout Admiral, had thirty-nine armed galleys lying in the Bay of Gibraltar. But a land commander was wanted. Alva alone would suit. He had lain in disgrace since his return from Flanders; his enemies, Perez and the peace party, had been all-powerful. As will be related below, Don John had been abandoned, and his minister, Escobedo, murdered, on the mere apprehension that they might strengthen Alva. But, now that Alva was needed for Philip's plans, the old soldier was called to honour again, and bidden to lead the Spanish army through Portugal. The Regents were on Philip's side; and those of the Portuguese nobility who were not bribed were terrified by threats or kidnapped to Spain. The first movement of the Portuguese people and clergy had been to elect to the throne Don Antonio, the half-Jewish and doubtfully legitimate grandson of Emmanuel the Great, Prior of Crato; but his resources were scanty, and, though he was personally popular, the people themselves were cowardly and unorganised. Alva marched through the country almost unresisted, defeating Antonio's forces in two battles, and driving the unfortunate pretender into hiding, and thence into lifelong exile.

In the meantime Philip followed in the wake of his army, to take possession of his new realm. On his way, at Badajoz, in October, 1580, to his inexpressible grief, he lost his fourth wife; and soon afterwards two of the three children she had left followed her to the grave. Philip was a good husband and father, and after this there was no more pleasure for him in life. He had always been reticent and grave; now he became a gloomy recluse, living but for his great task and for the love of his eldest daughter. In gathering sadness, but striving still to bear his troubles humbly and patiently, he went from town to town through his new kingdom to receive the oath of allegiance from the Portuguese Cortes at Thomar on April 1, 1581. Now, if ever, there seemed a chance of his being able to crush his enemies by mere force and wealth. All America, all Africa, vast, rich territories in Asia, the finest Atlantic ports in Europe, with trade and mineral wealth unbounded, were his; and the mere contemplation of the power thus acquired by him drove Elizabeth of England and Catharine de' Medici both into a panic.

The fugitive Don Antonio fled through France to England in July, 1581, and was received with royal honours, Elizabeth and Catharine vying with each other in their endeavours to secure the direction of so powerful an instrument to oppose Philip, or so valuable an asset for a transaction with him. Antonio at first decided to trust the English; and the Puritan party, now led by Leicester and Walsingham, rose in influence with such a tool in their hands. Catharine de' Medici pretended to some sort of claim to the Portuguese throne herself, but it was not seriously pressed; and, when Antonio found that Elizabeth and her

ministers were more eager to get possession of the priceless jewels which he brought than to go to war with Spain for his sake, he listened to the more tempting offers of the French Queen-Mother to fit out a mercenary fleet for the seizure of the Azores, which were inclined to accept him as King. Leaving England in October, 1581, he sailed in the following summer in high hope with a great fleet of 55 ships and 5000 men, commanded by Strozzi. Terceira received the pretender with open arms; but in the midst of the rejoicing the terrible Santa Cruz, with his Spanish fleet, appeared, and scattered to the winds Antonio's ships, the pretender himself barely escaping and Strozzi being slain. In the following year an exactly similar attempt was made, with the same result, when Aymard de Chaste's mercenary fleet with 6000 partisans of Don Antonio fell a prey, also off Terceira, to the skill and daring of Santa Cruz. Then Antonio, with broken fortune and flagging spirit, drifted back to England again, to be alternately taken up and dropped by Elizabeth, as the mutations of her attitude towards Spain demanded, until the crowning fiasco of the English mercenary invasion of Portugal in 1589 quenched for ever his chances of reigning in his own country. Then, having served Elizabeth's turn in the war of England against Spain, he sank into obscurity.

But both Catharine and Elizabeth took stronger measures than cherishing Don Antonio to retort upon Philip for his seizure of Portugal. When the Catholic Flemings had been driven to revolt by the outrages of the Spanish troops, some of the Catholic nobles had invited the Archduke Matthias to assume the sovereignty of Flanders. At the risk of offending his uncle Philip, Matthias consented; and the interests of the two branches of the House of Austria were thus separated; a diplomatic advantage which led Orange to accept with alacrity a subordinate position to the young Catholic Prince. But it soon became evident that another prince of stiffer material must be found by the Catholic Flemings, or Brabant and Flanders would have to choose between submission to the Protestants of Holland or to the Spanish tyranny. Before Don John's failure negotiations had taken place with the Catholic Flemings to place upon the throne of Brabant Elizabeth's young French suitor, Francis of Valois, now Duke of Anjou. Henry III, who had no desire to be drawn into a war with Spain in which his own Guises and extreme Catholics would not be likely to help him, was panic-stricken at the idea, and promptly put his brother under lock and key. Anjou escaped in February, 1578; and Huguenots and "malcontents" flocked to his standard to aid in the project of crippling Philip, by placing a Frenchman on the Belgic throne, with Hollanders and Protestants by his side, and perhaps with the support of England. Henry III and his mother were anxious not to be compromised with Spain; but the matter was much more serious for Elizabeth. Envoys were sent from England to Don John in his retreat at Namur, and to

the States urging them to agree in order to keep the Frenchman out. During the next few years English diplomacy was directed to this end, or to ensure that, if Anjou ever ruled, it should be under English influence alone, while France and Spain were embroiled. With Leicester by his side Anjou was crowned Duke of Brabant in Antwerp in 1582, only to be repudiated as such by Elizabeth directly afterwards. His utter worthlessness soon became apparent, and the farce of his sovereignty was abandoned; while the Catholic Flemings were cajoled or coerced by Farnese back into submission, and the northern Provinces, now supported undisguisedly by Queen Elizabeth, stood apart again from them.

It is not to be supposed that these French and English intrigues, carried on through a series of years to his detriment, were allowed by Philip to pass without retaliation. With every move of Anjou towards the Huguenots, the Guises drew nearer to Spain. In 1580 they gave Philip to understand that their niece Mary Stewart would thenceforward serve Spanish interests alone; and from that period until the unfortunate Queen's death the conspiracies constantly formed in her favour, at first with Guise, and subsequently without him, were purely Spanish in object, and intended, by placing England in Catholic hands, to end a *régime* by which Spanish commerce had been well-nigh destroyed, and the Protestant revolt against Philip sustained. For twenty-five years open national war between England and Spain had been avoided, with the constant hope on Philip's part that he might be able alone to crush religious dissent in his own dominions, and thus be in a position to deal with England subsequently. But, as we have seen, his poverty and tardy methods, as well as the resource and agility of his opponents, had frustrated this plan. He lived for the object of unifying Christianity for the ultimate political benefit of Spain; and, after a quarter of a century of ceaseless struggle, he was further from the goal than ever. Not only were the depredations of Drake and his many imitators a standing humiliation to him, but the interference with his shipping, Spanish and Portuguese, hampered him financially to a ruinous degree. His mind was slow to move, and he detested war. Despite the oft-repeated prayers of his ambassadors and agents that he would make open war on England, he had not dared to face the cost and responsibility of this course. He had done his utmost, by encouraging Catholic revolt in favour of Mary Stewart and subsidising English religious discontent, even by listening to and aiding plans for Elizabeth's murder—though with little conviction, for repeated failure had taught him the efficacy of Walsingham's spies and the faithlessness of conspirators. Very slowly and reluctantly he was forced to recognise that he would have to begin by mastering England, or the rest of his task would be impossible. Santa Cruz had always been of that opinion, and after his victory over Don Antonio's second expedition off Terceira he wrote to the King (August 9, 1583), fervently begging him to allow him to conquer

England with his fleet. Philip coolly thanked the Admiral, but evaded the offer. The idea however germinated; and, when Elizabeth accepted the supremacy over the Netherlands in 1585, the eventual adoption of the plan became inevitable. England, or rather Elizabeth's government, must be crushed, or Spain was doomed to decay. To this pass had Philip been brought by the march of circumstances and his own rigidity of method. His tactical mistake had been to refrain from dealing with England when she was weak, and so depriving the continental Protestants of their main support, misled by Elizabeth's clever juggle of an Austrian marriage and similar diplomatic pretences.

If, however, he was to be driven to the conquest of England, he was determined that the benefit must accrue to him alone. The plan of the Scottish, French, and Welsh Catholics and of the Vatican had always been to convert James Stewart, forcibly if necessary, and make him King of Britain—the end for which James himself ceaselessly worked. The English Jesuit party and Philip's English pensioners were violently opposed to such a solution, and indignantly scouted the idea of a Scottish King over England. Guise's plans had always included the invasion of Scotland in the Catholic interest simultaneously with that of England; but Philip looked more and more askance both at James Stewart and his French kinsmen, and listened with increasing favour to the hints of the English Jesuits that after James, excluded for heresy, he, Philip, had a good claim to the English throne through his descent from John of Gaunt and the House of Portugal. There was no candidate outside his own House who could be trusted; and with Mary Stewart's formal recognition of Philip as her heir (June, 1586), the policy of forcing a Spanish sovereign upon England was finally adopted. Thenceforward, if the plans of the Guises and the Scottish Catholics were smiled upon, it was done only in order to frustrate them.

In January, 1586, Santa Cruz again urged the King to adopt a strong naval policy. The English, he said, had since the previous August done damage to Spanish shipping to the extent of a million and a half ducats, and a national war would be less costly than that. Philip ordered the admiral to submit his plans and estimates for the invasion of England; but when they were complete, the cost—3,800,000 ducats—was alarming, and the whole force was to be raised and sent from Spain. Philip knew that ruined Castile could not produce such an amount and that years would be needed to collect in Spain the material for such a force. But he recognised at last that his time was now or never. The Flemings had been cajoled or crushed by Farnese; the Dutch were in worse case than they had been in for years; the English garrisons in the Netherlands towns were passing over to Farnese's side in a most alarming fashion; the Turk was busy at war with the Emperor; and France, divided by religious discord, was powerless to interfere. So the plunge was taken, though on a smaller scale, and on a less concentrated

plan, than that suggested by Santa Cruz. Orders went to Naples, Sicily, Portugal, and the Spanish ports, for ships and munitions to be prepared. Not a hint was given openly of the destination of the force, though the Irish refugees from the Munster rebellion who crowded the quays of Lisbon and Corunna soon began to chatter gleefully of the vengeance that at last was to fall upon their enemy. In his cell in the Escorial the little white-haired man toiled night and day, directing the smallest details everywhere. Pope Sixtus V (Peretti) was alternately bullied and cajoled into promising a million gold crowns, and perhaps half as much again if once a landing was effected in England. But he was kept in the dark as to whom the King of Spain was to put in Elizabeth's place, though he promised, after infinite wrangling, to approve of the person Philip might choose. In the secret councils of the King the English Jesuits had prevailed; and the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia was Queen designate of England. But the papal subsidy was not available until after the event: and, though finally Philip managed to borrow some money on the security of it, the sums needed at once and continuously were enormous.

The Cortes of Castile, when they met in the autumn of 1586, could only repeat in doleful tones their oft-told tale. The realm, they said, was going from bad to worse. Lands were untilled, and the former cultivators wandering tramps and homeless beggars at convent gates; trade was everywhere languishing or extinct, owing to taxation; and the utmost that could be squeezed from the country of Castile was the usual triennial grant of 450 million *maravedis*. It was a mere drop in the ocean of Philip's needs. The clergy had to disburse handsomely for the crusade, and the nobles were half ruined by extortions: the Italian princes were made to understand that if they wished to be regarded as friends they must contribute; and so, throughout the vast dominions of Spain, money was wrung from all classes in the name of Philip and the cause he championed; and the dockyards and arsenals throbbed with life.

It has been related elsewhere how the English seamen had taken the measure of the Spaniards, and how, on April 18, 1587, Drake and his fleet suddenly swept down upon Cadiz; plundered, burned, and sank all the ships in harbour, destroyed the painfully collected stores, and sailed out again unmolested. Santa Cruz's main fleet was in the Tagus, but it had no artillery on board; and, if Drake had burned it, as he might have done, the Armada could not have sailed. But Elizabeth's orders were precise. Drake had learnt that peace negotiations were in progress with Farnese as Philip's representative; and the ships in the Tagus were left unmolested. The peace negotiations in question were probably sincere on the part of the moderate Catholics and the Burghley party in England, who may have thought to separate Farnese from his uncle's interest by the bait of an independent sovereignty for himself in

Flanders. But, so far as Philip was concerned, the negotiations were insincere from first to last, though Farnese earnestly prayed for permission to make peace in reality.

Santa Cruz and Farnese urged ceaselessly the need for seizing a port of refuge in the North Sea; and the admiral fretted over the change of plan that had been forced upon him. An army under Farnese was to be convoyed across the Channel, and on land Farnese was to be supreme. Santa Cruz's idea was that of a seaman: first defeat the English fleet and gain command of the sea, and then invade the land. Philip's plan was that of the landmen: keep the English fleet at bay whilst Farnese's army was ferried across in barges. In September, 1587, Santa Cruz received his orders. He was to sail straight to the North Foreland and protect Farnese's passage across. He replied that the force was not ready and the season was too far advanced to sail without a port of refuge. Philip's soldier officers were scornful of such timid counsels; and Philip was impatient too, for he knew that Farnese's 30,000 men would melt away before another season came. So the only man who could have led the fleet to victory was driven to his death by the unmerited reproaches of his master, and Santa Cruz breathed his last in February, 1588.

The delay nearly ruined the whole project. Food went bad; ships grew foul; men had to be fed; and money was ever harder to be come by. The Pope distrusted Philip and stood firm to his stipulation that he would pay nothing until the Spanish troops landed in England; and one more appeal was made to the Cortes of Castile (April, 1588). They were well-nigh effete now, but they protested that no such sum as that demanded (8,000,000 ducats) had ever been heard of in Spain before and could not be raised. The pulpit and the confessional were set to work throughout the country; the members of the Cortes were bribed and terrified into acquiescence; the town councils were similarly treated; and the vote was passed that led to the excise tax called the "Millions," which for the next two centuries burdened the simple food of the people.

Philip had several fine seamen in his service, but pride and jealousy reigned supreme amongst the officers at Lisbon. The soldier always assumed superiority; the sailor was only a carrier to convey the fighting man to battle; and Philip was obliged to choose a man to succeed Santa Cruz whose rank was high enough to command respect from all, soldiers and sailors alike. He was also guided in his choice by his fatal desire to command the Armada himself from his cell; and a man of initiative and ability did not suit him. The man he chose was the greatest noble in Spain, the Duke of Medina Sidonia, head of the great House of Guzman, and admiral of the coast of Andalusia. He was a fool and a poltroon, and he knew it; but it served the King's purpose to appoint him. In vain he protested his unfitness, he suffered from sea-sickness, he knew nothing of marine warfare, he was half ruined already by the preparation

of his squadron, and he was in poor health. But Philip was firm. He was sure, he said, that the Duke would worthily uphold the great name he bore.

Medina Sidonia found disorganisation, corruption, and jealousy rampant in Lisbon. Pestilence and famine were rife, the men and ships all unready, and the stores rotten. This gave the new chief an excuse for fresh and ever repeated delay in sailing. More men, more arms, more money, was his constant cry, until his own officers accused him of wilful procrastination and sent angry remonstrances to the King. Only at Philip's peremptory command did Medina Sidonia unwillingly sail from Lisbon (May 30, 1588, N.S.); and even then nothing short of a miracle could have made the expedition successful. The teachings of experience, the advice of experts, the most obvious precautions, had all been perversely neglected. Everyone knew that the English sailors had revolutionised tactics in the previous twenty years; that their ships were stancher and handier, and could sail closer to the wind. The galley tradition still ruled in Spain; and the first principle was to grapple and close so that soldiers and small arms could be utilised. Artillery was reckoned an ignoble arm, and its use amongst Spaniards was to disable rigging not to pierce hulls. Philip and his advisers knew to their cost that Drake had formed a new system, depending upon the power of the English craft to evade grappling and employ their superior artillery upon the enemy's hull; but all this knowledge was useless, for Philip's mind was impervious to new ideas. Similarly, his neglect of the best advice to seize a safe port on the English coast was neglected. To all remonstrance he had but one type of reply. The expedition was in God's service, and He might be trusted to bring it victory. So in Lisbon, before the fleet sailed, and throughout Spain, prayers and vows took the place of prudent mundane precaution. Sacred banners, holy water, crucifixes, blessed scapularies, priests and friars, and images of the Saints, made the great fleet like a cloister, and inflamed to religious ecstasy the crews and soldiers, who were told that they went on a saintly crusade to deliver a yearning people from the tyranny of the evil one. If exalted enthusiasm and religious zeal had sufficed, the Armada was sure of victory; but its material, organisation, plan of campaign, and system of tactics, were such that it could only win by an almost impossible combination of entirely favourable circumstances.

Its unseaworthiness was proved almost as soon as it got clear of the Tagus. For the next three weeks the unwieldy ships were buffeted by a series of gales on the coasts of Portugal, Galicia, and Biscay; some of the vessels reaching as far north as the Scilly Isles. With gaping seams and shattered spars they sought such shelter as they might, and those that were not entirely disabled were finally once more collected in Corunna. This foretaste of disaster increased the Duke's fears. On June 24 he wrote to the King solemnly urging him to abandon

the expedition and to make an honourable peace with Elizabeth. The water, he assured the King, was fetid, and the food putrid; the supplies already so short that, under the most favourable circumstances, they could not suffice for two months. "The ships have suffered much and are now greatly inferior to the English; and the crews are seriously weakened, numbers falling ill every day in consequence of the bad food." All the force of Spain, he urged, was employed in this unpromising venture; and ill success would mean utter ruin. The same advice in more dignified language had been given two months before by Farnese. His men, unpaid as usual, for he was in dire straits for money, had dwindled by sickness and desertion after long waiting and two disappointments. His Italians, Germans, and Walloons were in a dangerous state of discontent; his only ports were the little sand-blocked harbours of Dunkirk and Nieuport; his boats were only flat-bottomed barges, unfit to face any weather but the finest: Justin of Nassau with his fleet was watching for him outside; and, unless the Armada could first gain complete command of the sea, and give him 6000 Spanish veterans to stiffen his own mercenaries, he warned the King again and again he neither could, nor would, move. Thus, with two unwilling commanders foretelling failure, Philip's faith was put to the supreme test, and conquered all his boasted prudence. Farnese was given no authority to make his sham peace negotiations with the English Commissioners real; and Medina Sidonia was coldly ordered to sail at once and carry out the plan laid down for him. Ever since the first sailing from Lisbon Medina Sidonia had continued to urge Farnese to be ready to come out and meet him; and on the voyage to England and up the Channel the Duke's letters to this effect became more and more peremptory. Farnese, in hot indignation, could only repeat that the conditions promised to him must be fulfilled to the letter or he could not move. His men had dwindled by plague and defections to 17,000; he was being closely watched by Nassau and Seymour; his barges were powerless against attack; and the sea must be cleared of enemies and 6000 Spanish veterans given to him, or the Armada must do without his aid.

Catastrophe, almost inevitable, therefore loomed ahead when on July 29, 1588, the Lizard was sighted from Medina Sidonia's flagship. The soldiers were confident; but the sailors knew the conditions better and were assailed by doubts. How in a week's running fight up the Channel, and one awful battle off a lee shore near Gravelines, the sailors were justified and the soldiers lost faith in themselves and in the Divine patronage promised to them, is told in detail in another chapter; but a few words must be said here with regard to the effects of the catastrophe upon Spaniards generally. A cry of despair and rage rang throughout the land. The Duke, abandoning everything, fled to the refuge of his palace at San Lucar, pursued by the curses of his countrymen. Farnese's

loyalty was impugned, the Duke's reputation for valour was attacked; but amidst the recriminations and dismay the one man to whose hopes the defeat was indeed a death-blow, blamed no one and gave no sign of anger. In agonised prayer for days together, Philip still fervently whispered his unquestioning faith to the God he tried to serve according to his dim lights. "It is Thy cause, O Lord!" he murmured: "if in Thy wisdom defeat is best, then Thy will be done." He could no more doubt of the final triumph than he could doubt the sacredness of the cause he had inherited. His slow, laborious mind was incapable of change or adaptations; a conviction once assimilated by him could only with great difficulty be eradicated. He had been taught that his royal House and his Spanish people were divinely appointed to champion the system which was to bring about God's kingdom upon earth. Suffering, hardship, oppression, cruelty, might be necessary for the attainment of the glorious object, of which he and Spain were to be the instrumental factors. If so, they must be endured without murmur, even as he endured unmoved labour and disappointments that would have broken the heart or crushed the faith of any other man. And thus, in the hour of Spain's bitter disillusionment the King alone remained serene, and turned again to his ceaseless round of plodding office-work, patiently planning how best to retrieve the disaster.

The immediate and personal effects of the catastrophe of the Armada were felt so poignantly, the culmination was so dramatic, the reaction both in Spain and England so violent, that the larger results were only very gradually understood. For the greater part of a century Spain had imposed herself upon the world to an extent entirely unwarranted by her native resources and the numbers of her population. She had during the period discovered, subjected, and organised a vast new continent: the commercial and mineral wealth of both East and West had been claimed as her monopoly; and throughout the world her assumption of the leadership of orthodox Christianity had been humbly accepted by all but a few. The accident of the accession of Charles V to Spain and Naples and the Empire with the added possession of the vast heritage of Burgundy, had given the appearance of strength necessary to maintain the pretence: but it was still only Castile, poor in herself, and her colonial possessions that bore the main burden of the expenditure demanded by the world-policy of the Emperor and his son.

The sentimental impetus such as must inspire a people for any great national advance came from Spain as a whole, though Castile had to provide most of the means. Yet there was no true Spanish nationality at all before the time of Ferdinand and Isabel, and to this day the nation is far from homogeneous. No purely political cooperation for national purposes was to be expected from the many divided peoples, with separate institutions, and antagonistic racial qualities, which constituted Spain. The bond of union had been sought in spiritual exclusiveness.

Under this influence the Spanish people had been used as a political instrument by its monarchs for a century. The religious pride thus engendered enabled the Spanish men-at-arms to dominate in Europe and America with a power that far surpassed the material resources behind it, and dazzled the eyes of the world for a century. The American treasure, which enriched other countries more than Spain, encouraged the deception; and until the defeat of the Armada there were few to question the claims of Spaniards to overwhelming power, except the English sailors and the Beggars of the Sea. In their running fight up the Channel the Spanish mariners first raised the sinister cry wrung from their disillusioned hearts, "God has forsaken us!" From that hour, though it lingered yet awhile, the source of Spain's ephemeral strength, the conviction of special divine protection, decayed; and, as it waned, so waned the haughty tradition that had for so long cowed Europe. Spain's agony lasted for a hundred years longer; and more than once in the period it suited other nations to revive the old pretence for their own ends: but the defeat of the Armada marked the commencement of the Spaniard's doubt of the destiny of his country.

But all this was hidden at first from those who witnessed the catastrophe. When the extent of the disaster became known, the unanimous cry of the Spanish people was for vengeance against the insolent islanders, who dared to claim a victory over Spain for what was really a visitation of Providence. The towns, half-ruined and depopulated as they were, came to Philip with offers of money for a new fleet; the Cortes secretly offered to vote five million ducats to wipe out the stain; the monasteries found that they still had some treasure left that might be employed for the holy cause; and the sailors and merchants were clamorous that they should be allowed to fit out a new Armada. But Philip knew, as yet alone, how utterly ruined the calamity had left him both in credit and in coin. The promised papal subsidy was not forthcoming. He was deep in debt everywhere; and, though he would have been willing to receive the money offered to him by his subjects, the offers were always clogged with conditions which he could not accept—that his organisation should be reformed, and that the contributing bodies should supervise the expenditure of their money. So he bade his people be patient, thanked them with evasive courtesy, and promised that he would act for the best when he judged opportune.

Other reasons gave him pause beside the lack of money. The Pope had been cajoled once into supporting a policy intended to make England a dependency of Spain; but he would hardly be likely to be so compliant a second time. The Papacy, always deeply jealous of Spanish supremacy, and depending naturally much upon France and other Catholic Powers, had no intention of aiding the subjection of all Christendom to Philip. But a still more important element was the attitude of France. The strong Huguenot party had been thrown into

a ferment at the threat conveyed by the Armada; and Henry III had only been kept neutral with difficulty by his hard taskmasters the Guises and by the strong Catholicism of the Parisian population. That, also, would never be likely to happen again. Henry III was sinking into premature senility; he had no child or brother to succeed him; and the next heir to the French throne was Henry of Navarre, the hereditary foe of Philip, whose great-grandfather Ferdinand with the aid of the Pope had filched the ancient Spanish mountain realm from its rightful Kings. Not only was it clear that as Henry of Navarre's sun rose, the danger of French interference in Philip's plans increased; but a still greater peril loomed ahead that well might turn the King of Spain's thoughts from Protestant England, even from the Netherlands and their revolt. Unless Spain was to decay, as has already been explained, England must be kept friendly as a counterbalance to France in the Channel. For her to be a fit friend for Philip's ends she must be at least tolerant to Catholics. Philip had signally failed to make her so, and, in addition, had now gained her undying enmity. He could therefore expect from England nothing but opposition, continuous and strenuous. The Dutch Protestants, instead of being nearer submission to their nominal sovereign in the matter of religion, were more stoutly determined than ever, now that they realised his maritime impotence, on resistance to the death. Philip had therefore failed completely in the two primary and most obvious points of his policy; and it was evident that, whatever happened, Spain could not hope to regain or retain her commanding political position by means of forcing religious uniformity upon all Christendom. This was bad enough; but if France under a Huguenot King became Protestant too, then the ruin, rapid and complete, of the system upon which the Spanish power was based, was inevitable.

This was a danger more pressing even than that of England or Holland; and the Spanish intrigues to avoid it were as crafty as they were unscrupulous. Already the Guises were hovering over the prey, a share of which they hoped to seize in due time by the help of Spain; while Philip, fully alive to the peril, fomented their ambitious hopes with soft words and painfully wrung treasure, determined that, come what might, no Protestant should reign over France; and above all not the foe of his House, the popular, self-reliant Henry of Navarre. Approaches had been made to the latter more than once on Philip's behalf; and, if he had been content with Béarn and Gascony, he might have had them for a kingdom without fighting. Philip's first idea had been to disintegrate France. He would give to his elder daughter, Isabel Clara Eugenia, the duchy of Brittany, to which she had a good right through her mother, Elizabeth of Valois: to his son-in-law, Duke Charles Emmanuel of Savoy he would cede the county of Provence; while Guise should reign over central France, including Paris, under Spanish influence; and, most important of all, Picardy and French Flanders

opposite England should be added to Philip's own dominions. The Spaniards would thus through Philip and his daughter control the French Channel coast. The plan was a clever one, but Henry of Navarre would have none of it; and cajolery, threats, and bribes were alike powerless to move him. The Guises secured the withdrawal of the Edict of Toleration; and anarchy and war at once reigned throughout France. To free himself from the Guises, Henry III caused the Duke to be murdered almost in his presence, and fled to the Huguenots (December, 1588). Paris solemnly deposed the King, and set up a provisional government under Guise's brother Mayenne. For years it had been agreed between Philip and the Guises that the former was to have a free hand in England in return for the support given by Spain to their ambition in France. But Guise was dead and Mayenne unstable; and Philip was not ready to begin a national war with France while Henry III was still alive, nor could he engage in such an adventure without a clear knowledge of how he was to benefit by it. He had his hands full at the time; for the English attack upon Lisbon in the interests of Don Antonio was in full preparation; and, if Drake and Norris could set the pretender on the Portuguese throne, then indeed Philip's sun had set. So he turned a deaf ear to the appeals of Mayenne and the fanatics, until the retirement of the English from Lisbon relieved his anxiety in that respect; and the murder of Henry III precipitated events and forced upon Philip the need of throwing all his power into the scale to prevent France from becoming a Protestant power under the Huguenot Henry IV.

The first impulse of the Catholics in Paris had been to proclaim Philip King of France; but this did not suit Mayenne, who did not wish to burden the cause of the League with the domination of the foreigner. The Dukes of Savoy and Lorraine, and Mayenne himself, were greedy for the dismemberment of France in order to partake of the spoils; but Philip was determined that, if Spanish men and money conquered France, it must be for him and not for others. The successes gained by Henry IV over the League on his march from Normandy to Paris swept away for the time the Flemish-Spanish contingents under Egmont; and, when the great victory of Ivry had been won (March 14, 1590), it was clear that, unless the Huguenot was to carry all before him and Spain be ruined, Philip's cause must be championed, not by Flemings and Walloons, with commanders of the stamp of Egmont, but by Spanish national forces under Farnese and veteran Spanish officers. Farnese had been badly treated by his cousin. A half confidence was all that was vouchsafed him; his children's claim to the Portuguese Crown had been ignored; his own hopes of the Flemish sovereignty had been set aside; and he yearned for the reconquest of the Netherlands above all things. His conditions were therefore precise and rigid, and the Spaniards again whispered of treason; but at length, unwillingly and with a heavy heart, he accepted

the great task of conquering France for Philip and the Church. During one brief period (August and September, 1590) it looked as if the power of Spain and the great Farnese would triumph; and the cause of Henry of Navarre seemed well-nigh hopeless. But Mayenne was jealous and self-seeking, Farnese rough and haughty; and the attempt of Philip to cause his daughter to be crowned Queen of France caused dissensions amongst the Leaguers. So Farnese suddenly abandoned his French allies and hurried back to Flanders. Again the cause of Navarre prospered. Philip now saw that he could not force his daughter upon the throne of France; and the idea of partition was revived—Britanny to fall to the Infanta. With this view a port on the Breton coast was seized. Elizabeth had already helped Henry; but now that a port opposite Plymouth was held by her enemy, even against Leaguers and Frenchmen, more efficacious help was sent in the form of 3000 English troops under Essex to besiege Rouen (July, 1591). Thenceforward for nearly a year the war was a scattered one, consisting indeed of several separate wars in the interests of the various parties; while Spain hardly made a pretence of wishing to conquer all France for Philip or his daughter.

Meanwhile, affairs in Spain grew more and more desperate. The King himself was sixty-five years old, suffering under the tortures of constant gout. The only son left to him was a dull, scrofulous weakling, fourteen years of age, in whom the vices of his origin were already too apparent. The dominions of Castile were now almost utterly ruined. The Cortes might be forced or persuaded to vote more money; but money could not be wrung from beggars. The well-meant, but financially unwise sumptuary laws, which followed each other from year to year, prohibiting, with increasing but ineffectual penalties, the expenditure of money upon superfluities, reduced still more the demand for labour: while the artificial attempt to reduce the prices of commodities by forbidding the export of manufactured articles, even to the American colonies, deprived Spanish industry of its best market, and strangled the trade upon which the revenue mainly depended. The constant ineffectual attempts to prevent the exportation of bullion encouraged almost universal contraband, while the arbitrary and illegal seizures, made by the government in moments of pressure, of the private property of merchants and bankers at the principal ports, especially Seville, sapped confidence and led to the concealment or surreptitious conveyance to foreign countries of much of the wealth drawn from remittances from America and the East. The constant accumulation in the hands of the Church of land consequently exempt from regular taxation; the continuous increase of a class really or ostensibly attached to the ecclesiastical institutions, and also exempt from taxation and the operation of the civil law; and the drain of the best and strongest men in the nation for the American settlements—these causes had towards the end

of Philip's life together produced a state of affairs in Castile that rendered the country cynically hopeless. Already the exalted faith that had carried their ancestors so far was giving way amongst Spaniards of all classes to a grosser form of slavish superstition, with which religion itself had little to do. The most rigid observance of ritual and devotional forms was gradually being blended with an almost blasphemous semi-jocose familiarity with sacred names and things, that has left its distinct mark upon the Spaniards of our own day. Religion was growing to be no longer a rule of life or a guide of conduct: it was becoming a set of formulæ, the strictest observance of which might be quite compatible with a life of the blackest iniquity.

Such being the inevitable results of Philip's fiscal and political system in the portions of his dominions where the weakening of parliamentary institutions had enabled that system to work without restraint, the kingdoms where the parliamentary check was still operative naturally looked with increasing jealousy upon any attempt to enforce in them the King's conceptions of the rights of sovereigns as against those of peoples. When the King, in imposing state, had carried his younger daughter Catharine and her husband the Duke of Savoy to embark on his galley at Barcelona for the voyage to her new home in 1585, the opportunity was taken for summoning the Cortes of Aragon to take the oath of allegiance to the heir to the Crowns, Prince Philip, then seven years old; and on the King's return journey from the coast, a united sitting of the Cortes of the three Aragonese dominions (Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia) was called at Monzon for legislation and the voting of supplies. Philip was kept chafing in the unhealthy crowded provincial town for five months during the autumn of 1585; while the Aragonese deputies besieged him daily with claims and demands which he considered injurious to his prerogative. So strongly was he opposed to the assertion of popular rights, that he had entered Barcelona at dead of night in order to avoid a State reception in which the citizens would have had an opportunity of displaying their ancient privileges.

Aragon had at the time a judicial system which was unexampled in the rest of Europe and had always been a source of annoyance to Philip and his father. The Chief Justice of Aragon, who was irremovable, and independent of the King, possessed the power of taking charge of any prisoner who claimed his protection, and lodging him in his own prison of the *Manifestación*, where he was judged by a legally constituted tribunal, defended by a qualified lawyer, and exempt from torture. Every person or authority, civil or seigniorial, was obliged to produce a prisoner in their hands and surrender him to the Chief Justice, if the demand was made; and so soon as a person, of whatever nationality, set foot on Aragonese soil, he could claim the invaluable right of the *Manifestación*, ensuring him a trial in which the law of the land alone was the criterion of guilt. Thus it sufficed for any of Philip's subjects

from other portions of his dominions, if accused or suspected, to escape to Aragon, appeal to the Chief Justice, and defy arbitrary or irregular persecution; and, as may be supposed, the King lost no opportunity of endeavouring to weaken an institution which so greatly reduced his prerogative of punishment.

Even the Inquisition in Aragon was not quite the pliant instrument that it was in Castile; and during his long stay in Monzon in 1585 Philip found himself opposed by both the Chief Justice and the Inquisition in an attempt to appropriate the great fief of Ribagorza, as well as worried by the Cortes. The chagrin thus caused him, added to the insalubrity of the overcrowded place, threw him into an illness which threatened his life; and when he returned to his daily round of work in Madrid in January, 1586, he was aged and broken almost beyond recognition. His contemporaries were passing away; Margaret of Parma and Cardinal de Granvelle died in 1586. Alva had died soon after his Portuguese campaign; Ruy Gomez was gone; and the ministers and secretaries who now surrounded the King were distinctly inferior in ability to those who had preceded them. Mateo Vasquez, the King's personal secretary, was a sly, servile scribe of obscure and doubtfully Christian birth, without the keen wit and vast ambition of the brilliant scoundrel Antonio Perez whom he had supplanted.

On the return of the King from Aragon, it was accordingly found that his infirmities would no longer allow him to deal as before with every detail of every paper; and his methods of despatching affairs had necessarily to be changed. Instead, therefore, of each document being submitted to him with his secretary's annotations before it was sent to the particular Council which it concerned, a sort of intimate Privy Council was formed, consisting of three members—Don Juan de Idiaquez and Don Cristobal de Moura (the principal Secretaries of State), and the Count of Chinchon. This Council met every night in the palace—it was called the Council of Night in consequence—and considered the documents of the day before they were submitted to the King. Each of these ministers took charge of a special department of government, and was accorded an audience every day, in which the affairs of his department arising out of the documents of the previous night were submitted to the King; and the execution of the policy decided upon was relegated to the various Secretaries of Councils.

The greatest loss to the bureaucratic part of Philip's government, as well as one of the bitterest trials of his life, was the defection and escape of his chief secretary, Antonio Perez, which once more brought the King into antagonistic contact with the stubborn Aragonese and their judicial privileges. In the circumstances mentioned in an earlier page Perez had been commanded by the King to bring about the death of Escobedo, Don John's warlike secretary, killed during his visit to Spain in the summer of 1577, in order to prevent his return to Flanders, where

his presence might have further inflamed the Prince's ambitions, and have led to a renewed rupture with the recently reconciled Catholic Flemings. The attempts to assassinate Escobedo failed at the time; but when Don John had, of his own motion, quarrelled with the States and fortified himself in Namur, and the murder of his secretary was powerless to mend matters in any way, Escobedo was stabbed by Perez' creatures in the streets of Madrid (March 31, 1578). It was a matter of little consequence; and, although doubtless the King may have marvelled somewhat that the man should have been put out of the way at such a time, the affair would have blown over but for the persistent rumours in the capital—made the most of by Secretary Vasquez—connecting the name of Perez and that of Ruy Gomez' widow, the Princess of Eboli, with the crime. The Princess, a Mendoza, was a haughty virago, who had given the King great trouble already, and who now clamoured, as did Perez, for vengeance against Secretary Vasquez for his gossip concerning her. Philip endeavoured to hush up the matter, for Perez had become necessary to him; but at last the scandal became too public, and both the Princess and the secretary were arrested and imprisoned. The Princess never regained her liberty; but Perez, reduced to a somewhat humbler state of mind by his disgrace, after a time once more returned to his functions as minister. He remained in Madrid when the conquest of Portugal was undertaken; and his fate was sealed, when the presence of Alva and his war party was necessary in the capital. Alva attributed to Perez—doubtless with reason—his own long unmerited disgrace. He knew that Don John had died neglected and broken-hearted because Perez, fearing the Prince's warlike influence, had poisoned the King's mind against him. The patient investigation of jurists in Alva's interests proved not only this, but that the Princess of Eboli had a private grudge against Escobedo; and that Perez killed the latter when he did—by virtue of the King's previous authority—not really for State reasons that had disappeared before the deed was done, but only to avenge the woman who was his paramour.

The knowledge of his betrayal by the man whom he had trusted turned Philip's heart to the bitterest hate of Perez. For years the ex-secretary lay in prison, while every wile and threat, even torture, was employed to wring a confession from him of his motive for the murder. In vain he pleaded the King's authority. This was not what Philip wanted. Perez could not well be executed for a murder done by the King's command; but, if he could be brought to confess that he did it to avenge the Princess' quarrel, he could be put to death for the divulging of State secrets to her. Philip dared not tell the world that he had purposely abandoned Don John because he had been persuaded by his false secretary that his brother was disloyal. At length, by the self-sacrifice of his heroic wife, Perez escaped from prison and fled to Aragon,

where he was safe from arbitrary action. Orders were sent that he was to be captured dead or alive and brought back to Castile in spite of Aragonese liberties; and Perez, learning this, claimed the *Manifestación*. When the message came that the prisoner must be delivered to Castile, all Aragon, priests and laymen, flew to arms to protect the right of their tribunals; and Philip found himself defied by his own subjects. Perez claimed a trial, and issued a masterly statement of his case, to which Philip dared not reply without telling more of his own secrets than he desired. Again and again he demanded of the Chief Justice the delivery or death of the fugitive; and the refusal of the Aragonese cut him to the quick. As a last resource Perez was accused of heterodoxy, and orders came that he was to be handed to the Inquisition on that charge. The judicial authorities acceded to this, as they had no personal liking for Perez, who was obviously a traitor and a rogue. But the populace rose, besieged the palace of the Inquisition, which they threatened with fire, and in a great popular tumult rescued Perez from the Holy Office, lodging him again in the prison of the *Manifestación*. To avoid further conflict, Perez was then hastily smuggled out of prison and over the frontier into Béarn. Henry IV was (May, 1591) in the midst of his war with the League and Philip. Perez knew, as no other man had ever known, the innermost springs of Philip's policy; and he was received by the King of France with almost royal honours. In Paris, and in London as the friend and pensioner of Essex, Perez remained during the last years of Philip's life his bitterest foe. At the disposal of the Puritan war-party in England, ever ready with his brilliant pen and subtle brain to wound his old master, he did more than any other man to drag England into the contest between Henry IV and Spain. All Philip's attempts to murder him in France and England failed; and, so long as the religious war lasted, it was a Spaniard who tipped with poison the keenest darts that pierced the armour of Spain.

But if Philip could not reach his enemy beyond the Pyrenees, his long-pent vengeance fell upon the Aragonese who had balked him, and upon the institutions of which they were so proud. Anarchy had been the outcome of the popular ferment; and, with the pretext of suppressing lawlessness, an army of 15,000 Castilians, led by Alonso de Vargas, one of the veterans of Alva's school, overran Aragon. In December, 1591, the Chief Justice was suddenly seized and beheaded; and the net of the Inquisition was cast far and wide, sweeping into the dungeons all those, high or low, who were known to have favoured the defiance to the King. A small body of Béarnais troops crossed the pass of the Pyrenees; but the Aragonese themselves joined Philip's troops in expelling them. Out of the great number of persons condemned, only six were actually burnt alive in the great square of Saragossa; but of the fourscore who were relieved of the death penalty by the King's

clemency nearly all suffered a terrible retribution for their support of the rights of Aragon. Even Philip dared not with a stroke of the pen or sword abolish the ancient charter of the realm; but it was made plain to the Aragonese that, when in future their rights conflicted with the sovereign's will, they must submit, not he.

In the meantime the struggle in France went on. The country was utterly exhausted with the civil war; and even Catholics were saying that a Frenchman, though of doubtful Catholicism, might be a better ruler of his country than a Spanish nominee pledged to rigid intolerance. To have been defeated in his objects in France, as he had been in the case of England and Holland, would have been to Philip the crowning catastrophe of a long life of failure; and a despairing effort had to be made. Farnese was again summoned from his fight with the Dutchmen, but came reluctantly. By a masterly march he raised the siege of Rouen in April, 1592; but he soon found that the Leaguers hated the Spaniards now as bitterly as the Huguenots, and that nearly all France was against him. Wounded and broken-hearted at the jealousy and distrust with which he was treated in France and Spain, Farnese with difficulty escaped suffering heavy loss. He died in Flanders in December, 1592, abandoned as Don John had been by the sovereign he had served too well. Philip saw now that the utmost he could hope for in France was a compromise which should leave the kingdom officially Catholic. When the Estates met at the Louvre in January, 1593, Philip's ambassador Feria was instructed to revive the idea of the young Duke of Guise as King of France, with the Infanta as his wife. But Feria, who, like all Spaniards of his time, stiffly upheld the tradition of Spain's superiority, lost too much time in pressing the Infanta's own claims to the French Crown, claims really unacceptable now even by extreme Leaguers. When it was too late, and Henry IV outside the walls had made it understood that he was not obdurate about religion, Feria brought forward the Duke of Guise. If he had done this at first, compromise or a partition might have been possible; but in July, 1593, Henry went to mass; and, nine months after, he entered his capital as a Catholic King. The Spanish troops by agreement marched out of the city the day after Henry's entry, leaving little love or gratitude behind them.

Of Philip's design to make himself master of Ireland and thence menace Elizabeth's English throne some account will be given in the chapter dealing with the reign of his son, who prosecuted that design to its close. The war with the French and their English and Dutch allies in the north of France continued languidly for five years after the conversion of Henry IV, but with little or no expectation of an issue favourable to Spain. Nor were the social results of Philip's lifelong effort to rule Spain as if it had been a cloister more happy than his attempts to reduce the rest of the world to his own ritual. It is true that, by means of the ubiquitous Inquisition, with its army of informers,

a certain level of devout profession had become an element of the daily life and speech of the people. Priests, monks, and friars were everywhere; and in every concern of existence they assumed a superiority and authority over laymen which caused matters of all sorts, political, social, and even commercial, to be regarded and dealt with on considerations other than those which usually govern mundane affairs. The narrow and professionally sanctimonious view taken by churchmen of purely secular business, and their predominance in every sphere of activity, had, by the time of Philip's declining years, blighted enterprise, discouraged research, and made Spaniards generally timid and slavish in their attitude toward ecclesiastical pretensions. Philip himself in his old age became perfectly servile towards any ignorant friar, and even boasted of his humility.

While the King, in constant ill-health and impotent from gout, divided his time between exhausting devotions and office-work, his people, to whom he had become a mysterious abstraction, and his Court, which had to a great extent lost its dread of him, grew daily more undisciplined and dissolute in their ordinary conduct. The women of Spain, who had always been kept in almost oriental seclusion, had within the last twenty years scandalised propriety by their freedom of demeanour and speech. The stern decrees, so often issued, forbidding luxury, splendour, and ostentation, were constantly evaded or circumvented; and the privileged classes still lavished money corruptly obtained. Yet the streets even of the capital were unutterably filthy and almost impassable on foot; and vagrancy and pauperism, encouraged by the convent doles, were almost universal. Of all this the recluse King probably knew or recked little. He was rarely brought into contact with realities, and saw things through the medium of documents alone. As he grew older, too, his ecclesiastical ministers became more insolent, even to him. Rodrigo Vasquez, the secretary, with his ally Friar Chaves the confessor, having between them ruined Antonio Perez, determined to depose from the most influential post in Spain, the Presidency of the Council of Castile, Count de Barajas, who had been at one time friendly with the former secretary. Vasquez coveted the great post himself, obscure upstart though he was; but Barajas was a great magnate, and Philip hesitated to dismiss him without cause. Chaves thereupon wrote to the King, saying that he would give him no absolution until he did. "For such is the command of God. I am certain that your Majesty is in a more perilous condition than any Catholic Christian living"; and, in answer to this insolence, the King humbly submitted, and disgraced Barajas, as he had been ordered to do. Such a spectacle as this made even lay grandees regardless of the King's authority; and his attempts, constant as they were, to meddle in their private affairs were often treated with contempt. Justice was scandalously corrupt; and murders and robbery, even in Madrid itself, were committed with perfect im-

punishment if favour or bribery was resorted to. Ignorance, especially of science, was absolute amongst Spaniards; for the Inquisition opposed the cultivation of research, and the education abroad of young Spaniards was strictly forbidden. The population, even of the principal manufacturing towns, had dwindled, and large districts of the country were entirely depopulated and lying waste; and, although Spain possesses some of the finest wheat-growing land in the world, it was found necessary to raise the prohibition of imports and introduce large quantities of grain from abroad, to prevent even the reduced populations of entire provinces from perishing from famine. On the other hand, the Court centres and the ecclesiastical institutions were overcrowded with hordes of idle, unproductive persons; the army and the Church monopolised the strongest men whom emigration had left. So the evil was a progressive one; for, bad as was the state of affairs produced in the last few years of Philip's life by his policy, the evils were cumulative, and the lowest depth of misery was yet to come.

Before the death of Farnese the King had sent to Flanders Count de Fuentes, who since the death of Alva had been his most efficient officer in Portugal. After a short interregnum, in which the aged Count Mansfeld and Fuentes with the assistance of Secretary Ibarra ruled the Belgic provinces, and Maurice of Nassau gained considerable successes against the Spanish forces, Philip turned again to his Austrian kinsmen to discover a figurehead for his government. His Savoyard grandsons were yet too young to be of use to him; and he had no other relatives to aid him, since he could not spare his dear elder daughter, his constant companion in his documentary labours. One of the Austrian Archdukes, Cardinal Albert, was his regent in Portugal, and had acted creditably during the abortive English invasion of 1589. His brother, Archduke Ernest, was the one chosen to succeed the great Farnese in Flanders. Albert, superior to any of his brothers, partook nevertheless of his eldest brother Rudolf's objections to marriage, which, however, as he was a churchman, was perhaps to be expected; and Ernest, the vice-sovereign designate of Flanders, was frivolous and self-indulgent, and already, though a young man, in constant ill-health.

Instead of proceeding at once to his government Ernest spent some months in feasting and celebrations on the way, while Maurice of Nassau with his fine army was threatening Brabant. Ernest finally arrived at Brussels in January, 1594, to find the Italian regiments, unpaid as usual, in full revolt. The Archduke, expelled by these regiments from his capital, was forced to stand idly by, until his uncle could send him money from Spain to buy the reconciliation of the Italian ruffians, who had established a government of their own and were robbing and sacking without restraint. No sooner had the Archduke conciliated the mutineers than he succumbed to disease (February 20, 1595); and Mondragon, a fine old Spanish soldier of the school of the Emperor and Alva, stepped

into the breach in spite of his ninety-three years, and turned the Italian and Spanish infantry from a horde of brigands to an army of fighting men, such as their fathers had been in the old days under the same Mondragon, Julian Romero, Sancho de Avila, Verdugo, Frederick de Toledo, and the great Duke of Parma himself. During the year that Mondragon still lived, Maurice of Nassau and his splendid army were impotent for harm; but when the last of the Emperor's men had disappeared, the link that bound the Netherlands to Spain as a possession seemed strained almost to breaking.

The defeat of the Armada, though a most terrible blow to Spanish policy, had been succeeded so closely by the even more immediate trouble of the course of events in France, that Philip had been obliged to postpone any idea of a direct attack upon England. But the English Jesuit and extreme Catholic party were loth to abandon all hope of restoring the Faith in their native land by Spanish assistance. The more moderate Catholics were, especially since the Armada, desirous of any reasonable arrangement which should provide them, at least, with toleration under a native or even a Scottish sovereign, rather than that the now detested Spaniard should hold sway in the country that had worsted him in fair fight. After the commencement of the war in France it was impossible any longer to doubt that Philip's aims were not, as he had always so loudly proclaimed, disinterestedly religious. His open intention of placing the Infanta on the throne of England by force if the Armada were successful, and his subsequent claim on her behalf to the Crown of France, had opened the eyes of the most infatuated Catholics to the fact that, notwithstanding Philip's real devotion, religion was with him only a means for the establishment of his political supremacy in Europe; which, in its turn, would ensure the perpetuation of the particular form of Catholicism which he championed. But the English refugees and Jesuits, though they knew this, were content to accept even a Spanish domination of their country in exchange for the establishment of their doctrines as the only faith: and after the Armada, as before it, they were ceaseless in their petitions that the King should still work by any roads, straight or devious, to root out the heretic government of Elizabeth.

The lessons of the Armada had not been entirely lost upon Philip. The period of comparative tranquillity at sea after the abortive English attempt upon Portugal in 1589 had enabled him in two or three years to collect a smaller navy of more mobile type than he had previously possessed. The fast-sailing galley-zabras, built in Havana as armed treasure-ships, were found to be eminently quick and seaworthy, and were largely adopted. In Spanish and Portuguese dockyards English plans were used in the construction of ships and guns; and even English designers and builders were employed; so that, by the end of 1592, the navy of Spain was once more a force to be reckoned with. The news of these

preparations, duly exaggerated by spies, was a frequent source of alarm, even of panic, to Elizabeth and her people during the progress of the war in France, and especially after the seizure of Blavet in Brittany by Spain, avowedly as a base of attack against England. The English seamen were invariably in favour of crippling Spain's naval power before it could do much harm: but the cautious counsels of Elizabeth and Cecil until 1593 obliged the English mariners to content themselves with harrying the Spanish treasure-fleets in the Atlantic.

At length the Spanish naval armaments were too formidable to be ignored; and in the English Parliament of 1593 a rousing appeal to patriotism was made in the Queen's Speech that funds should be provided to withstand the anticipated invasion. Raleigh and the sailors, as usual, were for attacking the Spanish base in Brittany first of all; and then to watch off the Spanish coast to intercept any invading fleet that might sail. As a matter of fact, there was at that time no intention or possibility of a Spanish invasion in force of England; and Spain was much more alarmed and with better reason than Elizabeth or her ministers. Nothing was done on either side until the sending of large Spanish reinforcements to Brittany in the winter of 1593; and in the spring of 1594 the Spanish position at Brest was captured by the English. The favourite scheme now, indeed, both with the Spaniards for a time and with some of the English refugees, was to invade England from Scotland, in conjunction with a rising of the Scottish Catholics, many of whom at this period were ready to throw over their own King and accept a Spanish supremacy over all Britain. This phase, however, thanks mainly to the clever tergiversation of King James and the diplomacy of the Vatican, passed away. By far the most dangerous plan was that which developed through the intervention of the Munster Catholic refugees in Portugal, by means of whom Hugh O'Donnell, the chief of Tyrconnel, and at a later period his kinsman O'Neill, Earl of Tyrone, enlisted the Spanish power in their attempt to throw off the English supremacy of Ireland.

The preparation of a small force in Spain to send to the aid of the Irish chiefs was magnified in England by Essex and the Puritan party, aided by Antonio Perez: and after much hesitation Elizabeth allowed a fleet to be sent to strike a decisive blow at the Spanish navy before it could sail to injure her dominions. With infinite trouble and unwillingness a force of English ships, royal and chartered, was got together, and reinforced by a Dutch contingent. The whole expedition sailed at the beginning of June, 1596, to strike a death-blow to all that was formidable of Philip's navy, then concentrated under the surf-beaten walls of Cadiz harbour. Philip lay ill in the centre of Spain; his blighting system had destroyed all efficiency and initiative in his local administration; and the supreme authority on the Andalusian coast was the feeble Medina Sidonia, who had led the Armada to foredoomed disaster. The secret

of the destination of the English force had been well kept; and, when on June 20, 1596, Cadiz was surprised by the arrival of the invaders in the Bay, the place was practically defenceless. In the circumstances the result was inevitable disaster, as is related fully in another chapter; and Cadiz was given up to systematic pillage and devastation.

Philip was almost moribund when the news of the disaster reached him, but in the despair that surrounded him he alone never lost faith. He had done his best, working all his life like a very slave, doing detail work which should have been delegated to others, centralising in his remote cell the springs of his vast empire. His own faith was immovable. He could not understand that the lessons of his youth, the maxims of his saints and sages, as well as the firm conviction of his heart, could be all wrong. It seemed impossible to him that his prayers, his fastings and self-denial, through a long life of voluntary suffering, could be quite fruitless. That this could be so was unintelligible to him, because his system was raised upon the unstable base of an assumption that he and his were in some sort partners with the higher powers for the final exaltation of the linked causes of God and Spain. But he was growing weary; he had aged beyond his years; and suffering had weakened him in body and mind. As in the case of his father, the taint of neurotic dementia in the blood of Castile had brought with it the morbid spiritual introspection, the yearning for relief from the things of the world, that had led the great Emperor to a cloister, and now made Philip long for his rest.

The war with Henry IV still lingered. The Béarnais was really King of France now; even the League had made terms with him, and in January, 1595, he had felt strong enough to abandon the fiction of irregular hostilities and had declared a national war against Spain. For two years Spanish armies under Fuentes and Frias held with varying fortunes strong places in the north of France; and, when by a stratagem Amiens fell into Spanish hands, it looked for a time as if the League might abandon Henry and rally to its early friend. At this juncture, when the balance of Europe seemed trembling, Archduke Albert marched with a strong force from Flanders to relieve the Spaniards besieged in Amiens. He failed, however, to raise the siege, was forced to retreat, and Amiens fell. It was Spain's last effort; her strength was exhausted. England could destroy her fleets, and Nassau could not only hold Holland, but take the offensive against the cities of Catholic Brabant; and, far from being able to force unity of faith upon Christendom, the only outcome of Philip's life-struggle had barely been to keep France from officially becoming Protestant.

Meanwhile, the poverty of Spain had progressively increased: the loss of treasure taken from her at sea, and more especially at Cadiz, had been a terrible blow; and, whatever might be the result, it was impossible for the country to continue any longer the war against

France. Henry IV, on the other hand, was not less desirous of peace than Philip. France had suffered from many years of devastating war and was also exhausted: and the patriotic King saw that the first step to the consolidation of his position was to reconcile all classes of his subjects. The commissioners of the two sovereigns met at Vervins early in 1598; and Philip's main difficulty was not so much in being forced to surrender his base in Brittany (Blavet) and Calais, which his forces had seized by a clever *coup de main*, or even in having to abandon the Leaguers who still remained in arms against their King. All these would, it is true, be bitter humiliations, but as nothing in comparison with the conditions upon which the Dutch and English allies of France insisted before they would consent to Henry's making peace: namely, the surrender by Spain of the sovereignty over all Flanders and the Netherlands. Elizabeth had been fencing with Henry IV for some time as to the terms of a possible peace; for his change of faith had destroyed her trust in him. But, when it became evident that as a last resource he was prepared to throw her and the Dutch over altogether and make a separate peace for himself, Burghley, almost on his death-bed, laid down as England's irreducible minimum demand that the United Provinces should be for ever secured against a Spanish attempt to subdue them. The Dutchmen themselves were equally emphatic in their demand that this should be guaranteed by the separation of the Belgic Provinces from the Crown of Spain. Essex, as usual, struggled against any compromise with Spain. The Puritan party was strong in England; and, although Elizabeth's government acquiesced with a bad grace in the peace concluded between Henry IV and Archduke Albert (March, 1598), the state of war between England and Spain itself still nominally continued.

It was an impotent conclusion of the longest continuous war with a foreign Power in which Philip ever engaged; but the result, tame as it was, relieved the life of the King from utter failure; and maintained the tradition of Spain's greatness for yet another generation or thereabouts. The terrible sacrifices which had made Castile desolate, had at least secured that France would not on religious grounds join the Protestant coalition, and by adding strength to this entail a corresponding loss of prestige and power on the country which, to its own infinite misfortune, had been at once the champion and the scapegoat of an impracticable religious uniformity.

The demand of a renunciation by Spain of the sovereignty over the Belgic Provinces had been characteristically met by Philip's representatives with a suggestion that this sovereignty should pass to the King's daughter, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia; but as this was, of itself, unacceptable, a proposal was added to it that the sovereignty should be exercised jointly by the Austrian Archduke Albert and his cousin, the Infanta, whom he should marry; and that, in the event of no issue being born of the marriage, the Provinces should be reincorporated with the

Crown of Spain. The Infanta was probably now the only person on earth for whom Philip felt any real affection. She had been his chief companion and solace for many years; and already the austere etiquette of the sombre Court and the strict devotion surrounding her had, in the thirty-two years of her life, withered the striking beauty which she had inherited from her French mother. Philip had failed to make her Queen of England and Queen of France; even the Duchy of Brittany, which was fairly hers, had now to be abandoned for the sake of peace. To allow of her becoming sovereign of the last foothold left to her father's House of the Burgundian heritage, a condition had to be accepted which, though for some reasons it must have been repugnant to her father's mind, must nevertheless have pleased his intriguing spirit with the almost certain knowledge that he was cheating his enemies after all. The Archduke, who was in his fortieth year, was not only a Cardinal and an Archbishop (of Toledo), and, as such, wedded only to the Church, but Philip knew that any more mundane marriage would probably, so far as Albert was concerned, remain fruitless.

The condition introduced at the instance of Spain into the Treaty of Vervins, by which Flanders would revert to the Spanish Crown in case the Archduke and the Infanta left no children, was therefore one that practically ensured the reversion to Philip's Spanish heirs within a generation. What the Infanta thought of the arrangement is not on record; but she was a dutiful daughter, and, for the sake of the new sovereignty, accepted it without demur. The Archduke, on the other hand, was less assured. His episcopal preferment of Toledo was the richest in Christendom: he was already practically sovereign of Flanders; and the ecclesiastical dignity gave him many advantages, all of which he would have to renounce if he contracted a marriage which he did not desire. But Philip usually had his way with his kinsmen; and Albert reluctantly gave up his Cardinal's hat and mitre, and went home to Austria, to escort his young cousin Margaret to Spain to marry Philip's heir, while he himself wedded the Infanta and assumed the joint sovereignty of Flanders.

This was in the summer of 1598; and the man at whose bidding all these puppets danced, lay in his grim palace of granite on the Guadarramas, wearing out the last weeks of his life in a martyrdom of pain. From June to September he remained at the Escorial for fifty-three days dying, in circumstances so repulsive, in agony so horrible, as to move any heart to pity. Yet he bore all his humiliation and anguish without a plaint. His only words were those of resignation and assurance of Divine forgiveness. Night and day in the bare room where he lay, overhanging the high altar of the Cathedral, the propitiatory offices of the Church went on; and through the dreary, hopeless hours, the eyes of the King were fixed in ecstasy on the saintly relics and emblems of the Divine passion that never left his sight. The papal blessing, plenary absolution, and extreme unction—all that the Church could do for poor

humanity at the last hour—came to Philip as he lingered week after week, in unspeakable bodily torment.

When the end seemed approaching he took his last farewell of his heir. "I should have wished," he said, "to save you this trial; but I want you to see how the monarchies of this earth end. Behold! God has stripped me of all the glory and majesty of sovereignty that they may pass to you. In a few hours I shall be covered only with a poor shroud, and girded with a coarse rope. The kingly crown is already falling from my brows, and death will soon set it upon yours. Two things I especially commend to you: one is that you always keep faithful to the Holy Catholic Church, and the other is that you treat your subjects justly. The crown will one day fall from your head, as it now falls from mine. You are young, as I too have been. My day draws to a close; the tale of yours God alone can see; but it must end like mine." This was Philip's farewell to the world, for he concerned himself no more with things mundane. The future of his son alone gave him occasional apprehension. Philip, the heir, was only twenty years of age. He had been brought up even more rigidly than his father, and had seen nothing of the world but through the eyes of monks and priests. He was kindly and well-meaning; but the piles of official papers, the endless procrastination and discussion, which formed part of his father's system, had confused his dull wits, and alarmed his pleasure-loving nature; and already the King had foreseen with distress the danger that his son's indolence would lead to his becoming a tool of favourites. Philip's last legacy to his son was a carefully made copy of the exhortations of St Louis to his heir; and, when he took a last farewell of young Philip and his half-sister, the Infanta, the only words he could murmur through his weakness, were one more prayer to them to keep inviolate the Catholic faith in the dominions under their sway.

So, patient to the end, in serene confidence and unshaken faith that his life had been well spent in God's service, Philip II passed from the world in the early dawn of September 13, 1598, while through the chamber rang the chant of morning mass in the Cathedral far below. Grasping in one hand the rough-hewn crucifix which he loved best, and in the other a sacred taper, Philip of Spain died as he had lived, in the firm conviction which no disappointment or misfortune could daunt that he and his were set apart from the rest of mortals to lead the host of the righteous in the fight against the powers of evil. The results of his policy had been to ruin his country in material resources, as it had enfeebled the faith that alone had made his people potent. He had terrorised his realm into a monkish theocracy, and in doing so had turned the majority of his subjects into ribald scoffers at the reality, while they were slaves to the symbols, of sacred things. Yet his people revered him as a saint, and still cherish his memory as a great King, not for what he did, but for what he dreamed.

CHAPTER XVI.

SPAIN UNDER PHILIP III.

PHILIP's last earthly care had been to enjoin his son to keep by his side his faithful friend and minister Cristobal de Moura. Young Philip had contracted a close intimacy with a brilliant young noble named Sandoval, Marquis of Denia; and the father had warned the Prince against allowing his favourite to influence him when he became King. In order, if possible, to guard against this, while not altogether offending his son, Philip in his last days appointed Denia to a high ceremonial post at Court, and at the same time bestowed upon the Prince's tutor, Father Loaysa, the archbishopric of Toledo, vacated by Archduke Albert; to Moura he gave the Lord Chamberlainship; and to Don Juan de Idiaquez the Mastership of the Horse under the new Queen Margaret, when she should arrive—urging his son to retain these three tried ministers as his political counsellors, and to limit Denia to his ceremonial functions. When the Prince had, as he thought, left his dying father for the last time, the King handed to Moura the keys of his secret cabinets, adding an injunction that they should be on no account delivered to anyone before his death. "And if the Prince demands them," asked the minister, "what am I to do?" "In that case," replied the King, "tell him the orders I have given you." "But if he still persists?" asked Moura. "Then give them to him," were the last words of the King. As no doubt Moura knew, the Prince was awaiting him outside. "The master-key, who has it?" he demanded. "I, your Highness." "Give it to me!" "But your Highness, pardon me; it is the private key of the King, and without his leave I dare not give it to you." "Enough," the Prince exclaimed, angrily, and flung away. Moura at once entered the sick-room and told the dying King what had passed. "You have done ill," was all Philip had strength to say; and when the Prince was summoned to the bedside, Moura dropped on his knee and tendered him the keys. Without a word the Prince handed them to the Marquis of Denia, who followed him closely. Thus, before the Crown was his, Philip III struck the dominant note of his reign, that of complete abandonment to his favourite; and his first act as King was to supplant

the laborious ministers in whom his father trusted, and to hand to Denia, whom he immediately created Duke of Lerma, almost every prerogative of his Crown.

The sudden change in the demeanour of Philip III astounded even those who had known him all his life. He had always displayed a humility and submissiveness of manner which had led to the belief that he was the gentlest of creatures. He now suddenly assumed a haughty and arbitrary tone that was really as misleading as his previous meekness. Denia, who alone possessed his confidence, had schooled him to assert himself in his new position; and he did so with the exaggeration of a weak novice, supported as he was by the greater strength of his favourite, who artfully used the monarch's despotic mood to get rid of all the old courtiers, and pack the Councils and secretariats with his own kinsmen and nominees. Everything was to be changed; the timid, laborious policy of Philip II, to which the new men attributed the misery and degradation that had fallen upon the country, was to be replaced by a bold assertion of Spain's undiminished greatness; and the rivals who had dared to question it were to be taught a sharp lesson.

But the treasury was empty, and nothing could be done without vast sums of money. Before Philip III could even start on his way to the east coast to meet his Austrian bride, who, escorted by her cousin Archduke Albert, was travelling with dazzling pomp through Italy, where, at Ferrara, the two marriages had been celebrated by proxy on November 13, 1598, starving Spain had to provide the travelling expenses of the King. The Cortes, which had not met for five years, were summoned anew, and heard from the King a worse tale of penury than ever. Not even money for the daily maintenance of the royal table was in hand; and not an asset was unpledged or available. A vote to cover six years, at the rate of three million ducats a year (£366,000) was demanded, with an extraordinary grant of 400,000 ducats for the King's journey, a similar sum for the new Queen's pin-money, and 300,000 ducats for the wedding feast. The sums were voted, for the country itself was a prey to reaction. The ghastly austerity of the old King's Court during many years, the forced sanctimonious tone of society, the national depression, and the hopeless misery of all classes but the ecclesiastics and higher nobles, had now given place to sanguine exuberance. The new King, young and gay, would bring plenty to all; Spain, no longer scorned and defied by insolent rivals, was once more to be the head of Christendom; and the brilliance of the Court would in future reflect the prosperity of the people.

With these vain ideas the Court, and then the country at large, flung themselves into a frenzy of waste and extravagance. The King's journey to Valencia to meet his bride was a series of pompous shows, in which one million ducats, more than thrice the sum voted by the Cortes for the wedding, were spent, besides three millions lavished by the

nobles in entertainments, Lerma being the most prodigal of them all—together more than the whole revenue of the country raised by taxation in a year. The people thought the millennium had come. But as the manufacture of luxuries had been effectually discouraged in Spain for many years, nearly all the squandered treasure eventually went abroad; and Spain became so much the poorer. The one thing that might have saved Spain would have been a limitation of the vain pretensions that had brought to her so much misery, under a firm, alert government pledged to close economy and to a policy that would set the people again to productive labour. The course actually pursued was the exact opposite. Not a jot of Spain's haughty claims was abated; wild prodigality in expenditure was at first met by the corrupt sales of offices, titles, and dignities; and idle ostentatiousness, always a failing of the nation, was flattered and encouraged.

The prices of commodities continued to rise with the decrease of production; yet specie currency was extremely scarce—an anomalous condition of things which may be explained by the fact that, although there still existed in the colonies a demand, partly satisfied, for Spanish manufactures, the remittances from America did not to any large extent become a medium of internal exchange, but were mostly hoarded or diverted abroad. Lerma was as unsound an economist as the other statesmen of his age, and attributed the scarcity of currency to the lavish use of silver in the churches and for household purposes, with the result that in 1600 and 1601 rigorous edicts were issued confiscating such silver to the King's use, and strictly limiting the future employment of the precious metals for ornament. The bishops and clergy soon frightened the minister out of his project, so far as the church silver was concerned; and to maintain the royal table, officers were sent as a last resource from door to door in the capital, to beg any sum not below fifty reals (£1) for the sustenance of the King and his family.

In this unhappy state of things, with waste and penury going hand in hand, the fields untilled, the looms idle, and Castile a wilderness, a foreign policy of bold aggression was adopted on every side. Throughout the latter years of Philip II the futile plotting of the Scottish and English Catholics to obtain the aid of Spain for their respective causes had continued; the English Jesuits, led by Father Parsons, still persisted in their idea that the only satisfactory solution of their trouble would be the establishment of the Infanta as Queen of England when Elizabeth should die, and they were ceaseless in their intrigues to that end. After the disaster of 1588, Philip II had never really allowed himself to be deceived as to the practical impossibility of this being done by outside force; and although he gave soft, evasive answers to the urgent prayers of his English pensioners, he saw that his only chance of success in future lay in providing at the crucial moment support to any rising of Elizabeth's own Catholic subjects sufficient to turn the

scale in their favour. Demands for such aid had been numerous enough from England and Ireland, as well as from the body of extreme Scottish Catholics led by Huntly and Bothwell; but Philip II had always required a fuller guarantee of success than they could give, and one chance after another had been lost by delay or had miscarried.

The disaffection in Ulster and the dangerous coalition of Irish Catholics formed by O'Donnell and Tyrone had seemed to Philip II to offer the best opportunity for effectually embarrassing Elizabeth. The Desmonds and Munster men in Lisbon, and priestly emissaries from Donegal, constantly coming and returning to Corunna, had persuaded Philip that with Spanish aid they might drive the English out of Ireland and make him King, as a preliminary to the capture of England; and already Spanish officers had met the Irish chiefs in Donegal, and had well surveyed the land. It was against the consequent naval preparations, neither so large nor so threatening as had been reported, yet still formidable enough, that the attack upon Cadiz had been directed. Great, however, as the loss at Cadiz had been, it was not there, but in Lisbon and the northern ports that the Adelantado of Castile, Martin de Padilla, was busy organising his new Armada, the real destination of which was unknown to anyone but Philip himself and Moura; and the bold Cadiz raid convinced the moribund King that the blow against the English in Ireland must be dealt swiftly, strongly, and secretly to be successful. But, as usual, the blighting centralisation of his system had spoilt all. Corruption, ineptitude, and indolence reigned supreme; and again, as in the case of the great Armada, the King peremptorily ordered his unwilling officers to sail with his unready fleet, foredoomed to failure.

On October 23, 1596, the new Armada of 98 ships and 16,000 men sailed from Corunna only to be scattered by tempest off Finisterre. Twenty vessels with 3000 souls on board perished in the storm; thousands more died of pestilence in the ports of refuge in northern Spain; and for that year, at least, England and Ireland were safe from attack. Again, in 1597, an attempt was made with exactly similar result. All unready, foul and unseaworthy, with rotten stores and fainting crews, the third Armada, consisting of 44 royal galleons, 16 chartered ships and a large number of hulks and small craft, put to sea too late in the season for safety (October 18)—not bound this time for Ireland at first, but, with instructions drawn up in defiance of all prudence, to capture Falmouth by surprise or treachery. A mere head-wind in the Channel took the heart out of admiral and men for so hopeless an enterprise; and the fleet ran back ignominiously to Spain, without even making an attempt. Early in 1598 England was again thrown into a paroxysm of alarm at the news of the coming of a great Spanish fleet. In fact, a strong Spanish force of 38 transports had sailed up the Channel unmolested, and had landed 5000 men at Calais (February, 1598), though half of the

ships were wrecked at the entrance to the port, and the rest dared not return down Channel. Lacking this squadron, the new Armada which was fitting out in the Spanish ports was never even able to sail: and, by the time when it should have been ready, France and Spain were at peace. The Spanish garrisons in the north of France were withdrawn; and the death of Philip II, added to the desire of the new sovereigns of Flanders for peace, provided an opportunity, if Philip III and Lerma had been wise, to reverse the policy, irremediably hopeless now, of trying to force upon rich, well-organised, and confident England a foreign faith and sovereign. The Spanish organisation was indeed rotten at the core: the faith of the people in their high destiny had been sapped by repeated failure and all-pervading misery; industry was not only languishing but was despised; and society, high and low, was in utter decadence. A wise ruler beginning a new reign would have recognised the actual conditions of things, and have abated unwarranted national pretensions that stood in the way of retrenchment and internal reform. But Philip III was not wise.

As the old King lay dying Ireland blazed out into rebellion again; and on Bagenal's defeat at Armagh the rebels sent hopeful messages and prayers for aid flying across to Spain. With the death of Philip II the hopes of the irreconcilable English Catholics revived. Fanatics such as Fuentes and the Adelantado assured the new sovereign that it would be easy to impose a Spanish monarch upon England. Philip listened; and once more the arsenals of Spain resounded with naval preparations. By the end of July, 1599, the Adelantado, Don Martin de Padilla, had mustered in Lisbon and Galicia the most formidable Spanish fleet collected since the great Armada. The new squadron consisted of 35 galleons, 22 galleys, and over 50 other vessels, with a military force of 25,000 men. There was for the moment a revival in Spain of the proud old crusading spirit, thanks to the youth of the King, the lavish splendour of his Court, and the heroics of Lerma. This futile boasting incensed England, and animated Ireland; but the danger was not really great; for the demoralisation, the corruption, and the penury that still paralysed Spain have only in our own days been fully brought to light. The Adelantado might brag and threaten in Lisbon or Ferrol; Fuentes in the Council might sneer at the heretics, but the ships in port were ill-found and crazy; troops were starving in one place, while food was spoiling in another. No ready money was to be found anywhere, except for costly shows. Plague and famine devastated the land, and Lisbon itself was a wilderness, most of the population having died or fled.

But the English did not know how bad things were in Spain, and were seized by a panic when they learned that the Dutch fleet, which had undertaken to watch the Spanish ports, had gone off on a marauding expedition into the Atlantic. The London trained bands were called out; a camp was ordered at Tilbury; nobles mustered their armed

retainers; every English ship was put into commission; Sir Francis Vere and his 2000 Englishmen were summoned from Holland; and all along the south coast the nation stood ready, as it had in 1588. News came once that the Spaniards had effected a landing in the Isle of Wight; the gates of London were shut; and a fear fell upon the citizens of which they were heartily ashamed afterwards when the news proved false.

After three months of vain vapouring the Adelantado's great fleet, badly provided, ill-armed, and poorly manned, could only start on a fruitless attempt to escort home the American silver ships and defend the Canaries from the attacks of the Dutch. By the time the wretched Spanish squadron reached the Azores (September 30, 1599), 22 out of the 85 ships had foundered at sea. The Adelantado had failed to meet the Indian flotilla and had failed to find the Dutch; and the four millions of gold ducats, wrung out of miserable Spain, were worse than wasted. As for help to the Irish Catholics, only two small pinnaces were sent to Loch Foyle with arms and money, over the division of which Tyrone and O'Donnell quarrelled; and nothing was seen of the oft-promised Spanish army. But Philip and Lerma would not learn wisdom from defeat. Though unable to send such aid as Tyrone demanded, they still kept up the hopes of the insurgents with fine messages, gold chains, swords of honour, Spanish bishops for Irish sees, and pompous embassies to the rebel chieftains meeting in council at Donegal.

Finally, in answer to the prayers of the Irish, and the offer of Tyrone to accept a Spanish sovereignty over the island, young Philip himself scrawled across the report of his Council, in which he was told that not even the 20,000 ducats ordered to be sent long ago to the Irish had yet been obtained, an order which gives us the measure of his failure to grasp the real position to which Spain had descended. His Council had stated that the very utmost that could be done at present was to obtain the 20,000 ducats somehow, and send it to Ireland with a supply of biscuit. Philip's peremptory command was that a powerful army and fleet should be raised immediately, and be despatched to conquer Ireland. The Council praised to the skies so noble and wise an order, but pointed out that it could not be executed without money, and of money they had none. The King again sent back the Council's report, saying that means must at once be found to raise the necessary funds. His Majesty's resolve, replied the Council, was worthy of his "grandeur and catholicity"; but a vast sum of money would be needed for such a fleet as that required, as well as six months' pay for an army; and there were only six weeks of the season (1600) left in which the expedition could sail, even if the money could be obtained. They would do their best, and muster every possible ship and man; but they were not sanguine of success. Philip's comment upon this in his own hand was as follows: "As the expedition is so entirely for the glory of Almighty God, all difficulties *must* be overcome. The greatest energy and diligence must be exercised

on all hands. I will find the money for it; even if I sacrifice what I need for my own person, so that the expedition may go this year. Settle everything without delay. Get statements for all that will be needed, and send them immediately to me. Do not wait to send to the Adelantado. I will give orders for the immediate collection of the money sufficient to send a force of 6000 men. In the meanwhile send to Ireland instantly the 20,000 ducats and 400,000 pounds of biscuit."

This was in August, 1600; but such was the prevailing demoralisation that in November not even half the biscuit was ready, much less the fleet. Tyrone's demands continued to grow. Spain must appoint him Governor-General of Ireland, Hugh O'Donnell and Desmond (James Fitzgerald) respectively Governors of Connaught and Munster; and a great force of Spaniards must be landed to cooperate with the rebels. This, said Tyrone, was their last stand: unless aid came promptly they would make terms with the English in earnest, and abandon the struggle. The Cortes of Castile were persuaded to vote a larger sum than ever before—24 millions of ducats in six years—and at length the Spanish fleet of 33 ships and 4500 soldiers sailed from Lisbon to support Tyrone and O'Donnell early in September, 1601. Brochero, the Admiral, was on bad terms with Don Juan del Aguila, the General; jealousy and divided counsels as usual hampered the efficiency of the force. A northern gale struck the fleet off Ushant, and drove back to Spain the Vice-Admiral, Zubiaur, and nine ships with 650 soldiers and most of the stores. The design was to seize Cork as a base; and Carew stood ready to defend the port to the last. But the Spaniards, unable to make the harbour, drifted into the almost untenable port of Kinsale, except three ships that sought refuge at Baltimore. Aguila in Kinsale had only 3000 soldiers; and as soon as he had landed, the Admiral, in a hurry to get back to Spain, dumped the cannons and stores on to the ooze of the harbour, and left him to his fate.

The position of the Spaniards was hopeless from the first; for Carew with a force of 4000 men was within reach. In vain beseeching messages were sent by Aguila to Spain praying for help, and to the rebel chiefs in the north to hurry down and relieve the Spanish garrison. Zubiaur's squadron at Corunna was not ready for sea again until December, when it sailed to reinforce Aguila. Four of its ten ships were wrecked before reaching Ireland; and those that were left, frightened at learning on reaching the neighbourhood of Kinsale that an English squadron was blockading the harbour, drifted into the port of Castlehaven. Here were three separate Spanish forces bottled up in as many isolated harbours. The Munster chiefs, generally, were trying their best to keep on fair terms with the English, whilst helping the Spaniards: but Castlehaven and Baltimore, belonging to the O'Driscolls, and Dunboy, the stronghold of the O'Sullivan Bear, were solemnly ceded by their lords to the King of Spain. Everything depended upon the arrival of the rebels from the

north; and at length Tyrone and O'Donnell, having marched the length of Ireland, appeared with 6000 rebels upon the hills above Kinsale, now being besieged by the English. All Ireland was aflame; and this was perhaps the most dangerous moment for the future of Protestant England in Elizabeth's reign. On January 2, 1602 (N. S.), the decisive battle was fought. Outmanœuvred by Montjoy, the rebel forces, with the Spanish auxiliaries that had joined them from Castlehaven, were utterly routed. Twelve hundred Irish and nearly 200 Spaniards were slaughtered in the fight, and the rest were captured, killed, or put to flight. Tyrone was wounded and reached his own country in a litter; O'Donnell, broken-hearted, fled from Castlehaven to Spain with Zubiaur.

The news fell upon Spanish pride like death. "The prestige of Spain," wrote the Council to the King, "is at stake." "Something must be done, or we shall never hold up our heads again." Wild, impossible suggestions of great fleets and armies were made. O'Donnell, O'Driscoll, O'Sullivan, and the Irish bishops, prayed earnestly for help. But the poverty of Spain forbade further rash adventure; and all that could be sent were a few small ships, only one of which reached Ireland, to find that the Spaniards had ignominiously surrendered, and abandoned the Munster chieftains to the tender mercies of the English. O'Donnell died in despair at Simancas; O'Sullivan became a Castilian noble; and the hope of Irish independence under a Spanish overlord was at an end.

This tame ending to young Philip's heroics had an immense effect in Spain; but it was not entirely displeasing to the English Catholic pensioners. They had long been urging that the Infanta should be openly adopted as Philip's candidate for the English throne on Elizabeth's death, and that the Catholic party in England should be liberally subsidised and prepared beforehand for a Spanish armed intervention in favour of that solution. Father Parsons in Rome, and his successor, Creswell, at Philip's Court, were indefatigable in their efforts. But the English enterprise, as it was called, meant more money even than that required for aiding Irish rebellion; and three years passed at Madrid in futile discussion. Some leading personages in England had now been gained for the Infanta's cause, which, at all events, would shut out the King of Scots; and the union of the sovereignty of Flanders with that of England, independent of Spain, would not have been entirely antagonistic to traditional English policy.

But, though the extreme English Catholics kept asking for the Infanta as their Queen, the new ruler of Flanders and her husband had no desire to be drawn into such an impossible adventure as the seizure of England. They were in the thick of their struggle with Maurice of Nassau; they were middle-aged and childless; they knew Spain's poverty, slowness, and disorganisation, and looked coldly upon the visionary Jesuit plans of conquest that were discussed so seriously and ineffectually in Philip's Council. At length one councillor more

sensible than the rest—Count de Olivares—had the good sense to prick the bubble. In December, 1602, he asked his colleagues what was the use of keeping up the pretence any longer. The Infanta had no desire for the English crown; Spain was impotent and could not force a foreign monarch upon England. Why not face the facts at once, and promise Spain's support to the most popular English claimant, thus keeping out the King of Scots, and securing some influence, even for gratitude's sake, to Spain in the new government? The advice was adopted when it was already too late to be of any service. Communications were opened with the English moderate Catholics. Money was ordered to be sent to Flanders; and a naval force under Spinola was to stand ready at a moment's notice for the news of Elizabeth's death (March 24, 1603). Doubtless the design was to forward the election of Arabella Stewart, in conjunction with her marriage to Lord Beauchamp, the son of Hertford and Catharine Grey. But while the interminable preliminaries were yet in progress, Elizabeth died. Robert Cecil had secretly prepared everything for James' accession. With the acclamation of the new King in England, Protestantism was safe; and it had become certain that the dream of the Emperor and his son would never be realised.

Immediately after the Peace of Vervins had been signed (1598) between France and Spain, Archduke Albert had written from Flanders to Philip II, pressing for permission to make peace with England. Friendly messages had for some time previously been passing between Cecil and the Archduke, whose evident intention was to secure an understanding with Elizabeth's government so soon as the Infanta and himself were acknowledged as independent sovereigns. He could only hope for a peaceful and prosperous reign for his wife and himself by shaking off the strangling toils of impossible Spanish ambitions. Yet owing to the constantly renewed cries of the Essex party in England about Spanish designs, the foolish bombast of Philip III and Lerma, the aid furnished by Spain to the Irish rebels, and the intolerance of the Infanta, a true daughter of Philip II, the peace between England and Spain and the Archdukes was not signed until after Elizabeth's death (August, 1604).

In the late autumn of 1599, when the Archdukes came to their new dominion, an attempt was made by Albert to escape from the devastating war which had united against him all the Protestant elements in Europe; and negotiations were opened with Nassau and Elizabeth for peace, Spain itself being represented. But the demands of Philip III were more inflated than ever; and the conferences at Bergcn-op-Zoom and Boulogne broke up fruitlessly in May, 1600. The new sovereigns began their reign auspiciously during the progress of these negotiations. The Belgic Catholics were overjoyed at the possession of complete independence, such as had been their boast under their Burgundian lords; and both the Infanta and her husband were personally popular. The

tolerant and diplomatic Archduke would of himself easily have made terms with the Dutch, had not the impracticable Spanish claims stood in the way, and had not there still rested upon the Infanta the shadow of her father, which made it repulsive for her to treat with heresy in any form. The reversion clause restoring Flanders to Philip if no issue was born to the Infanta unhappily gave to the King of Spain a voice in all that concerned the country, and thus effectually prevented the peace for which all Europe was yearning.

During the Archduke's absence in Spain his place in Flanders had been filled by his young cousin, the Archduke Andrew; and the war had still lingered on in Cleves. When the sovereigns arrived and a new campaign with Spanish help was threatened, now that the peace negotiations had fallen through, Maurice of Nassau with a great force carried the war into Flanders itself. It is related elsewhere in this volume how he was unable to pursue his victory over the Archduke at Nieupoort (June, 1600); and how the interest of the campaigns of the ensuing years centred in the efforts of the latter to recover Ostend, and in the great military struggle between Maurice of Nassau and Ambrogio de Spinola. The latter had arrived in 1602 with an army of some 8000 Italians, which he had raised on the guarantee of Spain; and throughout the campaign of 1602 his genius and the efficiency of his troops kept the Catholic cause from defeat. The elder brother, Federigo Spinola, who had also on the Spanish guarantee taken to Flanders a fleet of eight galleys to blockade Ostend by sea, was less fortunate than Ambrogio, and lost five of his vessels by the attacks of the Dutch and English before he arrived at Sluis. Thus, ruined as Spain was, Philip and Lerma listened still to the promptings of old ambitions, and consented to wring from the people the resources needed for the hopeless task of forcing Catholicism upon Holland. Under the vigorous action of Ambrogio de Spinola a new mercenary force, mainly of Germans, was raised with Spanish credit and money; and in the spring of 1603, after Federigo Spinola had been defeated and killed at sea by the Dutch, his brother Ambrogio, who had succeeded to his marquisate, formally took command of the siege of Ostend. During the winters and summers of 1603 and 1604 the siege was continued without a break. In April, 1604, Maurice of Nassau determined to attempt a vigorous diversion by besieging Sluis with an army of 17,000 men, after defeating a Spanish force sent to intercept him. Once again the hold of Spain upon Catholic Flanders seemed relaxing. The Infanta and her husband worked heroically, personally exhorting and beseeching their mutinous unpaid levies to trust them yet awhile; and summoning Spinola from Ostend to beat Maurice at Sluis. But in this he failed; for Sluis was captured by the Protestants in August, 1604, leaving Ostend still in the firm encircling grip of Spinola and the besiegers.

But already the great change that was coming over Europe by the

death of Philip II and Elizabeth was making itself felt. James I had for many years been endeavouring to ingratiate himself with Spain. He had no motives of pride for maintaining the old enmity, and was willing to admit all the inflated Spanish claims. This of itself was much; for the peace negotiations at Boulogne, in May, 1600, had broken down mainly upon questions of dignity and precedence; and, if concessions were made to Spanish pride, the more important material points could be easily settled. James hated piracy as much as he feared revolt against sovereigns, and was ready to agree to such terms as Elizabeth would never have subscribed. Juan de Tassis, Count of Villamediana, was sent by Lerma to congratulate the new King of England upon his accession in the autumn of 1603. Following the King on his progress in the home counties, he was detained for a time at Oxford in consequence of the death of some of his household from plague; and his first audience of James at Winchester was delayed for several weeks. But he made good use of his time, and won all hearts by his frank joviality and numerous presents of perfumed Spanish gloves and dressed kid for garments to both the ladies and the gentlemen. His fame as a good courtier and charming gentleman had preceded him; and, when James saw him at Winchester at the end of September, he overcame the rivalry of the French envoy, de Rosny. Count Arenberg, the Flemish special envoy, had already broached the desire of the Archdukes for peace some weeks previously, and terms had been tentatively discussed before Tassis' interview; James' principal desire being that Spain should be included in the arrangement, provided that he himself was not drawn into antagonism with the Dutch. Tassis' assurances to the King, that Philip III desired nothing better than to make peace with England, were therefore very complacently received.

The States General were not easy to deal with, when, throughout the spring of 1604, the details of the agreement were discussed in England by representatives of all the parties concerned. It was soon seen that the Dutch would bate no jot of their claim to independence; and public opinion in England, still distrustful of Spain, was strongly in favour of standing firm by the Protestant cause. But the Constable of Castile (de Velasco, Duke of Frias), who was sent to London with a splendid train of grandees, to conclude the peace, bribed broadcast the Howard interest and the ladies and gentlemen of the Court, whilst impressing the King by alternate flattery and veiled threats. To the indignation of those who had been bred in the school of Elizabeth, and in spite of French opposition, the pact was signed in August, 1604; and the Constable left Somerset House, where he for many weeks had been entertained by James at a cost of £300 a day, fully satisfied that, with so pliant a King as James upon the throne of England, Spain might yet hope for resurrection. Some of the clauses to which James consented were a complete surrender of the policy of Elizabeth and her ministers. No aid was to be given to the

Dutch; no English ship was to trade with the Indies; the Inquisition was to be allowed to seize and condemn Englishmen who failed to kneel to the Sacrament in Spanish territory; and a firm alliance and friendship was to exist for ever between England and Spain.

The signature of the treaty changed the position in Flanders. Thenceforward the Dutch stood alone. Maurice of Nassau had captured Sluis almost simultaneously with the settlement of peace; and immediately afterwards the heroic defenders of Ostend came to terms with Spinola—a dearly bought victory that cost the Archdukes at least forty thousand men. In Spain, as in England, the peace was welcomed ostentatiously, but not without dissent. The English sailors who had grown rich on privateering plunder, the large Puritan party, and the men who recollected the great days of the Armada, looked with frowning brows upon the abandonment of their fixed traditions; while in Spain the great churchmen declaimed almost violently against the shame of making terms with heretics. But, however much extreme partisans on both sides might object, the peace with England opened, to Spain at least, a vista of possible prosperity such as she had not enjoyed for forty-five years. Lerma's insane lavishness had inflicted upon the unhappy country the last extreme of misery and degradation; his financial experiments had made matters worse. The sudden doubling of the face-value of the copper coinage, with the idea of making its purchasing power greater, of course failed in that object, while it practically drove silver coin from circulation, and caused the introduction from abroad of vast quantities of forged copper currency, causing a still increased appreciation of the price of commodities. In 1600 Lerma conceived the opinion that the terrible condition of Old Castile, the depopulation, the famine and the dearth that scourged the land, would be remedied if the Court was removed thither with its luxury and expenditure. By decree (January, 1601), therefore, the capital of Spain was transferred from Madrid to Valladolid. In vain the Cortes protested that the cause of the trouble was over-taxation and the discouragement of industry; in vain all classes in Madrid appealed against so unwise a step. Valladolid became (until 1606) the capital; and the misery was increased enormously by the greater demand for food and commodities and the appreciation of rents in the poorest part of Spain; while Madrid was utterly ruined and deserted. In vain the household silver was seized and church plate begged, to be turned into coin; it disappeared so soon as it was put into circulation.

While this general wretchedness prevailed—with industry dead, the fields untilled, the husbandmen turned into beggars and vagrants throughout the Castiles—the Cortes continued to vote larger subsidies than ever, which it was quite impossible to raise. It is true that the relief afforded by the improved international relations now enabled the silver ships from America to arrive with some regularity; but for

the fiscal reasons already given, and in consequence of the general corruption, only a small proportion of the bullion reached the treasury or went to increase the wealth of the country. Through all this penury Philip III, occupied alternately in devotions and costly shows, entirely failed to grasp the true condition of affairs. Depending implicitly upon Lerma, who kept him in a fool's paradise, he squandered the money, so painfully wrung from his starving people, upon pompous christenings, such as that of his daughter Anne of Austria (1601), and the sumptuous baptism of his heir Philip in Valladolid, which coincided with the arrival there of the Earl of Nottingham (Charles Howard) in April, 1605, to ratify the peace. Grants, offices, and endowments, grandeeships with estates, and knighthoods with pensions, were showered upon Lerma's followers; and the King, with no possibility, even if he had possessed the desire, of knowing the truth, hunted, danced, prayed, and trifled, while the country was dragged from misery to misery.

No sooner had peace relieved Spain of some of her most pressing troubles and provided an opportunity for retrenchment of expenditure, than Spinola hurried to Valladolid to beg for means to carry on a renewed vigorous campaign against the Dutch Protestants. The capitulation of Ostend on the one hand had been balanced by the loss of Sluis on the other; and, if Philip and Lerma had been wise or even patriotic, they might have seen that the opportunity was a golden one for a general peace and reconciliation. After forty years of struggle, it was evident to all the world that Holland could not be forced to submit to the religious tyranny of Spain. The Archduke had no desire to prolong indefinitely a hopeless struggle; and though the Infanta was willing to fight to the end for a principle, she would have been powerless to do so without the great material aid of Spain, which as a nation had nothing whatever to gain from victory over the Dutch, even if it had been within her reach.

But the vain hope that the Protestants, now that they were deprived of English aid, might yet be subjugated, still inspired the inflated claims of Philip; and when Spinola, the victor of Ostend, arrived with his flattering tale, all thought of the misery of Spain was cast aside, and subventions of money and contingents of men, larger than before, were again thrown into the bottomless gulf of the Flemish War. The Spanish contingent was captured at sea by the Dutch; but, just as Maurice of Nassau was threatening Antwerp itself, the Italian and German troops paid by Spain fortunately arrived in Flanders by land; and Spinola was able to carry the war into his enemies' country on the other side of the Rhine (1605). In the winter, again flushed with such successes as he had obtained, Spinola returned to Spain for further help. This time he was less fortunate. The Indian flotilla had not come into port, and it was feared had been lost; not half of the taxes voted by the Cortes for the year had been collected, or could be;

the change of capital, it was now seen, had made matters worse instead of better, and Philip's treasury was absolutely empty. The Italian bankers would advance nothing upon the King's credit, even at the 30 per cent. interest paid by him in the previous year; and Spinola had to pledge his own fortune before even a small loan could be obtained.

The next campaign (1606), although it was still carried on in the Dutch territory, and added to Spinola's military prestige, was less vigorous and effective than the previous one. Whatever visions may have still dazzled young Philip in far-away Spain, it was now clear to the genius of Spinola, on the spot, that, unless Spanish arms, men, and money were provided very lavishly, the United Provinces could not be crushed by force of arms. His two visits to Spain had opened his eyes to the exhaustion of that country; and he saw that continued and sufficient resources could not be found there. The soldiery, without regular food and pay, were an element of disorder and weakness, not of strength. So he accepted the position, and sided with the Archduke and the Catholic Flemings in their desire to end a fratricidal war which could produce no good result to anyone. To propose peace was a difficult matter; for the "rebels," as they still were called, had again and again rejected compromise, and would accept nothing short of complete independence, which Spanish pride could not openly acknowledge. After some fruitless wrangling, however, a preliminary truce of eight months from May, 1607, was accepted, to which, for the first time, the Archdukes appended a private declaration that they entered into the arrangement with the United Provinces as with sovereign States, over which they claimed no authority.

Before the truce was ratified by Spain another heavy blow fell upon Philip. A Dutch squadron off Gibraltar attacked the Spanish fleet and almost annihilated it, and then sailed to the Azores to intercept the American silver flotilla. To surrender so great a source of revenue as the plunder of the Spanish treasure-ships was not at all to the taste of Maurice; and he stood out against the very natural demand of Spain that the suspension of hostilities should be operative on sea as well as on land. This difficulty was at length overcome; but it was found that the protocol was signed by Philip in the haughty ancient form of Spanish monarchs: "I the King." "Philip is no King of ours," said the Dutch Commissioners; and for a time it looked as if the war would be reopened upon so small a point as this. James of England intervened, as did the German Protestant Princes, in the interests of a permanent peace; but both sides were obstinate. Nothing less than the recognition of their independence would satisfy the United Provinces; nothing less than the acceptance of their supremacy would content the Spaniards. At length Philip offered to waive his claim if the Dutch would refrain from trading with the Indies; but to this Maurice would not agree, and the peace negotiations came to a deadlock. France and

England together proposed that at least a long truce should be settled in order that old animosities might be allowed to cool. Oldenbarnevelddt in the States General eloquently advocated conciliation; the Archduke sent his own confessor to Spain to calm the scruples of Philip; and gradually moderate counsels prevailed. It had been a bitter humiliation for Spain and the Infanta to consent to the Peace Conferences taking place at the Hague; but war for them was no longer possible and they had bent to what they could not avoid. At the later stages, when the situation was less tense, the negotiations were much facilitated by the transfer of the sittings to Antwerp, where an agreement was finally reached in March, 1609, for a twelve years' cessation of hostilities by land and sea, the clause respecting traffic with the Indies being purposely drafted so obscurely as to be unintelligible. The compact consisted of thirty-eight clauses, by which the Archdukes in their own name, and in that of the King of Spain, contracted with the United Provinces, as with independent States upon which they had no claim; and in a great assembly of 800 representatives of the States at Bergen-op-Zoom, on April 9, 1609, the momentous Treaty that was to bring peace to Europe—at least for twelve years—was signed and ratified.

It was a political event of the first importance; for it marked the abandonment of the principle by which Charles V and his son had hoped to dominate the world: namely, the forcible religious unification of Christendom on Spanish lines. Once more, the waning dream seemed temporarily revived a few years later by another Philip and another favourite; but its realisation was hopeless from the moment when sheer exhaustion compelled Philip III to renounce the struggle, and sign the Twelve Years' Truce with the United Provinces on equal terms. When the war was renewed under Philip IV and Olivares, it was no longer with the hope of forcing the Spanish form of Catholicism upon Europe; it was no longer animated by the burning zeal and supreme confidence in the sacredness of Spain's mission that had lent the factitious strength of a crusade to the struggle in its earlier stages; it was but the despairing effort of an utterly decayed and disillusioned nation to postpone the evil day when its secular enemy, France, should dwarf and crush it.

Terrible as had been the drain upon Spanish resources caused by the long wars against France, England, and the United Provinces, and in later years by the prodigality of Lerma, there had been another class of claims for expenditure which could not be neglected. The peace signed with Henry IV at Vervins in 1598 had not included Henry's ally the Turks; and with them and their fellow-unbelievers, the Barbary corsairs, the conflict had never ceased. The battle of Lepanto had, it is true, to a great extent broken the power of the Sultan in the western Mediterranean, and the task of holding in check the Muslim empire east of Sicily had been left to the Venetians and the Knights of Malta. The Papacy had tried almost unceasingly to draw Spain into the league with the Italian

States to pursue the Turk into his own seas ; but, for reasons already set forth, it was not until the recklessness of Lerma swayed the Spanish policy, and Philip III, without resources, dreamed of rivalling his grandfather's achievements, that overburdened Castile was called upon to contribute to a new Holy League against the infidel. In 1601 a powerful galley fleet of 70 vessels and 10,000 men was raised by Spain and the Italian States, except Venice, to surprise and capture Algiers. There was no Don John now to infuse enthusiasm into the expedition ; there was only his evil genius, the incompetent Gian Andrea Doria, nephew of the great Andrea ; and he, in accordance with his invariable ineptitude, returned with his fleet to Messina without striking a blow. Two more attempts, one in alliance with Persia, were made in the following years, with little better result. The Barbary corsairs, insolent before, now became boldly aggressive ; and the coasts of Spain in the Mediterranean were harried by the Muslim from end to end. By 1608 these pirates had become intolerable, and English seamen like the famous Captain Ward, and many others, raised and commanded in their service regular fleets of broadside ships and galleys, which defied the Christian Powers and mocked at Spain's supremacy. But with the signature of the truce with Holland a change in Philip's tactics in the Mediterranean became possible. The day of the galley was nearly over ; sailing ships could now be spared from the Atlantic ; and for the first time in history a great Spanish sailing fleet entered the Straits to punish the pirates. It was to join a squadron of freighted ships under Sir Anthony Shirley ; but the Spanish Admiral Fajardo missed them, and fell in with a French privateer fleet, which joined him. Together they made a dash upon Tunis, utterly destroying a fleet of over thirty sail there that had been organised by Ward, Verney, Bishop, and Kara-Osman, thus breaking for many years to come the pirate power in the Mediterranean. Spain rang once more with joyful hope. Trade was possible again, for the pirates were conquered, Drake was dead, the King of England was the servile friend of Philip, and the Dutch were at peace with Spain.

But though Spain had now no foreign foes, the attacks of the corsairs upon the Valencian coast had shown that in Spain itself there was a whole people who would be enemies if they dared. During the peace negotiations all Europe had watched with distrust the preparation of a great fleet of galleys in the Spanish ports. No one could guess the object of such a mobilisation ; but after the corsairs were destroyed at La Goleta (Tunis), distrust gave way to astonishment, and the extraordinary design of Lerma was revealed to the world. The kingdom of Valencia was largely peopled by Spaniards of unquestionably pure Moorish descent and sympathies ; and for years accusations, true or false, had been made against them of friendship with the Muslim corsairs, to the detriment of Christian Spain. Lerma himself was a magnate of Valencian Christian descent, and, like all his class, bitterly hated his Morisco countrymen,

towards whom he had been ruthless during his viceroyalty. The Valencian Moriscos, mostly agriculturists and horticulturists, were thrifty and prosperous, and had made the plain of Valencia the most fertile spot in Spain by means of patient toil and irrigation. Amidst the slothful misery that surrounded them they were envied and loathed for their prosperity by their Christian neighbours; and petitions had frequently been presented to the King for the expulsion of intruders, who, it was said, were eating food intended by Heaven for pure Spanish Christians. But the Moriscos were always ready to pay the heavy taxation; and Philip II, bigot though he was, could not afford to lose the contributions of his prosperous subjects. With the rise of Lerma, prejudiced, shortsighted, and impracticable visionary as he was, all was changed. The churchmen thundered denunciations against the Valencian Moriscos as doubtful Christians; the poor people were oppressed and persecuted beyond endurance; and at one time, before Elizabeth's death, they had entered into a correspondence with her and the Protestants with a view of organising a revolt in Spain. When James I made peace with Philip III, he cruelly sent to Spain this correspondence; and the hatred of Lerma against the Moriscos grew. Philip III was a mere puppet in the hands of his favourite and the monks who swarmed around him. For years the Archbishop of Valencia had demanded the expulsion of these "sponges who sucked up all the Spanish wealth." Fanaticism and envy joined forces against the Moriscos. They were backsliders who secretly carried on their infidel worship, said the priests; by devilish arts they contrived to be rich when worthier Christian gentlemen starved, said the sluggards, who despised industry as disgraceful; they were bad Spaniards and rebel subjects, said the King's officers; out with the whole vile brood, cried Spaniards everywhere.

But there were in Valencia 30,000 families, mostly large, of known Moorish blood; indeed it was, and still is, difficult to find a Valencian free from the admixture; and to depopulate a kingdom was no easy matter. When total expulsion became the cry, the Valencian landlords, fearful of losing their best tenants and husbandmen, protested; and some of the saner churchmen who were content to oppress, shrank from deporting the population which had turned Valencia into a garden. At the instance of the Pope a commission of ecclesiastics and officials met, ostensibly to devise means for the effective conversion of the Moriscos. But the latter, in fear and anger at the threats used towards them, became defiant; and rumours ran that the whole Moorish race in Spain would stand together to resist persecution. Whether this were true or false, it turned the wavering balance against them; and like a thunder-clap, there fell, on September 22, 1609, the dreadful edict which made clear to all men the real object of the great mobilisation of galleys in Spanish Mediterranean ports, that had puzzled Europe for months. With the exception of six of the "oldest and most Christian" Moriscos in each

large village, who were to be retained to teach their system of cultivation, every man and woman of them was to be deported to Barbary, taking only such personal property as might be carried by the owner. In heart-broken multitudes the unhappy exiles were driven to the waiting galleys from fields and homesteads, from looms and workshops. Thousands were murdered or plundered on the way, for there was no protection for them. They were forbidden to take money with them, so that their property had to be abandoned. Some resistance to the cruel order was attempted in the winter, but it was suppressed with ruthless severity; and in March, 1610, Valencia was declared free from its most useful citizens. During the six months 150,000 Valencian Moriscos were driven from the land which they and their fathers for centuries had made fertile.

Nor was this all: fear and bigotry drove Lerma to greater lengths; and not Valencia alone, but Aragon, Murcia, Andalusia, Castile, and Estremadura, also were swept clear of those who were regarded as "new Christians." In Castile and Estremadura, especially, the races had become so closely amalgamated that it was almost impossible to distinguish in most cases the old Christians from the new; and in these kingdoms the greatest hardship and wrong accompanied the expulsion, which was frequently made an instrument of private vengeance and cupidity. It is difficult to reconcile the many estimates that were made as to the number of Moriscos expelled; but at a moderate computation it cannot well have been less than half a million souls; to which should be added the great number who fled previous to the issue of the edicts, and those who fell victims to the Inquisition and to murderous attack. With these people, the best and most thrifty workers in the country, there went what was left of Spanish skilled industry. In horticulture, goldworking, silk-weaving, embroidering, damascening, and fictile manufactures, they had been supreme; and their productions had been in demand throughout Christian Europe and the East. For more than a century they had been loaded with disabilities, their industries impeded and clogged, in some cases almost destroyed, by mistaken fiscal edicts and sumptuary pragmatics. The reasons that have already been set forth had made work of any sort despised by most of their countrymen; yet, in the face of all these obstacles and drawbacks, the Moriscos had persevered, and had kept their beautiful crafts from complete extinction, contributing by them to the wealth and revenue of the country, in spite of the purblind governors, who thought that the way to make the country rich was to keep the people poor.

The expulsion was one of the most popular acts of Philip's reign, a subject for the admiring boast of his eulogists to the day of his death, and in his own eyes his chief claim upon the gratitude of posterity. Such a feeling, which was general throughout Spain, is not easy fully to understand in our own more tolerant and enlightened times. It must not be forgotten, however, that Spain's most splendid days were

contemporary with—indeed had mainly been owing to—the fierce spiritual pride of the majority engendered by the forcible suppression of religious dissent; and it was not unnatural that, led by false guides, the people at large should believe that the decadence which had fallen upon their country was due, to some extent, to a slackening of religious steadfastness amongst the growing population of “new Christians,” accused of looking with something more than sympathy upon the Muslim corsairs whose bold aggressions had reduced Spain to a cipher upon her own seas. The reasons that inspired the expulsion were consequently partly religious, partly social, and partly political; and in the eyes of most contemporary Spaniards the measure was necessary and meritorious. The underlying error of it, from an economical point of view, was the same as that which had rendered so ruinous the system of taxation pursued by the Emperor and his son: namely, that coin was wealth instead of a convenient token of value; and that, so long as the precious metals could be prevented from leaving the country, the creation and dissemination of wealth by the industry of the people was a matter of minor importance. The expulsion of the Moriscos practically killed the higher handicrafts in Spain; but another hundred years passed before it began to be understood by Spanish statesmen that the riches of a country do not depend primarily upon the bullion introduced into it as tribute, but upon the net value of its own products.

The decadence that had set in as the inevitable consequence of the policy inherited and accentuated by Philip II, very far from being arrested by the lavish recklessness of Philip III and Lerma, had been immensely accelerated by it, and by 1610 had attacked every element in Spain. The next twelve years of peace brought, it is true, greater security and tranquillity than had been enjoyed for many years, and some apparent revival of general prosperity was noticeable; while the political importance of the country had been renewed after the murder of Henry IV (May, 1610), by reason of the Spanish leanings of Mary de' Medici, and the anxiety of James I of England to outbid her for the friendship of Philip. This phase of Spanish history must be left for a future chapter, and it is mentioned here to emphasise the fact that this temporary revival, during the rest of Philip III's reign—he died in 1621—really aggravated the social dry-rot that had fallen upon Spaniards of every class. The craze for ostentation reached from the highest to the lowest: the frequently repeated edicts for the suppression of extravagance were evaded with impunity after the first few weeks; and where the King and Lerma set the fashion for unexampled magnificence of attire and adornment, it was difficult to prevent imitation becoming general, in various degrees. Idleness and corruption filled the towns to the detriment of the country; and every noble and churchman was followed by hosts of threadbare dependents and hangers-on, looking for easy preferment or plunder. The abundant Spanish fiction of the time presents an appalling picture

of the demoralisation of society, especially in the capital. The stock characters of the *picaresque* novels are the swaggering, penniless hidalgo, gaining a scanty subsistence by cheating and impudence; the sham student living, according to his luck, by alms, service, or theft; the self-indulgent hypocritical priest; and the leering ladies who bandy coarse jests with strangers in the streets. Crowds of crapulous mumpers—false cripples some, and some suffering from awful, self-inflicted diseases—throng the streets and churches, and cluster at the convent gates. Office-seekers, panders, and swindlers fill the ante-chambers of ministers; and assassins for hire stand at the corners of filthy alleys, reeking with sloth and vice. Above all, the scoff of men, the tattered poet seeking for a paymaster, is everywhere.

These types, presented to us with a fidelity and vividness peculiar to the genius of the time and country, when mordant satire and luxuriant verbiage ran riot, had all one spirit in common. From the King down to the self-maimed wretch in the gutter, they all scorned work, and sought to live in idleness upon the wealth of others. The State was regarded in some mysterious way as being the fount of riches, from which each citizen hoped to draw, while contributing nothing to it by his own labour. How such a general feeling would affect the life of a country is obvious. Idleness was honourable, work a disgraceful necessity to be avoided whenever possible; and corruption was so widespread that denunciation of the greater peculators by the less successful caused Lerma more than once to throw some of his too greedy officers to the lions, in order to escape unpopularity himself. One such, the powerful Pedro Franquesa, the Secretary of the Council of Finance, was made to disgorge nearly a million and a half of ducats, of which he had defrauded the revenue; and even Lerma finally saved himself from a similar disgrace at the hands of his own envious son, Uceda, by becoming an ecclesiastic and a Cardinal, and retiring to pious obscurity.

But this period of complete social decadence coincided, as similar periods had in the previous history of Spain, with a development of literary brilliancy and activity so extraordinary as to have stamped an enduring impress upon European letters. At a time when manual work was at a discount, and the Inquisition discouraged science and speculation, the only outlet for the florid fancy, the mocking malice, and the vehement verbosity, which are characteristic of the Iberian nature, was social satire based upon the observation of current life: and the period now under review, the golden era of Spanish literature, produced the great masterpieces of imagination, description, verbal felicity, and satire, which have become Spain's principal contribution to the intellectual wealth of the world. The earlier influence of Spain upon European thought had been mainly didactic. The science and culture of Greece and the Orient had been preserved through Hebrew and Arabic texts by the scholars of Cordoba and Toledo; and had, previous to the revival of Greek learning

in the latter part of the fifteenth and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, reached Europe almost exclusively through the medium of Spaniards. The sententious and proverbial form of wisdom, peculiarly Eastern in origin, and the didactic apologue from a similar fount, had also been revived and strengthened as a literary form in Europe through the translations of Spanish Hebrews and Arabs.

Great as these services were, they sink into insignificance before the intellectual debt incurred by Europe to Spain from 1540 to 1640. The revival in Spain, and to some extent thence communicated to the rest of the world, of the Celtic tales of chivalry, at a time when the realities of modern life had weakened their influence elsewhere, was rather in the nature of a manifestation of national character and ideals than an outcome of the true literary genius of the Spanish people. The central idea which lent to the nation the temporary greatness it enjoyed was individual exaltation by sacrifice. The spirit which had led thousands of Christians in Moorish Spain to insist obstinately upon martyrdom, in spite of opposition; the feeling which provided for every barren hill-side an ascetic hermit, and for every convent a bleeding cataleptic nun; which animated alike the ghastly pencil of Ribera, the bitter mortifications of Philip II, and the reckless bravery of the American *Conquistadores*, centred in the special distinction of each individual by self-sacrifice in the face of the Lord. The ruling idea of the romances of chivalry was merely a literary embodiment of the same spirit. The purely altruistic self-sacrifice of the hero for an idea; the seeking of wrongs to remedy, and of the oppressed to liberate, had for its ultimate object the exaltation of the hero in the estimation of a Higher Power; and the avidity with which the whole nation cast itself upon the stories, foolish and unnatural as they obviously were, was caused by the fact that they represented, for the first time in literary form, the spirit to which Spain owed its passing potency as a nation. For reasons which have already been set forth at length, the spirit itself had decayed rapidly towards the end of the sixteenth century. The old faith had waned in the face of repeated disaster. The craze for self-indulgence and ostentatious idleness had, by the time of Philip III, taken the place of a desire for suffering as a distinction. The chivalric ideal, when the influence of the Italian Renaissance was making the rest of Europe almost pagan in its love of beauty and ease, had long kept Spain stern and sacrificial!—partly, it is true, as a protest against the sensuous Moorish civilisation, which the Christians had fought so long. But by 1610 a mocking scepticism had ousted the simple faith, and selfishness had supplanted abnegation. Lip-service to the old ideal alone remained.

When, therefore, Cervantes, the man who of all Spaniards most completely personified, with boundless wit, the passing spirit of his countrymen, wove into an interesting story, overflowing with satirical pictures of daily life, a pitiless exposure of the dead ideal, and, stripping it of its glamour,

scoffed at its absurdity, Spain seized upon *Don Quixote* (1605) and raised it upon a pinnacle as the quintessence of the cynical disillusionment that had fallen upon the nation. To other countries that welcomed the marvellous book it appealed by its wit, its satire, and its truth; and these qualities, together with its pathos, doubtless aided its popularity in Spain also. But to Spaniards it was much more than a witty book: it was the supreme cry, echoing from the inmost heart of the nation, that the old gods were dead, and that Spain's exalted heroics were now but a laughing-stock. The nation was indeed decadent: its faith and belief in itself had fled, and presumptuous pretence, personal and national, was but a poor substitute for the spiritual exaltation that had made it great.

The chivalric tales had produced, however, another offspring besides the satire that killed them. The mawkish, unreal stories of the self-sacrificing hero had by the middle of the sixteenth century inspired by reaction a tale which centred round an anti-hero, as selfish as *Amadis* was altruistic. *Lazarillo* was but another form of protest against a false ideal of life. The other rogue tales which followed on the same lines were purposely cast in squalid scenes, as a reaction against the ineffable surroundings of the princes and princesses of chivalry. The hero was not a wandering noble helping others, but a cunning rogue helping himself at the expense of others. The rogue tales, *Lazarillo de Tormes*, *Guzman de Alfarache*, *Marcos de Obregon*, *Pablo de Segovia*, and their imitators, appealed to Europe as amusing stories of peripatetic adventure, and inspired the modern novel of movement through Fielding, Smollett, and Dickens; but, like *Quixote*, they meant much more to Spain than to the rest of the world; for they voiced the reaction and disillusionment that had fallen upon the people after the false standards of nearly a century.

The vast literary activity of Spain during the late sixteenth and first half of the seventeenth century, especially in the drama, did not exercise its greatest influence upon Europe until after the date when this chapter closes (1610), although the plots invented by the inexhaustible Spanish dramatists were liberally appropriated by English playwrights at about this period. The swaggering Spanish man-at-arms, who had overrun Europe, had also been accepted by Shakespeare and the Elizabethan dramatists as the type of his countrymen; though he had usually been employed as an object of derision, which was natural enough in view of contemporary international jealousies. But when Anne of Austria was wedded to Louis XIII, and Philip IV married a French bride (1612), Spain became the fashion. Anne of Austria throughout her life kept a Spanish Court; and for forty years Spanish actors and authors flocked into France. Spanish dress, demeanour, and manners were the rage. Scores of Spanish words were adopted into French. The games, dances, the favourite dishes, even the terms of endearment, of Spaniards

were naturalised ; and Spanish was the modish language. Spanish plays and novels were translated into French, and thence into English and other tongues ; or, at least, their ingenious plots and intrigues were appropriated. The romantic tradition of Spanish bearing which permeated the Court of Louis XIII exercised an enduring influence upon the form of French letters ; and, when the reaction came from classicism to realism under Molière, it was in Spanish originals that models and inspiration were sought. Where France led, England followed ; and the dramatists of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries perpetuated on the English stage, and this time in English form, the romantic story of intrigue which had its origin in Spain. When in the nineteenth century another realistic reaction took place against the neo-classicism of the Napoleonic period, it was to the Spanish times of Louis XIII that Dumas and the other novelists turned : and d'Artagnan and his numerous fellows faithfully reproduced the demeanour and sentiments which popular tradition ascribed to the swaggering gallant of Spain's decadence.

In addition to the popular peripatetic rogue tales, and the drama of romantic intrigue, with which Spain endowed Europe at this period, Spanish literary influence was seen in other directions during the latter half of the sixteenth century. English maritime ambition under Elizabeth promoted the search for information as to foreign countries and the science of navigation, and a large number of Spanish books describing exploration of the western Continent, and others teaching the science of seamanship, were translated into French and English, especially the latter, and became extremely popular. The extent to which English knowledge of distant countries was indebted to Spanish originals may be seen from Hakluyt's three Introductions to his volumes. The fame of the Spanish military commanders, again, led to the adoption of Spanish tactics and army organisation in other countries, and many military treatises in Spanish were translated and used as text-books in England. Literary form in England was to some extent influenced at this period by Spanish tradition, the sententious apothegm or didactic proverb, then a fashionable vehicle, being to a great extent Spanish in its revived form ; while the preciosity made popular in England by Lyly in his *Euphues*, was beyond question largely inspired by the philosophical and sententious writings of Antonio de Guevara, which were much read and admired in England in the last half of the sixteenth century.

CHAPTER XVII.

BRITAIN UNDER JAMES I.

THE accession of James I to the English throne was an event of greater importance than anything that he accomplished in the course of his reign. For the first time the whole of the British Isles were, for practical purposes, united under one government. Ireland, indeed, fell into James' hands by conquest, and for some time to come would have to be dealt with by the masters of English power, without contributing anything to the common objects of the three kingdoms. It was otherwise with Scotland, which had maintained its independence through a prolonged struggle, waged with the resources of a scanty but hardy population, upheld by the knowledge that the interest of the continental enemies of England, especially of France, was to support a nation whose alliance gave them the opportunity of attacking England in the rear. This danger was now at an end, though the connexion between the two peoples was as yet only a personal one.

Scotland too imposed a burden on England by giving her a King whose character had been moulded by thirty-five years of kingship. Placed as an infant upon the throne from which his mother had been excluded, James had grown up amidst scenes of war and slaughter. Of the four Regents who did their best to govern in his name, the first two, Moray and Lennox, had been murdered, and the fourth, Morton, had suffered death on the scaffold. Only the third, Mar, had died in peace. Sometimes under the pretext of a war of principle, in which a King's party strove against a Queen's party, sometimes without any pretext at all, the ambitions and the hatreds of the great families found vent in mutual slaughter, clothed at times under the form of law, but quite ready to dispense with this if it were not readily forthcoming. Scotland was a prey to feudal anarchy in all its unbridled cruelty. The greatness of the evil roused the indignation of the preachers of the Kirk—of whom John Knox was unmistakably the foremost—to testify against bloodshedding and the more insidious forms of immorality which followed in its train. It was only too probable that in the tremendous struggle which these men had undertaken their voices should

sometimes have been raised too arrogantly, and that they should have called on the civil power to execute their sentences upon offenders, some of whom would have been better left unnoticed. At all events their main efforts were directed against vice rather than against heterodoxy. Yet, seeing that they owed their recognition by the State to the eagerness of the nobility to appropriate the property of the Church, they had for many years hard work to stand up against their patrons; and in 1572 they gave their consent to the appointment of what were known as Tulchan Bishops, named solely with the purpose of passing on the revenue of their sees to lay patrons.

It is said, probably with truth, that the Massacre of St Bartholomew later in the same year not only destroyed the Queen's party, but, by the feeling it aroused, gave to the new clergy a far larger basis of popularity than they had before enjoyed. Morton, who was still Regent, found his advantage in their growing strength, and kept order among the nobility as it had seldom been kept before. But he was no friend to clerical pretensions; and, without support from the powers which divided Scotland amongst them, he was driven in 1577 to resign his office. In 1581 he was condemned to death and executed. Such help as the boy-King could give was thrown into the scale against him. James had fallen under an influence hostile to more than the late Regent. Amenable, to the end of his life, to personal flattery, especially when it proceeded from one superior to himself in daring and self-reliance, he was now under the yoke of his father's cousin, Esmé Stewart, who had been sent from France expressly to win him to the policy of the Guises and of the Catholic party in Europe. In 1581 the stranger became Duke of Lennox. The new favourite was necessarily detested, not only by the clergy, but by the nobles, who saw a stranger preferred before them; and in August, 1582, Lord Ruthven and other nobles seized on the King's person, hoping to control the government in his name. They appealed to the Protestant sentiments of the Kirk as Morton had never done, and before the end of winter Lennox was driven out of the country. This task accomplished, the lords of the old Queen's party, Huntly and the Earl Marischal from the north and Argyll from the west, rose against the knot of men who had monopolised power, and in 1583 James was liberated, only to fall under the dominion of a new favourite, James Stewart, a man of blood and iron, whom he created Earl of Arran. In 1584 the Earl of Gowrie, who had taken a leading part in the Raid of Ruthven, was condemned and executed as a traitor. In the following year there was another transformation, and Arran was driven from Court by the party of the Ruthvens. Meanwhile the Kirk had been organising herself under Andrew Melville, who, since Knox's death, had been the clerical leader. In 1581 she put forth the Second Book of Discipline, claiming for herself the right to inflict ecclesiastical penalties, and demanding that the State should see them executed.

It made for the strength of the Kirk that her assemblies were not composed of ministers alone. In the Kirk sessions in parishes, in the presbyteries, and in the General Assemblies themselves laymen sat as deacons or lay-elders. In those days no line could be exactly drawn between politics and religion, and in testifying against the young King's favourites the Kirk was expressing her abhorrence of a policy which would bring Scotland under the influence of the Catholic Powers and so endanger her Protestantism. James himself not unnaturally wished to free himself from both nobles and clergy, and did his best to play off the one against the other. In 1584 he obtained from Parliament an Act striking at the independence of the Assemblies of the Kirk, and placing its government in the hands of bishops. The crisis of Elizabeth's struggle with Spain was, however, drawing near; and when, towards the end of 1585, the Ruthven party regained power, a league with England placed Scotland on the Protestant side. The execution of Mary in 1587 did not disturb the alliance; and when the Armada appeared in 1588 Spain could count on no help from the Scottish government. In the year before that of the Armada James reached his majority. In 1589 he married Anne of Denmark.

However exaggerated were the pretensions of the Kirk, it was only with her support that James could make the turbulent nobles feel his hand, and in 1592 he consented to an Act reestablishing the full Presbyterian system. In 1593 he defeated, with the support of the clergy, a conspiracy of the Catholic Earls Huntly, Errol, and Angus, who had risen not so much against the King as against the harshness of the clergy. This victory brought him into collision with the ministers, who called for the forfeiture of the rebels' lands and the sternest measures against all who shared their faith. In 1596 the quarrel broke out. Melville told James to his face that he was but "God's silly vassal," and charged him with attempting to balance Protestants and Papists that he might keep them both in check. There was enough of truth in this to sting; and a pretext for attacking the clergy was found in a political sermon of David Black. When the ministers supported Black, on the ground that, in the pulpit, he was free to say what he pleased, James banished him beyond the Tay. Edinburgh rose in support of the clergy, but was brought to submission by James' removal of the law Courts to Linlithgow. The ministers beyond the Forth had little sympathy with Melville's opinions; and by holding Assemblies in the north James succeeded in obtaining their assent to measures intended to reduce the clergy to political obedience. His plan was to bring certain of the clergy into connexion with the government, with the intention of using them to control their brethren. Before the end of 1597 an Assembly had agreed that clerical commissioners should be appointed to confer from time to time with the King's representatives; and in 1598 another Assembly resolved that fifty-one representatives of the clergy might vote

in Parliament. Parliament, however, in which the nobility predominated, would only accept as voters Bishops nominated by the King; and in 1600 the nominations were made and the new Bishops allowed to vote. Though as yet they had no ecclesiastical position, the foundation had been laid for that work of conciliation which James hoped to carry out.

The next few years were occupied by James in securing his position as the heir of Elizabeth; and when she died in 1603 he was accepted by all parties in England as their rightful sovereign. He took with him the consciousness that he had succeeded in so making use of the circumstances of his time as to secure for the Crown in Scotland a position which it had not held for many a year. The nobles were no longer ready to rebel on the slightest pretext, and the clergy had been driven to abate the claims of their leaders to the right of interfering in politics. This James had accomplished rather by dexterous management than by supreme wisdom. It was natural that he should fancy himself equally capable of solving the problems awaiting him in England. Unfortunately he had little knowledge of those problems, and still less of the weaknesses of his own character, the impatience of opposition, the carelessness about details, and the reluctance to take trouble, which rendered nugatory his broader views of policy, often in advance of the peoples with which he had to deal. If he was, as he was called by Henry IV, "the wisest fool in Christendom," it is well to remember the wisdom as well as the folly.

So far as foreign policy was concerned, hostilities with Spain were suspended on James' accession; for he held that, as in his capacity of King of Scotland he was not at war with that Power, he could not be at war with her in his capacity of King of England. The first note struck in the reign was the predominance of the dynastic over the national interest—a predominance which was to characterise the whole of the foreign policy of his family. The suspension of hostilities was, in 1604, followed by a treaty of peace. By coming to terms with Spain, now that England was safe from attack, James was but carrying out the wish of Elizabeth. Nor was he diverging from the path traced by her in leaving the Republic of the Netherlands to continue its resistance without open aid; though it is probable that, had Elizabeth been still on the throne, she would have taken care, as Henry IV did after the Peace of Vervins, that the Republic, whose independence was so valuable to the maritime defence of the country, was in some underhand way supported against absorption by Spain.

Of more immediate importance was the question how James would deal with those ecclesiastical problems which in that age constituted a great part of politics. The Church of England had, under the Tudors, been in the main moulded by two influences—in the first place by the spirit of learning and enquiry which attached itself to the European Renaissance, and in the second place by the more specially Protestant individualism of religious life which had steadied itself through the

acceptance of the verbally inspired Bible as a rule of faith and practice, and by the belief that the Calvinistic creed and even the Calvinistic discipline was inculcated by the teaching of that Bible. The second of these elements had been strengthened by the long struggle against Spain and the Pope; and by far the larger number of religious Englishmen accepted at least the Calvinistic creed, though from their love of individual freedom they were hostile to the introduction of the Calvinistic discipline. To James, who had taken no part in the conflict with Spain, it was rather the other phase of the teaching of the Church of England which was acceptable; and he was likely to find support in a small but growing section of her clergy who had revolted against the Calvinistic teaching, and in a much larger body of the laity which was stoutly opposed to the introduction of the Calvinistic discipline. Yet the immediate cause of strife centred rather in external forms than in intellectual doctrines. Elizabeth, though enforcing in conspicuous instances the ritual enjoined in the Prayer-Book, took care not to be too ready to mark divergences of practice where they could conveniently be overlooked, with the result that large numbers of the clergy were remiss in their observance of certain outward forms, such as the use of the surplice, the ring in marriage, and so forth. On his arrival James was met by a body of clergy who wished to have his sanction for certain changes in the law which would allow them to dispense with ceremonies regarded by them as hostile to true religion. Bacon, the most thoughtful publicist of the day, recommended that the law should be changed so as to admit diversity of ceremonial in the Church; and James, in order to feel his ground, summoned a conference between conformists and non-conformists—those thus specified having as yet no wish to separate from the Church—which met on January 14, 1604, at Hampton Court. James, recollecting the opposition of Scottish Presbyterians, grew impatient of language which seemed to show tendencies in a similar direction, and, breaking up the conference, gave his support to the Bishops in driving out of their cures those amongst them who refused to conform to its existing rules. Such measures required prolonged watchfulness and consistency of purpose if they were to be even temporarily successful; and James was not the man to be either watchful or consistent. Puritanism, in the sense of attachment to Calvinistic doctrines, was too widely spread not to lead, amongst many of the clergy, to Puritanism in the shape of resistance to ceremonial observances; and in spite of fitful episcopal activity the neglect of ceremonial continued to creep in. Yet, for all this, the mental and spiritual movement of the time was not making for Puritanism. The Calvinistic doctrines, though still triumphant in the Universities, were at issue with the broader outlook of the men in whom the spirit of the Renaissance was still active, and the seed which a Shakespeare and a Bacon were sowing in the world would find its

counterpart in the Church in the work of a learned clergy prepared to sift the current theology of the day, and to find it wanting. If these men attached themselves, like the Bishops at Hampton Court, to the maintenance of an established ceremonial, or if, with Bancroft, who in 1604 succeeded Whitgift as Archbishop of Canterbury, they maintained that episcopacy was of divine institution, they did but act in accordance with the law of human nature, which makes men the more inclined to immutability in one direction in proportion as they treat matters as open to question in another. The Puritan could be careless about order and ceremonial, because his creed was strict. The rising school of ecclesiastics was strict about order and ceremonial, because it questioned the prevailing creed.

One result of this activity of parties in the English Church was the weakening of the hold of the Church of Rome on cultivated Englishmen, who were no longer left with the Puritan system as the only possible alternative to that of Rome. Men of thought were now found who refused to consider the doctrines of that Church as of diabolical origin, and who yet rejected them as fettering human intelligence, and subjected them to the searching investigation of historical study. So far as political danger from Rome was concerned, it was far less than it had been when Spain had been formidable and the spirit of domestic faction ran high; and it might seem that the time had come to relax the penal laws against recusants. Effects, however, long outlast their causes, and the ordinary Englishman was persuaded that the danger from Rome was as great as it had been twenty years before. It is to James' credit that he aimed at relieving the tension by contenting himself with civil obedience. He had given good words to the Catholics before leaving Scotland, which he was too indolent to translate into practice in defiance of the opposition of his ministers,—especially of Sir Robert Cecil, to whom he gave a leading place in the Council. A few hot-headed Catholics, led by a priest named Watson, formed a plot to capture the King; and their detection was followed by a promise from James to remit the recusant fines, while an underhand negotiation was carried on with Pope Clement VIII, in the hope of inducing him to appoint a representative in England with orders to excommunicate Catholics believed by the government to be dangerous to the peace of the realm. The traditions of the Papacy forbade the acceptance of a plan which would have virtually given to the civil power a voice in the issue of excommunications; and early in 1604 James learnt that the *modus vivendi* from which he had hoped much had failed to be accepted on the other side. His fears were also excited by discovering that, as might have been expected, the number of recusants had largely increased since the remission of the fines. Imagining that this portended a vast increase of Catholics of whose loyalty he could not be assured, and wishing to conciliate the Parliament that was shortly to meet, he

ordered the banishment of the priests. A consequence of this order was the formation by a little knot of exasperated Catholics of the conspiracy known as the Gunpowder Plot, for the destruction of King, Lords, and Commons, by means of an explosion of materials to be placed under the House of Lords. It was impossible for the design to take effect during the coming session; and when Parliament met on March 19, 1604, it could deliberate in safety.

Between James and a House of Commons filled with country gentlemen and lawyers misunderstandings soon declared themselves. A claim by the King to have disputed elections referred to Chancery was defeated under the semblance of a compromise. James was however eager for a complete Union with Scotland, which the Commons were too conservative to accept, and for an increase of financial resources, which had been scarcely sufficient for the frugal Elizabeth, but had been further impaired by his own extravagance, especially through the gifts he had lavished on Scottish favourites. The Commons desired the removal of evils connected with wardship and purveyance, the removal of ceremonies obnoxious to the Puritan clergy, and the enforcement of the recusancy laws. In the end little or nothing was done, and James prorogued Parliament after administering a sharp rebuke to the House of Commons.

One of the Bills which had received the royal assent reinforced the laws against Catholics; and to this after some hesitation James gave his consent. At the common assizes the judges put the law in force, and several executions took place. Furthermore, towards the end of the year, the recusancy fines were again required from a few of the richer Catholics, though James sent a messenger, Sir James Lindsay, to Rome, to endeavour to come to an understanding with the Pope. Either Lindsay or the authorities at Rome mistook the royal intentions; and early in 1605 it was noised abroad that the King was about to abandon his religion. James took offence, and on February 10, 1605, announced his purpose that the penal laws should again be put in force. His good intentions had broken down partly because he could not obtain the Pope's cooperation in the enforcement of obedience; partly because he shared the anxieties of those around him lest the Catholics, if suffered to increase, should prove a danger to his throne. The Gunpowder-plotters were naturally even more exasperated than before, and previously to November 5, 1605, the day fixed for the opening of the second session of Parliament, they had conveyed a large quantity of gunpowder to a room under the House of Lords. The government, however, got wind of their enterprise. Before long the conspirators were either killed or executed; Father Garnet, the Provincial of the Jesuits, being also executed on a charge of having a guilty knowledge of the plot.

The second session of Parliament (1605-6) was given up to the passing of a sharper law against recusants, accompanied by a new oath

of allegiance, not in order that Catholics who took it might be spared the ordinary hardships of recusancy, but merely that those who refused to take it might be subjected to the additional penalties of a *Praemunire*. Those who took the oath declared, not against the Pope's right of excommunication, but against his claim to pronounce the deposition of Kings and to authorise their subjects to take arms against them. The Pope, by pronouncing the oath inadmissible, placed Catholics who wished to be loyal subjects in an awkward position. Though the law was not put in general execution, its results pressed with no little harshness upon those against whom it was directed.

The Gunpowder Plot had delayed James' attempt to bring about a closer Union between England and Scotland. Parliament, in its first session, had contented itself with authorising the appointment of Commissioners to consider the question; but it was only upon the opening of the third session in November, 1606, that the report of the Commissioners was made. They recommended the repeal of laws passed in each country to repel hostile attacks from its neighbour, legislation for the mutual extradition of criminals, freedom of trade, and the naturalisation in each kingdom of the natives of the other. The first two suggestions were adopted by Parliament, but the opposition to the last two was strong. Englishmen feared lest the more economical Scots might undersell them, and they were alarmed lest James' Scottish favourites might compete with them in other ways. Those whom James had brought with him had received large donations in land and money, and did not scruple to sell their influence with their master. In the end, the Bills proposed to give effect to these two measures were talked out, and the session was brought to a close. Some effect was given to one of these measures by a judgment delivered in the Exchequer Chamber in 1608, by which the *post-nati*, or subjects of the King born in Scotland after James' accession to the English Crown, were declared to be natural subjects of the King of England.

Partly through the narrowness of the means on which Elizabeth had contrived to subsist, but still more through his own extravagance, James found himself in grave financial difficulties. In 1606 he had added a debt of £261,000 to one of £400,000 bequeathed him by Elizabeth, while the excess of ordinary expenditure over revenue was £51,000, to say nothing of extraordinary expenses, amounting to an average of nearly £35,000 a year in his first three years. In the enthusiasm caused by the discovery of Gunpowder Plot Parliament voted subsidies amounting to £370,000. Such liberality could not however be reckoned on as a constant source of supply; and when in 1608, Cecil, now Earl of Salisbury, became Treasurer, it was incumbent on him to find some means of replenishing the exhausted Treasury. Elizabeth had laid an imposition upon imported currants, that is to say a duty additional to the tonnage and poundage voted to each sovereign for

life by the first Parliament of his reign. In 1606 a merchant named Bate refused to pay the duty, on the ground that it had not been granted by Parliament. The judges, however, in the Court of Exchequer decided against him; and in 1608 Salisbury took advantage of their decision to lay new impositions on imports and exports, estimated to bring in £70,000 a year. At the same time he issued a new book of rates, fixing more highly than before the value of each pound weight or measure of goods, both the ordinary customs and the new impositions being raised on the value and not on the weight or measurement of dutiable articles. When Parliament met in 1610 for its fourth session, it was alive to the importance of the question of the legality of this new taxation, though it found itself hampered by the consideration that the judges, who were constitutionally empowered to lay down the law, had already given their decision, and that no resolution of the Commons, nothing, in fact, short of an Act of Parliament could overthrow it. On the other hand, it was possible that they might take advantage of the necessities of the government to obtain an Act which would give them what they wanted. This is, indeed, what very nearly happened. Salisbury, still in need of money, entered into a bargain with the Commons, known as the Great Contract, by which the King was to abandon such of his feudal rights as were burdensome to his subjects, receiving in return a permanent grant of £200,000 a year. Outside the contract it was agreed that a Bill should be passed, annexing to the Crown the least hurtful of the impositions, amounting to about £50,000 a year, while the Crown was to renounce any right it might possess to levy customs in future without consent of Parliament. When Parliament was prorogued, the understanding was that it should meet again in October to settle the detail of this arrangement.

The fifth session of James' first Parliament was of short duration. The members after consulting their constituents returned under the impression that the sum of £200,000 a year was too much to grant. James, on the other hand, thought it too little. The Great Contract was dropped, and the House in an ill-temper not only refused to grant supply in any form, but fell foul of the King's Scottish favourites. James angrily prorogued Parliament, and on February 9, 1610, dissolved it. The struggle with the Commons which was to end with the decapitation of his son had begun. As yet, however, it was want of sympathy rather than any definite variance of principle or practice, which separated the two authorities. Building his theory upon Elizabethan practice, Bacon held that the strength of a ruler was to be found in his representative character, and that financial support would not be withheld from a King who set himself to lead his people in the paths in which they would willingly go. "The voice of the people," said the House of Commons, in words which probably flowed from Bacon's pen, "in things of their knowledge is said to be as the voice of God."

This was exactly what James could not understand. His own superior judgment was to set the standard of progress; the aims which interested himself were to be alone pursued. He had little of the patience required for the leadership of men, and still less of sympathetic interest in the opinions of those who, like the opponents of the Union with Scotland, were less wise than himself.

James' foreign policy was, in principle at least, as unexceptionable as was his desire to bind together his own kingdoms. Though religious antagonism was still powerful in Europe, the attempt of Spain to establish her own predominance as the champion of the Papacy had signally failed; and, when James made peace with her in 1604, there seemed to be a chance that religious wars might be brought to a close. James having therefore recognised that this was so, his foreign policy was marked out for him by the facts of the case as well as by his own temperament. He had but to discountenance all efforts to revive the past strife, from whichever side they proceeded, and to transfer conflicts, if conflicts arose, from the domain of religion to that of politics. If Spain under Philip III was prepared to keep the peace, there was no reason to count her as an enemy. If Henry IV of France was nursing designs of future aggrandisement at the expense of Spain, there was no reason to support him. The point of danger during the early years of the reign lay in the Netherlands, where Spain was winning ground from the Dutch Republic. Spain was, however, financially exhausted, and in 1608 a conference opened at the Hague, in which England and France took part. This resulted in 1609 in the Truce of Antwerp, which put a stop to hostilities for twelve years. Later in the same year, a disputed succession in Cleves and Jülich seemed on the point of being seized by Henry IV as a pretext for attacking the Spanish monarchy; but his murder in 1610 put an end for the time to the danger of a European war. His widow, acting as Regent in the name of Louis XIII, was prepared to rescue Jülich from the Archduke Leopold, who had occupied it in the Emperor's name. She was, however, in no hurry to act; and the place was besieged and taken by a force to which James and the Dutch Republic had jointly contributed. Whether rightly or wrongly applied, James' principle was that the peace should be kept by leaving each Power in possession of what was already its own. Unfortunately for his popularity, he tried to carry his impartiality into his family relationships. Three of his children had escaped death in infancy—Henry, Elizabeth, and Charles. Since the treaty with Spain in 1604 James had been hoping to secure the hand of an Infanta for his eldest son, regarding the alliance partly as likely to bring personal credit to his family, and partly as placing in his hands an instrument by which he might in conjunction with Philip secure the peace of Europe. It seemed to him that a union of the chief Protestant State with the chief Catholic State of the day would be irresistible. The question

whether he was himself quite the man to place a bridle in the mouth of the Spanish monarchy appears not to have occurred to him, and still less the doubt, whether his own subjects might not be justly aggrieved by the introduction into the heart of the royal family of a religion which the nation had rejected. For the present, however, the danger was averted. An application made at Madrid in 1611 for the hand of Philip's eldest daughter, the Infanta Anna, was met by the answer that the Princess was engaged to Louis XIII. The Prince of Wales, it was added, might have her sister, Maria, a child in her ninth year; and even this was only to be permitted on the impossible condition that the young Henry should conform to the religion of his bride. Salisbury, as an old minister of Elizabeth, was pleased with this turn of events. The Prince, he said, could find roses everywhere; he need not trouble himself about this Spanish olive. Yet he was compelled to seek his rose in a Catholic Court. Salisbury's own career, however, was drawing to a close. His financial scheme had proved a failure, and in diplomacy he had dwindled into a mere exponent of his master's schemes. In May, 1612, he died. The Prince himself seemed likely to be a warmer opponent of his father's plans than Salisbury could be. He was resolved, he said, that two religions should never lie in his bed. This opposition, however, was brought to an end by typhoid fever, which carried him off in November, 1612.

James, indeed, had no desire for an exclusively Protestant alliance. He wanted to have a foot in both camps; and in February, 1613, he married his daughter to Frederick V, Elector Palatine, leader of the Union, an aggressive combination of the Protestant Princes of Germany. The Spanish government replied by despatching to England the ablest of its diplomatists, Diego Sarmiento d'Acuna, afterwards known as the Count of Gondomar, to bring James, if it were still possible, into strict conformity with Spanish policy. For the present, however, Sarmiento thought best to watch the situation till he was able to master it. It was in his favour that after Salisbury's death James fell more completely into the hands of the Howard family, the Earl of Northampton and his nephew, the Earl of Suffolk, together with the old Earl of Nottingham, who had commanded the fleet which defeated the Armada. Northampton was secretly a Roman Catholic, though he conformed ostensibly to the Established Church; and both he and the other members of his family were favourable to the Spanish alliance, and to the detachment from Protestant interests on the Continent which it implied. Their hold upon James was strengthened in 1613 by the marriage of Suffolk's daughter, Frances—who had been divorced from the Earl of Essex under disgraceful conditions—with the King's Scottish favourite Carr, created successively Viscount Rochester and Earl of Somerset. Yet, for all that, financial necessity compelled James at least to attempt a more popular course. The deficit was increasing, and the

extraordinary expenses were mounting up. It was determined to summon another Parliament; and in 1614 Winwood, an opponent of the policy of the Howards, was named Secretary. When Parliament met, however, no attempt was made to come to that general understanding which must form the basis of any permanent settlement. Winwood merely announced that the King was prepared to grant a certain number of concessions in consideration of a certain amount of supply. There was still to be a bargain, as had been proposed in 1610, between the Crown and the House, though it was to be a bargain on a smaller scale. The Commons on their part passed a Bill, declaring the illegality of the impositions. In this step the Lords refused to concur. There was an outburst of excitement in the Commons, and Parliament was dissolved after a session of little more than two months. It had not produced a single public Act, and was consequently known as the Addled Parliament.

The dissolution necessarily threw power into the hands of the Howards. Northampton having died in this year, Suffolk was appointed Treasurer, and his son-in-law, Somerset, Lord Chamberlain. The Spanish alliance was now taken up more seriously. Before dissolving Parliament James had consulted Sarmiento as to the likelihood of the King of Spain's consent being given to a marriage between Prince Charles and the Infanta Maria. The ambassador's reply was vague, but on the whole favourable; and Digby, James' ambassador in Spain, was instructed to make the proposal at Madrid, where it was resolved to open the negotiations on the ground that it might be a means of converting England. When the proposed articles reached England in 1615, it was found that they included a demand not only for the suspension of the penal laws against Roman Catholics, but for the education of all children born of the marriage, up to the age of twelve, by their mother, whose household was to be exclusively composed of persons of her own religion. James hesitated, but in the end offered to empower Somerset to treat on the matter with Sarmiento.

So marked a danger to the Protestantism of the future King brought on a fierce conflict in the Council between Somerset and the Howards on the one side, and the supporters of the Elizabethan tradition, headed by Archbishop Abbott and Lord Chancellor Ellesmere, on the other; the main attack was directed against Somerset, whose position was known to be shaken. Spoiled as he was by good fortune, his arrogance had shown itself in rudeness even towards the master who had raised him from obscurity. His enemies had been doing their best to induce James to accept in his place a new favourite, young George Villiers. A discovery was opportunely made that the Countess of Somerset, two years before, had poisoned Sir Thomas Overbury, who had remonstrated with her present husband against his marriage with her; and, rightly or wrongly, Somerset was implicated in her crime. The pair were put

on their trial and condemned to death, but were spared the extreme penalty by order of James, who never saw them again. Villiers was now accepted as favourite and raised rapidly to wealth and honour. In 1616 he became Viscount Villiers, in 1617 Earl, and in 1618 Marquis of Buckingham. Nevertheless, Somerset's enemies failed in their main object. In 1615, the question whether Parliament should again be summoned was debated in the Council, and though it was answered in the affirmative the proposal was ultimately abandoned. James felt that an understanding with Parliament was incompatible with a Spanish alliance, and, as he was now resolved to continue the marriage negotiations, decided that Parliament should not meet.

The marriage question was financial as well as political. In 1614, after the dissolution of Parliament, the Council had sent out letters to persons of means asking for a benevolence, holding it justifiable to ask for money, on the ground that the Statute of Benevolences condemned the exacting of gifts to the Crown, not the simple request. Informal pressure was however used; and a gentleman named St John was fined in the Star Chamber—not, however, for refusing payment, but for stirring up others to refuse. The whole sum collected was little more than £66,000. It was not a remedy to be repeated; and in the spring of 1617, when the opening of a formal negotiation for the marriage treaty was discussed, it was a powerful argument that, whereas the portion of a French princess would be but £200,000, the Spaniards offered £600,000 with the Infanta. To a body of commissioners selected out of the Council to advise him on the business James declared that the state of his affairs was such as might give him cause to make the best use of his son, thereby to get some good portion towards the payment of his debts, adding an assurance that Sarmiento had assured him that no alteration in the Prince's religion was required by the King of Spain, nor any liberty or toleration for his subjects. The Spaniards were doubtless promising more than they intended to fulfil, in the hope that by dragging James a step in advance he would ultimately be induced to go as far as they desired. At all events, in May, 1618, when Digby returned to England with the Spanish terms, it appeared that, though toleration was not asked for in the articles themselves, it was expected that James should agree to the repeal of the penal laws. James, who was obviously incompetent to do anything of the sort, refused to make the promise required of him. The negotiation, though not absolutely broken off, was suspended, and Gondomar—as Sarmiento was now styled—left England in July.

It was probably in consequence of the same financial distress which made James so eager for the Spanish marriage that he had sanctioned an enterprise which, if successful, could hardly fail to bring him into collision with Spain. One of his first acts on his arrival in England at the commencement of the reign had been to deprive Raleigh—the

outspoken advocate of war with Spain—of all his offices, though not without some compensation for his loss. Very soon afterwards, Raleigh was charged with having taken part in a plot to bring Spanish troops into England, a crime of which—though he may possibly have been guilty of rash and thoughtless speech—he was undeniably innocent. Raleigh, however, was condemned to death, though his punishment was commuted by the King to imprisonment in the Tower. In his eagerness to recover his freedom he assured James that if only he were relieved of his imprisonment he was ready to secure for him a gold-mine on the Orinoco, the existence of which he had ascertained in a former voyage to Guiana. Supported by the new favourite, Raleigh was allowed to try his fortune, and in 1616 was released from the Tower. The Spanish ambassador at once declared the enterprise to be an infringement on his master's right to the east of Guiana. James, instead of deciding the question, left the whole responsibility to Raleigh, who was given to understand that, if he meddled with any part of the King of Spain's dominions, he would answer for it with his head. Since it was precisely the extent of those dominions that was in dispute, this practically meant that if Raleigh brought back the assurance of large quantities of gold for James, the site of the mine would be held at Whitehall to be outside the limits of Spanish territory. Under these conditions Raleigh sailed in 1617. Reaching the mouth of the Orinoco, he sent an expedition up the river: but the Spaniards were able to stop its passage through the woods, and the venture ended in total failure. Raleigh, on his return in 1618, was offered as a sacrifice to Spain and executed—nominally in accordance with the sentence delivered in 1603, in reality because he had failed to secure the gold of which James was in need. The real crime was the King's, who had sent him out without first defining the limits of Spanish sovereignty.

It was not by the acquisition of gold-mines that English influence was to grow beyond the sea. Commerce was advancing steadily in the midst of political complications. The East India Company was driving a lucrative trade, though it received but scanty support from the Crown in its resistance to the overbearing interference of its Dutch rivals. In the West an attempt to colonise Virginia was made in 1607, and the new settlement proved successful after some years of struggle. In 1620 a more remarkable body found a home in the New World. A party of Separatists who had fled from persecution to Holland, finding themselves ill at ease in their new surroundings, crossed the Atlantic and established themselves at Plymouth in New England. The foundations of the Empire were laid in strenuous labour.

At home attention was little fixed on these seeds of future greatness. The minds of men, so far as they were bent at all on matters outside the domain of private life, were drawn to the constitutional struggles which were to render the mother-country worthy of her offspring.

The strife between the Crown and the House of Commons which had twice culminated in a breach between them, had given increased importance to certain questions which arose as to the functions and limitations of various branches of the judiciary. So long as the Parliamentary system was in working order, legislation might be called in to redress any defects in the existing system. Now that it was out of gear, a conflict of jurisdiction could only be ended by the direct interposition of the Crown—a result of little importance so far as the rights of private individuals were concerned, but one which, by rendering the judges subservient to the King, might lead to evils of no slight magnitude if his claims encroached on the subjects' rights. If, on the other hand, this undue influence of the Crown was to be resisted, it could only be opposed, under existing circumstances, by exalting the judiciary into a position in which it would have to decide between the rights of the King and his subjects, thus placing the final control in political disputes in the hands of lawyers, a class of men inclined to lay down hard and fast rules more suitable for a Court of justice than for political life.

It so happened that Coke, who had become Chief Justice of the Common Pleas in 1606, was the very man to claim this high position for himself and his colleagues. Ambitious and overbearing by nature, he was ever prone to overvalue his immense stores of legal knowledge, and to undervalue those broader perceptions and sympathies which enter into the making of a statesman. Whatever might have been his office, he would have been sure to do his best to magnify it, and as a judge of a Common Law Court he was determined, so far as in him lay, to exalt the authority of the Common Law Courts above all others. Even before he became a judge, these Courts had been accustomed to issue prohibitions to the ecclesiastical judges, stopping cases before them till they had shown that the matter in hand rightly fell under their jurisdiction. The clergy, on the other hand, held that the ecclesiastical Courts derived their jurisdiction immediately from the Crown, and that their powers could only be defined by the King. In 1605 Bancroft, then Archbishop of Canterbury, presented to James a statement of their case, entitled *Articuli cleri*, and asked that the disputes about jurisdiction might be decided by the Court of Chancery. In 1606, after Coke's appointment, the judges gave in their answer, contending that the points at issue could be settled by Act of Parliament alone. The smaller dispute between two sets of judges was thus brought into connexion with the large one between Parliament and the Crown. In 1607 a further question arose. A lawyer named Fuller appeared before the Court of King's Bench to ask for a prohibition forbidding the Court of High Commission to tender to two of his clients an oath, known as the *ex officio* oath, which bound the person taking it to reveal all he knew, even against himself. The High Commission proceeded to summon Fuller before it, on a charge of schism and erroneous opinions; upon

which the King's Bench issued another prohibition—this time on behalf of the lawyer. Bancroft appealed to the King, who summoned the judges before him. An altercation ensued between James and Coke, in which the latter claimed a supremacy of the law, which, to his mind, meant the supremacy of the lawyers over the King. The twelve judges were next consulted, who admitted that the High Commission had the right of trying schism and heresy; but that it was for the Common Law judges to decide on the legality of its acts. On this answer Fuller was condemned to a fine by the High Commission, and found no more support in the King's Bench. The assumption by the Common Law judges of a right to test the legality of proceedings in ecclesiastical Courts was, however, still contested by Bancroft; but, though the question was debated in the King's presence, it was still unsettled in 1609.

Another question in which the jurisdiction of the Common Law Courts was disputed arose out of an attempt made to reform the navy. Nottingham who, as Lord Howard of Effingham, had commanded the fleet which foiled the Armada, was now growing old, and was altogether destitute of organising capacity. Since 1604 the administration of the navy had fallen into the hands of Sir Robert Mansell, a man whose inefficiency was only equalled by his dishonesty; and under such control the navy, which had been handed down in admirable order by Elizabeth to her successor, was falling into ruin. In 1608 a commission of enquiry was appointed and ended in a speech by James, who contented himself with hoping that those who had misbehaved themselves would see the error of their ways. Bribery and corruption were hardly to be checked by so feeble an intervention, and in 1613, after a fresh commission of enquiry had been issued, Mansell obtained from James Whitelocke, a lawyer who in 1610 had taken a part adverse to the claim of the Crown in the matter of the impositions, an opinion that the commission was illegal as containing a clause authorising the Commissioners to "give order for the due punishment of offenders." Whitelocke and Mansell were forced to acknowledge before the Council that they had been in the wrong; but no further attempt was made at this time to reform the navy.

Two conceptions of government were thus confronted with one another—that of confining the royal authority strictly within the limits of the law, thus bringing in the judges as the arbiters of the constitution; and that which left considerable latitude to the prerogative, hoping to find in the King a centre of reforming activity. The former view was championed by Coke, the latter by Bacon. Bacon no doubt had acquired through his long experience of Courts much of the suppleness of the courtier; but there was at the bottom of his heart a warm and ever-active patriotism, never allowing him to lose hope that the wearer of the Crown would stand forth as the leader of the nation and at last prove himself acceptable to the Parliament by which the nation was

represented. Bacon must work with James, or not work at all; and it was the real tragedy of his life, that James, with all his good intentions, could never rise to the occasion, and that the best servants of the Crown were employed in building up an authority which their master knew not how to use.

In 1614 the conflict between Coke and Bacon was emphasised by the proceedings arising out of the case of a clergyman named Peacham, who was charged with a libellous attack on the King, in which he had suggested that the people might rise in rebellion. In 1615, in order to discover whether he had acted in collusion with others, Peacham was tortured by order of the Council; and, when nothing was discovered by this means, it was resolved to ask the judges whether Peacham was a fit subject for prosecution on the charge of treason. Bacon, then Attorney-General, was employed to ascertain the opinion of the judges of the King's Bench, and, dreading lest Coke should overawe his brethren, resolved to put the question to each of them separately. Coke, as might have been expected, was highly indignant. "Such particular and auricular taking of opinions," he said, "is not according to the customs of the realm."

The conflict between Coke and Bacon came to a head in 1615. In a case in which the King was interested Bacon produced before the King's Bench a writ *De non procedendo rege inconsulto*, directing the judges to proceed no further till the question had been referred to Chancery, and till the King's leave to proceed further had been obtained. Bacon appears to have thought that the Chancellor as a political as well as a judicial officer would be a fitting mediator between the Crown and the judges. The case however was compromised out of Court, and it was on another point that the final struggle took place. Embittered against the Court of Chancery, Coke took up the case of two swindlers whose victims had obtained in Chancery justice which had been denied them in a Common Law Court, and, on their application to himself, declared all who had taken part in the Chancery proceedings to be liable to the penalties imposed by the statute of *Praemunire*. In another case—a case of Common Law—Coke and the other judges of his Court refused to take notice of an order from the King to suspend action, inasmuch as the matter was one in which the Crown was interested. On this the twelve judges were summoned before James. Eleven of them gave way, acknowledging that they were bound to consult with the King before deciding a question in which he was concerned. Coke alone held out, and was dismissed from his office (November 15, 1616). "This," said James, "is a thing regal and proper, to keep every Court within his own bounds. As for the absolute power of the Crown, that is no subject for the tongue of a lawyer, nor is it lawful to be disputed. It is atheism and blasphemy to dispute what God can do—good Christians content themselves with His Will revealed in His Word: so it is

presumption and high contempt in a subject to dispute what a King can do, or say that a King cannot do this or that; but rest in that which is the King's will as revealed in his law." Stripped of James' verbiage, the meaning of this declaration of principle was that the Crown and not the Bench was the ultimate disposer of sovereign authority. The defeat of the judges was complete, a defeat which left King and Parliament face to face, and ensured the grave questions at issue being dealt with on political rather than on strictly legal grounds. In this conflict Coke was again to be heard of, but as a member of the House of Commons, and not as a judge.

For the present there was no House of Commons in which Coke could find a seat, and he therefore strove to climb back into power by the only means available. In 1617, James having set out to revisit his old kingdom, Coke sought to curry favour by supporting a marriage between his daughter and a brother of the favourite, a marriage which was strongly opposed by her mother, Coke's wife. At once the Court split into factions, Bacon, who had just been made Lord Keeper, taking part against Coke, in whose return to influence he recognised a grave political danger. Buckingham however, always eager to have as many dependents as possible, vehemently encouraged the marriage, and it was only by a profound apology that Bacon succeeded in warding off the danger which threatened him from the favourite's displeasure.

The position now assumed by Buckingham was, in fact, a greater danger to the Crown than anything that could arise from the pretensions of lawyers. As yet, indeed, the favourite claimed no more than to be the mouthpiece of the policy of the King; but he was allowed to be the master of the patronage of the Crown. Welcomed at first for the friendliness and good nature which distinguished him from the overbearing Somerset, he soon developed an impatience of opposition, and an insistence on personal submission by all who sought his favour, which might gain him obsequious idolaters for the present, but were certain in the end to cost him the good opinion of those standing outside the circle of the Court. Day by day he grew more self-confident, taking increased delight in the flattery of those who sought his favour. Brilliant in conversation and affable of demeanour towards his inferiors—and there was no man at Court whom he did not regard as such—he made the path easy to flatterers, and hard to those who respected themselves too highly to pay him the extravagant court that he demanded. His intervention in the question of his brother's marriage led to Coke's restoration to the Council Board; and though Coke gained little in real influence thereby, the interference of the favourite was significant of the weight which personal considerations were now to have over politics.

It was unlikely that a youth so constituted would long be content to remain a mere Court favourite. Somerset had risen to power in conjunction with the Howards, and Buckingham now set his heart on

ousting the Howards from power. In 1618, Thomas Howard, the Earl of Suffolk, was suspended from the office of Lord High Treasurer; and in the following year he was condemned by the Star Chamber to a heavy fine for corruption in complicity with his wife. Wallingford, Suffolk's son-in-law, was, also in 1618, turned out of the Mastership of the Wards. In 1619, the Secretary, Sir Thomas Lake, who had been introduced to office under the protection of the Howards, having indiscreetly taken sides in a private quarrel, was fined in the Star Chamber and dismissed from office. The most important change, however, took place at the Admiralty. Buckingham's determination had succeeded—when James had failed—in setting at work a commission of enquiry into the scandals of the navy. So enormous was the malversation now detected and exposed that Nottingham was driven to relinquish his post; and in January, 1619, Buckingham became Lord High Admiral. Mansell was got rid of, and a new body of Navy Commissioners was appointed to take charge of the details of naval administration. The leading spirit among the Commissioners was Sir John Coke, a man of probity and a fair administrator. Under his influence the navy made some recovery from the slough of corruption into which it had sunk in the former part of the reign. Ships were built at cheaper rates. Yet Buckingham, with the best will in the world, was too ignorant of naval matters, and too prone to dispense his patronage amongst sycophants, to obtain all the good results that ought to have followed from the dismissal of Nottingham.

The more economical handling of the expenses of the navy was paralleled by financial reforms in other directions. Buckingham's eagerness to lift the Crown out of financial embarrassments had found an instrument in Sir Lionel Cranfield, who, having been bred as a London merchant, brought his commercial experience to bear on the public revenue. The time had come when, unless something were done to check the outflow of expenditure, James would be compelled to surrender at discretion to the House of Commons. The deficit for the year 1617 reached £150,000; and a loan of £100,000, obtained with difficulty from the City, had been swallowed up. The Crown debts amounted to £726,000, and this in spite of the fact that the revenue was automatically rising through the growth of commerce, so that the customs, which at James' accession had brought in £86,000, were now leased for £140,000. In 1619 Gondomar estimated the growth of the trade of London since the peace with Spain at £7,500,000. It was Cranfield's task to battle with officials whose perquisites were threatened. Yet in spite of all opposition he reduced the annual expenditure of the Household by £23,000. In 1618 he was himself named Master of the Wardrobe, with the expectation that he would be able to reduce expenditure in that department; and in the same year, with a similar object, he was appointed Master of the Wards. He was looking forward to a seat in the Council, when he was threatened with a loss of favour, till he

consented to marry one of Buckingham's poor kinswomen. It was by proceedings of this kind that Buckingham spoiled his own career. It was only a lucky accident that gave him a man of ability like Cranfield as a tool, who was at the same time prepared to accept the position of personal subservience which the favourite regarded as indispensable. In the long run it is better for a government to attract men of independent character than to be served for a time by the ablest of financiers; and so long as Buckingham held the patronage of the Crown it was hardly likely that men of independent character would consent to serve under him. The immediate result was, however, to the advantage of the Crown. Cranfield's efforts resulted in bringing about something more approaching a balance between revenue and expenditure than had been known since the death of Elizabeth.

If, as was not unlikely, an actual balance could be reached, it would be on the sole condition that James should abstain from expensive entanglements in foreign politics. Yet this condition was becoming increasingly difficult of observance. In 1618 a revolution broke out in Bohemia; and in 1619 James' son-in-law, Frederick V, Elector Palatine, was elected King by the revolutionary Estates of that country, in opposition to Ferdinand, who claimed to be the legitimate King, and who was himself elected Emperor, under the title of Ferdinand II, two days later. The conflict which followed the Bohemian Revolution, usually known as the Thirty Years' War, was partly a war of religion, partly also a war in which the Imperial authority was pitted against the territorial authority of the Princes. James had no reason to take sides on the latter issue, and no wish to plunge into war on the former. What was wanting in him was the capacity for understanding the sentiments of those who were actuated by motives different from his own; and he only succeeded in making himself the laughing-stock of Europe by sending one diplomatic mission after another to urge the parties to a peaceable compromise which was detested by each. In the circumstances, it is impossible to blame him for refusing to send aid to his son-in-law in Bohemia; but it is difficult to overestimate his folly in consenting, when Gondomar returned to England in 1620, to take up once more the thread of the negotiation for the Spanish marriage. He was swayed by the vain hope that Spain, whose whole foreign policy was and must be based on her position as chief leader of Roman Catholic Europe, would join him in an effort to mediate between Protestant and Catholic, and would subordinate the interests of her Church to the petty question whether the King of England's son-in-law should retain his territorial dominions in the Palatinate.

No doubt James' means of making war were defective. England had no standing army ready to take the field, and it was only by permitting Vere to carry a regiment of volunteers in July to the defence of the Palatinate that he was able to signify his intention to secure that

country for his son-in-law. The Spanish government, recognising his weakness and sure of their power to lull him to sleep, in August sent Spinola with a Spanish army to seize the western portion of the Palatinate. In November, the defeat on the White Hill, outside the walls of Prague, drove Frederick out of Bohemia, and the question for James to decide was whether he would ally himself with other interested Powers to check the vengeance of the Emperor and his allies. At first James seemed now inclined to make a stand. He offered a military alliance to Christian IV of Denmark, and called Parliament to provide supplies for the undertaking. When Parliament met in January, 1621, the House of Commons enthusiastically voted two subsidies, worth about £140,000, in token of its loyalty, but prudently abstained from discussing ways and means for a military intervention till the King was able to announce that intervention would positively take place.

The postponement of the final decision gave an opportunity to Parliament to turn its attention to domestic affairs. Complaints had of late been rife against the issue of patents of monopoly. Elizabeth indeed had cancelled some of those against which an outcry had been raised, and James soon after his accession had cancelled many more. Fresh grants however had taken the place of those which had been recalled; and the public disposition was such as to cry out against them not merely as evil in themselves, but as having been launched for the sole purpose of diverting money into the pockets of the favourites of the favourite. Yet this latter belief, though justified to some extent, was not nearly so well founded as was supposed. The claim of the Crown to grant patents of monopoly had never been abandoned; and it was held by James' advisers, long before Buckingham had been heard of at Court, that it was desirable to exercise the King's powers when the public advantage could thereby be secured. It is true that it was held in those days that the public was benefited not only by protective measures, but by other expedients which would now be rejected. A patent for instance was granted in 1611 for the manufacture of glass by means of coal furnaces; and in 1613 all manufacture of this article by other persons was prohibited on the ground that the use of wood in their furnaces would be injurious to ship-building. Another patent for the manufacture of gold and silver thread was issued and enforced on the plea that the patentees pledged themselves to import the bullion they consumed, whereas it was exceedingly likely that private persons would melt down the gold and silver within the realm—a process which, according to the economic doctrine of the time, signified the consumption of the wealth of England for purposes of display. The manufacture was so easily carried on surreptitiously that stringent—perhaps illegal—measures were taken to maintain the patentees in the rights conferred on them; and these measures brought the greater obloquy on those

with whom they originated, since Sir Edward Villiers, Buckingham's half-brother, having invested £4000 in the concern, had a pension of £500 secured to him out of the profits, while a full-brother of Buckingham's, Christopher Villiers, was to enjoy a similar pension of £800 for no reason at all. It was easy to base on these facts a belief that the whole proceedings had been due to no more exalted cause than a desire to find money for the Villiers family. Large numbers of other patents were granted them, with some excuse of being, at least at the outset, for the public advantage, but all of them tainted with the slime of favouritism, though Buckingham himself gained nothing in the process.

Another patent, not strictly to be termed a monopoly, brought even greater obloquy on the government. There was as good reason then as now for keeping inns under special supervision, and in 1617 a project of one of Buckingham's kinsmen, Sir Giles Mompesson, having been adopted, all innkeepers were forced to receive a licence from certain commissioners, of whom Mompesson was one, which licences would be forfeited through overcharge or ill-treatment of travellers. A somewhat similar method was adopted with alehouses, Christopher Villiers and other courtiers receiving a share of the forfeitures expected to accrue. The mischief was that the commissioners had an interest in gathering in fines and forfeitures, but had no local knowledge to enable them to deal justly with the keepers of inns and alehouses, even if they had had any interest in so doing; and several cases were adduced in which the agents of the commissioners had extorted undue payments.

When therefore the Commons turned to domestic affairs, it was on these patents that they fell. They found a leader in Coke, who had been elected a member, and, being always prepared to magnify his own office, urged the House to limit the powers of the Crown to interfere with the ordinary process of law. Sir Francis Michell, as a Middlesex justice, had supported the patent for alehouses, and the House, without hearing his defence, ordered him to the Tower. Mompesson was thereupon ordered into custody. He, however, succeeded in making his escape, and the Commons discovered that they had no right to inflict punishment without the consent of the House of Lords. These intemperate proceedings show that the Commons were hardly fit to be trusted with unchecked power. Buckingham, at all events, was thoroughly frightened, and explained that if anything had gone wrong it was all the fault of the referees—the Privy Councillors who had recommended the adoption of the patents, on the ground either of legality or of the public interest. James had naturally no wish to see his chief officers brought to book for advice given by them in the exercise of their duty as councillors; but he soon found that he could only gain his point by throwing over less important personages, and in this view he acted with the concurrence of Buckingham, now under the influence of Williams, the worldly-wise Dean of Westminster. On March 13, 1621, Buckingham announced his

readiness to join in punishing even his own brothers if they had been the cause of grievance to the Commonwealth. The Commons, on this, diverted from any further attack on himself, prepared to deal with Michell and Mompesson by way of impeachment, and turned their attention to a bill drawn up by Coke with the object of securing that the rules under which patents of monopoly were to be granted should be interpreted by the judges, and not by the Council.

Among the names of the referees, that of Bacon, now Lord Chancellor and Earl of St Albans, was conspicuous. When therefore a charge of bribery in the execution of his office was brought against him, it seemed at first as if those who brought it merely sought to punish him in an indirect way for his share in the enforcement of the monopolies. Other charges, however, followed in quick succession, and were referred by the Commons to the consideration of the Lords. In the end Bacon acknowledged himself to have been guilty of corruption, and was sentenced to deprivation of office together with fine and imprisonment, the latter two penalties being ultimately remitted by the King. Subsequent investigation makes it almost certain that Bacon committed corrupt acts without corrupt intention; but it is impossible to blame the Commons for accusing him or the Lords for sentencing him.

Bacon's case was, indeed, but an indication of a widely-spread disease. The royal, or, as we should now say, the public revenue, was insufficient for the due payment of services rendered. Add to this that there was no line drawn between the public and the private revenue of the Crown, and it is obvious that not only officials who ought to have been paid in proportion to their services, but also Court favourites, who, if they rendered services at all, rendered them only to the King in his individual capacity, would seek to benefit themselves in irregular ways. Though the system did not originate with James, it undoubtedly flourished under him with increased vigour. Persons in office expected to be paid by those who sought their aid; and courtiers were not remiss in following suit. Occasionally, as when Suffolk was sentenced in the Star Chamber, an attempt was made to distinguish between legitimate gratuities and illegitimate bribery; but the attempt could not properly be crowned with success, especially as James was himself an offender in the matter. It is true that in 1611, when James created the Order of Baronets, and required the payment of £1080 from each recipient of the new title, he at first expended that sum upon the maintenance of cavalry in Ireland and afterwards took care to return the money to each payer; but in 1618 he openly sold four earldoms, and in 1620 he took, either for himself or for Buckingham, £20,000 from Chief Justice Montague for creating him a Viscount and conferring on him the Lord Treasurer's staff.

The causes which had wrecked Bacon's career had also frustrated the success of his political expectations. Looking as he did to the Crown

to be a leader in reform of everything, he had sunk into the position of a mere courtier, because James had no leadership in him. The House of Commons, feeling that the reins were slackly held, was taking the bit between its teeth. In the case of Mompesson, and then in that of Bacon himself, it had brought its charges before the House of Lords, and had thereby revived the system of impeachment, dormant since the reign of Henry VI. There was as yet no direct claim put forward to assert the responsibility of ministers of the Crown for political action—that had been for the time abandoned, when the idea of questioning the referees had been laid aside—but the claim to accuse before the Lords ministers who had been guilty of misconduct or crime had been successfully asserted, and it was no long step from the one to the other. Yet how unfit the House of Commons was to exercise supreme power appeared when, in May, 1621, it ventured to sentence a certain Floyd to be three times pilloried, ride on a bare-backed horse with his face to the tail, and pay a fine of £1000, simply because, being a Roman Catholic, he was said to have spoken contemptuously of the Elector Palatine and his wife. Here again James intervened, and the Commons had to carry their complaint before the Lords, who passed a still more cruel sentence on the unfortunate man. From a constitutional point of view, the result of the session at this stage was that, while the Commons were unable to secure for themselves the right of inflicting punishment, they actually secured it for the two Houses in cooperation.

When the usual time for the close of the session arrived James had come to no definite conclusion on the subject of the Palatinate. His negotiation with the King of Denmark had failed, because Christian IV—though ready to join England in an active alliance for the support of the Palatinate—had no patience with James' continued trust in negotiation unbacked by military force. James, who persisted in renewing his attempt to turn aside the Emperor's wrath by argument, despatched Digby to Vienna, and commanded the adjournment of the House, in the hope that it might be ready to take warlike measures should Digby's report prove unsatisfactory. On June 4, in the last sitting before the adjournment, a declaration was moved in the Commons to the effect that, if the negotiation failed, they would be ready to the uttermost of their powers both with their lives and fortunes to assist the King, so that he might "be able to do that by his sword which, by peaceable courses, shall not be effected." Waving their hats in the air the members accepted the declaration with resolute shouts. But James did not use his opportunities well. In the course of the same month he ordered the arrest of Southampton and two members of the House of Commons: and, though he had it given out that they were not under restraint for anything done by them in Parliament, it was difficult to persuade his subjects of the truth of the

explanation. The arrest of Essex followed. Then the King placed the Great Seal in the hands of Williams, whom he also made Bishop of Lincoln. If Williams' character had been equal to his parts he would have been a great statesman. At all events he had the sense in which James was wholly wanting—the sense of what the state of public opinion would allow a government to do with impunity. The first-fruits of his advancement was the liberation of the imprisoned members, and of other prisoners who had been in durance for a longer time. About the same time Cranfield became Lord Treasurer. For the first time in the reign the finances were placed under the control of an expert. If James could save the Palatinate by diplomacy, all might yet be well.

Unfortunately for James, neither the passions nor interests of the German Princes were likely to bring about such a consummation. The Emperor Ferdinand desired to establish the authority of his Crown and his religion in Germany, while the Duke of Bavaria craved Frederick's electorate and at least part of his territory. When Parliament met in November, it was to hear from Digby's lips that the Upper Palatinate had been overrun by Tilly and that the Lower was in danger. Digby was himself a warm supporter of the policy of an understanding with the Catholic Powers—a warm opponent of the policy which assumed that Protestant States must in every case be in the right. Yet he knew what James never perceived—that a Power which aims at an understanding with others must begin by inspiring respect; and he proposed that, as winter was coming on, sufficient money should be voted to pay the Elector's troops in the Lower Palatinate under Mansfeld, including the English volunteers who garrisoned the fortified towns. In this way only would it be possible to hinder these troops from plundering in the neighbouring Catholic States, and thus irritating the enemy into hostile resolutions. Before the summer arrived, there would be time enough to obtain from the Emperor a final declaration of his intentions as to Frederick's retention of his hereditary dominions. As to his retention of Bohemia there could be no longer any question.

The Commons voted that the supply required should be granted; but they coupled their vote with a petition complaining that the King of Spain was aiming at universal monarchy, and that, in England itself, the expectation of the Spanish marriage and the favour of the Spanish ambassador had elated the spirits of the recusants. They therefore asked that the King should pursue a purely Protestant policy at home and abroad, enforce the necessary Acts, make war upon Spain, and marry the Prince to one of his own religion. Against this petition James protested as derogatory to his rights; and the Commons admitted that they had no power to control him, especially as regarded the marriage of his son, but insisted on their right to debate all matters relating to the welfare of the kingdom, and to bring their sentiments humbly before the throne, without demanding an answer. No assertion by James that

they had only the right of debating questions on which he asked their opinion could drive them from their position, and they finally embodied their claim in a protestation, "that the liberties, franchises, privileges and jurisdictions of Parliament are the ancient and undoubted birthright and inheritance of the subjects of England; and that the arduous and urgent affairs concerning the King, state and defence of the realm and of the Church of England, and the making and maintenance of laws, and redress of grievances, are proper subjects and matter of counsel and debate in Parliament." They further declared that the Commons had liberty to treat of such matters in what order they pleased and that every member had freedom from all impeachment, imprisonment, and molestation other than by the censure of the House itself. The King's reply was to tear the Protestation out of the Journal Book, and to dissolve Parliament even at the expense of forgoing the subsidy which the Commons had resolved to grant. Coke and two other members of the House were imprisoned for some months, and Pym, who had taken a leading part in the opposition, was ordered into confinement in his own house.

The dissolution of James' third Parliament was a triumph for Gondomar. Without a Parliament behind him, James' plan of mediating between the Powers in collision on the Continent had been reduced to a shadow. A benevolence, to which he again had recourse, produced no more than £88,000—a sum that, if it had come in at once instead of in dribblets, would have gone but a little way to meet the expenses of war. In the meantime, the blow which James dreaded had fallen upon his son-in-law. Mansfeld, receiving no money from England, was under the necessity of plundering the neighbours of the Palatinate, and the excuse was eagerly seized by the armies which sought his downfall. In spite of fresh English embassies pleading for time to negotiate, the armies of Frederick were defeated, and the Lower Palatinate was overrun before the summer of 1622 had far advanced. Three fortresses only, Heidelberg, Mannheim, and Frankenthal, held out for the Elector. So completely had James played his part in bringing about the ruin of his own policy, that Gondomar had been able to leave England in May. safe in the consciousness that nothing that England could now do would rob the Catholic Powers of their supremacy on the Continent.

Even then, James could not see how complete his failure was. Starting from the simple proposition that both the Upper and the Lower Palatinate were the property of his son-in-law, and that everyone with a sense of justice ought to be ready to give effect to claims so well-founded, he persisted in believing that the Spanish government of Philip IV would not only recognise that his demands were just, but would also consent to renounce the solidarity of its religious and political interests with those of the Emperor, in order to restore to his inheritance a Prince who was the enemy of the religion professed by

every Spaniard, and whose only merit was that he had married the daughter of an English King. Seeing foreign policy, not as it really was, but as he wished it to be, James sent Digby—now Earl of Bristol—back to Madrid to complete the arrangements for the Spanish marriage (March, 1622). Nor was it only over James himself that Gondomar had cast his net. Prince Charles, now in his twenty-second year, had developed slowly. Shy and constrained in his intercourse with others, he had fallen entirely under the influence of Buckingham, who at this time shared the King's belief that Philip could not give his sister in marriage to the Prince of Wales without restoring the inheritance of Frederick and Elizabeth. During the last weeks of Gondomar's stay Buckingham had been on terms of close intimacy with him; and it can hardly have been without his approval that Charles had promised to come in person to Madrid incognito, should the ambassador advise him to do so.

There is no doubt that the Spanish government at this time desired to effect the marriage, if only to avert the danger of war with England. Yet it was morally impossible to assure James of the results which he expected from the marriage. The invaders of the Palatinate could not be held back. Heidelberg surrendered in September, 1622; Mannheim in November. The news of the first disaster brought about the mission of Endymion Porter to summon the King of Spain to obtain the restitution of Heidelberg within seventy days, and to engage to take the field against the Emperor, if he refused to make peace on terms agreed on by Spain and England. Buckingham, with the Prince in his train, threw himself on the side which was in favour of warlike measures.

Before Porter left England, the control of Spanish affairs had fallen into the hands of Olivares, a minister anxious to stave off financial ruin by keeping, if possible, out of war, and yet resolved to do nothing derogatory to Spain's position as a great—perhaps still the greatest—of the Catholic Powers. His position was moreover hampered by a declaration of the Infanta to her brother that she would never marry a heretic, and by Philip's consequent resolution that the marriage must be broken off in such a way as to give no offence to James. Porter therefore could but carry back a dilatory answer in regard to the Palatinate. At the same time more stringent demands were made in regard to the marriage articles; and these were accepted by James and his son on January, 1623. If Philip took no step to reveal his determination to break off the marriage, it was doubtless because Porter had brought a secret message revealing Charles' wish to come to Madrid in person, such a message being in the eyes of the Spanish ministers equivalent to an offer to change his religion: in which case, the repugnance of the Infanta to the marriage would be readily overcome.

By Buckingham, and also by Charles, whose irresolute mind had surrendered itself absolutely into the keeping of the strong-willed favourite, the proposed visit to Madrid was regarded from a very different

point of view. The visit would, they thought, be a personal compliment to Philip, which would impose on him an obligation to effect the restoration of the Palatinate. It was the misfortune of these two youths not only to subordinate political to personal considerations, but to imagine that others would do the same. Thus, when in March, 1623, they arrived in Spain, they were surprised to find difficulties thrown in their way. Some time elapsed before the papal dispensation for the marriage was obtained; and when it arrived it was clogged by a condition that, before it was handed over, Philip must swear that Charles and his father would fulfil the articles inserted in the marriage treaty to protect the religious liberty of English Catholics. James, indeed, after some hesitation swore to observe these articles; but Charles, annoyed at discovering that no binding engagement to reestablish Frederick in the Palatinate was to be had from Philip, left Spain in disgust in September. When he landed in England, he was received with every sign of popular joy—not so much in consequence of his own safety, as because he had not brought the Infanta with him.

Charles at once put pressure on the King, not merely to break off the marriage negotiations, but to declare war against Spain. Naturally, the old man hesitated to abandon the policy to which he had clung during so many years; but the logic of facts was against him as well as the petulant insistency of his favourite and his son. The Spanish alliance was one thing, and the restoration of the Palatinate was another, and there was no way possible by which the two could be combined. Step by step he yielded to the inevitable, till at last he was driven to summon Parliament; and Parliament, which met in February, 1624, at once recommended the dissolution of the treaty of the marriage and an attempt to recover the Palatinate. It was by this time obvious even to James that his double object was unattainable, and with a heavy heart he directed that effect should be given to the wishes of Parliament. Not only had his diplomacy broken down, but the policy behind that diplomacy. It was none the less a noble object that he had had in view—the object of smoothing away the differences arising from the great religious struggle of the last century and of bringing Catholic and Protestant governments to work together upon the lines of civil justice. But even if the scheme had not been in itself too far in advance of his age to have a chance of success, James was too deficient in skill or firmness to have averted its disastrous failure.

From that time onward the true ruler of England was Buckingham; and for the time being he saw his advantage in the cooperation of Parliament. He steered for war, not in the spirit of the statesman, but in the spirit of a rash youth eager to revenge the slights put on him, and careless of measuring his designs by the powers at his command. However warlike her sons might be, England was unorganised for military operations outside her own territory. Nor, even if such an

organisation could be improvised, were Englishmen habituated to the financial burdens by which alone such operations could be supported. Before the end of March Parliament had voted three subsidies and three fifteenths (about £300,000) for the defence of the realm, the securing of Ireland, the sending of assistance to the States of the United Provinces and other allies of His Majesty, and for the putting-out of a fleet to sea. The sum named was inadequate for these four purposes, especially if Buckingham construed liberally the vague mention of assistance to be given to allies other than the United Provinces. So far as domestic matters were concerned, the good understanding between him and the Powers bore fruit—on the one hand in the passing of the Monopoly Act, which confined the privilege of a monopoly to fourteen years in favour of those who had invented or introduced a new discovery; on the other hand, in the impeachment and punishment of Lord Treasurer Middlesex, on a charge of corruption, his real offence being his opposition to a war with Spain. So far as foreign affairs were concerned, the rift which led to a breach between King and Commons in the following year was beginning to be discernible. Buckingham, seeking for allies, aimed at a marriage between the Prince of Wales and Henrietta Maria, the sister of Louis XIII; whereas the Commons, though preferring a French to a Spanish alliance, would much rather have welcomed a Protestant lady as their future Queen. They were only to some extent reconciled to the prospect before them by a promise from Charles and James that no liberty of religion should be accorded to any Roman Catholics not of the Princess' own household. On the subject of the war, too, divergences of opinion soon revealed themselves. The Commons, regarding Spain as more powerful than she was, were eager for a war mainly naval and commerce-destroying, which would weaken Spain's financial resources and thus render her incapable of furnishing help to her continental allies; while Buckingham was eager not only to send forth the fleet with this object, but also to despatch a land expedition under Mansfeld to liberate the Palatinate in conjunction with the King of France. When Parliament was prorogued in May, it was understood that the Houses were to meet at the beginning of the winter to receive a communication from the government on the plans which would by that time have been matured, and to vote such supplies as might then seem necessary.

By that time Buckingham had discovered that he could not dispose of foreign governments at his pleasure. Louis XIII called Richelieu to his counsels, and through him refused his sister's hand, unless she were to take with her to her new home concessions to the English Catholics at least equal to those which had been promised to Spain. Buckingham, to save his house of cards from falling to pieces, persuaded James and Charles to throw over the promise made by them to Parliament; and in December the marriage treaty was ratified by James;

while Charles, with the counter-signature of a Secretary of State, ratified a secret engagement to grant religious liberty to the English Catholics as fully as had been promised in the Spanish treaty. That which—at least according to the notions of the present times—ought to have been accorded spontaneously was made a matter of obligation to a foreign Power, in the teeth of the ill-will of the English nation. Such humiliation brought with it a swift recompense. Louis XIII had promised to allow Mansfeld to pass through his territories with an English army on the way to the Palatinate, and to support him with a French contingent of 2000 horse. Partly through dread of the consequences of admitting so undisciplined a host, partly through his desire to divert the expedition to the relief of Breda, which was undergoing a siege by a Spanish army, the King of France retracted his promise, and Buckingham, having, in consequence of Charles' breach of promise in the matter of toleration, been unable to advise the summoning of Parliament, was driven to choose between sending Mansfeld through Dutch territory with his men unpaid and unprovided, and abandoning altogether the scheme of intervention in Germany on which he had set his heart. Being what he was, he preferred the former and more reckless course. In January, 1625, Mansfeld crossed the Channel at the head of 12,000 men. In a few weeks 9000 of that number were dead or invalided. Of the 2000 French horse only 200 made their appearance.

Never had an English government been more thoroughly discredited. James had shown himself incapable of making peace. Buckingham and Charles had shown themselves incapable of making war. On March 27 James died, and Charles and his favourite were left to bear the brunt of the struggle in which they had heedlessly engaged.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IRELAND, TO THE SETTLEMENT OF ULSTER.

Cut off by its position, but even more by the relapse of the greater part of its inhabitants into a state of semi-barbarism, from the general currents of European development, Ireland, which despite its insularity had done so much in the past for European civilisation, was to most Englishmen at the beginning of the sixteenth century a mere *terra incognita*. Quite recently it had, it is true, acquired a certain notoriety by its espousal of the claims of Lambert Simnel and Perkin Warbeck; French wines found their way into the country through Cork and Waterford; the long-established commercial relations between Dublin and Bristol still subsisted; Spanish traders landed their wares on Galway quay; the fame of St Patrick's purgatory attracted an occasional pilgrim from foreign lands; and of one Irish chieftain it was placed on record that he had accomplished the hazardous journey to Rome and back. But of those larger influences which were transforming the face of Europe politically, intellectually, and morally, Ireland knew nothing. The wave of the Renaissance expended its force without touching her shores.

Vast woods and impenetrable thickets—the lair of the wild boar and the wolf—interspersed with pathless bogs, covered the island, rendering communication with the interior dangerous and difficult, and preventing that political development which trade and intercourse with other nations can alone promote.

Of the three-quarters of a million of inhabitants, which by a rough estimate then composed the population of Ireland, two-thirds at least led a wild and half-nomadic existence. Possessing no sense of national unity beyond the narrow limits of the several clans to which they belonged, acknowledging no law outside the customs of their tribe, subsisting almost entirely on the produce of their herds and the spoils of the chase, and finding in their large frieze mantles a sufficient protection against the inclemency of the weather and one relieving them from the necessity of building houses for themselves, they had little in their general mode of life to distinguish them from their Celtic ancestors.

Three centuries and more had passed away since the Anglo-Normans had set foot in the country. The marks of their invasion were everywhere visible—in the better cultivated district of the *Pale*, where they had obtained a firm hold of the land, in their castles scattered up and down the country, and in the beauty of the ecclesiastical structures that their piety had raised. But conquerors and conquered had long since merged into one common race; and, if it was perhaps not literally true that the former had become *Hibernis ipsis Hiberniores*, there was in fact little difference either in language or in customs between them. Only in the four counties of Louth, Meath, Dublin, and Kildare, that comprised the *Pale*, were any signs of English authority visible: hence the saying that “they dwelt by west the law, which dwelt beyond the river of the Barrow.”

To preserve this last vestige of its dominion had been, in so far as it concerned itself with Ireland at all, the one object of the English Crown from the days of Richard II down to those of Henry VII. Acts of the most stringent description had been passed to prevent the assimilation of the two races; threats of confiscation had been hurled against the degenerate English nobles unless they abandoned their pestiferous customs of coyne and livery; the aid of Rome had been solicited, and the Church had thundered her anathema against the rebellious Irish. But all to no effect. Year by year the position of the Palemen became more precarious. Worse off in many respects than the wild Irish, from whose inroads they were compelled to purchase an uncertain immunity by the payment of heavy black rents, they seemed to exist on sufferance only because it suited the policy of the dominant house of Kildare to make use of the royal authority in its feuds with the Butlers and O'Neills. In order to remedy this condition of things, Henry VII had authorised his deputy Sir Edward Poynings in 1494 to consent to a law restraining the freedom of the Irish Parliament and subjecting its legislation to the sanction of the Privy Council. But the remedy hardly touched the disease. Before long affairs drifted back into their old channel; and how long Ireland might have continued an object of more or less indifference to England it is impossible to say, had not the political consequences of Henry VIII's divorce rendered active intervention there necessary.

Perhaps in no domain had the antagonism between the two races been attended with more peculiar results than in that of the Church. Despite the efforts of the Synod of Cashel to secure conformity in doctrine and ritual, the Irish had never entirely abandoned their own primitive form of Church government. And this for two reasons. First, because, being of indigenous origin, it had grafted itself permanently on the clan system; and secondly, because the Church of Rome by associating herself closely with the policy of the invaders had failed to gain the sympathy of the natives. Of course, as the power of the Crown in Ireland grew, so also grew the influence of the Roman Church. But though pushed

into the background, the old Church, if we may venture so to call her, never completely lost her hold on the people, and with the revival of Celtic ideas in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries her influence became more pronounced. Still, the consequences were not so fatal for the Church as they had proved for the State. Naturally, the secular clergy lost heavily in the contest, notwithstanding the severe enactments by which they sought to exclude Irishmen from their cures and benefices. But, wherever monasticism had firmly established itself, there the Church managed to hold her own, albeit Irish in lieu of English hands now trimmed the lamp that had been lit at Rome. Nevertheless it was hardly to be expected, that in a country so much the prey of civil discord, where the plundering of an abbey or the burning of a cathedral was a common incident of tribal warfare, the feeling of religion should be anything but superficial. And there is every reason to believe that the picture drawn by a contemporary describes accurately enough the state of degradation into which the Church in Ireland had fallen at the beginning of the sixteenth century:—"Some say, that the prelates of the Church and clergy are much cause of all the disorder of the land; for there is no archbishop, nor bishop, abbot, nor prior, parson, nor vicar, nor any other person of the Church, high or low, great or small, English or Irish, that useth to preach the word of God, saving the poor friars beggars."

The proceedings connected with Henry's divorce from Queen Katherine had hardly entered on their last and critical stage when signs of political complications likely to follow from an open breach with the Emperor Charles V began to show themselves in Ireland. James Fitzjohn Fitzgerald, eleventh Earl of Desmond, who, in order to strengthen his position in Munster against the MacCarthyies on the one side and the Butlers on the other, had lately been coquetting with Francis I, had seized the opportunity to open negotiations with the Emperor, promising in return for assistance to transfer his allegiance from the English to the Imperial Crown. This would have attracted little attention, had it not been that Charles, in the hope of creating embarrassments for Henry, had shown a willingness to entertain Desmond's proposals. And, though his death nipped the scheme before it had time to take any practical shape, his example had not been lost on others, and more than one Irish chieftain showed a readiness to follow in his footsteps. Thus the necessity of vigorous intervention in the affairs of Ireland was brought forcibly home to Henry. The Viceroy, Gerald, ninth Earl of Kildare, was accordingly summoned to London, and immediately on his arrival there clapped in the Tower. A report of his death, premature as it proved, was instantly followed by the rebellion of his son Thomas, Lord Offaly. Troops were despatched to Ireland; and on February 3, 1537, Earl Thomas and his five uncles, having been previously attainted, were hanged at Tyburn. The downfall of the House

of Kildare cleared the way for energetic action in Ireland. Already in the previous year a parliament professing, theoretically at any rate, to represent Ireland, had given its sanction to legislation bringing Ireland into line with England in ecclesiastical matters, and by confiscating the estates of habitual absentees had removed at least one great obstacle to a permanent settlement of the country. But the purely formal character of this Parliament's proceedings was too apparent to allow anyone to expect a sudden reformation; and it spoke well for Henry's appreciation of the difficulties of the task he had undertaken that, before proceeding further in the matter, he should have sought to obtain as much light as possible on the nature of the problems to be solved. With this object he ordered on July 31, 1537, the appointment of a Commission, presided over by Sir Anthony St Leger, "for the order and establishment to be taken and made touching the whole state of our land of Ireland, and all and every our affairs within the same, both for the reduction of the said land to a due civility and obedience and the advancement of the public weale of the same." The Commissioners, having collected information from every available quarter, completed their labours early in 1538; but it was only with the appointment of St Leger as Lord Deputy in the summer of 1540 that the scheme for the reformation of Ireland, as it was called, began to take practical shape.

Incidentally Henry's breach with Rome had the effect of attracting special attention to the so-called donation of Ireland to Henry II by Pope Adrian IV. The discussion to which the subject gave rise was not of a purely academic character. What one Pope had the power to grant, another Pope, it was argued, had the power to recall, and a disposition manifested itself in papal circles to give practical expression to this view of the question. To obviate this danger and to place the Crown's claims on an indisputable basis a Bill was prepared, conferring on Henry and his heirs the title of King of Ireland, and submitted to a parliament which met at Dublin on June 13, 1541. The Bill readily passed both Houses, and, having been read again "in playne Parliamente," received the royal assent on Saturday, June 18. This Act, though of comparatively little importance in itself, is useful as serving to mark the beginning of a new epoch in the history of Ireland. With it the long period of inaction came to a close, and a period of active intervention, leading to a final conquest and settlement of the country, began. It was the first step towards what was called the "recovery" of Ireland. Starting at this point, it will be the object of the present chapter to sketch in broad outlines the history of this "recovery" down to the eve of the great rebellion, and to show how a policy in its inception essentially conciliatory gradually and, to all appearance, inevitably developed into one of a directly opposite tendency.

On being informed that parliament had conferred on him the title of King of Ireland, Henry remarked with much shrewdness that it

behaved his good subjects in that kingdom to see to it that his revenues were made "sufficient to maintain the state of the same." For the guidance of his Lord Deputy and Council he would have them observe that Irishmen "and the lands they occupy" were to be divided into two classes. First, those whom like O'Reilly, O'Conor and the Kavanaghs, "we take to lie so far upon the danger of our power, as you may easily bring them to any reasonable conditions": secondly, those like O'Donnell and O'Brien, whom "we think to lie so far from our strength there, as without a greater force it will be difficult to expel them out of their country and to keep and inhabit the same with such as we would thereunto appoint." Consequently, in entering into any agreements with them it was necessary to bear this fact in mind. For the first mentioned they might follow the precedent set in the case of Turlough O'Toole, who was to receive a grant of the district of Fercullen in tail male, by the service of one knight's fee and an annual rent of five marks on consenting to keep the castle of Powerscourt in good repair; to cause the inhabitants on his lands to use the English language and habits according to the best of his ability; to keep no kerne without permission; to levy no black rents, coyne, or livery; to preserve open the passes through the woods and mountains; to answer the King's writ and to attend the Deputy with his men whenever required to do so. As for those great lords whose countries lay remote from the seat of government, they were to try to persuade them, on condition of receiving full possession of their lands, to consent to the surrender of some town or stronghold in the same; to pay a certain subsidy or rent; to hold their lands by knight's service, "whereby their children shall be our wards, and after sue out their liveries"; and, finally, to agree to the suppression of such religious houses as might happen to be in their countries. "Nevertheless," added Henry, "because we be desirous once again to experiment their faiths, we would you should not overmuch press them in any vigorous sort, but only to persuade them discreetly, upon consideration that the lands they have be our proper inheritance, besides our right and title to the whole land, and what honour, quiet, benefit, and commodity, they shall have by such an end to be made with us, and what danger may come to them, if they embrace not this our especial grace showed unto them, to induce them gently to condescend to that, which shall be reasonably desired of them."

Such then were the lines on which Henry proposed to effect the recovery of Ireland and the reduction of the country to good order and civility; of transplantation and extirpation there was as yet not one word spoken or implied. "Sober ways, politic drifts, and amiable persuasions"—these were to be the means by which Irishmen were to be induced to abandon their barbarous life and to conform to the laws of England. Immediate success seemed likely to crown Henry's policy. One by one the Irish chieftains, from the Earl of Desmond in the south

to Con O'Neill in the north, came in and signed indentures of submission in which they promised for themselves and those under their authority to acknowledge Henry as their Sovereign Lord and King and Supreme Head of the Church in Ireland under Christ; to live conformably to the laws of England; to hold their lands as from the Crown, paying therefor an annual rent in the name of a subsidy; to renounce all black rents and illegal exactions; to attend Parliament personally whenever summoned to do so; to accompany the King or his deputy on all hostings; to keep the passes bordering on the English districts open; and to rebuild all ruined parish churches in the countries assigned to them. The terms of the indentures were somewhat varied, in order to meet particular circumstances. Those recited were those to which Con O'Neill bound himself. But in all cases the renunciation of the papal authority was made compulsory—"which," says Sir John Davis, "I conceive to be worth the noting, because, when the Irish had once resolved to obey the King, they made no scruple to renounce the Pope." Striking while the iron was hot, St Leger persuaded O'Neill, MacWilliam, and O'Brien to go to England; whereupon Henry was pleased to confer upon them the rank and title of Earls of Tyrone, Clanricarde, and Thomond respectively, granting them at the same time letters-patent of the countries claimed by them and bestowing on each of them a house and lands near Dublin for their entertainment during their attendance on parliament.

The problem seemed to have been solved. Ireland, so long the scene of bloodshed and anarchy, appeared at last to have found rest and to be on the point of entering upon an era of peace and prosperity. "If only this same may be continued but two descents, then is this land for ever reformed," ejaculated St Leger. "Thanks be to God," wrote Sir Thomas Cusack, "this land was never by our remembrance in so good case—no, nothing like, for honest obedience; and after that cometh the profit to the King's Majesty, if they continue in this quietness they be in at this instant." "We confess," testified the Earls of Desmond, Thomond, and Tyrone, and divers other Irish lords, who had come to Dublin to witness St Leger's departure, "there lives not any in Ireland, were he of the age of Nestor, who has seen this country in a more peaceful state." Knowing, as we do, how fallacious these hopes were to prove, and how far Ireland was from being actually won, it is worth while to enquire into the causes of the failure of Henry's policy.

In tracing the history of the relations between England and Ireland, and in endeavouring to account for that deeply-rooted antipathy on the part of the latter to the former, which has constantly frustrated every effort at conciliation, historians have naturally laid special emphasis on the fatal consequences of the wars of religion and extirpation waged by Elizabeth and her successors. But, though both circumstances have undoubtedly served to complicate the problem, and indeed to alter its entire complexion, they can hardly be regarded as adequate to explain the

failure of a policy which touched neither the land nor the religion of the Irish. The solution of the difficulty must be looked for in another direction. In 1541 Ireland presented an open field for constructive statesmanship. Theoretically, Henry's policy was neither ill-conceived nor ill-adapted to accomplish the object he had in view. Unfortunately it was impracticable. It was an attempt to solve a problem by ignoring the main factor in it. What Henry had to deal with was not individuals, but a system. To treat O'Donnell, O'Connor, O'Neill, and the rest of the Irish chiefs as proprietors of the lands in which they possessed only a life interest was altogether to mistake the nature of the problem that confronted him. Over nearly the whole of Ireland service and not land formed the basis of the social system. All those indentures of submission on which such store was set were in reality only so much waste parchment. Doubtless the intention was good. Doubtless O'Neill and the rest would gladly have converted their unstable life interests into firm feudal tenures; but this was precisely what they were unable to do. The mistake was a natural one. Henry did not see, or seeing he thought he could disregard, the difference between a feudal baron and the chief of a clan. The history of the next hundred years was to show that the life of the clan was something quite independent of the life of its chief. The latter might come and go, but nothing short of extirpation could put an end to the former. All that Henry's policy had the effect of doing was to open still wider the door for domestic intrigue within the circle of the clan itself. But this it was reserved for the future to reveal; for the present, when St Leger left Ireland in 1546, everything seemed to betoken clear and settled weather. The little cloud gathering over Leix and Offaly was too insignificant to disturb the equanimity even of the most sceptical.

Henry's activity in Ireland had not failed to attract the attention of the astute politician who occupied the chair of St Peter, Paul III. We have already seen how the construction placed by the Papacy on the so-called Donation of Adrian had been a main cause in bringing about the alteration of the royal title. But a new power had recently sprung into existence of which Paul did not fail to perceive the significance and which he proceeded to turn to instant account. The foundation of the Society of Jesus by Ignatius Loyola and its part in the movement known as the Counter-Reformation have already been discussed in a previous chapter of this work. Here it is sufficient to note that the foundation of the new Order was exactly contemporaneous with the viceroyalty of St Leger. In a letter addressed to Con O'Neill on April 24, 1541, Paul, after referring to the pitch of impiety to which Henry's contempt of God's honour had brought Ireland, announced his intention of taking that land under his own fatherly protection. To this end he had appointed John Codure and Alphonso Salmeron, the latter one of the earliest of Loyola's recruits and afterwards prominent

at the Council of Trent, to proceed thither to confirm the inhabitants in the true faith. Before the expedition could start Codure died, but his place was speedily filled by Pascal Brouet, and to them Francesco Zapata was added, as secretary. In the instructions given them they were commanded to be all things to all men, fighting the devil with his own weapons, chary in speaking, constant in good deeds, seeking to win souls by kindness rather than repel them by excessive reproofs of them; to avoid meddling with money, spending whatever they received in alms by the hands of others; and finally to correspond regularly and frequently with the Holy See. Quitting Rome on September 10, the three missionaries, after narrowly escaping imprisonment in France, reached the Court of James V of Scotland, as it would seem early in January of the following year. Receiving letters of commendation from him to O'Neill and other Irish princes they managed to gain the coast of Ulster in safety. The bleak and inhospitable aspect of the country, together with the wild and savage appearance of its inhabitants, struck a chill into their very souls. The ruined churches, the deserted cloisters, told their own story. Their piety and charity made some impression on the common people; but the knowledge that government had information of their arrival, and that the Irish chiefs were more likely to hand them over to St Leger than to listen to their ministrations, compelled them constantly to change their abode. After wandering about disconsolately for several weeks, and seeing little good likely to accrue from their efforts, they succeeded with difficulty in effecting their escape into Scotland. So ended the first Jesuit enterprise in Ireland. It was a complete failure. Almost twenty years were to elapse before a second attempt was made.

As Henry's conversion to Protestantism had been the result rather of political causes than of any such religious grievances as had brought about the religious revolt in Germany, so it was hardly to be expected that his innovations in religion should have borne any other character than that of a mere State transaction. A number of Acts were passed conferring on him the title of Supreme Head of the Church, diverting certain sources of revenue from the papal into the royal treasury, and sanctioning the suppression of religious houses. Beyond this nothing was attempted in Ireland. No doubt even so much was not accomplished without opposition; but the opposition was of a purely formal nature, entailing neither persecution nor martyrdom for conscience' sake. A few images were knocked down in some churches, and their places supplied by English translations of the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, and the Ten Commandments; a new form of confession was promulgated, in which the power of the Pope to grant absolution for sin was directly impugned; but the Mass still continued to be set forth in the Latin tongue, invocations to be addressed to the Virgin, and prayers to be offered up for the dead. Between the Archbishop of

Dublin, George Browne, who represented the extreme wing of the reforming party, and George Cromer, Archbishop of Armagh, who headed the opposition, probably the only essential article of difference was that of the Royal Supremacy. And even in this respect Cromer was prudent enough not to offer anything more than a sort of passive resistance. For the people generally the question of the spiritual supremacy was a matter of absolute indifference. O'Donnell, O'Neill, O'Brien, and the rest of the Irish chiefs had, as we have seen, made no scruple about renouncing allegiance to the Pope, or of accepting grants of conventual property. Their clansmen, even if they heard anything of the matter, neither cared nor understood anything at all about it. A reformation implies something to be reformed. But outside the Pale there was nothing worthy of being called a Church. To say that the Irish had relapsed into a state of heathenism is perhaps going too far. The tradition of a Christian belief still survived; but it was a lifeless, useless thing. What the Irish needed was not reformation or conversion, but, if we may employ modern phraseology, a religious revival. We shall have occasion to notice how this need was met, not by the properly constituted authorities of the State Church, but by the missionary enterprise of the priests. Perhaps in no other country in the world were the efforts of the Counter-Reformation productive of more important or lasting consequences than in Ireland.

As the reign of Henry VIII drew to a close, the little cloud of rebellion that had been gathering over the western borders of the Pale showed signs of bursting; and the son of Jane Seymour had hardly mounted his father's throne when Brian O'Connor and Gilpatrick O'More, the chiefs of two important clans occupying the eastern parts of what was subsequently known as the King's and Queen's counties, rose in arms. It is not always easy to offer a plausible reason for Irish insurrection—probably because a plausible reason does not always exist. But in this case sympathy with the exiled head of the House of Kildare and the disappointed ambition of Brian O'Connor, who had vainly hoped for terms as favourable as those accorded to O'Neill and O'Brien, evidently cooperated with a feeling of insecurity on O'Connor's part owing to the intrigues of his brother Cahir and of general dissatisfaction at the recent proceedings of government. The rebellion was speedily suppressed. Leix and Offaly were laid waste with fire and sword, and a settlement of the two countries was taken in hand. But the project adopted in 1551 of granting leases for twenty-one years to a number of gentlemen of the Pale and loyal natives proved a complete failure. The inducements offered the former were inadequate to tempt more than a very few to risk the hardships and dangers of what could only be regarded as the occupation of hostile territory. A proposal was made to convert the leaseholders into copyholders. But no definite progress was made till after the passing of an Act in Queen Mary's

reign, entitling the Crown to Leix and Offaly, erecting those countries into shire ground as Queen's County and King's County respectively, and authorising the Lord Deputy, the Earl of Sussex, "to give and grant to all and every their Majesties' subjects, English or Irish born...such several estates in fee simple, fee tail, leases for term of years, life or lives ...as for the more sure planting and strength of the counties with good subjects shall be thought unto his wisdom and discretion meet and convenient." Even then, owing to a fresh rebellion of the two clans, several more years elapsed before the Earl of Sussex found himself in a position to proceed with the plantation. In 1563–4, however, a number of grants *in capite*, averaging between three and four hundred acres each, were made to certain natives on whose loyalty it was thought reliance could be placed, and to some forty gentlemen belonging to the Pale. No distinction was made on account of religion, Catholics being equally eligible with Protestants; nor was there any clause in their patents preventing the employment of Irish on their estates, though the grantees were held responsible for the good behaviour of any Irish so employed and forbidden to intermarry with them.

The plantation struck root; but more than half-a-century passed away before the settlers could be said to be in tranquil possession of their lands. Eighteen several times during that period did the O'Mores and O'Conors try by force of arms to recover their independence, each attempt in turn being repressed with great loss of life and fresh confiscation of property. Of those estated by Sussex hardly any remained at the close of the sixteenth century. In 1609 both clans were so reduced that Lord Deputy Chichester proposed to remove them bodily into a corner of county Kerry. The transplantation was effected only with difficulty; and a year or two later it was found that a number of the clansmen had returned to their old haunts, living as ploughmen and labourers on lands they had once called their own. But their power was broken; and though one of them, Rory O'More, was destined to play a prominent part in the rebellion of 1641, they had long ceased to cause anxiety either to the government or the settlers. In 1622 a Commission appointed to enquire into the state of the plantation reported that "as it was well begun, so it hath prosperously continued, and is for the most part well built and peopled by the English, and a great strength to the country and ready for your Majesty's service and their own defence."

In no instance was the failure of Henry's Irish policy more apparent than in his dealings with the O'Neills of Tyrone. The O'Neills have always been one of the most powerful clans in Ireland. Apart from the territory directly occupied by them, comprising the modern counties of Armagh, Tyrone, and the greater part of Londonderry, they exercised an undefined supremacy over the MacMahous in Monaghan, the Maguires in Fermanagh, and the O'Cahans in the north of London-

derry; a branch from the original clan had established itself in county Antrim; and for years there had been a standing dispute with the O'Donnells of Tyrconnell as to the over-lordship of Inishowen. According to the agreement arrived at in 1543, Con O'Neill, in return for his acknowledgment of Henry's supremacy and consent to hold his lands, or more properly those of his clan, immediately from the Crown, had been created Earl of Tyrone with succession to his eldest son Matthew or Fedoragh, created Baron of Dungannon. The agreement, as we have observed, was regarded by the clan as invalid, inasmuch as Con had no power to surrender lands which did not belong to him. This was, however, not its only defect. Matthew, though Con's eldest son, was illegitimate. These two facts cooperated to upset the agreement.

Shortly after Henry's death the discontent which Con's action had created came to a point, the malcontents finding an able and determined leader in the person of Con's eldest legitimate son, Shane O'Neill. At the time when the agreement was signed Shane was a mere boy of fourteen; whence probably the preference shown for Matthew by government, which can hardly have been unaware of his illegitimacy. Shane had now attained to manhood, and he speedily let it be seen that he was determined by every means in his power to assert his position as first favourite of the clan. In 1551 the struggle between the rival parties attained such dimensions that government was obliged to intervene. But despite the assistance rendered to the Baron of Dungannon, Shane not merely managed to hold his own, but in 1557 had grown strong enough to expel his father and brother, who were obliged to seek safety in the Pale. His success inspired him with the hope of establishing his supremacy over the whole of Ulster; and, taking advantage of a tribal dispute that had arisen among his neighbours, the O'Donnells, he invaded Tyrconnell. But at Carriglea, near Strabane, he was surprised by Calvagh O'Donnell and his army routed. Con O'Neill was in consequence restored; but the clansmen remained firm to the chief of their choice, and the Earl was once more compelled to retire into the Pale, where he shortly afterwards died. Chance about the same time placed the Baron of Dungannon in Shane's power, and whether he was murdered or killed in combat is immaterial. Shane's hands were free.

Such was the position of affairs in Ulster shortly after Elizabeth ascended the throne. The question for her to decide was whether in the interests of peace and economy she would consent to recognise Shane as his father's legal successor, or whether, feeling herself bound in honour to uphold the agreement with Con, she would support the claims of Brian, the late Baron of Dungannon's eldest son. Considerations of economy triumphed. But Shane was no *roi fainéant*, and his determination not to surrender one iota of the power exercised by his predecessors over his urraghs or subordinate chiefs soon led to a breach between him and Elizabeth. In August, 1560, the Queen

revoked her decision in his favour and authorised the restoration of Brian. Preparations were accordingly made to reduce Shane by force; and in June, 1561, the Earl of Sussex invaded Tyrone. Failing, however, to inveigle Shane into giving battle, Sussex harried his country, and leaving a garrison in Armagh Cathedral retired. Shane, who had recently got possession of Calvagh O'Donnell and his wife, now professed his readiness to submit his cause personally to Elizabeth, but insisted on the withdrawal of the garrison from Armagh as an essential preliminary. To this the government refused to consent; and after some futile negotiation Shane, accompanied by the Earls of Kildare and Ormonde, repaired to England, arriving in London on January 4, 1562.

Two days later he submitted publicly to Elizabeth. Being interrogated as to his claims, he insisted that he was the eldest legitimate son of Con O'Neill, and was designated O'Neill by joint consent of the nobility and people. The surrender made by Con he maintained was invalid, "forasmuch as Con had no estate in that which he surrendered but for life, nor could surrender it without the consent of the nobility and people by whom he was elected to the honour of O'Neill." For the Crown it was argued that Matthew, the late Baron of Dungannon, and his son Brian claimed by letters-patent and not by legitimation, and that the agreement arrived at was by right of conquest. It was impossible to reconcile views so divergent; but, in the hope that time or accident might furnish a solution of the difficulty, Shane continued to be detained in London on one pretext and another. Early in April, however, it came to Cecil's ears that the Spanish ambassador, de Quadra, was intriguing with him, and that Shane and several of his retainers had been secretly attending mass at the Spanish embassy. A week or two later it was reported that Brian had been waylaid and murdered by order of Turlough Luineach O'Neill, Shane's cousin and tanist or successor presumptive to the chieftainship. Whether this "accident" had relieved the situation remained to be seen; but it was felt desirable to get rid of Shane at all costs. Accordingly, after renewing his professions of obedience, he was acknowledged actual captain of Tyrone, with a general reservation of the rights of Matthew's younger son, Hugh, afterwards Earl of Tyrone, and allowed to return home. Boasting of the diplomatic victory he had won, Shane no sooner found himself back in his own country than he at once resumed his project of making himself paramount in Ulster. Maguire and O'Reilly quickly succumbed before him, and, keeping a tight hold on his prisoner Calvagh O'Donnell, he directed his attack once more against Tyrconnell. Government interposed a feeble protest, reminding him of his promise to submit his differences to arbitration, and threatening force in case he did not comply. But the attempt of Sussex to put his threat in execution miscarried; and the government found itself forced to conclude peace with him at Drumcru on September 11, 1563, on what were practically his own terms.

Shortly afterwards Calvagh O'Donnell, whose powers of endurance had been broken by three years of fearful imprisonment, offered to surrender Lifford, to renounce his claims to the over-lordship of Inishowen and to pay a heavy ransom; whereupon he was set at liberty. It soon appeared that he had promised more than he was able, or perhaps intended, to perform. Shane, however, managed to storm Lifford and about the same time to capture Calvagh's son Con. Having thus attained his object in the west he soon afterwards directed his forces against the MacDonnells of the Isles, who had recently effected a settlement along the coasts of county Antrim. On May 2, 1565, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Scots near Ballycastle, taking among other prisoners James MacDonnell and his brother Sorley Boy. This victory placed Ulster practically at his feet. Still Elizabeth hesitated to act with decision, though Sir Henry Sidney, who had succeeded Sussex as Lord Deputy, emphatically endorsed his predecessor's opinion that nothing but force would suffice to lower Shane's pride; nor was it until she had satisfied herself through Sir Francis Knollys as to the situation being really critical that she reluctantly consented to draw the sword.

Meanwhile Shane, whose ambition had taken a higher flight in proportion to his success, was busily forming schemes of fresh aggrandisement. That he aimed at making himself master of the whole of Ireland it is impossible to assert with confidence. But it must be remembered that he was only thirty-six years of age, and that his success had hitherto been phenomenal. He was known to be intriguing with Mary Queen of Scots and the Earl of Argyll; and letters had been intercepted from him to Charles IX and the Cardinal of Lorraine, calling on them to assist him in expelling the English and promising for himself and his successors to become the humble subjects of the Crown of France. On August 3, 1566, he was proclaimed a traitor; and a month later a small English force under the command of Colonel Randolph effected a landing on the shores of Lough Foyle, where afterwards the city of Derry was built, with the object of cooperating from the rear with Sidney, who forthwith invaded Tyrone. Shane's country was laid waste with fire and sword, and his enemy Calvagh O'Donnell restored; but so far as material damage was concerned the expedition proved a failure. In fact, no sooner had Sidney withdrawn, than Shane began to concentrate his forces on the border of Tyrconnell. He was defeated by Randolph; but the death of the English commander and the subsequent withdrawal of the garrison at Derry again set his hands free. In May, 1567, he once more invaded Tyrconnell, but this time he was defeated and his army almost annihilated by the O'Donnells in the neighbourhood of Letterkenny. Riding for dear life, he succeeded in reaching his own country. For a moment he thought of appealing to Sidney for mercy with a rope round his neck; but finally he decided on trying to come to terms with the MacDonnells. Taking

his prisoner Sorley Boy with him, he made his way to Cushendun. Perhaps, if he could have conducted himself with moderation the Scots might have consented to a reconciliation. But in his wine cups he began to brawl, and was literally hacked in pieces by his enemies. His body “wrapped in a kerne’s old shirt” was flung into a pit near the place of his assassination, and his head “pickled in a pipkin” was sent to Sidney.

Still more serious were the troubles impending in the south and south-west. One day towards the latter end of January, 1561, there arrived at Cork, on a vessel coming from Bordeaux, a man of unpretentious appearance. Beyond the clothes in which he stood he apparently possessed nothing. His name, he would have told anyone who might have thought it worth while to ask, was David Wolfe, a native of the town of Limerick. Yet this same unpretentious-looking person, whom no one knew, was the bearer of a commission which entitled him to take precedence of every Bishop and Archbishop of the Church of Rome in Ireland. Nearly twenty years had passed away since Alphonso Salmeron and his two companions, despairing of converting the natives of Ulster, had abandoned the task committed to them by Paul III of saving Ireland to the Holy See. In the meantime, neither the occupant of St Peter’s chair nor the Supreme Head of the Church as by law appointed had displayed much interest in the spiritual welfare of the Irish. There had, indeed, been considerable shuffling of the cards among the rulers of the land. Catholic had succeeded Protestant, and Protestant Catholic, both in Church and State; but to most Irishmen it was a matter of perfect indifference whether Edward VI, or Mary, or Elizabeth sat on the throne, or whether George Browne, or George Dowdal, or Hugh Curwen claimed the right to direct their consciences. How indeed could it be otherwise, when more than half the country lay outside the control of the Crown; when two-thirds of the population could understand no other language but Irish; and when no attempt was made to translate the English service into the vernacular?

In 1560 the new Pope, Pius IV, in view of the fact that Elizabeth was beginning “to bear herself openly as a heretic,” conceived the project of trying to use Ireland as a stepping-stone towards the recovery of England. To this end he selected as his confidential emissary David Wolfe, a member of the Society of Jesus and an Irishman. His intention was to create Wolfe a Bishop and invest him with the dignity of papal Nuncio; but he yielded to the advice of Laynez, who had succeeded Loyola as General of the Order, and, with the view of reducing the dangers of his task, confined himself to conferring on him powers equal to those of Nuncio. The instructions given to Wolfe bade him use his influence with the Irish chiefs in forming a league for the defence of the Catholic faith, to make a careful survey of the Church and clergy in each diocese, and to take what measures he thought

best to propagate the faith and to prevent the spread of heresy. In his dealings with the people he was not to soil his hands with money, even in the shape of alms—finding in the salvation of souls the only spring and reward of all his actions. Should the glory of God and the interest of religion demand it, he was cheerfully to risk his life; but in this as in all other matters he was to be guided by the rules of Christian prudence and to avoid all foolish temerity.

Quitting Rome on August 11, 1560, Wolfe, after being arrested at Nantes as a Lutheran and losing all his baggage at sea, reached Cork, as we have seen, in safety on January 20, 1561. Having caused his arrival and the object of his mission to be announced with as little noise as possible, he was surprised in how short a time and from what remote parts the natives flocked to him in their anxiety to confess their sins and to obtain absolution for their irregular manner of life—“*super incestis matrimoniis*.” On undertaking a tour through the provinces of Munster and Connaught he was grieved to find everything relating to religion in the utmost state of disorder. Many of the Bishops had conformed and taken the oath of allegiance; the churches for the most part were merely heaps of ruins or devoted to secular purposes; and the clergy were more familiar with the use of temporal than with that of spiritual weapons. The cathedral of Tuam, which for three hundred years had served as a fortress for the Burkes, had recently been recovered by force of arms by Christopher Bodkin, the Archbishop, at great risk to his own life; but he, though a good man as the ways of the world went, had conformed. The cathedral church of Athenry was still used as a fortress by the gentry of the neighbourhood. Wolfe apparently at first made no attempt to visit Ulster, having probably little confidence in Shane O'Neill, whom he describes as “*crudele ed impio heretico*.” Leinster also, owing to the vigilance of government, was closed to him; and he was obliged to appoint one Thady Newman his deputy in that province.

But, though he was compelled to work in secret, the success of his mission was none the less assured. Before long fresh missionaries arrived, and if religion was perforce shorn of its splendour, the foundations of the Catholic faith were being none the less firmly laid in the devotion of the rising generation. The movement was warmly supported by Pius IV. In May, 1564, he issued a Bull—*Dum exquisita*—authorising the erection of Catholic colleges with the privileges of a university in Ireland. The idea betrayed considerable ignorance of the real state of affairs in that country. For, as Richard Creagh, the newly-consecrated Archbishop of Armagh (to whom with Wolfe the execution of the scheme was entrusted), pointed out, the English government, if unable to counteract the new propaganda, was perfectly capable of resisting any open attack on its authority such as was implied in the creation of a university. Meanwhile Salamanca, Douai, and Louvain, sufficed to meet the lack of a national training college. Each year, as it came, witnessed the

establishment of some new centre for the propagation of the faith ; and Munster before long was honeycombed by the Jesuits. At first there was little or no persecution ; but, as the government began to appreciate the danger with which it was menaced, the honour of adding to the number of those who for conscience' sake have willingly laid down their lives was not denied to the Irish mission.

One of the earliest and most influential of Father Wolfe's adherents was James Fitzmaurice Fitzgerald, cousin-german of Gerald, fifteenth and, since 1558, reigning Earl of Desmond. James' father, Maurice "of the burnings" as he was called, had rendered excellent service to his brother, Gerald's father, the fourteenth Earl, by "removing" out of his way his rival James, the thirteenth Earl. He had been rewarded by a grant of the district of Kerrykurrihy. But the friendly relations thus established between the two branches of the family had come to an end with the accession of Gerald, who evidently regarded his uncle as quite capable of playing the same trick on him as he had done on James ; and it was soon noted that they were at "hot wars" with one another. Their quarrel did not, however, prevent Gerald, who had already acquired the reputation of being a person of turbulent disposition, from pursuing the traditional policy of his house towards his neighbours, the Butlers. In 1560 a dispute arose between him and Thomas Butler, tenth Earl of Ormonde, as to the duty on wines unshipped at Youghal and Kinsale, and as to certain debateable lands on the river Suir, into which Desmond swore that Ormonde had entered by force. The dispute conducted in the usual Irish fashion, terminated for the time being in the defeat and capture of Desmond by Ormonde at the ford of Affane in February, 1565. Both Earls were summoned to England ; and, after with difficulty being brought to enter into recognizances of £20,000 each to abide by Elizabeth's decision in the matter, they were allowed to return home in January, 1566.

Early in the following year Sir Henry Sidney, being then Lord Deputy, visited Munster and delivered judgment in favour of Ormonde ; "whereat the Earl of Desmond did not a little stir and fell into some disallowable heats and passions." Fearing he would rebel, Sidney arrested him, and in the meanwhile, till the Queen's pleasure was known, appointed his brother, Sir John, Captain of Desmond. Shortly afterwards Sidney left Ireland. During his absence the Lords Justices, Weston and Fitzwilliam, acting on instructions from England, inveigled Sir John to Dublin, and, having got him in their hands, shipped him and his brother the Earl off to England, where they were promptly placed in the Tower. The arrest of Sir John was, as Sidney remarked, a fatal mistake, inasmuch as it made James Fitzmaurice practically master of the situation in Munster. That the latter was already cooperating with the Jesuits there can be hardly any doubt ; but it was not until he heard that Sidney had returned to Ireland in

September, 1568, without bringing with him either the Earl or his brother, that he openly assumed the position of leader of the Munster Geraldines.

The blessing of the Church rested upon him. In February, 1569, Maurice MacGibbon, titular Archbishop of Cashel, escorted with solemn pomp by Fitzmaurice from Cashel to the sea, sailed from Ireland as the accredited agent of the southern confederates to the Court of Spain and the Vatican. They had charged him with the commission of imploring his Holiness to take their afflicted island under his special protection and of offering to acknowledge as their legitimate sovereign any Catholic Prince of the royal House of Spain or Burgundy whom Philip might appoint for that purpose.

A few months after his departure Fitzmaurice raised the standard of rebellion. It is unreasonable to question his sincerity in giving a religious colouring to the war, though there was perhaps some truth in the Countess of Desmond's assertion that he had rebelled in order to bring her husband into further displeasure, and to usurp all his inheritance "by the example of his father." Probably both motives cooperated. His policy evidently was to build up a strong anti-English and Catholic party, and by constituting himself its head, to render an alliance with him an object of importance to the Catholic Powers of Europe. The adhesion of Sir Edmund and Sir Edward Butler, brothers of the Earl of Ormonde, who had their own grievances, greatly strengthened him. In June he invaded Kerrykurrihy, and having stormed the castle-abbey of Tracton, sat down before Cork, promising the mayor and corporation never to depart until they agreed to "abolish out of that city that old heresy newly raised and invented." By the time Sidney could take the field against him, towards the latter end of July, the flame of the rebellion had spread as far eastward as Kilkenny. But it soon appeared of what unstable material the confederacy was composed.

By the exertions of the Earl of Ormonde, the Butlers were detached from the alliance. Their example was followed by Sir Thomas of Desmond, the Earl's half-brother, and Fitzmaurice, driven to depend upon his own resources, was ere long forced to seek shelter in the forest of Aharlow. Months passed away without any sign of assistance coming from abroad. Months lengthened into years, and still Fitzmaurice managed to evade every effort to capture him. Fearing he might escape to the Continent, Sir John Perrot at last consented to hold out an offer of pardon to him, and accordingly, on February 23, 1573, Fitzmaurice, "taking the point of the Lord President's sword next his heart, in token that he had received his life at the Queen's hands," submitted himself unto her mercy, swearing solemnly "to be and continue a true subject unto the Queen and Crown of England." So well did he act his part that Perrot almost believed he was likely to prove "a second St Paul."

The rebellion had failed. Nevertheless, the hopes of the Irish Catholics ran high. Hardly had the Massacre of St Bartholomew been perpetrated, when it was known to all the priests and friars in Connaught; whereat there was great rejoicing. Emissaries of the Pope swarmed everywhere, openly preaching sedition—those in Galway, it was said, carrying themselves as though the Pope were King of England and Ireland. Government retaliated by severe measures of repression, and on March 16, 1575, Edmund O'Donnell, a native of Limerick and a member of the Society of Jesus, was hanged and quartered at Cork for bringing letters from Gregory XIII to Fitzmaurice. But the difficulties and dangers of the Irish mission only served to stimulate the zeal and increase the number of its votaries. About a month after Fitzmaurice had submitted, the Earl of Desmond, having sworn to obey the laws of the realm both in Church and State, was allowed to return to Ireland, much to Perrot's indignation, who thought him "a man rather meet to keep Bedlam than to come to a new reformed country." His opinion was shared by the Irish government; and immediately on his arrival at Dublin Desmond was detained there on one pretext and another till the beginning of November, when he managed to escape into his own country. Within a month he, without actually committing any overt act of rebellion, effectually destroyed every trace of Perrot's government. Refusing to be warned, Sir William Fitzwilliam and the Earl of Ormonde invaded his country in August, 1574. Derrinlaur Castle was captured without much difficulty; and Desmond, recognising the futility of further resistance, submitted on September 2. But it was evident he was merely temporising. Only a week later he made over all his lands to Lord Dunboyne, Lord Power, and Sir John Fitzedmund Fitzgerald of Cloyne, in trust for himself and his wife during their joint lives, with provision for his daughters and remainder to his son James. Whether he was acting in conjunction with his cousin Fitzmaurice it is hard to say, though it may be suspected. Certain it is that in March of the following year Fitzmaurice, accompanied by his wife and family, and his relatives, the White Knight and the Seneschal of Imokilly, escaped to the Continent, whence, it was shrewdly conjectured, he would shortly return at the head of a Catholic army.

The situation was indeed critical. Catholicism was making the most alarming progress. Every year the natives were becoming more enthusiastic in the cause, and it was not without good reason that the English officials in Munster expressed their belief that a foreign invasion would be followed by a general insurrection. "The proud and undutiful inhabitants of this town," wrote Sir William Drury from Waterford in April, 1577, "are so cankered in Popery, undutiful to her Majesty, slandering the Gospel publicly as well this side the sea as beyond in England, that they fear not God nor man....Masses infinite they have in their several churches every morning, without any fear. I have spied

them, for I chanced to arrive last Sunday at 5 of the clock in the morning, and saw them resort out of the churches by heaps. This is shameful in a reformed city, but I judge them rather enemies than subjects." Drury's observations are confirmed by Edmund Tanner, Catholic Bishop of Cork, who later in the same year wrote that many of the nobility and inhabitants were being received into the bosom and unity of the Church. "And many more," he added, "will be reclaimed, if the present persecution and the deprivation of life, liberty and property prove not too strong for them."

The conquest of Ireland by Fitzmaurice was to be the grand consummation of all this preparation. Ireland won, was to be the stepping-stone to the recovery of England. Meanwhile Fitzmaurice himself, after failing to persuade either Catharine de' Medici or Philip II to intervene actively in Irish affairs, had gained the sympathy of Gregory XIII. The crown of Ireland, which had been declined for Henry III and Don John of Austria, was accepted by the Pope for his nephew, Giacomo Buoncampagni. A plan for the invasion of Ireland was soon on foot, the execution of which was entrusted to that notorious adventurer, Sir Thomas Stukeley. Early in 1578 Stukeley sailed from Civita Vecchia with 800 men; but, putting in at Lisbon for repairs, he was persuaded to join his forces with those of Sebastian of Portugal against Abdulmelek, Emperor of Morocco, and a few months later met his death on the fatal field of Alcazar. Undeterred by this disaster and encouraged by the presence and advice of Dr Nicholas Sanders, the author of that once famous book, *De origine et progressu Schismatis Anglicani*, who had thrown himself heart and soul into the enterprise and accompanied him as papal Legate, Fitzmaurice, having collected together with much difficulty a motley crew of Spaniards, Italians, Portuguese, Flemings, refugee Irish, and renegade English, set sail from Ferrol in Galicia on June 17, 1579. A month later he landed on the coast of Kerry, and at once began to entrench himself in Smerwick harbour, pending the arrival of reinforcements. His first business was to publish a proclamation justifying his expedition and calling upon the Irish to rise in defence of their religious liberties. He then proceeded on a pilgrimage to Holy Cross Abbey in Tipperary. On his way thither he was killed in a petty skirmish with the Burkes of Castleconnell.

His death threatened the collapse of the whole enterprise. But, whether moved by Fitzmaurice's death or by the eloquence of Sanders, the Earl of Desmond, after some hesitation, now assumed the position which circumstances and his own ambition marked out for him of head of the rebellion. He was proclaimed a traitor on November 2; and, finding himself irretrievably committed, he attacked and sacked Youghal. The end of the month was near before Sir William Pelham and the Earl of Ormonde could take the field against him. But their vengeance was swift and terrible. During the winter castle after castle belonging to

him or his allies was captured and went up in flames. The sword, famine, and pestilence thinned the ranks of his retainers; and, as month after month went by with nothing but promises of assistance from abroad, their hearts sank within them, and they openly cursed the Earl, his brother John, and Dr Sanders for the evil that had befallen them.

The flame of the rebellion seemed to be expiring, when the unexpected rising of James Eustace, Viscount Baltinglas, added fresh fuel to the fire. Did Baltinglas stand alone, or was his rising to be taken as a sign that the nobility of the Pale, Catholics almost to a man and not without grievances of their own, were beginning to move? Sanders and Sir John of Desmond flew to join him. On August 12, 1580, the new Deputy, Arthur Lord Grey de Wilton, landed at Dublin. A fortnight later he attacked Baltinglas and his ally, Fiagh MacHugh O'Byrne, at Glenmalure in county Wicklow, but was repulsed with heavy loss.

The effect of his defeat was tremendous. For a moment it seemed as if a general rebellion was imminent. In the midst of the excitement came the news that the long-expected Spaniards had succeeded in effecting a landing on the coast of Kerry, where they had been instantly joined by the Earl, his brother John, Sanders, and Baltinglas. It was an anxious time for every English official, especially for Grey, whose foolhardiness had been chiefly responsible for the crisis. But the feeling of consternation passed away, when it was found that Ormonde was quite capable of holding his own in Munster, and that the northern chieftains showed no sign of using the opportunity to strike a blow for themselves. Towards the end of October Grey marched to Ormonde's assistance. The invaders had entrenched themselves on a narrow slip of land jutting out into the bay of Smerwick; before them lay the English army, behind them the English fleet, cutting off their retreat by sea. On November 8, Grey opened his batteries: two days later the fort surrendered, and 600 men composing the garrison were put to the sword. The back of the rebellion was broken. Early in the following year, 1581, Dr Sanders died at Clonlish, worn out with disappointment and disease. A few months later Baltinglas escaped to the Continent. His ally, Fiagh MacHugh, having submitted, was pardoned. Before the year was out, the body of Sir John of Desmond was dangling over the gates of Cork. Only the Earl of Desmond remained, and for him there was no hope. At last, after many hairbreadth escapes, he too was captured and put to death on November 11, 1583, exactly three years after the tragedy at Fort del Ore. But long before that time the war had lost the character given to it by Fitzmaurice and Sanders, and had become one of extirpation pure and simple.

The death of the Earl of Desmond, his subsequent attainder, and that of his principal adherents placed at the disposal of the English

government about half a million acres of some of the most fertile soil in Munster. These lands it was proposed to plant with English colonists. The opportunity seemed a favourable one. Many of the natives had fallen by the sword: infinitely more had perished from famine and pestilence. It was calculated that in 1582 at least 30,000 men, women, and children had died within half a year, chiefly of starvation. But it was just this fact that seemed to promise well for the success of the plantation. In the case of Leix and Offaly every inch of soil had to be contested by the colonists. Here, on the other hand, was a wide stretch of country providentially, as it seemed, cleared for the reception of the new settlers. Much valuable time was lost before any progress could be made with the plantation, owing to the necessity of taking an approximate survey of the extent and quality of the lands at the disposal of the Crown; and it was not until the beginning of 1586 that "a plot of her Majesty's offers for the peopling of Munster" was published, and letters were addressed "to the younger houses of gentlemen" pointing out what a benefit it would be to them to obtain lands on such easy conditions as were set down in the plot, "and to have the manrode of so many families, and the disposing of so many good holdings," being "a thing fit for gentlemen of good behaviour and credit, and not for any man of inferior calling." Even then there were many obstacles to be overcome before any actual progress could be made with the plantation—a more accurate survey to be undertaken, claims of alleged freeholders to be disposed of, alterations to be made in the "plot" itself, etc.

At last, however, on June 27, 1586, the Queen's consent having been obtained for the amended plot, a beginning was made with the plantation. According to the scheme as finally approved the land was to be allotted into parcels, known as seignories, of 12,000, 8000, 6000, and 4000 acres. In the case of a seignory of 12,000 acres every "gentleman undertaker" was to establish six farmers with 400 acres each, six freeholders with 300 acres each, forty-two copyholders with 100 acres each, and finally thirty-six families holding at least 1500 acres for mesne terms; and so proportionately for the smaller seignories. The allotments were to be held in free socage at a yearly rent, commencing from Michaelmas, 1590, of £33. 6s. 8d. in Cork, Tipperary, and Waterford; £62. 10s. in Limerick; £75 in Connello; and £100 in Kerry and Desmond for every entire seignory of 12,000 acres. Bogs and waste lands were not to be reckoned as part of the rented grounds; and, for the convenience of the undertakers they were to be allowed to plant in companies, so that the ties formed in England might not be severed in Ireland. No restrictions were made in point of religion, it being evidently assumed that none but Protestants would be admitted as undertakers; but it was stipulated that no undertaker should make alienation of his estate to the mere Irish, that the heads of every family planted should be of English birth, and that heirs female

should marry with none but persons born of English parents under pain of forfeiting their estates. Finally, it was ordered that no estate larger than 12,000 acres should be granted to any single undertaker; while, for the sake of mutual defence against the Irishry and invaders, each farmer and freeholder was to have in readiness one light horse with man and furniture, the principal undertakers each three horsemen and six footmen, and every copyholder furniture for one footman.

Among those who volunteered and were accepted as undertakers were some illustrious names—Raleigh, Norris, Hatton, Grenville, Spenser, Herbert, Bourchier. A number of would-be colonists came over in August, but finding no prospect of a speedy settlement returned to England. The situation was, indeed, very discouraging. Everybody knew that large quantities of land had escheated to the Crown; but where these lands precisely lay, what their exact scope was, how much of them was arable, how much waste, and how far they were encumbered with legal obligations of one sort or another, was largely a matter of guesswork. By the end of December, only 63,000 acres had been measured and “drawn into plots.” The undertakers began to grow impatient, for at this rate it was evident another year would elapse before they could be put in possession. In consequence of their remonstrances orders were issued in February, 1587, “to cause the said survey to be prosecuted out of hand in a more speedy and superficial sort”; which it was found might “be done without hindrance either to her Majesty or the undertakers; for that the chiefest of them have already by mutual accord between themselves agreed what special seignories or smaller parcels shall be allotted to each of them.”

Encouraged by the prospect of at last getting to work, several undertakers arrived in the spring of the same year, bringing with them a number of colonists, to whom they had promised to assign lands as farmers or freeholders. Everything was, however, left to individual enterprise: and so it happened that while a few undertakers, like Sir William Herbert, set about energetically planting their estates, others, like Sir Walter Raleigh, after inspecting their properties left the management of them to agents, or, like Sir Christopher Hatton, did not take the trouble to visit the country at all. The apathy of some naturally crippled the exertions of the more industrious undertakers. Nor was this the only danger that threatened the plantation. Owing to defective delimitation of their seignories, dissensions broke out among the undertakers themselves, of which the Irish were not slow to take advantage, by “pretending titles” to lands already in the possession of the Crown. Until these titles were disposed of and the limits of their seignories accurately defined, it was impossible for the undertakers to pass their patents or to estate their farmers and freeholders. Meanwhile, in order to recoup themselves for their losses, they were only too glad to accept as their tenants at rack-rents those

natives who, having fled before the storm, were flocking back to their old haunts. So manifold were the complaints that the government thought it necessary in 1589 to institute an enquiry into the progress of the plantation. The result of the enquiry was not encouraging. A few of the undertakers, it appeared, were struggling manfully to carry out the conditions of their grants; but the majority were merely trying to make as much profit out of their estates as possible, without any regard either to the Irish or the future welfare of the colony. "Our pretence," wrote Sir William Herbert, "in the enterprise of plantation was to establish in these parts, piety, justice, inhabitation and civility, with comfort and good example to the parts adjacent. Our drift now is, being here possessed of land, to extort, make the state of things turbulent, and live by prey and by pay." Nothing however was done to repair the mischief. Consequently when the storm came, and it was not long in coming, its violence almost swept away the plantation.

So far as the general situation of affairs in Ulster was concerned the death of Shane O'Neill failed to produce the effect which was confidently expected from it. His cousin Turlough, who as tanist, naturally succeeded him, wrote apologising for his "thoughtless" behaviour in accepting the dignity of O'Neill; but, as he displayed no intention of renouncing the honour, which according to his own account had been thrust upon him, it was not to be wondered at if little confidence was placed in his professions of loyalty. In another respect, however, Shane's death was not without important results. For hardly had Turlough succeeded to the chieftainship, when he at once reversed Shane's policy of aggression by opening negotiations for a reconciliation with his neighbours, the O'Donnells on the one side and the MacDonnells on the other. It seemed as if he was trying to do in the north what Fitzmaurice was doing in the south.

To meet this danger, the late Baron of Dungannon's younger son, Hugh, was in 1568 brought over from England, whither he had been taken in order to save him from the fate that had befallen his elder brother, Brian, and was installed as chief of that part of Tyrone which corresponds to the modern county of Armagh. The policy of creating a rival to Turlough promised to answer its purpose; and for several years the young Baron of Dungannon, as he was styled, loyally and at considerable risk to himself enacted the part of "buffer" between the Pale and Turlough. But, after the failure of Walter Devereux, Earl of Essex, to oust the Hebridean Scots from their settlements in Antrim by establishing an English colony in those parts, Dungannon, feeling himself unequally matched, inclined to accept Turlough's offer of a reconciliation by marrying one of the latter's daughters. The strong remonstrances of Sir William Drury, however, coupled with the belief that he would not have long to wait till Turlough's death made him undisputed master of Tyrone, prevented him from carrying out this

undertaking. And it was largely due to the attitude taken up by him at this time that the defeat of Lord Arthur Grey at Glenmalure in August, 1580, did not have the disastrous consequences which might have attended it in the north.

Dungannon's loyalty was not left unrewarded. He was given a troop of horse, with which he served in Munster against the Irish. At his own request he was admitted Earl of Tyrone, and sat as such in the Parliament which passed the Act for the attainder of the Earl of Desmond and his relatives. Further, in consequence of an arrangement arrived at between Sir John Perrot and Turlough, he was put in possession of that part of Tyrone which lies between the Blackwater and Mullaghcarn Mountain, on condition of paying an annual rent to Turlough of one thousand marks. Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that his loyalty was more a matter of policy than of good feeling; and the opinion was openly expressed that the State was raising up for itself in him a formidable enemy. On the other hand it is questionable if his ambition at this time extended further than supplanting Turlough as chief of the O'Neills. He had indeed succeeded in getting himself acknowledged as tanist or heir-apparent to the chieftainship; but the danger of a friendly understanding between him and Turlough had been obviated by Perrot's policy of rewarding his loyalty at the expense of his rival. For it was not to be expected that, having once been put in possession of Tyrone as far north as Mullaghcarn, he would ever consent to relax his hold of that territory. Ere long Turlough himself recognised the fact, and tried hard to withdraw from his bargain. Disputes arose as to aggressions on the one side and non-payment of rent on the other, which being conducted in the usual fashion terminated in the defeat of Tyrone at Carriglea on May 1, 1588, by the combined forces of Turlough and the O'Donnells.

The result was regarded with satisfaction by the government. "Nothing," remarked Perrot, "had done so much good in the north these nine years." Nevertheless, it was evident that despite his defeat Tyrone was gradually winning the upper hand. Most of the principal men in the north were known to be of his party. His only formidable enemies, Turlough's only trusty allies, were the O'Donnells. A domestic revolution in Tyrconnell about this time not only rendered Tyrone paramount in his own country, but gave a new direction to his ambition.

For some time past the O'Donnells of Tyrconnell had been split into two parties, forming what might be called an English and an anti-English faction. Calvagh, Shane's old enemy, had belonged to the English faction. Shortly before his death in 1566 he had called his clansmen round him and adjured them to remain steadfast in their loyalty to Elizabeth. Unfortunately, at the time of his death his eldest legitimate son, Con, was a prisoner in Shane's hands. The consequence was that Calvagh's half-brother, Sir Hugh, was elected chief. His election was

more or less a victory for the anti-English faction, though the opposition of Calvagh's sons, particularly of Hugh MacDiaganach, prevented him pursuing any decided policy and constrained him to keep on good terms with Turlough O'Neill. As, however, Tyrone's star began to rise, Sir Hugh seized the opportunity to improve his position by contracting his daughter, Joan, in marriage to him. Thereupon Sir John Perrot, whose policy of balancing parties in the north was threatened by such an alliance, took the determined step of causing Sir Hugh's eldest son, Hugh Roe, to be kidnapped and carried off to Dublin.

This was in 1587; the defeat of Tyrone six months later at Carriglea appeared to have restored affairs completely to the *status quo ante*. Early in 1591, however, Hugh Roe managed to escape from Dublin Castle, and after several hairbreadth escapes succeeded with the help of his brother-in-law, the Earl of Tyrone, in reaching Donegal in safety. His chief rival, Hugh MacDiaganach, having died a violent death in the meanwhile, Hugh Roe became a few months afterwards, through the resignation of his father, undisputed chief of the O'Donnells. He was then only about twenty years of age, but had already given evidence of possessing superior ability and great personal courage. Added to this he was, like Fitzmaurice, a man of genuine religious feeling and an active ally of the Jesuits in the work of the Counter-Reformation. It was not long before his influence began to make itself felt in Ulster politics. In May, 1593, Turlough Luineach, finding himself in danger of being crushed between him and Tyrone, consented to come to terms, and on being assured a life-interest in the Strabane district voluntarily surrendered the chieftainship to the latter.

Tyrone's election as O'Neill and his alliance with O'Donnell led to serious consequences, and constitute the principal factor in the history of Ireland during the last decade of Elizabeth's reign. The characters of the two men presented a remarkable contrast to each other—O'Donnell, bold, enterprising, rash, always acting on the offensive, disdainful of every weapon save the sword, and withal a sincere Roman Catholic; Tyrone, sly, cautious, timid, fertile in excuses, a past master in all the arts of diplomacy, and utterly indifferent to religion except in so far as it served to promote his political aims. One thing only they possessed in common—ambition to extend their power to its utmost limits. Of patriotism in the larger sense of the word it is doubtful whether they ever realised the meaning. Neither aspired to become the leader of a united Ireland; neither would have submitted to the other becoming such. For Tyrone, as for O'Donnell, the goal of his ambition would probably have been reached, could he have obtained the absolute control of his urraghs, or subordinate chiefs, and the liberty to do as he liked in his own country. But if the claim of Tyrone to exercise dominion over MacMahon, Maguire, O'Reilly, and the rest was deemed impermissible, how much more so was that of O'Donnell to

revive a suzerainty long years in abeyance over O'Connor Sligo and the Burkes of upper Mayo!

Hitherto, curiously enough, Connaught had enjoyed a quite exceptional degree of tranquillity. True, there had hardly been a year during which absolute peace reigned within its borders. The unruly sons of the Earl of Clanricarde, and latterly Sir Brian O'Rourke, chief of Leitrim, provided for that. But from constant warfare, such as had turned Munster into a howling desert, Connaught had been happily free.

This result was attributable, partly to the absence of any one dominant family like the O'Neills in Ulster; to the loyalty of the two Earls of Clanricarde and Thomond, and to the composition effected with the natives by Sir John Perrot in 1585; but principally to the rigorous government of the two very able presidents of Connaught, Sir Nicholas Malby and Sir Richard Bingham. The execution of Sir Brian O'Rourke in 1591 seemed to have destroyed the last elements of discord. "The estate of this realm," wrote the Lord Deputy, Sir William Fitzwilliam, towards the close of 1592, "is quiet, without any stir or known trouble in any part thereof."

Appearances, however, proved deceptive. Before long it was remarked that the Jesuits were carrying on a very active propaganda in Ulster, and that Brian Oge O'Rourke was beginning to walk in the footsteps of his father. There was little doubt in Bingham's mind that Tyrone and O'Donnell had a secret finger in the mischief. Only a month after the former had assumed the dignity of O'Neill, Hugh Maguire, chief of Fermanagh, inflicted a sharp defeat on Bingham at Tulske in county Roscommon. The movement had been dictated by O'Donnell. But, in ignorance of the fact, the government could think of nothing better than setting Tyrone to "recover" Maguire. Tyrone of course readily undertook the task, with the result that may be imagined. Thereupon, recognising the necessity of more active intervention, Sir Henry Bagenal, in September, invaded Fermanagh from the east. At Enniskillen he was joined by Tyrone with 200 horse and 600 foot, and on October 10 gained a "splendid victory" over Maguire at Belleek. There is not the slightest doubt that Tyrone had taken part most unwillingly in the fight, but he was able to point to a slight wound in his leg as an unequivocal sign of his loyalty. O'Donnell was more indifferent to appearances. For, having been ordered to close the fords of the Erne, he not only did nothing of the kind, but furnished Maguire and his cattle a safe retreat into Tyrconnell. The danger of the situation was apparent, the more so as O'Donnell began actively to intervene on Maguire's side. Unable, however, to act on the offensive, Fitzwilliam was driven to the feeble expedient of sending commissioners down to Dundalk to treat with Tyrone in March, 1594. But beyond eliciting from him a statement of his grievances and a promise to keep the peace until her Majesty's pleasure was known, the commissioners effected nothing.

Affairs were in this uncertain condition, when Fitzwilliam surrendered the sword of State to Sir William Russell on August 11. A day or two later Tyrone, to the astonishment of everybody, appeared of his own free will before the Council in Dublin. It was a magnificent and most successful *coup de théâtre*. But Russell had shortly to regret his folly in not seizing the opportunity to lay the performer by the heels. As the year drew to a close, disquieting rumours reached him that Spanish gold was circulating freely in Ulster. Reinforcements under Sir John Norris were advised as being on their way; but Tyrone had information of the fact, and struck the first blow by invading Cavan and Louth, which he burned up to the very walls of Drogheda, while O'Donnell took the same course in Connaught, sparing, it is said, "no one over fifteen years of age who could not speak Irish." When Norris landed at Waterford on May 4, 1595, the fort at the Blackwater had fallen, Longford Castle had been captured by O'Donnell, and Enniskillen recovered by Maguire. Before he could take the field, the capture of Sligo Castle had placed Connaught at the mercy of O'Donnell, who immediately availed himself of his advantage to set up an O'Connor Sligo, a MacWilliam, and a MacDermot of his own. On June 24 Tyrone was proclaimed a traitor; and a day or two afterwards the English army under Russell and Norris invaded his country. There was much fighting, but every effort to bring the rebel to an engagement failed; and, under pretext that her Majesty, before proceeding to extremities, "would be content to see what was in the traitor's heart and what he would offer," a suspension of hostilities was consented to, and commissioners were appointed to settle the terms of a pacification. In April, 1596, Maguire, O'Reilly, and several others went through the farce of submitting and receiving their pardons on their knees in the market-place of Dundalk. But Tyrone, O'Donnell, and O'Rourke were more difficult to come at. They refused absolutely to treat anywhere except in the open fields; and their demands for "free liberty of conscience" and local autonomy were rejected as impossible. Nevertheless, the pacification was signed on April 24.

The explanation of the comedy is not far to seek. For, while the negotiations were still in progress, a letter reached Tyrone from Philip II, congratulating him on his victories over the English, and promising to render him any assistance he might require. This letter Tyrone, with sublime impudence, submitted to the inspection of the Lord Deputy as a token of his *bona fides*, adding that in their reply to Philip he and O'Donnell had declined his proffered assistance on the ground that they had been again received into the favour of their own sovereign. The statement was a gross falsehood, as the letter actually sent by them and still preserved in the archives at Simancas proves; but it served its purpose of throwing dust in the eyes of the government and spinning out the time. Towards the end of August information reached Tyrone and O'Donnell that Spanish help might shortly be expected. The promised

expedition actually set sail from Lisbon on October 25; but on rounding Cape Finisterre it was struck by a violent storm, which scattered it in all directions and sent some fifteen or seventeen ships with all on board to the bottom. It was a cruel disappointment to the Irish and to Philip; but the King, undaunted by repeated failures, gave instant order for the equipment of a fresh fleet at Ferrol.

Meanwhile, through the treachery of Tyrone's secretary, the government had come to a knowledge of his intrigues with Spain, and in January, 1597, Norris moved down with the army to Dundalk. Contrary to the advice of O'Donnell, who seized the opportunity to plunder Connaught to the very walls of Galway, Tyrone once more tried to win his way by diplomacy, going so far as to disavow all connexion with O'Donnell at the very time he was urging him to strengthen himself in Connaught. But even Norris, though consenting to Tyrone's request for a parley at a somewhat distant date, was not entirely convinced by his protestations of loyalty. Whatever doubts he had were removed when Tyrone, instead of keeping his appointment, applied for an extension of time. His application was granted, and April 16 appointed as the last day on which his submission would be received. Again he failed to keep his engagement, and preparations were made to reduce him by force.

On May 22, 1597, Russell was superseded by Thomas, Lord Burgh, and Norris was removed from the command of the army. The reunion of the civil and military authority in one person and the appointment of Sir Conyers Clifford as Governor of Connaught gave promise of a more vigorous administration. A general hosting was proclaimed for July 6. Already a good beginning had been made by Clifford in Connaught; and, though not strong enough either to penetrate into Tyrconnell, or even to wrest Ballyshannon out of O'Donnell's hands, he had obliged O'Donnell's *protégé*, Tibbot Burke, called the MacWilliam, to take to his heels. On July 14, Tyrone's fort on the Blackwater was stormed and regarrisoned with English soldiers. At the first approach of danger Tyrone had ensconced himself in his woods, where every attempt to reach him proved futile. The summer passed away in frequent skirmishes, but without any decisive battle. Early, however, in October Tyrone and O'Donnell made a combined attack on the fort at the Blackwater. Burgh at once hastened to its relief; but on his way thither he was stricken down by an attack of "Irish ague," of which he died a week later at Newry. Contrary to the general expectation that Tyrone would seize the opportunity to overrun the Pale, he at once opened up negotiations for a pacification. His demands were higher than ever, including not only liberty of conscience, the control of his *urrags*, and the claims of O'Donnell, but also a sort of protectorate over the Irish generally. They were pronounced inadmissible. But he effected his purpose of prolonging the truce till the beginning of June,

1598. Two days after its expiration he put three armies in the field, with one of which he attacked the fort on the Blackwater, with another the castle of Cavan, while the third was directed into the heart of Leinster. O'Donnell and O'Rourke at the same time assumed the offensive in Connaught. The attempt to capture the fort on the Blackwater failed; but lack of provisions ere long reduced the garrison to dire extremities. Sir Henry Bagenal was sent to relieve it, but on August 14 he was utterly defeated and his army almost annihilated by Tyrone near Armagh.

The effect of the victory was tremendous; and there can be little doubt that, had Tyrone acted promptly, he could have marched unopposed on Dublin. But he displayed no ability to profit by his unexpected success. After wasting nearly two months, he indeed directed a small force into Munster. Within a fortnight afterwards the whole province was in a state of rebellion. A nephew of the late Earl caused himself to be proclaimed Earl of Desmond, and a MacCarthy, subservient to Tyrone, was elected MacCarthy Mor. The English undertakers, panic-stricken at the first approach of danger, abandoned their castles and fled for safety to Cork, Limerick and Askeaton, often without striking a blow in their own defence. The plantation on which such store had been set vanished like the unsubstantial fabric of a vision. In Thomond a new O'Brien presented himself in the person of the Earl's brother, Teig. In Connaught the rebels again set up Tibbot Burke as MacWilliam, while O'Donnell improved the occasion by robbing O'Connor Sligo of eight thousand head of cattle. But it was in the midland districts, where the O'Mores and O'Conors had found a welcome ally in the nephew of the Earl of Ormonde, Viscount Mountgarret, that the flame of the rebellion burnt fiercest. The effects of the victory were felt even in Spain, where an embargo was laid on all ships coming out of Ireland without Tyrone's pass.

When Essex landed at Dublin on April 15, 1599, the situation was as critical as it well could be. The task of restoring order was certainly not a light one; but it can hardly be said for Essex that his management of the campaign in any way realised the extravagant notions formed of his military capacity, or even achieved that degree of success which might reasonably have been expected from the very considerable force placed at his disposal. After wasting the summer and frittering away his strength in a useless expedition into Munster, he reluctantly yielded to Elizabeth's remonstrances to make a direct attack on Tyrone, and marched northwards from Dublin on August 28. Whatever hesitation he might have felt was dissipated by the news of Clifford's defeat by O'Rourke in Connaught, and of the subsequent defection of O'Connor Sligo. But he was no longer in a position to act vigorously on the offensive; and, finding Tyrone as usual more ready to treat than to fight, he concluded a truce with him until the terms of a pacification

could be agreed upon. It was, as Elizabeth indignantly remarked, "a quick end made of a slow proceeding"; and, despite her direct prohibition, Essex quitted his post and returned to England in the hope that by his personal influence with the Queen he might save himself from the consequences of his failure.

Feeling himself master of the situation, Tyrone determined to do what he should have done before, and early in January, 1600, directed his march into Munster for the purpose, as he put it, of learning the intentions of the gentlemen of that province with regard to the great question of the nation's liberty and religion. From a military point of view the expedition proved a failure. His henchman, Hugh Maguire, was slain in a skirmish with Sir Warham St Leger on March 1; and Tyrone, hearing that Sir George Carew was on his way to Cork, returned by forced marches to Ulster, thereby evading Lord Mountjoy, the newly appointed Deputy, who was preparing to intercept him in Westmeath. His courage was revived by the arrival shortly afterwards of a Spanish vessel at Killybegs having on board Matthew de Oviedo, titular Archbishop of Dublin, with letters from Philip III and considerable supplies of money and ammunition to be divided between him and O'Donnell, together with a "phoenix feather" from Clement VIII for himself, and indulgences for all who should rise in defence of the faith—"as usually granted to those setting out to the war against the Turks for the recovery of the Holy Land."

It was high time that help should have arrived. In May Sir Henry Docwra succeeded in establishing himself on the shores of Lough Foyle, where, being afterwards joined by Turlough's eldest son, Sir Art O'Neill, and O'Donnell's cousin and rival, Niall Garv, he defied the efforts of Tyrone and O'Donnell to dislodge him. As the summer drew to a close, Mountjoy, having restored order in the central districts, moved to Dundalk, where he established his camp. His intention was, by creating a line of forts, to hem Tyrone in and expose him to the dangers of a winter campaign. Lack of forage compelled him to forego his purpose; but with the first approach of spring he was again in the field, and was gradually closing in on Tyrone from all sides, when the news of the landing at Kinsale of a Spanish force under Don Juan del Aguila in September, 1601, compelled him to withdraw the army into Munster.

That his work had not been done in vain was seen from the fact that neither Tyrone nor O'Donnell was in a position to take immediate advantage of the assistance that had been sent them. November had drawn to a close before they united their forces at Bandon. Hemmed in on all sides, the Spanish general, never very enthusiastic in the cause, and disgusted at the apathy shown by the natives, urged a combined attack on the English lines. His importunity prevailed over wiser counsels, and the attack was arranged to take place on Christmas Eve. The plan was betrayed to Mountjoy, and the Irish, after losing 1200 men,

retreated in disorder to Inishannon. Still, the situation was far from hopeless, and Tyrone was strongly in favour of renewing the attempt; but his advice was overruled by O'Donnell, who, having nominated his brother Rory chief during his absence, sailed for Spain to solicit fresh assistance under a more capable general. A week later del Aguila capitulated. Tyrone with sadly diminished forces regained Ulster in safety; but in the meanwhile Docwra had established a fort at Omagh, and Tyrone was forced to seek shelter in the forest of Glenconkein. Though no longer formidable, he refused to submit unconditionally; and, after remaining unmoved for another year, Elizabeth, evidently in fear of complications arising with Scotland, authorised Mountjoy in February, 1603, to promise him life, liberty, and pardon, with restoration, under certain conditions, of his estate. Peace was concluded on these terms; and on March 30 Tyrone, in entire ignorance of Elizabeth's death, submitted to Mountjoy at Mellifont.

A general amnesty followed Tyrone's submission. The war was at an end, and Ireland was conquered as she had never been conquered before. The work had cost England dear. Year after year for nearly fifty years the drain in treasure and life-blood had been going on with hardly any interruption. During the last four years and a half alone it was computed that the war had cost England about £1,200,000. What the loss in human life was it is impossible to calculate. But one thing is certain: great as was the number of those who fell by the sword, it bore only a slight proportion to those who perished from starvation and disease. No service in the world was so unpopular as that in Ireland. The grave, as it came to be regarded, of great reputations made elsewhere, it proved the grave, in a more literal sense, of nearly every soldier who was compelled to serve there. For this result Elizabeth's excessive parsimony was no doubt chiefly responsible. But the mischief did not stop here. A discontented soldiery is proverbially a disorderly one, and it is no wonder that the English army in Ireland was more an object of terror to the inhabitants of the Pale than it was to the Irish enemy.

The grounds of complaint were numerous; but the chief grievance complained of was that of the cess. "Cess," explained Sir Henry Sidney, is "nothing else but a prerogative of the Prince and an agreement and consent by the nobility and council, to impose upon the country a certain proportion of victual of all kinds, to be delivered and issued at a reasonable rate, and, as it is commonly termed, the Queen's price; so that the rising and falling of the prices of victuals, and articles, and the seasonableness of the times—dear or cheap—makes the matter easier or heavier to the subject." Granting the theory, it was urged on behalf of the gentry of the Pale that, in consequence of the general rise in the price of commodities since Elizabeth's accession, the "Queen's price" was a hundred, sometimes a hundred and fifty, per cent. below the market price,

and that in consequence there was little difference in effect between cess and the old extortion of coyne and livery. The abuse was admitted; but it was impossible for any Deputy with an empty treasury and an army always on the verge of mutiny to abandon such a certain source of revenue. A proposal to commute cess into a land tax of the annual value of £2000 was rejected by the gentry of the Pale on the ground that without the consent of parliament it was an illegal imposition; and, when Sidney urged that it was within the prerogative of the Crown to levy it, he was met by the answer that "they were English and free subjects, and if they could not have remedy at his hands they would seek it at her Majesty's." All they got for their pains was a short imprisonment, and a sharp reprimand for their audacity in impugning her prerogative. An arrangement was subsequently arrived at.

The question of cess possesses for Irish constitutional history almost the same significance as that which ship-money does for English. The principle involved in both was identical. What the constitutional party in Ireland demanded was not merely the control of the purse but all that the control of the purse implied, viz. constitutional government and the freedom of parliament. The agitation against cess was essentially a protest against the arbitrary principles on which the government of Ireland was being conducted and the assertion of that right of remonstrance which was denied them in parliament. And this agitation, the ultimate issue of which was the Confederation of Kilkenny, had, it should be borne in mind, nothing to do in the first instance with religion, though the gentry of the Pale were Roman Catholics almost to a man. It has ever been the misfortune of Ireland that opposition to government has been construed into rebellion. The reason for this is to be found in the fact that government in Ireland has always meant the interests of England, and not the welfare of its inhabitants, whether of English or of native descent. When Strafford asserted that Ireland was a conquered nation and to be governed as the King pleased, he merely spoke the settled conviction of every Englishman of Elizabeth's time, and what no Englishman of Charles' time would ever have denied—had it not suited the interests of a political party to substitute for "King" the words "English Parliament." But the gentry of the Pale could never be brought to assent to the theory. Time after time, whenever the occasion offered, they protested against it. But the occasion was seldom given them.

Setting aside the parliament which met on January 12, 1560, and was dissolved three weeks later, Elizabeth only summoned two parliaments in Ireland during the whole course of her reign, viz. in 1569-70 and in 1585-6. Both were called for the express purpose of confirming the Crown in the possession of large stretches of land forfeited by the rebellions of Shane O'Neill and the Earl of Desmond. In both instances the opposition, composed of the gentry of the Pale, made determined

efforts to secure the election of a Speaker from their own party: in both they were defeated, but not without having given such evidence of their power as to render the government unwilling to repeat the experiment. Between 1586 and 1613 no parliament was called in Ireland. In the interval the situation had become more complicated. It was no longer the nation's civil rights that were at stake. Thanks to the zeal of the Jesuits and the remissness of the government, the great question of religion had been forced into the foreground till the rift between government and governed had widened into a chasm. Nothing illustrates the change better than the foundation in 1591 of the University of Trinity College. The gentry of the Pale had long sighed after such an institution, in which their children could receive a higher education at home; but the constitution of the newly erected college, from the first strongly Protestant and even Puritan in spirit, had bitterly disappointed their hopes.

To return to Ulster. Tyrone, on learning that he had made his submission in ignorance of Elizabeth's death, is said to have burst into tears. But even his somewhat equivocal relations with James could hardly have led him to expect better terms than those he obtained. Whatever his feelings, he displayed no intention of receding from his bargain. On the contrary, he not only renewed his submission before the Lord Deputy and Council in Dublin, but a few weeks later repaired to England in company with Rory O'Donnell, chief of Tyrconnell, since the death of his brother Hugh in Spain in 1602. His reception by James at Hampton Court was a bitter disappointment to the hungry band of courtiers, who were already speculating on raising their fortunes upon his ruin. "I have lived," exclaimed Sir John Harington, "to see that damnable rebel Tyrone brought to England, honoured and well-liked....How I did labour after that knave's destruction...who now smileth in peace at those who did hazard their lives to destroy him." Perhaps the very friendliness of his reception had the effect of reviving his hopes of recovering that control over his *urraghs* which he had been compelled by the conditions of his submission to surrender; or, as is more likely, it may have been that accepting his earldom as equivalent for his chieftainship he was determined to make the boundaries of it coterminous with the extreme limits of the clan. Anyhow, shortly after his return to Ireland, he became involved in a dispute with his former vassal, Sir Donnell O'Cahan, whose possession of *Iraghticahan*, comprising the modern county of Derry, he declared to be incompatible with the terms of his patent.

The dispute, conducted in the usual style, was carefully fomented by George Montgomery, the newly appointed Bishop of Derry, Raphoe, and Clogher—an adventurer of the worst type—who, having his own scheme to serve in ferreting out ecclesiastical lands in Tyrone, had found a useful tool in O'Cahan. In April, 1607, Tyrone and O'Cahan

were cited to appear before the Council in Dublin. While the latter was stating his case, Tyrone, annoyed at his effrontery, snatched the paper he was reading out of his hands and tore it in pieces. This exhibition of temper did not improve his position; but at Chichester's suggestion it was resolved to refer the decision of the question to James himself. Letters were written authorising Tyrone and O'Cahan to repair to London. But in the meantime a warning had reached the former from his cousin Cuconnaught Maguire, who was then in the Netherlands, that if he went to England he would certainly be arrested. The warning is traceable to the fact that details of a plot for an insurrection in Ireland aided by Spain had recently, to the knowledge of Maguire, come to the ears of the government. Tyrone's name was not mentioned by the person who revealed it, though that of O'Donnell, recently created Earl of Tyrconnell, was; but Maguire evidently thought the situation dangerous enough to justify him in sending a vessel to the north of Ireland in order to facilitate his escape. On September 4-14, 1607, Tyrone and Tyrconnell with their wives and families quitted Ireland in the company of Maguire for ever.

The situation thus created took the government of Ireland completely by surprise. It was, of course, presumed that the fugitives would return and, with the help of foreign assistance, try to recover their lands by force. To guard against this danger Chichester proposed that the King should, "during their absence, assume their countries into his possession, divide the lands amongst the inhabitants—to every man of note or good desert so much as he can conveniently stock and manure by himself and his tenants and followers, and so much more as by conjecture he shall be able to stock and manure for five years to come; and will bestow the rest upon servitors and men of worth here, and withal bring in colonies of civil people of England and Scotland at his Majesty's pleasure, with condition to build castles or storehouses upon their lands." In which case Chichester assured himself that, "besides the yearly benefit that will redound to his Majesty's coffers, which will be nothing inferior to the revenues of Munster or Connaught, the country will ever after be happily settled." The scheme was approved by James in general terms; but, before any steps had been taken to put it in execution, events occurred in the north which led to the postponement and unforeseen development of the original plan.

Hardly had the one set of actors quitted the stage when another appeared in the persons of Sir Cormac O'Neill, younger brother of the Earl of Tyrone, Sir Cahir O'Dogherty, lord of Inishowen, Sir Niall Garv O'Donnell, claimant to the lordship of Tyrconnell, and Sir Donnell O'Cahan, lord of Iraghticahan. All of them believed they possessed claims on the government: all were anxious for the satisfaction of their claims. It is needless to say that these expectations were all disappointed. The case of Cormac O'Neill was speedily disposed

of. He had been the first to bring the news of the flight of the Earls. But it was discovered that he had not been so blameless in the matter as he wished to make out; and, instead of his obtaining *custodiam* of his brother's country, which he asked for, the constable of Dublin Castle, to repeat Sir John Davis' joke, obtained *custodiam* of him. In December he was sent over to England and ended his days as a prisoner in the Tower. The case of Sir Niall Garv on the other hand presented peculiar difficulties. There was no doubt that he had a right to expect to be acknowledged lord of Tyrconnell. But the government had no intention of allowing another O'Donnell to set himself up, and in lieu of his claims offered him a patent of the lands of Glanfyne and Monganagh. The offer seemed to him hardly worth accepting, and he neglected to take out his patent. Finding a sympathiser in Sir Cahir O'Dogherty, to whom the presence of a garrison at Derry was a standing grievance, he practised on his youthful inexperience and passionate nature to force him into a quarrel with the governor, Sir George Paulet. A personal insult from Paulet brought matters to a crisis. O'Dogherty swore that nothing but his blood could atone for the injury. On the evening of April 19, 1608, he surprised Culmore Castle, and having armed his followers marched directly on Derry. Arriving there in the early hours of the morning, while the inhabitants were still in their beds, he captured the town without much resistance. The place was sacked and burnt and the garrison put to the sword, among the first to fall being Paulet, the author of the calamity.

When the news of the rising reached Dublin, Chichester determined to make war "thick and short" against him, and at once despatched a strong force into the north under Marshal Wingfield. For some time O'Dogherty avoided an engagement; but on July 5 he was overtaken near Kilmacrenan by a party of soldiers under Sir Francis Rushe and shot through the brain at the first encounter. His friend and adviser, Sir Niall Garv, after instigating him to rebel, had shamefully abandoned him. But his motives were suspected by the government, and having been arrested he was sent to end his days in the Tower, where he was shortly afterwards joined by Sir Donnell O'Cahan. The news of O'Dogherty's death reached Chichester at Dundalk on his way northwards to make a survey of the lands lately escheated to the Crown in accordance with a commission recently issued to him and others. The results of his investigations, which lasted the whole of the summer, confirmed him in his opinion that, if a permanent settlement of the province was to be effected, it could only be by recognising the claims of the principal natives to be created freeholders, and by distributing the rest of the lands among well-chosen undertakers and persons who had served the State in a military capacity in Ireland. If the first consideration was carefully attended to, he anticipated no difficulty in the case of the inferior natives, "who were by nature inclined rather to be

followers and tenants to others than lords or freeholders themselves." His views were communicated to the King and Council in October, 1608; and in accordance with the information supplied a scheme of plantation was drawn up and published early in the following year.

According to the scheme the lands in each of the six counties of Donegal, Coleraine, Tyrone, Armagh, Fermanagh, and Cavan, setting aside those reserved for ecclesiastical and other purposes, were to be divided into four parts, of which two were to consist of proportions of 1000 acres, one of 1500 acres, and one of 2000 acres. Estates of 2000 acres were to be held by knight's service *in capite*; those of 1500 acres by knight's service as of the Castle of Dublin; those of 1000 in common socage. The undertakers or planters were to be of three sorts: (1) English or Scottish, as well "servitors" (military or civil officials of the government) as others, who were to plant their portions with English or inland Scottish inhabitants; (2) servitors in Ireland, who might take mere Irish, English, or inland Scottish tenants at their choice; (3) natives of Ireland who were to be made freeholders. Each undertaker of a large proportion was required to build thereon a castle, with a strong court or bawn about it, within two years after the date of his letters-patent; each undertaker of a middle portion a stone or brick house with a strong court about it within the same time; and each undertaker of a small proportion a strong court or bawn at the least. No English or Scottish undertaker could be admitted unless he took the oath of supremacy, and he was not to alienate or demise his lands to any of the mere Irish or to such as would not take the oath. In consideration of the expense involved in transporting themselves to Ireland, English and Scottish undertakers were to pay an annual rent to the Crown of only £5. 6s. 8d. for every thousand acres; servitors £8 for the same proportion; payment to begin in both cases after the expiration of the second year; whereas the Irish freeholders were to pay a rent of £10. 13s. 4d., beginning after the expiration of the first year. The division of land was to be by lot in order to avoid emulation; and, as a guarantee of peaceable possession, it was promised that the unruly native element or swordsmen should be removed.

The scheme failed to satisfy either undertakers, servitors, or natives. Chichester, when it was forwarded to him for publication, could not conceal his vexation at the narrow and pedantic spirit in which it had been drawn up. It had never, he declared, been his intention to suggest an "arithmetical division" of the lands, but that each person should receive in proportion to his merits and quality; apportionment by lot would have the effect of preventing persons who wished to plant together from undertaking at all; tenure *in capite* and of the Castle of Dublin was regarded as a grievance when anybody could obtain land elsewhere in common socage; so also the clause respecting building which took no account of the facility or difficulty of obtaining material for the

purpose. But it was the treatment of the natives and the proposal to remove the swordsmen that annoyed him most. There were, he insisted, many more Irish claiming and expecting freeholds than was supposed, while any attempt to remove the swordsmen instead of providing for them was sure to cause disturbance. Having thus, however, as it were, entered his protest against the scheme, he prepared to obey his instructions; and while commissioners appointed for the purpose were engaged in drawing the land into lots and mapping down the proportions for distribution, he exerted himself to the best of his ability and with some measure of success to ship off a considerable number of swordsmen to Sweden.

The publication of the scheme of plantation had, as may be supposed, elicited numerous offers to undertake from persons in England and Scotland who were either ignorant of the difficulties of the enterprise or were anxious to raise their fortunes by speculating in land. But these were not the sort of undertakers that the government wished to attract. Desirable individuals possessing the necessary capital held aloof from the enterprise, finding, as Chichester predicted, better investment for their money elsewhere. Worse than all, the servitors, who were to form the backbone of the undertaking, began to withdraw their offers. In this dilemma the government, foreseeing the possible collapse of the scheme, caused a special offer to be made to the City of London in July, 1609, inviting it to undertake for the whole county of Coleraine. The invitation was at first declined; but, on being pressed to accept and granted more favourable terms, the City, after sending agents to spy out the land, signed an agreement on January 28, 1610, to undertake. Lists of approved undertakers and servitors were about the same time transmitted to Chichester, and the month of May was fixed for the beginning of the actual work of plantation. But July was drawing to a close before the commissioners for allotting lands could get to work. A beginning was made in county Cavan, where the inhabitants were partly cajoled, partly forced, into consenting to submit to the distribution proposed, and to remove into the districts assigned to them. From Cavan the commissioners proceeded to Fermanagh, taking each county in turn, and finding unexpectedly most resistance in Tyrone and Armagh.

Sir John Davis was jubilant at the result. "*Fervet opus*," he wrote, quoting Virgil's description of the building of Carthage. But Chichester was not so entirely satisfied. The appearance of such of the undertakers as had arrived disappointed him, those from England being for the most part "plain country gentlemen, who may promise much, but give small assurance or hopes of performing what appertains to a work of such moment." The Scots, if they came with less money in their purses, were better attended; and he noticed that contrary to the orders of the plantation they were speedily in treaty with the natives, promising to get license that they might remain as tenants, "which is so pleasing to

that people that they will strain themselves to the uttermost to gratify them...hoping, as he conceives, at one time or other, to find an opportunity to cut their landlords' throats."

The beginning of the next year, 1611, saw numerous fresh arrivals. But the rate of progress was not satisfactory, and on April 13 a proclamation was issued ordering all British undertakers to repair to Ireland before the beginning of May, by which time all natives were required to transplant on to the lands assigned them, either as landlords or tenants. The proposal to remove the natives raised an immediate outcry on the part of those undertakers who were already planting. The crisis predicted by Chichester had arrived. At his suggestion the Lords of the Privy Council published an order on July 13 threatening the undertakers with the forfeiture of their bonds unless they complied strictly with the rules of the plantation, but allowing them to retain the services of the natives for another year. The scheme for their removal had in fact broken down. At the same time, in order to obtain precise information as to the actual state of affairs, instructions were given to Lord Carew to make a personal survey of the plantation. His report was not encouraging. Many of the undertakers had never come over; many after visiting their lands had returned home and were trying to sell them; the natives were still in their old quarters, and showed no sign of removing; while the servitors, on being expostulated with for having done so little, laid the blame on the undertakers who deprived them of the services of the natives.

Nevertheless, thanks to the energy of a few servitors and above all to the industry of the Scots, the plantation struck its roots deep into the soil of Ulster. That it should have borne permanently the stamp of a Scottish settlement is not without interest, considering the character of the early settlers. For if they were hardly, as they have been described, the scum of the nation, they were certainly not drawn from the best classes of the community. Indeed, the enterprise was not at all favourably regarded in Scotland, insomuch that "going for Ireland" was looked on as a miserable mark of a deplorable person. It was even turned into a proverb; and one of the worst expressions of disdain that could be invented was to tell a man that "Ireland would be his hinder end." Fortunately, though quite unintentionally, what was wanting to the settlers in moral solidity was speedily supplied by James' ecclesiastical policy in Scotland. Presbyterian ministers whose consciences rebelled against the restoration of episcopacy sought a refuge and a new sphere of labour in the north of Ireland. Their ministrations were abundantly blessed, not only amongst their countrymen, but amongst the English settlers to whom Calvinism in its Puritan form was not unacceptable. The character thus impressed on the plantation it never lost: hence the significance of Ulster for the subsequent history of Ireland.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE DUTCH REPUBLIC.

THE consequences of the assassination of William the Silent were not so momentous as his enemies had expected. The task undertaken by him had been so far accomplished, that his death in no way impaired the firm resolution of the revolted Provinces to maintain to the end their desperate struggle against the Spanish tyranny. On the very day of the murder (July 10, 1584), the States of Holland, sitting at Delft, passed a resolution "to uphold the good cause with God's help without sparing gold or blood"; and this resolution was at once forwarded to all officers in command on land and sea. The people, though stirred to indignation by the crime, everywhere preserved a calm and determined attitude. There was no panic, nor was submission thought of for a single instant.

William's death had left the government of the country in an amorphous condition. It would indeed be more correct to say that no government existed. When the authority of Philip II had been finally abjured, the sovereignty reverted to the several Provinces, and by their delegation was vested in the States General. But that body had only been anxious to find someone able and willing, under proper guarantees, to step into the place forfeited by the Spanish King. Failure and disappointment had attended their first efforts; and they had only been saved from ruin by putting trust in the leadership of the Prince of Orange, who, although he had steadily declined any offer of sovereignty, had guided them by his courage and sagacity through the long years of their desperate struggle. At length, in 1584, William had, though unwillingly, accepted for himself the Countship of Holland and Zeeland, and had secured for the Duke of Anjou, despite his misdeeds, the lordship over the other Provinces. By their almost simultaneous deaths the sovereignty reverted once more to the States General. It was an extraordinary state of affairs; for, when we speak of the sovereignty being vested in the States General, it must be remembered that the States General themselves were possessed of no real authority. They were composed of delegates from a number of Provincial States, each of them sovereign. These delegates were simply the mouthpieces of

the particular States which they represented, and the opposition of a single Province was sufficient to paralyse the action of all the rest. These Provincial States again were practically representative of the municipal corporations (*vroedschappen*) of the great towns. But these *vroedschappen* were close, self-coopting burgher aristocracies, with immunities and privileges which made them almost independent; and they were very jealous of their rights. Moreover, instead of there being anything approaching an equality of real power among the sovereign Provinces represented in the States General, Holland and Zeeland had not only borne the brunt of the war, but were, especially the former, the richest, the most energetic, and the most prosperous among them. They contributed some four-fifths of the charges and furnished the formidable fleets which formed the chief defence of the country. These two, while content to work together, though with many bickerings, looked upon the inland Provinces rather as protected dependencies than as allies and equals. Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel naturally resented such an assumption; but, now that the great Provinces of Brabant and Flanders could no longer be reckoned upon as a bulwark on the southern frontier against the military power of Spain, they found themselves compelled to choose between the bond uniting them to the overbearing Hollanders or submission to Parma. For, in the course of the year that followed William's death, resistance to the Spanish forces south of the Meuse had been practically extinguished by the military and diplomatic skill of their great leader. One after another all the chief towns of Brabant and Flanders, Bruges, Dendermonde, Vilvoorde, Ghent, Brussels, and lastly Antwerp, had fallen before the victorious general of King Philip. The seaports, Ostend and Sluys, alone remained in the hands of the patriots.

Thus it is not to be wondered at that the States General should have believed their only hope of safety to lie in securing some foreign potentate as their sovereign, who would be able to lend them armed assistance, and give unity of purpose to their councils. The only two Powers to whom they could turn were the same with whom they had already been in correspondence upon the subject, France and England. Elizabeth, however, had shown so strong a disinclination to embroil herself with Philip for the sake of the Netherlands, that, despite the deep offence which Anjou had given, negotiations were again on foot at the time of the Duke's death for his return to the country as sovereign with strictly limited powers. The States General therefore determined to adhere to William of Orange's policy on this head, and in the first instance to offer the protectorship of Holland and Zeeland and the sovereignty of the other Provinces conditionally to Henry III of France. An embassy was despatched accordingly. But the form of the offer displeased the King; and he was preoccupied with the serious discords in his own kingdom and the dangers which threatened his own throne.

He refused to consider the proposal, unless the sovereignty of all the Provinces were laid at his feet. The negotiation therefore came to nothing (1585).

All this time an influential party, in Holland, at whose head was the Advocate Paul Buys, was in favour of an English alliance. But Elizabeth was quite as coy as her brother of France. She received the Dutch envoys with fair words; but, partly on principle, partly from prudence, declined the proffered sovereignty. All she would undertake was to give a limited amount of military aid on characteristically commercial terms. The towns of Flushing, Brill, and Rammekens were to be handed over to her, as pledges for the repayment of her expenses. In the matter of bargaining the Dutch on this occasion certainly met their match in Queen Elizabeth, who after the treaty was agreed upon, August 10, 1585, still spent some months in haggling over petty details. But the fall of Antwerp, which she had not anticipated, hastened her decision. She agreed to despatch at once 5000 foot and 1000 horse, together with garrisons for the cautionary towns, under the command of her favourite, the Earl of Leicester. He landed at Flushing on December 19, and received everywhere an enthusiastic welcome, even the States of Holland, afterwards his foes, writing to the Queen, "that they looked upon him as sent from Heaven for their deliverance." There was an eager desire to confer sovereign powers on him; and he was nothing loth. Without consulting Elizabeth he allowed himself, February 4, 1586, in the presence of the States General and of Maurice of Nassau, to be solemnly invested with almost absolute authority, under the title of Governor-General. Practically the only restrictions placed upon him were that the States General and Provincial States should have the right of assembling on their own initiative; that the existing Stadholders should be irremovable; and that appointments to offices in the several Provinces should be made from two or three names submitted to him by the States. A new Council of State was created in which two Englishmen had seats. But Leicester was disappointed. His correspondence clearly shows that he wanted to be, for a time at any rate, in the position of a Roman dictator, though not from mere vanity or for the purpose of robbing the Netherlands of their liberty, but as a means to an end. But with good intentions he had little sagacity or tact, and he speedily found that his ideas conflicted not merely with those of a people obstinately attached to their time-honoured rights and liberties, but with those of his royal mistress herself. Elizabeth received the news of his inauguration to office as Governor-General with high indignation. Leicester was ordered to resign his dignity; and Lord Heneage was despatched to Holland to rate both him and the States General for their conduct. Not till July did the Queen's favourite succeed in appeasing her wrath, or obtain her consent to his being styled Governor-General, and being addressed as "Excellency."

The new Governor, who could speak no Dutch and knew nothing of the people with whom he had to deal, speedily found himself in difficulties. On April 4, 1586, he issued a placard forbidding, on pain of death, all commercial intercourse with the enemy. The exportation of grain, provisions, or other commodities to all countries under the sway of Philip II was henceforth absolutely prohibited. The Spaniards were dependent upon the Dutch for the supply of the necessities of life; and, if only these could be effectually cut off, the armies of Parma would be starved out. In this reasoning, however, Leicester left out of account the vital importance of this traffic to the merchants of Holland and Zeeland. The purse of Holland and Zeeland furnished the sinews of war, and equipped the fleets and paid for the armies; and it was their great carrying and distributing trade which filled the purse. The inland districts, which were constantly exposed to the destructive ravages of the enemy's troops within their borders, were jealous of the greater prosperity of the maritime Provinces. Already in 1584, under pressure from their representatives, the States General had attempted to stop the grain traffic with the enemy in the interests of the country at large; but Amsterdam, supported by the States of Holland, had refused to obey the edict, and had carried the day. The yet more stringent prohibition proposed by Leicester at the instigation of the democratic party at Utrecht, who had a special grudge against the Hollanders, brought upon him their lasting hostility. The course rashly adopted by him was, in fact, really impracticable.

Meanwhile, Parma continued to advance further northwards; in June Grave, and in July Venloo, fell into his hands. Leicester was too much engrossed with the difficulties of internal administration to conduct the operations of war with the necessary vigour. His efforts towards curbing what he regarded as the contumacious opposition of the Holland merchants and regents to his authority only made the breach wider. He surrounded himself with a circle of advisers from the southern Netherlands, the three most prominent members of the favoured group being Jacques Reingoud and Gerard Prouninck surnamed Deventer, both Brabanters, and Daniel de Burchgrave, a Fleming. On June 26 Leicester surprised the Council of State by the sudden announcement that he had created a Chamber of Finance, to which he had handed over the control of the Treasury. One of the special duties of this Chamber was to see that the placards against trading with the enemy were stringently enforced; and to effect this it was proposed to arm it with inquisitorial powers, extending even to the inspection of the books of suspected merchants. At its head was placed the Count von Neuenaar, Stadholder of Gelderland, Utrecht, and Overijssel, with Reingoud as treasurer-general and de Burchgrave as auditor. Leicester's arbitrary act deprived the Council of State of one of the most important of its functions, while foreigners were appointed to offices of financial control. Paul Buys, to

whom the post of Commissary had been offered, refused to serve under Reingoud, and notwithstanding his English sympathies became one of Leicester's most pronounced opponents. Oldenbarneveltdt, his successor as Advocate of Holland, likewise exerted his great influence with the States of that Province to resist the invasion of their rights.

The Governor on his part leant more and more on the support of the democratic party of Utrecht, who with the help of Neuenaar had deprived the old burgher oligarchy of the reins of power. Leicester secured the election of his confidant Deventer as burgomaster of the town, though as a foreigner he was disqualified from holding such an office; and the burgher captains and Calvinist preachers were his staunch partisans and allies. It was highly impolitic for the Governor-General, whose special task was to give unity to the national opposition to Spain, thus to accentuate the differences which divided Province from Province. But he was resolved to try conclusions with his adversaries; and Paul Buys was arrested at Utrecht and imprisoned.

West Friesland had long been merged in the Province of Holland and was known as the North Quarter. Leicester now resolved to revive the semi-independency of former times by appointing Sonoy Stadholder of West Friesland, thus openly ignoring the fact that that office was already held by Maurice of Nassau, who, as Admiral-General, also had supreme control of the naval forces of Holland and Zeeland. The Governor, however, took upon himself to erect three independent Admiralty Colleges of Holland, Zeeland, and the North Quarter, thus, to the great detriment of the public service, creating a system destined to last as long as the Dutch Republic. He made himself still more unpopular by violently espousing the cause of the extreme Calvinist preachers and zealots, and allowing a so-called National Synod to meet at Dort (June, 1586), whose aim was the suppression of all rites and opinions but its own, including those of the large "Libertine" or moderate party, at the head of which stood Oldenbarneveltdt, the inheritors of the principles of William of Orange. As the year 1586 drew to its close Leicester became more and more dissatisfied with his position. He had to draw largely on his private resources to meet his expenses; and his forces were so weak that Parma could have overrun Gelderland and Overijssel with ease, had his master but given him a free hand. Philip's attention, however, was absorbed in preparations for the invasion of England, an enterprise for which the cooperation of Parma's army by land was essential. So soon as England had been conquered, the Netherlands could speedily be coerced into submission.

Disgusted at the many rebuffs he had suffered, Leicester, towards the end of November, determined to return to England and represent his difficulties in person to the Queen. The exercise of authority during his absence was left in the hands of the Council of State. But this body was merely the executive of the States General, and therefore in reality

depended upon the support of the States of the sovereign Provinces. Besides, distrust was felt at the presence in the Council of two Englishmen, and of Leicester's foreign nominees; and this distrust was speedily intensified by the traitorous surrender to the enemy of Deventer and Zutphen by their English Governors, Stanley and York. The defection of these two adventurers, both of them Catholics formerly in Spanish service, threw suspicion on all Englishmen. Neither the death of the chivalrous Sidney on the field of Warnsfeld, nor the proved gallantry of the Norrises, Cecils, Pelhams, and Russells were allowed to atone for these base and damning acts of treachery, which delivered the line of the Yssel into Parma's hand. At the instigation of Oldenbarneveltdt the States of Holland and Zeeland determined to act independently both of the States General and the Council. A Provincial army was formed; a new oath to the States was imposed on the levies; and additional powers, with the title of "Prince," were given to Maurice, under whom the experienced Count Hohenlo was appointed Lieutenant-General. In West Friesland Sonoy was forced to acknowledge his subordination to the Stadholder of Holland. Such was the influence of Oldenbarneveltdt, that he was able to obtain for his measures the concurrence of the States General, and of the Council, which was purged of objectionable members. A remonstrance drawn up by him was sent in the name of the States General to Leicester, in which the faults and mistakes of the absent Governor were relentlessly exposed.

The terms of this document gave great offence to Elizabeth; but it did not suit her policy to abandon the cause of the Netherlands, and an accommodation was patched up. In July, 1587, Leicester returned to his post, welcomed by his partisans, but coldly and suspiciously received by the Holland leaders. His success or failure depended now upon his attitude towards the States of Holland and the States General, in which Holland was dominant. He came back determined to master them, but his conduct had already raised a question, which for two centuries was to divide the Dutch people into opposing parties—the question of the sovereignty of the Provinces. Elaborate arguments were brought forward to show that the sovereign power, formerly exercised by Charles V and Philip II, had by the abjuration of his sovereignty become vested in the States of each several Province. Hence it would follow that Leicester, as Governor, was subordinate to the States as Margaret of Parma had been to King Philip. This assumption of the States of Holland was historically indefensible; but Oldenbarneveltdt had offered to resign his post as Advocate in April rather than yield on this head. He thus founded a party with whom the question of Provincial sovereignty became a principle; and the unwise attempts of a foreigner to erect a democratic dictatorship at the expense of the burgher oligarchies intensified a particularism, which was for many years to prejudice the national action and the best interests of the

country. Leicester's motives were probably good, and his supporters were numerous and active; but he had not in him the makings of a statesman. One of the first effects of his continuous struggle for supremacy with the States of Holland was the failure to relieve Sluys, which important seaport, on August 5, fell into the hands of Parma. Had Farnese not been occupied with other projects, it is indeed difficult to see how, in this time of division and cross-purposes amongst his opponents, his further advance could have been arrested. Leicester would have been powerless to offer an effective resistance. His political efforts, though backed by such skilful and influential partisans as Deventer at Utrecht, Sonoy in the North Quarter, and Aysma in Friesland, failed against the firm resolve of the States of Holland and their able leader. All his attempts to create a revolution by the overthrow of the supremacy of the regents in the principal towns miscarried. Dispirited at last by a fruitless struggle, and in broken health, he on August 6, 1587, finally turned his back definitely on the country, which had, as he thought, treated him so badly. "*Non gregem, sed ingratos invitus desero*," was the motto inscribed on a medal struck upon the occasion. He came back a poor man.

The position of the States at the beginning of 1588 appeared all but desperate. Their army was weak in numbers and in discipline, and without leaders of repute. The Provinces themselves were split into contending parties and jealous of each other. They had no allies to whom they could turn for help. Opposed to them stood the first general of his time, at the head of a large and seasoned force, which he had led to repeated triumphs. Already the whole country to the east of the Yssel and to the south of the Meuse and the Waal was practically in his hands. His plans were laid for completing the work so well begun; and, had he been unhampered, Parma would have in all probability in a couple of campaigns crushed out the revolt in the northern Netherlands.

He was not, however, destined to have a free hand. King Philip had set his heart upon the conquest of England by the Invincible Armada. In vain Parma urged that the subjugation of the rebel States was now in the King's power, and that it was not only wise, but necessary, to finish the one task before embarking upon another. The Duke was ordered to collect an immense fleet of transports at Sluys and Dunkirk, and to hold his army in readiness for crossing the Channel, so soon as the Great Armada appeared in the offing to act as his convoy. The story of what ensued is told elsewhere. The weary months of waiting, and the failure of Parma to put to sea in the face of the swarms of Dutch privateers that kept watch and ward to oppose his egress, gave breathing time to the Provinces, and at the same time filled the mind of the suspicious Philip with distrust of his nephew.

Moreover, the scheming brain of the Spanish King, undeterred by the crushing disaster of his "invincible" fleet, was already busy with projects of aggrandisement in France; so that, instead of being able to devote his energies to the reconquest of the Netherlands, during the remainder of his life Parma was chiefly occupied with futile expeditions into French territory. Thus, just when it seemed that nothing could avert the complete subjugation of the United Provinces, the attention of their adversary was fixed on other costly enterprises; and the resources of Spain, already gravely crippled, were drained to exhaustion.

After the departure of Leicester it seemed as if the loose federation of the United Provinces must fall apart through its own inherent separatist tendencies, and the utter lack of any workable machinery of government. The executive power was nominally vested in the Council of State; but the presence upon it of the local English commander and of two other English members weakened its authority, and rendered it unacceptable to the Provinces, especially to Holland, whose representation upon it in no way corresponded to her position and influence. Gradually, therefore, the States General curtailed its powers, and consulted it less; until a few years later it complained that all the most important affairs of the Provinces were determined and carried out without its cognisance. The driving-wheel of the government was now to be found in the predominance of the Province of Holland, as personified in the person of her Advocate, Oldenbarneveldt. This great statesman, the real founder of the Dutch Republic, as it was known to history, with consummate ability took advantage of the interval of comparative repose which followed the withdrawal of the English Governor, in order to gather into his own hands the reins of administration.

Johan van Oldenbarneveldt was born at Amersfoort in 1547. After he had begun practice as an advocate at the Hague, he became a fiery adherent of Orange, and bore arms at the time of the sieges of Haarlem and Leyden. In 1576 he was appointed Pensionary of Rotterdam, and thus became a member of the States of Holland. His industry and powers of persuasion, and his practical grasp of affairs, soon won him his prominence; and, having in 1586 been chosen Land's Advocate in succession to Paul Buys, he filled that important post for the next thirty-two years, thus exercising a commanding influence on the affairs of his country, and upon general European politics. For though the Advocate was nominally only the paid servant of the Provincial States of Holland, yet the permanency of his office, and the multiplicity of his functions, gave to a man of great ability a controlling voice in all discussions, and almost unlimited authority in the details of administration. As practically "Minister of all affairs," Oldenbarneveldt became in a sense the political personification of the Province whose servant he was, and of which he was the mouthpiece in the Assembly of the States General. Thus it came to pass that a many-headed system of government, whose

divided sovereignty and hopelessly complicated checks and counter-checks appeared to forbid united action or strong counsels, acquired motive power, which enabled it to work with a certain degree of smoothness and efficiency. The voice of Oldenbarneveldt was that of the Province of Holland; and the voice of Holland, which bore more than half of the entire charges of the Union, was dominant in the States General.

But the Dutch Republic, in these first years of its consolidation as a federal State, required the services of the soldier quite as much as those of the statesman. Fortunately in Maurice of Nassau a great commander arose, who possessed precisely the qualifications needed. Maurice was only seventeen years of age at the time of his father's murder, and was at once appointed in his place Stadholder of Holland and Zeeland, and also first Member of the Council of State. During the next few years he had busied himself in the study of mathematics, and in acquiring both technical and practical acquaintance with the art of war. He served in several campaigns under Hohenlo, and from the first devoted himself seriously to the task of gaining a thorough knowledge of military tactics. He was a born soldier; politics had no attraction for him. In August, 1588, he was created Captain-General and Admiral of the Union by the States General, and in succession to Neuenaar, who died in October, 1589, he was elected by the Provinces of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overijssel to be their Stadholder. All the stadholderates, with the single exception of Friesland, of which his cousin, William Lewis of Nassau, was Stadholder, were thus united in the person of Maurice. As in addition to this he was charged with the supreme control in military and naval affairs, Oldenbarneveldt found ready to his hand an instrument capable of carrying out his plans, and of translating policy into action. Many years were to pass before there arose even the faintest suspicion of jealousy or opposition between these two men, both so capable and ambitious. Their spheres of interest were distinct; and the younger man was content to leave in the hands of his father's trusted friend the entire management of the affairs of State; his own thoughts were centred on the training of armies and the conduct of campaigns.

The Stadholder of Friesland, William Lewis of Nassau, the son of John, was the cousin and life-long confidant and adviser of Maurice, who owed to him his first instruction in military knowledge, and who could always rely on his far-sighted prudence and discretion. Of blameless life, sincerely religious, a firm adherent of the Reformed faith, William Lewis was at the same time broad-minded and statesmanlike in his views of men and things, like the great uncle whose daughter he married. He was a reformer of military science on principles drawn from a study of Greek and Roman writers, a commander of far more than ordinary ability, yet modest withal, aiming always at the good of the common cause rather than at his own personal fame or advantage. It was

by his counsel and persuasion that the States General at length consented in 1590 to alter their military policy. Hitherto it had been assumed as a kind of axiom that the troops of the States could not oppose the Spaniards in the field; and the efforts of the Netherlands had been strictly confined to the defensive. But the army of the States had been transformed by the assiduous exertions of Maurice and William Lewis both in discipline, mobility, and armament, and, though composed of a medley of nationalities, English, Scotch, French, and Germans, as well as Netherlands, had become, as a fighting machine, not inferior in quality to its adversaries. William Lewis had for some time been urging upon the States to take advantage of Parma's embarrassments by the adoption of offensive in the place of defensive tactics; and at last, in 1590, at the time of the first expedition of the Duke into France, the joint efforts of both Stadholders to this end at length overcame the timidity of the burgher deputies.

The tide of the Spanish advance had already begun to turn in the spring of that year. On March 3, a body of 78 Netherlands, concealed in a vessel laden with peat, had taken Breda by surprise. In the autumn Maurice, at the head of a small column, after failing to capture Nymegen by a *coup de main*, raided the whole of North Brabant and took some dozen small places from the enemy. The year 1591 was a year of surprising triumphs. Zutphen, unexpectedly attacked, fell into the hands of Maurice and William Lewis after a five days' siege, on May 20. Deventer was next beleaguered, and, though gallantly defended by Herman van den Bergh, a cousin of Maurice, surrendered on June 20. The army then moved upon Groningen; but, on hearing that Parma was besieging the fort of Knodsenburg, Maurice hastened to its relief, routed the enemy's cavalry, and compelled him to retire. A sudden movement southward to Zeeland brought the Stadholder before the town of Hulst in the land of Waas, which surrendered after three days' investment. Then returning upon his steps the indefatigable leader finished up an extraordinary campaign by the seizure of Nymegen, October 21. At the age of twenty-four years, Maurice now took his place among the first generals of his time.

The next year, 1592, saw Parma once more marching into France for the relief of Rouen; and the way lay open to the Stadholders for freeing Friesland and the Zuiderzee from the hold of the Spaniard. The Spanish forces in the north were under the command of their old chief Verdugo, who regarded the two fortresses of Steenwyk and Koevorden as quite impregnable. The English auxiliaries under Vere had been sent to France, and Maurice's army was thus weakened. But the Stadholder's scientific skill in the art of beleaguering was able to accomplish what was regarded as impossible. Steenwyk fell on June 5, after a gallant defence; and, despite the utmost efforts of Verdugo to raise the siege of Koevorden, that place also surrendered on September 12.

Shortly afterwards, on December 3, the most redoubtable adversary of the States was removed by the death of Parma. Broken in spirit, and ill from the effects of a wound, he had retired to Spa. He had long forfeited the confidence of the King, and died while on his way to meet the Count of Fuentes, who had arrived at Brussels with a royal letter of recall. Until the arrival of the new Governor, Archduke Ernest, his post was filled by the old Count of Mansfeld.

The great event of Maurice's campaign of 1593 was the siege and capture of Geertruidenburg, the only town of Holland in the possession of the Spaniards which closed important waterways. The conduct of this siege, sometimes called "the Roman leaguer" from the astonishing scientific skill with which the methods of the ancients were applied in the construction of the besieger's lines and approaches, put the crown upon Maurice's fame. Despite the neighbourhood of Mansfeld with an army of 14,000 men, the town was taken, June 25, after a siege of three months' duration. In the following year the Stadholder's attention was once more turned to the north. After a two months' siege Groningen surrendered, under the so-called "treaty of reduction." This defined the terms on which the town, with the *Ommelanden*, became a Province of the Union known as *Stadt en Landen*. William Lewis was appointed its Stadholder. Maurice's four offensive campaigns had practically cleared the soil of the federated Provinces from the presence of the Spanish garrisons; and the authority of the States General was now established within the defensible limits of a well-rounded and compact territory.

In January, 1595, Henry IV of France had declared war upon Spain, and sought a close alliance with the United Provinces. Thus Archduke Ernest, as Viceroy of the Netherlands, found himself in a most difficult position. He had hostile armies on both sides of him; and the resources of Spain were already so exhausted, that no money was forthcoming for the payment of troops. In these circumstances Philip urged the Archduke to make an effort for peace with the States on equitable conditions upon the lines of the Pacification of Ghent. But the States were in no mood to accept any conditions which recognised in any shape the sovereignty of Philip; and the King was unwilling to recognise their independence. The negotiations came to nothing.

The arrival of Archduke Ernest in the southern Netherlands had been greeted with enthusiasm. Rumour pointed to his marriage with the Infanta, and to the establishment at Brussels of a national government under their rule. But these expectations were speedily doomed to disappointment by the sudden death of the Archduke (February 20, 1595). His place was taken *ad interim* by the Count of Fuentes, a Spanish grandee of the school of Alva, but a very capable commander. His year's administration of affairs was attended by more success in the field than had attended the Spanish arms since 1587. The efforts of the allies

in Luxemburg, and along the southern frontier at Cambray and Huy, ended in failure, all the advantages of the campaign rested with the Spaniards. A serious disaster had meanwhile occurred to a portion of the States' army under Maurice. The Stadholder had made an attempt to seize Groenloo by surprise, but the veteran Mondragon had hastened to its relief. For months the two armies lay watching one another, but without coming to a decisive action. In a chance encounter, on September 1, a small troop of cavalry, sent out by Maurice to intercept a body of Spanish foragers, was completely defeated; and its leaders, Philip of Nassau, brother of the Stadholder of Friesland, and a brilliant scion of his House, and his cousin Ernest of Solms, were killed. Ernest of Nassau, Philip's brother, was taken prisoner.

At the beginning of 1596 Fuentes was replaced as Governor by Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria, the favourite nephew of Philip, a far more capable man than his brothers, both as statesman and soldier. He brought with him reinforcements and some money, and, finding the army well disciplined and ready for action, he resolved to emulate, if possible, the successes of the previous year. But Fuentes had departed; and both Verdugo and Mondragon had died immediately before his arrival. In the lack of Spanish generals of repute, Albert gave the command to a French refugee, the Seigneur de Rosne. At this time a considerable body of the States' troops were with Henry IV, who was besieging La Fère. His lines were so strong that it seemed hopeless to attempt to raise the siege by a direct attack. But, acting on the advice of Rosne, Albert's army suddenly advanced upon Calais, which was unprepared and quickly surrendered to the Spaniards. It was a heavy and humiliating loss to the French, for which the capture of La Fère offered scant compensation. The Archduke, by the recapture of Hulst, followed up this striking success. Maurice had been so weakened by the detachment of his troops serving in France, that he had been unable to attempt any offensive operations. Nor was he able to prevent the powerful Spanish army from effecting the capture of Hulst, dearly purchased by 5000 lives, including that of Rosne himself.

Albert, like his predecessor, had begun with futile peace overtures. The States General on the contrary were at this time engaged upon other negotiations, the issue of which marked a stage in the history of the United Provinces. Before the close of the year there was concluded between England, France, and the States, a triple alliance, which had to be purchased by hard conditions, but which proclaimed the recognition by England and France of the United Provinces as a free and independent State. The States General undertook to maintain an army of 8000 men in the Netherlands, to send an auxiliary force of 4000 men to France, and lastly to give up the privilege, so important to the mercantile classes in Holland, of free trade with the enemy. The consent of the States of Holland to this requirement was obtained only with the greatest difficulty;

and after it had been conceded it was systematically evaded. The traffic with Spain and Portugal was still carried on clandestinely; and, as the alliance was but of short duration, the forbidden trade was soon almost as vigorous as ever. The States in fact quickly found that their allies had agreed upon a secret treaty behind their backs, and that it was necessary for them to look carefully to their own interests.

Meanwhile, it was not the fault of the Netherlanders that the results attained were not more considerable. At hardly any stage of his career did the brilliant military talents of Maurice shine more conspicuously than in the campaign of 1597. It began with the astonishing victory of Turnhout. Near that village lay a considerable force under the command of an officer named Varax, which ravaged the neighbourhood far and near. In January, while the armies were still in their winter quarters, Maurice, at the head of a body of troops rapidly collected from various garrison towns, set out with such secrecy and despatch that he arrived quite unexpectedly within a few miles of Varax' camp. The Spanish General determined to effect a retreat under cover of the night. Maurice set out in pursuit with his cavalry only, and a couple of hundred musketeers mounted behind the riders, less than 800 men in all. He came up with the enemy, just in time to prevent their making their escape behind a morass, and at once gave orders to charge. Varax did his utmost to draw up his wearied troops in order of battle; but no time was given him, and the rout was complete. In half-an-hour all was over. Out of a force of some 4500 men, 2000 were killed, among them Varax himself; 500 prisoners were taken and 38 standards. Maurice lost only eight or ten men, and was back at the Hague within a week, having freed North Brabant and Zeeland from the incursions of the enemy.

The summer campaign was one long succession of triumphs for the States. The Archduke had not enough money to maintain a large army on both his northern and his southern frontier, and had resolved to direct his chief attention to the French side. Henry IV was in even worse want of means; and the capture by the Spaniards of Amiens, with a quantity of stores, was a severe blow to him. But the way was now open to Maurice for prosecuting siege after siege without fear of interference. Rheinberg, Meurs, Groenloo, Bredevoort, Enschede, Ootmarsum, Oldenzaal, and Lingen all fell into his hands, and a very large district was added to the territory acknowledging the authority of the States General.

The advantages of the French alliance, however, had ceased before the opening of another campaign on May 2, 1598. Henry concluded peace with Philip at Vervins. In vain the States had done their utmost to prevent this result. They were more successful with Elizabeth, to whom they sent an embassy, in which Oldenbarneveldt personally took part. She consented to continue the war with Spain on condition that the States repaid by instalments her loan to them, and agreed to send

a large force to England in case of a Spanish invasion. On the other hand she consented henceforth to have only one representative on the Council of State, and to allow the English troops in the service of the Netherlands, including among these the garrisons of the cautionary towns, to take the oath of allegiance to the States General.

It had been for some time the intention of Philip to marry his eldest daughter, Isabel Clara Eugenia, to her cousin, Archduke Albert, and to erect the Netherland Provinces into a sovereign State under their joint rule. Philip wished to conciliate the Netherlanders by conceding to them the appearance of independence; but the contract, and a secret agreement which accompanied it, was intended not only to secure the reversion of the Provinces to the Crown of Spain in case the Archduke should be childless, but to keep them in many respects subordinate to Spain, and under Spanish suzerainty. Philip was undoubtedly prompted to take this step, in the first place by affection for a daughter to whom he was deeply attached; and in the second place by his sincere zeal for the Catholic faith. Both Albert and Isabel possessed many qualities which fitted them for the difficult task.

In May the instrument was signed which erected the old Burgundian Provinces into a separate State under the rule of a descendant of Charles the Bold. In September Philip II died. In November the Archduke Albert, who had resigned his ecclesiastical dignities, was married by proxy to the Infanta, who was still in Spain. The old *régime* had passed away.

The hopes of reunion and of peace placed upon the advent of the Archdukes were speedily dissipated. Even in the south the new sovereigns were received without enthusiasm and with suspicion. It was felt that a government was being set up, imbued with Spanish ideas, guided by Spanish councillors, and relying on Spanish garrisons. The war and the Inquisition had effectually crushed out all life and enterprise in the southern Provinces; and the mere presence of a resident Court and well-intentioned rulers at Brussels could do little to restore a ruined and desolate land. Very different was the state of things north of the Scheldt. Here the long struggle for existence had filled the people with a new spirit, and, so far from bringing in their train exhaustion and misery, the very burdens of the war had been productive of unexampled prosperity. Nothing in history is more remarkable than the condition of the United Provinces, and especially of the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland, at the end of thirty years of incessant warfare.

They had become the chief trading country of the world. The riveting of the Spanish yoke upon Brabant and Flanders by the arms of Parma had driven the wealthiest and most enterprising of the inhabitants of Antwerp, Bruges, and Ghent to take refuge in Holland and Zeeland, whither they brought with them their energy, their commercial knowledge, and their experience of affairs. The Hollanders and

Zeelanders were above all things sea-faring folk; and their industries had up to the time of the revolt been all connected with the sea. Their fisheries, and especially the herring fishery, employed many thousands of boats and fishermen, and were a great source of wealth. They were the carriers whose ships brought the corn and the timber from the Baltic, the wines from Spain and France, the salt from the Cape Verde Islands, to the wharves and warehouses of the Zuiderzee and the Meuse, and again distributed them to foreign markets. Had the Hollanders and Zeelanders not been able to keep the seas open to their ships, the revolt must have collapsed very speedily. As it was, their trade with each succeeding year grew and prospered. Even the Spaniards themselves were dependent upon their hated enemies for the very necessities of life; and the Dutchmen did not scruple to supply their foes when it was to their own profit. Thus trade thrived by the war, and the war was maintained by the wealth poured into the country, while the crushing burden of the taxes was lightened by the product of the charges for licenses and convoys, which were really paid by the foreigner. Commerce became a passion with the Hollanders and Zeelanders; and eagerness after gain by the expansion of trade possessed itself of all classes. The armies commanded by Maurice were mainly composed of foreigners; the Netherlands themselves made the sea their element. In 1587 800 vessels passed through the Sound for corn and timber. In 1590 the Dutchmen, not content with carrying the corn as far as Spain southwards, penetrated into the Mediterranean and supplied Genoa, Naples, and other Italian towns with their commodities; and shortly afterwards they made their way to Constantinople and the Levant, under a permit from the Sultan obtained by the good offices of Henry IV. So greatly had this trade grown by the end of the century that in 1601 between 800 and 900 vessels sailed from Amsterdam for the Baltic to fetch corn within three days. Scarcely less remarkable was the expansion of the timber trade. In 1596 the first saw-mill was erected at Zaandam. During the decade that followed, the shores of the Zaan became the staple of the timber trade of Europe. At the neighbouring ports of Hoorn and Enkhuysen shipbuilding attained a perfection unknown in other lands. The cloth and the linen trades also flourished, introduced by the skilled Flemish weavers, who fled from persecution to Leyden and Haarlem. English cloth was imported to Holland to be dyed, and was sold as Dutch.

Nor was the enterprise of this nation of traders confined to the European seas. The Gold Coast of Africa, both the Indies, and even distant China, allured adventurers to seek in these distant regions, at the expense of the hated Spaniard, who claimed the monopoly of the Oceans East and West alike, fortunes surpassing those which were made in Europe. A certain Balthasar de Moucheron, a merchant of French extraction, who had been settled at Antwerp and fled from that city to

Middelburg at the time of its capture by Parma, was the pioneer in these first efforts at a world-wide expansion of commerce. His earliest attempt was directed to the opening out of trade with Russia. In 1584 he established a factory at Archangel on the White Sea. This intercourse with the far North led to a scheme for reaching China and the East by the route of northern Asia, for which, after laying his plans before the Stadholder and the Advocate, Moucheron secured the support of the States of Holland. In 1594 two small vessels sailed from the Texel under Willem Barendsz; they succeeded in passing through the Waigaats in open water, but were quickly stopped by ice. Undeterred by the failure a larger fleet, under Heemskerk and Barendsz, in 1596 essayed the same venture. Amidst incredible sufferings the winter was passed on the inhospitable shores of Nova Zembla. Barendsz himself perished, but a remnant under Heemskerk made their escape home. The effort again was fruitless; but the story of these brave men's wintering in the frozen polar seas fascinated their contemporaries.

The first voyage to the Gold Coast of Guinea was undertaken by Barent Eriksen of Medemblik, in 1593; and from this time forward an ever increasing number of ships made their way to the various river mouths of the bight of Guinea, and established friendly relations and a lucrative trade with the natives of the country. The first actual conquest on this coast was made by a large expedition despatched in 1598 by Balthasar de Moucheron for the seizure of the island Del Principe. But, before this, the daring enterprise of the two brothers Houtman had carried the Netherlands flag to the shores of India and the Malay Archipelago. The way thither was no secret, for numerous Dutch sailors served on Portuguese ships, and had thus learned the route to Mozambique, Goa, and Molucca. The *Itinerarium* of the famous traveller, Jan Huyghen Linschoten, a native of Enkhuyzen, who spent five years in the East Indies, aroused universal interest. Already during the period of the Leicester régime Linschoten found many of his countrymen occupying positions of trust in various parts of the far East. Linschoten, in 1594, went out as Commissary of the States of Holland on the first expedition sent by Moucheron to discover the North-West Passage; and at this very time another expedition was being prepared by certain Amsterdam merchants to sail direct for the Indies by the usual route round the Cape. The moving spirit of this voyage was Cornelis Houtman of Gouda, who, like Linschoten, had been in the Portuguese ships, and who, as upper commissary, was in command of the four vessels which set sail on April 2, 1595. They visited Madagascar, Java, Goa, and Molucca with varied fortunes, and after many dangers and hardships reached Amsterdam once more in July, 1597. Several small Companies were now formed for exploiting the rich regions which had for so long been the preserve of the Portuguese—three at Amsterdam, two at Rotterdam, two in Zeeland, one at Delft. In 1598 no less

than eight large East India merchantmen were despatched by three of these Companies. A new source of national wealth had been discovered, and the only fear was that the trade would be ruined by the unlimited competition. Hitherto the principle of Dutch commerce had been that of absolute free trade. Now for the first time a monopoly was created under the auspices of Oldenbarneveldt, and by the efforts of the States of Holland a Charter was, on March 20, 1601, granted to an East India Company for twenty-one years. This Company received, under certain restrictions, the exclusive right of trade to the East Indies under the protection of the States General, and was allowed to erect factories and forts, and to make alliances and treaties with the native princes and potentates, appoint governors, and employ troops. The Company was divided into Chambers, corresponding to the various small Companies, which had been amalgamated. The supreme government lay with a body, known as the Seventeen, on which Amsterdam had eight representatives, Zeeland four, the Meuse and North Quarter each two, the last three having the right of jointly electing a third member. This great Company thus came into existence a short time before its English rival, and has the distinction of being the first of all Chartered Companies, and the model imitated by its many successors.

Not content even with this extension of the sphere of their commercial enterprises and its vast possibilities, the eyes of the keen and eager traders were already turning westward as well as eastward. Netherlanders had first made acquaintance with the West Indies and Brazil in the Spanish or Portuguese service; and in 1593 Barent Erikszen, in his voyage to Guinea, had proceeded across the Atlantic to Brazil. It was, however, the fame of Raleigh's voyages, and his account of the Golden city of Manoa and the fabled riches of Guiana that spurred on the imagination of the adventurous Hollanders and Zeelanders with feverish dreams of untold wealth, and led them to follow in his steps. Moucheron was again among the pioneers; and Dutch trading ships laden with articles of barter were to be found entering the Amazon, coasting along the shores of Guiana, and returning with cargoes of salt from the mines of Punta del Rey beyond the Orinoco. A certain Willem Usselincx, also a Flemish refugee, first began to make his name known in the last decade of the sixteenth century as a strenuous advocate for the creation of a chartered West India Company. He did not succeed at this time; but for a quarter of a century he gave himself unceasingly to the task of urging upon the authorities the advantages and profits to be obtained by the establishment of colonies upon the American continent.

Thus, then, their war for life and death had stirred the sluggish blood of the Dutch people, and had aroused in them a most extraordinary spirit of energy and enterprise. Peace overtures, unless accompanied by the concession of all their demands, were unlikely to find acceptance

among traders thriving at the expense of their enemies, and dreading lest the cessation of warfare should close to them their best markets.

Albert and Isabel did not make their *joyeuse entrée* into Brussels until the close of 1599. During the absence of the Archduke the Spanish armies had been under the command of the Admiral of Aragon, Mendoza, who, making the duchy of Cleves his head-quarters, had mastered Wesel, Rheinberg and other strong places on the Rhine. The eastern Provinces were still mainly Catholic, and contained many Spanish sympathisers; but, in spite of disputes and discontents in Friesland, and still more in Groningen, Maurice at the head of a small army more than held his own. The difficulty of raising taxes in these Provinces, and also in Drenthe, Overijssel, and Gelderland, inclined the States General and the States of Holland during 1599 to content themselves with defensive warfare. In the following year, however, it was determined to raise a large force for offensive operations, and to undertake an invasion of Flanders with a view to the capture of Dunkirk. This seaport had for years been a nest of audacious pirates, who, by lying in wait for the Dutch merchantmen in the narrow seas, had become a constantly increasing menace and danger to navigation. All efforts to check the corsairs by armed force had proved in vain, though in the fierce fights which took place no quarter was given or taken. For the extirpation of the pirates by means of a land attack, an army of 12,000 men was embarked at Rammekens June 21, 1600, under the command of the Stadholder. The plan was to convey the troops by sea direct to Ostend, which had always throughout the war remained in the hands of the States, and was their sole possession in Flanders; hence to march straight along the sea-shore and, after capturing Nieuport, to use it as a base for the further advance on Dunkirk.

Curiously enough, this bold scheme of operations was proposed and carried out by the States General—in other words, by Oldenbarneveldt, who was supreme in that Assembly—in spite of the opposition of Maurice and William Lewis, both of whom, together with all the other experienced military leaders, were adverse to so extremely hazardous an enterprise. Oldenbarneveldt had persuaded their High Mightinesses that the moment was opportune for such a stroke, because a large part of the Archduke's troops were in open mutiny for lack of pay, and it was known that he had no funds for satisfying them. Maurice, on the other hand, believed it unsafe to denude the United Provinces of their entire field army, and expose it, when far away from its base in an enemy's country, to the risk of being cut off and possibly destroyed. The States General, however, persisted; and Maurice now set to work with his usual thoroughness. At his request, however, a deputation of the States General took up their residence in Ostend, to share the responsibility of the commander. Difficulties arose from the outset. Prevented from sailing by contrary winds, the army was forced to land

in Flanders at Sas de Ghent, and to march by land to Nieuport. On June 27, the fort of Oudenburg was taken, and a garrison left in it; on July 1, Maurice reached Nieuport and proceeded to invest the town.

Meanwhile the Archdukes had not been idle. By lavish promises Albert and Isabel succeeded in winning back the mutineers; and with great rapidity 10,000 foot and 1500 cavalry were gathered together, all of them seasoned troops. With this army the Archduke quickly followed on the tracks of Maurice, seized Oudenburg by surprise on July 1, and thus cut off the communications of the Stadholder with Ostend and the United Provinces. The news of the rapid approach of the enemy was brought to Maurice by a fugitive. It found the States' army separated into two parts by the tidal creek which formed the harbour of Nieuport, and which could only be crossed at low water. A few miles to the north a small marshy stream over which on the previous morning Maurice had thrown a bridge at Leffingen, entered the sea. He now despatched his cousin Ernest Casimir with 2000 infantry, Scots and Zeelanders, and four squadrons of cavalry, to seize the bridge and hold it against the Archduke, until he was able to extricate the main body of the States' army from their dangerous position. When Ernest Casimir arrived at Leffingen, the bridge was already in Albert's hands; but he drew up his small force in battle order on the downs to check the further advance of the Spaniards. Then ensued one of those unaccountable panics which sometimes seize the bravest soldiers. The Dutch cavalry turned their backs at the first onset; and their example infected the infantry, who, throwing away their arms, rushed along the downs and on to the beach in headlong flight. Upwards of 800 were butchered or drowned, the chief loss falling upon the Scots. The sight of vessels putting out of the harbour of Nieuport, and the argument that never yet had Netherlanders withstood the Spanish veterans in the open field, determined Albert to give the order to advance. Meanwhile the ebb had enabled Maurice to march his troops across the haven and draw them up in line of battle on the downs. The ships that had been seen by the Spaniards were his transports, sent by him out of the harbour probably to save them from the risk of being set on fire by the garrison of Nieuport, while he and his army were fighting on the downs. At 2 o'clock in the afternoon of July 2 the battle was formed. A brilliant charge of the States' cavalry under Lewis Günther of Nassau opened the proceedings, and then the solid mass of the Spanish and Italian foot, veterans who had conquered in many a hard-fought field, fell upon the vanguard of Maurice's army, consisting of 2600 English and 2800 Frisians under Sir Francis Vere. For more than three hours every hillock and hollow of the sandy dunes was contested on both sides hand to hand; backwards and forwards the conflict flowed, until at last the gallant Vere himself was carried from the field severely wounded. Then the Englishmen and Frisians slowly gave way, foot by foot, with their faces still to the foe.

Lewis Günther's cavalry attempted to relieve them by a fierce charge; but it was driven back in confusion, and when the Archduke, who had been in the thick of the fight all day, ordered up his reserves, the States' army began to retire in disorder. All seemed lost. But Maurice, conspicuous by his orange plumes, threw himself into the ranks of the fugitives, and succeeded in rallying a portion of his troops. The effect was instantaneous, for their adversaries in their turn were thoroughly worn out by their two battles in the same day. A momentary pause in their advance enabled Maurice, with the keen eye of a great captain, to hurl upon their flank three squadrons of cavalry that he had kept as a last reserve. Scarcely offering any resistance the army of the Archduke fell into inextricable confusion, turned their backs and fled. Albert himself only just succeeded in making his escape to Bruges. Of his army 5000 were killed, above 700 were made prisoners, among them a number of distinguished officers, including Mendoza, and 105 standards were taken. Thus Maurice and his army were saved from the very jaws of destruction. But though the fame of the victory, which showed that even in the open field the dreaded Spanish infantry were not invincible, spread through Europe, it was in reality a barren triumph. In spite of the opposition of the States, Maurice resolved to run no more risks. He led back his army to Holland, and attempted no further active operations. At this time were sown the seeds of the unhappy dissension between the Stadholder and the Advocate.

During the next three years the siege of Ostend (July 15, 1601—September 20, 1604) occupied the energies of both combatants. The Archduke Albert had made up his mind to capture this seaport, which in the hands of the Dutch was a perpetual thorn in the side of Flanders. But the town was open to the sea, and was continually supplied from Zeeland with provisions, munitions, and reinforcements. Its first Governor, Sir Francis Vere, was followed by a succession of brave and capable men, the majority of whom died fighting. Never was a more valorous defence, never a more obstinate attack. It was a long story of mines and counter-mines, of desperate assaults and bloody repulses, of fort after fort captured, only to find fresh forts and new lines of defence constructed by the indefatigable garrison. The efforts of Maurice in 1601 were confined to the recapture of the Rhine fortresses, Rheinberg and Meurs. In 1602 the important stronghold of Grave on the Meuse surrendered to him after a two months' siege. In the autumn of 1603 Marquis Ambrosio de Spinola assumed command of the Spanish forces before Ostend. He was a rich Genoese banker, who, though without any experience of war, had offered his services and his money to the Archdukes, promising them that he would take Ostend. He kept his word. With a reckless expenditure of life, what was left of the town fell piece by piece into his hands. At length, in April, 1604, the Stadholder yielded somewhat sullenly to the pressing requests of the

States General, and led an army of 11,000 men into Flanders, seeking to relieve the pressure upon Ostend, by laying siege to the equally important seaport of Sluys. It fell into his hands in August. Ostend was now at its last gasp, and the Stadholder was ordered to essay its relief by a direct march against Spinola's investing army. Maurice and William Lewis protested, but their protests were overruled. Before, however, they began to march southwards, Ostend had been surrendered, September 20. The town had already ceased to exist; and Spinola found himself after all the master of a heap of confused and hideous ruins. The siege had lasted three years and seventy-seven days, and had cost the Archdukes, according to some authorities, the lives of more than 70,000 soldiers. The gallant defenders had succeeded in draining away the main strength of the Belgian forces, and in exhausting the resources of the Brussels treasury; and before they had surrendered the poor little town on the sand dunes with its miserable harbour, the States had in Sluys possessed themselves of another Flemish seaport, far more commodiously situated, and enabling them to command the southern entrance to the Scheldt. Sluys was strongly garrisoned; and Frederick Henry, Maurice's younger brother, now twenty years of age, was appointed its Governor.

The military events of the next two years require but the briefest notice. The States were now isolated. James I of England had concluded a treaty of friendship with the Archdukes. Henry IV of France was lukewarm. Maurice was now confronted by an active and exceedingly able young general, Spinola, whose army had confidence in its leader, and, being regularly paid at his cost, followed him cheerfully. The policy of the Stadholder, who since the Nieuport campaign had been on far from friendly relations with Oldenbarneveltd and the States General, was strictly defensive. Yet such was the skill and vigour of Spinola that even in this Maurice was scarcely successful. The two armies faced each other for some time in the neighbourhood of Sluys, when, at the end of July, the Marquis made a sudden and rapid march northwards towards Friesland. Spinola captured Oldenzaal and Lingen before Maurice was able to relieve these towns; and, had he pressed on to Coewarden, it would probably have fallen into his hands, and the north-eastern Provinces would have lain at his mercy. But he paused in his march, perhaps from lack of supplies, and finally retreated towards the junction of the Rühr with the Rhine. While halting here, an attempt was made by Maurice on October 8, 1605, to surprise an isolated body of Italian cavalry. But a sudden panic seized the States' troops, and despite the desperate exertions of Frederick Henry, who, at the risk of his life, succeeded in rallying some of the flying troops, a sharp and humiliating reverse closed the campaign. The events of 1605 certainly damaged the Stadholder's reputation.

A severe illness kept Spinola from the front the whole of the next spring; but in June he set out with the intention of forcing the passage

of the Waal or the Yssel, and making an inroad into the very heart of the United Provinces. He was thwarted partly by the skilful defensive positions taken up by Maurice, but still more by a season of continuous rain, which turned the whole country into a morass. Foiled in his main purpose Spinola laid siege in succession to Groll and Rheinberg, both of which were taken, without any attempt on the part of Maurice to relieve them. His conduct throughout these operations excited some censure both among friends and foes; but his Fabian tactics were undoubtedly advantageous to the interests of the States. For the Brussels treasury was empty, Spinola's personal credit exhausted, and mutiny rife among his troops. Moreover it was on sea, and not on land, that the most damaging blows could be struck at the unwieldy empire of Spain.

The operations of the East India Company had been on a large scale, and had been attended with much success. Not merely had the monopoly of Spain and Portugal in the Orient been invaded, but their dominion there had been seriously shaken. A great fleet of seventeen vessels under the command of Admiral Warwyck and Vice-Admiral de Weert sailed in 1602, and was absent for more than five years. All the principal islands of the Malay Archipelago, as well as Ceylon, Siam, and China, were visited. In 1604 another expedition of thirteen ships, under Steven van der Hagen, was sent to Malabar and the Moluccas. Factories were established and ports built at Amboina, Tidor, and other places; and the fleet returned in 1606 with a very rich cargo of cloves and other spices. On his return voyage van der Hagen met at Mauritius a third outward-bound fleet of the Company, under Cornelis Matelief. This force consisted of eleven small armed ships, manned by 1400 sailors. In the summer of 1606 Matelief laid siege to the Portuguese fortress of Malacca, situate in a commanding position at the southernmost extremity of the Malay Peninsula. Here he was attacked on August 17 by Alphonso de Castro, the Spanish Viceroy of India, at the head of a vastly superior fleet, consisting of eighteen galleons and galleys, carrying 4000 to 5000 soldiers and sailors. A fierce but indecisive action resulted in the first instance in the raising of the siege of Malacca. On hearing, however, that de Castro had sailed away, leaving only ten ships in the roadstead of Malacca for the defence of the place, Matelief returned, and, on September 21, fell upon the Spaniards. One of the most complete victories in naval records was the result. Every single vessel of the enemy was destroyed or burnt, while the Dutch scarcely lost a man. After visiting China, and establishing the authority of the Company at Amboina, Tidor, Ternate, Bantam, and other places, Matelief left the further conduct of affairs in Eastern waters to Paul van Kaarden, who met him at Bantam at the head of yet another fleet, while he himself returned home with five ships, laden with spices, bringing into the midst of peace negotiations the great tidings of his adventures and victories.

Nor were the maritime triumphs of the Netherlands confined to distant oceans. As their fleets returned, laden with rich cargoes, along the West Coast of Africa, they had to run the gauntlet of Spanish and Portuguese squadrons, suddenly putting out from Lisbon or Cadiz or other Iberian ports. After voyages extending over two or more years the East Indiamen, by the time they passed the Straits, were no longer in good seaworthy condition or fighting trim, and thus ran a constant risk of falling an easy prey to their enemies. In 1607 news reached the States of the gathering of a large Spanish fleet at Gibraltar, supposed to be destined for the East Indies; and under pressure from the directors of the East India Company the States determined to equip a large expedition with the object of either intercepting this fleet or attacking it in the Spanish harbour. Early in April twenty-six vessels set sail under the command of Jacob van Heemskerk, the hero of the Nova Zembla wintering, and one of the bravest and most skilful of Dutch seamen. He was a man gentle and quiet in private life, but the joy of battle was as the very breath of his nostrils. He found anchored in Gibraltar Bay the entire Spanish fleet of twenty-one vessels, ten of them great galleons, beside which the Dutch ships seemed mere pigmies. The Spanish Admiral d'Avila was likewise an experienced veteran, who had fought at Lepanto. Heemskerk at once gave the order to attack, and directed that each of the great galleons should be assailed by two Dutch ships, one at each side. Heemskerk laid his own flagship alongside that of d'Avila, and so opened the fight. At the very beginning of the struggle both Admirals were killed. But Heemskerk's death was concealed, and his comrades carried out his instructions, and fought with desperate resolution—in his own ship to avenge his loss, in the others as if the eye of their chief had been still upon them. The victory was complete, and the Spanish fleet was annihilated. Between two and three thousand of their crews perished. On the Dutch side no ship was destroyed, and only about a hundred sailors were killed. This crushing and humiliating disaster to the Spanish arms had a powerful effect in hastening forward the negotiations for peace, in which both parties, now thoroughly weary of war, were at the time seriously engaged.

The first step had been taken by the Archdukes, who secretly despatched Father Neyen, Albert's Franciscan confessor, to open relations with Oldenbarneveldt and the Stadholder. The States, however, refused to enter into negotiations of any sort, unless they were treated as a free and independent Power. The Archdukes therefore at length consented to negotiate with the United Provinces "in the quality and as considering them free Provinces and States, over which they had no pretensions," subject to the ratification of the King of Spain within three months. They offered to negotiate either on the basis of a peace, or for a truce for twelve, fifteen, or twenty years. Meanwhile, it was arranged

that an armistice for eight months should be concluded, Heemskerck's fleet recalled, and no military operations of any kind carried on.

At the very beginning of the negotiations it was clear that in the United Provinces there was much division of opinion. On the side of peace stood Oldenbarneveltdt, and with him a majority of the burgher regents, who believed that the land could no longer bear the burden of taxation, and that the prosperity which had attended commerce in war-time would be largely increased by peace, so long as sufficiently favourable terms as to liberty of trading could be secured. At the head of the war party was Prince Maurice, with William Lewis of Friesland, the military and naval leaders, and a considerable number of the leading merchants. Maurice had lived in camps from boyhood; his fame had been won, not in the Council Chamber, but at the head of armies. Peace for him meant enforced idleness and great loss of emoluments. Still, though not uninfluenced by personal motives, both he and William Lewis were far too good patriots not to put on one side any purely selfish reasons for opposing that which they believed to be to the advantage of the land. But they and those who thought with them did not trust the Spaniard. They did not believe that peace could be obtained without closing the Spanish Indies, East and West, to Dutch trade; and, with numbers of their countrymen, they dreaded lest the southern Netherlands should once more become formidable commercial rivals, and Antwerp again, as a seaport, vie with and perhaps surpass Amsterdam.

At last, in October, 1607, it was signified that the King agreed to treat with the States as independent parties, but on condition that religious liberty to Catholics should be conceded during the negotiations. The document was in many points far from pleasing to the States, but by the exertions of the French Ambassador, President Jeannin, and his English colleague, difficulties were smoothed away, and at last, on February 1, 1608, the envoys from Brussels arrived in Holland, with a brilliant retinue. At the head of the deputation were Spinola and Richardot, the president of the Archduke's Privy Council. The stately procession was met near Ryswyk by the Stadholders, Maurice and William Lewis of Nassau, attended by a splendid suite. The two famous Generals greeted one another with much ceremony and courtesy, and side by side made their entry into the Hague. The States General appointed as Special Commissioners to represent the United Provinces, Count William Lewis of Nassau and Walraven, Lord of Brederode, and with them were associated a deputy from each of the seven Provinces under the leadership of Oldenbarneveltdt, as the representative of Holland. The envoys of France, England, Denmark, the Palatinate, and Brandenburg took an active part in the discussions; and it was largely owing to the skill and sagacity of Jeannin that in spite of almost insuperable difficulties an agreement was eventually arrived at.

The admission of the independence and sovereignty of the United Provinces met with less opposition on the part of the Archdukes than was expected. Their policy, though not openly avowed, was to conclude a truce, not a peace, and thus to leave the dispute as to the sovereignty over the Provinces to the arbitrament of a future war. It was a concession intended to be temporary, made with the object of gaining time for recruiting their ruined finances and gathering fresh resources, so as to renew hostilities at a favourable opportunity. Richardot raised no difficulties as to the declaration of independence; indeed, he said plainly, that he had full powers to treat with them "as free States," or as a kingdom, if they pleased so to name themselves. The objection raised by the Dutch against the use of the seal of the seventeen Provinces by the Archdukes caused more difficulty, but on this point also Richardot at length gave way. The avowed object was still to conclude a definite peace; for Maurice and his party had declared themselves absolutely opposed to a truce, and the Spanish-Belgian representatives were too clever diplomatists to show their hand at so early a stage of the discussions. The two thorny questions related to freedom of trade in the Indies, and to liberty of public worship to the Roman Catholics in the States.

At first the question as to religious liberty was allowed to fall into the background; and for week after week the right of trading in the Indies was acrimoniously discussed. Public opinion in the Provinces, and especially in Holland, was deeply stirred; a long series of pamphlets issued from the printing-press against the peace; the traders and the Calvinist preachers were all strongly on the side of Maurice; and Oldenbarneveldt was roundly accused of being a traitor in the pay of Spain. Even had he felt disposed to yield as to the Indian trade—and there is nothing to show that his determination to uphold freedom of commerce ever wavered—the Advocate, with all his self-will and firmness of purpose, dared not hold out against the public voice. The Spaniards, on the other hand, would not yield in a matter touching the traditional principles of their policy. A deadlock ensued. The time of the armistice expired and had to be renewed. Several of the foreign envoys left the Hague. President Jeannin went to Paris to consult the King, and Father Neyen journeyed to Madrid. On his return it was found that the King of Spain insisted on closing the Indies to foreign traders, and also on the reestablishment of public Roman Catholic worship. But on each of these points the deputies of the States were likewise steadfast; the negotiations appeared to be broken off; and both sides were preparing for a renewal of the war, when a proposal was made by the envoys of France and England to act as mediators on the basis of a twelve years' truce. The real author of the proposal was the resourceful President Jeannin. Peace was plainly impossible. But Jeannin hoped to induce the Dutch to agree to a truce on condition

that, so long as it lasted, the trade to India should remain free, and the religious question untouched. He was probably aware that the Spaniards were eager for such a proposal and would make sacrifices to obtain the respite from war that was so necessary to them. The difficulty lay in the attitude of Maurice, who had from the first been utterly averse to a truce; but on the other hand Oldenbarneveldt was heart and soul with the President. The skilful arguments of the French envoy; and the powerful influence and persuasions of the Advocate gradually won over the assent of the Provinces, though Zeeland was long recalcitrant; and at last the Stadholder sullenly and doubtfully gave way. The final discussions took place at Antwerp; and on April 9, 1609, the long drawn out parleyings at length came to an end, and a truce for twelve years was signed and sealed. Jeannin was able to inform the French King that his labours had been crowned with success "to the general satisfaction of every one, and even of Prince Maurice."

The suspension of hostilities recognised the *status quo* as regarded territorial possessions; and all points on which the States had insisted were conceded. The treaty was concluded with them "in the quality of free States over which the Archdukes made no pretensions." No mention was made of granting liberty of worship to Roman Catholics; but, in a secret treaty consisting of a single clause, the King of Spain promised that during the truce he would cause no impediment to the traffic of the Dutch in whatever place it might be carried on. To save Spanish pride the word "Indies" was never mentioned, though it was implied. The concession of freedom of trade thus wrung from Philip III was one that nothing but dire necessity would ever have induced a King of Spain to grant.

The immediate effect of the truce was an increase of Oldenbarneveldt's influence over the policy and government of the new Republic, which now for the first time took its place in the European system "as a free and independent State." To the Advocate's statecraft had been very largely due the building up of the Commonwealth during the quarter of a century after the murder of William the Silent. He was now, during the opening period of the twelve years' truce, by his consummate skill in the conduct of foreign affairs, to secure for the United Provinces a weight and influence in the councils of Europe out of all proportion to the size or population of the new-born State.

A critical question arose for settlement almost immediately after the signing of the truce. The death in March, 1609, of Duke John William of Jülich and Cleves without male heirs brought a number of claimants for the vacant succession into the field; and the principal competitors, the Elector of Brandenburg and the Count Palatine of Neuburg, came to an understanding to occupy the disputed territory jointly, whence they were known as "the Possessors." The Dutch, whose interest in the

matter was clear, since the duchies lay upon their borders, and it was important for their security that this territory should not fall into the hands of a Spanish partisan, were willing to recognise "the Possessors" accordingly. But the Emperor had not acknowledged their claims, and had allowed Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau, to enter the duchies at the head of an armed force and seize the fortress of Jülich. Henry IV of France, who had long been meditating war against the House of Habsburg, and who was at the moment exceedingly irritated with the Archdukes because they had given refuge at Brussels to the fugitive Princess of Condé, seized the occasion offered by the Jülich succession to hurry on his armaments, and he did his utmost to induce the States to join him in overthrowing the power of their hereditary enemies. The French armies were already marching to the Rhine and the Pyrenees; and the States had agreed to support the invasion of Germany with an army of 18,000 men under Prince Maurice, when the knife of Ravallac terminated the career and the schemes of Henry on May 14, 1610.

The new French government was well-disposed to Spain and Austria; and a complete change of policy took place. The States thus escaped being drawn into a large war; but it was felt that it was impossible for them to allow the duchies to fall into the hands of an Austrian prince. Maurice therefore in the early summer marched into the country and laid siege to Jülich. Though the place was strong, it capitulated on September 1; and the Archduke left the territory. Not till 1613 was the interference of the Dutch in the affairs of the duchies again called for. In that year, as was sooner or later to be expected, the "Possessors" fell out; and Neuburg called in Catholic aid for the maintenance of his rights. Hostilities ensued, and Maurice and Spinola once again found themselves face to face in the field. There was, however, no actual fighting; and the dispute was settled without serious consequences by the treaty of Xanten (November 12, 1614), by which a division of the duchies was made between the two rivals.

The relations of the Republic with England had meanwhile required delicate handling. The wide extension of Dutch commerce caused no small jealousy and envy to Englishmen. English trade had also been growing, though to a far less extent than that of their neighbours; and Dutch and English traders had met in rivalry on many distant seas. At the time of the signature of the truce, the burning question between the two nations was that of fishing rights. At the beginning of the seventeenth century the herring fishery employed more hands in the Provinces than any other occupation; and many thousands of households lived by it. The right to fish on the English coast had been conceded by ancient treaties, and had been unchallenged since its confirmation by the well-known *Magnus Intercursus* of 1496. But since, in the last years of Elizabeth, English fishery had grown, quarrels frequently arose between the fishermen; and the claims of England to the *dominium*

maris in the seas which washed its shores began to be loudly disputed. The result was that in May, 1609, James I issued an edict imposing a tax on all foreigners fishing in English waters. The terms were general, but it was directed against the Dutch. An embassy was accordingly sent to England in the spring of 1610, whose chief object was to endeavour to obtain the withdrawal of the fishery edict, or at least a favourable modification of it. Friendly relations with the States were at that time of importance to James, as a counterpoise to the *rapprochement* between France and Spain after the death of Henry; and after no small wrangling and controversy over the juridical points raised in Grotius' treatise, *Mare Liberum*, published in the previous year, the King consented to a suspension of the offensive tax. The wranglings over the legal aspects of the question went on, however, year by year; many pamphlets were written and public opinion was strongly roused on both sides of the North Sea. At last, in 1616, James then leaning towards a Spanish alliance, the tax was reimposed; whereupon serious collisions ensued, and actual fighting took place between the royal officers who tried to collect the tax and the Dutch fisherfolk, who sturdily refused to pay. Nor was this the only cause of dissension between the nations. Strife had arisen between the traders of the rival East India Companies in the Indian seas, and Englishmen had been killed by Dutchmen at Amboina. In Russia, too, upon the shores of the White Sea, the same struggle for commercial privileges was in progress. Off the inhospitable coasts of Spitzbergen and Greenland the whalers of the two nationalities had hostile encounters, and had to be escorted by armed convoys. Such was the bitterness of feeling that, in 1618, another important embassy to King James found great difficulty in arriving at an understanding on most of the points in dispute. The skilful diplomacy of Oldenbarneveldt had for some years previously greatly improved the relations of the States with England. The retention of the cautionary towns by the English sovereign had always been a menace to the security of the Provinces of Holland and Zeeland, and had cast a kind of slur over the newly acquired independence of the Republic. In 1615 the Advocate took advantage of the financial needs of James, always in want of money, to offer him a sum of £250,000 for the restoration of the pledged towns—£100,000 in cash, and £50,000 in three instalments at six months' intervals. The amount was far less than the debt claimed by England, but James was tempted by the offer, and Oldenbarneveldt at once closed with the King. In June, 1616, the English garrisons were withdrawn.

The sphere of Oldenbarneveldt's diplomatic activity was by no means confined to the immediately neighbouring States. An alliance was concluded with the Hanse towns; and in 1615 an army of 7000 men under Frederick Henry advanced into Germany and raised the siege of Brunswick, which was beleaguered by Christian IV of Denmark. The object of this alliance was to secure a still greater hold over the Baltic

trade, and to compel the warlike King of Denmark to lower the dues charged by him for the passage of the Sound. With this object embassies were also sent to Sweden and Russia, and friendly relations established with those countries. In 1614 a Russian embassy appeared at the Hague. The Advocate's son-in-law, van der Myle, was in 1609 despatched upon a mission to Venice. The Venetians had been for some time friendly to the States; and in 1610 their first ambassador, Tommaso Contarini, arrived in Holland. The object was to free the Dutch trade in the Mediterranean; and a commercial treaty (1609) with Morocco and a mission to Constantinople (1612) gave proof of Oldenbarneveldt's vigilant and far-seeing foreign policy. Within a few years of the conclusion of the truce, he had secured for the United Provinces a recognised position among European Powers, and had established his claim to be consulted on all matters affecting international politics.

A sad reverse to this picture of advancing influence and prosperity is offered by the story, during the same period, of the internal affairs of the Republic. It must be remembered that in 1609 there existed no such thing as a Dutch nation, but, instead of it, only a congeries of provinces and town corporations, each of them with sovereign attributes, held together by the loosest political ties. Moreover, while this many-headed government knew no supreme controlling authority, the great mass of the people had no voice in the control of their own affairs. A large majority, possibly two-thirds, of the entire population adhered to the ancient Catholic faith, and submitted to exclusion by an intolerant Protestant minority from all political rights and from the exercise of public worship. Nor had even this Protestant population any real voice, as such, in the government of the country. There was no such thing as popular election. The town corporations, the ultimate depositaries of sovereign power, were close, self-coopting oligarchies, in no sense representative even of the Protestant inhabitants.

The situation was redeemed from impracticability, and the machinery of public administration made to work, partly because the Dutch people were by nature patient, plodding, and easily led, keen as to trade and material welfare rather than politics,—partly because the administrative and executive power had during the years of stress and struggle, which followed the departure of Leicester, come into the hands of two men, Oldenbarneveldt and Maurice of Nassau. The cessation of the war in 1609 found them face to face, suspicious of each other's aims, and treating one another in their public relations with a cold aloofness that might quickly be changed into open enmity. But Maurice, slow and inert by nature, and averse from politics, was not the man to take the initiative in opposition to the Advocate. Some years before this he might have become sovereign of the Netherlands, with the help of Oldenbarneveldt himself and the universal assent of the people, had he cared to push himself forward; and now he had no wish to interfere

with all those practical details of administration, which he knew that the burgher Statesman with his unrivalled experience was better able to discharge than any other living Netherlander. Probably no serious quarrel would ever have arisen between them on merely political grounds; but a religious crisis, which had long been threatening to reach an acute stage, arose; in the fanatical bitterness of sectarian strife civil war broke out, and the force of circumstances compelled the two leaders, though neither of them theologians or violent religious partisans, to take opposite sides.

The Protestantism of the northern Netherlands had always been Calvinistic, but not of one pattern. From the first there had been two schools of opinion—the rigidly orthodox Calvinists, who called themselves “Reformed” and were known by those of the opposite party as “precisians”; and the liberal or “evangelical” party, who were commonly spoken of as “Politicals” or “Libertines.” To this moderate “Libertine” school William the Silent himself had belonged; and it counted among its sympathisers Oldenbarneveldt, and a considerable number of the “regents.” The adherence of these two great leaders to the “Libertines” was due not so much to religious conviction, as to a statesmanlike desire for toleration in matters of faith, so far as was consistent with the national safety, in order to preserve the supremacy of the civil power over Church and State. In opposition to this party stood the large majority of the preachers and of the Reformed congregations throughout the Provinces who held predestinarian doctrines of the strictest type, and who, in the very spirit of absolute intolerance which they had so loudly condemned when exercised against themselves by the Church of Rome, would have persecuted and deprived of civic rights those who refused to subscribe to the theological dogmas and tenets set forth in the Netherland Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism. The desire of this party was that a National Synod should be summoned, which should decide authoritatively on all points of controversy and create a Reformed State Church, which would have supreme control of religion throughout the land. The “Libertines” on the other hand dreaded such a consummation, and, relying upon the provisions of Article 13 of the Union of Utrecht, insisted on the independence of the Provincial Churches, and even in this case preferred that the “*classis*” rather than the “synod” should be the unit, and that the bond between the separate congregations should be loosened rather than tightened.

From the days of Leicester the strife had gone on, until at last it was brought to a head by the rivalry of two professors of theology at Leyden, Gomarus and Arminius, the protagonists of the two Schools. Franciscus Gomarus had held his chair already for eight years, when Prince Maurice through the influence of his chaplain, the eloquent and learned Johannes Uytenbogaert, obtained from the Curators of the University in 1602 the nomination of Jacobus Arminius, for many years

well-known as a preacher at Amsterdam, to fill the chair vacant through the death of Franciscus Junius. The Prince, who did not pretend to be a theologian or to feel interest in theological disputations, little foresaw the consequences which were to follow from this appointment. Round each of these leaders a band of disciples gathered; Gomarus in lecture-room and pulpit assailed the teaching of Arminius, who on his part was as ready in attack and as skilful in defence as his adversary. The chief subject of contention and argument between them was the abstruse doctrine of predestination; and as, with the course of years, the disputes became warmer, so did their divergences of opinion tend to accentuate themselves and become wider. Repeated demands were made for the convening of a Synod to settle the disputed points and, if necessary, to revise the Confession and the Catechism; but the States, in the midst of the long protracted peace negotiations, shrank from taking a step sure to give rise to embittered feeling. In 1609, shortly after the conclusion of the truce, Arminius died. Hereupon, however, under the leadership of Uytenbogaert, and with the connivance of Oldenbarneveldt, the Arminians bound themselves together in a defensive league, and determined to appeal against the Gomarists to the States of Holland. At a convention held at Gouda, June, 1610, the famous petition known as the *Remonstrantie* was drawn up, which in five articles defined the Arminian position; and an appeal was made to the States to submit the questions raised to the judgment of a National Synod, summoned by and under the control of the civil authority. These Articles expressed the dissent of the Remonstrants (by which name the Arminians were henceforth known) from the cardinal tenets of the orthodox Calvinistic faith on the subject of predestination, election, and grace. The Gomarists replied in a *Contra-Remonstrantie* (from which they obtained the appellation of "Contra-Remonstrants"). They claimed that these matters could only be dealt with by a purely Church Synod, and in seven Articles restated in their most stringent and uncompromising form the stern dogmas of Calvin in regard to the points raised by their opponents, accusing them of holding the heresies of the Socinians and Pelagians, and of being allies of the Papists. These accusations, and especially the last, drew to the side of the Contra-Remonstrants a large majority of the Protestant portion of the population throughout the Provinces. But, although the Remonstrants were thus numerically weaker than their opponents, in nearly every part of the United Provinces they had many adherents among the privileged burgher oligarchies, and could command a majority in the States of Holland, Utrecht, and Overijssel.

Oldenbarneveldt had been greatly perturbed by these Church quarrels. As to the particular points of dispute, he probably had formed no very definite conclusions. But all his sympathies, as statesman and politician, were with the Remonstrants, in the first place because theirs was the broader and more tolerant creed, and still more,

because they did not, like their opponents, set up the authority of the Church against that of the State. He was inflexibly opposed to the claims of the ultra-Calvinists on this head, and was determined to uphold the supremacy of the secular power and its right to intervene in ecclesiastical disputes. Accordingly, in 1613, the proposals of the Contra-Remonstrants for the summoning of a National Church Synod were, through the influence of the Advocate, rejected; and in January, 1614, the States of Holland passed a resolution which forbade the preachers to treat of the disputed questions in the pulpits, and imposing upon them moderation and diffidence in dealing with such abstruse matters. The resolution was moved by the youthful Pensionary of Rotterdam, Hugo de Groot (Grotius), now rising into fame through the extraordinary brilliancy of his intellectual gifts and his many-sided learning; and it secured the votes of a majority of the States, despite the violent opposition of several important towns, including Amsterdam.

The passing of this resolution, though undoubtedly intended to be a measure of conciliation, acted as a declaration of war. Obedience was refused in Amsterdam and elsewhere by the Gomarists, supported by the Town Councils. A deputation was sent by the States to Amsterdam, with de Groot at its head, to secure obedience to the law in the commercial capital; but by a small majority the Town Council refused to cooperate. But, whatever the opposition, the Advocate was resolved to carry matters with a high hand, and, where it should be necessary, in accordance with the Church ordinance of 1591, to enforce obedience to the authority of the State. The beginning of 1617 thus saw the country on the verge of civil war. The Contra-Remonstrant Ministers were driven from Rotterdam and other places, where the Town Councils were Arminian; and in the Hague a well-known preacher, Rosaeus, being forbidden the use of his pulpit, established himself, accompanied by his congregation, close by at Ryswyk.

But now a difficulty confronted the Advocate. Popular riots broke out in many places. It became evident that his policy could not be carried out without the employment of military force, and military force could only be employed with the consent and aid of the Stadholder, who was Captain-General of the forces of the Union. But Maurice, after long hesitation, had made up his mind to join the enemies of Oldenbarneveltdt. Despite the alienation which had been growing up between him and the Advocate for a considerable number of years, Maurice was very loth to stir up civil war and to take up the sword against the great statesman, who had been his father's friend, and whose weighty services to the national cause he fully recognised. He was long undecided and halting between two opinions; for his friend and Court Chaplain, Uytenbogaert, was the leading spirit among the Remonstrants, and he himself is reported to have said on one occasion "that he was a soldier, and not a theologian," and on another "that he did

not know whether predestination were blue or green." Moreover his step-mother, Louise de Coligny, whom he was accustomed to consult, and to whom he always showed the greatest respect and deference, favoured the Arminians, as did also her son Frederick Henry. But there were powerful influences drawing him the other way, which slowly gained complete supremacy over him. The first was that of his cousin, William Lewis, who was a zealous and convinced Calvinist. William Lewis urged Maurice to take up a decided attitude in defence of the cause of the Protestant religion, the destruction of which he honestly held to be threatened by the action of Oldenbarnevelddt and the States of Holland. The arguments of William Lewis were reinforced and supported by those of Francis van Aerssens, who owed Oldenbarnevelddt a grudge for the loss of his place as ambassador of the States at Paris, and of Sir Dudley Carleton, who had lately arrived as English ambassador at the Hague. Through the persuasive insinuations of Aerssens, whose early advancement had been entirely due to Oldenbarnevelddt, and who had been his trusted friend for many years, Maurice learnt to distrust Oldenbarnevelddt, and even to believe him to be in secret collusion with the French King to the detriment of his country, and his advocacy of the Truce to have been purchased with Spanish gold. Under these influences Maurice openly proclaimed himself in favour of the Contra-Remonstrants and of their resistance to the authority of the States of Holland. Oldenbarnevelddt saw that instead of receiving the support of the Stadholder, and, therefore, of the army, he must count upon their active opposition; but he was too long accustomed to rule, and too proud, to go back from the course which he had marked out for himself. Perceiving civil war to be inevitable, he resolved on a bold step, and in December, 1616, proposed to the States of Holland that they should, in the exercise of their rights as a sovereign Province, raise a force of 4000 men, who should be in their own service, taking an oath of allegiance to them, and at the disposal of the magistrates for the enforcement of order. After some delay the Advocate prevailed. The mercenaries thus raised for special local purposes and not forming part of the regular army were known as *waardgelders*. The proposal was, however, not carried into effect until some months later, and then only partially. In truth both sides, though determined not to yield, were afraid of taking any decisive step which would entail a breach of the peace. Efforts were made at conciliation; conferences were from time to time held between Maurice and Oldenbarnevelddt, still ostensibly friends; but, as the months went by, men's minds became more and more exasperated, and the country fell asunder into two hostile camps.

The situation was full of strange anomalies. The two Stadholders working together, who were determined that a National Synod should be summoned, commanded in the States General the votes of four out of the seven Provinces. In May, 1617, the States General agreed, by a bare

majority, to hold the Synod; and the States of Holland, again by a narrow majority, refused to accede. A powerful minority, speaking in the name of six towns, chief among which was Amsterdam itself, was strongly Gomarist, and was supported by popular opinion throughout the Province.

Maurice was at length provoked to declare himself openly the champion of the Contra-Remonstrants. On July 9 forcible possession was, by direction of the Prince, taken of the Cloister Church at the Hague, for the use of the proscribed sect; and a fortnight later, July 23, the Prince, accompanied by his cousin Count William Lewis and a large retinue, attended divine service there. This direct challenge to the States of Holland the Advocate did not hesitate to take up. On August 4 he proposed to the States a momentous resolution, known as the *Scherpe Resolutie*. It was passed on the following day, the Prince himself being present in the Assembly, and was a thorough-going assertion of the sovereignty of the Province of Holland. Assent was refused to the summoning of a Synod, whether national or provincial, as infringing the rights and supremacy of the States in matters of religion. The regents of the cities were admonished to maintain the peace, and to enrol men-at-arms, when required for their security. All officials, soldiers in the pay of the Province, deputed councillors, and magistrates, were to take an oath of obedience to the States "on pain of dismissal," and were to be accountable not to the ordinary tribunals, but to the States of Holland only. Maurice was very angry, for as Stadholder he was the servant of the Provincial States, and was bound to aid in carrying out their will. It was a *reductio ad absurdum* of the position that as Captain and Admiral-General of the Union he was the servant of the States General, and bound to execute the orders of their High Mightinesses. To complicate matters, the minority in the States of Holland, headed by Reinier Pauw speaking in the name of Amsterdam, uttered a strong protest against the action of the majority; and practically there was no power but the sword to compel these recalcitrant corporations to carry out the Resolution. Indeed, they openly announced their intention of disregarding it.

The "Sharp Resolution" passed, Oldenbarneveltdt on the plea of ill-health betook himself to Utrecht, leaving de Groot and the deputed Councillors in charge of affairs at the Hague. There can be little doubt that his object was to strengthen by his presence and counsel the hands of his supporters in the States of the only Province which had continued firm on the side of Holland. He did not return to the Hague till November 6. Meanwhile levies of *waardgelders* had been raised in several cities. This led to action being taken by the States General. Urged by the two Stadholders, their High Mightinesses sent letters of warning both to the Provincial States and the several towns, in which they pointed out the dangerous consequences that might follow. Still the levies went on, although both sides hesitated to proceed

to extremities. But the leaders were active; a deluge of pamphlets, lampoons and caricatures poured forth from the press; and the partisans of the Stadholder against the Advocate, of Contra-Remonstrant against Remonstrant principles, of Provincial sovereignty against the supremacy of the States General, were preparing themselves for a struggle that had become inevitable. The most strenuous supporters of Oldenbarneveldt were the Pensionaries of Rotterdam, Leyden, and Haarlem,—de Groot, Hoogerbeets, and de Haan; his bitterest opponents were Francis van Aerssens and Reinier Pauw, burgomaster of Amsterdam. To these two last-named were due in a large measure the violent personal attacks persistently and publicly made upon the Advocate, who was accused of many crimes and misdemeanours in both his public and private life. To meet these calumnies Oldenbarneveldt published a lengthy defence of his life, character, and conduct, throughout the whole of his career. This *Remonstrantie* he presented to the States of Holland, sending a copy, accompanied by a conciliatory letter, to Maurice. Though this document has served to clear the memory of the Advocate from the aspersions of his contemporaries, it had practically no effect upon minds poisoned and prejudiced by venomous charges and scurrilous abuse.

At last the States General determined upon decisive action. Legally, they had no right to enforce their will upon a sovereign Province; but matters had come to a dead-lock; and on their side, in the ultimate resort, was the power of the sword, in the person of the Prince of Orange, whose honoured name and high deeds secured for him the willing obedience of the soldiery. On July 9, 1618, the question of the *waardgelders* was discussed at the Assembly of the States General, and on July 23 it was resolved that a Commission, with Maurice at its head, should be sent to Utrecht to demand and, if necessary, to compel the disbanding of the levy. In reply to this challenge the States of Holland sent another Commission, headed by de Groot and Hoogerbeets, to support the Utrechters and urge them to maintain their rights. It arrived on July 24, followed on the next day by the Commissioners of the Generality, with the Prince and a body of officers. As neither party showed signs of yielding, Maurice, on the evening of July 31, entered the town at the head of a body of troops. Early next morning he summoned the *waardgelders* to lay down their arms. He was at once obeyed. There was no opposition. De Groot and his colleagues hurried away; the members of the Municipal Council fled; and the Provincial Estates gave in their submission. In his capacity as Stadholder the Prince at once proceeded to appoint a new Municipal Council of Contra-Remonstrants, and to effect changes in the constitution of the States, which gave the majority to the same party. The vote of Utrecht was henceforth in favour of the summoning of a National Synod. Holland was isolated and stood alone.

This was the beginning of the end. Obstinate spirits in the Remonstrant towns of Holland were still for resistance. On August 20,

however, a placard was issued on the authority of the States General calling for the dismissal of the *waardgelders* within twenty-four hours. The order was obeyed. The power of the opposition had collapsed. On August 25 the States of Holland gave a qualified assent to the summoning of the National Synod. Their spirit was broken. On August 29 a final blow was struck. By virtue of a secret resolution of the States General the Advocate, de Groot, and Hoogerbeets were arrested when on their way to attend a meeting of the States, and were confined in the Prince's apartments in the Binnenhof. The arrest of Ledenburg, secretary of the States of Utrecht, followed. Uyttenbogaert and other leaders of the Remonstrants fled. The prisoners were treated harshly and allowed no intercourse with each other or with their friends.

The arrests had no sooner been made, than Maurice set out upon a tour through the towns of Holland, attended by a strong retinue, and proceeded to effect such changes in the magistracies as would secure Contra-Remonstrant majorities in the corporations and in the Provincial States. Schoonhaven, Brill, Schiedam, Gorinchem, Oudewater, Delft, Leyden, Rotterdam, and Amsterdam were visited in turn, and duly purged. When the States of Holland met in November a vote of thanks was passed to the Prince, and full powers were granted him for the completion of his work. Dissension had been crushed. The holding of the National Synod was unanimously approved throughout the seven Provinces. The Contra-Remonstrants were everywhere in the ascendant.

During the months that followed the arrests, the Advocate, de Groot, and Hoogerbeets—Ledenburg had committed suicide—were kept in the strictest confinement. The trial began in November. Each of the prisoners was examined separately before a Commission appointed by the States General on all the events, not only of the past few years, but of their whole public careers. The examination of Oldenbarneveldt was especially severe, and his treatment cruelly unjust. He appeared more than sixty times before the Commissioners, and was allowed neither to consult his papers nor to put his defence in writing. He had to trust to his memory for all the complicated details of the public affairs in which for upwards of forty years he had been the chief actor.

At last, on February 20, 1619, the States General nominated a Court composed of twenty-four judges. Half of them were Hollanders. It was not in any sense a regular Court, and nearly all its members were personal enemies of the accused. The Advocate strongly protested against its composition, and claimed his right to be tried by the sovereign Province of Holland, whose servant he had been. It was in vain; nor could anything have exceeded the rigour of the proceedings which followed. The prisoners were allowed no advocates, nor the use of books, pen, or paper. The trial was merely a preliminary to condemnation. On Sunday, May 12, sentence of capital punishment was pronounced.

Simultaneously with the trial of the political prisoners the great National Synod, whose convention they had so long and resolutely opposed, had met at Dort. The Synod met for the first time on November 13, 1618, and held 154 sessions. It was an imposing assembly, consisting of more than 100 members. Twenty-eight of these were foreign divines from England, Scotland, the Palatinate, Hesse, Switzerland, Geneva, Brandenburg, East Friesland, and Bremen. The rest were Netherlanders, fifty-eight preachers, professors, and elders, and eighteen commissioners of the States General. The President was Joannes Bogerman, preacher at Leeuwarden. One of their first steps was to summon before them representatives of the Remonstrants, to make their defence. On December 6 a deputation of twelve, with Simon Episcopius at their head, appeared; and a fierce and wordy contest took place between the champions of the five and the seven points, which occupied nine sessions. But the Remonstrants refused to acknowledge the authority of the Synod as a Court competent to pronounce judgment on such doctrinal matters, and after a long series of violent altercations they were ordered by the President to withdraw. They immediately held what was styled an "anti-synod" at Rotterdam, and protested both loudly and publicly against the opinions and the tyranny of their opponents. In their absence the work at Dort proceeded steadily; and on April 23, 1619, the Canons that had been drawn up were signed by all the members. The Remonstrants were pronounced heretics and teachers of false doctrines, and unfit to fill any post in the churches, universities, or schools. On May 1 the Netherlands Confession and the Heidelberg Catechism were approved without change, as setting forth, shortly but completely, the principles of the orthodox Reformed faith. A week later (May 6) the results of the deliberations were proclaimed in the Great Church before a vast gathering of people; and amidst festivities and much speech-making the Synod was dissolved. There was indeed much ground for rejoicing on the part of the Contra-Remonstrant party. They had crushed their adversaries, and were henceforth dominant in the State. No less than 200 Remonstrant preachers were dismissed, and large numbers of them driven into exile. Like the Catholics, the Arminians were now placed under a ban, and were forbidden to hold meetings for public worship.

The condemnation of the Advocate followed immediately upon the close of the Synod's labours. In the then embittered state of party feeling probably most men expected that the sentence of the packed court would be a severe one; but few were prepared for a sentence of death. Many of the judges had hesitated long before pronouncing for capital punishment; but the unbending attitude of the Prince of Orange proved decisive. Louise de Coligny and the French Ambassador, du Maurier, did their utmost to induce him to intervene on behalf of Oldenbarneveltdt. But Maurice's mind had been thoroughly poisoned

against the aged statesman ; and, when he found that neither the Advocate nor his children would admit the possibility of guilt by asking for pardon, he hardened his heart.

On the evening of Sunday, May 12, Oldenbarneveldt was informed that he was condemned to death, and that after a public reading of the sentence execution would follow on the following morning. The prisoner received the news with surprise and anger ; but he soon recovered his calmness, and asked for pen, ink, and paper, that he might write a farewell letter to his wife and children. The greater part of the night he spent in earnest conversation with the preacher Walaeus, who had been sent from Dort to offer his ministrations. The Advocate remained firm in the unqualified assertion of his entire innocence of the charges brought against him, and protested in the strongest manner against the illegality of the Court and the injustice of its sentence. He requested Walaeus to see Maurice and to ask the Prince to forgive him for any injuries that he might have done to him, and to extend his protection to his children. For a moment this message from the man who had been so many years his friend and counsellor touched the Prince, and he asked whether the Advocate had said anything about pardon. Walaeus was obliged to confess that he had not, and the interview closed. At 8 o'clock on the Monday morning the prolix sentence recounting the grounds of condemnation was read to Oldenbarneveldt in the ancient hall of the Counts of Holland in the Binnenhof, in front of which a rough scaffold had been erected during the night. The outer court was densely crowded with people as the old man, leaning on a stick, appeared on the scaffold. His head was struck off at one blow. His last words—"Men, do not believe that I am a traitor to the country. I have always acted uprightly as a good patriot, and as such I shall die"—express the verdict of posterity upon his character and conduct.

The papers of Oldenbarneveldt all fell into the hands of his deadly foes, and were by them closely scrutinised with a view to discovering some proof of his guilt. Not a single vestige of evidence has ever been produced to show that the Advocate at any time was in collusion with his country's enemies or betrayed its interests. On the contrary, later researches and investigations have proved conclusively that Oldenbarneveldt in his forty-three years of service played a part in the long struggle of the war of independence second only to that played by William the Silent, and that he was one of the ablest and most influential statesmen of his time. He had his faults. His enemies were not without grounds in ascribing to him haughtiness, avarice, intolerance of other people's opinions, greed of power. The force of circumstances drove him on to take up a position and to commit acts which, though defensible from the strictly legal point of view, undoubtedly tended to weaken the bond of national unity, and to endanger the permanence of the Union. But he met his fate, not because he so strenuously upheld the rights of provincial

sovereignty, but because he was in advance of his times in his opposition to the efforts of the Contra-Remonstrant preachers to establish a religious tyranny in the State. His execution was in fact a judicial murder brought about by the machinations of his personal enemies, and will remain an indelible stain upon the memory of Maurice, and upon the annals of the country which thus required the services of the man to whom in so large a measure she owed her very existence.

The sentence upon de Groot and Hoogerbeets was delayed for a few days, in the hope that they might be induced to plead guilty and sue for pardon. But though de Groot had in the earlier stages of his imprisonment shown signs of weakness, both now stood firm, and on May 18 were condemned to perpetual imprisonment. Some two years later (March 21, 1621) de Groot by means of an audacious stratagem devised by his wife, succeeded in making his escape from the castle of Loevestein, and betook himself to France.

The death of Oldenbarneveldt and the complete overthrow of his party left the Prince of Orange (he had succeeded to that title on the death of his brother Philip William in February, 1618) sovereign of the United Netherlands in all but name. He might have had the title as well as the power; but he was unmarried, and was indifferent about the matter. He had never cared for the details of politics, and he now left the management of affairs in the hands of those who had taken the leading part in the opposition to the Advocate, foremost among whom were Francis van Aerssens and Reinier Pauw. These men were determined to reap to the full the fruits of victory. All over the country the Remonstrants were driven from their pulpits, and prominent adherents of Oldenbarneveldt deprived of their offices; the post of Advocate was abolished and never revived, his place being filled by a functionary styled *Raadpensionaris*, whose term of office was to be for five years instead of for life, and whose powers were much restricted.

The year 1620 was marked by the death of two prominent members of the House of Nassau. The widow of William the Silent, who had been deeply afflicted by the tragic end of her old and faithful friend, died at Fontainebleau in March. William Lewis expired suddenly in October, to the deep grief of Maurice, who succeeded him in his dignities as Stadholder in Groningen and Drenthe; in Friesland his place was taken by his younger brother, Count Ernest Casimir of Nassau.

In August, 1621, the Twelve Years' Truce came to an end, and after certain overtures for peace had been made by the Archdukes, which contained quite unacceptable conditions, war once more broke out, and Maurice took the field against his old adversary Spinola. But owing to the deaths in this year of Philip III, King of Spain, and of Archduke Albert, operations dragged for some time sluggishly along. In 1622 Maurice gained the only success of his last years, by relieving Bergen-op-Zoom, which Spinola was besieging. He sorely missed at the head of

affairs the vigorous hand and wise brain of Oldenbarneveldt, and himself confessed that nothing went right after the Advocate's death. In this year a conspiracy was discovered against the life of Maurice, in which two of Oldenbarneveldt's sons were implicated. The younger, William, Lord of Stoutenburg, resented deeply being deprived of his post as Governor of Bergen-op-Zoom and having his property confiscated; and he laid a plot for the assassination of the Stadholder, to which very unwillingly his elder brother, Regnier, Lord of Groeneveld, was persuaded to become a party. The plot was betrayed, and many arrests were made. Stoutenburg himself contrived to escape, but Groeneveld and a number of others were taken and executed.

The health of the Prince of Orange was at this time seriously impaired; and he neither showed the same endurance as before in bearing the fatigues of campaigning, nor the same vigour and skill in his conduct of the war. Misfortune dogged his steps; and in 1624 the town of Breda, an ancestral possession of his family, was taken by Spinola under his eyes. Deeply mortified, Maurice now fell seriously ill; and it was evident that his days were numbered. His last cares were to secure that his titles, dignities, and estates should pass to his younger brother Frederick Henry, to whom at his request the States General in the spring of 1625 had confided the command of the forces. The two brothers, despite a temporary estrangement, due to the leaning of the younger to the Remonstrant doctrines and the party of Oldenbarneveldt, had always been deeply attached to each other. Neither of them had shown any inclination for wedlock; but now Maurice on his bed of sickness used all his influence to bring about the marriage of Frederick Henry with the Countess Amalia of Solms. He was anxious to secure the prospect of the family succession, and is reported to have threatened even to disinherit his brother unless he complied with his wishes. The preliminaries were quickly arranged; and the wedding took place at the Hague on April 4, 1625. On the 23rd of April Maurice died, in the 58th year of his age, prematurely worn out by the hardships and privations of a life spent from his youth up in the camp and at the head of armies. He was perhaps the most accomplished soldier of his time, but as a politician weak, hesitating, and easily led, and he passed away under a cloud, for the splendour of his great achievements was overshadowed by the dark memory of the catastrophe of 1619.

CHAPTER XX.

HENRY IV OF FRANCE.

UPON the death of Henry of Valois, Henry of Bourbon succeeded to a dubious heritage and a distracted kingdom. His ancestral right to the temporal throne was clear; but, before a Calvinist could be accepted as Most Christian King and eldest son of the Church, a new definition of Church and Christian would be required. As a party leader he inherited all the difficulties which beset Henry III as well as those of his own position. His opponents commanded the sympathy of the great majority in France. The organisation of their League was effective and all-pervading. The great towns, with few exceptions, were on their side. The family interest of Guise, though it alarmed and alienated a considerable part of the French nobility, had grown by fifty years of active political work to rival the monarchy itself. The *Parlements*, which during the troubles had arrogated to themselves an extensive political control, had been captured by the League, and the royalist minorities had been compelled to secede. The Sorbonne contributed the prestige of theological authority to combat the claims of a heretic—a heretic relapsed. The lower clergy threw their considerable influence and damaging activity on the same side. The most experienced administrators added the weight of their support; and the rank and file of office-holders shared the views of the majority. Outside the kingdom, the Pope might be expected to give moral if not material assistance. The Leaguers were secure of aid from the most powerful European monarch, and had recognised claims upon his treasury. Among Henry's possible allies, Elizabeth was cautious and chary, the United Provinces were embarrassed and exhausted, the German Princes disorganised, divided, and for the most part poor. The King of Spain had all his resources at his own command, and it was not his habit to let expenditure wait upon revenue.

But chance had granted one signal opportunity to Henry. In the camps at Meudon and Saint-Cloud were assembled all that was left of the faithful royalist nobility, all that royal promises and prestige had availed to collect of foreign assistance, and all that the name of Henry

of Navarre and the credit of the Reformed religion had been able to contribute to this singular alliance. By the exercise of conspicuous tact, the new King contrived to propitiate the Catholic nobility—some, like Biron, by material concessions, others by holding out hopes of conversion—without alienating the bulk of his Protestant followers. The army which Henry led into Normandy, though weakened by important defections both on the Protestant and on the Catholic side, was still the army of a King, not that of a mere party leader or pretender.

The victories of Arques and Ivry were extorted from fortune by the valour and resource and energy of Henry IV. They gave time for certain favourable influences to sway the balance. The strong royalist feeling, which still prevailed among the French nobility, was fostered and strengthened by Henry's personal exploits. The Wars of Religion and the disgraces and disorders and incompetence of the Valois government had indeed done much to break down the tradition which the Capet dynasty had painfully and slowly built up during six centuries. The example of resistance to the royal authority had been set by the Protestants; but the formation and development of the League had called forth opinions destructive to the monarchy more abundantly, if anything, upon the Catholic side. The deposition of an unworthy King, the elective character of the monarchy, the control of the King by the Estates, the duty of resistance to tyranny, the justification, in certain circumstances, of tyrannicide, the doctrine of a contract between King and people that might be voided by non-fulfilment of implicit conditions or abrogated by the people's act, the need of constitutional checks and balances—all these were topics which lent themselves more easily to the champions of the League than to the Protestants, who were themselves in a minority. Again, the League, with its democratic organisation in the great cities where so much of its power lay, brought the practice of popular control and popular government into the political arena; while the Calvinists, in spite of the democratic aspect of their consistories and synods, were really more conservative both in theory and in practice than the extremists of the League, and were ready to rally to a monarchy that offered them tolerable prospects of efficient protection. Moreover, the subversive doctrines which inspired the abundant political literature of the time appealed rather to the bourgeois than to the nobles, who were in fact disgusted and alarmed at the license of the citizens; and such views found little sympathy among the higher ranks of the clergy. Everywhere attachment to the King, though dormant, only awaited a favourable occasion to reassert its power. Thus the monarchical tradition, though shaken by the years of disorder, still retained its vitality, and came to the support of a King who showed himself worthy of royalist devotion. The nobility, although their military service was interrupted and precarious, fought brilliantly and successfully on Henry's side.

Again, the Gallican sentiment, chartered but not created by the Pragmatic Sanction of Bourges, and encouraged in a less attractive form by the Concordat of Francis I, was a force that had hitherto exercised little influence in the struggle; but the situation was such that a conflict between national and ultramontane could hardly be avoided. A cardinal point in the Gallican creed was that the Pope could exercise no temporal authority in France; and papal excommunication, papal deposition of a heretic King, were probable if not inevitable, and carried vital consequences in the temporal sphere. The *Parlements* were the home of Gallicanism, and, if any question arose of the Papacy dictating the choice or the exclusion of a King, were likely to rise in opposition. Moreover, since the Concordat of Francis I, the King had controlled all the higher patronage of the Church; and the prelates, through dependence on the royal favour, had become a royalist body. Very few Bishops ever joined the League; and at the crucial time of his conversion episcopal aid and countenance proved of incalculable value to Henry. So long as Sixtus lived, his cautious policy avoided anything resembling a rupture. But the violent policy of Gregory XIV, which appeared to be dictated by Spanish proclivities, tended to enlist all Gallican sympathies on the royalist side. His monitorials of March 1, 1591, by which Henry was excommunicated and declared incapable of reigning, were rejected, not only by the dissident *Parlements* of Châlons and Tours, but by a weighty assembly of prelates at Chartres (September 21, 1591).

Finally, there was in France a strong national feeling which contributed not a little to the ultimate result. The League, although in alliance with Spain, and in receipt of Spanish subsidies, had before Ivry not shown itself decisively anti-national. The Guises were regarded by many as foreigners, in spite of their long settlement in France; and the intention of Henry of Guise may have been to substitute himself for Henry of Valois. But such designs, if they existed, were prudently masked. In reliance upon foreign aid up to the battle of Ivry there was not much to choose between the two sides. Both sides employed foreign contingents, and relied on foreign subsidies. But after that battle it became more and more apparent that the cause of the League depended upon the armed and official intervention of Spain. The blockade of Paris must have ended in the surrender of the capital but for the march of the Duke of Parma; and similar action frustrated the siege of Rouen. In the sittings of the Estates of 1593 the designs of Spain were clearly exposed. Encouraged by the overtures of the "*Seize*," the King of Spain put forward the claims of his daughter to the throne of France. But the Estates, purely partisan as were the interests represented among them, would not tolerate the proposal in any form. The hopes that Mayenne or the young Duke of Guise may have entertained were defeated in part by the division of the family interest; but the Salic Law proved the final and insuperable bar to all the candidates.

The *Parlement* declared the Salic Law fundamental, and vital to the interests of the nation. The Estates followed their lead. Had the Cardinal of Bourbon, only one degree further removed from the direct succession than Henry himself, lived to secure the adhesion of the national party, the result might have been different. But, as it was, the dreams of League theory, that a system of election might be substituted for the rules of succession under which France had grown to be a nation, were conclusively relegated to the limbo of the impracticable. For the second time in history the Salic Law, for all its frame of legal pedantry, proved itself the safeguard of French national existence, the formula of French independence.

Again, the support of Spain, which kept Henry at a standstill for more than two years after the battle of Ivry, brought about by an inevitable chain of causation the solution of another problem. Both before and after his accession Henry had professed his willingness to be instructed, and had held out hopes that instruction might lead to conversion. There are some reasons for believing that on the vital question of the Real Presence his personal leanings were towards the Catholic position. At Saint-Cloud he had opposed to demands for immediate conversion considerations of honour. He could not, as King of France, abandon his religious profession in response to force. The successes of Arques and Ivry seemed to have indefinitely postponed the prospect of his change of faith. Had he been successful before Rouen and Paris, no conversion might have ensued. But in 1593 four years' experience seemed to show that the choice lay between indefinite prolongation of civil war and fulfilment of his pledge. In what proportions ambition, true patriotism, and genuine conviction contributed to Henry's decision no man can say. But his subsequent history shows him a true friend, not only to religious toleration, but also to the religion which he adopted. Motives of patriotism were fully sufficient to justify some sacrifice of personal predilection. The reunion of France under a Protestant King had been proved to be impossible. It had been proved that no King other than Henry could hope to satisfy the national desire for a natural King. The conversion of Henry was thus the only hope of France.

But Henry's conversion, though indispensable, was not in itself sufficient to produce a settlement. Doubts still existed of his sincerity. The absolution granted to him by the French prelates was only provisional; and absolution by the Pope was necessary to complete his reconciliation with the Church. Clement VIII, though his attitude was encouraging, was determined that the King should knock at the door more than once before he was admitted to the Church. Meanwhile France had to live; and daily life gave daily opportunities for the application of minor sanatives. The military situation remained unchanged. Henry's authority extended little further than the area dominated by

his troops and his allies. In Dauphiné his lieutenant, Lesdiguières, held the field in the Protestant interest. In Provence the Duke of Épernon, nominally governing under royal authority, was building up against local opposition a power neither Leaguer nor Royalist, but private. In Languedoc the *Politique* Governor, Montmorency, maintained his position, though the League was still formidable and controlled the *Parlement* of Toulouse. Montmorency's own attitude was doubtful; and there was reason to believe that he aimed at establishing independent power. His loyalty was eventually secured by the gift of the office of Constable. In the country between Loire and Pyrenees lay Henry's ancestral domains, the lands of Navarre, Béarn, Foix, Armagnac, Bourbon, and Albret. But the League was strong even here. Bordeaux and the Bordeaux *Parlement* were for the League; Poitou in particular was very evenly divided. North of the Loire Brittany was held by the Duke of Mercoeur with Spanish aid, not without opposition, but with commanding superiority. Normandy was shared between the parties; rival *Parlements* sat at Caen and Rouen. Picardy was for the League and subject to Spanish influence. In the East and Centre of France the League had scarcely been attacked. Burgundy especially was the stronghold of Mayenne's power. Champagne, under the government of the young Duke of Guise, acknowledged the League. At Lyons, though the Guisard governor, Nemours, was on bad terms with the civic community, League influence was hitherto unimpaired. The work of reconstruction was still to be done.

In long years of warfare men had almost ceased to desire peace; some, like Biron, were inclined to prolong the war in order that they themselves might be indispensable; others, like the *Seize*, feared that peace would bring retribution; it was first of all necessary that men should be brought to desire security and repose. For this purpose Henry succeeded in negotiating a truce, which was concluded on July 31, 1593, for three months, and afterwards prolonged till the end of December. During this interval the League began to dissolve. Individuals opened negotiations with the King, and some minor surrenders actually took place. Lyons rose against Nemours (September 18) and threw him into prison. One vein of contemporary thought is represented by the *Satyre Ménippée*, part of which circulated in this year, and which in the following was published in its complete form. Though a partisan production, its exposition of the selfish aims of prominent Leaguers carried conviction; the line adopted hit the temper of the time; and the opinion began to spread that the League was now only perpetuated for personal and political objects. Meanwhile the King made known his desire for peace; and, when hostilities were renewed with the new year, it was felt that the fault lay elsewhere, with Spain, with the *Seize*, and with Mayenne. Before the truce was ended, Villeroy, the most experienced administrator on the side of the Leaguers, had

declared his defection; and on every side adhesions to the royal cause were in contemplation.

With the new year similar occurrences became more frequent. Aix and its *Parlement*, hostile to Épernon, submitted to the King and carried with them part of Provence. A fresh revolution took place in Lyons, and the city accepted terms in February. The condition that the exercise of no religion other than the Catholic should be permitted in the city showed how far the King was prepared to go. What better terms could any Catholic city desire? Villeroy and his son finally came over, and brought with them the town of Pontoise; and d'Estournel began to negotiate for the surrender of Peronne, Roye, Montdidier, frontier towns of Picardy, which was completed in April. La Chastre brought Orleans to the royal obedience; Bourges and the remainder of Berry and the Orléanais soon followed the example. The royal prestige was considerably enhanced by Henry's coronation with all due forms at Chartres (February 27, 1594). Rheims was still in the possession of the League, and precedents existed for this alternative place of consecration; while the chrism employed was drawn from the *Sainte-ampoule* of St Martin, scarcely less holy than that of St Rémi.

But Paris was not to be regained at the price of a mass. The new positions acquired by the King enabled him to establish an effective blockade; and the city soon began to feel the pinch of hunger once more. The *Politique* party began to raise its head; Mayenne began to feel insecure; he was forced to abandon himself more and more to the *Seize*, and to rely upon Spanish troops. The Governor, Belin, was deposed, and Cossé-Brissac set up in his place. The *Parlement* began to lean to reconciliation, and its meetings were prohibited. But agitation and conspiracy continued, and on March 6 Mayenne left the town. Freed from his supervision, the King's friends moved forward more boldly; Cossé-Brissac was gained and succeeded in hoodwinking the Spaniards. On the morning of March 22 the King entered his city and occupied it almost without resistance. The Spanish garrisons were cut off from each other and were fain to accept the conditions offered, that they should depart with bag and baggage. Great skill was shown in all the arrangements; but matters could not have passed off so quietly had not a considerable revulsion of feeling taken place. Even in the disorderly and enthusiastic quarter of the University no serious opposition was met, though the regular force by which the King was supported on his entry did not exceed the numbers of the Spanish garrison. A universal amnesty was granted, even to the leaders of the *Seize*, though it afterwards became necessary to banish some hundred and twenty of the most irreconcilable Leaguers.

On the reoccupation of the capital it became possible to begin the work of reconstruction. During the months of April and May the sovereign Courts, the *Parlement*, the *Chambre des Comptes*, the *Cour*

des Aides, were restored to their lawful constitution and authority. The dissentient members of these bodies had retired in 1589 to Tours and Châlons, where rival Courts had been set up. The members of these royalist Courts were now recalled and took their places peacefully side by side with those magistrates who had issued their decrees in the service of the League. The *Parlement* annulled the office of Lieutenant-General, irregularly conferred upon the Duke of Mayenne. The Sorbonne, and the University as a whole, made their submission to the King, took the oath of allegiance, and issued a declaration recognising Henry as the lawful sovereign of France.

Elsewhere the King began to enter into his heritage. In Normandy Villars, the Governor of Rouen, who had successfully resisted the King in arms, now consented to treat, and agreed on March 27 to hand over Rouen, Havre, Harfleur, and the other places under his control. The entire province shortly passed into the King's hands; and the dissentient *Parlement* of Caen united with that of Rouen. In Picardy Abbeville and Montreuil made their submission. Many smaller places in the centre and south-west came over before the end of May. But military successes were needed to expedite the process of reduction. The King moved against Laon, and, after a siege, forced it to capitulate on July 22. This important evidence of material strength hastened events. Amiens, Dourlens, Beauvais, Noyon, were surrendered to persuasion or force, and thus the reconquest of Picardy was nearly completed, and the north-eastern frontier of France was protected; though in compensation the King of Spain succeeded in attracting the League captains, de Rosne and the Duke of Aumale, to his service, and in placing a strong Spanish garrison in La Fère. Poitiers, and almost all the principal places which remained to the League in Poitou, Anjou, and Maine, were recovered. Most significant of all, the family of Guise began to treat. Elbeuf asked and received the government of Poitiers, which he had previously held for the League. The young Duke of Guise surrendered Champagne, and accepted in its place the government of Provence, which it was understood he would have to recover by arms from Épernon. The Duke of Lorraine himself made a treaty with Henry and left the coalition. Even in Mayenne's particular stronghold of Burgundy a movement for peace and submission began, and several towns made separate terms with the King. Only in Brittany the Duke of Mercœur still held up the banner of rebellion, assisted by Spanish reinforcements, but opposed with some success by the royal forces and an English auxiliary contingent.

But the break-down of authority in France had left the peasants without protection. The troops of both parties, ill-paid and ill-disciplined, had lived upon the country; and the local lords, to meet their expenses in the war, had often resorted to illegal exactions. Many castles were little better than caves of brigands. The peasants were

frequently subjected to double taxation, on behalf of the King and on behalf of the League. These manifold misfortunes had led to local insurrections of the countryfolk in many places, both before and after the accession of Henry; and now in 1594 throughout the districts of Limousin, Périgord, Saintonge, Quercy, and Agénois, the armed rising of the peasants reached a dangerous height, and threatened to spread into the neighbouring provinces. It is said that 50,000 men were under arms. Henry endeavoured to pacify the rebels, known as *Croquants*, by offering conciliatory terms and promising to redress their grievances; but force and skill were necessary in addition, and the insurrection was not finally put down until 1595. The revolt was the more dangerous, because in the south-west it appears to have received some secret encouragement from certain dissatisfied Calvinist leaders.

Towards the end of 1594 an enthusiast, Jean Chastel, a pupil of the Jesuits, made an attempt upon the King's life, and succeeded in wounding him, though not dangerously. This incident brought to a head an agitation which had long been growing against the Jesuit Order. It was the popular belief that the Jesuits taught the lawfulness of tyrannicide to the pupils in their schools and colleges; the University was jealous of their influence; it was asserted that the Society took its instructions from the King of Spain; the parish clergy added their complaints; and already in April, 1594, a movement had been set on foot for their expulsion. The attempt on the King's life renewed the attack; enquiries and searches were made, and evidence was found tending to incriminate to some extent three Jesuit fathers. The *Parlement* of Paris took up the matter, and passed a decision to exclude the Order from their jurisdiction. The *Parlements* of Rouen and Dijon followed the lead; but in the jurisdictions of Toulouse and Bordeaux no action was taken. These events tended to some extent to damage Henry in the eyes of the Catholics and of the Pope, and to delay the date of Henry's final absolution.

While on the one hand the King found it impossible to maintain friendly relations with every section of the Catholic clergy, on the other hand it was equally difficult to satisfy his Calvinist friends. The declaration of Saint-Cloud had promised to reserve to Catholics for a period of six months all offices which might become vacant, and to confer upon Catholics exclusively the government of all towns that might be recovered from the League. Policy required that until his position was secure Henry should show, if anything, a preference for the Catholics. The Catholics were the prodigal son, the Protestants learnt the feelings of the elder brother. Devoted servants, such as Rosny and La Force, saw their claims to recognition indefinitely postponed. The declaration of Saint-Cloud promised to the Calvinists private liberty of conscience, the public exercise of their worship in the places which they actually held, in one town of each *bailliage* and *sénéchaussée*, in the army, and wherever the King might be. In 1591, in response to pressure from

the Calvinists, and after consulting with the Catholic prelates, Henry formally revoked the Edict of July, 1588, and restored the Edict of Poitiers (1577) with its explanatory agreements of Nérac and Fleix. But in the compacts made with Paris, Lyons, Rouen, and other important Catholic towns, he was forced to concede the exclusion of Calvinist worship from the urban precincts. The more moderate of the Protestant leaders understood that these terms were the best they could expect for the present; but extremists, like La Trémouille, and Turenne, who in 1591 obtained by marriage the dukedom of Bouillon, did not conceal their dissatisfaction. Short of open hostility, they made their opposition and discontent felt in every opportunity; and it was only by the most constant exercise of vigilance and conciliation that an open rupture with the Protestants was avoided.

Amid all these difficulties Henry steered his course with unflinching accuracy of judgment, undaunted courage, inexhaustible geniality and buoyancy of spirits. By the end of 1594 he had recovered the greater part of his kingdom. The means adopted show his practical sagacity and disregard of conventional reasoning. He did not hesitate to pay the price which his opponents asked; and the price demanded was proportionate to his needs. Paris was bought comparatively cheap for 1,695,400 *livres*. Rouen, and the other places which Villars surrendered, cost 3,477,800 *livres*; the Duke of Guise received 3,888,830 for himself and his immediate subordinates; the Duke of Lorraine a similar sum. La Chastre had 898,900 *livres*, Villeroy 476,594. These figures do not include the value of the offices and dignities which were conferred upon the principal persons, for which indeed for the most part they rendered an equivalent in honourable service. When Rosny hesitated to accept Villars' terms, the King told him not to look too closely at the figures. We shall pay these men, he said, with the revenues which they bring to us; and to recover the places by force would cost us more in money alone, to say nothing of time and men. The sums asked may appear exorbitant; but it must be pointed out that all the leaders had drawn heavily upon their private fortunes, and had incurred enormous debts to defray their expenses in the field. With practical common sense the King stood neither upon honour nor upon precedent. He paid what was asked, often with a jest, and got full value for his money. First and last, he disbursed to the leaders of the League more than thirty-two millions of *livres*,—far more, that is, than a year's revenue of France at this time. But by so doing he antedated perhaps by many years the time when he should enter into the full receipt of his income; and in addition he saved his subjects from all the waste of war, and secured further the profits of peace. That rebellion should be recompensed seemed to many a dangerous example. But the King saw that the needs and the circumstances were exceptional; and he did not intend that they should recur.

Not less extensive were the concessions which Henry was forced to allow to the towns. Meaux was exempted from *taille* for nine years. Orleans was to have no royal garrison or castle; Rouen no garrison, impost, or *taille* for six years; to Troyes arrears of taxation for three years were remitted; Sens, Amiens, and Lyons, were to receive no garrison. But one danger the King avoided. He created no great hereditary governments. Such conditions were pressed upon him with dangerous pertinacity in 1592, when fortune had long been adverse. They were urged not only from the Catholic but also from the Protestant side. He rejected them consistently, and thus saved the unity of France and excluded the restoration of feudalism. Of money he was lavish, though he can hardly have known whence he was to procure it. But every form of permanent heritable authority he disallowed.

By one means and another, at the end of 1594 Henry might consider that he had established his position as King of France. He proceeded to emphasise this fact in the eyes of Europe by declaring war upon the King of Spain. Ever since his accession he had in fact been at war with Philip. But he had hitherto been fighting rather as a party-chief than as King. He now showed that as King he was not afraid to enter the lists with the most powerful of European monarchs. Nor was he without allies. The United Provinces, though unable to spare from their own needs any considerable assistance, by their own war continued to lighten the pressure upon France. Elizabeth, with whom he had informally concluded in 1593 an alliance of offence and defence, occasionally furnished small sums of money, or a few thousand troops. The Princes of Germany advanced loans, and allowed recruiting; and their assistance was not without importance. The Grand Duke of Tuscany also granted loans. It was hoped that the Swiss would join in the conquest of Franche-Comté, in consideration of a share in the territory acquired. This province had hitherto been guaranteed from attack by Swiss protection.

The King of France, then, determined to take the offensive. His plans were laid for a simultaneous invasion of Artois, Luxemburg, and Franche-Comté, while Montmorency, recently elevated to the dignity of Constable, was to defend the frontiers of Dauphiné and the Lyonnais. A fifth army was to attack Mayenne at his Burgundian base. The opening of the campaign found Spain unprepared. Raids were made on Artois, Luxemburg, Franche-Comté. But before long the invaders were rolled back. Elizabeth withdrew her troops from Brittany; and provision had to be made for the defence of this province against Mercœur and the Spaniards. A force of Dutch auxiliaries which had been serving in Luxemburg was recalled. The Duke of Nemours was threatening Lyons; and Montmorency called for additional aid. But Henry decided to make his first effort in Burgundy.

The Estates of this province had already urged upon Mayenne their desire for peace; and successes in this quarter might mean the recovery

of the district. By the early days of June, 1595, Beaune, Dijon, Autun, and other places had revolted and opened their doors to Biron (son of the old Marshal). Velasco, the Constable of Castile, who had been busy expelling the Lorrainers from Franche-Comté, united his forces with Mayenne and advanced into the duchy of Burgundy. After disposing of such forces as he could command for the defence of his other frontiers, Henry hurried eastward, and arrived at Dijon on June 4, 1595. He at once sent out reconnaissances to ascertain the position and forces of the advancing enemy, and moved forward himself with a portion of his cavalry to Fontaine Française. In consequence of inaccurate and insufficient information Biron was entangled in an encounter with a superior force of hostile cavalry. The King hurried to his aid, and found himself engaged with the vanguard of the main opposing force, while the remainder was close at hand. A dashing cavalry skirmish followed, in which the King displayed all the best qualities of a soldier, and, aided by the excessive caution of the Constable of Castile, succeeded in retrieving the error. The engagement, such as it was, was not in any way decisive; but in its results it was equivalent to a victory. The Constable, whose instructions were only to secure the Franche-Comté, declined to advance further, and retired to his own province. The reduction of such citadels as still held out against the King soon followed; and the whole of Burgundy, except Châlon and Seurre, came into the King's hands before the end of June. The *Parlement* of Dijon was reunited and reestablished. Henry even advanced into Franche-Comté, but retired at the request of the Swiss, who disclaimed any desire for the conquest of the country. Mayenne, who considered himself absolved from any further obligation to his allies, now concluded a truce with the King, and retired to Châlon, to await the final reconciliation of the Pope with the King, which appeared to be at hand.

In allowing a reasonable time to elapse before Henry's conversion was accepted as genuine, Clement was acting in conformity with the circumstances of the case. Political exigencies may have not only suggested the delay but prescribed the moment for removing the bar. All the influence of Spain was exercised in opposition to Henry; and Spanish ambassadors allowed themselves a singular freedom of language in dealing with independent Popes. So long as Henry's fortunes were uncertain the threats of Spain required consideration. In the autumn of 1595 Henry appeared to have gained the upper hand of his enemies in France, and to be holding his own in opposition to Spain. He was on friendly terms with the Grand Duke of Tuscany; and the Venetians from the first had shown him conspicuous favour. These facts may, indeed they must, have suggested to Clement that the period of penance and probation had been sufficiently prolonged; and the southward advance of Henry with his successful army was another element affecting the calculation. After the most serious deliberation in private and among the

assembled Cardinals terms were concluded with the King; and on September 17, 1595, the solemn decree of absolution was pronounced. The conditions were not unduly severe. Besides the indispensable obligation to restore the Catholic religion and grant free exercise for its worship in all parts of his kingdom, even in Béarn, the only points that require notice are the provisions: that the Prince of Condé, the heir-apparent, should be brought up in the Catholic religion; that the decrees of the Council of Trent should be published and observed in France, with the exception of those articles which might endanger the order and peace of the realm—a proviso which in effect nullified the concession; and that a monastery should be built in every province of France, including Béarn. Nothing was said about the suppression of heresy; and, although a preference was to be given to Catholics in appointments to offices, that preference did not imply the exclusion of Protestants.

While this important negotiation was drawing to its close, the King was moving south to Lyons, where the Duke of Nemours had recently died. He made his solemn entry into the city on September 4, and the places occupied by the late Duke were rapidly reduced. The new Duke began to treat, and his submission was solemnly ratified early in the new year. The Duke of Joyeuse, who had hitherto maintained his power in western Languedoc in the interests of the League, had been weakened by many defections, and notably by the secession of the majority of the *Parlement* of Toulouse. While he was attempting to coerce the *Parlement*, Narbonne and Carcassonne revolted; the bases of his strength were crumbling under him; and he also made his peace before the end of the year. Preliminary terms were accepted by Mayenne on September 23; the government of the Île de France was conceded to his son; three strong places, Soissons, Châlon, and Seurre, were allotted to him for his security; and he was allowed to treat in the quality of chief of his party. His monetary compensation exceeded three and a half million *livres*. But the price was not excessive; for Mayenne abode loyally by his compact, and proved a faithful and valuable servant to his King.

The decrees of Folembray (January 31, 1596), which covered the cases of Mayenne, Nemours, and Joyeuse, marked a further stage in the general restoration. Shortly afterwards (February 17) the young Duke of Guise entered Marseilles, by agreement with some of the principal inhabitants, just in time to defeat a plan of Philip to seize this important harbour. The galleys of Doria were already in the port. Since the previous November Guise had taken seriously in hand the reconquest of his province; and, in spite of an alliance which he concluded with Spain, Épernon had seen the area of his authority steadily diminishing. On March 24 he made his agreement with the King; and the reduction of the south-east was completed. Other and less conspicuous surrenders had meanwhile taken place elsewhere; and even the Duke of Mercœur in Brittany had concluded a truce.

But these important advantages were not to be attained without a considerable display of military force, which was sorely needed elsewhere; and the time spent by Henry in Burgundy and at Lyons, although most profitably employed, coincided with a critical period of the northern campaign. The Spanish army, commanded by Fuentes, after failing to seize the castle of Ham, which had been held by the Duke of Aumale for the League but now fell into the hands of the King's troops, proceeded to besiege Dourlens. The command of the French forces was divided between Bouillon, Saint-Paul, and Villars, with the results that might have been expected. The plan adopted for the relief of Dourlens led to a general engagement; and Villars, in covering the retreat, was defeated, captured, and put to death (July 24). The losses of the French were estimated at 3000. But Nevers had meanwhile come up with the troops under his command, and the towns on the Somme were put in a state of defence. Fuentes turned aside and laid siege to Cambray (August 11, 1595). At this moment Henry had to choose between his expedition to Lyons and a northward march to take command in Picardy. Results seem to prove that his decision was wise. But a heavy price was paid for the pacification of the south-east; and the funds disbursed by agreement to the Leaguers reduced the royal treasury to complete destitution.

The position of Cambray was peculiar. The Duke of Anjou had seized this independent bishopric on his way to the Low Countries in the year 1581; and in the opening year of Henry's reign it was held by the Sieur de Balagny for the League. Balagny, first among the leaders of the League, had made his terms with the King of France. The Governor of Cambray now acknowledged the royal authority; the city was held in the King's name, and had been prepared for defence with royal assistance and by royal advice. The force, which now beleaguered the city, was contributed and equipped by the Spanish Netherlands, whose territory was flanked and threatened by this hostile fortress. De Vic was sent by Henry to take charge of the defence. After vainly endeavouring to collect an army for its relief he threw himself into the town with a small force (September 2). His arrival imparted fresh vigour to the garrison, and gave Henry time to complete his work at Lyons, and to issue orders for the assembling of a relieving army. But, while the King was still on his way, having left Lyons on September 25, the inhabitants of Cambray, with whom Balagny had always been unpopular, taking offence at the issue of a copper token currency to defray the expenses of the garrison, rose against their governor, seized a gate, and on October 2 delivered the city to the Spaniards. The citadel remained; but for want of provisions that also was surrendered on October 9. Spanish rule was established, and the authority of the Archbishop reduced to insignificance.

To compensate for these losses the King now undertook the siege of

the Spanish stronghold of La Fère. His mission to Elizabeth requesting assistance failed, because he was not willing to purchase her aid by the surrender of Calais. But, by threatening to conclude a truce with Spain, he persuaded the Dutch to send a small auxiliary force of 2000 men. With such troops as he could spare from the defence of his own fortresses, and with the *ban* and *arrière ban* which assembled in response to his appeal, he sat down before La Fère (November, 1595). The state of the finances, and in consequence the provision for the army, were deplorable. The King had to intervene almost weekly to obtain such small sums as could suffice to keep his army together. Meanwhile the Archduke Albert assumed the government of the Low Countries; and, although he was unable to relieve La Fère, by the advice of de Rosne he planned a sudden attack upon Calais, surprised the positions which commanded the approaches to the walls, and took the city before Henry could come to the rescue (17 April). The fall of Calais was soon followed by that of Ham, Guisnes, and Ardres. The Protestants, discontented with the delay interposed by some of the *Parlements* in the registration of the new decrees, chose this time to press their demands upon the King. La Trémouille and Bouillon had left the camp at La Fère; civil war was again in sight; but the mediation of Duplessis Mornay averted the danger. Still the King held on; and on May 16 La Fère capitulated. But as soon as the siege was completed the army broke up. For want of funds it was impossible to keep the professional soldiers together; and the nobles felt that they had done their duty. With difficulty the King retained sufficient men to secure his frontier towns. Fortunately the Archduke found work to distract his attention and to divert his resources on the side of the United Provinces.

At this moment there was danger that the King might be left to carry on his work alone. The Dutch were inclined for peace, if peace could be obtained; and their foreign policy was dictated by Elizabeth. To Henry's urgent demands for assistance during the siege of La Fère, and while the fate of Calais hung in the balance, Elizabeth had returned no response. Until the fall of Calais she had hoped to obtain this place as an equivalent for her aid. After its fall she still hoped to obtain it from the King of Spain by exchange for Flushing and Brill, which she held as security for her loans to the Dutch. Boulogne was now to be the price of her assistance; and Henry could hardly afford to pay this price. But a fresh embassy, despatched in April, aided by reports of fresh designs on the part of Philip upon England, obtained more favourable terms. On May 26, 1596, an offensive and defensive league was concluded between England and France; and the adhesion of the United Provinces, though not immediately notified, was in principle settled. In order to secure this support, Henry was obliged to tie his hands and to promise that he would not make peace without the consent of his allies. But the proposition as to Boulogne was dropped, and the

designs upon Calais came to nothing; the Dutch had been warned, and kept an eye on Flushing and Brill. On the other hand, the great joint expedition to Cadiz, which followed at once upon the new alliance, was mismanaged and effected little of moment.

The autumn of 1596 saw no important operations on the northern frontiers. A French attempt to surprise Arras failed, and raids into Artois did not affect the main issue. On the other hand this autumn saw the beginning of financial reform, and of Rosny's activity in the Council of Finance; and the necessary foundations for the campaign of the following year were laid. The assembly of Notables, which Henry summoned for October, 1596, was intended to suggest and authorise new taxation, and to assist in the reorganisation. Its members were drawn from the clergy, the nobility, the sovereign Courts, the municipal magistrates, and the financial officers of the Crown. Their deliberations threw light upon the financial position, but their suggestions did little to improve it. They discovered that the royal revenues amounted to 23 millions of *livres*, of which sixteen millions were appropriated to first charges, leaving only seven millions for war, the royal household, fortifications, roads, and public works. They agreed that the revenue ought to be raised to thirty millions, and for this purpose they proposed the *pancarte* or *sou pour livre*—a tax of five per cent. on all goods introduced for sale into towns and fairs, excepting corn. They reckoned that this tax would bring in five millions, while minor reforms would supply the other two. In operation this tax produced little more than a million and proved highly unpopular. The picturesque story told by Sully of the establishment of a Council of Reason, and of his own wise advice, whereby the Council was utilised and circumvented and eventually suppressed, appears to be without historical foundation—an invention intended to exalt the author's own importance.

In the early months of 1597, while Henry's ambassadors, Bongars and Ancel, were urging in vain the Princes of Germany to combine in a final and joint attack upon the King of Spain, Clement was working for peace. But Henry, anxious as he was to secure for his exhausted kingdom an interval of repose and recuperation, could not consent to any peace or truce which involved the retention by the Spaniards of the captured places on his northern frontier. To this list Amiens was added on March 11, 1597. When this town made its terms with the King, it was stipulated that no royal garrison should be quartered in its precincts. Nevertheless, relying on the strength of the fortifications, and on the loyalty of the inhabitants, the King had selected Amiens as the *depôt* for the war material collected in view of the coming campaign. The commander of Dourlens, learning of this great accumulation of valuable stores, and also that the civic guard, although duly watchful during the hours of night, relaxed its vigilance by day, planned an attack for the early hours of morning, and effected his entry into the town. Resistance

was overpowered; the town was sacked; the military chest, artillery, and provisions, fell into the hands of the Spaniards.

The King determined that his first object must be the recovery of Amiens. Expedients were immediately devised for the collection of funds—a forced loan, a sale of new offices, an increase in the *gabelle* of salt. Lesdiguières was despatched to take charge of Dauphiné. Aid was sent to the King's lieutenants in Brittany. The garrisons of Picardy were strengthened, and a small force was at once collected to begin the blockade. Measures were taken for the manufacture of a new siege-train, and the necessary ammunition. The Constable was left in Paris to see to the execution of these orders; on March 12 the King left the capital. Marshal de Biron had already been despatched to make preparations for the blockade.

The King began by visiting his garrisons, where he found the troops ready to disband for lack of pay. Promises, and urgent messages for the supply of funds, enabled him to meet this danger, and to put the fortresses in a state of defence. Before the month of March was out Biron was established at Longpré beyond the Somme to close the approaches from Flanders. Corbie and Pecquigny were strongly occupied. To divert attention attacks were made upon Arras and Dourlens, of which much cannot have been expected. On April 5 the King himself designed and ordered the siege works necessary to cut off all access from the north. He then returned to Paris to induce the *Parlement* to register the Edicts framed in view of the extraordinary financial exigencies. "I come to demand alms," he said, "for those whom I have left on the frontier of Picardy." But a *lit de justice* was needed, and was held on May 21. With the *Parlement* of Rouen he had similar difficulties. To them he wrote, "I think rather of the danger of an invasion, than of the formalities of laws and ordinances. There is nothing irremediable except the loss of the State." The *Parlement* held out for two months, and then registered the Edicts. The emergency was indeed dangerous; the King's prestige was shaken; seditious attempts were made to seize Poitiers, Rouen, Rheims, Saint-Quentin; and Archduke Albert had hopes of securing Metz. The Vicomte de Tavannes was arrested; and exceptional measures had to be taken to restrain the Comte d'Auvergne from open rebellion.

Meanwhile, in spite of the bankruptcy which had been forced upon Philip in the autumn of 1596, the Archduke Albert was collecting an army of 28,000 men to relieve Amiens. Elizabeth was entreated to make a diversion by attacking Calais; but she confined her aid to 2000 men for six months. The Dutch sent their stipulated contingent of 4000 men, but refused to initiate offensive operations on their own part. But to propositions of peace from Spain the King replied, "I will speak of it further when I have recovered Amiens, Calais, and Ardres." Infantry was raised in the various provinces; the nobility were called

up, and promised to remain in arms until Amiens had fallen. Rosny, who was now supreme in the Financial Council, was stimulated to the utmost exertions, and supported in every step which he thought necessary. The pay and provisions for the siege of Amiens were regularly supplied up to the end, and almost from the first.

On June 7 Henry reappeared in the camp of Amiens. The army of investment was not yet much larger than 6000 foot, with a small force of cavalry. Nevertheless Biron had done wonders. The work of circumvallation to the north was nearly completed. The forces were soon raised to 12,000 foot and 3000 horse; and before the siege was ended there were 30,000 men about the town. The line of the Somme was now strengthened at every possible point of crossing to prevent relief from reaching the city by a circuit from the south. On July 17 a dangerous sortie was made, but was eventually beaten back. Forty-five cannon were now battering the walls. Saint-Luc showed conspicuous ability in the command of the artillery; and his death on September 5 was a great loss. Early in September the Archduke Albert left Douay with a relieving army of 18,000 men, and 3000 horse, 7000 being left to guard his communications. The proposal to cross the Somme below Corbie was thought too dangerous; and a more direct advance upon the besiegers was substituted. On the 15th the Spanish army appeared upon the banks of the Somme, about six miles below Amiens. The enemy, while detaching a small force to attempt the passage of the Somme, advanced to Longpré, which had been fortified by the advice of the Duke of Mayenne. On the approach of the main army he sent forward trustworthy supports to strengthen this position; an attack upon it was repulsed; and the attempt to cross the Somme was frustrated by Henry's dispositions, the troops which reached the southern bank being driven back with serious losses. On the 16th the Archduke retired in good order, Henry having decided not to risk a general engagement. On September 25 Amiens capitulated. After this the town was held by a royal garrison.

This success opened to Henry the prospect of an honourable peace. Philip II knew that his days were numbered; he was anxious to leave to his son a peaceful succession; he desired to make provision for his daughter, the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia; it was clear that nothing worth the sacrifices involved could be gained by prolonging the war with France; and he still cherished hopes of recovering the United Provinces. His ally, the Duke of Savoy, had been hard pressed in the south. Lesdiguières had invaded his territory, and occupied the whole territory of the Maurienne. The forces of Savoy had been defeated in several engagements. Prince Maurice had taken advantage of the expedition of Archduke Albert to carry his arms far and wide into Gelders, Overysse, Frisia, and even into Westphalia, and the Electorate of Cologne. The expedition which left Ferrol in October for Brittany and Cornwall

was scattered by storms. In October Philip opened negotiations with France, in November he pushed them with more sincerity. Henry began to hope.

His chief difficulty was with his allies. So recently as 1596 he had concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with England and the Dutch, and had promised not to make peace without their consent. In order to give some colour to his defection, he pressed upon the Estates General in November the necessity of more ample and vigorous assistance in a joint and general war for the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. To Elizabeth de Maise was sent to make similar representations. But it would have been difficult to satisfy Henry. He was bent upon peace on the condition of recovering his lost towns. These diplomatic demonstrations were only intended to prepare his allies, and to give some excuse for his desertion of them. The state of his kingdom required peace; and herein lay his real justification. The cool reception given by Elizabeth to his proposals was natural enough in the circumstances, and could not be considered to relieve him of his obligations.

On January 12 Henry authorised his representatives to negotiate with the Archduke at Vervins for a peace. The chief difficulty was the condition on which the King thought it necessary to insist: that England and the United Provinces should be admitted to the peace if they desired. When this had been surmounted, the Peace of Vervins was concluded (May 2, 1598). The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis was put in force again. Henry recovered all his conquered places in Picardy, as well as the fort of Blavet in Brittany. The Duke of Savoy was included in the treaty; and the question of Saluzzo, which he had seized from France towards the end of the reign of Henry III, was to be decided by papal arbitration. The Swiss were comprised in the agreement, with their allies—a term which by implication covered Geneva. Neither Elizabeth nor the United Provinces elected to join in the treaty; but Henry continued his unofficial assistance to the Dutch, first by repaying gradually the sums which they had advanced to him, and afterwards by subsidies, which ultimately amounted to two million *livres* a year. About the same time the Grand Duke of Tuscany was persuaded to give up the Château d'If and other places commanding Marseilles, which he held as security for his loan of 3,600,000 *livres*.

Meanwhile the King had completed his preparations for the armed reduction of Brittany. His intervention on this side of France was the more necessary since Protestants, headed by the Duke of Bouillon and La Trémoille, and leagued with the Duke of Montpensier, and the Comte de Soissons, had long been threatening trouble in Poitou, Limousin, Berry, Auvergne, and neighbouring provinces. The disturbed condition of these provinces, where League captains still retained some centres for their depredations, was the excuse; but ambition working on religious disaffection for political ends inspired the movement.

In February, 1598, the King set out from Paris. On his way he passed through Anjou and Touraine and used the opportunity to extinguish remaining sparks of disorder due to the League, and to overawe the leaders of Protestant disaffection. For ten years the province of Brittany had been the arena not only of faction and party strife, but also of foreign armies, English and Spanish. Now that the King had been converted and received by the Pope, the peace party was strong among the Bretons, as was proved by spontaneous demonstrations in Dinan, St Malo, and Morlaix. But Mercoeur still held the strong city of Nantes, inaccessible at certain seasons; and his strength was not contemptible. Besides 5000 Spaniards at Blavet, he had 2000 men under his own command. Twelve places acknowledged him in Brittany and Poitou, each of which was said to be strong enough to stand a siege. The reasons therefore, which induced Henry to compromise with Villars, Mayenne, Épernon, and others, existed here in greater force; and Mercoeur made a very profitable bargain. The Duke and his followers received a complete amnesty and more than four million *livres* in return for the surrender of the province, the cities, and the castles; and it was agreed that Mercoeur's daughter should be married to the natural son of Henry and Gabrielle d'Estrées, César, afterwards Duke of Vendôme. On the conclusion of this treaty at Ponts de Cé (March 20) the submission of the whole north-western district, and the extirpation of the last centres of disorder, speedily followed; and the evacuation of Blavet by the Spaniards after the Treaty of Vervins completed the reunion of France under one King.

Henry moved on to Nantes, and held an assembly of the Estates of the province of Brittany. All the irregular imposts of the unquiet time were abolished, and arrears of taxes remitted. In return for these benefits the Estates granted a special vote of 800,000 *livres* for the coming year. At Nantes the moment seemed to have come to settle the status of the Protestants on a more satisfactory if not on a permanent basis. The famous Edict signed in April, 1598, consolidated the privileges which the Calvinists already possessed by the various declarations and edicts previously passed: the Declaration of Saint-Cloud (1589), the Edict of Mantes (1591), the Articles of Mantes (1593), and the Edict of St Germain (1594).

Although the registration of the Edict of Mantes and of the Edict of St Germain had been delayed, it had been finally accorded. Complete liberty of conscience and of secret worship, local rights of public worship in 200 Protestant towns and some 3000 castles of Protestant *seigneurs hauts justiciers*, and in one city of each *bailliage* and *sénéchaussée* of the kingdom, free access to all public offices—these rights the Calvinists already possessed, except in Provence and in the *bailliages* of Rouen, Amiens, and Paris. At the assembly of Sainte-Foy (1594) they had claimed far more. They had planned the division of the kingdom into

ten circles, each with its separate council authorised to collect taxes, to maintain troops, to accumulate war material. A central assembly of deputies, one from each of the ten circles, was to combine and harmonise the common policy. There was also talk of a foreign protector to preside over this internal and independent State.

The object of the Edict, which bears the stamp of a temporary measure, was to extend religious liberty so far as was consistent with the temper of the time and with special conditions made with rebellious towns and districts, and to limit political independence so far as was compatible with the not unnatural fears and suspicions of the Protestants, who still remembered the day of St Bartholomew and the ascendancy of the Guises. Liberty of public worship was extended to two places in every *bailliage* or *sénéchaussée*; a limited number of *seigneurs* not *hauts justiciers* were allowed to establish public worship in their castles; and in all places where it already existed it was authorised. The King assigned a sum of money for Protestant schools and colleges, and authorised gifts and bequests for this purpose. Full civil rights and full civil protection were granted to all Protestants, and special Chambers (*Chambres de l'Édit*) were established in the *Parlements* to try cases in which Protestants were interested. In Paris this Chamber was composed of specially selected Catholics with one Protestant Councillor; in Bordeaux, Toulouse, Grenoble, one half of the members were to be Protestant. The admissibility of Protestants to all public offices was confirmed and even the *Parlement* of Paris admitted six Protestant councillors.

The political privileges granted were of a liberal, even of a dangerous character. The Calvinists were allowed to hold both religious synods and political assemblies on obtaining royal permission; this condition was at first omitted in the case of the synods, but was later seen to be necessary. They retained the complete control of the 200 cities which they still held, including such powerful strongholds as La Rochelle, Montpellier, and Montauban. The King agreed to supply funds for the maintenance of the garrisons and the fortifications, hoping, it may be, in this manner to retain a hold upon them. The possession of these cities and towns was at first only guaranteed until 1607, but it was prolonged until 1612. If, as may be surmised, Henry looked forward to a time when this provisional guarantee should no longer be thought requisite, that hope, like many others, remained unfulfilled at his death. After considerable opposition on the part of the *Parlements* the Edict was finally registered in 1599, at Paris; and the other *Parlements* sooner or later accepted it with some restrictions.

The Edict, according to modern ideas, grants more and less than was desirable. Religious liberty was incomplete, while local political liberty was excessive and dangerous. The reasons for both defects are too obvious to require explanation; and, in spite of them all, the registration

of the Edict of Nantes in 1599 worthily marks the completion of the first part of Henry's work in France. Union was now restored; the League was at an end; an honourable peace had been concluded with Spain; the frontiers of France had been recovered; order was established throughout the land, and a law securing adequate religious liberty was not only enrolled but respected. The remaining years of Henry's reign, in spite of some trifling wars and the menacing storm-cloud that arose before his death, were years of peace and returning prosperity. The way was now clear for administrative reform; but, before attempting an estimate of what was achieved in that direction, it will perhaps be well to conclude the narrative of events which henceforth admit of a more summary treatment.

The controversy with the Duke of Savoy concerning the marquise of Saluzzo was left by the Peace of Vervins to the arbitration of the Pope. The Treaty of Cateau-Cambrésis assigned the disputed territory to France, so that the arbitration seemed to be an easy matter. But the Pope soon found that the parties were irreconcilable; and in 1599 he renounced his ungrateful task. Direct negotiation proved equally fruitless. It was plain that the Duke of Savoy relied upon arms to maintain his claim. Fuentes, the Spanish Governor of Milan, encouraged him to hope for Spanish aid; and it is probable that he relied upon the help of friends in France. Henry offered to exchange Saluzzo for Bresse and certain neighbouring territories. Abundant time was given for the consideration of this offer; but the Duke continued to temporise; and at length in August, 1600, the King decided to resort to arms.

Rosny, who was now not only *Surintendant* of Finance, but also Grand Master of the Artillery, had raised the funds and constructed the finest siege-train that had hitherto been seen. An army under Biron was directed to invade Bresse, another under Lesdiguières to invade Savoy. On the same day, August 13, the towns of Bourg in Bresse and Montmélian in Savoy were taken by assault; and Chambéry opened its gates. In spite of understandings between Biron and the Duke of Savoy, and secret information supplied by the latter, the campaign resembled a military promenade. Castles reputed impregnable melted like wax under the fire of the new and powerful artillery. The King, after seeing that all was going well in Savoy, joined the army of Bresse; and under his eye any traitorous dispositions on the part of Biron were left little chance. The fall of the citadel of Montmélian (November 16) completed the military occupation of Savoy and Bresse, with the exception of the citadel of Bourg. The fort of Sainte-Catherine, a constant menace to Geneva, was destroyed. On January 17, 1601, the Duke of Savoy was obliged to come to terms, and ceded in return for Saluzzo the lands of Bresse, Bugey, Gex, and Valromey, in lieu of an indemnity. The King rounded off his territory in France, and seemed to renounce the Italian ambitions of his predecessors.

During this period another urgent desire of the King had been fulfilled. He had long been separated from his wife, Margaret Valois; and the fear that Gabrielle d'Estrées might be her successor had alone prevented the Queen from agreeing to a divorce. The death of Gabrielle (April 10, 1599) removed this obstacle. The papal Court proved complaisant; the Queen agreed; and on December 17, 1599, the marriage was dissolved. A conditional promise of marriage to another mistress, Henriette de Balzac d'Entragues, threatened to interpose another difficulty; but the conditions were not fulfilled; and Henry was free to marry the princess of his choice, Maria de' Medici, who became his wife on October 5, 1600. On September 27, 1601, the Queen gave an heir to France. Other children were afterwards born; and all fear as to the succession was now removed.

The career of Henry IV is an unfinished career. The Peace of Vervins marks the end of the first period. By 1598 internal peace had been established; and external peace until 1610 was only disturbed by the brief war with Savoy. The second period was a period of peace, but of peace as a preparation for war. The third period had just begun when the assassin's dagger cut short the execution of that policy which, after all apocryphal details have been struck out, may still deserve to be termed his "Great Design." The exact nature of the King's plans cannot now be ascertained. Of the fantastic and discredited imaginations of Sully little use can be made, and that only with the greatest caution. More may be learnt from the confidential correspondence of the King, if care be taken to distinguish between schemes entertained for a moment and indications of settled and continuous policy. But the safest guide to the ultimate aims of Henry is the study of his action as a whole from the Peace of Vervins to the outbreak of the Cleves-Jülich War. Reserve, restraint, economy, organisation, silent and steadfast advance, the gradual addition of alliance to alliance, indicate that the purpose was so great as to require the employment of all available resources. The establishment of universal toleration may have been subsidiary to the main design; but religion was consistently postponed to politics; the real end was the political hegemony of Europe, which could only be obtained at the expense of the House of Habsburg as a whole. For a time antagonism appears to be mainly directed against Spain; but, as the combinations widen and mature, the Austrian House is seen to be also included; and against Austria in fact the first blow was actually directed.

Some years were needed for the settlement of unsolved domestic problems. The final dissolution of the League, the peace with Spain, and the Edict of Nantes, did not free the realm of France from elements of disquiet, disunion, and intrigue; and the play of these forces was seldom unaffected by external influences. The conspiracies of the years

1598-1606 are compounded from the potent ingredients of personal ambition and religious discontent; they work upon a society not yet weaned from traditions of faction and disorder; and they rely upon the secret support of Spanish ambassadors and the Spanish Court. In Biron personal ambition predominates; in Bouillon it is strengthened by the impulses of a party chief; in the Comte d'Auvergne and his sister, Henriette d'Entragues, a personal, almost a dynastic, motive prevails; but the several conspirators work with each other and with Spain, though the diversity of their several ends facilitates the operations of defence.

The old Marshal de Biron had been one of the first to adopt the cause of Henry after his accession. He had demanded a substantial price for his adhesion; but, having received it, he did good work. His conduct on one or two occasions, notably at the siege of Rouen, gave cause for suspicion that he was prolonging the war in order to enhance the value of his own services. Such suspicions are, however, easier to conceive than to confirm; and he had given his life for the King. After his death his son stood high in Henry's favour: he was a dashing soldier; and at Amiens he had shown himself before the King's arrival a good commander. After the King joined the besieging army, Biron's jealousy, vanity, and uncertain temper, impaired his usefulness; he was already in communication with the Archduke; later, it is said, he confessed that he purposely left the important position of Longpré undefended, in order that the Archduke might throw succour into the city, and that the King might thus still be dependent upon himself. This omission was retrieved by Mayenne's foresight; and the purpose of the conspirator was defeated. The King loaded Biron with favours; he was made a Marshal, a Duke, and Governor of Burgundy. But his ambition does not seem to have been satisfied. During the war with Savoy he was in communication with Charles Emmanuel and with Fuentes; and several acts of treachery are laid to his charge. The Duke of Savoy had promised him his daughter in marriage; and this alliance, suspicious in itself, was rendered more suspicious by concealment. In 1601 he made a partial confession to the King, who freely pardoned him. But it seems that he nevertheless continued his secret intrigues.

The scope of his designs was wide and vague. There can be no doubt that he was in communication with the Duke of Savoy, with the Viceroy of Milan, and with the King of Spain; and that he approached all who were supposed to be malcontent—the Duke of Bouillon, the Comte d'Auvergne, La Trémouille, the Comte de Soissons, the Duke of Montpensier, the Duke of Épernon—and endeavoured to organise a rising, which, if successful, would have led to the dismemberment of France in the interests of private ambition, Protestant particularism, and Catholic exclusiveness. To reconcile these diverse interests would have been difficult, if not impossible; even at the outset this difficulty became apparent. The King's prestige was growing day by day; and the

prospects of the conspirators seemed by no means hopeful. Bouillon and Auvergne, however, were certainly implicated in Biron's designs. Henry was well aware that Biron was engaged in dangerous intrigues. In September, 1601, he sent him on a mission to Elizabeth, who gave him a very suggestive lecture on the fate of Essex. But the lesson did not avail; and in 1602 significant preparations abroad, which could not be concealed, seemed to indicate that the plot, whatever its nature, was nearly mature. At this stage it was discovered that La Fin, a discarded agent of Biron, was ready to make disclosures. La Fin was sent for; the King listened, and took measures to defeat the plot. All the suspected personages found that the King required their presence on important business. Some gave satisfactory assurances; but Bouillon and La Trémouille kept away. By an ingenious device all artillery was withdrawn from Biron's province of Burgundy, and troops were massed in every dangerous quarter. At length Biron consented to appear before the King at Fontainebleau, where he arrived on June 12, 1602.

The King knew all, or nearly all; but he was still anxious to save the Marshal, whom he seems to have dearly loved. A confession and complete submission would have saved him, but no confession or submission was forthcoming. The Marshal was too proud or too suspicious. He protested his complete ignorance of any criminal intention other than those which he had previously admitted. There was no other way. Biron and Auvergne were arrested. Biron was sent to trial before the *Parlement*. The verbal pardon which he pleaded had no legal validity; it was more than doubtful whether the pardon covered all his offences up to its date; it could not cover subsequent proceedings. Among the documents put into court and acknowledged by the accused was a memorial of some length and considerable detail, supplying full information about the King's army to the Duke of Savoy. This and other autograph documents supplied by La Fin made the case clear, even without his verbal testimony; and justice took its course. On July 31 the Marshal suffered the death penalty. There is much that is doubtful, much that is unintelligible, in the case of Biron; but it can hardly be doubted that he was guilty, and that the King did his utmost to save him. After four months of imprisonment Auvergne made a full confession, and received his pardon. Many details were ascertained after Biron's death.

Auvergne may have owed his safety to his half-sister, Henriette d'Entragues, Marquise de Verneuil, the King's mistress. But the family deserved little consideration. The promise of marriage, mentioned above, was the excuse for their discontent. It not only gave plausible ground for a grievance, it opened the way for vague claims to the succession on behalf of Henriette's children. In 1604 the King demanded and obtained its restitution; a little later all the intrigues which the family had been carrying on with Spain and with Bouillon became

known, and the father, the daughter, and Auvergne were arrested. Henriette was pardoned; Auvergne, who was indiscreet enough to quarrel with the still powerful mistress, was, however, kept a prisoner. But this plot and the previous attempt of the Prince of Joinville, son of the Duke of Guise, serve mainly to show how firmly the King's power was established. Even the Duke of Bouillon, though a Prince of the Empire, connected by widespread relations and alliances with the Protestant German Princes, could do little more than advertise his discontent. The Protestant leaders of France rejected his treasonable overtures when these were laid before them. After the discovery of his share in Biron's plot Bouillon took flight to Germany, where he endeavoured to raise the Protestant Princes against Henry, and, failing in this attempt, he retired to his capital of Sedan. When at length, in 1606, it seemed opportune to bring this troublesome intriguer to reason, Henry occupied his territory and capital almost without firing a shot. Sedan received a royal Governor and a royal garrison; and Bouillon was completely reconciled to the King. La Trémouille had died in 1604; and the expedition of Sedan closed the last source of internal weakness. The effect is at once seen in the firmer action taken by Henry in the diplomatic questions which he had in hand.

The disaffection of the Protestants throughout these years gave strength to every hostile manœuvre. It must be remembered that the Edict of Nantes, favourable as it was in many respects to the Protestants, did not put the two religions on a complete equality. While the exercise of the Catholic religion was introduced everywhere, even into Béarn, the Protestant worship was confined to a limited number of places. Complete freedom of speech could not be allowed to the Calvinists. The public identification of the Pope with Antichrist could not be permitted in a Catholic country. Such latitude could not be allowed even to Duplessis-Mornay. But, when the King protested, he had some difficulty in preventing the Protestants from adopting this identification as a substantive part of their confession. In 1603 the King thought it desirable to conciliate the Jesuits, and allowed them to return to certain specified places in those parts of his kingdom from which they had been excluded since 1595. This act was ill-received, not only by the Protestants, but also by the Gallican *Parlement* of Paris, and was only registered after the vigorous intervention of the King (1604). In face of this apparent evidence of unfavourable intention the Protestants held the more firmly to their privilege of political assemblage which the King rightly felt to be dangerous. This conflict of purpose came to a head at the Assembly of Châtelherault in 1605, for which the King reluctantly gave his permission, on condition that his commissary was to attend the proceedings.

Rosny was nominated as commissary; and the proceedings of the Assembly at first took a menacing direction. On July 26 the deputies

of the Reformed renewed the oath to the Union of the Evangelical Churches, promising to keep secret all resolutions which might be adopted, and to devote their lives and property to the maintenance of such resolutions against whosoever should attempt to frustrate them. This oath was not relieved of its factious and rebellious character by the reservation of humble obedience to the King. But Henry's protest, conveyed through Rosny, brought the Protestants to their senses. No further steps were taken for the execution of the designs implied in the oath; and the deputies were eventually contented with the permission to retain their fortified places until 1612. The Assembly then broke up; and the King and his Protestant subjects were once more at peace.

While Henry had ambitious subjects who were unsatisfied with the highest position attainable by them under the monarchy, and had to reckon with an organised Protestant community whose latent discontent might at any time lead to civil war, Spain had also a subject population whose grievances gave opportunity for external intrigue. The Moriscos, on whom the prosperity of Valencia and Granada chiefly rested, and who were powerful even in Aragon, had for more than a century suffered the most galling forms of religious, political, and national oppression. No means had been spared to stamp out their religion, their customs, their speech. The Moriscos rendered outward obedience to force, but inwardly they clung the more obstinately to their religion and their nationality. Their industry supported agriculture, the arts, commerce, and banking, in the provinces where they were settled. They were in relation with the Berbers of Africa, and with the Turks. In 1602 they opened negotiations with Henry, who saw an opportunity to retaliate for Spanish intrigues among his own subjects. A general Moorish rising was planned to which Henry was to contribute arms and leaders. But the moment was not propitious for decisive action on the part of France. The negotiations were allowed to drag on until 1605, when everything became known. The Spaniards had agents in France, by whom the most secret designs of the French Court were divulged. L'Hoste, the confidential secretary of Villeroy, was in their pay, and was discovered in 1605. Thus the Moorish conspiracy came to light; and the negotiations only gave an excuse for the final expulsion of the Moriscos in 1609, which proved indeed almost as disastrous for Spain as a successful Moorish rising could have been. The only evidence that Henry could then give of his friendly disposition towards this unhappy people was to receive with kindness the fugitives who were driven across his boundaries, and to supply them with means of transport to the country of their choice.

Thus the Peace of Vervins, though it brought to an end open hostilities between France and Spain, did not, indeed could not, terminate mutual animosity and rivalry between the two Powers, the one still struggling to maintain a precarious hegemony, the other justly aspiring

to equal influence, and ambitious of superiority. Neither Power was prepared for open hostilities; both were exhausted and desirous of repose. Each was, however, willing to use any means short of open war to secure an advantage; each was willing to ignore an attack provided it was decently disguised. Thus the Spanish attempts in 1601 to seize Marseilles and Metz were allowed to pass unnoticed; their disavowals in the cases of Biron and Auvergne were accepted; when Henry, in 1602, stopped the Neapolitan troops passing up the Rhine towards Flanders, his action led to altercations but not to war; his schemes against Perpignan in 1603, though discovered, were not openly resented. The superiority of Henry's policy is seen in the more careful economy of his resources. The Spaniards continued the long struggle with the Netherlands long after it was evidently hopeless. Where Henry contented himself with diplomatic means, as in the question of the Grisons and the dispute between Venice and the Pope, the Spanish power was drained by expensive armaments, which were never brought into action. The internal management of France was prudent and sparing; that of Spain extravagant and corrupt. Thus, if it had come to an open conflict between the two Powers, France would have been found complete in equipment and organisation, able to bear the strain of long campaigns, and rich in reproductive vitality. Though the machinery was never put to the test, we may yet admire the plans.

In the secret duel between the two Powers the advantage at first lay with the Spaniards. It was hope of Spanish support that drove Savoy into war with France. Similar expectations inspired the attack made by Savoy on Geneva in 1602. The failure of that attack, and the dissatisfaction of Charles Emmanuel with the material advantages gained by his close alliance with Spain, gradually alienated Savoy from the Spanish, and urged her to court the French connexion. From 1603 onwards negotiations between Charles Emmanuel and France were in constant progress. In return for his alliance, which opened the road to Italy, the Duke hoped to secure the restoration of the lands ceded by the Peace of Lyons, and in addition the right to conquer Geneva. Henry was determined to bring him over to his side without paying any such price; and by patience he eventually succeeded. The renewal of friendly relations with Savoy showed that the King was once more turning his eyes towards Italy; and in fact Henry began gradually to form connexions with Italian Powers. The Grand Duke of Tuscany, alienated from Spain by the fortification of Ponte Longone in Elba, drew closer for a time the ties of friendship that from the first he had maintained with Henry. Modena and Mantua showed cautious leanings in the same direction. In the dispute between Venice and the Pope concerning the Venetian jurisdiction over the clergy, the relation of the religious Orders to the State authority, the taxation of the clergy, and similar questions, both Powers put out their utmost diplomatic resources; and Spain made

serious preparations for war (1606-7). But the credit of securing the final settlement remained with the French diplomats, Joyeuse, du Perron, and de Fresnes; and though the Pope might cherish rancour at his virtual defeat, and the Venetians had expected more than diplomatic support, yet the matter was arranged according to the wishes of Henry; and his prestige was thus materially raised without the expenditure of men or money.

The renewed interest of France in Italy was also seen in the affair of the Grisons. In 1602 the Spaniards had succeeded in preventing the Gray Leagues from renewing their alliance with France. But, undeterred by this defeat, Henry aspired not only to friendship with the Leagues, but to predominant influence with them as controlling the Valtelline, and therewith the communications between Milan and the Spanish and Austrian dominions north of the Alps. In 1603 he succeeded in concluding an alliance between the Grisons and Venice. The Grisons were peculiarly susceptible to Spanish influence, because their country depended for its supplies upon the duchy of Milan. The alliance with Venice opened for them an alternative source of supply; and the Spanish Governor of Milan found that neither the exclusion of the Grisons from the Milanese markets, nor the erection of fortresses on the Grisons' frontier, availed any longer to bend the mountaineers to his will. The Leagues wavered, and negotiated; and for years the conflict continued. Finally, in 1607, French influence won the day; the Franco-Venetian alliance was confirmed; and for the time the Valtelline was closed to Spanish ambition.

Henry's antagonism to Spain was to be seen not only in the diplomatic field. Though in 1602 he declined an offensive and defensive alliance with England and the United Provinces, he encouraged the latter with large subsidies of money, and allowed French regiments to serve in the Low Countries. He rejected all proposals made by Clement VIII for an alliance between France and Spain. Although at one time he seemed inclined to listen to suggestions of a marriage between the little Dauphin and the Infanta Anna, his real wishes in the matter were never seriously tested, and the overtures were soon abandoned. Nor was he disposed to make a distinction between the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg and the Spanish branch. Though his direct interests came less frequently into collision with the Austrians, his animus was clearly shown by his refusal in 1602 to aid the Austrians against the Turks. He maintained in fact the policy, inherited from Francis I, of friendship with the Turks; whom he encouraged by all the means in his power to war against the Austrian monarchy, and against Spain in the Mediterranean.

It is hardly necessary to say that in the most important part of Henry's foreign policy during these years, the hardly disguised support which he gave to the United Provinces, his action was not disinterested. Apart

from the constant drain of Spanish treasure and troops which he thereby occasioned at small expense to himself, he cherished hopes that the Provinces would at last be induced to accept his sovereignty. In 1606 he put before the Estates General proposals to this effect, and suggested a joint campaign for the conquest of the Austrian Netherlands. The Estates ingeniously met the inconvenient proposition by pointing out that so important a step could not be taken without consulting the provincial Estates. As they foresaw, Henry shrank from the involved publicity. Alternative plans for territorial concessions, in return for increased support, were similarly declined; and this pressure from their powerful ally may have inclined the Provinces to accept the eight months' suspension of hostilities offered by the Archdukes (March, 1607) and to begin negotiations for a permanent peace. Unwelcome as this action was to Henry, he adapted himself to the change of circumstances so soon as he was convinced that the Provinces really desired peace, and was determined to have a hand in moulding the conditions. It was to his interest that the terms should be as unfavourable to Spain as possible, and therefore he could safely throw the whole of his diplomatic weight upon the side of the Provinces. He could do this the more safely since the failure of the negotiations would be even more advantageous to him than the most favourable treaty of peace. In accordance with this policy he concluded (January, 1608) a defensive alliance with the Provinces, without waiting for the adhesion of England, which had been sought. Meanwhile he endeavoured by every means in his power to detach Archduke Albert from the Court of Madrid, and even hoped that his offices as mediator might be requested.

The negotiations dragged on; and side issues arose. Henry pursued for some time with zeal the scheme of a marriage between Philip's second son, Carlos, and his own daughter, Christine; the united and independent Netherlands were to be their marriage portion on the death of Albert and his consort. But this scheme was little likely to commend itself to Spain, against whom it was in fact directed. The Spaniards required as a condition previous to the consideration of any marriage proposals that Henry should abandon the cause of the Provinces. Thus, after delaying for some months the conclusion of a lasting truce, these negotiations broke down. On the vital points of the negotiations Henry consulted his own interests. The Indian trade did not concern him. The freedom demanded for Catholic worship in the Provinces was a delicate point; and he steered as well as he could between his duty to the Catholic religion and his desire not to offend the susceptibilities of the Dutch. He opposed all proposals for a rectification of boundaries, wishing to perpetuate difficult relations between the two Netherland States. At first his preference was for a peace as against a prolonged truce; but, when the conditions demanded on either side appeared irreconcilable, it was Jeannin who induced the States General to put

forward proposals for a lengthy truce. Throughout the negotiations Henry continued his subsidies; and in September, 1608, when a rupture seemed imminent, he sent reinforcements of 4000 men. His envoys worked upon the Archduke Albert to induce him to grant the indispensable recognition of Dutch independence (October 16, 1608). All attempts on the part of Spain to detach the King from his Dutch allies failed; the marriage negotiations never reached a hopeful stage; and the special Spanish envoy, Don Pedro de Toledo, only succeeded in impressing Henry with a deep sense of the insincerity of his own government. Henry rejected absolutely the proposal for a conclusion of a truce unaccompanied by a recognition of Dutch independence; and the attempts of Spain to escape from such a concession of independence, though it had been promised by Archduke Albert, made an unfavourable impression even upon Pope Paul V. Finally, the Spanish Court decided to grant the truce on the basis in question, and without insisting on freedom for the Catholic worship in the United Provinces. Henry might consider that his wishes were accomplished; but his hostility to Spain had been intensified by the unsatisfactory course of the long negotiations.

Before the old controversy was extinguished by the conclusion of the twelve years' truce (April 9, 1609), material for a new one was provided. On March 25, Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg had died without issue. Henry had already taken measures to build up a league under the leadership of France in view of a great European struggle. At the beginning of 1608 his long and patient pressure upon Charles Emmanuel of Savoy led at length to unmistakable proof that the Duke had determined to break conclusively with Spain. The leader of the Spanish party in Savoy, d'Albigny, was arrested and put to death in prison. This decisive indication of a change in policy was followed by the marriage of two Princesses of Savoy, linking their House in the most public manner with two of the more independent States of Italy, Modena and Mantua. That Charles had influence at Rome had been proved by the recent nomination of his son Maurice as Cardinal; and the tendency of these events was the more marked, inasmuch as both the marriage alliances and the elevation of Maurice had been strenuously opposed by Spain. But the negotiations of Henry for a Spanish marriage during the year 1608, his suspicions of Charles Emmanuel, and the demands still put forward by the Duke for a cession of territory, retarded the *rapprochement* between Savoy and France. When the attempts to secure peace for the Netherlands appeared to have failed, Henry turned with proposals for an offensive and defensive alliance to Savoy and Venice; when the outlook improved, these proposals were withdrawn. The Duke meanwhile was becoming more and more estranged from Spain. He had endeavoured to use the advances of France to extort better terms from Philip. Then, when his expectations were disappointed, he let his irritation be seen, until the Spaniards were persuaded of his confirmed

hostility. Meanwhile France had been rendered suspicious by his double manœuvres. And so the negotiations dragged on month after month; and the offensive and defensive alliance, on which the execution of Henry's plans depended, did not take shape until the end of 1609. But the position was such that the final adhesion of Savoy to France could hardly be doubted: for France could offer the Duke territorial extension in the direction of Milan. Spain on the other hand could only enrich him at her own expense, which she was not likely to do.

Henry's interest in Germany had always been subordinate to more immediate objects. He had endeavoured to win the Protestant Princes for the aid of the United Provinces. He had occupied himself occasionally with the question of the Imperial succession; when there was fear that the Spanish King might wish to secure it for himself, he had expressed his intention in such an event of presenting himself as a candidate (1600). He had attempted (in 1602 and 1605) to induce the Duke of Bavaria to come forward. He had consulted with his German friends as to the choice to be made among Habsburg claimants. Albert of the Netherlands, Ferdinand of Styria, were at all hazards to be opposed. Matthias or Maximilian of Tyrol were regarded as preferable. But no selection of a successor actually took place; and all these questions remained in the sphere of diplomacy. More important was Henry's scheme for a union of the Protestant German Powers, to which he should stand in the relation of ally and protector. From 1599 onwards we find him urging the conclusion of such a union; but the German Princes were suspicious; they were alienated by the King's delay in paying the debts he had contracted; they sympathised with Bouillon; and hence they refused to contract any French alliance. In 1607, however, the scheme began to gain ground, and in 1608 a part of Henry's scheme was fulfilled by the formation of the Evangelical Union. The keen interest taken by Henry in these negotiations proves that his policy was directed not only against Spain, but also against the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg. Rudolf was then tottering on his throne; and the disunion in the House of Austria increased Henry's advantage.

The question of the Jülich-Cleves inheritance had long occupied the minds of European statesmen, and especially of Henry IV. The matter concerned him nearly. If the territories in question were added to the Habsburg dominions the pressure of this House upon his eastern frontier would be redoubled; the United Provinces would be threatened; and the might of uncompromising Catholicism, to which Henry, whatever his religious profession, was always by temperament and policy opposed, would be dangerously increased. So early as 1599 Bongars, the French ambassador, called the attention of the Elector Palatine to the question. In 1602 Henry warned the Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel, and put forward his proposal for a friendly arrangement between the three Protestant claimants, Brandenburg, Neuburg, and Zweibrücken, intended to avoid

the danger of division among the natural opponents of the Habsburg ambitions. In 1605 Brandenburg and the Palatinate concluded a league, which the United Provinces joined. But Lewis of Neuburg was on bad terms with his Palatine relative, the Elector, and purposed to push his own claim separately when the time came. The formation of the Union was favourable to the prospects of a Protestant succession in the disputed duchies; but any peaceful agreement between the Protestant claimants seemed far off, when on March 25, 1609, the inheritance actually became vacant.

However, Henry's policy—to exclude at all hazards the Habsburgs and to secure the Provinces for Protestant rulers—was at first so far successful that Brandenburg and Neuburg agreed (June 10, 1609) to occupy and govern the duchies in common; the aid of the Union was secured for them; and Henry threw all the weight of his influence on the side of the two Princes. He would have been satisfied to secure the peaceful possession of the disputed duchies for Protestants, but he let it be known that he would meet force with force. The occasion for this did not seem far distant when the Emperor charged with the execution of his sequestration order the Archduke Leopold, Bishop of Passau and Strassburg, a zealous Catholic and a member of the Habsburg House. On July 23 Leopold obtained possession of the fortress of Jülich from the commandant, who was in Spanish pay. The Habsburg designs being thus revealed, Henry saw hopes of uniting Europe against the rival House. To this he addressed himself, with no fixed intention at the first, as it would seem, of making the present his occasion for the great effort which he long had had in mind.

Preparations were, however, made for immediate intervention if necessary. The Dutch were called upon to send the French regiments serving in their pay to the frontier of the disputed duchies. France began to arm. But it was not Henry's intention to challenge the Habsburgs single-handed. He set himself first to detach from them possible allies. The Elector of Saxony, who was himself a claimant, required the most careful handling. The Pope, at the outset, was eager to see a new district won for the Catholics; but he was persuaded that the Habsburgs as usual were using religion as a cloak for political schemes, and his neutrality was for the time at least secured. Attempts were made to excite the jealousy of the Princes of the newly formed Catholic League and to win in particular the Duke of Bavaria. On the other side the unqualified and substantial support of the Evangelical Union might be hoped; but even here difficulties arose. The German Princes were suspicious of Henry's intentions. Even the Princes who had occupied the disputed duchies showed no steadfast determination to provide the necessary means for a campaign. The alliance with Savoy was now a certainty; but the crafty Duke spun out the negotiations in the hope of extracting some concession. Attempts to win Venice failed,

for the Signory displayed their customary caution. The United Provinces, though the King counted on them, were disinclined to sacrifice the hard-won benefits of peace. The Habsburg position was a strong one. With the exception of Venice, Savoy, Mantua, and the Pope, they controlled the policy of the independent States of Italy: Tuscany, Parma, Modena, Urbino, Genoa, Lucca. The Archduke Albert was forced to forget his desire for peace and prepare for war, and to take the definite step of cutting off access to Jülich-Cleves by the Rhine at the fortress of Rheinberg. Henry's efforts with the Catholic League proved unsuccessful. The finances of Spain were in a bad condition; but her military strength was still formidable. The chief weakness lay in the hostile relations between Rudolf and Matthias, which tended to paralyse the Austrian House.

Though Henry had good reason for regarding the Jülich-Cleves complication as a likely opportunity for uniting Europe against the Habsburg House, by the autumn of 1609 he must have perceived that his more sanguine expectations were far from fulfilment. There are indications that his desire for war had begun to cool, when the flight of the Prince of Condé to the Spanish Netherlands to protect his wife from the King's pursuit (November 29), and the protection and assistance which Condé received from Archduke Albert, introduced a new and irrational element into the situation. The diplomatic history of the next few months is filled with demands for the surrender of Condé and the restoration of the lady, pressed upon Archduke Albert, the Court of Spain, and afterwards on Milan, whither Condé had removed. The incident was exploited to the utmost by Spain in order to discredit the King. The conflict of interests rendered a collision probable in connexion with Jülich-Cleves; the form which the collision took was in partial accord with the great scheme which Henry no doubt cherished; but we are forced to recognise that at this time the King's judgment was obscured and his movements were deflected by a disastrous passion. Thus, when he advanced to the execution of his life's design, the ground had been insufficiently prepared by diplomacy; and a part of the results of eleven years' watching, waiting, and scheming was sacrificed.

Fevered and irresolute, Henry still pressed forward. The agreement for a marriage of the Princess Elizabeth of France with the eldest son of the Duke of Savoy was signed on December 28, 1609. In February arrangements were made for a joint invasion of Milan, the King providing 12,000 foot, and 2000 horse, the Duke supplying half that number, and receiving twenty pieces of ordnance. The results of the congress of the Union at Schwäbisch-Hall were disappointing. Boissise, the French envoy, did not even venture to mention to the delegates his master's ulterior aims—the exclusion of the Habsburgs from the Imperial succession, and the conquest of the Spanish Netherlands. The King was obliged to be content with a contingent of 8000 foot and 2000 horse, half

from the Union, half from the Princes who were in occupation of Jülich-Cleves. The Dutch declared their intention of limiting their support to the Jülich-Cleves undertaking. No other effective alliances were forthcoming. Nevertheless the King's scheme was for a general war. He was to advance himself on Jülich-Cleves with about 30,000 men. So large a force seemed unnecessary, and the Netherlands were probably the ulterior objective. Lesdiguières with the Duke of Savoy was to invade Milan. La Force was to attack Navarre with 10,000 men. It is noticeable that the principal commands were given almost exclusively to Huguenots. Besides Lesdiguières and La Force, the Duke of Rohan was to command the Swiss contingent of 8000 men, Rosny (since 1606 Duke of Sully) was grand master of the artillery, and the Duke of Bouillon was to accompany the King.

On the other hand his opponents had not been idle. The army in the Netherlands had been brought up to more than 20,000 men. The Milanese was held by not less than 30,000; and contingents were expected from Sicily and Naples which would raise the total to 40,000. The semi-dependent Princes were called upon for money or men. Troops were raised in Spain. In May 25,000 were ready, and more were being collected. The Emperor gave orders to raise men for Archduke Leopold. The Catholic League was also arming. The Duke of Savoy, Henry's only noteworthy ally, made it felt that he knew his own value. In the durable offensive and defensive alliance concluded at Brosolo (April 25, 1610), the forces to be provided for the Italian expedition were increased to 31,600; all conquests in Milan were to go to the Duke; and only trifling compensations were accorded to the King. On the other hand Archduke Albert showed the keenest desire for peace, and granted leave for the King's army to pass through Luxemburg on their way to Jülich.

Everything was ready. In May the King was in Paris making his last dispositions before he joined his army at Châlons. The Queen, Maria de' Medici, was appointed as Regent with a council of fifteen advisers. She was crowned at Saint-Denis on May 13. On May 19 the King was to leave for the front. On the 14th, as the King was driving in company with the Duke of Épernon through the Rue de la Ferronnerie, a block in the traffic brought his carriage to a foot's pace. A man, who had followed the King from the Louvre, seized the moment to spring forward, and to strike him two blows in rapid succession in the left side with a knife. His death followed instantly.

No trustworthy evidence has ever been brought forward to connect the act of François Ravallac with any conspiracy. Under torture he steadfastly maintained that he had no abettors or accomplices. He was moved, as it appears, by religious frenzy, and the desire to strike down the treacherous Catholic who was taking up arms in the Protestant cause. He believed that his act would be welcome to the people of France. The execration with which it was received throughout the

kingdom surprised and disappointed him. The enemies of France rejoiced; but the French people united as one man to deplore the loss of the most human and sympathetic of French Kings.

The universal and heartfelt grief of his subjects was due to Henry's achievements, no less than to his personal qualities. He had raised France from her nadir almost to her zenith. He had found her distracted, impoverished, desolated, impotent. He left her united, prosperous, peaceful, flourishing, powerful. He had surmounted difficulties that seemed insurmountable; he had used the favour of fortune to the best advantage. His death arrived too soon for the completion of his ulterior schemes; it may also have saved him from his greatest blunder. In forcing on the general war on the occasion of the Jülich-Cleves dispute he had been moved by passion rather than policy. His successors had still time to minimise and localise the danger. Had Henry lived, he would no doubt have succeeded in extricating himself from the difficulties incurred by his rashness; but it is probable that he would have consumed to little purpose a great part of the resources patiently accumulated in the course of many years.

His highest qualities lay perhaps in the diplomatic sphere. In his relations with the League these were well displayed. His victory over the rebels was due rather to tact and timely concessions than to force of arms. In dealing with the French Protestants even greater tact and skill were required. After the peace he showed the same qualities, making the power of France felt in every important question, never wasting his strength, never losing a chance. In Villeroy, the ideal State Secretary, and in Jeannin, the skilled negotiator, he had able coadjutors who proved his wisdom in the choice of men; but he was always his own Foreign Minister. As a diplomatist he was keen, quick-witted, versatile, prompt, patient. He was, on the other hand, perhaps too sanguine. He relied too much on the wisdom of his associates. He assumed they would put aside petty advantages, ignorant fears, and purblind doubts, and see their true interests clearly. His scheme for a great European coalition could only have succeeded, if several years of successful war had brought the falterers one by one into his camp. Policy dictated his opposition to the Habsburgs; he trusted that religion would bring him allies, and that fear of oppression or absorption would drive the weak to seek his protection; he found that the Protestants never trusted him and were jealous of each other, while the weak looked for safety in inaction.

As a soldier he was vigorous, rapid, intrepid, and clear-sighted. He never had an opportunity of showing the highest qualities of a strategist. But he did well whatever he had to do; and in his clear perception of the value of artillery he was in advance of his time. In his recognition also of the close relation between finance and successful warfare he showed himself a statesman. The commissariat and transport of his

armies were served with care and method hitherto unknown in modern Europe. By regular pay he secured the discipline of his troops, and diminished the evils of war. He endeavoured to make France independent of foreign mercenaries, to dispense with German *reiter* and *landsknechte*, and to rely on French troops alone. For his last war he enrolled a force of Swiss, but the remainder of his troops were purely French. Of some 80,000 men, raised for the Jülich-Cleves enterprise, only 8000 were foreign. He developed and improved the engineering department of his forces; and herein, as in countless other ways, he prepared the way for the glories of his grandson. With characteristic humanity he extended his thought for his soldiers beyond the period of their useful service, and founded an establishment for the maintenance of wounded and decrepit officers and men. His energy and resources, however, did not suffice to cover the whole field of warlike activity; and the navy remained during his reign, as previously, neglected.

In temperament he was cheerful, genial, buoyant, kindly; in manner free from all affectation and pride; in intercourse with all classes of his subjects affable and sympathetic, eager to learn at first hand all the circumstances of their fortune and life; in relation to his subordinates, faithful, free from caprice, willing to listen, but determined to be obeyed; in speech and writing, ready, pointed, apt, and natural. On the faults of his private life it is not necessary to dwell; few men have shown in their personal conduct less dignity, self-respect, and self-control; and the effects of his weakness did not concern himself alone. His infatuation for Gabrielle d'Estrées delayed the marriage which he owed to France; his relations with Henriette d'Entragues led to a dangerous conspiracy, which he hardly allowed to interrupt his intimacy; his passion for the Princess of Condé led to an inopportune war. But on the whole his conduct as a ruler was less affected by such influences than has often been the case.

Religion with him was consistently subordinated to policy. He must have the credit of having been the first to perceive the merits of toleration as a political expedient. He saw in it the means by which unity and peace could be secured for his country. The religion he adopted was the religion of his people; he maintained it in accordance with the wish of the majority; for the minority he secured such freedom of conscience and worship as opinion would allow, and such political guarantees as the times required. He sought allies for the most part, though not exclusively, among the Protestant Powers, because his enemies were Catholic; but no act or word of his ever tended to embitter religious animosity. Religious forces he used to serve his political ends; but the line of action which he pursued, if successful, would in time have emancipated Europe from the devastating furies of religious dissension.

His religious policy was wise and enlightened; unfortunately he did

not live to develop it to its natural conclusion. Thus it is as an administrator that he deserves most fully the gratitude of his people. Few rulers have more persistently worked for the material welfare of their subjects. In this department he found an able instrument in Rosny, afterwards Duke of Sully. Here the good qualities of Rosny told. As *Surintendant* of finance, as grand master of artillery, as administrator of roads and communications, his energy, his financial accuracy, his fidelity, his strength of will, his industry, made him an invaluable servant. He bore without chafing the unpopularity of the King's economies; and his overbearing demeanour was even an advantage when he had to deal with importunate courtiers. His vanity, jealousy, and malice, did not seriously impair his efficiency. The policy which he carried out was the King's; the indomitable persistence and ubiquitous activity were his own.

In 1598 order had been generally restored. The salutary ordinance of that year prohibiting the bearing of arms on the public highroads was firmly enforced and accomplished its end. But the effects of nearly forty years of civil war and misgovernment were still everywhere apparent. Industry and commerce were at a standstill; agriculture was crippled; the finances were in disorder; the taxable capacity of the people was at its minimum; the public debt was equivalent to a burden of 350,000,000 *livres*; the royal domains were pledged; provinces and revenues had been alienated to foreign Princes or great men in return for loans or in defrayment of obligations. By the close of the reign the debt had been reduced to 224 millions; the provinces and revenues, whose profits had been allowed to pass out of the King's control, were recovered; domains had been regained to the value of 40 millions; rent charges had been redeemed to the value of 25 millions. On the other hand the illicit robbery of officials had been repressed; the illegal exactions of governors of provinces had ceased; twenty millions of arrears of *taille* had been remitted (1598); the *taille* had been reduced by nearly two millions a year (from sixteen millions to fourteen); and a treasure of forty-one millions had been built up. In consequence of better administration, better bargains with tax-farmers and contractors, and the redemption of domains and other sources of revenue, the revenue from sources other than taxation had increased from some three millions a year to thirteen, and the total income of the State from 23,000,000 *livres*, at which it was estimated by the Notables (1597), to 39,000,000, the estimate for 1609. This sum must be multiplied by about eight, in order to give its equivalent in modern currency. Sully deserves in great measure the credit for this improvement; but the directing intelligence was that of Henry.

Meanwhile, the active mind of the King was constantly considering means for the material development of his kingdom. Care was taken for the sanitation of Paris and other large towns, and for the endowment

of public hospitals. Many rivers were canalised and made available for navigation. Schemes were devised for connecting with each other the great river systems of France, the Seine, Loire, Garonne, and Rhone, by means of canals; and, although the plans were not executed, they remain as a memorial of the wise inventiveness of Henry's age. Extensive operations were undertaken for the draining and cultivating of marshy land. Olivier de Serres' great work on agriculture attracted the King's most lively interest; and by his example he did much to increase its popularity. Efforts were made, with some success, to introduce the culture of the silkworm into the central provinces of France. The restrictions on the export of corn were removed, to the great encouragement of agriculture. Measures were taken to promote various industries—silk, wool, tapestry, iron, steel, glass, pottery; endeavours were made to resuscitate the mines of France; and, although such attempts had only a partial success, they prove the high notion conceived by Henry of a ruler's duty. Sully, as Master of Ways and Communications, did much to improve the roads and bridges throughout France; the State spent freely for this object; and the localities were forced to do their part. The posts were reorganised; and a new system of relays was introduced for the transport of commodities. Commercial treaties were concluded with England, Spain, and the Porte; and French consuls were established in the most important trading stations of the Levant, even in Barbary. The colonising energy of Champlain and others in Canada was encouraged; and attempts were made to organise an East India Company. In every way Sully and his master showed that they understood that, if a King is to be rich, his country must first be prosperous and industrious.

While all means were adopted to improve the revenue and to increase public and individual wealth, the closest economy was exercised in expenditure. During the years of peace the standing army was reduced to the minimum. Henry relied on finding levies of experienced soldiers at need; and this proved to be the case in 1606, and again in 1609. Full provision of arms and ammunition and ordnance was constantly kept in store; here again Sully did good work; but the expenditure on *personnel* was rigorously kept down. In consequence the budget for 1609 showed a clear balance of 18,000,000 *livres*, available for the extinction of debt, or for the provision of a war-chest. A weak side of this economy was the reluctance to pay just debts. This lost for the King the friendship of the Grand Duke of Tuscany, and did much to alienate the German Princes.

Constitutional changes were rare throughout the reign. Perhaps the most important was the concentration of the financial authority in the hand of one man (1599), in place of the cumbrous and inefficient Council of Finance. The *pancarte*, established in 1597 on the advice of the Notables, had to be abolished in 1602. In general, the benefits of

Henry's administration were attained through the better handling of the existing machinery. But the *Paulette* deserves mention. Since Louis XII and Francis I the sale of offices, originated as a financial device, had become a settled practice. In 1604 the King, on the advice of a certain Paulet, determined to convert the judicial offices of the kingdom into recognised heritable property. Judges, in consideration of the annual payment of one-sixtieth of the sum paid on the last occasion when the office was sold, were confirmed in the ownership of their posts, receiving liberty to sell them, or leave them to their heirs, or bequeath them, subject to the sole provision that the new holder should prove himself qualified. The measure was in part financial, in part it was expected to create a caste of magistrates, proud of their independence and of their traditions. As compared with the abuse of public sale, the new system was perhaps an improvement; but that abuse could have been at any time abolished; the new one created vested and heritable rights, which only a revolution could destroy. The independence of the magistrates might easily make them a danger to the State in times of sedition or discontent.

In general, it may be said that Henry adopted the system of absolute government as he received it from Louis XI and Francis I. The change was due to improved administration, and to a better choice of men. The system suited the King with his impatience of routine methods and circumlocution; the King suited the system, for his energy was weighted with caution, his thoughts were for the State rather than for himself, his ambition never degenerated into megalomania, and his love of pleasure was controlled by a sense of public duty. Thus in this reign we see French absolutism at its best. The King's will is law, but his will is beneficent; and the instruments of his power respond to the impulse from above. A new page has been turned; few can desire to return to the traditions of the League or of Henry III; thus the public machine is not clogged with precedents, or complicated by time-honoured routine. The nation feels the need of a ruler, and surrenders itself willingly into his hand; the ruler is worthy of the nation's confidence. In Henry the nation's genius seems to be embodied; gaiety, wit, intrepidity, lucidity, industry, and common-sense, are his most distinguishing attributes, and fit him to be the King of a people in whom those qualities are prominently displayed. In the person of a King the French nation more than others finds its completion, its central point of life; in Louis XIV the nation felt its majesty, its strength, its glory, its pomp, borne as on a banner before the eyes of Europe; but in Henry IV its vital characteristics of intellect and disposition were expressed and realised as in no other of the long Capetian succession.

CHAPTER XXI.

THE EMPIRE UNDER RUDOLF II.

THROUGHOUT more than a generation, covering the greater part of the long succession of years during which the Empire, disturbed within and menaced from without, drifted on towards the Thirty Years' War, the reigning Emperor was Rudolf II. The utter impotence of his rule, ending in collapse, directly contributed to render inevitable the outbreak of the European struggle of which Germany was the principal theatre. Before his downfall the condition of the Empire, and the progress of the intersecting religious and territorial questions that agitated it, had been materially affected by his policy and by that of other members of his dynasty. A few words thus seem called for as to his personality, and as to those of his brothers and principal German kinsmen.

It should, however, be remembered that after the accession of Rudolf II many years passed before the black cloud of insanity settled upon him, and before, at the very time when everything seemed to depend on his action, he hid himself away from the face of man, and allowed the confusion around him to become chaos. We must not think of him in 1576 as he appeared to the observant Tuscan Daniel Eremita in 1609, or even as some thirteen years earlier he was seen at Vienna by the well-informed Cambridge traveller, Fynes Moryson. At the time of his accession, little was known of him except that he had brought back from Spain, where he had spent nearly eight years, not only an unsmiling Castilian manner, but a predilection for Catholic advisers so marked as to alarm the Protestant Estates of his hereditary dominions. But neither was he now, nor did he ever become, a Spaniard in heart and mind. Among the many languages of which he was master (and which included a certain amount of Cech) he retained a predilection for the German tongue; and he incurred censure for preferring Germans to appointments in both Bohemia and Hungary. For the rest, though his disposition was reserved, his ways were mild. Not unskilled in bodily exercises, he had little liking for them; but he took the constant interest of a genuine dilettante in almost every known branch of art and science, was in several himself no mean technical expert, and became gradually

the greatest patron and purchaser of his age, employing agents in all parts of Europe in the interests of his galleries of pictures and statuary, his collections of jewelry and curiosities of all kinds, and his botanical and zoological gardens at Prague. But he was no mere collector; there was hardly an art or a science of which some distinguished representative was not to be found at his Court; he was a great reader of Latin verse, and a friend of historical composition; and he entered with special interest into mathematical, physical, and medical studies. Chemistry and astronomy—with their then inseparable perversions, alchemy and astrology—irresistibly attracted his speculative mind; and it is noticeable that Tycho Brahe and Kepler enjoyed his patronage in the later years of his reign, whereas in the earlier it was shared by Dr Dee and the rank impostor Kelley, who figured as Dr Dee's "seer."

Although, as time went on, Rudolf allowed his private tastes to distract him from the business of government, he both entertained from first to last a most exalted conception of his Imperial dignity, and showed a notably intelligent insight into his responsibilities as a territorial sovereign, initiating or promoting in his dominions industrial, economical, and sanitary reforms. He asserted his political independence of both Rome and Spain; nor were the papal claims disputed by him wholly formal, or the efforts which he made to recover the Netherlands for the Empire altogether idle. To this attitude on his part, rather than to his secret excesses and their consequences, should be attributed the breakdown of the negotiations carried on during many years, from 1579 onwards, for a marriage between him and the Infanta Isabel Clara Eugenia. Like James I of England, between whom and Rudolf in his earlier and better years there is more than one point of resemblance, he devised schemes of mediation which he was powerless to carry out; but he was devoid neither of sound political impulses nor of a certain magnanimity of purpose. His interest in public business was, however, at no time continuous; and in the end it was manifested only by fits and starts. The symptoms of melancholia and madness were gradual in their advent; but from 1597 or 1598 onwards he showed himself unwilling to sign papers or transact other ordinary business. His last appearance at a Diet of the Empire was in 1594; the Austrian and Hungarian Diets he had ceased to attend much earlier; the last Bohemian Diet opened by him was that of 1598. About 1600 things grew worse, and the ascendancy of the chamberlain Wolfgang von Rumpf was exchanged for the *régime* of a series of valets, the most notorious of whom, Philip Lang, was not overthrown till 1603. Affairs had now fallen hopelessly out of gear; to gain access to the Emperor was a process of intrigue and corruption; even ambassadors were excluded from his presence. From these later years date acts of cruelty explicable only by a suspiciousness and pride intensified by madness, and political designs which bore the stamp of the same diseased origin.

The testamentary dispositions of Maximilian II, dictated by a desire of avoiding the dissipation of territorial power, left each of Rudolf's four brothers who grew to man's estate with nothing but an appanage and his ambition. Rudolf's celibacy, and in course of time his mental collapse, made the question of the succession the chief dynastic problem of his reign; and it continuously occupied the attention of his brothers and kinsmen from 1581 onwards, when, on the occasion of a serious illness of the Emperor, it was first mooted by Archduke Charles of Styria.

Of Maximilian's sons the next in age to Rudolf, Archduke Ernest, who had been his companion in Spain, seems, though not flawless in character, throughout to have found more favour there than his elder brother. After missing the Polish throne, he was, on Rudolf's accession, entrusted with the government of Upper and Lower Austria, where his steady enforcement of the principles of the Counter-Reformation obtained for him the Golden Fleece from Philip, and a consecrated hat and sword from Pope Sixtus V. Later, Philip appointed him Governor-General of the "loyal" Provinces of the Netherlands, where, however, he died a few months after his arrival (February, 1595).

Very different was the career of the third brother, Archduke Matthias. He began it as if in religious questions he was minded, like his father before him, to be of no party. In truth, he was incapable of entering far into the principles or of taking up the policy of either side; though in a long period of expectancy he cast his eye upon sees that might provide him with a suitable income, and repressed the Protestants when he had a chance. His mind was shallow and his selfishness transparent; but he had in his favour, besides a lightheartedness which made him ready for anything, a certain *bonhomie* that stood him in excellent stead, and a docility under skilful guidance so long as he deemed it in his interest to submit to it. Thus, after he had ultimately become the inevitable alternative to the existing anarchy, he was carried to the top, but speedily surrendered the control of the Imperial policy placed in his hands.

Maximilian II's fourth son and namesake, educated in Germany like Matthias and always faithful to him, had already in his youth been admitted into the German Order, of which he finally became High Master in 1590. He thus necessarily remained unmarried; but he too had gone through his period of personal ambition when, during his coadjutorship in 1587, he was brought forward as a candidate for the Polish throne, vacant by the death of Stephen Báthory. He maintained his candidature even after the Diet had voted in favour of his competitor, Prince Sigismund of Sweden; he twice invaded Poland, and was twice defeated by the Chancellor John Zamoyski; on the second occasion he fell into captivity, nor was it till a year later that he was released on humiliating terms (1589). After this Maximilian devoted himself steadily to the service of his House, in the field against the Turks, and at home as

guardian of the young Styrian Archdukes. In 1595 his merits were rewarded by the government of the Tyrol and Anterior Austria (*Vorder-österreich*); and at two most critical dates in the history of the Habsburg dynasty he conspicuously contributed to preserve it from falling asunder.

The fifth son, Archduke Albert, had in his eleventh year been received at the Court of Philip II, whose goodwill he never afterwards lost. Created a Cardinal at the age of eighteen, and soon afterwards named Archbishop of Toledo (though it was not till long afterwards that he assumed the administration of his Province), he was in 1593 charged with the Viceroyalty of Portugal, and in 1596, as has been narrated elsewhere, was appointed his brother Ernest's successor in the government of the Spanish Netherlands. His marriage with the Infanta was not actually concluded till after her father's death; nor is there any reason for holding Albert accountable for the Spanish design which seven years later sought to place him on the Imperial throne.

It may be worth remembering that the eldest daughter of Maximilian II, Anne, became in 1570 the fourth wife of Philip II, and thus transmitted to their son (afterwards Philip III of Spain) pretensions to the Austrian succession which had to be bought off. After her death in 1580, the widower with characteristic promptitude offered his hand to her younger sister Elizabeth, in the opinion of her late husband Charles IX of France the most virtuous woman in the world. A third daughter, Margaret, died at Madrid, in a Carmelite nunnery, whither half a century before she had retired with her mother, as to a customary dynastic retreat.

Of the side-lines of the House of Austria, the Tyrolese, as already noted, expired in 1595 with Archduke Ferdinand. On the other hand, at that date a sufficiency of male successors was assured to the Styrian line, whose head was Archduke Charles, the third and favourite son of Ferdinand I. Obviously, the succession to the hereditary dominions of the House of Austria must be expected ultimately to pass to this Styrian line. Archduke Charles died in 1590; but till 1596 his widow Maria, Albert of Bavaria's sister, acted as regent for her son Ferdinand, while he was pursuing his studies with the Jesuits at Ingolstadt. Ferdinand's younger brother Leopold came in 1607 to unite in his hands the bishoprics of Strassburg and Passau; and his ambition suggested to Rudolf II in his last years a scheme of reaction and revenge. Their sister Anne's marriage in 1592 to Sigismund III of Poland (Archduke Maximilian's former competitor) marked the reconciliation of Austrian and Polish interests, not only as against the Turk, but also in the cause of Rome.

In fine, the lives of these Habsburg Archdukes and Archduchesses, filled chiefly with a succession of duties imposed upon them in Court, camp, or cloister, are marked by a singular stillness. The traditional reserve and the secluded habits of the House contributed to debar it from frequent or intimate intercourse with the other German Princes,

either by a prodigal hospitality like that to which many of these were addicted, or even by means of an active diplomatic intercourse. The relations between Rudolf's government and the Princes of the Empire, cold enough to begin with, were by his habits of seclusion chilled to freezing-point.

No immediate break is perceptible in the policy of the Imperial government after Maximilian's mantle had fallen on Rudolf's shoulders. Like his father, he was primarily intent on saving the Netherlands for the House of Habsburg. To this end more especially Rudolf, again like his father before him, desired to be on good terms with the Estates of the Empire itself, to whom moreover he had constantly to appeal for aid against the Turks. But the good- or ill-will of the Estates depended on the treatment of the religious difficulty; and towards this Rudolf stood in a different position from his father, both by reason of his own close connexion with the Catholic interest, and because of changes on the Protestant side which occurred at the very beginning of his reign.

The existing peace with the Turks was at the time of Rudolf's accession renewed on the same humiliating conditions, and, largely by means of superadded bribes, was nominally preserved till 1593-4. The frontier warfare had never stopped; and the tension with the Turkish government had increased since the close of its Persian war (1589-90). In 1593 the rout of Hassan, Governor of Bosnia, who was slaughtered with some 18,000 of his troops at Sissek on the Kulpa, called forth an irresistible cry for vengeance, and a war began which lasted till 1606. The *Türkenglocke* was rung in every town and village of the Empire, and every effort was made to put its whole defensive power in action, though the thought had to be abandoned of making the Christian armament a matter of general European concern. In 1594 Archdukes Matthias and Maximilian both took the field; and the *Voivods* of Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia entered into an alliance with the Emperor. But in October, 1596, the new Sultan Mohammad III in person defeated Archduke Maximilian's forces in a three days' battle, with the awful loss of 50,000 men; and a sort of general mourning was proclaimed by the Emperor in his Austrian dominions. In 1599 there was some talk of peace; but the war continued till Mohammad's death in 1603, and went on under his successor Ahmad I.

In 1604 the Turks seemed to have found a most valuable ally in Stephen Bocskai, a Hungarian magnate who, two years after the Austrian rule, had in spite of many backslidings been established in Transylvania, was invested by the Porte with its Voivodship, as well as with the kingdom of Hungary. Many complaints had arisen against the Austrian administration of the Hungarian State, more especially against the employment of German officials, and the appointment of Bishops as Regents; and a more recent grievance was the attempted restitution of Protestantised churches to Catholic patronage. Thus in 1605 a Diet at

Szerenes proclaimed Bocskai King, and his coronation followed. But there was no solidity in the movement; and in the following year Archduke Matthias on the Emperor's behalf, with the aid of the patriotic Magyar Stephen Illeshazi, satisfied the Hungarian Estates by granting to them the administrative concessions desired by them, with full freedom of exercising both the Lutheran and the Calvinist forms of faith. Bocskai died in the same year. The fact that the Turkish Power was hard pressed both by a Persian war and by a formidable insurrection in Asia Minor further accounts for the peace which in November, 1606, the Imperial government was enabled to conclude with the Porte at Zsitva-Torok. Its real significance lies not so much in the territorial arrangements, as to which there was no real change, as in the abolition of the tribute, and in the recognition of the political and diplomatic equality of the two contracting Powers. Though more or less transitory in its effects, it was the first "peace with honour" concluded by a Habsburg Emperor with his arch-foe.

While the necessity for common sacrifices which the Turkish peril imposed upon the Empire during nearly the whole of Rudolf's reign in a measure tended to union among the Estates, the action taken by him in his hereditary dominions marked him from the first as a partisan in the perennial religious quarrel. Under the influence of the party of reaction at Vienna, he soon showed that his advent to power was likely to put a speedy end to the religious policy of his predecessor towards the Austrian Estates. Their power as to both the grant of taxes and the raising of levies was so considerable, and the concessions made by Maximilian in 1591 went so far, that the Catholic party had little time to spare. Before the close of the year 1576 Rudolf appointed Archduke Ernest to the government of Upper and Lower Austria. The Emperor himself almost at once took up his permanent residence at Prague, attracted by the airy prospects and ample accommodation of the Hradschin, round which clustered the palaces of the magnificent and cultured Bohemian nobility. In 1577-8, however, he spent the better part of a year in Austria, and set down his foot in the first instance against the progress of religious liberty in the towns. In June, 1578, an edict bade the Protestant preachers quit Vienna before nightfall and the country within a fortnight. At Linz, the Upper Austrian capital, the Estates had to do homage (though under protest) without having secured a renewal of Maximilian's engagements. Archduke Ernest met with much recalcitrance in carrying out his rulings. The measure of success reached by the Emperor's religious policy, which aimed at restricting Protestant worship in Austria to the lands of noble proprietors, was largely due to the activity of the Bishop of Passau's Vicar-General, Melchior Klesl, afterwards Bishop of Neustadt and of Vienna. The versatile statesmanship of this large-minded ecclesiastic—by birth a *Wiener Kind*, whom the Jesuits had rescued from Protestantism—has been charged with an

unreasonable weight of responsibility for results partly promoted, partly resisted by him. In the present instance he succeeded, not in undoing the privileges assured to the Austrian nobility by Maximilian, but in reforming the towns and their districts, which under his direction resumed a Catholic aspect. As the reaction spread from Lower into Upper Austria, the nobility there were supported in their resistance by the peasantry, a sturdy race of men, mostly proprietors of the lands tilled by them, but subject to certain services (*Roboten*). The Diets became unmanageable, and in 1578-9 even resorted to the stopping of supplies. Thus things continued, the Church and the temporal authority occasionally colliding both in Austria and in the neighbouring Bavaria, but remaining united against Protestantism. In 1593 the renewed outbreak of the Turkish War, while it heightened the self-consciousness of the Estates and put arms into the hands of the peasantry, at the same time furnished the Austrian government, now under Archduke Matthias, with troops. The peasant insurrection which in 1595 spread through Upper Austria was no doubt largely provoked by the persistent endeavours of the government to advance the Counter-Reformation, but soon chiefly busied itself with the social grievances of the peasants, so that both Catholic and Protestant nobles united with the government in measures for its repression. A victory of the peasants at Neumarkt (November) led to the reference of the points at issue to the Emperor, and finally to the appointment in 1596 of an Imperial Commission, which ordered a disarmament of the unfortunate peasantry, and with the help of the Estates made an end of the insurrection. But the Estates did not altogether find their account in its close. By means of a Commission of reform instituted in 1597 the predominance of the Catholic Church was successfully restored in Austria, despite both the privileges of the nobility and the preferences of the towns. In 1598 Archduke Leopold, hitherto Coadjutor of Passau, succeeded (in the twelfth year of his age) as Bishop; and Pope Clement VIII was able to withdraw from the diocese, which comprised the greater part of Austria, the concession of the Cup made by Pius IV a generation earlier.

Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola were in Rudolf's earlier years at least as strongly Protestant in sentiment as Upper and Lower Austria; and towards the end of Archduke Charles' rule offered a violent resistance to his reactionary Commission of visitation. But before his death in 1590, and afterwards under Archduke Ernest's administration during Ferdinand's minority, the Counter-Reformation made considerable, though not unhindered, progress. Actual persecution, however, only began under the personal rule of Ferdinand, who after issuing a Commission in 1600, put a stop to all Protestant worship and instruction, banished all Protestant preachers under pain of death, and left to the laity no choice but submission or banishment. By 1602 Catholicism was firmly established as the only form of religion permitted in the duchies under his sway.

It was this Styrian Counter-Reformation that encouraged Rudolf II in his attempts to enforce a religious reaction in Hungary and Bohemia. In the latter kingdom he had so early as 1581 issued an edict of banishment against the Bohemian Brethren. The nobles, many of whom belonged to the Brotherhood, were not accustomed to such a royal command: it remained a dead letter; and Rudolf's need of the Estates in the wars against the Turks long left it such. In 1602, however, he resolved to go back upon the letter of the Basel Compactates, allow no alternative in Bohemia to the Catholic Faith besides Utraquism, and reissue the ordinance of 1581, which was now extended to the Calvinists. Some Protestant churches were hereupon closed; Catholic clergy were introduced into others; and the school of Jungbunzlau, the hallowed "Carmel" of the Bohemian Brethren and a kind of later Deventer in its mingled traditions of piety and learning, was destroyed. These proceedings more than sufficed to set in flame the national spirit of Bohemian Protestantism; and when in 1605 (rather late in the day) a Catholic Synod adopted the decrees of the Council of Trent, the various forms of Bohemian Protestantism, which collectively commanded an indisputable majority among the Estates, drew more closely together than ever. The success, about this time, of the Hungarian Protestants in obtaining the acceptance of their demands further encouraged the Bohemians in their determination to oppose an organised national resistance to the Catholic Reaction.

During its struggle against the forces of the Catholic Reaction, on whose side the Emperor and the Austrian branch of the House of Habsburg seemed now definitively ranged, German Protestantism was weakened by the simultaneous working of many causes. Of these none was at this time more marked than the growth of the more rigorous form of Lutheranism, and of its hostility both to those Lutherans whose attitude towards Calvinism was less uncompromising, and to Calvinism itself. In the month (October, 1576) of Maximilian II's death died also the Elector Palatine Frederick III, who had made his capital, Heidelberg, an asylum of persecuted Calvinists, and the University in which it gloried a chosen seminary of Calvinistic youth from all parts of Europe. One of his sons, John Casimir, had, as has been seen, rendered substantial service to the Huguenot cause, and another, Christopher, had sacrificed his life in support of the rising in the Netherlands. But their eldest brother Lewis, now Elector Palatine, adhered to the Lutheran dogma, and immediately on his accession set about purging the Rhenish Palatinate of all Calvinistic teaching and preaching. Meanwhile John Casimir, to whom a small principality of his own had been assigned at Neustadt, kept up Calvinism in church and schools, and remained in intimate relation with the Protestant interest beyond the border.

The short-lived recovery of the Palatinate to Lutheranism gave much satisfaction to the Electors John George of Brandenburg, a very practical politician, and Augustus of Saxony. The latter was now intent upon bringing about a Lutheran union based upon a doctrinal exclusion of Calvinism, by means of a *Formula Concordiae* drawn up by the orthodox Lutheran divines in whom he confided—Martin Chemnitz, David Chytraens, and above all the indefatigable Württemberger Jacob Andreae, and, after a preliminary conference at Torgau in May, 1576, communicated by the Saxon to the other Protestant governments. When in June, 1580, this *Formula Concordiae* was at last promulgated, the new test was found to divide the Protestant governments into two unequal halves—the majority who had accepted it comprising, with the three temporal Electors, the Houses of Brunswick, Mecklenburg, and Ernestine Saxony, and in the south Württemberg, Ansbach, the Neuburg Palatines and Baden; the minority, who refused, Pomerania, Holstein, Anhalt, and Hesse, with John Casimir, Zweibrücken, and Nassau in the south. The Wetterau Counts also declined, and the majority of the Imperial towns. Thus, the adoption of the *Formula Concordiae* made patent the split among the Protestant Estates, and at the same time showed the preponderance among them of religious opinions which to all intents and purposes implied a conservative policy.

At the very time when the division among the German Protestants thus became manifest the insurrection in the Netherlands had reached a most critical stage; and the Emperor Rudolf, who flattered himself that at the beginning of his reign he had helped to prevent the States General from coming to an understanding with the Duke of Anjou, showed a renewed desire to intervene. It has been seen elsewhere how Archduke Matthias held his entry into Brussels as Governor in January, 1578; and notwithstanding assurances to the contrary at Madrid, Rudolf seems to have ultimately approved his brother's step. Though, ignored by Philip and overshadowed by Orange, Matthias was after a useless sojourn dismissed (June, 1581), the King of Spain had before this signified his readiness to accept the Emperor's mediation. John Casimir's great *coup* had indeed been delivered in vain; though with a force of above 10,000, half German and half Swiss, and partly paid with Queen Elizabeth's gold, he had joined the States' army in September, 1578, the further junction with the Huguenots had not proved practicable, and in January, 1579, he had quitted the country. But about the same date the Union of Utrecht was concluded; and Philip seems to have thought it worth while to make some attempt by means of negotiations to preserve his sovereignty intact. Thus in May a formal peace congress was opened at Cologne. But though a *Deputationstag* at Worms had approved the Emperor's mediation, his plenipotentiaries suggested no concessions as to religion which were satisfactory to the States; in other words, the Imperial diplomacy had no basis of agreement to propose. Thus by

December the solemn mockery was over; and the final answer to Rudolf's futile attempt was the abjuration, in July, 1581, of the sovereignty of Philip by the United Provinces.

But though the Empire had accomplished less than nothing by its formal intervention in the affairs of the Netherlands, it could not in its turn remain unaffected by the progress of their war of liberation. Parma's campaign of 1579, which culminated in the capture of Maestricht, led to a succession of raids by both Spanish and Dutch soldiery across the German frontier; and, owing to the enterprise of Dutch privateers on the Rhine, the river was no longer safely navigable below Cologne, the chief waterway of trade with the south being thus practically stopped. Even more unsettling, however—for governments and populations alike were in this age more troubled by religious than by economic disturbances—was the continuous influx of Calvinist refugees from the Low Countries into the German border-lands, and the propaganda which they carried on there. These aliens, whom Alva had tried to induce the governments of Jülich and Cologne to expel, were mostly laborious and peaceable artisans; but they were uniformly full of bitter hatred against the Church of Rome. The centres of this immigration were Wesel in Cleves, Aachen, Cologne, and the prosperous sea-port of Emden, which had been the cradle of Anabaptism, and where in 1571 was held a Synod of all the Dutch Churches in Germany.

The duchies of Jülich and Cleves were of course immediately exposed to the influence of this Dutch immigration, with whose aid a Reformed congregation established itself at Düsseldorf. In his religious opinions as well as in his tolerant disposition Duke William resembled the Emperor Maximilian; and he had married his eldest three daughters to Protestant Princes. But he had secured the bishopric of Münster for his surviving son John William, and from about 1578 his views began to take a Catholic turn. He issued some strong edicts against the Dutch refugees; but they avoided persecution by keeping quiet.

In the free Imperial city of Aachen and its district—*das Reich von Aachen*, as it proudly called itself—a religious conflict had long been on foot. In 1580 both Lutherans and Calvinists, whose numbers were now swelled by the Dutch immigration, demanded the free exercise of their religion; and on the refusal of the strictly Catholic town council, supported by an Imperial Commission, the Protestants brought about a riot, and made themselves masters of the city (May, 1581). The Emperor sent two mandates in succession for the maintenance of the Catholic constitution of Aachen, but hesitated to enforce it. Hereupon Parma actually marched some troops across the frontier; and ultimately the Aacheuvers, anxious to avoid a new Imperial Commission, made over the whole matter to the Diet. Was the right of choosing its religion, granted by the Religious Peace to every Estate of the Empire, to be denied to Aachen because of the clause requiring all Imperial

towns where both religions were exercised at the time of the Peace to maintain them in the same proportions, although as a matter of fact in 1555 only one religion was established in this particular city? If the Catholic minority here were to prevail, why should it not in other towns—say, in Hamburg, Lübeck, and Bremen? If on the other hand Protestant expansion were to be permanently stopped, how was Protestantism to protect itself against the Catholic Reaction?

The Diet of Augsburg, which met in July, 1582, had been summoned by Rudolf to enable him to put in order the eastern frontier fortresses against the Turks, and to advise with him on the danger in the west, where the Netherlands seemed about to become a dependency of France, and where by way of warning the Imperial town of Cambray had just been handed over to Anjou. But in addition to the Aachen difficulty another religious question of typical significance thrust itself to the front. As has been seen, the great archiepiscopal see of Magdeburg had since 1566 been held by Prince Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg; but neither Maximilian nor Rudolf had in this instance been found willing to resort to the convenient arrangement of an indulgence (*Indult*), whereby the temporalities of a see might provisionally be granted to its occupant, although his election had not yet received the papal confirmation. Joachim Frederick now claimed to sit and vote at the Diet as administrator of the archbishopric. This unprecedented demand was resolutely resisted by the Catholic Estates; and the new Elector of Mainz, Wolfgang von Dalberg, and Duke William V of Bavaria, who had succeeded in 1579, declared that they would quit the Diet if the claim were allowed. The administrator hereupon withdrew from Augsburg; and the Emperor was henceforth less ready than before to resort to the subterfuge of indulgences.

As to the defence of the western frontier, the Diet merely voted a trifling grant and gave ample authority for protective measures to the three Circles nearest to the border. In the matter of the Turkish aid, it was this time the towns who declared that they would make their assent to the moderate grant voted by the Electors and Princes depend upon the redress of grievances, in which they specially included the treatment of Aachen. When the Imperial government hereupon accepted the grant by the two Colleges as equivalent to one by the whole Diet, the protest of the towns was, notwithstanding the usual Saxon attempt at compromise, supported by the Protestant Princes. In the end the towns, whose discretion was apt to master their valour, paid their share under protest: and the Emperor appointed a new Commission at Aachen, consisting of the Electors of Saxony and Trier, freedom of religious worship being granted to the Protestants *pendente lite*. The commissioners duly kept the question open as long as possible; and the Emperor having in 1593, in accordance with the conclusions of the *Reichshofrath*, pronounced the Catholic town council restored and

Protestant worship abolished, the execution of this sentence was carried out five years later—sixteen after the matter had been first brought before the Diet. That Diet ended characteristically with a quarrel about the new Calendar, introduced by Pope Gregory XIII. Rudolf had at last found an occasion on which he led the party of progress; but the age was too full of religious polemics for any Protestant to raise his voice in favour of the change, except the mathematician Kepler of Graz.

The failure of the Diet of 1582 to settle the religious difficulty in the north-west was immediately made manifest by the outbreak of serious troubles in the Electorate of Cologne. Here the capable and tolerant Salentin of Isenburg had in 1577 resigned his Archbishopric; the noble House to which he belonged seemed likely to become extinct; and he preferred a papal dispensation to marrying without one, and thus furnishing a test case as to the valuelessness of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*. In his place Gebhard (II) of the noble Swabian family of Waldburg, a nephew of the zealous Cardinal Otto of Augsburg, was elected Archbishop and at once confirmed by Gregory XIII. The Protestant party in the Chapter, headed by Count Hermann von Neuenaar, a nephew of Archbishop Hermann von Wied, had carried Gebhard, calculating on his dissolute habits of life, for in the year after his election he was living with the Countess Agnes von Mansfeld. Early in 1582 her brothers made a raid in approved fashion on the Electoral Palace at Bonn, and obtained from Archbishop Gebhard a promise of marriage, which he appears to have made with the intention of resigning his Archbishopric. But Hermann von Neuenaar and his faction now represented to Gebhard that marriage was reconcilable with the retention of his see. The Protestantisation of the see, which must necessarily follow, would involve a defiance of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*, and with it of the whole Catholic party in the Empire. If successfully carried out it would effectually break up the north-western group of Catholic States, in which the defection of Aachen had already made a gap, and throw this portal of the Empire entirely open to the ingress of Dutch Protestant influence.

But Gebhard had a light heart, and in August, 1582, betook himself to his Westphalian dominions, where the Protestant element was strong, and where the close vicinity of the northern Netherlands made it easy to collect troops with the aid of John of Nassau, and the ever-ready John Casimir. At Cologne itself Gebhard could not reckon on the majority of the Chapter, while the town council kept down the Protestant malcontents in the city, and the Rhenish nobles were in the main adverse to his enterprise. A Diet of the whole Electorate held at Cologne in January, 1583, at which the ambassadors of Saxony and Brandenburg contented themselves with a platonic approval of Gebhard's proceedings, while the Imperial aid was promised to the Estates, should they resolve to resist him, broke up without formulating a decision; and the two sides prepared for a conflict in arms. In February Gebhard married his

leman; and in April the Pope issued his Bull of deprivation. In May Ernest of Bavaria, who in 1581 had added the Prince-bishopric of Liège to his other sees, was elected Archbishop of Cologne. Spanish troops had by the Emperor's request at the beginning of the year occupied the neighbourhood of Aachen.

Meanwhile Gebhard, who in March, 1583, had held a Diet of his own in Westphalia, and then set on foot as much of a Protestant reformation as was feasible, sought in his turn for outside support. The Protestant Princes were quite aware of the directness with which the problem of respecting the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*, or of ignoring it in the interests of Protestant expansion, was now presented to them. But athwart any possibility of a combined Protestant movement of aggression lay the *Formula Concordiæ*, and the unwillingness of its adherents to act with the Calvinists. In April, Gebhard formally conferred the chief command of his forces upon John Casimir, who in the summer executed a series of marches up and down the Rhine, while Henry of Navarre's emissary, Ségur, was soliciting the cooperation of the German Protestant Courts in his great combination with England and the Dutch, and promising pecuniary aid for the Cologne design. Such proceedings were little to the taste of the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg; yet John Casimir might have defied the Imperial threat of the ban of the Empire (October), for not one of the Circles whom the Emperor had ordered to support the Cologne Chapter had stirred in response to his mandate. But about the same time the death of the Elector Palatine Lewis called his brother home to assume the regency on behalf of the young Elector Frederick IV; and John Casimir's army was disbanded, though portions of it found their way back to Westphalia.

In January, 1584, Gebhard gained a victory at Alost over Duke Frederick of Saxe-Lauenburg, the commander of the capitulär troops; but in the same month Bonn, which was still held for Gebhard, was surrendered by mutineers to a Spanish and Bavarian force. There now only remained to recover the Westphalian portion of the Electoral dominions, where with some pecuniary assistance from the States General Gebhard still stood his ground. In March Duke Ferdinand of Bavaria nearly succeeded in cutting him off with all his forces; but he contrived to escape with a thousand horse into the Netherlands, where he and his wife were received by William of Orange at Delft. In Gebhard's rear Westphalia was speedily re-catholicised under the eyes of the Bavarian commander; but events in the Netherlands, the assassination of Orange (July) in particular, put any further Dutch support of Gebhard out of the question, and after some further hesitation Ernest was admitted into the body of Electors of the Empire (*Kurfürstenverein*) of which, as his nephew's guardian, John Casimir was now a member.

After one or two attempts at recovering his Electorate by force, Gebhard threw up the game, and withdrew to his deanery at Strassburg,

where three deposed and excommunicated Canons of Cologne were likewise members of the Chapter. They transplanted the Cologne war to Strassburg by establishing themselves by force of arms, and with the sympathy of the Strassburg citizens, in the capitular premises; and Gebhard remained in possession here till his death. In 1592 he helped to bring about an episcopal schism in Strassburg, which began by a double election of Bishops—Cardinal Charles of Lorraine, Bishop of Metz, and John George of Brandenburg, son of the administrator of Magdeburg. The former appeared on the scene with an armed force, with whose operations Huguenot troops in Dutch pay interfered; and after in 1593 a truce had been arranged on the *uti possidetis* basis, an Imperial Commission was appointed to bring the matter to a conclusion. But on this occasion Austrian policy was vigilant. In 1598 an Imperial “indulgence” was granted to the Cardinal of Lorraine, which enabled him to postulate Archduke Leopold as his Coadjutor; and in 1599 the Cardinal was invested with the see. Austria had thus secured an important further footing in Elsass; and in November, 1604, the compromise of Hagenau brought the Strassburg episcopal quarrel to a close, John George being bought out. In 1601, Gebhard was laid to rest with great pomp in Strassburg minster. Few men personally so insignificant have made more stir in the world.

The recognition of Ernest of Bavaria at Cologne had in 1585 been followed by his election as Prince-Bishop of Münster, John William of Cleves having by his elder brother's death become heir to his father's duchies. In the same year the sees of Paderborn and Osnabrück, and not long afterwards that of Minden, were restored to Catholic occupancy. Of greater importance was the progress of the Counter-Reformation in the see of Würzburg under the high-minded and strenuous Bishop Julius Echter von Mespelbrunn. He made over to the Jesuits the theological and philosophical faculties of the University of Würzburg, founded by him in 1582; and from 1585-7 reformed his diocese root and branch. His example was more or less effectively followed in other sees of the south-west and south, notably in Bamberg and in Salzburg.

In Bavaria Duke William V, whose ultramontane tendencies were shown by his concordat with Pope Gregory XIII (1583), warmly favoured the idea of a working alliance among the Catholic Princes. But, though this might have most easily been brought about by the development of the Landsberg League, the perennial jealousy between the Bavarian and Austrian Houses, which no religious or political sympathy and no intermarriage could subdue, made itself felt; and in the end Archduke Ferdinand of the Tyrol quitted the League, followed by the city of Nürnberg. For the rest, the infirm state of health of William V obliged him in 1591 to admit his son Maximilian to a share in the ducal government; but he did not wholly resign till 1598, when an epoch of unprecedented significance began in the history of Bavarian policy.

While the Baden-Baden Margraves had been educated as Catholics under Bavarian guardianship, Margrave Jacob III of Baden-Hochberg was brought over from Lutheranism to the Church of Rome through the efforts of Johannes Pistorius, himself a convert and afterwards confessor of the Emperor Rudolf (1590). But Jacob, who thus applied the principle of the *reservatum ecclesiasticum* by immediately imposing his faith upon his dominions, died a few months later—some said from poison, others from excess.

The progress of the Counter-Reformation was favoured in varying measure by the long succession of Popes beginning with Pius V and Gregory XIII. Sixtus V (1585–90) was more occupied with French and Spanish than with German affairs; and in his differences with the Jesuits the Emperor Rudolf refused to join Duke William V of Bavaria in intervening. Gregory XIV (1590–1) during his brief pontificate unhesitatingly fell in both with the principles of the Catholic Restoration and with the Spanish policy which had caused so much searching of heart to Sixtus. The ascendancy of the Jesuits was temporarily obscured under the politic rule of Clement VIII (1592–1605); but in Paul V (1605–21) a Pontiff of fiery determination once more ascended the papal throne, under none of whose occupants during the whole of this period the struggle against heresy had ceased.

On the death in 1583 of the Lutheran Elector Palatine Lewis, John Casimir had assumed the guardianship of the nine-year old Elector Frederick IV, leaving the other guardians appointed by Lewis's will to institute a suit before the *Kammergericht*. The unwillingness of the Emperor in 1588 to admit the administrator Joachim Frederick of Magdeburg to a seat, in the ordinary rotation, on the Commission of revision to which all the decisions of the *Kammergericht* were subject, blocked the whole revisory process and thus rendered futile the decisions of the tribunal itself. This encouraged John Casimir, whom in 1585 the Emperor had invested with the Palatinate in the name of his nephew, not only to provide for the latter a thorough Calvinistic education, but to effect a complete restoration of Calvinism in the Rhenish Palatinate, while in the Upper Palatinate going as far as he could in the same direction. These proceedings, together with John Casimir's attempts to bring over to his faith the young Elector's sister Christina and to coerce his own Lutheran wife Elizabeth, Augustus of Saxony's daughter, into Calvinism, widened the breach between Palatine and Saxon policy. Yet at no time was combined action among the German Protestants more urgently needed by the common cause, endangered as it was by the assassination of Orange (1584) and the capitulation of Henry III to the League (1585). Elizabeth just before sending Leicester into the Netherlands, commissioned an agent (Bodley) to the German Courts, whither he was soon followed by another diplomatist (Ségur) on behalf of Henry of Navarre. In October John Casimir,

whose designs were warmly seconded by the far-sighted Landgrave William of Hesse-Cassel, conveyed to Elizabeth proposals for a jointly equipped expedition on a scale even larger than that for which she had promised her support. Neither Augustus of Saxony nor John George of Brandenburg would go beyond joining in an embassy to Henry III; but on February 16, 1586, the Elector Augustus died.

The event was of great significance for the peace of the Empire abroad and at home. The desire for an active foreign policy was growing wider and warmer among the Protestant Princes of all shades of religious opinion. Much therefore depended on the line of religious policy which the new Elector of Saxony might elect to follow. It is quite unlikely that the young Christian I had formed any deliberate design of introducing Calvinism into his Electorate, or that his chief minister, Nicolas Krell, was an instrument in the hands of John Casimir and the Palatine Councillors. It is more probable that under Krell's influence Christian inclined to the broader "Philippist" theological views which had maintained themselves in opposition to the *Formula Concordiae* in spheres of Saxon society at all times open to academical inspiration. So early as 1587 he announced his intention of dispensing with the adherence to the *Formula* imposed on clergy and teachers; and in 1589 he appointed Krell Chancellor, abolishing his Privy Council as a permanent authority. In 1590 the ecclesiastical change was made definite by the abolition of the sacramental rite of exorcism (the conjuration of the Devil to depart from the baptised and regenerate), which the Calvinists had long discontinued and to the retention of which Melancthon had declared himself indifferent.

With regard to foreign policy, however, though Christian I was on the friendliest of terms with John Casimir, caution was still thought desirable. In October, 1586, the German Protestant embassy to Henry III of France, after being kept waiting for two months, had been unceremoniously sent home; and in November Krell, though in sympathy with the Huguenots, drew up a memorandum against the participation of Protestant Estates of the Empire in foreign religious wars. But John Casimir was not to be held back, and early in 1587 concluded a treaty of alliance, drawn up in the grand style, with Navarre. John Casimir's actual resources, however, were limited to 150,000 florins from Queen Elizabeth, and a third of the sum from Denmark and Navarre; and the German army, commanded by the Duke of Bouillon, were after a useful campaign cut up by Guise (November).

It would be unjust to hold John Casimir responsible for the interruption of peace, for the embers of the Cologne war had never died out. The Stadholder of Gelders, Count Adolf von Neuenaar, had with the aid of the Geldrian captain Martin Schenck von Nydeggen, who had learnt the military art under Parma, harried Archbishop Ernest's dominions by a petty warfare which he pretended to carry on

in Gebhard's name. Ernest fell back on the aid of Parma, who captured Neuss and allowed a massacre to follow (July). Bonn was hereupon taken by Schenck (December, 1587), and retaken by the Spaniards (September, 1588); and in the following year (1589) Spanish troops occupied the important Cologne frontier fortress of Rheinberg.

Thus, on the Lower Rhine, a chronic state of foreign invasion had come to prevail, while higher up, and in Elsass, the continued French wars had led to a perpetual ingress and egress of armed forces. Foreign intervention must before long seek to determine the future of the western borderlands. Meanwhile, the course of the struggle against Spain and Rome reached its most critical stage in 1588 and '89, the years of the destruction of the Armada, and of the height of the religious and political conflict in France. Henry IV now once more sought the aid of the German Protestant Princes; and in 1590 Christian I and John Casimir at Plauen agreed upon a list of grievances to be laid before the Emperor, which included the Strassburg and Aachen cases, and the *reservatum ecclesiasticum*. Brandenburg joined the two other Electors; but Rudolf turned a deaf ear to their remonstrance. After withdrawing from a *Deputationstag* held at Frankfort (September, 1590), where complaints had been made in vain of the Spanish violations of the frontier, the representatives of the three Temporal Electors, together with those of the Administrator of Magdeburg, the three Landgraves of Hesse, and the rest of the party of movement, met at Torgau (February, 1591). Here, an aid to Henry IV of 8000 foot and 6000 horse, to be partly paid by English money, was voted, and the young Prince Christian of Anhalt was appointed to the command. Within the Empire the Torgau Alliance was to be purely defensive; but it marked unmistakably the advance of the Calvinist interest. The House of Anhalt was known to incline that way; and already in 1588 the Duke of Zweibrücken had established Calvinism, with a catechism of his own on the Heidelberg model.

Shortly after the conclusion of the Alliance of Torgau there occurred, however, an inopportune series of deaths. The earliest of these was that of Christian I of Saxony. The storm against his religious and administrative changes had broken out, when, early in 1591, he had ordered exorcism to be omitted from the christening of his youngest daughter. The nobility, who believed their ascendancy at issue, by a corporate protest identified themselves with the Lutheran resistance; many ministers who denounced the government were driven into exile; and the population, by refusing to receive either of the Sacraments at the hands of the conforming clergy, placed themselves under a sort of interdict. In the midst of these troubles Christian died, the victim of infirmity, vexation, and drink (September, 1591). His successor, Christian II, was a boy of eight years of age; and his appointed guardians, Duke Frederick William of Saxe-Altenburg and the Elector John George of Brandenburg, were both rigid adherents of the *Formula*

Concordiæ. They at once ordered a visitation, which, with the general approbation of nobility and people, uprooted Calvinism—or crypto-Calvinism—throughout the electorate. Krell was after a long enquiry put to death (1601). The domination of the *Formula Concordiæ* was reasserted in the electorate, where for many generations to come it remained a rule of faith as free from loopholes as the Decrees of the Council of Trent. When Christian II grew into manhood he seems to have become a type of too many of the German Princes of his day; entirely given up to the delights of show, sport, and drinking-bout, devoid of all mental vigour and shrinking from the ghost of an initiative. He kept wholly aloof from cooperation with the Protestant party in the Empire; and the day-dream of a union between Saxony and the Palatinate as the two leaders of that party was over.

Not long afterwards (January, 1592) John Casimir's unquiet spirit passed away. Only a few weeks were wanting to the coming of age of the Elector Palatine Frederick IV; but John Casimir had taken care to name a species of committee (*Oberrath*) of the Privy Council, which conducted affairs both before and after his nephew's actual accession. It was, of course, thoroughly Calvinist and in sympathy with the Huguenots; and in the following year the Elector married Louisa Juliana, daughter of the murdered William of Orange. Frederick IV steadily adhered to the far-sighted policy of John Casimir, whose death nevertheless was a serious loss to the cause of which he had long been the foremost champion. The *Amberger Händel* (a Lutheran agitation in the Upper Palatinate, provoked by the old Count Palatine Richard) hampered the outset of the new rule; and, owing to his profuse expenditure, Frederick's finances soon fell into disorder. Not all his pleasures were, however, unrefined; and his respect for intellectual power raised the University of Heidelberg and its library to unprecedented renown.

In the same year (September, 1592), died Landgrave William "the Wise" of Hesse-Cassel, leaving behind him a son, Landgrave Maurice, only twenty years of age, but destined to become a guiding spirit of the Calvinist party of action. Thus, though the Torgau Alliance seemed forgotten almost so soon as it had been formed, the time could not fail to arrive for resuming the idea which that compact had embodied.

Such was the political situation in the Empire when a crisis seemed to announce itself on its western as well as on its eastern borders. In July, 1593, Henry IV abjured Protestantism; but he speedily made it clear that his conversion would only leave him more free than before to carry on his struggle with the Spanish Power, and that he had never been more anxious to secure the cooperation of the German Protestant Princes. And, before the year was out, a Turkish alarm arose such as had not been previously experienced in this reign.

The immediate situation of affairs in which the Diet met at Ratisbon on June 2, 1593, was by no means a promising one for the Emperor.

He had to bring forward a more urgent demand for aid against the Turks than on any previous occasion; but in his hereditary dominions, on whose levies the defence of the frontier must in the first instance depend, nobility, towns, and peasantry were banding together against his authority. It was well that in 1592 he had made his peace with Poland by Archduke Maximilian's final renunciation of his claims to the throne, and by marrying Ferdinand of Styria's sister Anne to King Sigismund III. On the other hand, Rudolf's western policy, in which Austrian and Imperial interests had more or less coincided, had been wholly unsuccessful; and he could only fall back upon a general support of Spanish action, provided the government of the Netherlands were entrusted to Austrian Archdukes.

Though the majority at the Diet was prepared to vote the Turkish grant, and though Saxony went with the majority, the Protestant opposition, inspired by Palatine counsellors, were resolved to utilise the opportunity for their purposes. On March, 1594, a meeting was held at Heilbronn, which was attended in person by the young Elector Palatine, Frederick IV, Duke Frederick of Württemberg, a Prince of eager dynastic ambition, the Calvinist Duke of Zweibrücken, and the Margraves of Ansbach and Baden-Durlach. They drew up a list of grievances of unprecedented completeness, and formulated a distinct statement of the Palatine reading of the Religious Peace. A free right of change of religion was claimed for ecclesiastical States and foundations, and for Imperial towns; the right of Catholic rulers to expel their Protestant subjects, and the validity of the *Declaratio Ferdinanda*, were denied; and a protest was added against the jurisdiction of the *Reichshofrath* as concurrent with that of the paralysed *Reichskammergericht*.

In May Rudolf at last appeared in person at the Diet; and the conflict seemed likely to declare itself on the question of the admissibility of Protestant Administrators of episcopal sees, of whom not less than seven, headed by Joachim Frederick of Magdeburg, had found their way unsummoned to Ratisbon. The Heilbronners had resolved to make their own attendance conditional upon the admission of the seven, when an anti-Calvinist faction formed itself among the northern and other small Lutheran Princes, headed by the Ernestine Duke Frederick William of Saxe-Altenburg, who was acting as regent of the Saxon Electorate during the minority of Christian II. They were ultimately joined by Württemberg. Having, in spite of some recalcitrance on the part of Magdeburg, succeeded in maintaining the exclusion of the Administrators, the "moderate" faction was encouraged to use its endeavours to weaken the effect of the Heilbronn draft. The Palatine party (or most of its members) indeed declared that they would make the Turkish grant conditional upon the redress of their grievances; and the Catholics retorted by grievances of their own, and by charging the Calvinists, not the Lutherans, with being the real disturbers of the peace.

In the end the Turkish grant—an unusually large one, calculated to suffice till 1600—was made over the heads of the minority, which did not venture to protest.

But, as has been seen, the campaigns against the Turks were unsuccessful (1594-6); and a new Diet therefore had to be summoned, which met at Ratisbon in December, 1597. Rudolf, who was becoming more and more unwilling to appear in public, was represented by Matthias, unadorned by any Hungarian laurels; and the same game was played over again, with increased determination, by the Palatines and their allies, the "Corresponding" Princes (*die Correspondirenden*), as about this time the party came to be called. It comprised the Heilbronn group, with the addition of Duke Henry Julius of Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel, the Hessian Landgraves, the Anhalt Princes, and the Wetterau Counts, together with, shortly after the close of the Diet, the Administrator Joachim Frederick of Brandenburg, who in 1598 succeeded as Elector of Brandenburg. The towns—as usual Lutheran and to some extent Imperialist in their sympathies, and pre-eminently timid—held aloof at the last. In the face of an Imperial demand for an enormous grant, they not only protested against its exorbitancy, but declared the minority not bound by the vote of the majority. A majority vote was, however, actually passed in favour of a grant half as large again as that to which the *Corresponding* Estates were prepared to assent. When, hereupon, the ban of the Empire was, according to usage, proclaimed against defaulters, the minority protested (April, 1598). Shortly after the dissolution of the Diet the *Kammergericht* summoned certain of the defaulters (May); and though nearly five years elapsed before, on the attempted enforcement of judgment, payment by composition was made, a serious constitutional conflict had thus been added to the thickening difficulties of the Empire—at Aachen, in the Strassburg diocese, and in the Jülich-Cleves duchies.

Of the Jülich-Cleves-Berg question the dangerous significance had long been patent. While in Jülich most of the nobles were Catholics, in Berg (whose Estates sat with those of Jülich) and in Cleves Protestantism was in the ascendant; the towns being, of course, throughout open to Calvinist immigration. Frequent incursions of both Spanish and Dutch troops took place accordingly; and the agreement of the Estates of the duchies for their common defence (1587) was quite ineffective. In 1584, John William, the only surviving son of Duke William, had through Bavarian and papal management been married to the Catholic Jacobaea of Baden-Baden; and on being admitted to a share in the government of the duchies in consequence of his father's mental derangement, had endeavoured to repress Protestantism and show himself obsequious to the Spanish government in the Netherlands. But by 1590 John William himself was hopelessly insane. There were no children from his marriage.

The primary question to be settled, when the old Duke William should pass away, was that of the government of the duchies. The Emperor at once issued a mandate entrusting it to the ducal Council, which was mainly Catholic; but the Estates held a meeting at Düsseldorf (the Jülich capital) for the assertion of their rights. Duke John William's ambitious consort, the Catholic Jacobaea, was likewise preparing to assert her pretensions. On Duke William's solicitation the principle of indivisibility had been established for his dominions by Imperial privileges granted by Ferdinand I and Maximilian II; and as far back as 1546 he had obtained from Charles V a further privilege, granting the right of succession to his female line in case of the extinction of his male. It was, however, uncertain whether these grants could be held to extinguish an older privilege, dating back to Frederick III and Maximilian I, which in the event of the extinction of the male line of Jülich-Berg reserved the succession in these two duchies to the whole House of Saxony. It is true that this older privilege had been twice ignored: once when Maximilian had made Maria of Jülich-Berg capable of succeeding and thus of bringing these duchies as a dowry to Duke John III of Cleves (1516), and again when in 1544 the right of succession had been granted to John III's daughter Sibylla, who had married the Elector John Frederick of Saxony. In the troublous days of 1546 the Ernestine claim had gone to the wall; and now there seemed a prospect of a revival, with the goodwill of the Emperor, of the pretensions of the whole Saxon House, represented by the Albertine Elector.

The female line of Duke William of Jülich-Cleves-Berg consisted of four daughters. Of these the eldest, Maria Eleonora, was married to the mad Duke Albert Frederick of Prussia; which duchy was administered for him by Margrave George Frederick of Brandenburg-Ansbach, one of the leaders of the advanced Protestant party in the Empire. Her sons having died young, her claims were by their supporters declared to pass to her youngest daughter Anna, who had married John Sigismund, eldest son of Joachim Frederick, Administrator of Magdeburg and from 1598 Elector of Brandenburg. But this was disputed by the husband of Duke William's second daughter Anna, Count Palatine Philip Lewis of Neuburg, to whose son by her, Wolfgang Wilhelm, it was contended that the female claim to the duchy would ultimately pass. The husbands of the third daughter, Magdalena, and the fourth, Sibylla,—Count Palatine John of Zweibrücken and the Catholic Margrave Philip of Baden—were of no immediate importance.

Thus, when on January 5, 1592, Duke William died at Düsseldorf a conflict at once broke out around his helpless successor, Duke John William. The Protestant claimants demanded the establishment of an administration on their behalf, and so early as 1594 the States General offered to intervene; but the time had not yet come. At first the Duchess Jacobaea, who secured an Imperial mandate in her favour,

seemed to control the situation; but in 1595 an Imperial Commission placed the government in the hands of the ducal Council. Less than two years later the Duchess was found dead in her bed, and the Emperor forbade an enquiry. The Councillors covenanted to allow no claimant to the succession to enter the country till a judicial settlement should have been accepted by the Estates and themselves; and every year during which the mad Duke continued to linger on seemed to ripen the pear for the plucking of Spain.

But many changes were to take place on the shifting scene of European politics before the Jülich-Cleves difficulty brought the great contending forces to the very brink of a collision. The war which in 1595 Henry IV had with the support of England and the United Provinces declared against Spain ended in 1598 with the Peace of Vervins and the liberation of the soil of France; and, though the struggle in the Netherlands was not yet over, Philip II had made up his mind to sacrifice the Spanish rule over them in order that they should not be wholly lost to the House of Habsburg. In the very month of his death (September, 1598) a large and ill-paid Spanish army flooded the north-western parts of the Empire, took Calvinist Wesel, and commenced an irregular Counter-Reformation in the Westphalian and neighbouring Circles. Such was the indignation created by these proceedings that in March, 1599, the Corresponding Princes at Frankfort voted the raising of 16,000 men against the Spaniards. Some of the contingents were actually levied; but the new Elector of Brandenburg was too much hampered by home difficulties to come forward, and even the Palatines were unprepared for immediate action. The command over the force voted at Frankfort was offered to Prince Christian of Anhalt, but declined by him.

It is thus—falling back in order to advance more surely—that the incarnation of the militant Calvinism which was to become responsible for the outbreak of the direst of European religious wars begins to play a part in political history. Christian of Anhalt-Bernburg, like his elder brother John George of Anhalt-Dessau, was a linguist and a traveller: already in his nineteenth year, the Emperor Rudolf, whom he never ceased to attract, had attached him to an embassy to Constantinople. Through Queen Elizabeth he was introduced to Henry of Navarre, and in 1591 commanded a German force for whose services in aid of the Huguenots Henry long remained in his debt. He afterwards served in the Strassburg war (1592). But the statesman predominated in him over the military commander; and in 1595, after his marriage to Countess Anne of Bentheim, he settled at Amberg as governor of the Upper Palatinate. Their Court was French in manners and language; and like his elder brother he had become a declared Calvinist. There can be no doubt as to the sincerity of his religious convictions; but the keynote of the policy, which in person and by means of his correspondence

(*Kanzlei*) he came to pursue with a ubiquitous activity, and a versatility of resource beyond compare even in this restless and unscrupulous age, was enmity against the House of Habsburg as the arch-foe of the liberty (*Libertät*) of the German Princes.

Christian of Anhalt, as a Palatine official, had, in pursuance of the Palatine policy of the hour, declined to take charge of an insufficient army and an immature movement; and, though not long after this the Spaniards withdrew from the Empire except from the fortress of Rheinberg, both the Aachen and Strassburg difficulties were, as has been seen, settled against the Protestant interest. Much anxiety was therefore felt as to the revisions of four recent judgments of the *Kammergericht*, awaited about this time (1600) from the *Deputationstag* assembled at Speier, in accordance with powers conferred upon that body by the Diet of 1594. These judgments, ranging in their dates from 1593 to 1599, ordered the restitution of four convents of the south-west—Christgarten, Frauenalb, St Margaret's at Strassburg, and Hirschhorn—which had been appropriated by the territorial lords of their respective districts, on the principle that the provisions of the Religious Peace were not applicable to ecclesiastical foundations appropriated after the Treaty of Passau. This view seemed likely to be accepted by the Committee of revision; but the move was checkmated by the Palatines and their adherents at Speier, who objected *in limine* to any revision involving a point disputed between Catholics and Protestants by any other body than the Diet. In the following year the "Corresponding" Estates agreed at Friedberg (July) to allow no further visitations of the *Kammergericht*. As they at the same time resolved to oppose the execution of any judgment of the *Reichshofrath*, this issue of the so-called *Vierklosterstreit* amounted, as it had been intended to amount, to a collapse of the supreme judicial machinery of the Empire.

Nor were the Catholics able to remedy this breakdown at the Diet which the continued expenditure of the Turkish War once more made it necessary to summon to Ratisbon for 1603. The Emperor obtained his grant, though the minority adhered to their new principle that it was not bound on this head by the vote of the majority. But on what proved the main question of debate, the "Corresponding" Estates, rather than listen to the renewed proposal that the revisions of *Kammergericht* judgments should be committed to a *Deputationstag*, withdrew from the sittings of the Diet; whereupon Archduke Matthias simply postponed the whole question (July, 1603). Beyond a doubt the advanced Protestant party had rightly apprehended the wish of the Catholics to recover all the ecclesiastical foundations confiscated since 1552; but, as an alternative to recovery by judicial process, the Protestants proposed a course which, as Maximilian of Bavaria pointed out, could hardly but lead to anarchy.

Maximilian—who had succeeded to the government of the paternal

duchy in 1597—was a personage of the utmost importance for the whole course of the conflict in the Empire from this time forward till his death, three years after the close of the 'Thirty Years' War. While the religious policy of "Maximilian the Catholic" was traditional in his House, and strengthened by a strong personal belief both in the vitality of Catholicism and in the value of wholeheartedness in its champions, the dynastic and territorial point of view was with him, as with most of his fellow Princes, the determining one. He worked in accord with the Jesuits, though by no means a tool in their hands; and as a politician he took advantage of the necessities as well as the successes of the House of Austria. At home, he vigorously reorganised the legal, financial, and military system of his duchy; abroad, his influence, strengthened by that of his brother the pluralist Archbishop of Cologne, was rooted in a rare combination of prudence—" *propria imperantis virtus*," as he told his son—with resolute high courage.

In the interval between the Diets of 1603 and 1608 a more definite shape was gradually assumed by the struggle between the party of movement among the Protestants, of which Christian of Anhalt was the soul, and the determined Catholic resistance, led by Maximilian of Bavaria. But the new feature in the situation was the reluctant surrender by Rudolf II into the wavering hands of his brother Matthias of the remnant of Imperial responsibility for the maintenance of peace among the contending forces. The tribunals of the Empire had broken down; and now followed a wholly unprecedented personal humiliation of the head of the Empire himself. During the earlier and longer part of Rudolf II's reign it was not so much want of insight as an utter weakness in action which had caused his impotence at home and abroad. Now, his insane suspiciousness and perversity of judgment retarded action of any sort, and frequently ended in sheer inaction. Though he never permanently lost his wits, he sank into a hypochondria which he neither controlled nor was capable of controlling. He feared assassination, and (it is said under the nightmare of a prediction that his murderer would be a monk) conceived a violent prejudice against clergy and Church, and fell into a special distrust of the Jesuits.

Protracted discussions had already taken place among the Archdukes as to the succession in Rudolf's dominions as well as in the Empire; Philip III of Spain and Pope Clement VIII were now taken into confidence; and their envoys and Ernest of Cologne made some representations to the Emperor. But neither these nor the visit of Archdukes Matthias and Maximilian in 1603 had the slightest effect. Meanwhile, as has been seen, everything had gone wrong in Hungary; and the religious agitation had communicated itself to Bohemia and the German hereditary lands. In April, 1605, Matthias and Maximilian, with their Styrian kinsmen, Ferdinand and his younger brother Maximilian Ernest, met at Linz, whence they all repaired to Prague, with an entreaty that the Emperor

would make over the conduct of Hungarian affairs to Matthias, and proceed to regulate the succession. Making some pretence about marriage negotiations on his own account he, notwithstanding continued pressure from Matthias, persisted in his refusal to accept a successor; but at last he empowered Matthias to settle matters in Hungary and Transylvania, and to make peace with the Turks (May—October, 1605).

These tasks, as we have seen, were actually accomplished by Matthias—the former by means of concessions to the Hungarian Protestants, which could not but exercise a contagious effect upon Bohemia and the Austrian duchies. Matthias, however, though he had in him no really Protestant vein like his father's, ran the risk of offending not only the Emperor, but Spain and the new Pope, Paul V, and went counter to the counsel of Klesl, with which in his heart he agreed. The safety of Austria, and secondarily of the Empire, outweighed all other arguments; and on April 25, 1606, the Archdukes had at Vienna concluded a family compact, which decided the situation. On the ground of the Emperor's mental incapacity Matthias was in the name of the entire House of Austria appointed its head; and the Archdukes agreed that, should an Imperial election be rendered necessary by the same cause, they would use their best endeavours to secure the choice of Matthias.

Thus assured, Matthias at last, on June 23, 1606, by the conclusion of the so-called Treaty of Vienna brought to an issue his long negotiation with the Hungarian Estates, who would have preferred as an additional security to elect him King. On November 11 followed the Peace of Zsitva-Torok with the Turks. But Matthias could not yet feel certain of ultimate success in the difficult game which he was playing against the cunning perversity of his elder. The Emperor ratified the Hungarian compact, but with a reservation of his coronation oath, and the Turkish Peace, with the unconcealed intention of speedily breaking it. And, although the rest of the Archdukes—including Archduke Albert, the joint ruler of the Spanish Netherlands—adhered to the family compact, cooperation for its purposes was now refused by Archduke Ferdinand. He may not have quite seized the significance of the agreement, which it is said his pious mother, the Bavarian Maria, now first made clear to him; he may have shrunk from proceedings prejudicial to the divine authority of the Emperor; he may have distrusted the policy of Matthias—and he may have thought of the Imperial Crown for himself. In any case, his withdrawal took away all security from the compact, and left Matthias once more face to face with an uncertain future. That the Emperor was turning to the Styrian line, was also indicated by his appointment of Ferdinand as his commissioner for the Diet summoned for the close of 1607; and there seems also to have been talk of his diverting the Bohemian succession to his favourite, Leopold, Ferdinand's ambitious younger brother. Meanwhile he sank deeper and deeper into a succession of long spells of

silent gloom, varied by outbursts of ungovernable fury. How long could this endure?

It was in these circumstances that Matthias resolved on carrying further the policy of the Treaty of Vienna, and, rashly or otherwise, entered on a course of action fraught with the most momentous consequences. He entered into close relations with the Hungarian leaders, and placed himself in touch with the league between them and their friends and sympathisers in Moravia and Austria, which after long negotiations had been concluded at Rossitz in December, 1607. Having made up his mind to a policy of concession to the Estates in all the dominions of the House, he on his own authority opened at Pressburg (January, 1608) a meeting of the Hungarian Estates, in which committees of the Austrian Estates took part. The leader of the Hungarians was Stephen Illeshazy; the foremost among the Austrians was Baron Erasmus von Tschernembl, who had thrown in his lot with the Protestants and was in frequent correspondence with Christian of Anhalt. At Pressburg Matthias progressed from the simple demand of a Turkish grant and the establishment of order in Austria to what was in effect a confederation between himself and the Hungarian and Austrian Estates against his brother's authority. On February 1-3, 1608, the Pressburg alliance was concluded for upholding the treaties of 1606 (Vienna and Zsitva-Torok, which Rudolf was scheming to overthrow), and to this it was further agreed to invite the adherence of all the Estates which had joined in the Vienna compact. In other words, a general alliance of the Estates of Rudolf's dominions was to subvert his policy and government in favour of those of Matthias.

Ignoring a prohibitory mandate from the Emperor, Matthias hereupon with some difficulty secured the approval of the Pressburg alliance at a meeting of the Upper and Lower Austrian Diets, and more easily that of the Moravian Estates, largely through the exertions of Karl von Zerotin, a member of the Moravian Brotherhood, and akin in spirit to Illeshazy and Tschernembl. Matthias now levied taxes and troops, and set forth for the Bohemian frontier, issuing a manifesto in which he completely identified himself with the demands of the associated Estates, including that for the deposition of Rudolf II. On the frontier he met envoys from Philip III and Pope Paul V, who proposed to him that he should content himself with Hungary and Austria, and leave Bohemia to his brother. But Matthias was no longer his own master. On May 4, 1608, the Bohemian Estates, with those of Silesia and Moravia, were to meet the committees of the Pressburg allies; and on the decision of Bohemia the solution of the whole problem must depend.

In this eventful summer of 1608, when the fraternal discord in the House of Austria had reached its crisis, the advanced Protestant party was at last driven into opening a new stage in the religious conflict in the Empire. The renewed activity of Spain on the Netherlands frontier,

marked by Spinola's reoccupation of Rheinberg in 1606, was extremely disquieting, especially as, through the marriage (1599) of Duchess Antonia of Lorraine to Duke John William, Jülich-Cleves had of late been bound more closely than ever to the Spanish-Catholic interest. But while Frederick IV of the Palatinate, for dynastic reasons, at this time rather hung back from action, Christian of Anhalt was, since the death of George of Ansbach in 1603, more than ever the chief moving spirit among the Calvinists; and inasmuch as nothing was to be expected from Protestant action at the Diet, he more and more concentrated his efforts upon two parallel lines of action. In the first place, the Estates, impeded by no consideration for the Empire at large, must fully and formally adopt the expedient of a union *in imperio* on which the meeting at Heilbronn had resolved in 1594; in the second place, such a union must assure itself of foreign support, and more especially of that of France. Christian of Anhalt's "Chancery" was at work in the United Provinces, and among Austrians, Hungarians, and Bohemians, in the last instance not without an eye to the chances of a throne to be possibly alienated from the House of Austria. The first direct step in advance seems to have been taken when, on receiving a visit in 1602 from Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel (then on the eve of adopting Calvinism), Henry IV urged on his guest the expediency of a union or alliance between the Protestant Princes of Germany—with the immediate object of supplanting the Austrian by the Bavarian House at the next Imperial election. But though French envoys continued to work for this end, this particular scheme was dropped, to be revived later. The general purposes of this policy and its relations to Sully's ideas of a permanent reconstruction of the map of Europe and of its political system, are discussed elsewhere. In planning the overthrow of what remained of the Habsburg ascendancy in Europe, Henry could not but turn his thoughts to the German Protestant Princes, who were becoming more and more willing, with French aid, to unite for the defence of their religion and its securities against the Catholic Reaction, for the maintenance of their "liberty" against the Imperial authority of a reinvigorated House of Austria, and for the protection of the north-western frontier of the Empire against the renewed designs of Spain.

Henry's quarrel with the Duke of Bouillon for a time engrossed his attention and alienated Protestant sympathies; but during this period (1603-5) Anhalt's activity continued, and the Protestant party of movement was materially strengthened by the definite accession of Brandenburg. In 1603 the Elector Joachim Frederick had made a territorial settlement which enabled him to assert with vigour the Brandenburg pretensions on the Jülich-Cleves duchies. He now married his grandson George William to Elizabeth, daughter of Frederick IV; and the two Electors concluded an alliance with the States General for military aid in certain contingencies. Brandenburg, into which John

Sigismund was actually to introduce Calvinism in 1608, was now bound to the Palatine party. Of the return, on the other hand, of the Elector Christian to the policy of his father there was no hope; and the political influence of Saxony was on the wane. Still even in Lutheran Saxony as in Lutheran Württemberg there was a growing sense of uneasiness at the growth of Jesuit influence, and the Universities of Wittenberg and Tübingen continued to supply Austria with Protestant preachers and to flood it with anti-papal literature.

Thus Anhalt continued his manœuvres and intrigues for the formation of a Protestant union which should in the first place direct its efforts to breaking the tenure of the Imperial throne by the House of Austria—perhaps beginning by securing the succession of the celibate Archduke Maximilian. With this most recent draft from his Chancery in his hands, Anhalt in 1606 repaired to Paris, where Henry IV now offered, in the event of a strong alliance of German Princes being brought about, to contribute two-thirds of the cost of the forces to be jointly raised by it and himself. But on Christian's return the plan, which would have amounted to a direct cooperation on the part of the proposed union in Henry's action against Spain on behalf of the United Provinces, fell through once more, owing to the unwillingness of both Brandenburg and the Palatinate to venture so far (1607). Thus the prospect of a union for which Christian of Anhalt had been labouring seemed once more remote when the time approached for the meeting of the Diet, to be presided over in the Emperor's name by Ferdinand of Styria, the pupil of the Jesuits. At last—immediately before the meeting of the Diet—an event occurred which abruptly brought the religious parties face to face, and through the effect of which the combination which Henry IV and Christian of Anhalt had in vain sought to bring about was actually accomplished.

Donauwörth was a small Imperial town in the Swabian Circle, where at the time of the Religious Peace both Catholicism and Protestantism had been professed, but which now contained less than a score of Catholic households. But the younger generations of the Benedictines of the Holy Cross at Donauwörth, most of whom had been trained at Dillingen, had resolved to stem the tide; and many years since had to this end revived the use of processions. In 1603 they had added the waving of banners; whereupon the Protestant town council had intervened; so that in 1605 Bishop Henry of Augsburg obtained from the *Reichshofrath* a summary mandate. On the strength of this in September, 1606, a procession of special provocativeness was held; and a riot of corresponding vehemence ensued, which the town council was unable to restrain. Duke Maximilian of Bavaria was now commissioned by the Emperor to inspect the case, and protect the conventual clergy and other Catholics at Donauwörth in the exercise of their religion.

Maximilian, probably moved chiefly by territorial considerations,

accepted the Imperial commission. Without loss of time, he, in April, 1607, ordered the Donauwörth town council to pledge itself that Catholic worship should remain undisturbed, and to allow a procession to be held. When the town council declined to comply, he gave it the choice between submission or the Ban of the Empire. Great agitation ensued among the neighbouring Protestant Estates—Neuburg in particular, Württemberg, Ansbach, and the cities of Ulm and Nürnberg; but their meeting at Stuttgart (July) led to no result. On November 12 the Ban of the Empire was actually promulgated against Donauwörth, and Maximilian was charged with its execution. The Protestant towns armed; but Württemberg and the Elector Palatine hung back; and when on December 8 Maximilian had a force of 5000 foot and 600 horse in readiness, Donauwörth was left without an auxiliary. The Protestant preachers and some of the citizens fled; and on December 17 a body of 600 foot and 300 horse took possession of the town. Nobody was hurt in life or limb, but in all other respects the Bavarians treated Donauwörth as a conquered town; and Maximilian, who now perceived the significance of the pledge which he had secured, soon made it clear that he intended to keep a firm hand upon it.

When in January, 1608, the Diet was opened at Ratisbon, the importance of the Donauwörth incident very speedily became manifest. At a meeting of all the Protestant Estates the principle of making the large Turkish grant demanded by Archduke Ferdinand conditional on the redress of the Protestant grievances, and on the confirmation of the Religious Peace and the Treaty of Passau, was unanimously adopted. The Protestants refused to have a vote taken on the Catholic counter-proposal that the Religious Peace should be confirmed with a clause restoring the exact condition of things in 1555; and, when the Catholics insisted, they withdrew for further instructions (February). When hereupon Ferdinand proposed a simple confirmation of the Peace, the Palatines demanded an express rejection of the proposed Catholic addition, and finally withdrew from the Diet, together with the Brandenburg ambassadors and those of most of the "Corresponding" Princes. The Saxons, who had accepted the concession, remained, with the representatives of a minority among the Protestant Princes and of the always timorous towns (April).

Thus the Diet of 1608 had ended in an open schism between the two Protestant sections; and the time had come for closing up the ranks of the party of movement. The Donauwörth incident had not only quickened the sympathies of Brandenburg, but also those of the Lutheran Philip Lewis of Neuburg, who had come forward on behalf of the town and was much alarmed by consequent Imperial menaces. When, after the breaking-up of the Diet, the Elector Palatine, the acknowledged leader of the Calvinists, was at last prevailed upon by Anhalt to take action, and when Lutheran Württemberg, afraid of

further judicial decisions against the confiscation of ecclesiastical property, gave in its adhesion, the goal was reached at last.

On May 16, 1608, a few weeks after the collapse of the Diet, while Maximilian of Bavaria was keeping a firm hold on Donauwörth and Archduke Matthias was marching upon Prague, the Union of the Evangelical Estates was formally concluded at Anhausen in the margravate of Ansbach. Its original members were the Elector Palatine, the Duke of Württemberg, the Count Palatine of Neuburg, and the Margraves of Ansbach, Culmbach, and Baden; Zweibrücken and the Houses of Oettingen and Anhalt soon acceded; then came in Strassburg, Nürnberg and Ulm, respectively at the head of the Alsatian, Franconian and Swabian towns, with several others; in 1609 the new Elector John Sigismund of Brandenburg joined, together with Landgrave Maurice of Hesse-Cassel, who in 1607 had openly adopted Calvinism and was a pensioner of France. Hesse-Darmstadt, on the other hand, had been lost to the Protestant party, as had Brunswick-Wolfenbüttel in the north, by reason of the Imperialism of Duke Henry Julius, due to dynastic and personal motives. Saxony too stood persistently aloof.

The slow birth of the Protestant Union had at last been expedited by a craving for political security rather than for religious expansion; and it defined its primary purpose as the defence of any of its members if attacked in contravention of the laws of the Empire—which of course included the Religious Peace. At its head was to stand a Director, who for the first three years was to be the Elector Palatine; the military command was to appertain to the Estate attacked, but that of troops employed outside the territory of the Union to the Director, who was to name a Lieutenant-General. The contributions for the first five years were to produce a sum of not much more than half a million of florins; so that only a very large development of the Union and its resources could furnish the means for undertaking a serious war. As for Donauwörth, Maximilian retained it as a redeemable pledge; and in July, 1609, a provisional oath of homage to him was administered to the civic authorities. The retention of Donauwörth became a standing Protestant grievance; but, with brief interruptions, the town henceforth remained Bavarian, and strictly Catholic.

Anhalt's intrigues had for some time been particularly active in Bohemia; and he seems at one time to have thought of an armed intervention for placing Archduke Maximilian on the Bohemian, and then on the Imperial, throne. But the general ferment in the Habsburg dominions had come to a more speedy issue. A vast majority of the Bohemian population—nine-tenths, according to a more or less conjectural estimate—were under one name or another Protestant; and there were religious grievances in abundance against the growing tendencies of Rudolf's government. On the other hand, the Bohemian Estates had a profound sense of autonomy; if the throne were vacant, they might place on it a

Protestant Prince, such as the Elector of Saxony; and they were much offended by the self-reliance of the Estates of Moravia, a dependency of the Bohemian Crown. Thus though many Bohemian lords appeared at Czaslau, to listen to Matthias' proposals, the Bohemian Estates as such gathered at Prague, upon which Matthias now gradually advanced with his army. When he had reached Böhmisch Brod, some twenty miles' march from the capital, Rudolf confirmed the Treaties of Vienna and Zsitva-Torok; while a few days later (May 25, 1608) he sought to gain the goodwill of the Bohemian Estates by allowing to all adherents of the Confession of 1575—that is, practically to all Protestants—the free exercise of their religion, until a new Diet should have made a final religious settlement. But these concessions to pressure from within and from without proved of no avail; and on June 25, when Matthias was only five miles from Prague, Rudolf was at last prevailed upon to cede to his brother the Hungarian Crown, together with the territorial dominion in Austria and Moravia. Bohemia, with Silesia and Lusatia, were, with the reversion of the Tyrol, to remain to Rudolf, who, however, agreed to confirm the “free election” by the Bohemian Estates of Matthias as his successor. Thereupon Matthias and his army quitted Bohemia, where it left no good name behind. The Austrian and Moravian representatives had meanwhile bound themselves by a secret covenant to refuse homage to Matthias, should he withhold religious freedom from their lands. His own victory had been one of neither creed nor principle; but it had given a tremendous shock to the authority of the Emperor, while taking from him the greater part of his territorial dominions; and it had added proportionately to the self-consciousness of the Estates, who were mainly Protestant in their sympathies and aspirations.

Matthias had to thank Anhalt for nothing; and the resolution passed at a meeting of the Union at Rothenburg (August) inviting the accession of the Austrian dominions could not be expected to lead to any result. Indeed, under the advice of Klesl, once more in favour, Matthias was evidently veering in a Catholic direction, while the Estates in the lands surrendered to him were still looking for the fulness of their reward. The Moravian Estates, led by Zerotin, were so far encouraged by his promises as to do homage to Matthias (August); but in Austria the majority, headed by Tschernembl, formulated a demand of unrestricted religious liberty for the towns as well as the nobles, and of official parity; and on this being resisted by Matthias, withdrew from the Vienna Diet to Horn, whence they issued a declaration refusing homage before redress of grievances. In March, 1609, an embassy from the Union appeared at Linz and Vienna; but it brought to the Austrian Estates nothing but vague undertakings for the future.

On March 19, Matthias gave a grudging assent to a resolution which granted to the Austrian nobility the required liberty of religious worship,

while the towns received a verbal promise, supplemented by certain guarantees, against arbitrary changes. Offices, it was ingeniously resolved, were henceforth to be conferred on the grounds of merit only, preference being given to the old families of the land. Hereupon the hitherto recalcitrant Austrian Estates did homage. But Matthias had as usual satisfied nobody. While he had incurred the deep resentment of Pope Paul V, the Estates only awaited an opportunity of securing something more; and in return he was himself, as he informed Klesl, only awaiting his opportunity for revoking what he had conceded.

In Bohemia, as was seen, Rudolf had saved himself by postponing a final settlement to another Diet; and of this he contrived to delay the meeting till the end of January, 1609. When it met, the majority showed itself intent upon establishing a comprehensive ecclesiastical and educational system under the protection of a Committee of *Defensors*. The uncompromising resistance of Rudolf enabled the broad-minded Wenceslas von Budowee, chief of the association of Brethren, to maintain among all the Protestant sections a unity of purpose and action which found full expression in the Remonstrance, drafted by him and read in the Diet, against Rudolf's threat of dissolution. The threat was, however, carried into execution (April 1, 1609). During these proceedings only a small minority, of whom the chief members were the Chancellor von Lobkowitz, William von Slawata, and Jaroslav von Martinitz, had stood by the Crown.

The Protestant majority in the Bohemian Diet had agreed to meet again on May 4 in an assembly of their own. The intervening month they devoted to stirring up the country and to appeals for outside support, while Rudolf, afraid to resort to force, remained inactive. When the time of the meeting drew near, the Protestant nobles who had flocked to Prague sent deputation upon deputation to him, but he refused to yield. On May 4 the Protestant Estates opened their sittings in the Neustadt town-hall in the midst of a kind of popular panic; and after a *Justification* had been drawn up, the Emperor was at last terrified into summoning the Diet which was to formulate the religious settlement.

When this Diet met on May 25, Rudolf, now largely under the influence of Archduke Leopold, strove to restrict the Protestants to the footing allowed them under Ferdinand I. But the very Catholics perceived the futility of so perverse an offer; and the Diet replied by bluntly declaring its determination to resort to force against any attempt at oppression, while announcing a national armament at the national expense, and presenting the draft of a religious settlement almost identical with what afterwards came to be known as the *Letter of Majesty*. When hereupon Rudolf made the transparent proposal to refer the whole question for arbitration to all the Spiritual and Temporal Electors, the Diet retorted by appointing a provisional government of thirty Directors—ten from each of the three Estates—and levying a force of 3000 foot

and 1500 horse. After a vain attempt at intervention by Christian II of Saxony, negotiations were opened between Rudolf and the Diet; and on July 9, 1609, he signed the *Letter of Majesty*, and confirmed an agreement between the Estates *sub unâ* and those *sub utrâque* on those points which the *Letter* had left open.

The *Letter of Majesty* granted to all inhabitants of Bohemia freedom of choice between the Catholic faith and the Confession of 1575, "which some call the Augustinian"; but the building of churches or of schools was to be permissible only to the three Estates—that is, to the Nobles, Knights, and Royal towns. In the supplementary agreement the concession was added, that if on any royal domain—whether in a town or elsewhere—the Protestants should be without a church or churchyard, these might there be provided by them. Inasmuch as according to Bohemian law ecclesiastical domains stood directly under the administration of the royal treasury, they were commonly spoken of as "royal," as well as royal domains proper. It is clear that in concluding the agreement which supplemented the *Letter of Majesty* the Protestants understood "royal" domains as including ecclesiastical; and that the subsequent proceedings, which were to lead to the actual outbreak of the Thirty Years' War, were based on a *bonâ fide* interpretation of an accepted term.

Once more, on the eve of its long eclipse, the Bohemian nation seemed to have gained a great religious and a great national victory in one. Well might Archduke Leopold bitterly lament to Maximilian of Bavaria, that the Emperor had been driven not only to grant everything but to confirm it with a *privilegium*. A Silesian *Letter of Majesty* had rapidly followed on the Bohemian; and through the length and breadth of their dominions Rudolf and Matthias had alike been obliged to yield to the demands of their Estates. Even the Styrian Estates, with those of Carinthia and Carniola, sent a deputation to Archduke Ferdinand to demand the restoration of their religious liberties. But his reply was a direct refusal. The Catholic cause was not yet lost.

Meanwhile, grievously smitten in those south-eastern lands, it had suffered a heavy blow on the other side of the north-western border. On April 9, 1609, Spain had at last concluded a Twelve Years' Truce with the United Provinces, and two months later a treaty of alliance had been concluded by them with France and England. In the face of these events the formation at Munich on July 10 of the Catholic Union (it did not yet call itself League), by Maximilian of Bavaria with a few Bishops and Abbots, might seem of slight importance. But since the occupation of Donauwörth, at all events, Maximilian was well aware of his own importance in the religious struggle. Both during the Diet of 1608 and afterwards his efforts for a consolidation of the Catholic party had been incessant; but they had in the first instance only resulted in a defensive

alliance, under Bavarian directorship, with the Bishops of Passau and Würzburg, and a few other prelates of the Bavarian, Swabian, and Franconian Circles. Already, however, a month later the association was joined by the three Spiritual Electors, the Rhenish members being placed under the directorship of Mainz, though the general military command remained with Bavaria. At a meeting held at Würzburg in February, 1610, when several other prelates joined, it was decided to invite the accession of Archdukes Ferdinand and Maximilian and of other Catholic Estates, and to extend the system of foreign alliances. A treaty with Spain, which promised two regiments of foot and one of horse, was actually concluded in August, 1610; and the Catholic League (*Liga*), as it soon came to be called, gradually developed into a great alliance, with Pope Paul V himself as a member, on behalf of the Catholic faith. But its fundamental principle of self-defence was jealously guarded by Maximilian, who remained its right hand.

On March 25, 1609, the Jülich-Cleves question had at last forced itself to the front on the death of the childless Duke John William. Hitherto the Imperial (and Spanish) policy had prevailed as to the government of the duchies; but as to the succession it had been wholly wanting in resolution. So late as August, 1608, the *Reichshofrath* had declared that without the assent of the Electors none of the privileges were valid on which the claims of the several pretenders were based; if so, the whole of the inheritance escheated to the Emperor. There was a general notion that he favoured the Saxon claim; but nothing had been done towards either recognising it or buying it up in the interests of Sibylla, Duke John William's fourth sister, who had married as her second husband Margrave Charles of Burgau (son of Archduke Ferdinand of the Tyrol), and whom Philip II had at one time advised putting forward as the Austrian and Catholic claimant.

To this Austro-Spanish inaction, largely no doubt due to the Truce with the United Provinces and to fear of French intervention, the Protestant side had opposed a greater measure of vigour. But while John Sigismund, now Elector of Brandenburg, who represented the claims of the eldest sister as descending to his wife, obtained promises of aid from the leading personages in the Dutch Republic, his claims were at the Court of Henry IV and in the counsels of the Union, more especially after Maria Eleonora's death in 1608, crossed by those of Neuburg, on behalf of which no exertion was spared by Wolfgang William, as the second sister's eldest son.

On the death of John William of Jülich-Cleves, the Emperor at once named commissioners to carry on the government of the duchies in conjunction with the widowed Duchess Antonia and her Council; but she very soon withdrew. Then (May) he summoned the claimants before the disputed tribunal of the *Reichshofrath*, and in the meantime forbade their taking possession. But before this both Brandenburg and Neuburg

had actually or symbolically occupied Cleves (with Mark and Ravenstein) and Jülich-Berg (with Ravensburg) respectively. After a compact for joint action without prejudice to their several claims had been concluded between them at Dortmund (June), to which Zweibrücken afterwards adhered, Margrave Ernest, the Elector of Brandenburg's brother and representative, and Count Palatine Wolfgang William held their joint entry into Düsseldorf (July). The "Possessing" (*Possedirenden*) Princes, as they were called, now defied the Imperial mandates, and, refusing to acknowledge the jurisdiction of the *Reichshofrath*, demanded judgment by a tribunal of their peers. The pressing question, however, was whether they could keep possession? The only place in the duchies still held against them was the fortress of Jülich, which the ducal officer in command seemed disposed to make over to the Emperor. And into Jülich Archduke Leopold, eager for the laurels which he had missed in Bohemia, now threw himself by Rudolf's order with some 800 men (July). There was no prospect of supplies from Archduke Albert, or—for some time, at least—from Spain. On the other hand, the "Possessing" Princes had not more than 1200 men at their disposal; and Ernest of Brandenburg was unsupplied with money.

A difficulty which had already become a European question was not to be solved by a conflict conducted on such a scale. Of the ulterior purposes of the foreign policy of Henry IV there could be little doubt, though his immediate intentions were carefully veiled. He had from the first encouraged the "Possessing" Princes, and, when the news of the entry of Archduke Leopold into Jülich reached him, at once increased his armaments. But he had good reason for avoiding precipitation. The Union, at its meeting, held at Schwäbisch-Hall (May) had only harked back to the old Protestant grievances; and, when Christian of Anhalt hereupon repaired to the Emperor's presence at Prague, to menace him with the open revolt of the Princes of the Union, Rudolf had merely promised the restitution of Donauwörth, which had of course remained unaccomplished. On his return Anhalt had at last taken up the Jülich-Cleves question in earnest; and after the forces of the "Possessing" Princes had by contributions from the Elector Palatine and others been raised to a total of 5000 foot and 1200 horse, he was himself offered the command (October). He made his acceptance dependent on French support, and armed with proposals adopted by a meeting of Princes at Stuttgart, betook himself to Paris, where he had two audiences of the King (December).

He returned to Germany, greatly elated, and bringing with him two proposals. One of these was a written statement that if the Possessing Princes and the Union were prepared to take the field for the capture of the fortress of Jülich with 8000 foot and 2000 horse, Henry IV was prepared to furnish the same force for the same purpose. The other was a plan, which Anhalt was authorised to communicate to the Union "*comme de luy mesme*," for an attack upon the line of the Meuse, to be

conducted by France and the United Provinces (upon whose assent the execution of the plan depended), and in which after the capture of Jülich the army of the Union and the Possessing Princes was to cooperate.

At another meeting of the Union held at Schwäbisch-Hall (February, 1610), it was agreed to accept the French proposal as to an attack upon Jülich; and an agreement on these lines was speedily confirmed by Henry IV. But as to the larger scheme more hesitation was shown. It must be remembered that the Princes only outnumbered the more timorous towns by a couple of votes. In the end, Anhalt was authorised to offer to Henry IV the aid of the Union forces, provided that the invasion of the Spanish Netherlands should have been begun by the French and Dutch; that Jülich should have been captured; and that the members of the Union should not be engaged in any hostilities within the Empire. Henry IV hereupon once more received Anhalt in Paris (March—April), where they agreed that he should at once proceed to Düsseldorf to prepare for a German attack on Jülich, while the King should ascertain the willingness of the States General to cooperate with him in the march upon the Meuse. Thus matters stood in April, 1610; and during the next few weeks there can be no doubt that Protestant Europe was in expectation, more or less assured, of the opening of a campaign which might perhaps not begin, and would certainly not end, with the capture of the fortress of Jülich. This feeling of friendly interest extended to the Scandinavian north; while James I of England, after characteristically offering to participate in an arbitration, had promised to furnish in aid a force of 4000 men.

Meanwhile the Empire was in a worse state of defence on its western frontier than on its eastern; and its helpless head could only authorise Archduke Leopold, glad to escape from Jülich, to raise a military force in his sees of Passau and Strassburg. No sooner had the news of these latter levies reached the Elector Palatine and other of the "Corresponding" Princes, than they immediately raised a large body of troops of their own, and by March had sent them "in self-defence" into Elsass.

The influence of Leopold's restless ambition seems to have been strong on Rudolf in this last stage of his unhappy reign, when he was craving for revenge upon his brother Matthias, and impotently longing to undo the religious concessions to which only his necessity had consented. His armaments were probably due to purposes of this sort, to which Leopold cannot have been a stranger, quite as much as to the fear of foreign intervention in the Jülich-Cleves difficulty; and it was with his own grievances uppermost in his mind that, on May 1, 1610, the Emperor opened a meeting at Prague of the Electors of Mainz, Cologne, and Saxony, the faithful Duke Henry Julius of Brunswick, and the anti-Calvinist Landgrave Lewis of Hesse-Darmstadt, together with Archdukes Ferdinand and Maximilian, and a representative of Archduke Albert. But here, too, the Jülich question came to the front; and the ways of resisting the Possessing Princes were discussed.

On May 8, Henry IV announced to Archduke Albert and the Archbishop of Cologne (as Bishop of Liège) that he would be obliged to march through a portion of their territories, in order to assist his ancient allies in Jülich, Cleves, and Berg. Albert, whose preparations for resistance were incomplete, on May 15 reluctantly granted leave of transit. But he had reckoned without the luck of his House. On May 14 Henry IV was assassinated at Paris. Whatever part he might have intended to play, or actually have played, in the affairs of Europe, the western peril of the Habsburgs had for the time passed away. Instead of an armed combination between the chief Powers of Protestant Europe, the House of Austria had in the first instance only to face an alliance of German Estates, disheartened by the catastrophe which had delayed the outbreak of a great European war, and had perhaps saved the Empire from speedy disruption.

But though with the death of Henry IV the Jülich-Cleves question lost its European interest, it was not yet at an end. The government of Maria de' Medici, notwithstanding the almost immediate change in its general foreign policy, resolved to satisfy the *amour-propre* of the French nation by furnishing the aid promised at Schwäbisch-Hall. In July a French army marched from Metz upon Jülich, before which already lay a large force of Dutch and English troops under Maurice of Nassau, and the troops of the Possessing Princes, with others sent by the Union, under Anhalt. On September 1 the 2000 defenders of the fortress capitulated to a besieging force of 30,000; and a handful of troops occupied Jülich for the Possessing Princes. Archduke Leopold's levies had been unable to come to the rescue; for so early as June the Union had despatched from 8000 to 9000 men under Margrave Joachim Ernst of Ansbach into Elsass. The excesses committed by this soldiery led the Emperor to issue a mandate against the entire Union and to charge Duke Maximilian of Bavaria with its execution. Maximilian judiciously ascertained at Prague that the Emperor was unlikely to adhere to so bold a line of conduct; but at a meeting of the League at Munich a levy of nearly 20,000 troops was agreed upon, and in August the Union withdrew its troops from Strassburg territory, while Leopold's forces there were in turn reduced and finally disbanded. In November, Union and League mutually agreed to dismiss their forces.

On every side the fires seemed flickering out once more; and it was characteristic of this temporary calm that, in October, 1610, an attempt was made to set up a Catholic-Lutheran League, headed by Bavaria and Saxony, "for the defence of the Imperial constitution," and that a meeting of Princes for the purpose was summoned to Würzburg. But Christian II of Saxony could not make up his mind; and by April, 1611, the project was abandoned. In the contested duchies themselves things went quietly after the capitulation of the fortress of Jülich. The foreign troops had all withdrawn; those of the Union had been disbanded; and each of the Possessing Princes was able to maintain his occupation by means of

a handful of armed men. Nothing came of Rudolf II's provisional investiture of Christian II with the duchies during his drunken sojourn at Prague (July); though by the Treaty of Jüterbok (March, 1611) the Saxon Elector was nominally admitted to a share in the government. Wolfgang William, notwithstanding his anti-Calvinistic tendencies, attempted a settlement with John Sigismund, who was on the eve of formally adopting Calvinism; but the result was a hopeless quarrel; and the Neuburger now turned to Bavaria, and after, in July, 1613, secretly becoming a convert to Rome, clinched his new alliance in September by marrying Duke Maximilian's sister Magdalena. A new and dangerous phase seemed about to begin in the perennial question of the duchies, when Philip III of Spain promised his support to this interesting convert, and the Calvinist Elector of Brandenburg appealed for aid to Maurice of Nassau. In September, 1614, he and Spinola confronted one another, and the latter occupied Wesel in Cleves. But once more the rupture of the truce by an actual collision was averted; and by the Treaty of Xanten (November) the two "Possessing" Princes agreed on a partition of government, without abandoning the principle of unity; thus leaving the dispute just where it had stood at the time of the assassination of Henry IV, and ignoring the claims of Saxony and the Imperial authority. The only difference now was that of the Princes in possession one was a Calvinist and one a Catholic, and that the apple of religious conflict had thus been cut in half.

Meanwhile, the Emperor at Prague had striven to gain the assent of the Convention of loyal Princes to his designs of recovery and revenge. They actually called upon Matthias to restore the ceded lands to the Emperor, and signified their willingness to accept his favourite Archduke Leopold as Roman King. But they were not prepared to go to war with Matthias and the united Hungarian, Moravian, and Austrian Estates, all of whom were arming. The Bohemian Estates too were in agitation; at the end of January, 1611, they obliged Rudolf to assemble a Diet, which levied troops in addition to the militia called out by the Crown officials. A surprise on the Emperor's part was apprehended; and the Hussite spirit of the people was once more up. Their fears had not been vain, for on February 15 Archduke Leopold at the head of the soldiery (between 5000 and 7000 men), levied by him in the see of Passau, which the Emperor had promised to order him to disband, but had left him without the money for disbanding, occupied the *Kleinseite* of Prague, after a short conflict with the troops of the Estates. From the two sides of the Moldau the armies confronted one another; and in the *Altstadt* a savage riot, in which the mob devastated four convents and murdered some of their inmates, was with difficulty suppressed by the Estates, who hereupon, without consulting the Emperor, established a Committee of Thirty Directors for the government and defence of the country.

It is not surprising that this determination and the knowledge that the Estates had applied to Matthias for aid, caused Rudolf's resolution

and Leopold's courage to fail them at the last. Early in March the Passau troops were paid off, and, headed by the disillusioned Archduke, took their departure—a wild and undisciplined force, prefiguring the mercenary hordes of the Thirty Years' War, and believed by the Bohemian people to be in league with the Evil One. As they marched out of Prague, a body of Austrians and Moravians, sent forward by Matthias, marched in, and were soon joined by troops of the Estates, commanded by Count Matthias Thurn. On March 24, 1611, Matthias, who had marched from Vienna with his main army of 10,000 men, expecting to encounter the Passauers, since disbanded, entered Prague. He came, as he had told envoys of the Estates who met him on the Moravian frontier, as the guardian of the *Letter of Majesty*, and was welcomed by an outburst of patriotic and Utraquist enthusiasm.

Matthias now summoned a Diet, of whose intentions to himself he had previously been made aware, and placed a garrison in the Castle, where the Emperor was now a mere prisoner. The ambassadors of the loyal Electors of Saxony and Mainz were still using their good offices with Matthias, and the faithful Duke Henry Julius of Brunswick still remained with the Emperor. When the Diet assembled in April, Rudolf tried delay as his last resource; but in the end menaces, or what came very near to them, forced him to resign conditionally the Bohemian Crown. The coronation of Matthias followed on May 23, after he had promised on the preceding day to confirm all the rights and liberties of the Bohemians and to sanction the alliance concluded by them with the Silesians. But as Rudolf's intention of revoking his conditional resignation was known, further proceedings became necessary; and at last, on August 11, he was coerced into a clear and certain bargain. Rudolf, retaining private rights of property, formally resigned the Bohemian Crown to his brother, and undertook to "commend him to the Electors" at their approaching meeting.

Rudolf now only had the Imperial Crown, certain rights in Anterior Austria and the Tyrol, and his private revenues in Bohemia. But, though his authority was all but extinct, the spirit of revenge had not been laid within him. A meeting of Electors (*Kurfürstentag*) was about to be held to consider the situation, including the prospects of the succession. Rudolf prepared for this meeting with the double intent of discrediting Matthias and preventing the election of any successor to himself. At an earlier date there had been some notion of transactions between him and the militant Calvinist party; but the death of the Elector Palatine Frederick IV had intervened (September, 1610). Though not a great Prince, he was a stout Calvinist, and, in his later years at least, open to ideas of a free union between Christian confessions such as animated some of his descendants in a less bigoted age. His heir was Frederick V, a boy of fifteen, to whom Anhalt had succeeded in inducing the Emperor to allow the Calvinist John II of Zweibrücken to be named guardian instead of the Lutheran Philip

Lewis of Neuburg. Now, at the last, Rudolf again entered into communications with the agents of the Union, thereby, it seems, actually giving rise to an apprehension "*ne Caesar ad apostasiam declinaret.*" When the Margrave of Ansbach found his way to Prague, it is said that the Emperor adopted him as his son and charged him to watch the Imperial interests at the *Kurfürstentag*. At other times grotesque marriage projects occupied the Emperor's bewildered brain; and carriages were kept ready to carry him off into safety in the lands of the Union.

In October, 1611, the preliminary meeting of Electors actually took place at Nürnberg. The preference oscillated between Matthias and Albert, Leopold being left unmentioned; and it was resolved that, on the hypothesis of the Emperor's assent being accorded, the final meeting for the election of a Roman King should be held on May 21, 1612. Rudolf, when pressed for his assent, gave way in principle, but ordered the immediate summoning of a Diet to Ratisbon. Here the madman seems to have hoped, by throwing himself on the side of the Protestants, to divide the Electors, to ruin the chances of Matthias, and perhaps himself to regain all that he had lost. In December, 1611, the Archdukes held another family meeting at Vienna, where they entered into an engagement to preserve the Imperial Crown, so far as in them lay, to the House of Habsburg, and to secure it for Matthias. At Prague the Emperor had already donned his travelling clothes for his journey to Ratisbon. But the end was at hand. About the new year he was seized with a mortal malady, and he had other reasons for knowing that his death was near. It came on January 12, 1612. His servants were cruelly treated; most of his bastard children were at a distance or in obscurity. No tragic catastrophe was ever more complete.

The long years of Rudolf's misrule had terribly intensified the religious hatreds which made the Thirty Years' War inevitable; but he had benefited no cause, as he left behind him barely a friend. In his powerless hands the political and judicial authority of the Empire had alike collapsed; its eastern frontier-line would have been effaced had he not surrendered his guardianship; the western had been preserved only by the assassin's dagger from an irruption which must almost inevitably have ended in dismemberment. But all comments on such a reign and life are swallowed up by compassion for the poor human being, by nature neither bad nor ignoble, whose doom would not have been darker or drearier had he during the latter half of his sixty years been the inmate of a madhouse instead of the occupant of an Imperial throne.

The reign of Rudolf II had been the seed-time of war; the prospects of peace which his death brought with it could be only partial and temporary; for he at least had exercised no control over the destinies of the peoples under his territorial rule, or over those of the Empire of which he was the elected chief.

CHAPTER XXII.

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

THE supreme achievement of the Reformation is the modern State. Our notions of citizenship are the result at once of the Protestant revolt and of its partial failure. As with all the ideas of Protestantism and of the Counter-Reformation, the origins of their political conceptions must be sought in the Middle Ages, although they may thence be traced back to the ancient world, Hellenic, Hebrew, and Christian. Still, it was through the crucible of the sixteenth century that medieval notions were passed before influencing the modern world.

The Conciliar movement of the fifteenth century witnessed the promulgation on the most impressive scale of those doctrines which treat all political power as a trust, and its holder as responsible to the community, liable to be deposed by it in cases of gross misgovernment. Yet that movement ended in failure—save in so far as its fundamental principles could be subsequently invoked for different purposes. The claim of the Council to be superior to the Pope was always at the service of advocates of the rights of the people against the despotism of Kings. However, it remained nothing more than a claim.

Modern political thought, as distinct from medieval, begins, not with Gerson or Nicolas Cusanus, but with John of Torquemada's *De Potestate Papae*. In this work the arguments for monarchy are to be found set forth very much as they were to be quoted for a couple of centuries. Of course much of his argument is concerned with the Petrine texts. Yet it may be doubted whether the Divine right of monarchy ever had a more efficient defender.

Even before the star arose out of Wittenberg, many constitutional checks on monarchy were in existence. The system of Estates, the powers of Parliament and *Parlements*, the oaths of coronation, the *Justicia* of Aragon, the Conciliar eloquence, would all furnish inexhaustible precedents and arguments for what was to follow. But these checks were daily diminishing in practical value; and with the destruction of the evils of the feudal system its merits disappeared. The very

sense of the need of the universality of law tended to remove for a time the checks on the powers to which tradition ascribed the right of law-making. Budé in France, and Salamonius at Rome, might write eloquent passages and engage in brilliant dialectic against theories of absolutism. But these theories had the future on their side, and commanded the intellectual assent of the ablest minds. Those who wanted government to be efficient, and desired to carry on an energetic foreign policy, would not wait on the long task of educating opinion. Illustrations of this may be found in the opinions of Wolsey and Cromwell in England, and later in the views of Cecil and Bacon, and again in those of Laud and Strafford. All these men wanted something done—order introduced into the chaos of administration; a single authority everywhere recognised; the tangle of competing and confused governmental agencies reduced to a simple and smoothly working system, which would enable ideas to be realised at once without regard to average stupidity. They were all quite honestly on the side of the one power which on principles of natural selection had proved its necessity to the public welfare. All this was heralded at Rome. The party which had arisen at Paris at the close of the fourteenth century was *idéologue* and impracticable. It had failed. The task of making the Papacy efficient passed over to the Borgia and Julius II, to the Jesuits, and the Spaniards. The tendencies to despotism in all Italian principalities found their highest expression in Rome itself, and thence spread over the world. The new Papacy was more absolute, less spiritual, more fitted to be a model for other despots, than the old; a Duke of Tuscany or a King of England would find more that might be expedient to copy in Julius II than he could have found in Boniface VIII. Works like that of John of Torquemada in the fifteenth century, or that of Thomas de Vio (Cardinal Cajetan) in the sixteenth, show how far the general notion of the complete servitude of the community had advanced, and how slight a practical sway was exercised by the traditions of constitutionalism—traditions inextricably mingled with the memories of feudal disorder, and always capable of being interpreted after such a fashion as to dissolve the unity of the State into its component factors, and pave the way, as in the case of the French League, for mob rule and anarchy. Indeed, the passion for unity in the medieval mind only expressed the fact that this unity was so seldom realised. Even before and apart from the Reformation, the widespread sense of the appalling evils of disorder and the supreme necessity of social peace proved the most efficacious support to the growth of national despotism, and directly ministered to the papal reaction.

As a matter of fact, neither the ideas which we call liberal, nor the notions of despotism and of Divine right, are the creatures of the Reformation. Before it, the movement towards absolute monarchy

was at work, and first of all in the Church. Eugenius IV triumphed before Louis XI, or Edward IV, or Ferdinand of Aragon. What then did the Reformation effect? Briefly this. It gave to the ideas on both sides fresh opportunities of exercising practical influence; and it caused them to assume the forms that actually contributed to produce the world in which we live. It fixed for a long time the subjects of debate and the area of discussion.

To transfer the allegiance of the human spirit from clerical to civil authority was roughly speaking the effect of the movement of the sixteenth century, alike in Catholic and Protestant countries. It was less successful in those lands or cities where Calvinism, manipulated by a highly trained ministry, obtained predominant or exclusive control. The result was achieved, partly by the sacrifice of earlier and larger aims, partly by their realisation. Luther firmly believed in the right of the laity to do what he told them; his whole tendency was individualist; and the statements of the *Babylonish Captivity*, that no Christian man should be ruled except by his own consent, doubtless represent the writer's real mind. The ideas at the bottom of that work are certainly capable of being made into a programme of political liberty, though the connexion is not so obvious as in the Conciliar writers of the fifteenth century. But Luther's effective struggle for freedom extended only to the Princes and the divines. His governing idea is the thought which inspired the address *To the German nobility*: that the actual holders of the civil power must carry out the necessary reform of the Church. For purely political liberty and the application to it of his doctrines he never really cared at all; and circumstances drove him farther and farther from such ideas as even appear in his treatise on *Weltliche Obrigkeit*, or the first of his admonitions to the peasants. The whole bent of his mind was really in favour of secular authority. He really believed in its Divine origin and in that of human inequality. Indeed he definitely broke with the notion held for centuries, and derived partly from the Roman jurists, that all inequality was the consequence of the Fall, and was against nature. He felt, also, perhaps more strongly than anyone before or since, the incalculable value of the security afforded by the ruling power and of social peace. Besides, he succeeded as he did, because he was in the main stream of European development. Had he connected himself with movements purely popular, he would have been relegated to a backwater. On behalf of the authority of the civil power, however gained, and the real sanctity of home life and lay avocations, he was always prepared to do battle. He disbelieved in the political claims of the Church and in the religious claims of monastic life. For the common man and the civil governor he would fight, on the strongest religious grounds, against the competing authority of monastic ideals or ecclesiastical law. But it may be safely said that he never cared one jot for political liberty. To the ancient authority of the Emperor, bound up,

especially in the minds of Germans, with the idea of the Church, Luther was indeed reluctantly in opposition. But of the princely power, then rapidly rising from feudal to sovereign authority, he was by temper and circumstance alike an outstanding support. Like all men by whom the spiritual world is strongly realised, he was largely an opportunist in politics and cared for little but the spread of his ideas. His sympathies were rather with the prosperous classes than with the disinherited, although his severe language on legal oppression is not to be overlooked; and no one ever connected more closely the love of God with man's duty to his neighbour. Luther never approved of the violence of the peasants, although in the earlier phase of the revolt he showed some sympathy with their wrongs. There is nothing remarkable in his final condemnation of the rebels. Yet there was a case for the peasants.

The movement started by Luther was in its essence revolutionary. So were the language of its leader and his ideas, however little he might desire to recognise the fact; as he said later, we are now in a different world. But, like all revolutionary movements, the Reformation claimed to be conservative. The restoration of the ancient order was the cry not only of Luther, but of the Puritans. It is the indefeasible rights of the sovereign laity which he asserts against the temporary and illegitimate tyranny of the priesthood. The inalienable and Divine authority of Kings and Princes was to hew down the upas-tree of Rome, and wrest from the Papacy its usurped and unwarrantable powers. The claim of most revolutionaries to be at the bottom conservatives is rooted in human nature. The instinct which produces it is perhaps the strongest tribute to the value of continuity in constitutional development. In Luther's case it was strengthened by an external motive.

The revolution being, however it might disguise itself, a fact, it was natural that a party should arise to take the Reformers at their word, and assert that all Christians were equal, not only as priests but as kings. If a hierarchical order was proved either noxious or superfluous by the famous text, "Who hath made us kings and priests"?—how was it better with the civil authority? Why should the Emperor, alone of the powers that be, undergo banishment to the limbo of those that have been? So thought Carlstadt and Münzer and the peasants. The notions of equality and fraternity, based on a Christian communism, and setting at nought all merely legal authority, which the reception of Roman law had rendered more aggressive and unelastic, produced the revolt of 1525. The connexion of all this with the principles of the Reformation, and its extension of the ideas at the bottom of Luther's *Liberty of a Christian Man* becomes evident in comparing with this tract the Twelve Articles of the peasants. Their rebellion gave expression to forces long operative, and is to be regarded, like the revolt of Sickingen, as medieval rather than modern on its political side. The "great social forces" were marshalled against it. Luther's revolution was to consecrate

the rising activities of the middle class, and elevate still higher the power of the Princes. But to the peasants it was fundamentally hostile. Its theocratic side is best considered in connexion with the more striking history of the Anabaptists, among whom ideas were at work which found better expression in Quakerism. Like the rebellious peasants, the Anabaptists insisted on the equality of Christians and on community of goods. In one of its phases Anabaptism asserted a political quietism and denied all rights of resistance, and even of government. Its tenets are to be found combated in the Thirty-nine Articles and in the Augsburg Confession. Later, there ensued a reign of the Saints, which strove to make all things new, including marriage. The idea of this reign, instituted by John of Leyden, is medieval theocracy, applied with a disregard of existing conditions and a thoroughness of intolerance which the Papacy had too much common-sense to display. It illustrates an important aspect of the Reformation in regard to its political thought. Whatever the ultimate effect of Protestant principles, they did not directly tend either to toleration or to non-theological politics. Only, indeed, where real toleration exists, can politics be non-theological; and, *vice versâ*, only where the idea of theocracy is abandoned, can there be a real toleration. To attempt to identify the Christian law with that of the State must frequently lead to persecution.

For a couple of centuries politics were to become not less but more theocratic than they were at the time of the outbreak of the Reformation. Pure politics, if in the last resort the child of the Reformation, took a long while to grow up. Their existence had to be justified, as against the clerical control of civil matters. This was the work of the theorists of Divine Right; not until it had been accomplished could secular politics have free play. Besides this, the value attached to the Bible was a stumbling-block. The Old Testament contains a great deal of political history and can be used to support any side. Large sections of the Protestant world demanded that every institution should justify itself by an appeal to Scripture. Luther's attitude—and it was typical—towards Aristotle, tended, even in politics, not to advance but to retard rational thinking. The deference paid to the letter of Scripture led men to find their political principles in the Bible, to a degree at least as great as in the earlier Middle Ages. Even Grotius repeats with approval the famous interpretation by St Thomas of the text "Against thee only I have sinned" in the Fifty-first Psalm, as convincing proof of the irresponsibility of kings and their superiority to all rules of law. This enslavement to the letter of Scripture, which was a feature of the whole Reformation movement (including the Jesuits), reached its most emphatic and uncontrolled expression in the short-lived triumph of the Anabaptists of Münster, and in the doctrines which underlay it. Here indeed we see the attempt to construct a State on purely Biblical grounds, without any reference to historical

development and existing conditions. The Anabaptist movement may be looked upon as the limit of one side of sixteenth century thought, which affected, at least by repulsion, the attitude of all other Protestants.

Luther's views are difficult to harmonise, for he had that quality of political leadership which is not afraid of self-contradiction. But the bent of his mind and the tendency of his acts are alike clear. So far as the two ancient supreme authorities were concerned, his attitude was one of resistance. Yet it was only necessity and the lawyers who convinced him, almost against his will, that active resistance to the Emperor on the part of the Schmalkaldic League was justifiable, because the Emperor was not *legally* the supreme authority. Charles V was essentially a conservative; Luther, where he was successful, reduced Imperial authority to a shadow. On the other hand, Luther not only did not arrest, he actively assisted the development of the princely autocracy; he asserted its Divine ordination and universal competence; he proclaimed the duty of enduring tyranny as God's punishment for sins; nor can it be said that he showed any sympathy for representative institutions. A compact territory governed by a religious autocrat, with family life well ordered, was his ideal. The Divine right of the secular authority, *i.e.* its equality of origin with that claimed by the Papacy, was asserted; and all smaller associations or rights were absorbed in that of the State. Not only feudal anarchy had been suppressed, by the lord having become either definitely a sovereign or a subject; not merely had papal claims and clerical privilege been repudiated; but guilds tended either to decay or abolition, and the monasteries, *i.e.* great competing celibate governments, were secularised. Nothing is more noteworthy than the political hostility of Melanchthon to the monastic ideal. Such denunciations of monkery are not mere abuse or meaningless bigotry. They are the expression of the feeling, that monasticism sets before men a different order from that of the political and a different ideal from the domestic.

The terrible days of 1525 made one thing clear to every one of the Reformers. They must at all costs dissociate the religious from the political revolution. The Anabaptist movement only deepened the view that the Princes and the prosperous middle classes must be made secure in the belief that reform was not opposed to respectability. On the one hand, the original necessity of legitimating the idea of the religious revolution led to an assertion of the sanctity inherent in the lay power and of the usurping nature of ecclesiastical jurisdiction, while the very notion of justification by faith only pointed to the overthrow of the legal system of the hierarchy. On the other hand, the actual extension of these ideas to the whole social order on the part of peasants and Anabaptists drove the Reformers to assert even more strongly that, while the Church as a visible, organised society was at best a necessary evil, the State was a Divine institution; resistance to it incurred the

pains of damnation. It was not for nothing that Luther burnt the *Corpus Juris Canonici*. If we contrast the statement of Melanchthon, that there is nothing on earth more noble than the State, with the medieval view of the priest as a divinely appointed and of the Prince as a divinely tolerated power, we shall have some notion of the revolution in men's minds. Such a view as that of Melanchthon or Bullinger is inconceivable in the twelfth or thirteenth centuries. When Melanchthon denied that the ecclesiastical authority can make laws binding on the conscience, he expressed in a single phrase the difference between the old world of thought and the new. Probably the transition to the modern view was only possible because men pictured not two distinct communities but one society, which the medieval thinker regarded as essentially a Church, the modern as essentially a State. This view is consecrated in the great work of Hooker. In the Middle Ages, ideally at least, Western Europe is one; in the sixteenth century the territorial State is the distinct and self-sufficient unit. The godly Prince is *summus episcopus*, in whom all jurisdiction centres; and the superiority—always in dignity, sometimes in fact—of the ecclesiastical functionaries, is gone for ever.

Yet the religious leaders of the day are not to be charged with Erastianism in its developed meaning. They did not desire, and did not intend, that religion should be the sport of politics. But they intended that the laity in the person of the Prince should carry out necessary reforms "without tarrying for any"; and they were determined that all coercive jurisdiction should be concentrated in the State. If a movement designed to remove the abuses and traditions of a thousand years, embodied as they were in the strongest of vested interests, were ever to succeed, it could only be by the employment of means at the moment revolutionary. The history of the Conciliar movement had proved the incapacity of the clergy, even assisted by the Emperor, to reform the Church. If the cleansing was to take place, the other power within the Church, the lay power, must be invoked. Luther could appeal to the Prince's jurisdiction because it was within the Church. But neither he nor anyone else desired to make religious belief the mere child of political expediency. The position of Hobbes and Machiavelli is not that of Luther, although these three are rivals for the preeminent place in the creation of the modern State. The Protestant ideal of a king was Josiah. No more than the Jewish chroniclers could the Reformers deny themselves the pleasure of branding monarchs who took a line different from their own as having done evil in the sight of the Lord. They were no more and no less Erastian than Laud, who magnified the ecclesiastical office of the King, because he knew that he would support the order of the Church, not because he recognised in him a right to upset it.

The refusal to admit any competing jurisdiction is most prominent in the famous controversy carried on by Erastus, to which reference has already been made in a previous volume. Erastus was not what we mean by an Erastian. This is proved by his words, that he is considering only the case of a State in which a single religion is tolerated as the true one; and also by his action. For when the new Elector Palatine in 1576 changed the religion of his dominions once more to Lutheranism, which as a pure Erastian he had a right to do and to command his subjects obediently to accept, Erastus went into exile and died, not at Heidelberg, but at Basel. The real object of Erastus was to give clear expression to his denial of any right to coercive authority in the religious society apart from the State. He decided, in fact, to prevent the Evangelical Churches becoming what one of them claimed to be in Scotland and actually became in Geneva, a *societas perfecta*, with all its means of jurisdiction complete and independent. He was opposed, not to the free profession of truth, but to the political conception of a Church. The introduction of the "holy discipline" formed, and rightly formed, the ground of contention. It was the beginning of the theory soon to be proclaimed by Cartwright and Melville, that the Church as a visible kingdom was the rival of the State. Where it was admitted, we find either, as in the case of Calvin and Beza, the State entirely manipulated by ecclesiastical influences, in the interests of a system more tyrannical than Rome and more opposed to culture, or else, as in Scotland, the growth of a theory placing the Church as a distinct and independent society over against the State. There is no need to discuss how far Erastus was right. What is of importance is to know the nature of his contention, which runs as follows. In any State in which the true religion only is tolerated there exists no power but the civil which can authorise any actions of a directly or indirectly coercive nature; and every attempt of the Church to claim such a power is to set up a new tyranny worse than the papal. The root of his desire was doubtless the fear of his own excommunication, which actually took place. Yet his protest reveals the whole spirit of the modern world. Had he seen a little further, he would have known that the true remedy was to remove the direct and not the indirect restriction on religious liberty. If toleration be admitted by the State, there is no danger in Church discipline because there are rival Churches; excommunication has ceased to be tyrannical by becoming futile.

The principles of civil authority were of universal import. The gain to the Sovereign was as great, or nearly as great, in Catholic countries as in Protestant. It is well known that the Spanish Inquisition was at least as much civil as ecclesiastical; or rather, it belonged to the royal Church, not to the papal organisation. Orthodox Princes might thank the Protestants for giving them the true State, no less than the Popes for the true Church. The true meaning of the situation is apparent in

the struggle between the Venetian Republic and Pope Paul V in the early years of the seventeenth century. The Venetians were determined to be masters in their own house. The Pope, on high prerogative grounds, attempted to interfere with the coercive jurisdiction of the Republic over its subjects, and with its right to control the disposition of its own territory. He asserted that the Doge had no right to arrest a canon of the Church on the charge of flagrant immorality, or to pass an act restraining gifts in mortmain, or to attempt to limit the number of churches: he laid the State under an interdict, and excommunicated the Doge and the Senate. A bitter controversy took place, in which among many others Fra Paolo Sarpi on the one side and Bellarmin and Suarez on the other took part. The whole conflict turned on the canonist conception of civil authority, as against the modern secular theories. The Venetians asserted the Divine right of the civil power, and claimed its natural liberty; the Papalists repeated the old theories of the "plenitude of power" and the supremacy of priests to Princes, as of mind to body. Eventually the Pope was forced to give way substantially. The Jesuits remained excluded from Venice. "The natural liberty given by God unto the State" was successfully asserted and upheld, at least in the main issue. The course of the struggle is interesting, because it was at least partly decided through the Pope's fear of throwing Venice politically on to the Protestant side. The reign of the Pope, as King of Kings, was over.

A comparison of medieval and modern statements of papal claims is instructive. They diverge more than is often supposed; though there is, of course, nothing to prevent the reassertion of old ideas, should circumstances ever again prove favourable. The claim of infallibility is not the culmination but the (implicit) surrender of the notions of right embodied in the *Unam Sanctam*. Instead of claiming, as is done in writings like those of Bozius or Augustinus Triumphus, the political sovereignty of the world, the Vatican Council merely asserted the supreme rights of its recognised head as a religious teacher in its own communion. Constructively, of course, this may be made to mean much more. But the decree of Infallibility is the expression of the fact that the Church has become more distinctly a religious body than in the Middle Ages, and is no longer a world polity. The Pope, from being the Lord of Lords, has become the Doctor of Doctors. From being the mother of States, the Curia has become the authoritative organ of a teaching society. The difference can be seen by comparing modern arguments for infallibility with earlier defences of sovereign jurisdiction. High Papalists, like John of Torquemada or Augustinus Triumphus, admit the possibility of the Pope being a heretic, and *ipso facto* ceasing to be Pope. In fact, the governing idea of the Counter-Reformation, that a heretical monarch has through his heresy become a private person, and may be treated as such—first appears in the Papalist theory.

Another aspect of the modern State is the irresistible force at its disposal. To us it appears a necessary attribute of any government, that it shall be able to compel practically universal obedience. Force is at the back of all law and every private right; so much is this the case that it seems to us inseparable from the idea of law. The modern mind is not disposed to admit the existence of any legal right or duty, either public or private, which cannot be enforced by compulsion. But this is quite a new conception. It is the result of the struggles of the Middle Ages, and of the movements, political and religious, of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Indeed, the recognised need of such a power became the great support of tyranny. Long periods of impotence generated a belief in the Divine origin and necessity of political power. In the modern world government is occupied in administering the law and adapting it to fresh needs. In the Middle Ages it was occupied with a struggle for its own existence. "In the older feudal monarchy, not only was the monarch at no time sovereign, but neither was the State." Slowly, indeed, but surely, local franchises disappeared, private war diminished, and there came to be recognised a central authority giving force to a general system of law. The very fact of the "reception" of Roman law in continental countries in the fifteenth century shows how foreign to the actual life of the day was a uniform universal system of common law. Such law as existed was the outcome of local, feudal, or national custom rather than of the will of any lawgiver. For the Popes, indeed, legislation became a main business. The *Decretale* and the *Sext* are among the greatest of statute books; yet even in the case of the Papacy it was but gradually that the claim to be universal lawgiver developed out of the notion of supreme judge. But, when the Popes had made the discovery that they could legislate, they naturally developed alongside of their power a theory of its basis. This was derived largely from the civil law, partly from Aristotle, and partly from the Bible. Whencesoever they derived their theory, its nature is clear enough. The *plenitudo potestatis* of the Pope is the expression of the unity of the Church, and the sovereignty, Divine, inalienable, and illimitable of its ruler. The Popes claim not only to make but to annul the canons; their exercise of the Dispensing Power in the case of all rules which are merely positive and resting on human sanction, was the first form of the theory of sovereignty to influence the modern world. Bodin expressly says that Innocent IV understood the nature of sovereignty better than anyone else before him.

But to those who saw in law, not the success of effectual rulers, but the transient effort at social improvement or the recognition of principles of action—even to those who looked upon it merely as the decision of a Court interpreting immemorial custom, another view than the modern notion of positive law was a necessity. They discerned in legal rules, not the authority of the governor, but his purpose: namely justice,

which is a shadow of the Divine nature. In its promulgation they perceived not a sovereign act, but a personal revelation. To those holding such views law, in so far as it is something beyond the mass of customs which bind society together, is not a command; it is a discovery. In other words, there are certain truths about human nature in society which are eternal and independent of immediate circumstances. Law is the expression of the fact that human history is not merely the record of a hand-to-mouth existence, but embodies principles. The adequate knowledge of these principles may, however, be deficient; and their application to existing conditions needs wisdom. Hence the lawgiver's task is not that of Moses, or Lycurgus, or Justinian; he has a humbler office. He is to make known to his subjects what applications of natural law he will sanction, and in such instances to fix the quantum of penalty for breaches of it. The Sovereign is at first prophet, then judge—only later legislator in our sense; in Suarez' phrase he is the "disciple of the law natural." Towards the prevalence of this view the ancient belief in the natural law, as anterior to and supreme over positive law, largely contributed. Here it suffices to call attention to its existence, deepened as it was by the daily growing reverence for the Roman *Corpus*. A large proportion of political discussion from the days of the French wars of religion until the conflicts of Hoadley and Charles Leslie, was to centre round these two conceptions of law: the one regarding it as the command of a sovereign, uncontrolled and self-conscious, the other treating it as the mere outward explication of certain principles of eternal validity, the inalienable heritage of man in society. The one lays stress on the sanction, the other on the content, of law. To the medieval multiplicity of laws and inefficacy of law is due the survival into later times of notions which only required rearrangement to form an internal check on the unlimited sovereignty of the ruler—whether, as in the seventeenth century, the King, or, as in the eighteenth, the Parliament, and an external check on the unlimited sway of international selfishness. In the medieval mind, behind the conflicting claims of manorial custom, the law of the fief, the gradually encroaching law of the royal Court, the non-national law of the Church, there is always the law of nature, to evolve a harmony out of chaos and to soften the asperities of barbaric rules. Even in the Church the unlimited sovereignty of the ruler stopped short at natural law; and the proud waves of canonical encroachment were stayed by the one recognised barrier to Omnipotence itself. For it must be remembered, that to some minds the natural law presented itself as independent of the will of God, and to all as so completely in accordance with this will that He could not conceivably break it. The uniformity of nature is an idea which might have been borrowed by science from the philosophy of law.

But with the sixteenth century law more and more takes on the nature of embodied will, and discards other elements. This was assisted by the

strong sense of the sovereignty of God entertained by the Reformers, and by the doctrine of the arbitrary and irresponsible character of the Divine decrees. To the Calvinistic view God is the ideal type of an absolute monarch. Theology once more goes hand in hand with politics; and the Leviathan of Hobbes owed more of his non-moral attributes than the author knew to ideas of God which had been prevalent ever since the last phase of nominalism. In the world of fact, competing authorities, feudal or ecclesiastical, disappeared or were absorbed; armies, like those of Philip in the Netherlands, were under one rule, in a way which had been unknown for centuries. It began to be true that "war is a relation between States, not between individuals." Legislation came to occupy the attention of rulers far more than in the past. The need of organising the Reformation and appropriating its economic benefits increased this tendency. The alleviation of poverty, education, and the problems springing from the rise of capitalism—all these demanded a secular, no longer an ecclesiastical solution. The King in most nations had established for ever his independence of foreign authority; and the Assemblies of Estates were everywhere less powerful than a century before. The assertion of a theory of sovereignty was inevitable. Feudalism, where conquered, redounded to the advantage of the overlord, for it made him seem like the proprietor of an estate. For centuries the Roman doctrine of dominion had been growing in influence, hardening the rights of the proprietors and getting rid of their duties; the Pope claimed dominion over the benefices of the Church, though the claim was not always admitted; the King in some cases claimed to be sole proprietor of his subjects' goods. Every tax was a remission, just as every decree of Divine election was an act of grace; all subjects were at the disposal of their King by right, just as all sinners were born *ipso jure* damned.

The spirit of the new age displays itself decisively in the work of Bodin on the State. He discards the old title of the "government of Princes," and writes of a body politic in general, apart from the question of the nature of the government. Bodin had perceived, more clearly at any rate than his predecessors, that the fundamental nature of the State is independent of the form of government. He emphasised also the distinction between the "*status civitatis*" and the "*ratio gubernandi*." In the great days of its power the "*status*" of Rome was popular, but the "*ratio*" oligarchic. He develops the notion of a sovereign authority, inalienable, imprescriptible, incapable of legal limitation, very much as through Hobbes, and Rousseau, and Austin, it has come down to us. But Bodin was not, any more than Hobbes, a purely scientific enquirer. He was a *Politique* and a monarchist. He has the qualities of all who perceived with any clearness the fact of sovereignty, and also their defects; thereby perhaps exhibiting his kinship to the medieval ideal which was always concerned with the unity of society. "Liberty depends

on the division of power." Bodin will allow of no such division. He does not indeed disallow the existence of aristocratic governments, such as Venice and the Empire; or deny their fitness in certain historical conditions. But it is royalty which has his admiration. With the needs of France before him, it was not unnatural that he should mingle his assertion of the fact of sovereignty with the encomium on monarchy. With the dangers of the League and its violence to warn him, it is not strange that he should deny any rights worthy of the name to any controlling body or assembly of Estates. In Elizabeth he sees a purely absolute Princess. He recognises neither in the English Parliament nor in any similar body elsewhere any but purely advisory functions. Neither in taxation nor any other respect will he allow of restrictions on the power of the Prince. Bodin, in fact, like Bacon, exalted the power which alone seemed capable of evolving order out of chaos, and actually in most cases started the modern State on its career. He typified and helped to create that alliance between the Kings and the theorists of sovereignty which formed part of the strength of monarchy. Everywhere the King had the name of sovereign, everywhere his power was on the increase—except where anarchy and violence were dominant. It was natural, then, that an age which had only just made the discovery of the fact of sovereignty—the necessity, that is, for any perfect State of the existence of a power above the law, because able to alter it—should ascribe all attributes of this authority to the monarch, and should look with unfriendly eye on all traditions or assemblies which claimed in any way as a matter of right to limit it. The sentiments of the judges in Bate's case were as inevitable as they were probably sincere. Their danger lay in the fact that the balance of the constitution had been fixed by an age which knew no distinction between the rule of law and the rule of sovereignty, and regarded it as no more difficult to subject the sovereign to law than to secure the subject's obedience to it. The work of Sir Thomas Smith on the Commonwealth of England will afford an illustration. Admitting, as he did, the sovereignty of the Crown in Parliament, he is yet unable to carry out his principle completely. He asserts here and there claims for the Queen as absolute, and is clearly not at rest in his mind (though his inclinations are decided) as to the issue between a sovereign claiming to be absolute, and the rights of Parliament. The whole standpoint is nearer that of Bracton than that of Bodin. Bodin of course allows the King to be subject to the law natural, but denies that there are any means of enforcing his compliance. Althusius blames him for this denial, since nearly all positive laws are only declarations of natural law.

In their views of the nature of law the apologists of monarchy had the future with them, and showed deeper insight than their adversaries. They were in fact upholding the modern, as opposed to the medieval and obsolescent theory of law. Alike in the sixteenth and in the seventeenth

century the supporters of popular rights (except the Jesuits who were clear-headed) do not as a rule claim sovereignty for Parliament. They deny the existence of sovereignty, and seek to limit not its exercise but its possibility. They do not assert that insurrection is morally honourable, they claim that it is legally right; and they have the support of documents like the last clause of Magna Charta. Daneau denies that in any State there is true sovereign authority, and so really does Locke. But the fundamental conception is the belief, discarded by the modern world, that positive law is merely declaratory, and adds nothing to law natural and custom. In this view the idea of the authoritative origin of law in the human will fades into insignificance. At the bottom of most political argument until the eighteenth century lies the distinction between the idea of law as nothing but the command of the lawgiver, and the conception of law as something in essence universal and therefore just, ceasing to be law where it ordains injustice. The dictum of Algernon Sidney, "What is not just is not law," ran right back through Bellarmin and Aquinas and Augustine to the ancient jurists. Law and right, says Bodin, are not at all the same thing; and the idea of the non-moral character of law first springs into prominence in the six books of his *Republic*. But we must beware of the historian's danger of seeking an absolute beginning to what "only continues." Bodin himself depends partly upon Bartolus, partly upon the Papalists, notably Innocent IV. The Dispensing Power, which is the characteristic invention of the Papacy, is the form in which the supremacy of the sovereign over positive law and the conception of law as resting on command and not on congruity became first of all predominant notions. A glance at any act of dispensation will show the reach of the principles involved in its words.

The idea that sovereignty is imprescriptible, and that no sovereign power can limit itself or alienate its prerogative, is familiar to us in the maxim that an Act of Parliament can do anything but make a man a woman. This idea was, as we know, not always recognised; both Richard II and Henry VII passed Acts of Parliament attempting to bind the future by fundamental laws; and legitimism itself puts the law of succession beyond even sovereign competence. But when the notion obtained full recognition, it came to be seen that no sovereign could make a binding promise, and that he could only declare an intention which circumstances might alter. Hence laws, charters, and treaties are only in force so long as the sovereign wills them. This doctrine, once grasped, released the monarch from all obligations and rendered nugatory any concessions he might be led by circumstances to make. It enabled the royalist to harmonise the fact of royal limitations or representative assemblies with the theory of sovereign rights. Both history and actual conditions made it natural and inevitable, that with the growth of the idea of sovereignty in the State the King should

be regarded as the source of Parliaments and charters, which he might annul at his pleasure. Such a view was expressed naively, but with perfect sincerity, by James I, and was the occasion of the great breach with the Commons in 1621. It was advanced by the Papacy before others snatched at so convenient a doctrine. The Pope's interference *proprio motu* with ecclesiastical arrangements, his perpetual reiteration of ancient claims as of Divine and therefore inalienable right, and his assertion that all concessions to secular power were merely for the moment or on compulsion and did not affect his rights, which were to last as long as Christianity, was clearly the same principle which afterwards caused so much dissension in the State. As Contarini and his friends saw, the great need in the Church was to make the Pope admit that he was bound by his own laws. To the secular power in its efforts to assert its independence against the Papacy, the same principle was not merely serviceable, but necessary, if previous concessions to clericalism were to be withdrawn. "Time may not prescribe against God's truth," is Stephen Gardiner's defence of the Royal Supremacy; and the invalidity of the Donation of Constantine, even supposing it to be a fact, was for ages the cry of Imperialists, on the ground that an Emperor could not, if he would, alienate the sovereign rights of the Empire. Perhaps the distinction between questions of law and matters of policy on which absolutist theories were based may have been due to the recent growth of the notion of public policy, and to the very gradual development of the idea of public law, as apart from the mere private rights of the ruler. In fact, neither public nor private rules of action existed in modern distinctness in earlier times. The very phrase "reason of State" is fundamentally modern. The idea involved would hardly have been less strange to a politician of the Middle Ages than the modern notion that the individual must choose his Church. To the theory of sovereignty, and the assertion that in all countries nominally monarchical the King was truly sovereign, and that any ancient traditions of representative rights controlling it were mere survivals from an age when the notion of a State was not comprehended, was added the principle that the King's power comes immediately from God alone, and that he is therefore irresponsible. Divine justice is denounced in the words of St Paul against all who resist the King. The complete theory of the Divine Right of Kings includes all the above notions, with the added claim that the right is both hereditary and indefeasible. In many respects the doctrine harks back to the Middle Ages, but in its developed form it was forged on the anvil of the Reformation, and owes more to Luther than to Hobbes or Filmer.

It was against the Pope, not against the people, that the animus of the absolutist attack was directed. The theocratic notions of the Middle Ages, with their vivid belief in the Divine government of the

world, made the position of God's viceroy not only necessary, but holy. But if, as was admitted, all lawful power was mediately or immediately held from the Divine overlord, who was the tenant-in-chief? *Jus divinum* was the attribute of all authority rightly based and legitimate. But, alike in spiritual and secular matters, the Pope gradually asserted the claim to be the sole source of all other earthly jurisdiction. In regard to the tenure of secular authority the struggle went on from the days of the Investiture controversy; in regard to Bishops, the Jesuits only just carried their point at the Council of Trent; and then an assertion of Divine right either way had to be withheld. The most valuable insight into the whole question as concerning either ecclesiastical or general politics is given by Laynez' disputation at the Council of Trent on episcopal rights. This interesting argument exhibits in the most illuminating form the relation between theories of papal omnipotence in the Church and doctrines of popular sovereignty in the State, both alike deepened in consequence of the Reformation, since the Pope's claims to jurisdiction had to be confronted by the assertion that the King had just as much claim to Divine sanction as the Pope. The Kings, and not the peoples, stood, as a matter of fact, in the first line of defence; and the Pope's claims were never asserted so strongly as they were against Emperors in earlier days, or against Elizabeth and Henry IV in the sixteenth century. Monarchy reaped the benefit of the argument which defended the independence of the civil power. The claim, advanced alike in medieval and in modern times, that Emperors and Kings hold of God alone—or, in the words of our Prayer-Book, that God is "the King of Kings and Lord of Lords"—is nothing but the assertion that civil society has an inherent right to exist, apart from its ecclesiastical utility. This was denied by Popes and Presbyterians. The principle of the Catholic Reaction, that no heretic sovereign was legitimate, together with the other influences noted above, provoked an assertion of the Divine right of all Kings in the form of legitimism. The *Politiques* in France were its great assertors; the claims of Henry IV made it necessary to ask, "Whom should he follow but his natural prince?" But there is no substantial difference. The claim of the Papacy to be different in kind from all other Powers, to be a "kingdom not of this world," because founded on the direct command of Christ, while earthly kingship, even when absolute, arises from the people by a *lex regia*, is met by a corresponding denial of the human origin and consequent responsibility of the civil monarch. Henry IV is the hero of legitimism. He won the Crown solely in virtue of this principle, despite the efforts of Papacy, populace, and Philip. But he did not strive to theorise about it. That was the task of a sovereign whose merits and defects were of a very different order. In his *True Law of Free Monarchy* James I, who had felt the galling ecclesiasticism of the Presbyterian preachers, asserted the whole doctrine of Divine Right. The controversy

which arose with Bellarmin and the other Jesuits on the subject of the oath of allegiance imposed after the Gunpowder Plot led to a voluminous reiteration of the whole argument on both sides. As will be seen, the High Churchmanship of Bellarmin or Cartwright led to the claim that only adherence to the commands of the ecclesiastical authority could infuse that spirit of justice, without which the kingdoms of the world are, in Augustine's phrase, but "*magna latrocinia*." In their view the State, in and by itself, is merely secular. The opposite doctrine, that of the Divine Right of Kings, whatever its defects and its subsequent dangers, was historically the form in which the civil State asserted its inherent right, its claims as a natural and necessary element in human life, and the independence of politics from merely ecclesiastical control. From both sides came elements of value to the modern world, and neither can be ignored. One view asserts the fundamental righteousness of the State apart from clerical interests; the other, the necessity of recognising other sides of human life than the political, and of putting practical limits to the exercise of civil omnipotence. Where either aspect is neglected there is danger of tyranny—in the one case ecclesiastical, in the other secular.

Connected with this doctrine, and at the root of its religious side, is the theory of Passive Obedience. This asserts the duty of the subject to submit to punishment rather than obey the Sovereign's command where it conflicts with conscience. This is not, then, a theory of unlimited obedience (as Hobbes bitterly remarks), but only of unlimited non-resistance. The doctrine goes back at least to Gregory the Great. It bases itself on the precepts of St Paul and St Peter, the practice of the early Christians, and the attitude maintained towards Julian the Apostate by the Church, towards Constantius and Valens by the orthodox. The Pope had claimed it as enuring to his benefit, and was resisted by the Conciliar party. With the Reformation it became, for a while, the watchword of Protestants. Luther never swerved from it except under compulsion; all his instincts were in its favour; he was justified in claiming to be the strongest supporter of civil authority. Even where he admitted resistance, it never took the form of a denial of the rights of the sovereign power to the sole use of force; he merely raised a question as to whether the Emperor or the independent States were actually sovereign; whether, in fact, Germany was not rather a Confederation than an Empire. After the Peasants' Revolt the orthodox Reformers continually asserted the duty of non-resistance. William Tyndale proclaimed it in his *Obedience of a Christian Man* (1528). Even Calvin cannot justly be said to have asserted the right of insurrection. His language is cautious; and he drops a hint about ephors, which was afterwards developed by others. Salmasius was quite justified, when opposing Milton, in claiming the bulk of Protestant

opinion as against the Regicides: a fact which is proved by the extreme paucity of the authorities whom Milton found himself able to adduce on his own side. There were plenty, of course, had he chosen to quote Catholics. But circumstances in Scotland, France, and Holland proved too strong for any theories. With the development, moreover, of the organised Churches of Calvinism there also grew up a new theory of the Church as a visible kingdom, independent of, or even superior to, the State. This theory was alien to the whole mind of Luther; but it formed the strength of the Churches of Holland, and still more of those of Scotland. The emphasis which Protestants in general laid on the idea of the invisible Church combined with other tendencies to exalt the rights of the State. But there is no substantial difference between the political claims of the developed Presbyterian system of Scotland and those of Rome, except that the actual constitution of the former was democratic, and the true depositaries of power were an oligarchy of preachers, instead of a Curia with centuries of diplomatic traditions to guide it.

Henry IV was more than the hero of legitimism. He was the prince of the *Politiques*. The existence of this party, which was well named, was due to the religious dissensions, and more especially to the Massacre of St Bartholomew. The state of affairs was such that quiet men began to ask themselves whether religious discord ought to bring the State to destruction. Michel de l'Hôpital first expressed this view in the States General of 1561. He did not deny the right of the State to persecute, or the proposition that unity of religion is the true foundation of the unity of the State. He only asserted that, since unity of religion was now definitely broken, the cost of restoring it was too great. Toleration was, in fact, a *pis-aller*. This was the view of Pasquier and Bodin, and in regard to Europe in general, of Henry IV and Sully. The idea was to save at least the State from the wreckage. The State is founded on unity; true, and the more solidly the better. But, because all the unity desirable is unattainable, why throw away what remains? There will still be a State left; for even Papalists do not now deny that a heathen Power is an ordered and justifiable State. They no longer assert with Augustinus Triumphus that none but a Christian government can be just, and that consequently war is always permissible against a heathen government without any grievance. The *Politiques* are, in fact, the party of the *πολιτεία*; admitting religious unity to be of the *bene esse* of the State, circumstances had led them to enquire whether it was of the *esse*. If they could not in their distracted country obtain the maximum of their desires as Catholics, why not be content with the possibilities obtainable by them as citizens? The half loaf of toleration was better, in fact, than the famine of anarchy. They were modern, legal, and liberal in spirit. As against those who had attempted, under the guise of "the religion," a recrudescence of feudalism, and as against

those who under the name of the Holy Union were preaching disunion, and under cover of a zeal for religion were erecting on the ruins of the ancient royalty a monarchy by grace of the Paris mob, Pasquier, Bodin, and the rest stood out as partisans of the State. They were accused, naturally, of Machiavellism; and there was so much of justice in the charge, that their desire for toleration was based solely on expediency, though this included motives of humanity; they did not regard religion as beyond the province of State action. The common view of the *Politiques* was that persecution of some sort was very desirable in the earlier stages of a new belief; but, when such a belief had gained as much ground as had "the religion," they were not prepared to run the risk to humanity of exterminating or to the nation of banishing it. Possibly this fact may lie at the root of the insecurity of toleration in France. Toleration might be granted in order to make the monarchy safe, or even possible; but when that end was secured there was little in the ideals of French statesmen to prevent its removal. Still, the Edict of Nantes is the definite recognition of the modern principle that the State is independent of the forms of religions, even in the appointment of its officials. In principle the Edict went further than the English Toleration Act of a hundred years later, which left it still incumbent upon all holding public office to take the Sacrament according to the Church of England rite; yet it was not so definitely the recognition of individuality. The grand security of the Nonconformists in England after 1689 was the fact that they were not merely a local body, but were diffused throughout the nation. To the Huguenots the dangerous guarantee of local strongholds was indispensable. This made it possible again to raise the cry of an *imperium in imperio*, and to connect them with aristocratic disaffection. An unstable foundation of royal tolerance resting on expediency, and a reliance on local material guarantees, proved ruinous alike to the Huguenots and the monarchy.

This brings us inevitably to the mitigated toleration established in the Empire by the Religious Peace of Augsburg, and defined by the phrase "*Cujus regio ejus religio*." The principle that no heretic could rule a Christian State was abandoned. Such an idea was at least a step in the right direction, as compared with the notions of the Middle Ages or the Counter-Reformation. Besides, there is another aspect to the "*Cujus regio ejus religio*" principle. It did not abandon the occasional practice, but it abandoned the medieval theory, of persecution. The right to migrate could mean no less than that, while unity of religion was necessary to the State, there was no ground for burning the heretic for the good of his soul. Persecution to the extent of banishment is in fact treated as necessary for political reasons; for as yet the ideas of Church and State as separate societies were not clearly realised, and it was not regarded as safe to have more than one religion in a State. But the principles of persecution, incarnate in Philip II and the Inquisition, are

abandoned. There is no claim to discern thoughts, none to exterminate heresy. The theory that one religion was needful to a State, but that it might vary in different States, was a step towards the modern view, that the State is indifferent to confessional distinctions. It became clearer that social order rested on deeper and less visible foundations than uniformity of ecclesiastical organisation; just as the success of Venice and the Dutch showed that the stability of a State was not bound up in a monarchical form of government.

The same principle was substantially that of Elizabeth. Whether or not we accept the assurances of Cecil to the Catholics, that they were persecuted for purely political reasons, it remains true that the English government refused to accept the responsibility of religious persecution for its own sake. To Cecil persecution was a necessary evil, to be justified on political grounds; but it was not an ideal. After the papal Bull of 1571, deposing the Queen, there was ample room for asserting that a good Catholic could not be a good subject; and the Jesuits made matters worse by their attitude towards the oath of allegiance under James I. Anyhow, Cecil had to make his appeal to public opinion; and the fact shows that public opinion was not what it had been on the subject. The outcry raised by Calvin's treatment of Servetus is another proof of this. This outcry, indeed, only caused men like Beza to restate in strong terms the theory of persecution; and the growth of Puritanism, wherever it became influential, meant the growth of intolerance. The only difference between Knox and Calvin and a Roman persecutor was, that Knox and Calvin asserted for themselves a freedom which they denied to others, and promoted a more anti-human tyranny than the Roman. To the Puritan mind as to Philip II, who declared that he would rather not reign at all than reign over heretics, orthodoxy was of the essence of citizenship. According to this view all foreign politics were to be regulated by confessional antipathies apart from other considerations. The Puritan objection to Anabaptism was due far more to a dislike of any system of communism than to the theocratic notions of Rotmann and John of Leyden. Even against the ill-treatment of Anabaptists voices were raised. In Brenz and a few elect souls the principles of freedom were not extinguished by theological zeal; and the few pages of Brenz on the claim to use the sword against Anabaptists lay down the true principles of all toleration. It is better, he says, to harbour fifty false ideas than to delay the triumph of one true one; and it is wrong to condemn men for constructive reasons. If their principles lead to murder, they will commit murder, and may be punished for that. William the Silent was a genuine believer in toleration, and did his utmost to stem the Calvinistic fanaticism of some among his supporters. Marnix de St Aldegonde, however, late in his life, affirmed in regard to the Family of Love the duty of the civil magistrate to persecute; but even here he would allow force only within narrow limits.

The principle of religious toleration found one other important expression in the sixteenth century. The *Politiques*, as was said, asserted the indifference of the State to creeds, in order to prevent fanatical Catholics from tearing the kingdom of France asunder. We now come to those who maintained the same principle, in order to prevent undue delay in the triumph of the truth. The Puritan party in this country desired, as is well known, to capture the Church of England. Cartwright and his friends made a definite attempt to set on foot a thoroughgoing system of Presbyterianism, to be privately at work alongside of the Church as by law established. Repeated efforts were made to induce Parliament to reorganise the Church in the interests of the famous "discipline." Elizabeth, as we know, always thwarted these efforts, partly because she personally disliked them, partly because she did not choose to act apart from the Bishops.

The attempt, however, was never abandoned, and attained success after a sort with the overthrow of the royalists in the Civil War. But this did not seem likely in the earlier years of Elizabeth. Robert Browne suggested a different plan. Since the civil authority was unlikely to sanction a complete reversal of the existing order, he suggested that each congregation so disposed should make the change by itself. In his pamphlet *Reformation without tarrying for any* he asserted the independence of all authority, civil or spiritual, belonging to local religious communities, and the indifference of the State to religion. His position differed from that of the religious revolutionaries of Scotland, who established their new system, not indeed originally by constituted civil authority, but by the will of the nation, and eventually made the civil authority assent. Knox roused the community as a whole. Browne had no desire to do this. He merely claimed the right for any body of Christians, however small, to set up for themselves, and denied the right of the civil magistrate to interfere. To however limited an extent they may have practised toleration, either in old or new England, the Independents, so far as they were the inheritors of Brownism, founded their system on the principle of the separation of the spheres of religion and government, which logically resulted in toleration. The same may be said of one section of the Anabaptists, who preached a doctrine of political quietism and the independence of Churches.

One more theory which began its development in this age—the theory of the Church as a *societas perfecta*—did not indeed lead to toleration as its necessary consequence, but it made toleration possible. Forced by circumstances to recognise the sovereignty of the State and its unity within itself, the partisans of ecclesiastical power began to seek a new form for their principles, and to develop the notion of Church and State as two distinct, though related, societies. This view was not the same as the medieval, which very commonly identified the Church with the hierarchy, and in any case contemplated a single polity with

diversities of function, known as temporal and spiritual. Luther and Hooker, as we saw, retain in principle this view of a single society, but assign coercive authority entirely to the civil functionary. But those who desired a strong organisation for the Church, whether Ultramontane or Presbyterian, were driven more and more to formulate the conception of the Church as a society perfect in the same kind and apart from the assistance of the State, and enjoying its own means of jurisdiction. This is the real significance of the controversy about the "Holy Discipline," and the justification for the attitude of both sides in it. This controversy involved the idea of the State, and the question whether the life of corporate bodies not arising from its fiat was to be admitted. In Simanca, a Spanish Papalist, we meet with arguments expressly based on the Church being a *respublica perfecta*, a position no longer denied for the State. It is indeed remarkable to find him, and Bellarmin also, justifying papal interference on those general grounds of natural, that is international, law, which permit the interference of any foreign sovereign in a State where his own interests are involved. The Church in this view is one State among others; only it includes those who are civil subjects of many States. Bellarmin conceded a really separate existence to the State; while no such concession was made by Bozius, who reasserted the medieval theory of a papal Empire in its most uncompromising form. Bellarmin was more of an innovator than he imagined, and was rightly suspected at Rome as a minimiser. He in fact prepared the way for that surrender of the principles of the *Unam Sanctam*, which, even if still partial, is none the less real. Like all other religious bodies, even the Church of Rome is more departmental and special since the Reformation. General ideals and methods, it is often said, became less theological in the sixteenth century. On the other hand, the activity of all the Churches became more theological; and this holds good of their political side as of all others. The Jesuits are the expression of this fact; and the Roman Church ever since has been engaged in developing their ideals. Not only did they render the prospect of another Nicholas V or Pius II unlikely; they really, though less obviously, hindered the arrival of another Innocent III.

There are in Molina and Suarez statements which either express or imply the same notion. Among the Presbyterians, Melville is found telling James I that there is another kingdom equally real and self-sufficient with the State; and the same view is emphatically held by Cartwright and Travers. It is clear that the Lutheran and earlier Protestant view of the Church, as essentially the invisible collection of the faithful, had been abandoned in favour of the Catholic conception of a visible society with its own means of government complete in itself. It was against this notion that Luther, and afterwards Erastus, strove. But it reappeared in all its strength in the Calvinistic communities after they became developed. This is the cause of the virulence of the Erastian

controversy, both when it arose in Heidelberg and when it reappeared in the Westminster Assembly. We see in fact two ideals in collision—one, that would make the State not merely physically omnipotent, but the source of all other social union, religious or political; the other, which asserts for the Church apart from the State independent existence and authority. The Church, in fact, is the last body to maintain the medieval theory of the relation of corporate societies to the central power.

But one thing is clear. So soon as the State and the Church are recognised as in essence distinct, not merely as different departments of the same class, their relations may be settled by concordat. For this as in other matters the arrangements made at Constance prepared the way. In the concordats with Francis I the Papacy admitted the modern idea of the civil power, and thereby, it is said, escaped in France a danger like that which beset it in England and Germany. The conception of the Church as a *societas perfecta* like the State admits of the view that each has its own orbit, its own principles, and its own methods; and they need not collide with one another. The medieval view tends to deny all significance to the State apart from the Church. Molina, in whom both views jostle one another, says that the State is imperfect without the Church. German and Elizabethan Protestantism hold much the same view about the Church (as a visible society) apart from the State. Luther does not recognise any real society but the State, and the family as its lowest unit. This is the modern view, which sets the State on one side and the mass of individuals on the other, as opposed to the medieval view of a society, consisting of many other societies and powers, with a certain central point in the King and his Court. From the victory of unitary over federalistic ideals in the Church there followed a similar conquest in the State. The only limit to this all-devouring autocracy was furnished by the conception of the Church as a perfect society, or in other words a real body politic. This may of course lead to the claim that one society shall dominate the other on account of the superiority of its end. The Jesuits did so use the idea. But this result is by no means necessary, nor is it even the most natural development. In England, what may be termed the normal sixteenth century view long continued to be commonly maintained, and was held even by Laud. The Jesuits, and indeed most ecclesiastical champions, used the theory merely to reassert in another form the Hildebrandine ideal. They recognised the sphere of the State, as distinct from the Church, in a way which would not have commended itself to medieval writers; but they claimed for the Church a right to interfere, whenever it is necessary for her own ends. The distinction which Bellarmine and nearly all the Jesuits drew between direct and indirect temporal power may not have been worth much in practice, but it was a real distinction. Every

moral teacher, or at any rate every teacher who bids his followers decide political questions on moral grounds, is exercising indirect temporal power. But this need not mean a claim to actual sovereignty. The early Jesuits paved the way for a conception of the Church as one among other societies, which may yet have a fruitful influence in counteracting the all-absorbing activity of the secular State. In Bellarmine more clearly than in anyone else we can see the new view growing out of the old; Barclay charged him with inconsistency because at one time he asserts, and at another denies, that secular and ecclesiastical societies are separate bodies.

We have seen how the Reformation at once expressed and intensified the belief in the inherent sanctity of civil government in the form of the Divine Right of Kings. We come now to the most salient fact which counteracted the evils of this theory—the fortunate accident, that as a result of the movement for reform the sovereign was sometimes the adherent of a different confession to that of his subjects. But for this fact, there could have been in the seventeenth century few relics of any form of popular liberty or of any check on monarchical tyranny. The importance of having a central power which should carry on uniformly and with rapidity the administrative functions of a modern State, was in fact so great, that, with feudalism gone and the Church abased, there would have been scarcely a force left to withstand the monarchical tendency. Nor was there, as a matter of fact, any such force in those places where King and people were united in religion. Spain, the German States, a little later France, all witnessed the complete suppression of popular liberty until the time of the French Revolution. From the later Reformation period onwards until 1700, however, there was for a time nearly everywhere a body, larger or smaller, of subjects professing a religion different to that of their sovereign. We have already seen how this fact destroyed the last relics of Imperial unity, and produced the triumph of the territorial principle in Germany. But the Empire was, and long had been, in so anomalous a position that the effect of Luther's work was not, as he himself found, to destroy the principle of obedience to the civil power, but to strengthen it by denying that any power but that of the Prince was the civil power. In other countries, however, this was not the case. There, the differences between sovereign and subjects led to the expression of a theory of popular rights in the form in which it passed over to the French Revolution. Of course this could not have been but for the generally admitted duty of sovereigns to persecute. As a matter of fact, it naturally produced what Montaigne called the supreme question of his time: whether, on the ground of religion, resistance to the legitimate sovereign was ever justifiable? The great Reformers were, as we saw, very loth to admit any such thought. But even Luther, so far as the

Emperor was concerned, came to admit the right of the Princes to resist. And Scotland, long distinguished for its lawlessness, did not become more loyal, when to the fact of her sovereignty, Mary added the crime of "idolatry." Owing to the increased strength of monarchical ideas it became necessary to justify her deposition. George Buchanan, therefore, in addition to the rich and glowing details which he added to the people's knowledge of his Queen, wrote a dialogue entitled *De Jure Regni apud Scotos*. In this pamphlet he adopted the twofold argument that was to become so familiar in the next century, showing how, alike on grounds of past precedents (of which there was no lack), and of a general right of the governed to punish violators of the Original Compact, the Scots were justified in their action. He went farther than others in asserting for individuals the right of tyrannicide.

It was, however, in France, that the most influential manifesto of popular liberty was to appear. The Massacre of St Bartholomew aroused a not unnatural resentment among the Huguenots. These views were expressed in two famous books which laid down the main lines of discussion for another century—the *Franco-Gallia* of the great jurist, Francis Hotman, and the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos*, probably by Duplessis-Mornay. The *Franco-Gallia* is interesting for its strongly anti-Roman character. The Latin element in France Hotman detests and tries to minimise; he was an early "Germanist," and hated appeals to the civil law. He sought to justify the right of the Estates General and other checking bodies by an appeal to history. His position may be compared to that of the English common lawyers of the Civil War. His conception of public authority is very vivid and interesting. The book strikes the keynote of the numerous historical vindications of liberty. The *Franco-Gallia* is the earliest of modern constitutional histories.

The *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* calls for deeper consideration. It lays down the fundamental argument in favour of liberty which was to influence two continents and to justify a series of revolutions of the utmost importance. In the concentrated force and noble passion of the writer there breathes an eloquence too often absent from works on this subject; in his lucid exposition and firm grasp of principles we have a foretaste of Locke, whose work indeed has most of the defects, without the originality, of the sixteenth century writer, but was fitted by its very faults to become the text-book of ordinary men. The writer professes to deal with the following questions:

(1) Whether subjects are in duty bound to obey their rulers, when their commands are contrary to the law of God?

(2) Whether it be lawful to resist a ruler who is purposing to abrogate the law of God and is desolating the Church? Further—granting this—who may resist him; how may they resist him; and to what extent?

(3) Whether and to what extent it be lawful to resist a Prince either oppressing or ruining the commonwealth? Further, who may do this; by what methods may he do it, and in virtue of what right?

(4) Whether neighbouring Princes may lawfully succour, or are bound to succour, the subjects of other Princes who are persecuted for religion or suffer under flagrant tyranny?

The questions have been stated in full; for they afford valuable insight into the way in which political questions were approached in the sixteenth century, and exhibit the dependence of political thought on religious exigencies. The theory of the author is easy to summarise. The existing order in all States is based upon two contracts. The first is that between God on the one hand and King and people on the other, as contracting parties, by which God covenants to maintain the nation in prosperity so long as it serves Him and refrains from idolatry. (This agreement, which appears in a vast number of writers, is always supposed to be typified by the action of Jehoiada.) The second is that between King and people; they agree to obey on condition of good government, and only on this condition; "*bene imperanti bene obtemperatur.*"

These principles being laid down, resistance either to a tyrant or to a monarch attempting the religious perversion of his subjects becomes perfectly justifiable. It is of the latter that the writer is of course thinking; and religion alone gave the leverage to liberty, which otherwise would have perished in the development of the central power. But this permission of insurrection is severely limited. The Huguenot movement was not democratic. No right of the individual to rebel is recognised. For him is only recommended that recourse to prayers and tears which was to become so familiar to Englishmen in the next century. The right of resistance and deposition inheres in those whom the author, developing a phrase of Calvin, describes as "*ephors*"; that is to the assembly of estates and to those great officers who are not royal servants but public functionaries. This is the view of the great majority of the supporters of the Huguenot party.

The treatment of tyranny may be noticed. The probable author, Duplessis-Mornay, like most of his contemporaries, attached much importance to the distinction between the usurper, the "*tyrannus absque titulo*" (in the Greek sense), and the "*tyrannus in exercitio.*" The latter may be legitimately slain only after having been deposed by public authority. Against the former any violence is justifiable; and it is hinted not obscurely that the Guises (and perhaps Catharine de' Medici) come under this head. The term "tyrant" was of wider extension then than now.

The fundamental notion of the writer is, that the State arises from the voluntary surrender by individuals of such portions of their natural liberty as are necessary for the purposes of peace and security. There is to

him no unlimited authority in government of any kind. Is it reasonable, he asks, to suppose that men who are by nature free and equal could have been so devoid of sense as to surrender their property and lives to a government except on conditions? The surrender is thus neither absolute nor irrevocable. Herein the author differs essentially from Hobbes, with whom at starting he practically agrees.

The implications of this theory are more important than its statements. Its origin or at any rate its prevalence is, together with the maxim of "no taxation without representation," the enduring legacy of feudalism to the modern world. The feudal tie is of the nature of a contract, and the feudal aid in origin a voluntary gift. Some of the arguments for the right of deposition in the *Vindiciae* and elsewhere are deliberately taken from admitted rules concerning the relations of lords and vassals. The idea of the original contract can be found in medieval writers. To us the idea is not so much false as difficult of comprehension. It seems both artificial and impossible. The first objection that occurs is on the score of evidence. This, however, is already met in the *Vindiciae*, which declares that the contract need be no more than tacit. The second and weightier objection is, that for a contract to be binding a state of law must exist, which *ex hypothesi* arises only after the contract has been made. It seems more reasonable to justify insurrection as a moral necessity. But the author of the *Vindiciae* and his followers did not and could not do this. They were unable to separate law and morality, as we can; and they demanded a proof, not that insurrection was a defensible act, but that it was a legal right. This they found in the conception of the Original Contract. It arose in an age which conceived of religion, morality, and revelation as above all things law. Positive law is, as has been seen, only one of many kinds of law, all equally named *jus*, and all deriving a main part of their validity from their conformity to the law natural. This law natural makes contracts binding apart from civil law. Such is the explanation of the sanction believed to exist both for the Original Contract and for International Law. They made their appeal to an age whose traditional conceptions were not those analysed by Bodin or latent in Machiavelli, but rather the wider and more ethical notions of a law mirrored to us for ever by the serene and gracious intelligence of Hooker. To law no slighter tribute can be paid than that "her seat is the bosom of God, her voice the harmony of the world; all things in heaven and earth do her homage, the very least as feeling her care, the greatest as not exempted from her power; both Angels and men and all creatures of what condition soever, though each in different sort and manner, yet all with uniform consent, admiring her as the mother of their peace and joy." Only the arrogance of an unhistorical dogmatism could brand this description as "fustian." But it relates to an order of ideas which in regard to positive law was passing away. In regard, however,

to rulers and their relations to their subjects and to one another, this conception was of great value. It formed the strength of the appeal made to the common man by the theory of the Original Compact and the idea of international law. Both notions are avowedly based on the ground, that, since man is a social animal, promises are binding by natural law. They both alike start from the assumption that all contracts are binding, not by reason of but before, positive law. Instead of making the obligatory force of contracts depend on law in the usual sense, they do just the opposite, and base the possibility of law on a contract binding by the force of that power which makes it "not good for man to be alone." Hence the opposition to the theories of Bodin and others, which release the sovereign from any duty to keep his promises. Hobbes' view that men are by nature unsocial is at variance with the assumptions of Grotius and nearly all other believers—and their name is legion—in the Original Contract; and it clearly makes the supposition of such a contract far less reasonable, for there is nothing to make the agreement binding. Tacitly or expressly, the theory of governmental responsibility was for that age grounded on the universality of the natural law which makes promises binding.

Like most writers on this side, the author of the *Vindiciae* treats government as originally an artificial invention. Only the background of a law of nature made such a notion conceivable. With the growth of the historical habit of mind the belief faded away. The permanent value of the theory of the Divine Right of Kings arises from its insisting, as against theorists upholding ecclesiastical predominance, that the State has an inherent sanctity of its own; and, as against the claim of popular rights, that it was a natural growth. The latter is best seen in Filmer. In the *Vindiciae*, however, the State is the result of a definite act of choice; and in Mariana and others we are treated to a description of life in "the state of nature," when civil society had not yet arisen. This is indeed essential to the belief in the contract theory, unless the word "tacit" be strained beyond what it will bear. Thus, while nothing is easier than to see the defects and even the absurdities of each of the two opposing theories, the Original Contract and the Divine Right of Kings, nothing could be more superficial than to repudiate the debt which the whole modern world owes to both doctrines. In an age dominated by theocratic conceptions and ideas of natural law, the latter was the only way in which the rightness of the State could be maintained; and the former was equally necessary, if the newly developing State were not to crush its subjects, both soul and body, under the Juggernaut car of efficiency. It is only as we realise how large an element in the mental atmosphere of the day was filled by the conception of natural law, soon to develop into that of natural rights, that a book like Mornay's becomes intelligible, and serves as a connecting link between the ideas of the medieval and the modern world.

Lastly, we observe that in the *Vindiciae* government is viewed with suspicion. It exists because it cannot be dispensed with; but, as we saw, it has only such powers as have been definitely surrendered to it. We have not here the spectacle of a power almost holy in its nature and Divine in origin, which claims the allegiance of all that is noblest in man. The grand conception of civil life which inspires the thoughts of Luther, and adds dignity even to Dante, is absent from this passionate protest against the misuse of royal authority. We have the limited power which Locke in later days expounded, and something of that jealousy of the State which afterwards became classic in the pages of Mill. The controversy is akin to that between the supporters of the Union and those of State rights in America. Indeed the actual ideas of Duplessis-Mornay were more completely realised in the American Constitution, as it presented itself to the believers in State rights, than in any other country; only for the individual we must in this interpretation substitute the legal person of the federated State.

But the greatest and most notable assertion of the principle of resistance was not made by Protestants. The brief period of Huguenot resistance soon ended; but the Counter-Reformation had a long life. The death of the Duke of Anjou in 1585 made Henry of Navarre heir presumptive, and rallied the Huguenots to the side of legitimism. The fulminations, empty though they were, of Sixtus V, and his attempts to dictate to the French whom they should not have as King, led naturally enough to an assertion of the independence of France, of the Gallican liberties, and of the Divine Right of Kings. The theory of resistance was now to prove of service to the party which was historically connected with it. The League was reformed. It professed the principle, so familiar to Englishmen, of protecting the King against evil counsellors, and the country against heresy. In the course of the operations of the League, and more especially after the murder of Henry III, it became incumbent on its supporters to take over the Huguenot theory of resistance, and to assert the doctrine of tyrannicide. There is little difference between the principles expounded by Reynolds in his *De Justa Reipublicae Christianae Potestate*, and by Boucher in the *Sermons de la Simulée Conversion*, and in the *De Justa Abdicatione Henrici Tertii*, from those already discussed. The tendency, however, is more democratic than in the Huguenot writers, who like the fathers of Constance were distinctly Whig in sentiment. We hear more of the sovereignty of the people, as became the party of the Paris mob. The case for the democratic, as opposed to the aristocratic element in the League, is well represented by the *Dialogue de Manant et Maheustre*, a bitter satire against the corruption and violence of the high-placed supporters of the League, and emphasises the purely democratic and religious element. There is little to cause surprise here. Papalism has always been incompatible with the Divine Right of Kings

in its strict interpretation; not so Protestantism, as expounded by Luther and Laud. Yet the Protestant party owed its existence to the belief in the rights of laity and the general movement of secularisation; and it cannot, as a rule, distinguish like the Papalist between political and ecclesiastical authority. The Ultramontane is bound to assert the human origin of political powers and the supremacy of the Pope. These principles lead easily, if not inevitably, to the sovereignty of the people, and to some form of the Contract theory. The clearest expression of this view is given in the writings of Laynez already referred to. But nearly all important Jesuits till 1660 give expression to it. The position is briefly this. The government of the Church is from above, and rests on the commission of Peter, who either delegated his authority to the other Apostles, or allowed them to exercise theirs on the principle that "whatever the sovereign permits he commands." In the State, which has different and more restricted objects, the right to govern springs from below. It is divine only in so far as everything natural and even everything permissible is divine. Its principle springs from human needs, and has in itself no ulterior reference. The multitude which comes together for this purpose may make what conditions it pleases, and in all Christian States loyalty to the Baptismal Confession, and therefore to the Pope, is one of these. The curious connexion of the Baptismal covenant with the Original Compact is characteristic of the times and is found in several writers. Molina, however, is of the opinion that the mere coming together of men into a common life produces political power naturally without any agreement, tacit or express, and hence political power is not limited by conditions at the outset. Molina and Suarez are the ablest and most philosophical of the thinkers who expound the doctrine. In all cases the indirect temporal power of the Church, as the society with the higher end, is asserted. The Pope has the right to tell the Papalists when the reserved case has arisen which justifies them in deposing their King, who is in this view always the creature, never the constitutor of the State. We have in fact in the Ultramontane and Jesuit theory the fundamental principles of popular sovereignty and of the secular State. The Jesuits conceive the State as merely secular, existing for certain human ends and limited to utilitarian advantages. Rousseau, it is to be observed, took his theory of the popular origin of all power from one side, and the notion of the all-embracing activity and sanctity of the State from the other. In a remarkable book, which closes our period, Althusius of Herborn wrought a very similar fusion, although he is distinguished by his strong sense of the federal character of government, which is to him always compounded, not of individuals, but of a hierarchy of groups.

It is to be noted that, apart from polemics, the typical form of the writings of the Jesuits on the subject is to be found in works entitled, *De Justitia et Jure*, consisting of dissertations on that portion of the

Summa of St Thomas which deals with law. The writings of the Jesuits are, in fact, a part of their revived scholasticism, and testify to their endeavour to treat the fundamental problems of law as a part of a general philosophy of life. These treatises are remarkable for their comprehensiveness, and endeavour to include all kinds of law, so that there is much irrelevant matter, while subjects like international law find a natural place, no less than canon or civil law. At the same time the method tends to a cosmopolitan conception of legal principles, not unimportant in the days when Roman law was replacing feudal custom all over the Continent; and it intensifies the notion of natural law as the embodiment of universal principles which all particular legal systems should set forth.

The question of tyrannicide inevitably came up for discussion; and there was only one conclusion possible for Ultramontanes in an age when the chief use of Machiavelli was to apply his principles to the advantage of religious organisations. To the Papalists William the Silent was a clear case of the "*tyrannus absque titulo*," as, indeed, he is called, while Henry III of France was the cardinal instance of a tyrant in action. The murder of Henry was, indeed, only a case of retaliation after his own deliberate murder of the Guises; nor can anyone, who has so much as a doubt on the side of regicide, condemn the act of Jacques Clément who rid the world of "the worst prince of the worst race that ever ruled." Mariana glorified the deed, and, though he afterwards very slightly modified his language, he shares some sentiments of Milton and Cromwell. In spite of their strong and repeated assertions to the contrary, it is a purely idle proceeding to deny that the members of the Society of Jesus preached the duty of tyrannicide, and of the interference of the Pope in secular politics. Yet the Society was never corporately committed to the doctrine any more than it was to Probabilism, and may claim the benefit of Acquaviva's repudiation.

The Society of Jesus had other lessons for the politician. It was, indeed, an absolute monarchy, and offers an object-lesson in socialism; for it was always conducted for its own purpose as a community, not for the personal wishes of the ruler for the time being. The duty of "*caeca obedientia*" was proclaimed by visions and inculcated by its whole discipline. The famous phrase about the individual being "*quasi cadaver*" in the hands of the corporation, and the added clause in regard to breaches of morality for the purposes of the Society, are illuminating in their significance. The life of the Society was to furnish the individual conscience with its only motive. Like the modern State, the Jesuit Order contemplates no other bond of union beyond that of the individual and the community. The principle of making the will of the General the general will was secured by all kinds of precautions. By the Society every means was taken to prevent him from deflecting it from its end; there were to be no spectacles like those of the Borgia and

Farnese Popes who attempted to found dynasties. Except the Church, of which it is a part, there is no political institution which so well repays consideration by the historical student as the Society of Jesus, quite apart from its religious and political activity. It enshrined the principle of Machiavelli, that nothing was to count beside efficiency; and, even more effectually than he, it absorbed all individual volition, thought, and conscience into the service of the community.

Much of the whole thought of the day is summed up in the *Politics* of Althusius. To him, as to the medieval thinker, the community is not made up of individuals, but of a hierarchy of smaller communities. As the English House of Commons was originally the "*communitas communitatum*," so the State of Althusius is the State of Estates; in his own words, the "*consociatio consociationum*." He traces the gradual development of civil authority from the family to the city, thence to the province, and, finally, to the State, his conception of which is thus definitely federal. To Althusius, as to Rousseau, there is one supreme authority founded on a contract, the people as a whole. Under all forms of government the inalienable rights of sovereignty remain with the people, of which Kings, or aristocrats, or assemblies, are merely the mandatories. At the same time, unlike Rousseau, Althusius recognises a second contract between the governor, whoever he be, and the people. This second pact is more like the Original Contract, as conceived by the majority of writers, and rendered classical by Locke. The former pact is better termed the Social Contract, which brings out its kinship to Rousseau's conception. Althusius, again, like Rousseau, exhibits none of the jealousy of government displayed by Locke and the Whig school. It is to him both omnipotent and holy; and he naturally denies all separate existence to ecclesiastical authority.

The precepts of natural law are binding in his view; and he quotes more frequently than any other passage the great phrase of St Augustine, "*Remota justitia quid regna nisi magna latrocinia?*" Only, to him the notion of justice is civic righteousness, not the precepts of an ecclesiastical tutor. In the hierarchical view ecclesiastical authority does for the State what a director of conscience does for the individual; the view of individual religion which dispenses with one kind of guardian also gets rid of the other. The principles of natural law, as expounded by Albericus, Grotius, and Suarez, are the expression of the belief that morality is something more than the creature of civic necessity; and the latter is the view of Hobbes and Machiavelli. To Hobbes morality, religion, and truth have no meaning except as the precepts of the legal superior, who has no other consideration but political expediency to guide him; and by him the human race is conceived as, above all things, the child of wrath. The view of Hobbes is the political counterpart of the Calvinistic theology, although such a statement would have been repudiated by both Hobbes and his opponents.

The inevitable reaction against that glorification of the civil State and of the monarch as its embodiment, which was the essence of a great deal of Protestantism, took the form of the resounding though not novel reassertions of the supremacy of natural law, and the contractual, and therefore limited, character of government. When men were familiarised with the idea of a natural law, which could make promises binding, and of the Original Contract resting upon it, some check might be placed on the uncontrolled action of political authority. These ideas, and these alone, could preserve the notion that government was a trust and not a right, and render it fruitful after many days. That these conceptions were not incompatible with the Protestant view of the sanctity of the State is proved by the writings of Hooker and Althusius. The idea of the State, which we may call the hierarchical, whether Jesuit or Presbyterian, expresses the need in a different form. In this view, as already indicated, the State is a mere convenience, and must be judged by its power to satisfy its objects. Its nature, products, and activity are no more mysteries than are those of a joint-stock company, and it ought to be equally obliged to publish its balance-sheets and be equally amenable to criticism. Above all, it must be always limited, and sometimes guided, by the superior rights of that other society which exists for eternal ends. It is in fact non-moral, and must be moralised or controlled by another power from without. Luther's State is, as has been pointed out, the *Kulturstaat*.

We may have our own opinion of the society which the clericalist desired to maintain. But it is not to be denied that the fundamental principle of ecclesiastical protagonists, the recognition of other societies beyond the State, so far from being an unwarrantable encroachment on civil rights, is the best preservative against the practical dangers which may, and sometimes do, follow from an acceptance of the undiluted conception of legal sovereignty. If the true test of liberty be the recognition of the claims of minorities, it must be conceded that Puritan Dissenters and Quakers in England, the Episcopal Church in Scotland, and the Roman Catholics in Ireland have all alike performed the service of showing that there are bonds of association which do not spring from the fiat of positive law, and may not, save in minor matters, be controlled by considerations of political expediency, justified by an abstract theory of sovereignty. For the true conception of the State it is needed first to realise the idea of sovereignty, and afterwards to realise its practical limitations. Religious liberty arose, not because the sects believed in it, but out of their passionate determination not to be extinguished, either by political or religious persecution. Political liberty was born, not so much in the notions of the Independents, as in the fact that they refused to be merged in other societies. Where this was not so, it did not arise. In the States of Germany, and in the Cantons of Switzerland, there was no liberty for the minority.

It is finally to be observed that religious liberty is rightly described as the parent of political. The forces in favour of monarchy were so strong that, apart from a motive appealing to conscience, making it a duty (even though a mistaken one in any individual case) to resist the government, there would have been no sufficient force to withstand the tyranny of centralisation which succeeded the anarchy of feudalism. This may be illustrated from the return of the Catholic portion of the Low Countries to Spanish allegiance, and perhaps best of all in the small States of Italy and the large ones of France and Spain. France gave to the world of thought the ideas of the *Vindiciae*, to that of fact the ideals of the *Roi Soleil* and the *Dragonnades*. Spain, which in the *Justicia* of Aragon had a model of freedom for admirers in all lands, closed her career with a lifeless despotism, based on the extinction by the Inquisition of all the forces that made for freedom. The nominal right of the Cortes succumbed to the real power of the Holy Office. It was only the religious earnestness, the confessional conflicts, and the persecuting spirit of the sixteenth century, that kept alive political liberty, and saved it from a collapse more universal than that which befell Republican ideals at the beginning of the Roman Empire. To the spiritual intensity of the Reformers and the doctrinal exclusiveness of the Confessions—at once the highest and the lowest expressions of “the theological age”—we owe the combination of liberty with order which is our most cherished possession to-day. If much is due to the virtues of these men, something also is owing to their vices.

DATES OF ADOPTION IN THE PRINCIPAL EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES OF THE NEW STYLE ENJOINED BY
POPE GREGORY XIII'S BULL, DATED FEBRUARY 24,
1582.

DENMARK AND NORWAY	1582
EMPIRE :			
CATHOLIC STATES	1584 (Emperor from January 17)
PROTESTANT STATES	1699 (November 15)
FRANCE	1582 (December 20)
GREAT BRITAIN	1752 (September 14)
HOLLAND	1582 (December 15)
HUNGARY	1587
NETHERLANDS :			
SPANISH PROVINCES	1582 (December 25)
UNITED PROVINCES	1700 (December 12)
PAPAL STATES	1582 (October 15)
POLAND	1586
PORTUGAL	1582 (October 15)
SPAIN	1582 (October 15)
SWEDEN	1753
SWITZERLAND :			
CATHOLIC CANTONS	1583-4
PROTESTANT CANTONS	1701 (January 12)
TUSCANY	1751

[Adapted from Sir Harris Nicolas' Chronology of History, 2nd edn.]

CHAPTER I.

THE FRENCH RELIGIOUS WARS.

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[See also *Bibliographies to Chapter IX of Vol. II, and to Chapters II and XX of the present Volume.*]

CHAPTER II.

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CHAPTER III.

THE CATHOLIC REACTION IN POLAND, AND THE
VALOIS AND BÁTHORY ELECTIONS.

[(*Pol.*) signifies that the work is in the Polish language.]

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CHAPTER IV.

THE HEIGHT OF THE OTTOMAN POWER.

I. MANUSCRIPTS.

For an exhaustive review of the period treated in this Chapter it is necessary to study in the first place the despatches from Constantinople of the Venetian Ambassadors and Bailos, preserved in the Frari archives at Venice. The series begins with the year 1527, and, with interruptions due to war, extends to the end of the Republic. The greater part of the despatches are in cipher; in the early part of the series the deciphering added by the old Chancery of the Republic is only in rare instances annexed to the text of the despatch. Besides these, the letters from the Austrian Ambassadors at Constantinople should be consulted, together with their instructions preserved in the Imperial archives at Vienna; and, for a knowledge of the diplomatic transactions, the manuscripts in the libraries and archives at Rome and Paris, and in the Spanish archives at Simancas. Concerning the league against Selim II, and the great difficulties attending its preparation, the recently published work of P. Herre, founded on researches in various archives of the Continent (see below under Later Works), is of special importance. The correspondence of the Emperor Charles V with his counsellors, preserved in the archives of Lille, is a source of primary importance hitherto little explored.

II. COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS.

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CHAPTERS V AND XXI.

THE EMPIRE UNDER FERDINAND I, MAXIMILIAN II
AND RUDOLF II (1558-1612).

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It seems unnecessary to add any general account of the MS. materials for the history of the Empire in this period to that furnished in the Bibliography to Chaps. V-VIII of Vol. II with regard to the period immediately preceding. The ensuing list of printed authorities will show how considerable a proportion of the contents of the Archives enumerated by Mr Pollard have been made generally accessible in print through the labours of royal and princely historical Commissions, of Academies and of the Universities, as well as of the Associations for historical and archaeological research to be found in every part of the country. For the period treated in the present chapters the archives of Vienna, Munich (which have been most systematically worked), Dresden, and Heidelberg, are necessarily of primary importance; but those of Marburg, Berlin, Hanover, Düsseldorf and other present or former capitals may likewise be expected to yield an additional harvest. It should be remembered that, whereas the Vienna Archives furnish abundant documentary evidence concerning the reigns of Ferdinand I and Maximilian II, the residence of Rudolf II was throughout at Prague, and that his Archives there were, with the exception of the Acts of the Diets, almost totally destroyed, probably at the time of the capture of the Kleinseite by the Swedes in 1648. During the whole of this period the Imperial towns, owing largely to their fear of the territorial governments and to their general timidity, played a subordinate part; but though this diminishes the interest of their Archives even in the case of the Hanseatic towns except in reference to particular conflicts, this does not apply to several of the Rhenish and Westphalian towns, whether or not ecclesiastical centres. The reader is again referred to the general guidance of C. A. H. Burkhardt's *Hand- und Adressbuch der deutschen Archive*, in two parts, Leipzig, 1887. A guidance of special advantage to research in connexion with the period treated in these chapters is supplied by C. Edler von Böhm, *Die Handschriften d. k. u. k. Haus- Hof- und Staats-Archive*, Vienna, 1873.

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Among collections of historical studies particular reference is made to the invaluable series now being published at the Hague under the title: Robert Fruin's *Verspreide Geschriften.* 52 parts have appeared under the joint editorship of P. J. Blok, P. L. Muller and S. Muller Fz.

CHAPTER VIII.

MARY STEWART.

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CHAPTER IX.

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[Mr Corbett thinks that this, a second edition of the foregoing, was written by desire of Drake, in order to set forth more clearly his own services, which he considered Howard had slighted. It may be so; but the "altri huomini honorati" seem to have crammed the writer with many imaginary anecdotes, which mar its authority as a record of the facts.]

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CHAPTER XI.

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CHAPTER XII.

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CHAPTER XIII.

ROME UNDER SIXTUS V.

I. MANUSCRIPTS.

[The following list includes the chief Manuscripts concerning Sixtus V and his pontificate which are to be found at Rome, arranged under the headings of the collections to which they severally belong. It is not thought necessary to indicate here the documents connected with the subject of this Chapter that are to be found in the archives at Rome, Simancas, Venice, and other places. As to these see Hübner's *Sixto-Quint*, though the selection there given admits of considerable enlargement.]

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 (8382) *Memorie in forma di Annali del Pontificato di Sisto Quinto, d' incerto autore*.
 (9721) *Life of Pope Sixtus V.*
 (9969) *Life of Sixtus V.*
 (5563) *Fragment of the Life of Sixtus V.*
 (8891) *Some Memoirs of Sixtus V.*
 (5531) Bonaventura, N. V. *Elogium Sixti V.*
 (8656) *Memoirs of the Life of Sixtus V before his Cardinalate.*
 (5917; 8407; 8656) *The Conclave of Sixtus V.*
 (7439) *Narrative of several executions that took place in Rome under Sixtus V; and other Memoirs relating to that Pope.*
 (5440) *Liber bonorum hospitalis...et ecclesiæ S. Hieronymi Illiricorum a Sixto V extractæ.*
 (5525) *Relatio (Sixto Pap. Quinto) status Collegii Anglicani.*
 (5531) Roscius, Julius, *ad Sixtum V Pont. Max. de restaurando Hortano ponte antiquissimo.*
 (8778) *Narrative of the raising of the Obelisk at St Peter's, Rome.*
 (9003) *Erection of the Ospedale de' poveri mendicanti by Sixtus V.*

Ottoboni Collection.

- (734) *Narrative of the Pontificate of Sixtus V.*
 (2584) *Annals of the Pontificate of Sixtus V.* [By an uncertain author, supposed to be Father Maffei, S. J.]
 (3141) *The Conclave of Sixtus V.*
 (563) Foglietta, Catero. *Report as to the Churches of Rome and the constructions of Sixtus V.*

Capponi Collection.

- (160) The Conclave of Sixtus V.
 (57) Memoirs relating to the finances and buildings of Sixtus V.

B. BIBLIOTECA VALLICELLIANA.

- (K. 46) *Istoria della vita e sommo pontificato di Sisto V, scritta da antore grave e quasi contemporaneo, con varii monumenti spettanti allo stesso pontefice.*
 (I. 60) *Acta Consistorialia Summorum Pontificum.* (The acts relating to the Pontificate of Sixtus V are at pp. 37 sqq.)
 (I. 64-5) *Pauli Alaleonis Diarium caremoniarum ab a. 1582 ad a. 1590.* (Complete. Other complete copies are in the British Museum, Add. MSS. 8456-60, and in the Biblioteca Chigiana at Rome; incomplete copies are in the Vatican archives, in the Vatican, Corsini and Barberini Libraries, and in the Caetani archives.)
 (O. 26) *Juvenalis Ancina, Episcopi Salntiarum, Opuscula.* (Contains writings on the Jubilee of 1888, and the relations between Sixtus V and Charles Emmanuel of Savoy.)
 (N. 34) Writings regarding various negotiations with Poland from 1521 to 1596. (Contains a narrative of the legation of Cardinal Aldobrandini.)
 (G. 50) Writings regarding the city of Rome.
 (L. 22) *Historical Memoirs of the various Foreign Missions.* [Of interest because of the evidence which is here furnished as to the antagonism between the Franciscan and the Jesuit Missionaries, and as to the grave charges brought against the latter.]

II. CONTEMPORARY DOCUMENTS AND WRITINGS.

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 Albèri, E. *Le relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti al Senato.* Vol. x. Florence. 1857.
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- Replie, a second, against the defensory and apology of Sixtus the fift...defending the execrable fact of the Jacobine friar, upon the person of Henry the third, late king of France, to be meritorius. Wherein the said apology is...translated ...answered and fully satisfied. London. 1591.
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- Leti, Gregorio. *Vita di Sisto V.* 3 vols. Amsterdam. 1693.
- Litta. *Famiglie celebri italiane.* (Famiglia Peretti.) Milan. 1819, etc.
- Lorentz, J. *Sixtus V und seine Zeit.* Mainz. 1852.
- Massimo, C. *Notizie storiche della villa Massimo.* Rome. 1836.
- Narducci, E. *Intorno ad alcune prediche stampate di Sisto V.* Rome. 1870.
- Philippson, M. *La Contre-révolution religieuse au xvi^e siècle.* Brussels. 1834.
- Platina, B. *Delle Vite de' Pontefici...ampliato...da Onofrio Panvinio, Antonio Cicarelli, etc.* Venice. 1643. (The life of Sixtus V is by Cicarelli.)
- Proemio delle efemeridi del pontificato di Sisto V volgarizzato da P. Giordani in Archivio Storico Italiano, t. vii. 1842.
- Ranke, L. von. *Die Römischen Päpste.* Vols. xxxvii and xxxviii of *Sämmtliche Werke.* Leipzig. 1874, etc.
- Raulich, Italo. *La contesa fra Sisto V e Venezia per Enrico IV di Francia, in Nuovo Archivio Veneto, Vol. iv.*
- *Storia di Carlo Emanuele I duca di Savoia.* Milan. 1896-1902.
- Segretain, E. A. *Sixte-Quint et Henri IV.* Introduction du protestantisme en France. Paris. 1861.
- Stevenson, E. *Topografia e monumenti di Roma nelle pitture a fresco di Sisto V della Biblioteca Vaticana.* Rome. 1887.
- Tempesti, C. *Storia della vita e delle geste di Sisto Quinto.* Rome. 1845.
- Teza, E. *Sisto Quinto e Filippo II secondo una canzone veneziana di un contemporaneo in Archivio della R. Società romana di storia patria, Vol. vii.*

CHAPTER XIV.

THE END OF THE ITALIAN RENAISSANCE.

I. ORIGINAL WORKS.

[The names here given are not intended to form an exhaustive list. They are those of writers who may be regarded as in some sense typical; and the editions named are as a rule either the earliest, or the most accessible. Where only one edition is given, it is, except in the case of collective works, the earliest extant edition.]

- Alamanni, Luigi. *Opere Toscane*. Lyons. 1532.
 — *La Coltivazione*. Paris. 1543. Florence. 1549.
 — *Giron Cortese*. Paris. 1545.
 — *Works*. Florence. 1859.
 Ammirato, Scipione. *Storia Fiorentina*. Florence. 1600.
 — *Discourses on Tacitus*. Florence. 1594.
 Anguillara, Giovan Andrea della. *Translation of Ovid's Metamorphoses*. 3 Books. Paris. 1554. Venice. 1561.
 Aretino, Pietro. *Letters*. Venice. 1537-67.
 — *Comedies, and many other works*. (Various dates.)
 Ariosto, Ludovico. *Orlando Furioso*. Ferrara. 1516, and repeatedly since. London. 1834. English, by J. Harington. London. 1591.
 — *Satires*. S. l. 1534. Venice. 1554. English, by G. Markham. London. 1608.
 — *Comedies*. (Various years.)
 — *Works*. 4 vols. Venice. 1741.
 Baldi, Bernardino. *Nautica, Eclogues, Description of the Palace of Urbino, etc.* Collected edition. Venice. 1590.
 — *Selections*. Florence. 1859.
 Bandello, Matteo. *Novelle*. Lucca. 1554. London. 1740 and 1791.
 Bembo, Pietro. *Gli Asolani*. Venice. 1505.
 — *Prose della Volgar Lingua*. Venice. 1525.
 — *Letters*. Venice. 1552, 1575.
 — *Rime*. 3rd edn. Venice. 1543.
 Berni, Francesco. *Capitoli and sonnets*. Frequently printed at Venice from 1537 to 1545.
 — *Rime, etc.* Florence. 1885.
 — *Rifacimento of Boiardo's Orlando Innamorato*. Milan. 1542. Venice. 1545.
 Botero, Giovanni. *Della causa della grandezza e magnificenza delle città*. Rome. 1588.
 — *Ragione di Stato*. Venice. 1539.

- Bruno, Giordano. *Cena delle Ceneri*. London. 1583.
 — *Spaccio della Bestia Trionfante*. Paris. 1584, etc.
 — *Collected Italian Works*. Leipzig. 1829.
 Buonarroti, Michelangelo. *Rime*. Florence. 1863. Berlin. 1896.
 — *Sonnets*. English, by J. A. Symonds. London. 1878.
 Cariteo, Benedetto. *Opere Volgari*. Naples. 1509.
 Caro, Annibale. *Rime*. Venice. 1569.
 — *Translation of the Aeneid*. Venice. 1572-5. Padua. 1763.
 Casa, Giovanni della. *Rime e Prose*. Venice. 1558.
 — *Opere*. Milan. 1806.
 Castelvetro, Ludovico. *Poetica d' Aristotele*. Vienna. 1570.
 — *Commentary on Dante's Inferno*, i-xxix. Verona. 1886.
 Castiglione, Baldassare. *Il Cortegiano*. Venice. 1528, and repeatedly since.
 Ed. Rigutini. Florence. 1889. English translations by Sir Thomas Hoby, London, 1561, and several later writers. Latin translation by Bartholomew Clerke. London. 1571.
 Cellini, Benvenuto. *Treatises on Goldsmiths' work and Sculpture*. Florence. 1568.
 — *Memoirs*. "Cologne" [Naples]. 1728. Ed. Guasti. Florence. 1890.
 Columna, Vittoria. *Rime*. Parma. 1538. Venice. 1544, and in many anthologies. Florence. 1840.
 Costanzo, Angelo di. *Rime*. In *Anthologies*. Bologna. 1709. Palermo. 1843.
 Davanzati-Bostichi, Bernardo. *Translation of Tacitus' Annals*. Florence. 1596 and 1600.
 — *Works*. Florence. 1852. Ed. Bindi.
 Dolce, Ludovico. *Sacripante Paladino*. Venice. 1556.
 — *Palmerino di Oliva*. Venice. 1561.
 — *L' Achille e L' Enea*. Venice. 1572.
 — *Tragedies*. (Various dates.)
 — *Osservazioni sulla Lingua Volgare*. Venice. 1550. 8th edn. 1562, etc.
 Firenzeuola, Agnolo. *Ragionamenti*. Florence. 1548, 1552. Naples. 1723.
 — *Asino d' Oro*. Florence. 1598.
 — *Works*. "Florence" [Venice]. 1743. Pisa. 1816.
 Folengo, Girolamo (Teofilo). *Macaronea*. Venice. 1517, 1521, etc.
 — *Orlandino*. Venice. 1526.
 — *Chaos del Triperuno*. Venice. 1527.
 — *Umanità del Figliuolo di Dio (Vita di Cristo)*. Venice. 1533.
 Gelli, Giovan Battista. *Capricci del Bottai*. Florence. 1546, 1548.
 — *Circe*. Florence. 1530, 1550.
 — *Lecture su lo Inferno di Dante*. Florence. 1544-61 and 1887, etc.
 Giannotti, Donato. *Della Repubblica e Magistrati di Venezia*. Rome. 1540.
 — *Della Repubblica Fiorentina*. Venice. 1721.
 — *Works*. Florence. 1850.
 Giralaldi, Giovan Battista (Cintio). *Tragedies*, various dates. Orbecche: Ferrara. 1541.
 — *Discorso intorno al comporre de' Romanzi*, etc. Venice. 1554. Milan. 1864.
 — *Hecatommithi*. Mondovi. 1565. Venice. 1566.
 Grazzini, Anton Francesco. *Comedies*. (Various dates.) *La Gelosia*. Florence. 1550.
 — *Le Cene*. "London" [Paris]. 1756.
 — *Works, Novels and Comedies*. Florence. 1857.
 — *Rime*. Florence. 1852.
 Guarini, Battista. *Pastor Fido*. Venice. 1590 (and repeatedly since). English translation by C. Dymock. London. 1602. By R. Fanshawe. London. 1648.
 — *Letters*. Venice. 1593.

- Guicciardini, Francesco. *Storia d' Italia*. 16 Books. Florence. 1561. The remaining 4. Venice. 1564. [Both with omissions.] (Complete.) "Frihurgo" [? Florence]. 1775. English translation by G. Fenton. London. 1579.
- *Opere Inedite*. Florence. 1857-67.
- Machiavelli, Niccolo. *Arte della Guerra*. Florence. 1521. English translation by P. Whitehorne. London. 1560.
- *Istorie Fiorentine*. Rome. 1531. Venice. 1540. English translation by T. Bedingfield. London. 1595.
- *Discorsi sopra la prima Deia di Tit. Livio*. Rome. 1531. English translation by E. Dacres. London. 1636. By N. H. Thomson. London. 1883.
- *Il Principe*. Rome. 1531. Florence. 1532. English translation by E. Dacres. London. 1640. By N. H. Thomson. London. 1882. Ed. L. A. Burd. Oxford. 1891.
- *Works*. S. l. 1550. "Italia" [Florence]. 1813. English translation. London. 1680.
- Magno, Celio. *Rime*. Venice. 1600.
- Mauro, Giovanni. *Capitoli*. Venice. 1537.
- Molza, Francesco Maria. *Works*. Bergamo. 1747.
- Monnier, Marc. *La Renaissance*. Paris. 1884.
- Paruta, Paolo. *Perfezione della Vita Politica*. Venice. 1578.
- *Discorsi Politici*. Venice. 1599.
- *Storia della Guerra di Cipro*. Venice. 1605.
- *Works*. Florence. 1852.
- Sannazaro, Jacopo. *Arcadia*. Venice. 1502. Naples. 1504. Turin. 1888.
- *Sonetti e Canzoni*. Venice. 1534.
- *Opere Volgari*. Padua. 1723.
- Sassetti, Filippo. *Letters*. Milan. 1874. Florence. 1855. Milan. 1886.
- Speroni, Sperone. *Dialogues*. Venice. 1542.
- *Works*. Venice. 1740.
- Straparola, Giovan Francesco. *Le Tredici Piacevolissime Notti*. Venice. 1550-4, and frequently during the century.
- Tansillo, Luigi. *Opere*. Venice. 1738.
- *Poesie liriche*. Naples. 1882.
- Tasso, Bernardo. *Amadigi*. Venice. 1560.
- *Letters*. Padua. 1733.
- Tasso, Torquato. *Rinaldo*. Venice. 1562.
- *Aminta*. Cremona. 1580. Venice. 1581. English translation. [By H. Reynolds(?).] London. 1623.
- *Gerusalemme Liberata*. Ferrara. 1581 (and repeatedly since). Florence. 1890. English translation by E. Fairfax. London. 1600 (and eight edd. since).
- *Il Padre di Famiglia*. Venice. 1583. English translation by T. W. London. 1588.
- *Letters*. Florence. 1852-5.
- *Dialogues*. Florence. 1858.
- *Prose Works*. Florence. 1875.
- Tebaldeo, Antonio. *Sonetti*. Rome[?]. 1499.
- Trissino, Giovan Giorgio. *Sofonisba*. Rome. 1524.
- *Translation of Dante De Vulgari Eloquentia with Castellano*. Vicenza. 1529.
- *Italia Liberata de' Goti*. Rome. 1547-8.
- Varchi, Benedetto. *Storia Fiorentina*. "Cologne" [Florence]. 1721. Florence. 1857.
- *L' Ercolano*. Florence. 1570. Milan. 1879-84.
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- Crescimbeni, Giovan Maria. *Istoria della Volgar Poesia.* Rome. 1698.
- D' Ancona, A. and Bacci, O. *Manuale della Letteratura Italiana.* Vol. II. 4th edn. Vol. III. 2nd edn. Florence. 1897.
- D' Ancona, A. *Del Secentismo nella Poesia Cortigiana del Secolo XV.* In *Studj sulla Lett. It.* Ancona. 1884. (Abridged in Morandi, *Antologia.*)
- Dennistoun, J. *Memoirs of the Dukes of Urbino.* London. 1851.
- De Sanctis, F. *Storia della Letteratura Italiana.* Naples. 1870-2. *Nuovi Saggi Critici.* Naples. 1872, 1901.
- D' Ovidio, F. *Secentismo Spagnolismo?* *Nuova Antologia.* Oct. 1882.
- Gardner, E. G. *Dukes and Poets in Ferrara.* London. 1904.
- Gaspary, A. *Geschichte der Italienischen Literatur.* Strassburg. 1888.
- Gingueué, P. L. *Histoire Littéraire de l'Italie.* Paris. 1811-19.
- Hallam, H. *Literature of Modern Europe.* 4th edn. 3 vols. London. 1854.
- Mazzuchelli, Giovan Maria. *Gli Scrittori d' Italia.* Brescia. 1753-63.
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- Roscoe, W. *Life of Leo X.* Liverpool. 1805. 5th edn. 2 vols. London. 1848.
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(See also *Bibliographies to Chaps. V and VI of Vol. I, and Chap. XII of Vol. II.*)

CHAPTERS XV AND XVI.

SPAIN UNDER PHILIP II AND III.

I. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

The unpublished Spanish documents and State Papers relating to Spain in the reigns of Philip II and Philip III are for the most part to be found in the Archives of Simancas, classed under the heads of the various Councils which despatched public business—Estado for Foreign Affairs, Guerra for War, Castilla for Home affairs and Judicial business, Hacienda for Finance, etc. etc. The papers specially referring to Colonial affairs are for the most part in the Archivo de Indias at Seville. The manuscripts relative to the dominion of the Archdukes in Flanders are at the Brussels Archives, and the Correspondence of Alexander Farnese at Brussels and Naples; while the British Museum possesses a large number of transcripts of manuscripts of the period, and also many original Consultas in Spanish, mainly derived from the Altamira Collection, dispersed some years ago.

II. PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS.

- Albèri, E. *Relazioni degli Ambasciatori Veneti*. Florence. 1839-63.
 Cabala. London. 1691. [Contains several despatches of interest, especially with reference to the conclusion of peace between Spain and England, 1603-5.]
 Calendars of State Papers, Foreign. Edd. J. J. Stevensou, A. J. Crosby and A. J. Butler. London. 1863, etc.
 —, Ireland. Vols. vi-viii. Ed. E. G. Atkinson. London. 1860, etc. (In progress.)
 —, Scotland and Mary Queen of Scots. Ed. J. Bain. Scottish Record Publ. Edinburgh. 1898-1900. (In progress.)
 —, Spain; in the archives of Simancas. Vols. i-iv. Ed. M. A. S. Hume. London. 1892-9. (In progress.)
 —, Venice. Vols. viii-x. Ed. H. F. Brown. London. (1900.) (In progress.)
 Carew Papers. Edd. J. S. Brewer and W. Bullen. 6 vols. 1867-73.
 Contarini, P. (Venetian Ambassador to Philip III). *Relacion* (in Spanish). In *Documentos Ineditos*.
 Digges, Dudley. *Compleat Ambassador*. London. 1655. [Contains a large number of papers to and from Walsingham as to Spanish relations with England.]
Documentos Ineditos para la hist. de España. Madrid. 1842, etc. [In the 116 volumes of this series already issued are reproduced a great number of documents of the highest interest to the period covered by these chapters. The General Index of the series is published separately.]
 Gachard, L. P. *Correspondance de Philippe II*. 4 vols. Brussels. 1848-79.
 — *Correspondance de Philippe II avec ses filles*. Paris. 1884.
 — *Correspondance de Marguerite d'Autriche*. Brussels. 1842.

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- La Mothe Fénelon, B. de S. de. Correspondence. 1568-75. 8 vols. London. 1838.
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- Le Laboureur. Castelnau's Correspondence in his edition of Castelnau's Life. 3 vols. Paris. 1731.
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- Piot, G. J. C. *Correspondance de Granvelle*. Brussels. 1882.
- Pouillet, M. E. *Correspondance du Cardinal de Granvelle, 1565-86*. Brussels. 1877, etc.
- Weiss, M. C. *Papiers d'État du Cardinal de Granvelle*. Paris. 1843.
- Winwood State Papers. 3 vols. London. 1725.

III. PRINCIPAL HISTORIES.

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- *Relacion de las Cosas Sucidadas en España desde 1599 hasta 1614*. Documentos Ineditos. Madrid.
- Campana, C. *Vita del Catolico Don Filippo II con le guerre de suoi tempi*. Vicenza. 1605.
- Danvila y Collado, M. *El Poder Civil en España*. Madrid. 1885-7.
- Du Hamel. *Historia Constitucional de España*. Madrid. 1848.
- Fernandez Montaña, J. *Nueva Luz y Verdad Historica sobre Felipe II*. Madrid. 1891.
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- Forneron, H. *Histoire de Philippe II*. 4 vols. Paris. 1881-2.
- Gonzales, Davila G. *Vida y Hechos del Rey Felipe III*. Madrid. 1774.
- Herrera, A. de. *Historia del Mundo del tiempo de... Felipe II*. Valladolid. 1606-12.
- Hume, M. A. S. *Philip II of Spain*. (Foreign Statesmen.) London. 1897.
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- *Spain: its Greatness and Decay*. Cambridge. 1898.
- Lafuente, M. *Historia de España*. Vols. VIII-XI. Barcelona. 1888.
- V. *Historia Ecclesiastica de España*. Madrid. 1874.
- Leti, G. *Vita del Catolico Ré Filippo II*. Cologne. 1679.
- Mariana, J. de. *Historia General de España*. Madrid. 1794-5.
- Masdeu, J. F. *Historia Critica de España*. Valencia. 1783-96.
- Novoa, M. *Historia de Felipe III*. Documentos Ineditos. Madrid. 1842, etc.
- Philippson, M. *Zeitalter von Philipp II und Elizabeth*. Berlin. 1882.
- *Ein Ministerium unter Philipp II*. Berlin. 1895.
- *Heinrich IV u. Philipp III (1593-1610)*. Berlin. 1870-6.
- Porreño, B. *Dichos y Hechos de Don Felipe III*. Madrid. 1628.
- *Vida y Hechos del Señor Rey Felipe II*. Valladolid. 1863. French adaptation with some fresh matter: *Recueil des Actions et parolles mémorables de Philippe Second Roy d'Espagne*. Cologne. 1671.

- Prescott, W. H. *History of the Reign of Philip II.* 3 vols. 1855. [Useful only for the first twenty years of the reign.]
- Ranke, L. von. *Fürsten und Völker von Süd-Europa im sechzehnten und siebzehnten Jahrhundert.* Vols. XLII-XLIV of *Sämmtliche Werke.* Leipzig. 1874, etc.
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- Van der Hammen, L. *Don Phelipe el Prudente.* Madrid. 1632.
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- Birch, T. *Memoirs of the Reign of Elizabeth.* London. 1754.
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- *Defensio Fidei.* Valencia. 1610.
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(See also *Bibliographies to Chapters VI, VII and XIX, and to Chapter IX.*)

CHAPTER XVII.

GREAT BRITAIN UNDER JAMES I (VI).

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CHAPTER XVIII.

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CHAPTER XX.

HENRY IV OF FRANCE.

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(See also *Bibliographies to Chapters I, II.*)

CHAPTER XXII.

POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY.

I. CONTEMPORARY WORKS.

For many of the treatises written on this subject it is best to consult the various collections made in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Much light may also be gained from the contemporary historians and memoir-writers, such as De Thou; for these the reader is referred to the bibliographies of the previous chapters. Only the more important treatises and pamphlets are here mentioned.

A. THE CONCILIAR MOVEMENT AND THE PAPALIST REACTION.

Of the writings of the Conciliar party many will be found in Dupin's edition of Gerson, Antwerp, 1706. Vol. II, Appendix, includes :

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Joannes de Varennis. *De tollendo Schismate*. 1394-5.

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— *De Ecclesiae, Concilii Generalis, Romani Pontificis, et Cardinalium autoritate Tractatus*. 1417.

Jacobus Almainus. *De Dominio naturali, civili et ecclesiastico*.

— *De autoritate Ecclesiae*.

— *Expositio de ecclesiastica et laica potestate*.

Joannes Major. *De statu et potestate Ecclesiae*.

— *De autoritate Concilii*.

— *De potestate Papae*.

Many of the above are included, with other tractates, in von der Hardt's *Concilium Constantiense* (Frankfort and Leipzig, 1697), and reprinted in Richer, *Vindictio Doctrinae Majorum* (Cologne, 1683). E. Brown's *Fasciculus Rerum Expetendarum* (London, 1690) contains Letters of Gregory von Heimburg.

Jean Charlier de Gerson's *De auferibilitate Papae, De Schismate, De Unitate Ecclesiastica, De potestate ecclesiastica, De origine Juris et Legum*, will be found in Vol. II of Dupin. They are also in Goldast and von der Hardt. The documents relating to Jean Petit are in Vol. V of Dupin.

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CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

OF

LEADING EVENTS.

- 1525 Compact of Cracow.
- 1527 Ferdinand crowned King of Hungary.
- 1528 Castiglione's *Il Cortegiano*. Andrea Alciati summoned to Bourges.
- 1529 Failure of Turkish attack on Vienna.
- 1530 Fall of the Florentine Republic.
Confession of Augsburg.
- 1531 Ferdinand elected King of the Romans.
- 1532 Solyman checked at Güns. Andrea Doria seizes Coron.
- 1533 War between Turkey and Persia. First Austro-Turkish Treaty of Peace.
Chaireddin Barbarossa conveys Moors to North Africa. He takes Tunis.
Death of Pope Clement VII and accession of Paul III.
- 1534-5 Geraldine rebellion in Ireland.
- 1535 Charles V takes Tunis.
- 1536 Alliance between Francis I and the Porte. War between Charles V and Francis I.
- 1537 War between Venice and the Turks.
- 1538 League of the Pope, Emperor Ferdinand, and Venice against the Turks.
Solyman annexes part of Moldavia.
- 1540 Peace between Venice and the Turks.
Death of King Zápolya of Hungary. Reopening of the Austro-Turkish War.
- 1541 Ireland declared a kingdom.
- 1542 Jesuits Lefèvre and Le Jay in Bavaria.
- 1543 Reopening of University of Pisa.
- 1545 Spread of Calvinism in Poland.
- 1547 Adrien Tournibus Regius Professor of Greek at Paris.
Peace between Solyman, Ferdinand, France, Venice, and the Pope.
Death of Francis I.
Victory of Charles V over the Protestants at Mühlberg. "Bloody Diet" in Bohemia.
- 1548 Bohemian Brethren in Great Poland. Death of Sigismund I of Poland; accession of Sigismund Augustus.
Alliance between Scotland and France. Mary Stewart sent to France.
Murder of Cardinal Beton.
- 1549 Maximilian acknowledged as successor to Bohemian throne.
Osiander at Königsberg.
- 1550 First Calvinist Synod in Poland.
- 1551 Gotthard Kettler, last Grand Master of Order of Sword, cedes Livonia to Poland and does homage for Semigallia and Courland. Socinus in Poland.

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- 1551 Hungarian War breaks out again.
Habsburg Family Compact.
- 1552 Treaty of Passau.
Foundation of *Collegium Germanicum* in Rome. Canisius summoned to Vienna.
- 1553 Accession of Elector Augustus of Saxony.
Murder of Prince Mustafa.
- 1554 Mary of Lorraine Regent of Scotland.
Philip of Spain marries Mary Tudor, and becomes King of Naples.
Ronsard, chief of the *Pléiade*, proclaimed "the prince of poets."
- 1554-79 Great work of Henri Estienne's press at Geneva.
- 1555 Jesuits under Canisius at Prague.
Bohemian Brethren unite with Calvinists at Synod of Kozminek.
Peace of Amasia between Turkey and Persia.
Religious Peace of Augsburg.
Abdication of Charles V. Philip II invested with sovereignty of Netherlands.
- 1556 Philip receives crowns of Spain. Ferdinand I Emperor.
Netherlands States General oppose Philip II's financial demands.
Jesuit College at Ingolstadt.
Diet of Warsaw attacks Polish Church.
- 1556-7 Diet of Ratisbon. *Reservatum ecclesiasticum* upheld.
- 1556-9 Reformation in Palatinate under Otto Henry.
- 1557 Alva at gates of Rome.
Matthaeus Flacius summoned to Jena by Duke John Frederick.
War of France with Spain and England. Battle of Saint Quentin.
Religious colloquy at Worms. Canisius Provincial of Southern Germany.
Scottish Lords of Congregation draw up the first Covenant.
- 1558 Death of Charles V.
Death of Mary, Queen of England, and accession of Elizabeth.
French defeated at Gravelines.
Marriage of Mary Stewart and the French Dauphin.
Landsberg League. Diet of Piotrkow.
Ramus' treatise on logic published in French.
- 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis.
Savoy and Piedmont restored to Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy.
Acts of Supremacy and Uniformity.
Knox returns to Scotland. Outbreak of religious conflict.
Accession of Francis II in France.
Death of Paul IV. Accession of Pius IV.
Diet of Augsburg. Publication of *Confutationsbuch*.
Death of Henry II, and accession of Francis II.
- 1559-60 Beginning of Catholic reaction in Poland.
- 1560 Conspiracy of Amboise. Death of Francis II and accession of Charles IX.
Regency of Catharine de' Medici.
Disastrous Spanish expedition to Tripoli coast.
Treaty of Luzern between Savoy and certain Swiss Cantons.
Death of Melancthon. Aachen expels Protestant immigrants.
Mary Stewart refuses to ratify Treaty of Edinburgh.
Elizabeth aids Lords of the Congregation against French.
Vaudois take up arms against Savoy.
- 1561 Landing of the Jesuit David Wolfe in Ireland.
Queen Mary returns to Scotland.
Orange and Egmont protest against action of Regent of Netherlands.
Cardinal Granvelle enters Malines as Archbishop.
Protestant Princes meet at Naumburg. Submission of the Vaudois.

- 1562 Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy enters Turin, henceforth his capital.
Peace of Prague between Ferdinand and Solymán.
Outbreak of First Religious War in France. Battle of Dreux.
League of Netherlands nobles against Cardinal Granvelle.
Maximilian Roman King and King of Bohemia.
Expedition under Warwick in aid of Huguenots. Death of Anthony of Navarre.
Torquato Tasso's *Rinaldo*.
- 1563 Close of Council of Trent.
Commendone, Papal Nuncio, advances Counter-Reformation in Poland.
Murder of Guise. Peace of Amboise ends First Religious War.
Maximilian crowned King of Hungary.
- 1564 Death of Ferdinand I. Maximilian II Emperor.
Treaty of Lausanne (compromise between Savoy and Bern).
First idea of Catholic League. Peace of Troyes between England and France.
Papal briefs granting use of the Cnp to laity in Germany.
Heidelberg Catechism. Calvinistic Reformation in Palatinata.
Opposition in Netherlands to Trent Decrees.
Ortenburg troubles in Bavaria.
- 1565 Relief of Malta, besieged by Turks.
Conference of Bayonne. Rise of the *Politiques*.
Proclamation of Inquisition in Netherlands ordered.
Introduction of Jesuits into Poland.
Marriage of Mary, Queen of Scots, and Darnley.
Death of Michelangelo.
- 1566 War between Sultan and Maximilian. Death of Solymán the Magnificent.
Accession of Selim II.
The "Compromise" issued by confederate nobles in Netherlands. The Culemburg banquet and the *Gueux*.
Assembly of Moulins.
Maximilian's first Diet at Augsburg. Jesuits in Würzburg.
- 1567 Death of Landgrave Philip of Hesse.
"Enterprise of Meaux" opens Second Religious War in France. Fight at St Denis. John Casimir leads German reinforcements to Huguenots.
End of Grumbach troubles.
Outbreak of insurrection in the Netherlands. Arrival of Alva and resignation of Margaret of Parma. "Council of Blood."
Murder of Darnley. Carberry Hill. Abdication of Mary Queen of Scots, and coronation of James VI.
- 1568 Peace of Longjumeau ends Second French Religious War. Third War opens.
Execution of Egmont and Hoorn. Battle of Jemmingen. Flight of Orange.
Death of Don Carlos. Peace between Solymán and Maximilian.
Spanish capture of English ships and booty at San Juan. Moorish rebellion.
Flight of Queen Mary into England. Jesuit seminary for English mission founded at Douai.
- 1568-71 Chytraeus' ecclesiastical scheme for Lower Austria.
- 1569 Battles of Jarnac and Moncontour. Duke Wolfgang of Zweibrücken reinforces Huguenots.
Cosimo de' Medici Grand Duke of Tuscany.
Union of Poland and Lithuania at Lublin.
Letters of marque issued to the *Gueux de Mer*.
Catholic rising in North of England.
- 1570 Peace of St Germain-en-Laye ends Third French Religious War.

- 1570 War between Venice and the Porte. Papal Bull deposing Elizabeth.
Moorish revolt put down by Don John of Austria.
Civil war in Scotland. Diet of Speier. Consensus of Sandomir.
- 1571 Triple Alliance against the Turks between Spain, the Pope, and Venice.
Battle of Lepanto.
Death of John Sigismund Zápolya. Stephen Báthory Prince of Transylvania.
Ridolfi plot. Synod of Emden.
- 1572 Massacre of St Bartholomew. Fourth Religious War in France begins.
Death of Sigismund Augustus of Poland.
Orange invades the Netherlands and becomes Stadholder of Holland.
The "Sea-Beggars" seize Brill. "*Wilhelmus van Nassouwen*."
Death of Pius V. Accession of Gregory XIII.
Treaty of Blois between England and France.
Drake attacks Nombre de Dios.
Foundation of Accademia della Crusca.
- 1573 Election of Anjou to throne of Poland.
Edict of Rochelle closes Fourth Religious War in France.
Alva recalled from the Netherlands. Appointment of Requesens. Don John takes Tunis.
Peace between Venice and the Porte. Cession of Cyprus.
Pacification of Perth. Expulsion of Flacian clergy from Ducal Saxony.
Chytraeus' ecclesiastical scheme for Styria.
- 1574 Outbreak of Fifth Religious War in France. Death of Charles IX of France.
Accession of Henry III. His flight from Poland.
Death of Cosimo de' Medici. Death of Selim II. Murad II succeeds.
Augustus, Elector of Saxony, imposes Torgau Formula.
Zeeland lost to Philip. Relief of Leyden. Foundation of its University.
- 1575 Stephen Báthory elected King of Poland. Tartars in East Poland.
Rudolf King of the Romans. Failure of Breda conferences.
- 1575-6 Spanish conquest of Duiveland and Schouwen.
- 1576 "Peace of Monsieur" ends Fifth French Religious War. The Catholic League comes into operation.
Diet of Ratisbon. Death of Maximilian II. Catholicism restored in Fulda.
Death of Requesens. Sack of Antwerp. Pacification of Ghent.
Don John Governor-General of Netherlands. "Spanish Fury" at Antwerp.
Jean Bodin's *Six Livres de la République*. Grindal Archbishop of Canterbury.
- 1577 Sixth Religious War in France. Peace of Bergerac.
Surrender of Danzig. Polish opposition to Báthory collapses.
Union of Brussels. "Perpetual Edict." Don John seizes Namur. Orange enters Brussels.
- 1577-80 Drake's voyage round the world.
- 1578 Archduke Matthias enters Brussels as Governor. Death of Don John.
Alessandro Farnese, Duke of Parma, Governor of the Netherlands.
Death of Sebastian of Portugal at battle of Alcazar-Kebir.
James VI assumes government of Scotland.
League between Savoy and Swiss Catholic Cantons.
- 1579 Treaty of Arras and Union of Utrecht. Desmond's rebellion in Ireland suppressed.
Death of Grand Vezir Mohammad Sokolli.
Spenser's *Shepheards Calender*.
- 1580 Death of King Henry of Portugal. Alva sent to seize his kingdom.
Seventh Religious War in France. Peace of Fleix.
Death of Emmanuel Philibert of Savoy. Accession of Charles Emmanuel.

- 1580 Landing and defeat of Spanish and Italian troops in Kerry.
Arrival in England of the Jesuits Parsons and Campion.
Formula Concordiae issued. First *Essays* of Montaigne.
- 1581 Portugal submits to Philip II of Spain as King. Don Antonio in England.
Act of Abjuration of northern Provinces of the Netherlands. *Apology* of William of Orange.
Act (against Catholics) to retain Queen's subjects in due obedience.
Publication of *Second Book of Discipline* by the Scottish Kirk.
Bibliotheca Vallicelliana founded.
- 1581-3 Catholic plots in England and Scotland.
- 1582 Ivan IV (the Terrible) surrenders Wielicz, Plock and all Livonia to Poland.
Diet of Augsburg. Raid of Ruthven.
- 1583 Death and attainder of Desmond.
Whitgift Archbishop of Canterbury. Throckmorton's plot.
"French Fury" in Antwerp. Orange Hereditary Count of Holland and Zeeland.
Gebhard, Archbishop of Cologne, marries, and attempts Protestantism of his see.
Ernest of Bavaria, elected Archbishop of Cologne, takes forcible possession.
Expedition of Sir Humphrey Gilbert.
Scaliger's *de Emendatione Temporum*.
- 1584 Assassination of the Prince of Orange.
Association in England for protection of Elizabeth. Act against Jesuits and seminary priests.
Death of Ivan the Terrible. Dutch factory at Archangel on the White Sea.
- 1585 Sixtus V Pope. Expulsion of the Jesuits from England.
English expedition to Low Countries under Leicester.
Treaty at Joinville between the Catholic League and Philip II.
Outbreak of "War of the Three Henrys" in France.
John Casimir invested with the Palatinate as guardian of Frederick IV.
Münster, Paderborn and Osnabrück restored to Catholicism.
- 1585-6 Drake's expedition to West Indies.
- 1585-7 Counter-Reformation in Würzburg.
- 1586 Death of Stephen Báthory.
Oldenbarnevelt Land's Advocate of Holland.
Death of Elector Augustus of Saxony.
Leicester Governor-General of the United Provinces.
The Sixteen establish revolutionary government in Paris.
Babington conspiracy in England. Attempted English plantation of Munster.
Star Chamber ordinance against unlicensed printing.
- 1587 Execution of Mary, Queen of Scots.
Death of Francis de' Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany, and accession of Cardinal Ferdinand de' Medici.
Alliance between John Casimir and Navarre. Victory of Navarre at Coutras.
Dohna routed at Auneau.
Drake destroys Spanish shipping in harbour of Cadiz.
- 1588 Destruction of the Spanish Armada.
Maurice of Nassau Captain-General and Admiral of the United Provinces.
Marquisate of Saluzzo seized by Savoy.
The League in control of Paris. Assassination of Guise.
Vatican Library built by Domenico Fontana. Marlowe's *Tamburlaine*.
- 1588-90 Martin Mar-prelate controversy.
- 1589 Henry IV's victory at Arques.

- 1589 Maurice of Nassau Stadholder of Utrecht, Gelderland, and Overysse.
Expedition to Portugal under Drake and Norreys.
Death of Catharine de' Medici.
Assassination of Henry III. Contest between Henry IV and the League.
- 1590 Death of Sixtus V. Battle of Ivry. End of War between Turkey
and Persia.
Charles Emmanuel attacks Provence.
Sidney's *Arcadia*.
- 1590-6 Spenser's *Faerie Queene*.
- 1591 Rejection in France of papal monitorials against Henry IV.
Maurice of Nassau takes Zutphen, Deventer, Hulst and Nymegen.
Philip II suppresses opposition in Aragon.
Foundation of Trinity College, Dublin.
Shakespeare's *Love's Labour's Lost* acted.
- 1592 Death of Parma. Archduke Ernest Viceroy of the Netherlands.
Clement VIII authorises publication of Sixtus V's Bible.
- 1593 Henry IV hears mass at St Denis. War between the Empire and Turkey.
Diet of Ratisbon. Archduke Albert Viceroy of Portugal.
Dutch ships on Gold Coast of Guinea.
Legislation repressing Protestant nonconformity in England.
- 1594 Henry IV enters Paris. Edict of St Germain.
Meeting of Heilbronn. Tyrone's rebellion in Ireland.
La Satyre Ménippée.
- 1594-6 Attempts to discover Northern route to China and the East.
- 1594-7 Hooker's *Ecclesiastical Polity*.
- 1595 Absolution of Henry IV. Open war between France and Spain.
Peasant insurrection in Upper Austria.
Expedition to West Indies under Drake and Hawkins.
Expedition sent by Amsterdam merchants to Java, Goa, and Molucca.
"Lambeth Articles" issued by Whitgift.
- 1596 Cardinal Archduke Albert of Austria Governor-General of Netherlands.
Alliance of England and France with United Provinces.
Three Days' Battle between Mohammad III and Archduke Maximilian.
Death of Drake. English expedition to Cadiz. Spanish expedition for
Ireland shattered off Cape Finisterre.
- 1597 Death of Alfonso II of Ferrara.
Third Armada turned back.
Victorious campaign of Maurice of Nassau.
Diet of Ratisbon. Catholic predominance restored in Austria.
Henry IV recaptures Amiens.
- 1598 Peace of Vervins. Albert and Isabel joint sovereigns of the Netherlands.
Death of Philip II and accession of Philip III.
Edict of Nantes.
Tyrone's rebellion in Ireland. End of Munster plantation.
- 1599 Essex sent to Ireland.
- 1600 Peace conferences at Bergen-op-Zoom and Boulogne.
War between France and Savoy.
Battle of Nieuport. Mountjoy Lord Deputy of Ireland.
English East India Company receives its Charter.
Isaac Casaubon Regius Professor of Greek at Paris.
- 1601 Treaty of Lyons between France, Spain, and Savoy.
Landing of a Spanish force at Kinsale.
Failure of Spanish and Italian expedition against Algiers.
Dutch East India Company receives its Charter.

- 1601 First general Poor Law in England.
- 1602 Spinola against Maurice of Nassau in the Netherlands.
Counter-Reformation in Styria, Carinthia, and Carniola.
Rudolf II reissues edict of banishment against the Protestants of Bohemia,
and destroys school of Jungbunzlau.
Charles Emmanuel attacks Geneva.
Arminius Professor of Theology at Leyden.
- 1602-3 Mountjoy's conquest of Ireland.
- 1602-6 Dutch East India Company establishes trade at Amboina, Tidor, Bantam, etc.
- 1603 Death of Queen Elizabeth. Accession of James I.
Treaty of Saint-Julien. Alliance between the Grisons and Venice.
Diet of Ratisbon.
- 1604 Peace between England, Spain, and the Archdukes.
Conference of Hampton Court.
Sluys taken by Maurice of Nassau. Ostend taken by Spinola.
- 1605 Assembly of Châtelherault.
Gunpowder Plot in England.
Calvinism established in Hesse-Cassel.
Diet of Szerenes proclaims Bocskai King of Hungary.
Malherbe at Paris. Cervantes' *Don Quixote*. Bacon's *Advancement of Learning*.
- 1606 Treaty of Vienna.
Abortive attempt at Union of England and Scotland.
Death of Bocskai. Peace between the Empire and the Turks at Zsitva-Torok.
- 1607 Spanish fleet at Gibraltar annihilated by Dutch Admiral Heemskerck.
English colony sent to Virginia.
Archduke Leopold Bishop of Strassburg and Passau.
- 1607-8 Incident of Donauwörth.
- 1608 Diet of Ratisbon. Union of Evangelical Estates. Pressburg Alliance.
Rising in Ireland.
- 1609 Death of Duke John William of Jülich-Cleves. Brandenburg and Neuburg
take possession of the Duchies.
Catholic Union formed in Germany.
Twelve Years' Truce between Spain and the United Provinces.
Commercial treaty between the United Provinces and Morocco.
Destruction of the Mediterranean corsairs at Tunis.
Edict for deportation of the Moriscos from Valencia.
Death of Ferdinand, Grand Duke of Tuscany.
Death of Arminius and organisation of his followers.
- 1610 Alliance of Brosolo between France and Savoy for a joint attack on Milan.
Murder of Henry IV.
German Catholic Union develops into Catholic League.
Scheme of plantation in Ireland ultimately successful for Ulster.
Arminians draw up *Remonstrantie*.
- 1611 The *Tempest*.
- 1612 Death of Rudolf II.
- 1613 Marriage of Princess Elizabeth of England with Frederick V, Elector Palatine.
- 1614 Treaty of Xanten.
- 1618 Synod of Dort.
Troubles in Bohemia. Outbreak of the Thirty Years' War.
Execution of Sir Walter Raleigh.
- 1619 Frederick V, Elector Palatine, elected King of Bohemia.
Execution of Oldenbarnevelde.
- 1620 Colony of English Separatists founded at Plymouth in New England.
- 1621 War between Spain and the Dutch Republic. Death of Philip III of Spain.

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